The Enemy Other: Discourse of Evil in William Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*

**Abstract:** Caliban, the ‘enemy Other’ of William Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*, is a character that allows further investigations of the colonial ideology in its earliest forms; locating ‘evil’ forces outside the continent of Europe and the White race. Caliban, the only non-European character, is typified as the autocratic antagonist of the play whose evil intentions and actions cannot be redeemed. Against such representation, the essay argues that the villainous discourse attributed to Caliban is informed by Renaissance theological doctrines escorted by an emergent colonial ideology. It argues that, at a semantic level, the employment of the concept of ‘evil’ often serves as an intensifier to denounce wrongful actions. At a moral level, however the term is often contested on the basis that it involves unwarranted metaphysical commitments to dark spirits necessitating the presence of harmful supernatural creatures. To attribute the concept to human beings is therefore essentially problematic and dismissive since it lacks the explanatory power of why certain people commit villainous actions rather than others. Hence, the epistemological aporia of Caliban’s ‘evil’ myth reveals an inevitable paradox, which concurrently requires locating Caliban both as a human and unhuman figure. Drawing on a deconstructionist approach, the essay puts the concept of ‘evil’ under erasure, hence, argues that Caliban’s evilness is a mere production of rhetoric and discourse rather than a reality in itself. This review contributes to the intersecting areas of discourse, representations, and rhetoric of evil within the spectrum of postcolonial studies.

**Keywords:** discourse of evil, William Shakespeare, deconstruction, post-colonial criticism, European renaissance.

The concept of evil is problematic at epistemological, moral, and linguistic levels. In contemporary secular Western societies, as Brian Horne argues, “human intentions and action could be quite adequately explicated in the
language of ethics rather than theology: the opposite of good, consequently, is not evil, it is bad in the sense of being wrong morally, of willing and acting in ways that are in opposition to an accepted moral standard” (30). The difficulty of establishing universally accepted moral standards does not invalidate such a tendency. When the term is used, its semantic content is vague or reductive, in the sense that it acts as merely a kind of intensifier: “when one wants to express extreme outrage at an action of gross immorality, the word one reaches for is the word evil; but there would be no qualitative difference between a wrong action or intention and an evil action or intention” (30). Literary discourse is however replete with the term, and quite often associated with supernatural evil creatures and dark powers. The monsters of fictions including vampires, witches, and werewolves as well as many invented dark-forces or monstrous creatures are thought to be paradigms of evil as possessing powers and abilities that defy rational explanation (Todd Calder para. 5). More pertinent to the present argument, is the fact that “ranking something as evil immediately labels it as something to be avoided: wicked, immoral, malevolent, sin, vice, depravity, nefarious, malicious” (Lynn Fallwell and Keira Williams 13). This means that any possibility of encountering evil forces brings about triumphant fear and harm sourced from an outsider and unbeatable force, which makes the Other always threatening and dangerous. Of no less significance to understanding the discourse of evil stigmatizing Caliban in Shakespeare’s The Tempest is the fact that the term denotes deep-rooted and lasting villainous actions and intentions, which necessitates an evitable paradox when attributed to human beings.

Therefore, the presence, and maybe success, of discourse of evil in literature primarily depend on the writer’s rhetorical ability to convey a sense of wonder and mystery detecting a concealed desire for this discourse in human consciousness and realised through imaginative constructions in the realm of the supernatural (Horne 32). Yet, for Horne, the association between evil and the supernatural is fundamentally unreasoned as supernatural powers do not exist in reality, and when the action is merely described as a mystery, it renders sensible explanations not possible. It is however agreed that the discourse of evil in its broad sense, whether in reality or in fiction, institutes a system of knowledge using affiliated discourse and notions to represent despicable actions, characters, and events subject to moral condemnation (Phillip Cole 106).

Caliban, the enemy Other of William Shakespeare’s The Tempest, is a character that allows further investigations of the evolutionary discourse of evil in the Renaissance period in its theological, rhetoric, political and cultural spheres. It also reveals how early colonial discourse intersects with Elizabethan theological beliefs at an early stage of European colonialism. Long before the eighteenth-century, the time when European colonialism has reached its zenith, and writers and critics were not yet versed in post-colonial discourse, Shakespeare’s Renaissance romance The Tempest has established the figure, or
one might say, a consensual canon of Caliban as a prototype of the mysterious and incomprehensible evil. In fact, such canon has evolved through subsequent centuries, contexts, and literary genres at times when the European colonial discourse has become an integral part of the Anglophone literary tradition especially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

To further explore the intersection between theology and colonialism, this essay aims to problematise the discourse of evil in its capacity to reflect morally reliable accounts for Caliban’s case. In doing so, it reviews the evolution of the discourse of evil, and explores the historical conditions involved in the construction of the discourse of evil in the Renaissance period. Methodologically, it draws on post-structural and postcolonial repertories to empirically examine and problematize the discourse of evil as exemplified by three main characters in the play: Prospero, Miranda, and Caliban himself. In what follows, the essay largely identifies its arguments and claims with the copious body of post-colonial critical repertories that locate the play within a geography other than Europe. Therefore, the depiction of Caliban is not an abstracted figure nor located in a “spatial ambiguity,” (Peter Hulme, William Sherman and Howard Sherman 18) it is rather located in a well-defined geography, a non-European island in the Mediterranean.

*The Tempest* is, thus, a drama of intercultural encounter between the European ‘Self’ and the non-European Other. It is about magic, betrayal, love, and forgiveness, but it is also about the supernatural and dehumanised villainous dark forces. While all other characters, including the conspirators, are eventually redeemed, hence their morality is restored, Caliban alone stands out as the absolute dark side of the play. The exiled Prospero, who was once the Duke of Milan and his daughter, Miranda, live with two supernatural creatures, Ariel and Caliban in a Mediterranean island. As a powerful magician and lord of the island, Prospero manages to turn these two creatures as his subjects. Ariel, “who is labelled a ‘mulatto’ in this play” (Bibhash Choudhury 136) hence becomes a loyal and virtuous servant while Caliban, the native inhabitant of the island and the outspoken colonial subject (Hulme, Sherman and H. Sherman 205) is the lazy, useless, ugly and traitorous. With the assistance of Ariel, Prospero creates a storm that wrecks a ship and captures the conspirators while sailing nearbay the island. The plotline then develops towards a sharp divide between wrong and good deeds and intentions including: a plot to murder the King of Naples, a conspiracy scheme to kill Prospero whose protagonist is Caliban and, finally, a romance between Miranda and the King’s son, Ferdinand, which brings the narrative to its happy ending. Eventually, all those who commit wrong deeds are pardoned and set sail back home, Europe. Yet, Caliban, is not entitled such a status and left behind in the island.
Since it was created by Shakespeare, Caliban has become an intertextual character of the alien, savage, primitive, bestial and monstrous; a variety of notions that affiliate with the umbrella concept of evil (Simon Hay 16). This canon has been cherished and propagated in several literary texts, critical essays and artistic productions in subsequent centuries carrying with it a weighty corpus of politically informed axioms about the perceived notion of evil. In the Restoration period, John Dryden’s and William Davenant’s *The Tempest: Or, The Enchanted Island* (1667), Caliban became a deformed and savage slave. Victorian Age and early Romanticism also had their share through the works of Robert Browning’s poem “Caliban upon Setebos,” (1864) where Caliban is institutionalised as a human but primitive savage. At the break of the twentieth century, Jose Enrique Rodo’s essay “Ariel” published in 1900 reintroduces Caliban as half daemon, half brute, but inferior to and, hence, logically slave to Prospero. Modernist writers returned to the idea of dehumanising Caliban as represented in W.H. Auden’s poem *The Sea and the Mirror* (1945); and in modern times, Caliban claimed evilness is also restored in Tad Williams’ *Caliban’s Hour* (1994). This canon is also reworked in other artistic forms including critical accounts, paintings, theatre performances, cinema, and cartoons. Hay rightly observes that these works constitute a political and social history of the ‘sign’ of Caliban that carries a prefigured signification or, at least, a substantial amount of cultural baggage, in terms of expectations and preconceptions as to nature, focus, and form. What these works have in common is a representation of Caliban as either “savage” and “primitive,” or “bestial” and “monstrous” (3). To some extent, this depiction reflects a history of Western thought that institutes an interplay between Caliban, evil and colonial discourse (David Spurr and Faris Kenny).

The fact that these recurrent constructions of Caliban as representing shadowing breeds of the discourse of evil throughout extended periods is a mere production of what Edward Said refers to as a “system of knowledge” (45). Caliban, thus, becomes “a set of references, a congeries of characteristics, that seems to have its origin in a quotation, or a fragment of a text, or a citation from someone’s work . . ., or some bit of previous imagining, or an amalgam of all these” (177). Such “political vision of reality,” as Said puts it, creates an enduring “framework constructed out of biological determinism and moral-political admonishment” linked to “insane” creatures whose identity is best described as lamentably alien (207). Caliban is, thus, located inside a history that marks the evolution of discourses and theories of the supernatural evil. A reviewer for *Dublin University Magazine* in November 1864 was aware of the history which the figure of Caliban carries. In the review of Browning’s poem “Caliban upon Setebos”, the writer claims that the poem presents us with the “theories of a primitive mind”. These theories reflect our first acquaintance in
Shakespeare’s ‘Tempest’; how Caliban’s brutal mind has developed, how he has begun to make his surroundings, his present and future (Hay 25).

The importance of this historical trope lies in understanding how the supernatural evil seeks to represent itself in the image of reason, of the enlightenment, when reason and enlightenment require the Other to assert their universal sovereignty. That Other has often been originated in the southern and eastern parts of our planet (Spurr 3). March Rod points out that these ‘mysterious’ geographies were always the feeding birthplace of the brute, savage, unformed, or any amorphous Other to Europe’s rationality and refinement (para. 6). As such, no sooner Caliban is set inside the metanarrative of evil than it has become burlesque of an abstracted but mysterious figure, materialised sign of otherness. In *Characters of Shakespeare*, Hazlitt writes that Caliban is “one of the wildest and most abstracted of all Shakespeare’s characters, whose deformity whether of body or mind is redeemed by the power and truth of the imagination displayed in it” (Hay 13).

While the above cited works share a common perception of Caliban as an alien disfigured Other, the focus of this essay is to investigate the Renaissance construction of the discourse of evil originated in Shakespeare’s *The Tempest*. The importance of this exploration stems from the fact that the Renaissance is professed as a transitional period from theological and religious doctrines, laden with discourses of evil, to secular and moral account of knowledge that concerns itself with depicting human conditions with the language of ethics more than theology. A contextual analysis of Shakespeare’s discourse of evil reveals this unique Renaissance position as a transitional period between late medieval and early modern discourses concerning the question of evil. This specific historical period, as Amos Edelheit argues: “presents us with some important shifts in the understanding of this notion in a period which is essential to the early modern era” (84).

For the moral philosophy of the Renaissance, the question of evil was subject to debate best understood not only within the ethical and theological spheres, but also through the socio-political context of the period. While philosophical debates marked a sizable space in the works of Renaissance thinkers, the new and fervent colonial competitions also had their significant input in the literary tradition of that period. The discovery of America, for example, which had begun much earlier than Shakespeare’s time, opened up new frontiers to stimulate European imagination of the Other perceived as exotic, dangerous, and deviated from the ‘norms’ of White race. Such conceptions encourage the representation of this Other as potentially inimical needing to be put under control. In *The Tempest*, Shakespeare adopts this tendency through Prospero who claims full control of Sycorax’s (Caliban’s mother) island, displaces her, treats her as a beast, and subjugates her son as his servant slave. This conduct of Prospero has prompted many critics to interpret
the play as working out the drama of colonisation. *The Tempest*, as such, is a fictional text where the Renaissance discourses of evil and colonisation constitute interplay between “culture-specific discursive practices” (Harold Veeser 34) and the institutionalisation of the moral philosophy of the age. As Greenblatt Stephen and Stephen Jay Greenblatt explain in their Introduction to *Representing the English Renaissance*, the Renaissance texts reflect historical contingencies in the ways they are “produced, reproduced, circulated, categorised and analysed” (19). Veeser contends that Renaissance texts were “reconstructed as historically determined and determining modes of cultural work; apparently autonomous aesthetic and academic issues are being reunderstood as inextricably though complexly linked to other discourses and practices – such linkage constituting the social networks within which individual subjectivities and collective structures are mutually and continuously shaped” (33).

While Renaissance thinkers (e.g., Nicolaus de Mirabilibus (d. 1495) and the Franciscan Salviati (c. 1448-1520)), concerned themselves revitalising classical philosophy including the question of evil, they incorporated within this philosophy the current theological and socio-political norms of the age. Having religious doctrines in the back of their minds, the question of evil was problematic to handle by those thinkers. Consequently, their extended debates reflected lack of consensus to earth down a rational and widely accepted perception of the concept of evil. This dispute, according to Edelheit, was originated in two competing discourses, theological and philosophical, but was also “connected to many other related issues such as divine-human relation, or will, reason, and rational impulses” as well as the socio-political conditions of the period (33). Neoplatonic thinkers, as Edelheit reports, perceived evil as a pure privation and nothingness subjected to human experience that is either linguistically or socially constructed; hence, evil is abstracted and separated from good. This thesis claims that “reason controls and directs the will; a successful rational assessment should always lead the will towards good aims or actions. Evil is possible only when error or ignorance interferes in the rational process, causing reason to direct the will towards wrong or evil aims and actions” (35). What is rejected in this account is the possibility of pure evil—that is, evil which leads to evil actions without any error or ignorance interfering with the rational process. It rather stems from those agents possessing evil intentions, and who are fully conscious of the evil results of their actions, which introduces the strong version of evil. Therefore, the notion of evil is weak since it “has no essence or existence of its own; in other words, evil can be only accidental, it does not have a substance” (36).

What interesting in these discussions is the fact that they are solely limited to the world of man rather than to that of the supernatural. Therefore, one can sense a move towards a more realistic understanding, which brings the notion of evil to be subjected to human experience. Moreover, the
contextualisation of Platonic notion of evil reflects the medieval psychology of human soul as being seduced by sensual desire or irascible passion. In short, Renaissance thinkers, although disputed God’s relation to evil, had all ascribed evil to human being and to the features of human consciousness. This conclusion, as Petryk argues, reflects a dialectic perception of the world through the binary opposition of good-evil: “when we look at the term ‘evil’ (in moral sense) in Western culture, we usually face the traditional religious or theological ideas postulating the duality of existence of our existential frame” (151). In challenge to this religious dogma, Petryk contends that our perception of the basic principle of existence is distorted by this duality. He argues that our human conceptual image of the world is based on the oppositions and beliefs that phenomena are necessarily balanced by the existence of the contradicting forces such as light-dark, white-black and good-evil, etc. While believing that all good must be balanced by evil, then, we bind ourselves into a system of reality that is highly limiting. Through this system, paralleling structuralist assumptions, the duality of good and evil is highly distortive to our understanding of reality. Therefore, “there are no devils or demons except what people create out of their beliefs where evil effects become exclusively illusions created by fear” (152).

Fictional narrative structures considerably depend on such dualistic construction of reality where the notions of good and evil are always juxtaposed against each other. This polarising tendency is heavily embedded in structuralist visions of reality. Horne (2003) reasons:

What one encounters in most of the stories is a narrative structure that depends heavily on a strongly dualistic interpretation of reality. The universe is presented in basically Manichaean terms: Darkness and Light; Good and Evil powers oppose one another in almost equal strength. Conflict between these forces is at the heart of these narratives, and the universe of these tales is one in which the conflict between good and evil is usually finely balanced and, often, never completely resolved. (34)

*The Tempest* affiliates with such a structure in its depictions of the forces representing good and bad intentions and actions. While Prospero and his daughter stand for the moral side of the play, the conspirators enact the bad or immoral side. Yet, Shakespeare goes beyond this dualistic structure by adding another set of evil forces, the supernatural evil, which operates through the aid of fictional discourse. In fact, such a dualistic and, to some extent, Hegelian structure is at the centre of structuralist conception of language, which perceive the relationship between language and the world not as representative, but as a set of binary oppositions determined by the internal structure of languages, whose parts are arranged as a set of oppositions which structures the worldview of those who use it. Therefore, “the concept [evil] is viewed as a unit of mental
lexicon coded in language” (Pertyk 151), hence, the ontologically defined evil is a “product of human consciousness, or within the power of human consciousness that shifts our reality from positive (lighted by the presence of good) to negative (darkened by evil)” (152). This epistemic process—contrasting good with evil—creates a binary system (or logic) to produce the intended meaning. Indeed, Shakespeare’s treatment of evil in this particular drama requires breath-taking pace, which can only be sutured with a magical environment and supernatural elements that gathers the structure of the play together (Tuğlu Begüm 66).

In her preface, Laurie Skiba highlights the socio-political context of the play as reflecting the Renaissance conflicts between European nations over the newly discovered lands, which “shaped Shakespeare’s view of the world” (21). One particular occasion, as Skiba comments, that inspired Shakespeare to write the play was the news of a ship believed to be lost and all its crew presumed dead while sailing to Jamestown. The confirmed news however revealed that the sailors did eventually arrive to Jamestown after having passed by the island of Bermuda. Pamphlets about the discovery of the island, the shipwrecks, sea-adventures and other explorations became a popular form of literature in England, which added fascinating imaginative stories about the natives as ‘natural societies’ compared to ‘civilised’ Europeans. Skiba claims that “Shakespeare used some of these pamphlets about Bermuda as sources when writing the play, which is set on a remote island that resembles both this island of the “New World” and a Mediterranean island” (14). Similarly, Stephen Greenblatt and Stephen Jay Greenblatt argue that the play reflects the colonialists’ adventures reiterating European arguments regarding the legitimacy of their presence as civilising forces in the newly discovered lands. Since colonisation was not old enough for all its complexities and moral issues, the relationship between the play and colonial discourse is more likely to be prophetic rather than descriptive (Ravi Bhoraskar and Sudha Shastri 23). The Tempest, thus, “moves towards achieving reconciliation and regeneration, but many serious issues remain unresolved” (24).

The play commences its discourse by establishing an authoritative voice of Prospero as a God figure, the lord of the island; a ‘man’ of super powers that enable him to subjugate natives. More crucially to my purpose, Prospero stands as retaining an absolute authority on knowledge construction through which he interpellates other characters, including Caliban. This knowledge is however politically constructed and premised on the basic necessities of the Self/Other dialectical construction. As Étienne Poulard states, “the most powerful visual code of Prospero’s ideology lies in his books. The book is the ideological instrument par excellence because it is the ultimate signifier of language” (3). In this sense, “the creation of Caliban is the perfect medium for ideology as his whole social perception relies on the king/subject relation” (4). At an early stage
and through a flashback narrative, Prospero informs his oblivious daughter about the “evil” action of the conspirators including his brother, Antonio. Revealing his identity as “Thy father was the Duke of Milan and/ Prince of power” (The Tempest 1.2.5). Prospero establishes his power over the whole discourse. He proceeds, “And Prospero the prime duke, being so reputed/ In dignity, and for the liberal arts/ Without a parallel” (1.2.6). Such demonstration of power is necessary for Prospero not only to restore his dukedom on a newly discovered space, but also to establish himself as a morally authoritative figure and as a “benevolent, God-like being” who is capable to control the island under his own desires (Bhoraskar and Shastri 15). Hence, “assigning himself to the role of God with his power as a “magician,” Prospero subjects everyone in the play to his own commands, directing the storm on stage with an ambition that would steal the thunders of Zeus” (Begüm 63). Reflecting the Renaissance dichotomy of God and Devil, Prospero thus becomes the God of the island, who is capable of all good deeds, hence, for this role to be confirmed, it necessitates the presence of a devilish figure to be encountered. Away from the white community in the island including those of the conspirators, this figure turns out to be Caliban as the none-white and native inhabitant of the island.

Standing at the centre of the play and possessing the powers of God, Prospero directs the narrative according to two basic premises: relations of power and discourse. As “the Prime Duke,” and “being so reputed in dignity and, for liberal arts, without a parallel” (1.2.6), Prospero safeguards his authority with his own sophisticated language and discourse. In his Order and Discourse, Michael Foucault reminds us that the interplay between authority and discourse is more than making discourse a mere manifestation of domination, but rather, discourse itself becomes the object of struggle and the power which one wishes to maintain (49). The trajectory of Prospero’s discourse is therefore bidirectional: a benevolent reproach addressed to the conspirators, and a violent denunciation of the natives of the island, Caliban and his mother, Sycorax. While Prospero’s discourse towards the conspirators, who usurped him as Duke of Milan, could reflect forces of good and evil, his sympathetic voice towards them and his pardoning attitude removes any possibility to locate them in the realm of absolute evil. When Miranda pronounces her concerns about the men (the conspirators) in the shipwreck: “O, the cry did knock/ Against my very heart. Poor souls, they perish’d” (1.2.3), Prospero responds: “Be collected:/ No more amazement. Tell your piteous heart/ There is no harm done” (1.2.4). The conspirators’ safety is also assured through Ariel while reporting the event of the shipwreck: “Not a hair perish’d;/ But fresher than before; and as thou badst me,/ In troops I have dispers’d them ‘bout the isle” (1.2.11).

The dualism of good and evil in this case is obscured by two conflicting voices of Prospero: resentment versus forgiveness. While referring to his former status as Duke of Milan with bitterness delineating the “perfidious” (1.2.68)
betrayal of his brother, Antonio, as “an enemy/ To me inveterate” (1.2.61-2), he admires the “charity” and “gentleness” of his “noble” friend Gonzalo who secures him a safe passage to the island (1.2.62-3). Prospero’s ambivalent attitude towards the conspirators contradicts his earlier description of them as agents of “evil.” This divide between repulsion and reconciliation intensifies the ambiguity of his attitude since while he announces the conspirators’ action as an outright evil and announces his brother’s “evil nature” (1.2.7), he pardons the conspirators assuring them safe passage back home: “I’ll deliver all,/ And promise you calm seas, auspicious gales,/ And sail so expeditious, that shall catch/ Your royal fleet far off” (5.1.82). Such romantic happy ending could project the narrative as an idealistic example of God’s compassionate forgiveness for those of wrong deeds. Nonetheless, there remains another ‘villain’ who is denied such a privilege since it exhibits the absolute sources of evil resembling the case of Satan who is deprived of any possibility of repentance.

Caliban is not only situated in a sharp contrast with Ariel and those presumed of good nature and deeds, but his claimed evil nature is also contrasted against that of the conspirators. He becomes an utterly devilish figure which, according to the theology of the age, is denied deliverance and forgiveness. To this end, the very nature of Caliban reflects a stagnant creature characterising perilous actions including his attempt to rape Miranda, his part in the conspiracy to kill Prospero and his defiant attitude against Prospero. Consequently, being an object of colonial knowledge, Caliban essentially becomes stable, and even if liable to some changes, those changes are subservient to those who possess power (Said 83). In late medieval theological beliefs, reconciliation and forgiveness require the presence of God in those committing wrongdoings. For Shakespeare’s pleas to meet the prospect of a faithful community, Caliban, the alien Other, is therefore essentially located outside the Christian community in the island. Once Ariel declares the safety of the conspirators, Prospero promptly shifts the focus of the narrative towards Caliban describing him as the slave “child” brought by a “blue-eyed hag” (1.2.13). As such, Caliban is constructed as an external evil force, which demands inclusive control that is coupled with hatred, but also with distress and fear.

Having this contextual analysis of the text, I turn to examine the construction of the discourse of evil attributed to Caliban at both linguistic and cultural levels. For this, I draw on structuralist semiotics as a representational tradition. I also use Derrida’s deconstruction to unsettle this ‘knowing activity’. Semiotics is concerned with our intuitive capacity to understand signs, which enables us to classify and ‘know’ the world (Sebeok 8). It “is the interplay between ‘the book of nature’ and its human decipherer that is at issue” (9). Therefore, “semiotics never reveals what the world is, but circumscribes what we can know about it” (26). Reality, as such, operates in the duality that exists
between two actants operating simultaneously: the observer and the observed. It is, thus, as Sebeok states, a consequence of mutual interaction between our private perceptual signs informed by our transformation of meaningful impulses—and the phenomenal world, which reveals itself solely through signs (45). Accordingly, any cultural phenomenon is not simply a composite of material objects, but rather objects with meanings loaded with cultural signs. Cultural phenomena therefore do not have an essence in themselves but are defined by a network of relations.

Briefly introduced as a dehumanised exotic child, the curiosity of the audience has already been established to know more about Caliban. To satisfy this curiosity, Prospero summons Caliban: “Thou poisonous slave, got by the devil/ himself/ Upon thy wicked dam, come forth!” (1.2.14). This opening establishes Caliban’s identity with a constellation of dreadsome signifiers including “poisonous”, “slave”, “devil”, “wicked” and “dam”—all conceived as variants of the notion of evil. The construction of Caliban identity as such is intended to meet the expectations of the Renaissance audience who are familiar (or one might say believers) of the existence of evil dark forces beyond Christian faith. This appropriation also involves a warning of such exotic dark force optimised as ‘the enemy Other’. Caliban, thus is metamorphosed as inherently capable of supernatural menacing actions: “His mother was a witch, and one so strong/ That could control the moon, make flows and ebbs,/ And deal in her command without her power” (5.1.81). In result, the relationship between the signifiers and the signified is not an impartial one, but rather is forged with ideological constructions motivated by the power of Prospero, the sign-maker. All through the narrative, Caliban’s brutish nature as lacking moral reason is essentialised via a system of signification based on the willpower of Prospero’s articulacy and command of language.

Furthermore, Prospero’s extravagant signifiers create a deterministic “symbolic system” that serves “a cultural function like a second order in language or text” (Marin Irvine 17). The influence of the Renaissance perception of evil is reflected in the discourse of the play in two seemingly coherent narratives, yet those narratives are based on two conflicting assumptions of how evil forces are perceived. On the one hand, within the view that holds evil as belonging to the world of supernatural and dark forces, the narrative is materialised by Prospero’s excessive articulations of Caliban as a symbol of bestial and inhuman evil. On the other hand, conforming to the Renaissance ethos that associate evil with human consciousness, Caliban’s identity is also sanctioned as a human being to become liable to accommodate the Renaissance assumptions. Towards the end of the play, Prospero declares: “This thing of darkness! / Acknowledge mine” (5.1.74). As Greenblatt argues, Renaissance literature is a self-conscious tradition deemed as a part of the system of signs that constitute the Renaissance culture. Greenblatt warns against oversimplifying
the conclusion that Renaissance texts alone can reconstruct the complete culture of the 16th century. Instead, a textual representation is the result of an interplay between the symbolic structures and those perceived in the larger social world. Such an intersection however presents itself as constituting a single process of self-fashioning.

The construction of Caliban’s sinfulness is also introduced as if perpetuating and immune to restoration, which deepens his claimed villainous nature. In addition to introducing Caliban through exhaustive signs of evil, Prospero shifts to a pretentious process of rehabilitation coupled with menacing authority: “For this, be sure, tonight thou shalt have/ Cramps, / Side-stitches, that shall pen thy breath up; unrchins” (1.2.15). For the sign of Caliban’s evilness to achieve the required degree of credibility, Shakespeare crafts an authoritative voice of Prospero not only to maintain power over his insubordinate slave, but also to construct an image of Caliban as an unquestionable alterity and foreignness whose intellectual and moral abilities cannot parallel those of the white community. Therefore, discipline and rehabilitation within such an intention are violent and maniacal and materialised through the severe pain Prospero inflicts on Caliban. The creation of such physical and symbolic violence is also intended to intensify the estranged nature of Caliban’s alienness. The amalgam of the signifiers of “cramps”, “side-stitches”, “pinch’d”, “as thick as honeycomb”, “stinging” – are all intended as accentuating signs of the frenetic pain that Prospero can execute on Caliban. With a huge reserve of anger that he can unleash on Caliban, Prospero upholds: “What I command, I’ll rack or dost three with old cramps, /Fill thy bones with aches, make thee roar/ That beasts shall tremble at thy din” (1.2.16). Such violence, although comprehensible when considering Prospero’s colonial desire to control the Other, also reveals a hate of that Other sourced from racist ideologies. Racism, as Michael Rustin argues: “involves a state of preoperative identification, in which hated self-attributes of members of the group gripped by prejudice are phantasised to exist in members of the stigmatised race” (62). As a matter of fact, Caliban who is constantly defined as a villain never causes any real harm to any character in the play, yet he is alone to be subjected to Prospero’s severe pain that is sanctioned in the name of claimed edification.

Further to this, resting on his ability to subdue Caliban through words, Prospero’s speeches reflect two strands in colonial discourse: blatant otherness and ambivalence. On the one hand, ‘blatant otherness’ refers to the act of constructing and imagining the profiling Other to be essentially, irredeemably inferior and defective. Prospero not only produces knowledge about Caliban, but the very reality he appears to describe. As Said holds, the power of such discourse lies in its ability to produce a reality more than reality itself. Said describes this “political vision of reality” (46) as “a material investment of scholarship that colonial powers used as an instrument for maintaining ‘content’
or the voluntary reproduction by the subjects of the social reality desired by the power” (10). Yet, to sustain Prospero’s authority over Caliban, there should be an attempt of reformation, or “a civilising mission,” whose object is “to construe the colonised as a population of degenerate types on the basis of racial origin, in order to justify conquest and to establish systems of administration and instruction” (Homi Bhabha 70). For this aim, Prospero brings the idea of enlightenment as an attempt to consolidate his mission in this foreign land. Bhabha argues: “colonial power and discourse are possessed entirely by the coloniser” to legitimise its practice over the colonised (74).

On the other hand, Prospero’s attempt to domesticate Caliban and abolish his radical otherness creates a split by simultaneously positioning him inside and outside his colonial knowledge. Bhabha perceives this as an ambivalent relation since while the coloniser, via discourse, desires to produce subordinate subjects who, in turn, reproduce his values, he ceases to create subjects that are too similar to him as this would be threatening. This ambivalence is unwelcomed to the coloniser as it problematises both his claimed authority on knowledge and his attempts to produce compliant subjects who can reproduce his assumptions, habits and values. That is why, Prospero’s aim is never fully fulfilled since Caliban’s mimicry, in using the same discourse, appears to outdo Prospero in their cursing competition: “You taught me language, and my profit on’t/ Is, I know how to curse” (1.2.16). Being too similar to Prospero, Caliban becomes threatening to the authority of his master, and in a desperate attempt to illuminate this danger, Caliban is also determined as a fixed irreformable subject. Accordingly, as Bhabha argues, the coloniser appeals to the notion of ‘fixity’ as the last ideological construction of the Other who in turn becomes predictable but unchangeable. Fixity, as Bhabha holds, is an essential concept for the survival of the colonial subject in the coloniser’s discourse as an Other who “is always in place, already known, and something that must anxiously be repeated” (66). Ultimately, Caliban’s evil identity is perpetuated and repeated through Prospero’s discursive strategy that vacillates between the discriminatory power of discourse and its ambivalent essence. This is exactly where the colonial and Renaissance theological discourses intersect: ‘fixity’ in the part of the colonised subject that hampers its rehabilitation parallels the axiomatic evilness sourced by the devil.

Nonetheless, the relationship between the coloniser and the colonised is more complicated than just relying on corecive power in the part of the coloniser. It also rests on a strategic control brought about by means of paralleling prudent diplomacy with discourse and violence. While Caliban is despised throughout the entire narrative as being ungifted, he is believed to possess native-slave assistance to his master. Addressing Ariel, the loyal native servant, Prospero reminds him of how Caliban can be useful in labour work: “But as ‘tis./ We cannot miss him. He does make our fire./ Fetch in our wood,
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and serves in offices/ That profit us” (1.2.14). In fact, the triangulated interaction between the natives Ariel and Caliban with Prospero discloses different yet similar conducts of the coloniser colonised relation. As a contrast to Caliban’s rebellious behaviour, Ariel demonstrates eagerness to complicity and unquestionable obedience. Hence, Caliban, with human flesh and tangible disgust more realistically reflects resistance to the coloniser’s authority. Ariel, on the other hand, constructed not as true flesh but as a spiritual figure, becomes the ideal subject to the coloniser. As Spurr and Kenny argue, “to a Shakespearean audience not versed in post-colonial theory, let alone established views on colonization, Ariel becomes an ideal servant and partner in cultural interactions, accepting the rhetorical power and economic status of Prospero in sharp contrast with Caliban” (para. 1). To borrow Bhabha’s statement: “there is always ambivalence at the site of cultural contacts” (111), Caliban becomes a social reality that is at once an unfamiliar Other and yet is entirely knowable and visible. Prospero manipulative, but ambivalent discourse, thus, appropriates the unfamiliar Caliban into seemingly coherent terms consummating his power and control over knowledge production about this Other.

To deepen this argument, the claimed identity of Caliban is reinstated with what Jean Baudrillard describes as “hyperreality” suggesting that the sign of Caliban’s evilness needing punishment becomes more important than Caliban himself (18). Poulard argues that “the island becomes a pure ideological signifier to fix Prospero’s fantasy: a hyperreality […] the ultimate simulacrum for power relations” (3). With such hyperreality, it is quite possible to understand how the discourse of the powerful creates a hierarchical system which not only defines the identity of the Other, but also creates lacks within the identity formation process. Through his omnipotent and forcefully controlling speeches, Prospero occupies a position of a totalitarian “prince of power” whose omniscient eye institutes the perception of the Other. This omniscient eye, according to Poulard, was born with the Enlightenment assumptions as a totalitarian regime of truth and was deepened during the late Renaissance era. The possibility of Shakespeare’s endorsement of this Elizabethan idea is what allows Prospero to succeed in fashioning Caliban’s reality as such. Accordingly, being constructed as the only dissident voice to Prospero’s rhetoric authority, Caliban becomes a dangerous insider to the colonial discourse since assigning him part of this authority undermines the logic and infrastructures of this discourse.

Although lacking a similar authority to that of her father, Miranda’s discourse serves as an extension to Prospero’s colonialist attitude in the manner discussed above or, at least, her “speech certainly takes a leaf out of Prospero’s book” (Deann Williams 9). Miranda’s use of the signs of “slave”, “savage”, “Being capable of all ill”, and “A thing most brutish”—are all associated with White cultural supremacist tendencies. Yet, Miranda’s position creates an added tension to the colonial discourse since introducing her as an innocent child who
later on grows up as an educated young female figure contradicts the colonial role assigned to her. Consequently, Miranda, the sympathetic and pure female, is burdened with the mission of the male’s colonialisist and autocratic role. As such being complicit to her father’s teachings against her presumed attributes of femininity, Miranda represents another aspect of ambivalence in the play’s colonial discourse. As a result, Miranda becomes not just an occasional feminine figure and a source of some sympathetic simulacrum of the white community in the island, but the Caliban’s primary educator. Whilst an educator role requires an understanding and compassionate responsibility towards learners, Miranda’s ‘education’ to Caliban—like that of her father’s—is both hypocrite and brutal. Additionally, the portrayal of Miranda involves two conflicting roles: while being subservient to the other male powers represented by Prospero and Ferdinand, she is simultaneously overmastering Caliban through actions stronger than expected from her. This conflictual image of Miranda invites some critics to claim that Miranda’s conduct towards Caliban is “out of character for her” (Williams 10). This conduct, as Williams argues, “complicates Miranda’s reputation for being obedient, demure, and a willing pawn in Prospero’s marriage scheme and conveys, instead, the discourse and outlook of a hard-hearted coloniser: equating her own language and culture with civilised “goodness” and condemning Caliban as a “brutish” barbarian” (16). In such depiction, Shakespeare betrays his own ideology regarding women as being subordinate subjects despite the fact that such representation is temporarily interrupted through her behaviour towards Caliban. In this respect, Miranda is forced to compromise her demure nature that make the pinnacle of femininity in favour of adopting a white heterosexual middle-class male role in the colonial project.

Lastly, I turn to Caliban’s perception of his own identity as the despised and inferior Other, and the role of the white community in constructing and shaping his identity. Caliban evokes: “I must obey. His art is of much pow’r,/ It would control my dam’s god, Setebos” (1.2.16). Situated in Prospero’s manipulative discourse, Caliban passes through a deconstructive process, simultaneously in-and-out a state of the self and otherness. It becomes a process of self-identification that is always fluctuating between differences, shifting beyond Manichean thought and as a product of two competing discourses (Said 132). Caliban internalises Prospero’s discourse in a fundamental matter that shapes his perception of himself including his faith, which is constructed within the vocabulary of binarism between the ‘centre’ and the ‘periphery’; (Prospero’s god versus Caliban’s Setebos). The outcome of this contrasting process is that his god becomes inferior to that of Prospero and the others who make a Christian community in the island. Although he lives in his own native land, Caliban suffers from a deep sense of loss and estrangement as he is being surrounded by a powerful Christian community that despises his otherness. In result, he
internalises his otherness as the evil Other. Being an object of intense oppression makes him pass through a mystic experience culminating in internalising the evil nature that is imputed to him.

Caliban’s articulation of his consciousness reflects a state of devoid self-control therefore develops a submissive state to the authority of Prospero. Professing such a state, he reflects: “When thou cam’st first./ Thou strok’st me and madest much of me, wouldst give/me/ Water with berries isn’t, and teach me how/to name the bigger light” (1.2.15). As such, Caliban’s perceived evil identity is inescapably intertwined with a state of fluctuation between sameness and difference (Bhabha 142). Although violently comprehended, he makes a perception of the world, including his own claimed evilness, through the eyes of his master. “Since Caliban learns English through Prospero, his expression on his own self is bound to remain within the strict lines of the superior Subject who controls him” (Tuğlu 62). As Jacques Derrida puts it, the self “in departing from itself, lets itself be put into the question by other” (94). Derrida insists that, in its encounter with otherness, the self indulges in “adventuring outside oneself towards the unforeseeably-other,” and in so doing, it encounters “the impossibility of return to the same” (99).

Furthermore, the relationship between Caliban and Miranda is fraught with undercurrent tension reflecting the specifically English colonial desire for “peopling”. While Shakespeare imputed to Caliban a motive for the attempt to rape Miranda, Caliban is rendered guilty of what were in reality English colonial ambitions (Hulme, Sherman and Howard 205). Shakespeare’s projection of colonial ambitions onto Caliban, as Hulme argues, allowed “English audiences of the time to understand the character’s motives, but to identify with their fellow coloniser’s horror at the possibility of a colonial island peopled with Calibans. Since Caliban is the colonial subject, English audiences would not perceive him as having symmetrical rights with colonisers to ‘people’ the isle” (205). Yet, while Caliban articulated his desire to people the island with descendants like himself, he chooses Miranda as his means to reproduce himself. Rather than being a mixture of Caliban and Miranda, those descendants would be Caliban’s, which touches on English folk beliefs in the determining character of the father. As such, Caliban’s claimed attempt to rape Miranda implies gendered complexities of the coloniser and colonised respective claims to the island, for both men’s rights turn out to operate through women.

To conclude, Caliban’s presumed villainous nature is ambivalently constructed both linguistically and culturally. With an interplay between authority and discourse, the incomprehensibility of Caliban’s otherness is simultaneously located inside and outside the White European cultural values. His ‘evil’ identity is configured through restless violence, insanity, and alienation, which allows an interpretation of these signs as being constructed through a triangulated interplay between discourse, power and ideology. Caliban
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therefore has become an ideological social reality that lacks sensible justification. On the one hand, he is radically the unfamiliar Other, and, to meet the authority of European ‘self’ represented by Prospero, he is, on the other hand, entirely knowable and visible. Prospero’s manipulative but ambivalent discourse appropriates the unfamiliar Caliban into seemingly coherent terms including savage, demon, brute and half brute, bestial, primitive, etc.—a combination of images, which make a colonial discourse irrespective of the signifying contradictions they involve. Prospero’s discourse, therefore, as Horne asserts is “suspended between the world of mind and language where words enable [him] to lay hold on reality and a world of essences which, somehow, have no existence and no words by which they can be grasped” (41). This indicates how in “the discourses of colonialism, colonised subjects are split between contrary positions. They are domesticated, harmless, knowable; but also, at the same time wild, harmful and mysterious” (John McLeod 53). Ironically, in spite of lacking semantic authority, the image of Caliban, as a figure permeating the characteristics of evil, has been propagated in the subsequent centuries. As demonstrated above, several poets, writers and critics have incorporated this image of Caliban in their works.

With the emergence of new theoretical strands, e.g., postcolonialism and poststructuralism, the colonial discourse as presented in *The Tempest* has turned to be subject to security and criticism. The discourse of evil as discussed in this essay is also conceived problematic since it fails to provide sounding evidence of why Caliban is essentially evil beyond the ideologically informed claims. Although religion and literature have a long common history where the religious scripts have been a source of inspiration to writers and poets, this tendency has become unquestionably problematic nowadays. It might be observed that the majority of classical literatures is religious, in the sense that it was produced in a cultural milieu in which the Divine was taken for granted (Christina Phillips 64). This tradition, according to Phillips, has ceased to be the case in the modern periods since moral worldviews were taken away from God to the humans’ value judgements. In *The Tempest*, the discourse of evil attributed to Caliban mounts up as a hyperreality evidenced through Prospero’s theological accounts and actions, which might be justified within the Renaissance religious values. This discourse however has become questionable since Caliban’s apparent villainous nature relies on a contingency of religious linguistic signs. When religious beliefs are forced into a work of a cross-cultural dimension, truth becomes doubtfully accepted on universal and secular levels.

Postmodernism has also been unfaithful to religious beliefs once included in literary works: “it [postmodernism] has not helped the cause of religious fiction and poetry by casting doubt on any narrative that asserts unproblematic truth” (Phillips 66). The ascribed evilness of Caliban instates a manic discourse that lacks justified semantic authority; it rather
metamorphosed as a gnostic textual doctrine that acclaims its authority from the interplay between language and power. The discourse of evil, thus, becomes a purposeful obscuring of power that hides beneath textuality and knowledge (Said 162). Accordingly, Caliban’s otherness is established as an imaginative reality that is located against the mainstream culture. This political account of reality is also coupled with the Manichaeism of dualism rooted in Renaissance ideology regarding light and darkness, or the struggle between the spiritual world of light, and the material world of darkness. This ideology had also been flourished in an era when the earth-shattering discoveries of new lands and races, which aided the fancy of writers and poets to find the different Other as a fertile realm to circulate such assumptions. Last, since the overall aim of the paper was to address an area that is under researched, namely, the intersection between discourse of evil and politics of representation in the Renaissance period, it is recommended that future research would be necessary to examine the interplay in contemporary works.

**WORKS CITED**


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