Three Doctrines of the Nature of Mathematics (Some Comments of a Knowledge Theorist)
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.18778/0138-0680.46.1.2.02Keywords:
mathematics, formalism, realism, intuitionism, truthAbstract
In this note I am reflecting on interrelations between three concepts of truth: (1) that employed by Hilbert arguing his formalist view on the nature of mathematics, (2) Freges idea of truth supported by mathematical intuition, and (3) known as Aristotelian correspondence idea of truth concerning any propositions not merely mathematical.
References
[1] S. Feferman, Logic, mathematics and conceptual structuralism, [in:] The Metaphysics of Logic (P. Rush, ed.), Cambridge University Press (2014), pp. 72–92.
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[2] G. Frege, Philosophical and Mathematical Correspondence, ed. G. Gabriel, H. Hermes, F. Kambartel, C. Thiel, and A. Veraart. Abr. B. McGuinness and trans. H. Kaal. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, pp. 39–40.
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[3] F. Klein, Vergleichende Betrachtungen ber neuere geometrische Forschungen, Verlag von Andreas Deichert, Erlangen, 1872.
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