Cognitive advice, testimonial authority and the value of epistemic wisdom
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.32.13Keywords:
cognitive advice, epistemic authority, epistemic values, epistemic wisdom, metaepistemology, personal wisdom, value of wisdomAbstract
This paper deals with the question of which role wisdom plays in epistemology. Firstly, I briefly sketch the general framework of this inquiry. Linked to this is a specific proposal for the conceptual definition of epistemic wisdom. This proposal is explained in more detail with regard to three different aspects (ontological, epistemic, axiological) of the attribution of epistemic wisdom. In the following, the main thesis behind the proposed definition is discussed more closely. Accordingly, epistemic wisdom is a testimonial activity that has an interpersonal structure. As a consequence of this view, wise (cognitive) advisors are to be regarded as testimonial authorities whose cognitive superiority is to be analyzed within the framework of an “authority-resources model” of the explanation of personal wisdom. Finally, on the basis of this model, it can be shown that wisdom in connection with cognitive advice has a distinctive epistemic value.
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