Can we build theories of understanding on the basis of mirror neurons?

Anita Pacholik-Żuromska

doi:10.18778/1689-4286.28.08

Autor

Anita Pacholik-Żuromska Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18778/1689-4286.28.08

Słowa kluczowe:

mirror neurons, understanding, intentionality, self-reflection, concepts, self-knowledge

Abstrakt

The discovery of mirror neurons and the characterization of their response properties is certainly an important achievement in neurophysiology and cognitive neuroscience. The reference to the role of mirror neurons in ‘reading’ the intentions of other creatures and in the learning process fulfils an explanatory function in understanding many cognitive phenomena beginning from imitating, towards understanding, and finishing with complex social interactions. The focus of this paper is to review selected approaches to the role of mirror neurons in mental activity as understanding, and to conclude with some possible implications for researches on mirror neurons for philosophical theories of understanding.

Bibliografia

Brentano, F., 1874, Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, trans. A.C. Rancurello, D.B. Terrell and L.L. McAlister, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1973.
Zobacz w Google Scholar

Davidson D., 1999, The Emergence of Thought, “Erkenntnis”, 51(1999), 7–17.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1005564223855

Davidson, D., 2001, Rational Animals, (in:) Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective, New York: Clarendon Press.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0198237537.001.0001

Di Pellegrino, G., Fadiga, L., Fogassi, L., 1992, Understanding motor events: A neuropysiological study, “Expermental Brain Research” 91.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00230027

Erlhagen, W., Mukovskiy, A., & Bicho, E., 2006, A dynamic model for action understanding and goal-directed imitation. “Brain research”, 1083(1), pp. 174–88. doi:10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.114
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.brainres.2006.01.114

Evans, G., 1982, (reprint 2002), The Variety of Reference, ed. J. McDowell, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Zobacz w Google Scholar

Gallup G.G., Jr., Chimpanzees: Self-Recognition, “Science” 2 January 1970: Vol. 167 no. 3914, pp. 86–87
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.167.3914.86

Guttenplan, S., 1994, First Person Authority, in: Samuel Guttenplan (ed.) A Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, Oxford: Blackwell.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1111/b.9780631199960.1995.x

Günther, M., 2002, Prinzipien der Interpretation, Paderborn: Mentis.
Zobacz w Google Scholar

Iacoboni, M., 2009, Mirroring People. The Science of Empathy and How We Connect with Others, New York: Picador.
Zobacz w Google Scholar

Knoblich, G., & Jordan, J. S., 2002, The mirror system and joint action. In M. I. Stamenov & V. Gallese (Eds.), Mirror neurons and the evolution of brain and language, pp. 115–124, Amsterdam: John Benjamins.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1075/aicr.42.10kno

Kohler, E., Keysers, M., Umilta A., et al., 2002, Hearing sounds, understanding actions: Action representation in Mirror Neurons, “Science” 297.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1126/science.1070311

Lepore E.,, Ludwig, K., 2005, Donald Davidson. Meaning, Truth, Language and Reality, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0199251347.001.0001

Metzinger, T., 2003, Being No One. The Self-Model Theory of Subjectivity, Cambridge, Massachusetts; London: MIT.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/1551.001.0001

Pacherie E., Dokic, J., 2006 , From mirror neurons to joint actions, “Cognitive Systems Research” 7, pp. 101–112.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cogsys.2005.11.012

Peacocke, Ch. 2008a, Mental Action and Self-Awareness (II): Epistemology, in: Mental Action, ed. L. O’Brien and M. Soteriou, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199225989.003.0010

Peacocke, Ch., 2008b, Truly Understood, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199239443.001.0001

Peacocke, Ch., 1992, A Study of Concepts, Cambridge: MIT Press.
Zobacz w Google Scholar

Peacocke, Ch., 1999, Being Known, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/0198238606.001.0001

Rizzolatti, G., Scandolara, C., Matelli, M., Gentilucci, M., 1981a, Afferent properties of periarcurate neurons in macaque Monkeys. I. Somatosensory responses, “Experimental Brain Research” 2.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-4328(81)90052-8

Rizzolatti, G., Scandolara, C., Matelli, M., Gentilucci, M. 1981b, Afferent properties of periarcurate neurons in macaque Monkeys. II. Visual responses, “Experimental Brain Research” 2.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0166-4328(81)90053-X

Rizzolatti, G., Camarda, R., Fogassi L., Gentilucci, M. Lupino, G., Matelli, M., 1988, Functional organization of inferior area 6 in the macaque monkey. II. Area F5 and the control of distal movements, “Experimental Brain Research” 71.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/BF00248742

Rizzolatti, G., Fadiga, L., GalleseV, Fogassi, L. 1996, Premotor Cortex and the recognition of motor actions, “Cognitive Brain Research” 3.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.1016/0926-6410(95)00038-0

Rojszczak, A. 2001, Mentalizm, psychologizm, intencjonalność, (in:) Psychologizm, antypsychologizm, Ed. A. Olech, Kraków: Aureus.
Zobacz w Google Scholar

Strawson, P., 1996, Individuals, New York: Routledge.
Zobacz w Google Scholar

Wilson, M., 2002, The six views of embodied cognition, “Psychonomic Bulletin & Review”, 9 (4), pp. 625–636.
Zobacz w Google Scholar DOI: https://doi.org/10.3758/BF03196322