Towards a Logic of Value and Disagreement via Imprecise Measures

Federico L. G. Faroldi

doi:10.18778/0138-0680.2021.07

Authors

Federico L. G. Faroldi Research Foundation, Flanders (FWO)/Ghent University, Department of Philosophy, Blandijnberg 2 #9000, Ghent, Belgium https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0069-2022

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18778/0138-0680.2021.07

Keywords:

value, disagreement, truthmaker semantics, hyperintensionality

Abstract

After putting forward a formal account of value disagreement via imprecise measures, I develop a logic of value attribution and of (dis)agreement based on (exact) truthmaker semantics.

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