

The cognition of something in front and something in the background. Is “taken-for-granted reality” experienced?

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Abstract

The paper is an analysis of the cognitive-sociological model of reconstructing taken-for-granted knowledge, as presented by Eviatar Zerubavel. The analysis shows Zerubavel's structuralist and “sociologistic” approach to common-sense knowledge. The analysis also shows that his concepts of formal sociology could be used in phenomenological, existentialist, and contemplative approaches, where social and cultural knowledge is bracketed and reflected upon to clear the social mind for personal and experiential cognition.

Keywords:

[cognitive sociology](#), [ignoring](#), [sociology of attention](#), [Eviatar Zerubavel](#), [existential sociology](#).

W oszałamiającej złożoności nieskończonego zawarta jest, jako jego element konstytutywny, kategorię negacji formy, zamkniętego, określonego planu. Ponieważ nieskończoność to absolutna progresywność, nieuchronnie musi ona unicestwić wszystko, co ma skończoną substancjalność i wykrystalizowaną formę.

Forma wykazuje zawsze tendencję do absolutyzacji fragmentu, do izolowania go w jakiejś autonomii i do eliminowania — poprzez indywidualizację treści — perspektywy powszechnej i nieskończonej.

Zmysł formy jest owocem upodobania w tym, co skończone, płochę fascynacji ograniczonością...

Rozbrat z życiem rodzi upodobanie do geometrii. Zaczynamy wszystko wiedzieć w formach ustalonych, w liniach zastygłych i w martwych konturach. Gdy nie masz w sobie radości, jaką karmi się dynamika egzystencji, wszystko zamiera w symetriach.

Upodobanie do form zdradza tajemną słabość do śmierci. Im bardziej jesteś smutny, tym bardziej rzeczy nieruchomieją, przy niższej zaś temperaturze smutku krzepną w lód.



Introduction

The construction of reality is made by the cognitive categorization of what we observe. Since the beginning of the discipline (Durkheim, 2008), sociologists have been interested in the problems of how categories can classify phenomena and genres, and how the borders between the different spheres of life are created. Cognitive sociologists, to whom Eviatar Zerubavel belongs, are interested in the social aspects of cognition and searching for patterns and conditions of their emergence. Zerubavel concentrates on reconstructing social patterns of perception and cognition by using the comparative method of many cases in different cultural situations (Zerubavel, 2018a). He also uses arguments from analyzing the cultural diversity, inspired by Emile Durkheim (2008), and diverse social contexts with inspiration from Georg Simmel (Simmel, 1964). His approach is sociological because, for him, the mind and cognition have a collective character. Individual cognition is immersed in the social contexts and categories that are given and ready to use by individuals. Clichés, narrations, and lexicons are already prepared for use, and the individual chooses and uses them in social situations where pressure, or a lack of pressure, could be considered or not. Attention has a social origin. We concentrate on objects that are socially constructed, and our attention is directed by social determinants such as class, culture, subculture, and race, which are also culturally defined. Interactional conditions are important in organizing our activity according to existing patterns, perception, and attention (Goffman, 1963, 1974). Sometimes, we are not aware of how we use categories for perception and classifications (Garfinkel, 1967). We can mirror how others behave without conscious consideration.

Perception and attention are the main aspects of constructing social reality (Brekhus, 2015). Framing situations and what we consider to be relevant and irrelevant is the basis of the social definition of reality. We can be inattentive unconsciously, but in other situations, we are actively inattentive when we tactfully do not want to see some behaviors. The problems of “what we want to see and what we see and what we do not see” are important for the sociology of attention that is developed by Eviatar Zerubavel. What we perceive and do not perceive is a kind of distinctive thinking that divides reality into two parts, as in the Goffmanian vision of the world, the front and coulisses (Goffman, 1959). Attention is socially created and directed, and it can also be divided. The reconstruction of the dimensions, divisions, and conditions for patterns of attention is one of the goals of Zerubavelian sociology. This is an analysis of the deep cognitive level of human activity. Zerubavel advanced the comparative method of analysis for studying human thinking and perception. He analyses different social and cultural groups according to the themes that are needed to reconstruct the social patterns of perception, attention, and collective denial. The generic concepts could be the effect of analysis and also variations between them (Brekhus, 2015). We want to reconstruct this kind of sociology by Zerubavel in this paper and show the advantages of the approach and some of its limitations.

We present in the paper the analysis of the cognitive-sociological model of reconstructing taken-for-granted knowledge as presented by Eviatar Zerubavel. The analysis shows Zerubavel’s structuralist and “sociologistic” approach to common-sense knowledge. We also show that the formal analysis is devoid of the experiential knowledge that could be supplemented with analysis of lived experiences. The analysis also shows that his concepts of formal sociology could be used in phenomenological,

existentialist, and contemplative approaches, where social and cultural knowledge is bracketed and reflected upon to clear the social mind for personal and experiential cognition.

1. Analysis of Distinctive Thinking

Zerubavel has always been fascinated by the concepts of “figure” and “background.” “The relations between ‘figure’ and ‘background,’ in other words, basically represent the relations between the attended and unattended parts of our phenomenal world” (Zerubavel, 2015b). The phenomenon of noticing and ignoring, very often unconsciously, has social origins, and this contribution to the development of sociology is noteworthy. Whatever we concentrate on or focus on, the selectivity of our perception is not only a neurophysiological issue but also a social and cultural one. We selectively see elements of the social world in the same way; for example, we selectively chose our ancestors (Zerubavel, 2012), or create sharp divisions between disciplines in science what make mental “walls” and “rigid minds” (Zerubavel, 1995, p. 1095). So, we need the *sociology of attention*. (Zerubavel, 2015b). We ignore one thing if we concentrate on something else (*inattentional blindness*). It is important in public and political spheres when the public’s attention could be directed at irrelevant social issues to avoid them concentrating on really important ones. But what is hidden can be uncovered. Foregrounding seems to be an important tactic to show that perception is a convention and is socially created. It could be politically important to see how ignoring, or *the conspiracy of silence*, is created (Zerubavel, 2015a). Censorship or the distraction of attention, along with a great number of supporters of a conspiracy of silence, can keep the silence, and even make *a denial of the denial of silence* (Zerubavel, 2015a, p.15). Zerubavel describes social forms and creates concepts of them to see the social

reality from a different perspective, following Georg Simmel’s model of social science and formal sociology (Zerubavel, 1980, pp. 26–27).

We always make distinctions between the *ordinary* and the *special*. Marked phenomena are always *accentuated*, while unmarked ones are *unarticulated* (Brekhus, 1998, 2015; Zerubavel, 2018a). In social worlds, it often happens. We take for granted that when we say *a nurse*, it is a woman; mention *a surgeon*, we think it is a man. At the background of such expressions and words is the power of unuttered phenomena of the dominance of maleness. The distinctions and the unequal weight of each side of a distinction are socially constructed. However, the attention that is given to each side of the equation is also created culturally. Attention is an individual issue but socially rooted. The mind is social for Zerubavel (Brekhus, 2007). Decisions are made because of the social roles and symbolic categories determined by cultures. The inspiration for distinctive thinking comes from semiotics, when we can differentiate semiotic pairs, such as blackness and whiteness or homosexuality and heterosexuality (Brekhus, 2015; Zerubavel, 2018a).

The method of analysis is well presented in *Taken for granted: the remarkable power of the unremarkable*, which was published in 2018. It is a remarkable work that opens the eyes of sociologists to unremarkable phenomena or aspects of phenomena that are in the background of public knowledge, and often sociologists’ knowledge, too.

The reasoning of the author is as follows. When we accent homosexuality (mark it), we do not see heterosexuality, which is so obvious (unmarked) that is not mentioned in the public discourse. The second part of the distinction, we assume by default and take it for granted. When we publicly label “women’s football championship,” we mark it, and when we say “football championship,” we assume

that it is a male championship. We do not label many occupations or phenomena with gender because we take them for granted as being masculine ones. They are unremarkable, so not worth mentioning. It would be *semiotic superfluity* to look for a label to name them according to gender (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 4). Zerubavel gives examples of *semiotic asymmetry* in a statistical way. “Whereas a simple Google search for the term *openly gay*, for example, yields 3,740,000 hits, a parallel search for its nominally equivalent counterpart *openly straight* yields only 32,800” (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 5). Another example: “Thus, whereas a Google search for the term *homeroetic*, for instance, yields 760,000 results, a parallel search for its nominally equivalent counterpart *heteroerotic* yields only 11,700” (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 39). This semiotic asymmetry could be represented statistically, but according to Zerubavel, it is marked experientially (statistical evidence from searching for terms on Google is often used in the book, see, e.g., pp. 47 and 63). These terms are cognitive labels, cognitively attained and cognitively used by our minds, which are totally social in the formal analysis carried out by Zerubavel. Therefore, analysts should be sensitive to *lexical gaps*, when some terms are very rarely used, such as female nurse. When marking homosexuals, we cover the unmarked heterosexuals, who are taken for granted and already normalized.

This sentence below is very meaningful for the cognitive sociologist:

“Studying the unmarked, in short, requires exceptional self-reflectiveness about what we habitually and thus pre-reflectively take for granted!” (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 9) Self-reflectiveness is needed here. But what is it? And how can it be attained by analyst, that studies taken-for-granted phenomena, we do not know from the book of Zerubavel? The author is a very reflective person, with

an immense sociological imagination. But can an adept of cognitive sociology be trained to be sensitive and reflective (Zerubavel, 1999)? What about the emotions and embodied knowledge that we gain in the process of socialization and use in the cognition of the world? Do we only survey the cognitive aspects through cognitive-conceptual frames of cognition, or are the body feelings and emotions of the researcher unimportant here? (Denzin, 2009).

We will analyze these aspects during the reconstruction of the Zerubavelian analysis of taken-for-grantedness and in discussion about assumptions of the approach.

2. Unmarkedness Has A Political Meaning

Zerubavel looks for the unarticulated, silenced (Zerubavel, 2015), not noticed, taken for granted aspects of everyday life. So, it is the sociology of everyday life. However, it could also be a question of politics. If a phenomenon (or an aspect of a phenomenon) is not noticed, then the political and moral consequences become important, even if they are not explicitly articulated. Ethnomethodological studies have revealed the importance of knowledge that is covered by conventions, etiquette, and norms that are not disputable (Garfinkel, 1967; Heritage, 1984). They stabilize the existing social order and identities. It is so deeply embodied that it cannot be discussed openly because it would disrupt the order and auto-identifications.

Unmarkedness can have a **political meaning**. According to Zerubavel, it shows political and social dominance. The political weight and significance are on the side of the unmarked part of the equation, like maleness in andronormative societies or whiteness in leukonormative societies (the terms are derived from Greek and refer to gender

and color). If the gender is not mentioned, it is assumed to be male. If the color of the skin of the person is not mentioned, it is assumed that the person is white (at least in the USA). People with an accent are marked, and *unaccented English* is not marked. So, deviations are pointed out, but the “normal” accent is not (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 38). Immoral is more often marked but average morality is not. Social dominance is connected with normality, which is usually taken for granted, and it shows the social dominance of the “obvious.” The self-evidence that is associated with normality is based on *cognitive hegemony* (Zerubavel, 2018b, p. 58). It is very difficult to question what is *implicitly* assumed.

What is very powerful in Zerubavelian sociology is the potential to *foreground* what is not mentioned, and what is shadowed and located in the background of our explicit knowledge. When we make a semiotic subversion and mark the hitherto unmarked, we can experience a revelation that gives us the freedom to clearly perceive the shadowed. And here we touch on the method of foregrounding. If we read poetry, we notice that poets discover the extraordinary in the ordinary, what we usually pass by and do not notice. Art deautomatizes our perception and estranges the familiar (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 75). Photographers can focus on the background instead of on objects that are obvious and in the foreground. Journalists, when playing with words, open the unmarked bag of hidden assumptions or hidden affairs. Talking openly about some incidents, such as sexual harassment, revealed many hidden affairs. The “#metoo” movement, which named concrete affairs and exposed the male dominance in many occupations, also changed the cognitive map of many societies: “As a semiotic ‘eye-opener,’ naming, in short, helps make the hitherto unmarked culturally ‘visible’” (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 65). Other terms, such as vegaphobia, speciesism,

and carnism also did the same opening work; however, the important work is done by academics who do research on taken-for-granted phenomena. Feminists studies made maleness explicit and challenged its presumed normality (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 69). Studies on disabled people finally revealed the important category of the *nondisabled* (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 72). Comic foregrounding is also very important. It makes it safer if society is not ready to accept the truth about difficult assumptions (such as racist ones) or others connected with assigning gender to some professions. This illustrative and short wit is in the analyzed book (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 81). A woman in the bookstore asks the clerk: Do you have any books on the white-male experience?

Our perceptions and how we make distinctions with these perceptions are socialized. The mind is almost fully social for Zerubavel. Emotions are epiphenomena of cognition. Reflexiveness is also social, and sociology or social sciences are part of the social mind (as a sociological mind) that uncovers what is social in everyday life perception, in covering and uncovering what is important and what is relevant. An individual uses a system of relevancies contextually; however, it is acquired from society through the process of socialization (Schütz, 1962). The individual is determined here by his social cognition, although the situational circumstances are very important (Zerubavel, 2018a, pp. 26–27). The logic of determination also comes from the structuralist inspirations of the semiotics school that is mentioned on page 2 of the Zerubavel book (2018) by referring to Nikolai Trubetzkoy of a fellow linguist, Roman Jakobson.

In society there are marking traditions. Therefore, we are culturally and socially determined to see or not see certain things or phenomena. The marking conventions are constructed socially and have an indispensable “distinctive” power. For Zerubavel this

general structure has a permanent character and it organizes our perception of the world: "While our view of any particular semiotic object as marked or unmarked may indeed be only ephemeral, the very distinction between the 'special' and the 'ordinary' is here to stay. (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 97) Society and the social order produce the attentional norms, as well as the moral evaluations, that we socialize: "It is not just our personal feelings, therefore, that make us concerned about some war casualties (women, enemy civilians) more than others (men, enemy troops) and deem mosquitoes morally irrelevant" (Zerubavel 2015a, p. 64). Individual feelings are in the background of scientific considerations.

3. Is Zerubavel good to think with?

I think that Zerubavel's set of concepts create a quite innovative model for analyzing everyday life knowledge. It is inspired by semiotics and ethnomethodology (Garfinkel, 1967), and we see it also in the "exemplary methodology" (giving examples as proof to characterize the formal features of perception) influences of Goffman (Goffman, 1959, 1974) and the formal sociology of Simmel (Zerubavel, 1980). The style of investigation is the transsituational, transhistorical, and transcultural "social geometry" that the author calls "social patterns analysis" (Zerubavel 2007, p. 132). It is very similar to Goffmanian analysis of the organization of experience, and even the interests in the covered phenomena are similar (see the example of the "frame trap," Goffman 1974, pp. 480-486; and see concept of "tracking deceptions" on pp. 470-471). According to Zerubavel we should first observe facts and later look at them from an analytical perspective. Formal patterns should be created based on real facts, and this also concerns fieldwork. There should be focused observation with analytic concerns, not concentration on the concrete contents of events: "They must give up

the traditional ethnographic efforts to study everything about concrete phenomena, and commit themselves to focused observations, since being committed to a particular analytical perspective involves viewing reality in a selective manner and focusing only on a few aspects of observed phenomena" (Zerubavel 1980, p. 32). The prototype of this kind of work is the analysis of Erving Goffman (1959), which is highly developed in the book *Frame Analysis* (1974). Conceptualization takes precedence over the lived experience. Concepts should precede entering the field of research. They are the sensitizing concepts that show only the direction for searching of data (Blumer, 1969; Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Prus, 1996; Denzin & Lincoln, 2001). Taking this into consideration, we are not surprised that formal patterns are created and their structures are highlighted, even when there is no fieldwork, only the very careful observation of some everyday life incidents that are theorized about and formal concepts created to describe them.

The methodology in the book from 2018 seems to be the same as the author wrote about it in a paper from 1980. Although we do not know exactly how it was applied in either the book or the paper, it is very illuminating work (Zerubavel, 2015a). We can infer, however, the methodology from the paper that was published in 1980 and 2007 (Zerubavel, 1980, 2007). The basic method is comparative and the pieces of evidence come from many sources. Such methodology was also used by Goffman, when he gathered data from newspapers, magazine advertisements, and etiquette manuals. According to Zerubavel's methodological assumption (2007, p. 139), someone carrying out formal analysis should always stay analytically focused. First, the sociologist should find the core category and later collect data that develop the concept and hypotheses. Grounded theory seems to have similar features when

researchers look for new data to enrich their formal analysis and to add more properties to categories and theoretical models (Glaser & Strauss, 1967). Theorizing, like in the grounded theory approach, is an indispensable feature of "pattern analysis": "It is the mental process of abstraction that allows social pattern analysts to focus on, and thereby uncover, generic patterns" (Zerubavel 2007, p. 140). However, idiosyncratic research (historical, ethnographic or autoethnographic) could be a source of data for formal sociology analysts (Anderson, 2006).

Discussion – Applying and Contesting Zerubavel's Model

Sometimes cultural and country peculiarities go against the general pattern, as I found in the Polish public discourse, following the formal conceptualization of marked and unmarked distinctions by Zerubavel¹. I tried to show statistically that the term "socjolożka" ("woman sociologist" in Polish; the feminine gender is indicated in the lexical item) is used more often than "socjolog" ("male sociologist"). The term "socjolożka" is also politically correct, but not often used, and many male sociologists are against using it in Poland. However, it is not the case that the marked term is used more often in the Polish language (according to data from Google). It is quite the opposite of Zerubavel's model. The Polish term "sociolożka" (woman sociologist) appeared **74,000** times, while the term "socjolog" (male sociologist) appeared **6,400,000** times (the search was conducted on 9th of August, 2019). The power is on the side of the marked and visible (in this case male), not on the side of

the invisible and unmarked, as in Zerubavel's formal theory. Males dominate the language in institutions as well as the occupations and positions.

What are the other conditions that unnecessarily make the marked more visible in a statistical sense? Is it possible that we have here another more general pattern that includes the indicated pattern? The Polish language is dominated by masculine names both for occupations and social positions (also in the statistical sense, if we count the labels that appeared in the Google search). Looking for patterns could overshadow the specificity that is very important to characterize a phenomenon or institution. For example, calling Nazi concentration camps total institutions could overshadow their main goal of killing inmates. They should be called "death total institutions" (see criticism of the Goffmanian concept in Konecki, 1987; Goffman, 1961)².

Taken-for-granted knowledge is self-evident, axiomatic, and unquestioned. It is embedded in language. We are almost the slaves of language. We experience the world through language, and we cannot see anything behind the language. (Zerubavel, 2015a, p. 65) This creates the fundamental methodological problem of how to research something that is often not even noticed and named. How can we get it and analyze how it is created? We can write essays about a phenomenon, but we do not know how it should be empirically researched methodically by sociologists. Zerubavel uses many historical examples

¹ "I have thus far defined markedness and unmarkedness in strictly experiential terms, yet marked semiotic objects actually "stand out" not only experientially but also statistically" (Zerubavel, 2018a, p. 19).

² Similarly, not all Goffmanian small theories based on his concepts are verified positively. The concept of "civil inattention" (Goffman, 1963, pp. 83-84) among pedestrians was verified negatively (Cary, 1978). Civil inattention is a more contextual phenomenon than can be treated as the obligatory ritual of civil inattention (Zuckerman, Miserandino, & Bernieri, 1983). Civil inattention could also be created by the intentional strategy to avoid focusing attention on the self in public places (van der Laan & Velthuis, 2016).

from the media, the Internet, from belles-lettres, as well as the empirical research of psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, and historians. He overcomes the different manifestations of phenomena and concentrates on the transcultural and transhistorical principles of the patterns that underlie the phenomena (Zerubavel, 2012). The examples he gives of patterns are very imaginative and persuasive. This is the art of using examples, as in Goffman's analysis. However, we do not know how, in a methodical, step by step way, to use the methodology of reconstructing the taken-for-granted. How is the comparative method used? What about the body (cognition through body feelings) and emotions that create distinctions (Douglas & Johnson, 1977; Johnson & Melnikov, 2008; Kotarba & Fontana, 1987; Kotarba & Johnson, 2002; Manning, 1973), or experiencing values (Melnikov, 2013)? We see from the Zerubavelian model the cognitive approach, which focuses on distinctions to analyze commonsense knowledge. Emotions and existential dilemmas in contextual, personal, and interactional dimension are less important here. This is also noticed in his previous works. As Zerubavel points out, discovering the New World (America) meant that it needed to be differentiated from the Old World. It took three hundred years to separate it in the cognitive and geographical maps of the two worlds (Zerubavel, 2018b). So, separation and distinctions from commonsense knowledge are also replicated in scientific models.

However, knowledge (even with formal distinctions), when we contemplate it more deeply from a first-person perspective (Valery M. Bentz & Giorgino, 2016; Giorgino, 2016; Rehorick & Bentz, 2008), is also holistic and embodied in the existential situation of the person living *here and now* (Konecki, 2018). It is not divided. Divisions and distinctions are social creations and we should overcome them. We should deconstruct them to create

the clear a field of perception to experience reality as it is. Zerubavel writes in the book *Hidden in Plain Sight: The Social Structure of Irrelevance*: "Conspiracies of silence may also trigger feelings of loneliness (...) Needless to say, co-ignoring the elephant in the room requires a major collaborative effort on everyone's part and is therefore socially exhausting" (Zerubavel 2015a, pp. 82 and 84) These are important notes for me because they indicate that people somehow feel something they experience – "the pattern." It is this part of the conspiracy of silence, it is the patterns with feelings around them, that interest me. How do people experience phenomena? How is the phenomenon of silencing felt at the level of the body and emotions? And finally, how does this experiencing maintain the pattern so it can exist and influence other feelings? Feelings of loneliness or exhaustion could be the products of this "silence", but they also influence and maintain the silence. So, the taken-for-granted reality also seems to be experienced and felt (disgusted, loved, being ashamed, etc.), and this also needs to be researched. More experiential approaches (Ellis, Carolyn; Adams, Tony; Bochner, 2000; Giorgino, 2014, 2016; Kacperczyk, 2014; Rehorick & Bentz, 2008) and formal pattern analysis could meet here and provide more insight to describe the researched phenomena.

Beyond these reservations, Zerubavel's approach is extremely useful for sociologists of everyday life because it delivers a method to uncover the first level of taken-for-grantedness. It means that it shows to us the other part that is unmarked and unremarkable in a context. We can get to the level of a little-known phenomenon and uncover it. This is politically very powerful, although the aim of the researcher could be different than to change the world (Schütz, 1945).

However, this is not the end of the story for contemplative researchers (Valerie Malhotra

Bentz, Rehorick, Marlatt, Nishii, & Estrada, 2018; Giorgino, 2014; Konecki, 2018). They want to go further and, for them, knowledge about unremarkable phenomena (about patterns of perception) should also be bracketed to see the phenomena without the social and cultural filters that are described by the patterns. The Zerubavel model could be extremely useful for phenomenologists and contemplative researchers with an existentialist perspective who want to get to the experiential level of a phenomenon. If we can notice the unremarkable and to perform the *epoché* of this knowledge, we can see the things as they are. We can see racism, homophobia, family violence, anti-Semitism, and misogyny at the experiential level, how the social actors bodily and emotionally react while experiencing the phenomena. How is the "conspiracy of silence" experienced? Is it connected with fear and anxiety? It could be connected with feelings of guilt or shame (Scheff, 1990), and covering it is associated with strong emotions (Douglas and Johnson, 1977, pp. 26-27). The understanding of own or other activities not always has a purely cognitive character in the usual sense. It could be the pathic understanding: "But the first important point is that the terms empathy and sympathy suggest that this understanding is not primarily gnostic, cognitive, intellectual, technical — but rather that it is, indeed, pathic: relational, situational, corporeal, temporal, actional." (Van Manen, 2007, p. 20).

The presentation of self in cognitive and formal approaches connects with socially defined strategies and tactics of presentation of self (Goffman, 1959; Scheff, 1990, 2014). If we want to hide something, we do it because of the social norms and values associated with the assumptions – what can be shown openly and what should be hidden? We take the role of others to conform to the social order. This formal perspective is taken in the dramaturgical approach and any formal sociology, including

phenomenological sociology (Douglas and Johnson, 1977, pp. 63-64). Instead of refusing these formal sociological approaches, we can use formally described phenomena in more existential, contemplative, and experiential approaches, to see what is experienced while creating them in everyday life.

I shall return for a moment to the almost forgotten book by Douglas and Johnson *Existential Sociology* (1977). The sociology of everyday life, if it is to be realistic, should take into consideration what we know directly *from* everyday life contexts and experiences – that we are not certain of our decisions, we often cannot explain our motives, the self is vague, and we dream and feel the excitement while acting and even not acting, we feel our body. We can hide something because the feeling of shame could take the precedence over the value of being sincere. Our contentment changes to dissatisfaction, and vice versa, from one moment to another. Maintaining silence about phenomena or experiences (e.g., death, sexual harassment, abortion, acts of pedophilia, chronic pain) is often connected with loneliness, suffering, and shame. Some people want even sometimes to commit murder in revenge for the harm they suffered. It could be their dream. Depression and suicide attempts are often experienced by stars from the media. Everything is in the flux of activities and mixed in everyday life. Catching the moments in the auto-reflective flux of thoughts (autoethnographical presentations) is important to show how the living experiences are sedimented temporarily in presentational performances (Denzin, 2006; Ellis, Carolyn; Adams, Tony; Bochner, 2000; Kacperczyk, 2014). The self is not always *in the service of social order* but is often vague, critical, explosive, contradictory, actively created, and elaborated in the particular context of performing an autobiography and talking about the experiences. The cognition of the world is nested in real experiencing.

Below the *geometric* dimensions of social order, below the front and background, are lived experiences (Prus, 1996). The sociology of everyday life also needs to explore them.

This quote below could represent the confession of faith of Zerubavel: "The transcendence of subjectivity and the social construction of intersubjectivity help define the distinctive scope and focus of the sociology of the mind. Essentially rejecting cognitive individualism, cognitive sociology ignores the inner, personal world of individuals, basically confining itself to the impersonal social mindscapes we share in common." (Zerubavel, 1999, p. 8). We can agree with the social aspect of cognition. However, something is lost here. The social mindscape could not be informed, observed, and reported without the individual experience of the acquired knowledge. Nonetheless, cognitive sociology is a crucial starting point for such an analysis of lived experiences. And this is a tremendous input of the author to the development of the sociology of everyday life. 🧠

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