Radicalization of Empiricism and the Synthesis of Time

Abstract

The article analyzes Gilles Deleuze’s philosophy of time in the co text of the so-called radicalization of empiricism, which postulates a transition from an epistemological (Kantian) to an ontological understanding of temporality. The main thesis of the paper is that time does not constitute an external stage for phenomena, but is a dynamic creative force based on the mechanisms of difference and repetition. The analysis focuses on the Deleuzian concept of the three passive syntheses of time. The first synthesis (Habit) constitutes the “living present” in the process of imagination and habituation. It is a synthesis based on the “contraction” of instants, serving as a foundation for subsequent active syntheses (reflection and memory). The second synthesis (Memory) refers to the “past in general” (the pure past), which does not pass away but coexists with the present as its virtual condition. In this section, the article also analyzes the relationship between virtual and empirical time, as well as the role of involuntary memory. The third synthesis (Eternal Return) concerns the future as an “empty” and “unhinged” time, which is linked to the fracturing of the subject’s identity (the “fractured I”). This is the dimension of novelty, where the eternal return selects beings, allowing only difference to return. The text also addresses the problem of the relationship between virtuality and actuality, and the concept of “sub-representation” as a sphere that conditions classical representation. The conclusion points to a shift away from the philosophy of substance and identity toward a philosophy of difference and repetition, in which the subject is not given in advance but is incessantly constituted by series of time.