Faktualizm Davida Armstronga
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.24.07Abstrakt
In my article I present David Armstrong's stance on properties, relations, particulars and states of affairs. I introduce this categories to show, at the most general level, his metaphysical system called factualism. My article consists of four parts, in each one I characterize following categories: 1. Properties 2. Relation 3. Particulars 4. States of affairs. I also discuss Armstrong's arguments considering the nature of those categories and their role in his philosophy. Also, I try to emphasis differences between Armstrong's factualism and other contemporary metaphysical positions (Bundle theory and Trop theory).
Bibliografia
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