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# ***Why do settled immigrants commit terrorist acts against countries that have accepted them? Preliminary remarks***

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## **Abstract**

Some people behind terrorist attacks committed in the 21st century in Europe include immigrants or descendants of immigrants, which is abominable to the native population. In this paper, I analyse factors that account not only for cultural or political motivation of the terrorists, but also factors conditioned by interaction between immigrants or their descendants with indigenous people of the host country. One of the fundamental questions to be asked is whether immigrants in European countries are really accepted by residents of the host country. If they are indeed not accepted, they might have developed a sense of exclusion, even despite achieving apparent integration at certain levels of the social structure. The sense of being rejected is a major factor causing aggression, and such aggression can be used by terrorist organisations to recruit such people.

## **Keywords:**

[terrorism](#), [integration](#), [discrimination](#), [marginalisation](#).

## Introduction

It is a fact that some terrorist attacks taking place in Europe recently have been committed by immigrants or descendants of immigrants settled in the European countries. This causes consternation and outrage on the part of its native inhabitants. It is particularly difficult to understand when a terrorist act is committed by people born in the country that has accepted one's parents or grandparents and goes against logical expectation that this would result in gratitude towards host countries, not aggression against them.

Before I pass on to further analysis of the problem, a definition of terrorism must be provided. No consensus has been achieved so far, and there are many definitions of the term. Because this paper is devoted to terrorism in Europe, definitions of interest here include the one coined on the territory of the European Union according to which (...) *terrorist offences are certain intentional acts which, given their nature or context, may seriously damage a country or an international organisation when committed with the aim of seriously intimidating a population, or unduly compelling a government or international organisation to perform or abstain from performing any act, or seriously destabilising or destroying the fundamental political, constitutional, economic or social structures of a country or an international organisation* (Europol, 2016, p.11). Another definition to be taken into consideration as a starting point is the one provided by the United Nations in 2004, published in the *Report of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change*, which basically resembles the previous one, differing exclusively by pointing out that terrorist acts are openly intended to harm the civilians. According to this definition, terrorism means (...) *any action [...] that is intended to cause death or serious bodily harm to civilians or non-combatants, when the purpose of such*

*an act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a Government or an international organization to do or to abstain from doing any act* (United Nations, 2004, p.83). This definition, as well as all those I have encountered, indicates that an act of terrorism has a fundamentally political goal. As pointed out by for example Jesús Argumosa Pila when talking about Muslim terrorism, (...) *although the key to the discourse of terrorism is religion, its objectives are constantly and obviously political* (Argumosa Pila, 2015, p.10). Without contradicting the above, one should ask a question to what degree a political objective based on religious or non-religious premises constitutes the fundamental trigger in the case of terrorist attacks committed in Europe, and who is it a trigger to. In order to appropriately analyse the motivation to commit terrorist attacks, one must account for the place, the historical moment, and who the attackers are.

One must not forget that terrorism is not a new phenomenon, it has been present throughout history. As Anthony Giddens writes, (...) *the phenomenon of using violence with the idea of terrifying populations, especially civilian populations, is obviously older than the term* (Giddens, 2012, p.1060), as the term 'terrorism' was coined as late as in the 18th century (ibidem, 2012, p.1059). Anthony Giddens and Steven Pinker, for example, state that the first terrorist attacks took place in the ancient times (ibidem, 2012, p.1059; Pinker, 2011, p.449). Ilona Resztak provides a more precise date of the first terrorist attack as 356 BC (2012, p.152). Jarosław Tomaszewicz writes about *pre-terrorism*, which includes acts of terrorist nature described in the Old Testament (2014, p.119).

More recently, by the end of the 20th century, terrorism usually remained within national borders and was mostly related to nationalist groups struggling for independence of a certain territory belonging to a particular state to

which they claimed their rights (cf. Giddens, 2012, p.1059). In the 21st century, a new type of terrorism emerged, cross-border terrorism, as in the case of Islamic terrorism (cf. United Nations, 2002, p.5).

In the past two decades, most terrorist attacks worldwide were related to the *jihād* terror. According to Argumosa Pila, the term *jihādism*, is (...) *used to refer to the most aggressive and radical trends within political Islam, characterised with frequent and brutal retorting to terrorist attacks in the name of the alleged jihād<sup>2</sup>, as the followers call the sacred war in the name of Allah* (Argumosa Pila, 2015, p.17). In Europe, although clearly the most numerous terrorist attacks are the ones related to ethnonationalism and separatist movements, almost all the fatalities of terrorist attacks in the recent years were a result of *jihād* attacks, as stated in the report by the European Union Agency for Law Enforcement Cooperation (Europol) (Europol, 2017, p.10; Europol, 2018, p.9; Europol, 2020, p.15). For some time, significant migration was observed from the European Union Member States to the war zones in Syria and Iraq to join the self-proclaimed Islamic State. In 2015 alone, over 5,000 people moved from the European Union (EU), most notably from Belgium, France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, to war zones in Syria and Iraq in order to join ISIS (Europol 2017, p.12). Later, the numbers quickly decreased (Europol 2020, p.44). ISIS forms one of the largest groups of international *jihād*, also referred to as the Jihadist International (Argumosa Pila,

2015, p. 9), aimed at uniting all the Muslims and extending Islam worldwide (ibidem, 2015, p. 18).

Notwithstanding the fact that attacks by the *jihād*ists are responsible for the largest number of victims in Europe in the period of the last eighteen years, and that the Europeans are most focused on the attacks committed on their continent, actually most terrorist attacks inspired by *jihād* take place within the Arab and Muslim world, with their inhabitants forming the largest group of victims. According to the data published by the Institute for Economics and Peace (IEP), approximately 75% of all deaths resulting from terrorist attacks in 2015 took place in five countries: Iraq, Afghanistan, Nigeria, Syria, and Yemen (over 21 thousand fatalities) (IEP, 2017, p.36) while the countries most affected by terrorist attacks in 2019 included Afghanistan and Iraq, followed by Nigeria and Syria (Fernández Rosa, 2020). Although the number of fatalities in Europe is not low, it is still the most peaceful region of the world (IEP, 2019, p.68). In the countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD<sup>3</sup>), the 577 fatalities recorded in 2015 constitute less than two percent of all fatalities resulting from terrorism, despite it was the year recording the highest number of fatalities in a single year since 2001 (IEP, 2016, p.40). It must, however, also be pointed out that the total number of terrorist attacks in Europe decreased after the peak increase in 2017 (Interpol 2019, p.10).

It seems clear that the motivation of *jihād*ist terrorists operating in regions with open conflicts is principally political. Some of these countries experience ongoing internal conflicts; neighbouring countries in the region engage in long-term conflicts among one another, on top of conflicts involving countries

1 Radicalism is the "uncompromising attitude and methodology of procedure in the area of proclaimed views, adopted objectives, and selection of measures" (Petrozolin-Skowrońska, 1996).

2 *Jihād* means "Every effort undertaken on God's path; including: collective duty to spread Islam imposed on the entire umma [umma is a "community of the Muslims worldwide"] and lead the war against the infidel countries" (Larroque, 2015, pp.128, 132).

3 Among 35 members to OECD, 21 include EU countries, including those targeted by terrorists (cf. OCDE).

of the West (cf. Argumosa Pila, 2015). And although Federico Aznar Fernández-Montesinos rightly states that (...) *the source of jihadist terrorism lies in its ideology* (Aznar Fernández-Montesinos, 2015, p.71), following a detailed analysis of both the ideology and the functioning of various jihadist groups, he comes to a conclusion that (...) *differences between radical groups are not of religious, but of political nature, namely they refer to the means and strategy to be implemented in order to achieve the goal: establishment of the Caliphate, its range and nature, global or not, the priority of actions against the West, policy in respect of the Shiites, Marabouts, and Sufis, and the degree of exercising the implementation of the Islamic law in subordinate countries...* (ibidem, 2015, p.105).

Terrorist attacks outside the Muslim territories (both within the struggle against the West and aimed at expanding the Islam worldwide) are largely not committed by the jihadists who specially arrived from those zones with the intention to commit an attack, but by adepts recruited outside the Muslim territory, very often citizens of the countries of the attack. As Luis de la Corte Ibáñez points out, referring to Angel Rabasa and Cheryl Benard, (...) *the vast majority of jihadists attempting to perform attacks in Europe recently, or departing from Europe in order to spread terror in other regions of the world, have acquired their extremist orientation<sup>4</sup> and have adopted the ideology of jihad on the European territory* (Rabasa and Benard, 2015 qtd in: de la Corte Ibáñez, 2015, p.27). These are not just immigrants from Muslim countries settled in Europe, but many of them have been born in European countries. According to the data published by Europol in 2015, 63% people arrested in relation to terrorist attacks are EU

citizens, with 58% born in the EU (Europol, 2016, p.11). In 2019, almost 60% jihadist terrorists included citizens of countries where the attacks took place (Europol 2020, p.15). Therefore, there a fundamental question arises as to what has led some people settled by their own will in European countries, sometimes already being their citizens, or descendants born in Europe, to adopt the ideology of *jihad* and become terrorists acting against their own countries, regardless of whether this is the country of their birth or the second homeland. Psychologists, social psychologists, sociologists, political analysts, and many other are still seeking an answer to this question.

### Methodological remarks

When attempting to answer the question, we principally face the problem of strictly methodological nature because it is extremely difficult to analyse motivations of people committing terrorist attacks or intending to do so, because of the nature of their activities as, on the one hand, the last thing they would probably wish for is to be identified<sup>5</sup>, while on the other, establishing contact is very risky for the investigator (cf. Horgan, 2015, pp.55–66). Therefore, most studies on such phenomena are not based on primary data, which largely undermines the credibility of their results. Unfortunately, we have no other data so far.

As indicated in the title, this paper is intended as preliminary remarks. It does not aim at verifying the hypothesis, but to present the hypothesis, namely to state it and to justify the answer to the question posed at the end of the previous section: [what led some people settled by their own will in European countries,

sometimes being European citizens already, or their descendants born in Europe, to adopt the ideology of *jihad* and become terrorists acting against their own country, regardless of whether this was their country of birth or the second homeland?]. The next step to be taken in the future would be to find a way to investigate the problem directly in order to verify the hypothesis, despite the methodological challenge.

### Proposed Explanation

To review the most important aspects touched upon in the attempts to explain the radicalisation of European citizens, I shall refer to the theoretical concept of Javier Jordán from the perspective of the process of jihadist radicalisation in Spain, which brings together and orders many of the reflections by various other authors on the issue. From the point of view of the radicalisation process occurring in Spain, Jordán defines three strictly interrelated levels of investigation: the macro level, the meso (intermediate) level, and the micro level (Jordán, 2009). The macro level is configured by factors of general nature, external to an individual, both national and international, broadly related to the social, economic, political, and cultural environment of such an individual. Jordán speaks of factors encouraging radicalisation at the macro level, some of which are related to the globalised environment in which they emerge, such as the experience of injustice, or military conflicts that cause suffering of the Muslim population, which factors can (...) *cause personal feeling of humiliation, offense, and rebellion among people sharing the Islamic identity* (ibidem, 2009, p.198), while other refer to the freedom of the press and mass media which favour and even amplify the effects of terrorist attacks by spreading the ideology of *jihad* among the general population, and which provide arguments justifying terrorist attacks through their rationalisation, as well

as emotional arguments that are emotional, normative, and identity-related, which can be easily adopted by an individual, and which can affect the micro (individual) level (ibidem, 2009, p.200). Radicalisation is also favoured by social and economic factors, such as: (...) *establishment of ghettos, severe social inequalities between the Muslim and non-Muslim in such areas as access to education, failures at school, access to the labour market, personal labour situation and unemployment; deficient socio-political integration manifested in lack of confidence in the system and institutions, or the appearance of parallel structures of political and social participation; social polarisation, attitudes of rejection and distrust on the part of the society, all these can cause the feeling of frustration, humiliation, and aversion to the political system and the society they live in, which together prepare a fertile ground for violent radicalisation* (ibidem, 2009, p.200). Finally, there are triggers points, such as political support for the war in Iraq on the part of some western powers, breakdown of some jihadist groups, or the ban on Muslim veils in French public schools. The micro level comprises individual factors, among which Jordán differentiates aforementioned rationalisation factors (which have already been defined), both affective and cognitive-normative, as well as identity-related factors. Among affective elements, there are emotions or conditions such as frustration, relative deprivation, rage against the injustice experienced by the individual or by other people, or the will to take revenge, all of which are often ascribed to terrorists (ibidem, 2009, pp.203–294). Cognitive-normative elements are those that, upon assuming an extremist ideology, lead a subject to take such extremist ideology as one's own, with its standards and values that give meaning to the individual's actions and life (ibidem, 2009, pp.204–206). At this level, one can also find what Jordán refers to as identity-related elements, namely the

4 Extremism means (...) *upholding extreme views on an issue, application of the most radical measures to achieve a political, economic, or ideological goal (violence, terror, military revolt, etc.)* (Petrozolin-Skrowrońska, 1995).

5 As pointed out by Basque historian, Igor Barrenetxea Marañón, terrorists (...) *camouflage without hesitation in the society, behave as average Muslims, and even permit themselves to breach the regulations of Islam so as thus not to raise suspicion and remain unnoticed until it is too late* (2017).

ones that help to meet the need for belonging, pushing an individual to affiliate with a specific group and to act in pursuit of common goals (ibidem, 2009, pp.206–208). The intermediate (meso) level comprises external factors with the vehicle formed of social networks present in the social and political environment that is the closest to the individual, facilitate his contact with other individuals with similar normative, affective, and cognitive framework, and which also serve to strengthen the socialisation in the values proper to the jihadist ideology (ibidem, 2009, pp.208–213). One must also take account of the fact that all the aforementioned factors encourage the adoption of extremist ideology, but only some individuals become radicalised and proceed to committing terrorist acts. It must also be pointed out that deprivation or negative feelings are not a shared characteristic among all the radicalised individuals committing or attempting to commit terrorist attacks. Among the individuals convicted of jihadist terrorist activities or killed in suicide attacks in Spain in the period 1996–2012, as many as 24.1% had university education, 12.2% were entrepreneurs employing staff, and 14.9% were self-employed in the industry and services sector (Reinares and García-Calvo, 2013). One cannot also generally speak of individuals with profound religious formation. It seems that individuals more prone to radicalisation are those with rather superficial religious education, rather than those with solid, profound knowledge of religion (cf. Akhmedova and Speckhard, 2006, p.337).

An important characteristic to be accounted for in the analysis is the age of individuals involved in terrorist attacks in Europe. According to Europol's data, over the years, the detained suspected of terrorist activities related to *jihad* or responsible for the attacks, are noticeably young. For example, according to Europol's data, in 2016, (...) *almost one-third of arrestees*

(291) were 25 years old or younger. Only one in ten arrestees (9%) in 2016 was older than 40 years (Europol, 2017, p. 10) while in 2019 (...) *most jihadism-inspired attackers and would-be attackers (almost 70 %) were between 20 and 28 years old. The youngest perpetrators were 16 and 17 years old* (Europol, 2020, p.15). One of the papers on terrorism in Spain states that 51.5% of the sample comprising individuals convicted of jihadist activity or suicide bombers in the country in the period 1996–2012 began the process of radicalisation in the spirit of jihadist Salafism<sup>6</sup> at the age of from 16 and 25; and the percentage grows to 84.4% if the limit is extended from the age of 16 to 30 (García-Calvo and Reinares, 2013, p.4). As pointed out by the authors, this indicates that the radicalisation began in such individuals in an earlier phase of life, when young people are particularly prone to the impact of extremist ideologies<sup>7</sup>. As shown by Pauline H. Cheong and Jeffrey R. Halverson, the propagators of jihadist Salafism make intense efforts to influence and recruit people at this particular stage of development (Cheong and Halverson, 2010).

The fundamental questions to ask here are: 1) where these feelings come from; and 2) why some individuals originating from those countries feel frustrated, not accepted, pushed to the social margin. One of the most frequently provided answers, closely related to the affective factors, points exactly to the actual or perceived marginalisation of such individuals. This, however, appears to be contradictory to the data quoted above, indicating that such

6 Salafism is a (...) *branch of Sunnism, which preaches the doctrine of the old followers, particularly the first four Califs of Islam from which jihadism derives.* (Argumosa Pila, 2015, p.18).

7 According to, for example, Erik Erikson, if, in the process of adolescence, an individual has not yet achieved a stable identity, he is largely ready to get ideologically involved (cf. Hall, Lindzey, Campbell, 2006, p.211).

individuals include persons with university education and prestigious, well-paid jobs. Maria Carmen Forriol Campos writes: (...) *The possibility that a young Muslim immigrant in a second/third generation and well-integrated, which means, a young man coming from a wealthy, non-pathological family, a qualified specialist under a permanent job contract, as exemplified by Mohamed Jaroume<sup>8</sup>, can become radicalised, rebuts the popular thesis of radicalisation being possible exclusively in the case of young individuals from the second/third generation that have not been integrated or who appear to have been integrated* (Forriol Campos, 2013, p.356). Forriol Campos postulates that the motives for radicalisation of young people non-integrated or who appear to be integrated<sup>9</sup> in the spirit of jihadist Salafism would include social discrimination which might be a result of islamophobia, ethno-cultural, socio-economic, political, identity-related, and religious issues, whereas among well-integrated youth, radicalisation would be motivated exclusively by identity-related, political, and religious factors (ibidem, 2013, p.356). Lorenzo Vidino, an expert in *jihad* and investigator of Salafism in Cataluña, following the attacks of 17 August 2017 in Barcelona, in his interview for El País, stated: (...) *It would be a mistake to think that integration is an antidote to radicalisation. It seems natural to think so, believe that someone who has been raised in a given community and forms part of the society, someone who plays football and speaks Catalanian, and so on, would not get radicalised. And yet most radical individuals in Spain and in Europe have been well-integrated*

8 This is about a young Muslim immigrant from the second generation, apparently well-integrated in Italy, where he resided, who despite that got radicalised via the Internet (cf. Reinares, 2012).

9 Unfortunately, the author does not precisely define her understanding of being “non-integrated or appear to have been integrated” and what criterion was used to differentiate between such categories.

(Mars, 2017). What does Vidino understand by being well-integrated? And if they are integrated, why do they commit the attacks? In the same interview, Vidino explains: (...) *This is not related to integration, but rather to the personal sense of lack of affinity with the society. Many jihadists have been well-integrated* (ibidem, 2017). And yet can one be really integrated and not have a sense of belonging in a society where one lives? The term ‘integration’ can be understood in many different ways, depending on who uses it, and what theoretical, political, and ideological perspective is used to formulate the definition. Aleksandra Grzymała-Kazłowska attempts to reconstruct the meaning of the term ‘integration’ by reviewing its definition depending on the perspective applied, and concludes that (...) *generally, integration can be perceived as a two-directional process of adaptation leading to immigrants’ participation in the social, cultural, economic, and institutional-political life of the host society* (2008, p.50), and adds: (...) *from the perspective of the country of immigration, immigrants should be a coherent and harmoniously functioning part of the host society, have bonds and relations with the others, share fundamental values of the society of the country of residence, observe the most important standards and laws applicable in the public sphere, and have at least a minimum sense of identification and community with the new society* (2008, p.50). The last assumption can be summed up with a statement that the society where the immigrants live should become a normative group of reference for them, and even partly a membership group. Vidino, in his comment, seems to ignore this. On the other hand, this definition stresses the need for immigrants’ adaptation to the society but does not mention their right to maintain their culture. The definition used by many other authors, as formulated by the Commission of the European Communities, refers to integration as (...) *a two-way process*

involving adaptation on the part of both the immigrant and of the host society (Commission of the European Communities, 2000, p.19). In the quoted document, further on, it is stressed that (...) *There must [...] be respect for cultural and social differences [...]* (ibidem), which already accounts for the cultures of origin, and the need for respecting them. The need for respecting the immigrants' culture is not, however, obvious to everyone. Cezary Żołędowski, for example, writes: (...) *It turns out [...] that, in majority, immigrants do not wish to integrate, and are even not susceptible to acculturation, adhering to their own traditions and customs* (2014, p.47). This statement seems to suggest that Żołędowski does not agree for the immigrants to preserve their own culture and should assimilate by adopting the culture of the host country as their own, which basically contradicts the idea of integration. Does the fact that immigrants or descendants of immigrants actively participate in the social, cultural, economic, and institutional-political life of the host society, respect fundamental standards that regulate the public sphere and the law, show at least a minimum sense of identification and affiliation with the new society, and respect its culture, expressly mean that they will be accepted and will feel accepted by the society? Anyways, does the respect for cultural differences equal their acceptance? What about phenotypic differences that are apparent at the first sight? These cannot be either eliminated or hidden. The source of the problems with integration can be found not in the absence of the will to integrate among immigrants, but in the fact that the adoption of the host society as a normative group of reference and a membership group is ineffective without the acceptance of the immigrants themselves, not just their culture, meaning not just acceptance on the part of the host society as a whole, but acceptance on the part of people forming part of such

society in their nearest environment. In other words, if immigrants do not feel accepted by members of the society where they live, the anticipatory socialisation [namely adoption by an individual of a group of non-affiliation as a normative group of reference with the hope of becoming a member (cf. Merton and Kitt, 1965, pp.470–480; Merton, 1982, pp.427–429)] is not functional, and the immigrants will not be able to feel members of such society, and will not be able to develop a sense of identification and affiliation with the new society. In the absence of the sense of rooting, a sense of exclusion can easily be developed in an individual, even in the case of apparent integration at certain levels of the social structure. As proved by neuroscience, from the brain perspective, social rejection, exclusion, and underestimation are perceived as physical pain (Bauer, 2013, p.67; cf. also: Eisenberger and Lieberman, 2005, pp.109–127), and physical pain causes aggression (cf. Bauer, pp.67–69). According to Bauer, (...) *the absence of affiliation with a group and being rejected are the strongest and the most important factor causing aggression* (p. 68; cf. also Twenge, Baumeister, Tice, Stucke, 2001, pp.1058–1069). Therefore, in the case of immigrants, the absence of the sense of belonging in the society of residence and the sense of rejection, perceived as pain, can trigger consent to the use of violence against such society. And thus, aggression evoked by the sense of being rejected can be used by terrorist organisations to recruit immigrants for their purposes (Malinowski Rubio, 2016, pp.233–236).

In the aforementioned document, the Commission of the European Communities refers to the need of (...) *ensuring fair treatment of third country nationals residing legally on the territories of the Member States through an integration policy aimed at granting them rights and obligations comparable to those of EU citizens* (Commission of the European Communities,

2000, p.9). It also stresses the need for fighting against discrimination of immigrants (...) *in the fields of employment, training, social protection (including health and social security), education and the supply of goods and services, including housing* (ibidem, 2000, p. 10). It also stresses the role of (...) *regional and local authorities and their political leaders, especially those of the larger towns where many migrants settle, providers of education, healthcare, social welfare, the police, the media, the social partners, non-governmental organisations and migrants themselves and their associations* (ibidem, 2000, p. 20) in successful implementing of integration programmes. As we read in the document, apart from regional and local leaders, institutions, and organisations, the immigrants and their associations are of key importance in the implementation of integration programmes, although there is not even a mention of the decisive role of native members of the host society in the immigrant integration process, including those in the nearest environment, namely neighbours, friends from school and work, passengers on the same bus, or people shopping at the same place. The Commission of the European Communities (and not only in the document quoted, but in all known to me documents published on this issue or in publications executed on the basis of such documents since the year 2000) emphasises the legal and institutional, as well as economic dimensions of integration (Cf. Biernath, 2008, pp.181–192), and as can be concluded from its postulates not as much because it cares about the immigrants, but in order to make sure that immigrants settling on the territory of the EU meet the needs of its labour market, and function smoothly within it without causing conflicts. It also believes that through the appropriate integration policy, one can attract "desirable" immigrants: (...) *The provision of equality with respect to conditions of work and access to services, together with the granting of*

*civic and political rights to longer-term migrant residents brings with it such responsibilities and promotes integration. By coordinating their efforts to ensure that employers respect the provisions of labour law in the case of third country nationals, Member States would greatly contribute to the integration process, which will be particularly important in attracting migrants to highly skilled jobs for which there is world-wide competition* (Commission of the European Communities, 2000, p. 20); (...) *The opening up of channels for immigration for economic purposes to meet urgent needs for both skilled and unskilled workers has already begun in a number of Member States* (ibidem, 2000, p.13). Moreover, the document points out that (...) *this would be closely related to labour market needs but would also take into consideration [...] other factors (e.g., public acceptance of additional migrant workers in the country concerned, resources available for reception and integration, the possibilities for social and cultural adaptation, etc.)* (ibidem, 2000, p.16). In other words, it assumes that, at the individual level, it is the immigrants who should make the effort to integrate. There is also a suggestion that some immigrants are incapable of adapting to the European society.

It can be thus concluded that integration programmes of the EU principally focus, as pointed out above, on the legal and institutional dimension, as well as economic dimension of the integration, while on the other shift a major part of the responsibility for its success on immigrants themselves.

To answer the above questions, we must know how Muslim immigrants feel in their closest environment, among neighbours, friends from school and work, passengers on the same bus or shoppers at the same supermarket. In a report by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobes (EUMC), among others drafted on the basis of 58 thorough interviews with members of

Muslim communities in ten EU countries with a large Muslim population (Choudhury, Aziz, Izzidien, Khreeji, Hussain, 2006, p.7), which recompiles information regarding perceptions of individual experiences reflecting the sentiments, fears, and personal frustrations, which is fundamental for evaluating their impact on such individuals (Casa Árabe, 2007, p.69), we can read that (...) *when Muslims report experiencing Islamophobic prejudice and hostility in daily life, this is more likely to take the form of verbal abuse and other forms of hostility rather than physical violence [...] beyond verbal and physical abuse, respondents suggested that Islamophobia is also expressed in the small details of every day encounters; in passing comments and jokes* (Choudhury et al., 2006, p.44). Further on, we can read that (...) *respondents suggested that the extent to which Muslims face hostility, harassment or violence is also dependent on the extent to which a person's Muslim identity is visible. Thus they report that women who wear a headscarf or men with beards or dress that identify them as Muslim feel more vulnerable and are more likely to face hostility. Muslim women wearing a headscarf are reported to bear the brunt of Islamophobic attacks with people spitting at them or trying to remove their headscarf. It is also believed by interviewees that those who «look Muslim» are more likely to be targeted by state officials, by security, police and immigration officers* (ibidem, 2006, pp.44–45). Moreover, it must be stressed that (...) *the respondents feel that, increasingly, acceptance by society is premised on the assumption that they should lose their Muslim identity. They feel that there is an assumption that their values are not compatible with «European» values* (ibidem, 2006, p.8).

I personally had the opportunity of observing hostile attitude to the Muslim headscarf during one of my stays in Spain which coincided with the attack of August 2017 at Las Ramblas in Barcelona. I then witnessed the

first reactions, both in the press and other media, and among people. One of the persons I talked to, a Spanish person from Avilés, told me she hated her colleague from work, a Muslim woman, doctor just as herself, exactly because of the Islamic headscarf [or *hijab*, a veil used by Muslim women to cover their hair (Mirys-Kijo, 2015, p.31)]. This hatred had its source in the fact that the Muslim woman, born in Spain and having Spanish citizenship, had not resigned from the veil which, in the opinion of my interlocutor, is a symbol of male domination over women. She was outraged that her Muslim colleague from work had not yet got rid of it. Let me point out that this was her subjective opinion, as from the perspective of a Muslim woman, *hijab* can be a choice, not an obligation. Some Muslim Spanish woman said in the interview: (...) *for me this [wearing a hijab] is a choice. My parents or brothers never forced me to wear it. I have daughters aged 17 and 15 who don't wear it. [...] If you forbid me to wear it, you force me to be like yourself, and I defend my right to be as I want to be* (Borraz, 2017). For that Spanish doctor, however, the fact that a Muslim doctor wears a headscarf means subjection to foreign cultural standards that degrade women and are incompatible with Spanish cultural standards, which she interprets, as she points out, as lack of will to integrate on the part of that Muslim woman. She admitted she had never attempted to make friends with the Muslim woman, could not bear her, never talked to her beyond what the professional situation required, and never asked about the other's motivation to wear a *hijab*. This situation correlates to what the Spanish summary of the aforementioned EUMC report states on the subject: (...) *The question of the headscarf is complex and multidimensional. Indeed, it is possible that many Muslim women wear the headscarf against their will, as a result of social pressure in their family environment, or even as a result of mobbing*

*inside their own social group, but others decide to wear it for religious reasons, as an affirmation of their Muslim identity, or as a sign of culturally defined modesty* (Casa Árabe, 2007, p.20).

Difficulties with sustaining identification and affiliation with the society one lives in due to rejection because of preaching Muslim religion and because of one's physical appearance can be observed in the interview given at the beginning of 2017 by a young musician from Granada of Moroccan origin, Jalid Rodríguez, alias Khaled, who says: (...) *This is madness. Two cultures clashing. I consider myself to be Muslim, in my own way. I have the best of both: I am a Spanish Muslim. I have no homeland. [...] You can feel very much Spanish, but I will never be Spanish to the police. This is simply elementary racism* (Riaño, 2017). He goes on: (...) *I went to the movies with my father, when some kids pointed to him and shouted: «Mum, mum, look, Bin Laden!». This is madness. Recently, one of my friends in Barcelona got arrested for a week, as they suspected him of being a member of jihad. Later on, they set him free and apologized. Pure madness* (ibidem, 2017).

As regards discrimination in daily life, EUMC report also points out that (...) *respondents state that they are «worn down» by such daily experiences [...] and] facing discrimination in access to housing, education and employment [...]. In housing, the discrimination can be detected in questioning about language ability, headscarves, or the size of a tenant's family. In education, it can come from the denigration by teachers of a Muslim pupil's ethnic culture or the reinforcement of stereotypical views about Muslim communities and Islam. In employment, interviewees were aware of instances of employment agencies receiving requests from employers not to send Muslim workers and several respondents mentioned the difficulty in finding a job or accommodation when wearing a headscarf* (Choudhury et al., 2006, p.9).

It is also worth noticing that, in the EUMC report, the respondents point to how little attention is given to their needs, and if any changes occur owing to the requests of Muslim communities, they are usually limited to (...) *access to and provision of halal<sup>10</sup> food, religious education in schools, planning permission for mosques, and so on* (ibidem, 2006, p.9). Moreover, they are convinced that whether the needs of the Muslim are met or not largely depends on good will of the authorities and people holding power, and that their needs very rarely constitute an important factor when planning services, and (...) *that even when the law is on the side of those making the request, they face resistance in the form of extra bureaucratic hurdles or refusal by local officials to apply the rules* (ibidem, 2006, p.9). According to the report, the respondents complain that Muslims are often helpless against discrimination. Experience tells them that in most cases people behind the acts of discrimination or Islamophobia go unpunished (ibidem, 2006, p.10). The support offered to victims of discrimination varies depending on the country, so whereas in some Member States there are solutions to effectively combat this phenomenon, which enjoy the trust of the Muslims, in other countries complains rarely bring any effect whatsoever (ibidem, 2006, p.10). It is hopeful that, as the report states, nevertheless, most Muslims consider the law as an important tool to prevent discrimination (ibidem, 2006, p.10).

## Conclusion

Everything above clearly indicates that the fundamental problem in Europe (and other western countries) is not the process of radicalisation by itself, but the factors that encourage individuals to become radical.

<sup>10</sup> Halal means (...) "permitted"; what is permitted by the Muslim law (Larroque, 2015), p.129.

Notwithstanding the importance of other factors, I would say the major issue is the impossibility to build a real sense of belonging in the host society on the part of persons originating from Muslim countries and other immigrant ethnic or religious minorities due to lack of acceptance by the closest environment. And although it is true that there are few people who radicalise and become terrorists, even one is one too many. One must not forget that young people are the most prone to extremist propaganda. Those with a sense of rooting and acceptance will rather not be seduced by extremist ideologies. I believe that this problem deserves more thorough analysis that would allow not only better understanding, but would provide instruments to mitigate the effects and, as a consequence, reduce the virulence of all extremist ideologies, not just the jihadist ideology. ☹

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## **Dlaczego osiadli imigranci popełniają akty terrorystyczne przeciwko krajom przyjmującym? Uwagi wstępne**

### **Abstrakt**

Część autorów ataków terrorystycznych przeprowadzonych w XXI wieku w Europie stanowią imigranci lub potomkowie imigrantów, co szczególnie oburza rdzenną populację. W tej pracy rozważam czynniki, które biorą pod uwagę nie tylko kulturowe lub polityczne motywacje terrorystów, ale również czynniki uwarunkowane przez interakcję imigrantów lub ich potomków z autochtonicznymi mieszkańcami państwa przyjmującego. Jednym z podstawowych pytań, które należy zadać jest to, czy imigranci w krajach europejskich są rzeczywiście akceptowani przez mieszkańców kraju przyjmującego. Jeśli w rzeczywistości nie są akceptowani, mogli rozwinąć u siebie poczucie wykluczenia, nawet w przypadku osiągnięcia pozornej integracji na określonych poziomach struktury społecznej. Poczucie bycia odrzuconym jest istotnym czynnikiem powodującym agresję, a agresja ta może zostać wykorzystana przez organizacje terrorystyczne do ich pozyskania.

**Słowa kluczowe:** [terroryzm](#), [integracja](#), [dyskryminacja](#), [marginalizacja](#).