Supposition: A Problem for Bilateralism

Nils Kürbis

doi:10.18778/0138-0680.2023.07

Authors

Nils Kürbis University of Bochum, Department of Philosophy I; University College London, Department of Philosophy; University of Lodz, Department of Logic and Methodology of Science

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18778/0138-0680.2023.07

Keywords:

assertion, denial, negation, supposition, assumptions, speech acts

Abstract

In bilateral logic formulas are signed by + and –, indicating the speech acts assertion and denial. I argue that making an assumption is also speech act. Speech acts cannot be embedded within other speech acts. Hence we cannot make sense of the notion of making an assumption in bilateral logic. Attempts to solve this problem are considered and rejected.

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