Aspekty teoretyczne kolektywnego podejmowania decyzji – przegląd literatury
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.2478/cer-2013-0007Abstrakt
Artykuł ma na celu dokonanie przeglądu literatury ekonomicznej z zakresu kolektywnego podejmowania decyzji. W tym celu zaproponowano ramy pozwalające na ustrukturyzowaną analizę czynników wpływających na pracę organu kolektywnego (rady). Dokonano podziału tych czynników na zewnętrzne (tzn. kształtowane poza samą radą, np. przez wymogi prawne) oraz wewnętrzne (związane ze składem rady oraz interakcjami między jej członkami). Dokonany w ramach zaproponowanej struktury przegląd literatury ogólnoekonomicznej dotyczącej kolektywnego podejmowania decyzji pozwala na zaproponowanie interesujących kierunków dalszych badań, w tym konsekwencji dla kształtu rad polityki pieniężnej.
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