Tworzenie koalicji między operatorami 4PL
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18778/0208-6018.338.12Słowa kluczowe:
operator 4PL, teoria gier koalicyjnych, wartość Shapleya, innowacje, łańcuch dostawAbstrakt
Operator logistyczny 4PL (Fourth Party Logistics Provider) oferuje nowe i innowacyjne rozwiązania, mające na celu obniżenie kosztów, udostępnienie usług i usprawnienia w zarządzaniu złożonymi łańcuchami dostaw. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie najlepszych warunków do współpracy między wyspecjalizowanymi podmiotami zajmującymi się zarządzaniem łańcuchem dostaw – operatorami 4PL. Rozważania dotyczące czynników wpływających na tworzenie koalicji przez operatorów 4PL, a także konkluzje z zakresu trwałości współpracy stały się podstawą do zaprojektowania dwustopniowej procedury, zbudowanej w oparciu o pojęcia z teorii gier. Celem przedstawionej procedury jest wybór metody alokacji kosztów/zysków przez koalicjantów. Analizy przeprowadzono na podstawie danych pochodzących z literatury.
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