Ethical gradualism – beyond anthropocentrism and biocentrism?
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.31.02Keywords:
ethical gradualism, anthropocentrism, moral rights, animal rights, ethics of discourse, metaethicsAbstract
The realm of ethics is most often restricted to man and the human world: only humans can act morally or immorally, only humans can be morally praised or blamed, only humans can be moral agents and only humans can be moral subjects. To which extent is this ethical anthropocentrism tenable? In the light of contemporary biological knowledge and its recognition of biological continuities and gradual distribution of properties characteristic for living creatures, how can such strict division and the notion of the privileged position of man be still valid? Should not we reduce or overcome human speciesism? In this paper I shall consider arguments in favour of such a paradigmatically unique ethical standing for humans, and I shall look into arguments in favour of an ethical gradualism between humans and other mammals and between man and nature.
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