A Note on the Intuitionistic Logic of False Belief

Authors

  • Tomasz Witczak University of Silesia, Faculty of Science and Technology, Institute of Mathematics, Bankowa 14, 40-007 Katowice, Poland https://orcid.org/0000-0002-1178-3691

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18778/0138-0680.2021.20

Keywords:

Intuitionistic modal logic, non-normal modal logic, neighborhood semantics

Abstract

In this paper we analyse logic of false belief in the intuitionistic setting. This logic, studied in its classical version by Steinsvold, Fan, Gilbert and Venturi, describes the following situation: a formula $\varphi$ is not satisfied in a given world, but we still believe in it (or we think that it should be accepted). Another interpretations are also possible: e.g. that we do not accept $\varphi$ but it is imposed on us by a kind of council or advisory board. From the mathematical point of view, the idea is expressed by an adequate form of modal operator $\mathsf{W}$ which is interpreted in relational frames with neighborhoods. We discuss monotonicity of forcing, soundness, completeness and several other issues. Finally, we mention the fact that it is possible to investigate intuitionistic logics of unknown truths.

References

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Published

2021-09-01

How to Cite

Witczak, T. (2021). A Note on the Intuitionistic Logic of False Belief. Bulletin of the Section of Logic, 51(1), 57–71. https://doi.org/10.18778/0138-0680.2021.20

Issue

Section

Research Article