Cyrkularność w definiowaniu przez postulaty pojęcia wiedzy logicznej

Autor

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.17.05

Abstrakt

In this paper I critically evaluate the Implicit Definition Theory and its possibility of resolution of two main problems concerning logical knowledge: the explication and the justification. I point at five results that can be obtained: apriority, factuality, normativity applicability and non-circularity. I argue that in case of explication all mentioned results can be obtained but in case of justification the circularity is inevitable. In the last paragraph I propose a solution of this problem.

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Pobrania

Opublikowane

2005-01-01

Jak cytować

Vilanova Arias, J. (2005). Cyrkularność w definiowaniu przez postulaty pojęcia wiedzy logicznej. Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Philosophica. Ethica-Aesthetica-Practica, (17), 73–95. https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6107.17.05

Numer

Nr 17 (2005)

Dział

Articles

Licencja

Creative Commons License

Praca jest udostępniana na licencji Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 Unported License.

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