Mental concepts: theoretical, observational or dispositional approach?

Marek Pokropski

doi:10.18778/1689-4286.38.05

Autor

Marek Pokropski University of Warsaw

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.18778/1689-4286.38.05

Słowa kluczowe:

other minds, concepts, theory-theory, direct perception, dispositions, phenomenology

Abstrakt

In the article I discuss the conceptual problem of other minds and different approaches to mental concepts. Firstly, I introduce the conceptual problem and argue that solutions proposed by theory-theory and direct perception approach are inadequate. I claim that mental concepts are neither theoretical terms nor observational terms. Then, I consider third option which states that mental concepts are dispositional terms, i.e. they concern particular patterns (stereotypes) of behavior. Finally, I argue that dispositional approach is to some extent coherent with phenomenological account and that phenomenological concept of embodiment can improve this position.

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