Region and Regionalism

The role of the state in the era of globalization

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edited by Marek Sobczyński and Krystian Heffner

Region i Regionalizm

Rola państwa w erze globalizacji

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Foreword

2018 was a special year for Poland. We celebrated the 100th anniversary of the revival of Polish statehood after 143 years of captivity. On 27 January 2018, we also celebrated the centenary of the Polish Geographical Society. The fact that the association of Polish geographers was established a few months before the Polish statehood was reborn inspired the Editors to reflect on the role of the state in the political, social and economic life of nations. When an independent Poland was forming, the state was a desirable entity, necessary for the realisation of national aspirations. The borders of this state had to be fought for militarily, often sacrificing lives to maintain its sovereignty and territorial integrity.

In the era of globalization, which in the 21st century became a leading trend in civilisation development all over the world, does a state still play the same role as before? This present volume No. 8 of the periodical "Studies in Political and Historical Geography" entitled *The role of the state in the era of globalization* attempts, through the texts of the invited Authors, to give at least a partial answer to this question.

In the very first article entitled *Do we need state and what for? The role of the state in modern World*, Marek Sobczyński, political geographer from the University of Lodz, attempts to show how the approach to the issue of statehood has changed in the history of mankind. It starts from presenting the variability of the definition of state starting from antiquity. It then focuses on a different understanding of the functions of the state and the contemporary differentiation of their implementation in different states of the world. This issue is illustrated by maps of the diversity of the world's states in terms of democratisation, prosperity and social welfare, economic freedom and health. The author points out that not only politicians, but also poets and writers dealt with the issue of statehood, quoting examples from various historical periods and cultural circles of literary works that focused on the role of the state in social life. Finally, the author analyses the processes of functioning of quasi-states, i.e. geopolitical entities that proclaimed independence, but this fact was not accepted by the international community. The examples he mentions, mainly from the post-Soviet area, serve as an illustration to consider whether the existence of a sovereign state is necessary for society and for what purpose.

The issue of the importance of the state for the citizen is also the subject of the second article by Jan Kłos a philosopher from the Catholic University in Lublin entitled *The State – a necessity or an enemy?* This author also starts from the definition of the state, starting with Aristotle, to present against this background the historical process that led to the formation of a modern state. He then goes on to consider whether the state should be limited in its plenipotency or completely eliminated. Throughout the article, Jan Kłos supports his arguments with quotations from philosophers and political scientists dealing with the essence of the state. Using Poland as an example, the author analyses the relations between the state and society, reviewing this process over the course of several centuries. In conclusion, J. Kłos reflects on the relationship between the state and society, referring indirectly to the current discourse in Poland whether the state has the right to deeply interfere, even control social development or whether it should only serve and support grassroots processes.

Another article by Ryszard Żelichowski a political scientist from the Institute of Political Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences in Warsaw is entitled *Poles and Finns under Russian rule*. The author compares the process of approximately concurrent (1917–1918) gaining independence in two different states, Poland and Finland, liberating themselves from the same invader – Russia. Outlining the historical background very broadly, he shows the political and social processes, both similar and different, taking place in both states. He also takes up a personal theme by comparing the characters of two heroes of the struggle for independence, Carl Mannerheim and Józef Piłsudski. In conclusion, he raises the issue of the Russification of the two societies, stating that the tsarist government had hoped for a successful assimilation policy in Finland rather than in Poland, but had failed in both cases.

American political geographer William R. Stanley from the University of South Carolina in Columbia discusses the problem of the disintegration of states in the Middle East. In his article entitled *Syria's ordeal: A modern state's disintegration in an age of fake news and superpower regional rivalry*, he shows the process of social revolution in the Arab states of North Africa, the so-called Arab Spring and its impact on the social rebellion in Syria. Against this background, he draws attention to the role of the flow of information and the media, and in particular to the importance of fake news for the destruction of the state. He also addresses the problem of internationalisation of the conflict in Syria by showing all foreign actors who benefited from the disintegration of the state in Syria to pursue their imperial interests, which resulted in the formation of the so-called Islamic State in Syria and Iraq.

An article by Zoltán Hajdú a Hungarian geographer from the Research Centre for Economic and Regional Studies of Hungarian Academy of Sciences in Budapest entitled *A historical and politico-geographical analysis of Hungarian-Polish border before 1939 in the Hungarian historical geography* presents the process of variability of state borders in Central and Eastern Europe, in particular focusing on the relatively episodic existence of a common border between Poland and Hungary within just a few months of 1939. The author presents the process of shaping political borders in the long term, starting with the formation of Hungarian statehood in the 9th century. Polish- -Hungarian relations for centuries were formed in a friendly and peaceful way, so the establishment of a common border was a kind of culmination, although politically and morally it was controversial, because it was supported by Nazi ideology and resulting from the looting of Czechoslovakia's territory by both countries.

The role of the state in shaping migration processes is raised in the study entitled *Challenges to the state policy towards migration processes in Poland* by Krystian Heffner and Brygida Solga, geographers from the University of Economics in Katowice and Silesian Institute in Opole. The authors start by discussing the migration policy of the Polish governments after 1900. Then they identify the migration challenges faced by Poland, paying attention to the impact of immigrants on our labour market. In the final part of the article they review some of the instruments of migration policy that the government is trying to use to implement it.

In the next article, *From the Adriatic to the Black Sea: The Italian economic and military expansion endeavour in the Balkan-Danube area*, Corrado Montagnoli from the University of Milan addressed the issue of fascist state propaganda on Italy's political and economic interests in the Balkans. The author analysed both the texts and cartographic material published in the Italian scientific journal "Geopolitica". It also shows how Italy, in its expansion towards the Black Sea, had to take into account the political and military allies of the axis states – the governments of Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria and their interests.

The same Italian magazine "Geopolitica" was used by Antonio Violante from the University of Milan in his article *The Baltic sea as the mediterranean of the North. The Baltic Region and Poland in the periodical "Geopolitica" (1939– 1942)* to present a fascist point of view on the role of the Baltic Sea in the politics of Poland and the Baltic States. The author starts from the geopolitical significance of Poland's access to the sea in the interwar period. He then presents how the issue of the Ribbentrop–Molotov pact was reported in "Geopolitica", illustrating it with maps from this journal. The

author then reports on the opinions of Italian geopoliticians from the period of Germany's invasion of the USSR, also referring to the unification concepts of Central and Eastern Europe, including one by Józef Piłsudski.

Political geographer Marek Barwiński and historical geographer Łukasz Musiaka from the University of Lodz in their article *The Sikhs – religion and nation. Chosen political and social determinants of functioning* present an example of a nation aspiring to its own statehood but as a result of political arrangements finally divided by the Pakistani-Indian border. Starting from the historical origins of the Sikhs and their religious distinctiveness, they focus on the functioning of this minority in modern India and its economic success.

Robert Wieczorek from the Silesian Institute in Opole wrote an article entitled *Integration around regional development goals. Discourse concerning the European Social Fund utilization in Opolskie region*. The process of European integration was presented using the example of one Polish voivodeship. The author discussed the EU legal regulations concerning the functioning of European Social Fund, then presented the Polish regulations in this respect, followed by a presentation of the Communication Strategy of European Funds in Opolskie Voivodeship for years 2014–2020 and the role of the media in its popularisation in the Opole region.

Krystyna Krawiec-Złotkowska from Pomeranian Academy in Słupsk in her article entitled *NSZZ "Solidarity" notions for the state's role in social life. Their social and political roots and status in 3ʳᵈ Republic of Poland* showed the impact of ideas propagated by the first in the communist countries free trade union "Solidarity" on the political and social life and economy of Poland after 1989. The authors also showed the influence of these ideas on other communist states, and their path to political and economic freedom.

The presented volume 8 of "Studies in Political and Historical Geography" closes with an article by the team of historical geographer Anna Majewska from the University of Lodz and activists of the regional movement from Northern Poland – Krzysztof A. Worobiec of The "Sadyba" Association for the Protection of the Cultural Landscape of Masuria in Kadzidłowo and Edyta Bugowska from The "Światowid" Center for European Meetings in Elbląg. The topic of the article is *Locality in the era of globalization. Carriers of the memory of historical landscapes – studies on the Evangelical cemeteries of the Masuria region (Poland)*. The text is a fruit of field research done as part of two research projects on old Evangelical cemeteries carried out by A. Majewska in the Masuria region. The aim of the article is to present the cultural heritage of disappearing religious and national minorities in the light of modern research methods of contemporary archaeology used to study the cemeteries in Pasym and Wilki.

The articles collected in volume 8 of "Studies in Political and Historical Geography" by authors from Italy, Hungary, the United States and Poland show the diversity of views on the role of the state in the contemporary world and a wide range of research undertaken, mainly in Europe, on the issue of the influence of state structures on the functioning of societies, including national minorities. The editors hope that the material presented in this volume will be an inspiring reading for further studies on the role of the state in the life of societies.

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ARTICLES

Marek Sobczyński

Do we need state and what for?
The role of the state in the modern World

Abstract: The state is subject of interest to many scientific disciplines: constitutional and international law, sociology, philosophy, administrative and political sciences, social psychology, economics, political and economic history, military sciences, regional studies and, of course, political geography and geopolitics. In the course of history, from ancient to modern times, the state was defined in very different ways.

The author comes out in his deliberations from the analysis of the elements that make up the various definitions of the state. Then he reviews the classification of functions that the modern state fulfills and analyzes the way in which they are implemented in various countries around the world, trying to answer the question, is the state necessary for citizens and for what?

Finally, the author draws attention to the frequent undertaking of the subject matter of the functioning of the state in the world's belles-lettres in epic works and in dramas both in the past and nowadays.

The last issue raised in the paper is the analysis of the functioning of unrecognized countries, mainly European ones, and what are the consequences of their exclusion from the international community influencing the life of their inhabitants, economy and functioning of their societies.

Keywords: the role of the state, globalization, philosophy of the state.

Introduction – how the definitions of the state
have changed over time?

The state is a subject of interest of many scientific disciplines: constitutional and international law, sociology, philosophy, administrative and political sciences, social psychology, economics, political and economic history, military sciences, regional studies and, of course, political geography and geopolitics. In the course of history, from ancient to modern times, the state was defined in very different ways.

The definition of the state evolved with the appearance of different philosophical systems. It was based on changing elements or features of statehood, which determined the ways of which the complex socio-political structure of state was sought to be defined.

Let's try to recall certain stages of this process of defining the state.

The ancient Greek philosopher Plato (427–347 BC), an outstanding theoretician of the state, wrote down his views on this matter in 10 books. The ideal state according to Plato should strive to universality and permanence, should operate according to general and universal principles regardless of the conditions of its functioning; citizens should be steady in thinking and feeling, poets should be expelled from the city so they would not affect citizens by art. The state should have one goal for everyone; parts of the state should depend on the whole entity, because it's to be built like an organism, it must be based on knowledge; philosophers should be situated in the top positions as they possess the greatest knowledge. The state should be ascetic, because it aims to an ideal goal, the achievement of which does not provide citizens with any direct benefits, goods or even requires their renunciation; for the two higher classes of society, individual property is abolished; there is a communist system in which renunciation is common; the lowest class is not subjected to rigors because it does not participate in the pursuit of perfection.

Also in ancient Greece, Aristotle (384–322 BC) defined the state as "a community (organization) of various groups of people necessary for its existence" and, at the same time, a product of nature. The state in this view is a community of equals, i.e. only citizens performing military service and participating in representative assembles. For the existence of the state, non-citizens like peasants, craftsmen and all kinds of workers, were also needed.

In the circles of European Christian democracy very popular is the vision of the state proposed by Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), according to which "the state is a perfect community (*societas perfecta*) self-sufficient, independent and self-governing. The goal of the state is the common good (*bonum commune*), which is expressed in preserving peace and ensuring universal temporal happiness". The state, however, was supposed to arise as a result of the sin of people (Sidorkiewicz 2010: 216).

The famous German philosopher from Königsberg Immanuel Kant (1724–1804) considered the state as "association of number of people under the rule of law". Thus, the element of the rule of law as a civic duty appears in this definition.

The founder of the German philosophical school of panlogism Georg Hegel (1770–1831) defined the state as a "as a kind of God on Earth (*absolute being*)". In such a state, an individual can shape its identity and devote itself to the state.

It is also impossible to forget, especially in Central-Eastern Europe, about the existence of the Marxist ideology and its catastrophic impact on humanity.

The German founder of this ideology, Karl Marx (1818–1883), proclaimed that "the state is a tool of the ruling class". True power has always been in the hands of the "owners of the means of production" or the bourgeoisie. Marxists believed that the state should be in the hands of a minority. The primitive societies, as they argued, did not create states, because all individuals had a common interest and there was no class system. According to Friedrich Engels (1950), this means that the minority is the basis of the state's dominance, because it is the only way to restore power to the people.

These thoughts were later developed in a criminal way by Vladimir Ulyanov alias Lenin (1870–1924), according to who "the state is a machine for maintaining the control of one class over another – a forced organization serving to the ruling class". However, the French writer Alexis de Tocqueville (1945), warned that the state will become selfish if one class decide to dominate the other classes.

The Polish philosopher, sociologist, and the theoretician of the state and law from the interwar period Czesław Znamierowski (1888–1967) defined the state as a "ruling organization normalized by constitution, indispensable for a community of larger number of members living on a larger territory". The goal of the state is to protect and defend members of this group and to maintain internal order. In the state there are: the ruling group and politically passive unorganized mass – the ruled.

Unfortunately, Znamierowski did not specify the size of the population and the size of the territory necessary for the existence of the state. Today we know that such criteria do not exist, as evidenced by the functioning of a state deprived of territory (State of the Order of Malta), by examples of numerous countries which do not control their territories (e.g. Palestine, the Sahrawi Republic), and country with a small population, below 1 thousand people, in addition not always possessing citizenship of this state (the Vatican).

The modern American definition of the state proposed by J. Roland Pennock and D. Gregory Smith defines it as "a social organization that has conclusive power over all people living in a certain territory, whose main goal is to solve common problems, to secure common goods, and most of all to maintain order".

And finally, according to Weber, Gerth and Mills (1946: 48), "the state is a human community that successfully demands a monopoly on the legal use of physical force in a given territory".

Let's therefore try to recapitulate the perception of the essence of the state on the basis of several disciplines of science.

On the basis of political sciences: "The state is a compulsory organization, equipped with the attributes of supreme power in order to protect against external and internal threats, providing to the community inhabiting its territory, composed of interdependent groups with diverse interests, the conditions of existence favorable to their economic strength position and political influence".

On the other hand the modern functionalist philosopher Talcott Parsons (1967) views the state as an authoritative structure. He believes that authoritarianism is justified if it achieves a "social goal" on which society depends. He looks from the electoral perspective, where "the deposit of power" is revocable when the politician is not elected by voters in the next election.

For sociologists, "the state is the highest form of social organization, a great sovereign political institution controlling the area of a given country, involving all members of society or societies that inhabit its territory".

On the ground of international law, the Austrian-German lawyer Georg Jellinek (1851–1911), the author of the three-element concept of the state, argued that "the state is an organization of a nation settled in a specific territory, equipped with direct supreme authority" (Jellinek 1914: 144). For the existence of a state, a permanent population, a defined territory and sovereign power are necessary. In 1934, the Montevideo convention, added a fourth element to this definition – the ability to be legally recognized by the international community.

In this review we certainly cannot ignore the political geography. According to our colleague from Lodz Andrzej Suliborski and an outstanding Bulgarian political geographer Marin Bachvarov, "The state is a sovereign territorial entity acting in favour of political, economic, social and defence interests of its inhabitants" (Baczwarow, Suliborski 2002: 124).

What is the function of the state in the modern world and how is it implemented in practice?

According to the British political geographer David Storey (2001: 39), the state provides the legal framework, infrastructure and services to be used for the benefit of citizens.

In particular, the contemporary state fulfils the following functions:
– regulates the economy (however, there are theories postulating the maximum limitation of this function of the state),
– it provides public goods, such as health, education and transport services (though in many countries such services are currently privatized),
– it provides legal and other frameworks that guide the behaviour of citizens,
– it defends its territory and its citizens against external aggression and interventions (there are, however, countries that use only diplomatic means for their defence, and do not have armed forces in practice).

As you can see from among four basic functions of the state, as many as 3 are not always performed to the full extent. The only aspect that remains is the legal and social framework as an immovable pillar of state functions. However, there are countries that will not even fulfil this task in a proper way, e.g. Venezuela, Zimbabwe, Democratic Republic of the Congo, and unfortunately also closer to us Hungary and Poland.

In a large number of countries around the world, citizens have daily contact with the state. The post office, telegraph and telephone are mostly state institutions or stay in the hands of companies controlled by the state. The police are almost always state-owned, the same as the justice system. The issue of money is the exclusive privilege of a national bank, a state institution. The state organizes and equips armed forces, and often also legally obliges citizens to perform military service. In 1979, however, the United Kingdom initiated the process of privatization of certain spheres which until now have been the domain of the state. This process was followed later by other highly developed Western countries. Rail transport and water supply systems have been privatized. This process of so called "state rolling up" leads to minimizing the contact of the citizen with the state.

The role of the state in contemporary societies is to deal with the current problems of its citizens regardless of the geographical region, identity and culture. The features of the state combine the idealistic, functionalistic and organizational perspective, because they are compatible with its ubiquity, private and public sectors, legitimacy, domination and territorial aspects. This commitment is characterized by at least three bases; increasing number of interpersonal bonds (creating the world network), studying of the pace and depth of human evolution (history) and combining anthropological and ecological transformations (social, cultural, economic and technological).

There are many different types of countries. The most numerous are unitary states, in which power is centralized, there are a few federal states with a high level of political decentralization. There are authoritarian states with a fairly extensive control function and a low degree of social participation, but there are also more open state systems, symbolized by liberal democracies characteristic for the Western world. In a simplified way, there is a tendency to think about the relations between the state and the citizen as a freely introduced set of assignments. In fact, it does not occur in authoritarian states. Even in the so-called liberal democracies, where the electoral system ensures transparency, there are strivings to delve into the superficial appearance of the state as a repository of the collective will of its citizens to develop appropriate theories regarding the role and function of the state.

A very interesting illustration of the diversification of the level of democratization of individual states is the democracy index (Fig. 1). Its highest level was reached by the Scandinavian countries, and the British dominions Australia, New Zealand and Canada. The position of the United States (the same as India) is a very surprising and only slightly ahead of Poland. The worst state of democracy prevails in the belt of Central Africa, the Northern Korea, and Laos, the two Asian post-Soviet republic of Turkmenistan and Tajikistan, Syria, Yemen and Saudi Arabia.

In modern societies, the state is ruled by common ideologies, although there is a fundamental difference between the state and the government. Martin Wolf (2010) confirmed that the primary goal of the state is protection. However,

Fig. 1. The democracy index in 2018
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Democracy_Index [3.03.2019].

anarchists believe that state protection is pointless and one can rely on voluntary programs such as the social police. On the other hand, there is a common belief that the majority of citizens voluntarily recognize state protection against all factors that may destroy or harm them, both internally and externally.

Mancur Olson in the book *Power and prosperity* wrote that the state is a "stationary bandit", not a "wandering bandit". The "wandering bandit" has little interest in improving the economy, but the "stationary bandit" is looking for all possible means to develop citizens, and the state authorities always try to draw from the generated surplus controlled by them.

According to the Encyclical *Pacem in Terris*, the role of the state is to try to solve all problems. This may include changes in legislative conditions, changes in the constitution and changes in the moral standards of the state and its citizens. Moreover, authorities must govern society with discretion and make decisions with full knowledge of the law. The social agency of the state is to maintain some form of power through the appropriate bodies; this is done through moral and civil control. Democracy is further developed to facilitate citizenship education and to maintain public order and peace. The government's role in the political sphere is to intervene in public authorities, such as the political and legal structure of the state.

In the subject literature one can find numerous proposals for classifying the functions of the state (Sidorkiewicz 2010: 220).

Taking as a criterion the directions of the state's activity in relation to other political systems, one can distinguish following functions: adaptive, regulatory and innovative.

The adaptive function is associated with the process of adapting the activities of the state, its organs and structures to the changing reality (economic, social or cultural).

The regulatory function aims to develop specific rules for the organization of the state. The supreme thing is to maintain internal order in the state. Caring for an internal structure contributes to greater integrity. It is very important in this case to create good law.

The innovative function is based on the process of changes that are introduced into the state institutions. Indication of the direction of these changes or their initiation is a key issue. New elements may appear in the system (change in the ownership structure, modernization) that affect the system's changes or the rules of its functioning.

From the point of view of the universal directions of the state's activity, one can distinguish its functions: creation of norms, distribution of goods and values, and organizing function (Storey 2017).

According to the criterion of the spatial extent of the state's operation, two types of functions can be distinguished: internal and external (Sidorkiewicz 2010: 222). This division has already appeared in Aristotle.

The internal function aims at achieve and maintain social order within the state organization and it includes following activities: legislative, order, administrative, economic-organizing, social and cultural-educational. The external function includes border protection and international policy (Dudek *et al.* 2013: 6).

Almost all countries are trying to effectively protect their territory and maintain military forces for this purpose. There are, however, some exceptions (altogether 21 countries), and these are not only so-called micro-states, whose armed forces are equally microscopic and in practice do not guarantee them any defense. The Iceland does not have any army, however it is a member of NATO guarantying the defense of its territory. The possession of a regular army has also been renounced by a number of countries, including Costa Rica, Panama, Haiti, Mauritius, Solomon Islands and Vanuatu. In Europe, besides Iceland, Andorra, Liechtenstein, the Vatican and Monaco also have no army.

The scope of the internal functions of the state can be very diverse. This can be illustrated in a few examples.

An interesting example is the structure of state expenditure on the protection of citizen's health in 2014 (Fig. 2). In general, the percentage share of expenditure on health care in the total state budget reaches the highest values in the so-called highly developed countries (blue on the map, namely USA, Japan, New Zealand, the Netherlands and Switzerland – these are not surprising) but such countries as Uruguay, Nicaragua and Costa Rica stand out from this background. The low level of health protection in Libya, Cameroon, Eritrea and South Sudan, Pakistan Myanmar and Laos is also not a surprise, but again the position of oil-rich Azerbaijan is a negative surprise.

Fig. 2. Governmental expenditure on health in 2014 as a percentage
of the total government expenditure
Source: WHO Statistics.

The Human Development Index (HDI) in 2017 is a very good measuring instrument of comprehensive state care over the citizen. It is dominated by two countries of North America (United States and Canada), four Pacific states (Australia, New Zealand, Korea and Japan), the Benelux and Scandinavian countries and Ireland, the United Kingdom, Germany, Austria Switzerland and Israel. At the other extreme of the HDI are almost all of Africa and a large part of Asia (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Human Development Index in 2017
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Human_Development_Index [3.03.2019].

Another measure of the level of democracy in economic terms is the index of economic freedom, which shows a picture quite different from the one expected (Fig. 4). The fact that North Korea, Myanmar and other dictatorships strongly restrict the freedom of economic activity is not a surprise, but the positions of Ukraine, Argentina, Iran, Brasil and India are surprising. Full economic freedom prevails only in the South Pacific and in Switzerland. The position of Botswana and Jordan (equal to Poland) is surprising.

Fig. 4. Index of the Economic Freedom 2018
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Index_of_Economic_Freedom [3.03.2019].

Even in the group of the most developed countries in the world, social care is strongly diversified, as its shown on the graph for the OECD countries presenting the share of retirement in the level of wages (Fig. 5). Retirement that the Dutch can get is close to 90% of their former salary, which is over three times better than that offered to the British (22%). It is interesting to note the very modest offer of the government of the United States (retirement pension is 40% of the salary) of Ireland and Japan for its citizens. Poland, despite of being a former socialist state with the long tradition of broad social assistance, is already at the bottom of this chart, while Slovakia and Hungary are still in the upper half.

The last analyzed indicator is the percentage of help for mothers who gave birth to a child covered by state aid (Fig. 6). High (over 90%) is in parts of Europe, including Scandinavia and former communist countries of Central Europe, as well as in Greece (as we know today overgrowing possibilities of its government) and in New Zealand. It is shocking that only two countries do not give help to the mother of the child, one of them is Papua New Guinea are the second is United States.

Fig. 5. Social security benefits as a percentage of earnings in OECD countries in 2015
Source: own elaboration.

Fig. 6. Governmental support to mothers who gave birth to a child (2018)
Sources: WHO.

The image of the state in belles-lettres

The essence of the state is of interest not only to political scientists or historians but also to writers and poets. The topos of the state as a social institution appeared in numerous works of belles-lettres. Already ancient philosophers in their treatises, dramas or poems have often referred to the functioning of states. As examples, you can recall works such as: Sophocles *Antigone* or Plato's *State*. In modern times, the works of *Utopia* by Thomas More, *On the spirit of the laws* Montesquieu's (Charles Louis de Secondat), *The Prince* by Niccolo Machiavelli, *The tragedy of Macbeth* by William Shakespeare were particularly important.

The books of *Nineteen-eighty four* and the *Animal farm* of George Orwell and *The trial* and *The castle* of Franz Kafka are considered as symbols of literature devoted to the exercise of power. The essence of power and state affects world--famous works *Breve new world* of Aldous Huxley and *Fatelessness* by Imre Kertész, or the work of the Soviet dissident Alexandr Solzhenitsyn – *The Gulag archipelago*.

Politics, state and government system play a particularly important role in the Ibero-American literature. Writers and poets were at the forefront of revolutionary movements (Jose Marti in Cuba, Jorge Amado in Brazil), and sometimes they also exercised power (Sergio Ramirez vicepresident of the Nicaragua). Numerous references to politics and the role of the state can be found in the works of such writers and poets as: Echeverría Estéban, Jorge Borges, Julio Cortazar, Carlos Fuentes, Osvaldo Soriano, Pablo Neruda, Gabriel Garcia Marquez, Alejo Carpentier, Juan Carlos Onetti, Mario Vargas Llosa.

Also in Polish literature, one can find many works politically engaged which refer to the essence of the state and power. The outstanding examples are: *A brief discussion among three persons: a lord, a commune chief, and a priest* of Mikołaj Rey, *The dismissal of the Greek envoys* of Jan Kochanowski, *On the improvement of the Commonwealth* of Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski, *The Sejm sermons* of Piotr Skarga, *The return of the deputy* of Julian Ursyn Niemcewicz, and *Konrad Wallenrod* of Adam Mickiewicz. After regaining independence in Poland in the inter-war period, the subject of state continued to be discussed in Stefan Żeromski's works *The labors of Sisyphus and Seedtime*. In the period of communism, when it was not impossible to criticize the totalitarianism of communism, appeared books by Ryszard Kapuściński showing the absolutist systems in Ethiopia (*The emperor*) and Iran (*Shah of shahs*). There were also books published in the underground or on emigration like *The captive mind* of Czesław Miłosz, *The world apart* of Gustaw Herling-Grudziński, *Tango* of Sławomir Mrożek and *My century* of Aleksander Watt.

Non-recognized states and consequences of this fact for their citizens

The importance of efficient functioning of the state for its citizens can be assessed by analyzing several examples of countries that are *de facto* existing but are not recognized by the international community. The criterion of non-recognition is not only the fact of absolute lack of recognition, because there are only five such cases (Transnistria, Nagorno-Karabakh, People's Republics of Donetsk and Luhansk and Somaliland), but also cases of countries enjoying only a trace recognition (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – recognized by Turkey and Abkhazia and South Ossetia recognized by 5 countries in the world, including Russia and Syria) (Fig. 7).

Fig. 7. Non-recognized states
Source: own elaboration.

Most of these countries owed their independent existence to the victorious wars which resulted in separation from another country (e.g. Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Cyprus, Ukraine). Only Somaliland had disconnected from Somalia without a fight during the disintegration of the state but then had to fight against the other units that emerged in parallel with Somalia (e.g. with Puntland, which, in fact, is independent but did not declare its independence, as Somaliland did). This means that their infrastructure has been damaged in the course of the wars and in almost all cases has not been completely rebuilt until today.

The status of unrecognized states is not ephemeral, but seems to be permanent, as it has lasted for 43 years in Northern Cyprus, 28 years in Transnistria, 27 years in Somaliland, Nagorno-Karabakh and South Ossetia, for 26 years in Abkhazia

and only for 4 years in case of republics in the east of Ukraine. In the first case, already two generations, in the other five cases one generation, were born in non--existing countries.

In another situation are the citizens of countries that enjoy a trace of international recognition, but the recognition by the immediate neighbour is crucial.

Abkhazia has its own currency (apsar) but it is only issued in the form of commemorative coins, whereas the Russian ruble is in circulation. The Russian ruble is the currency of most post-Soviet non-recognized states, including the Donetsk and Luhansk republics, with the exception of Nagorno-Karabakh, where the Armenian currency (dram) is on operation and Transnistria, which issues its own ruble. In 2004 Poland received and accomplished the order for the production of coins for Transnistria (treating them as tokens) (Krause 2013; Czubik 2009: 133). In Northern Cyprus the currency is Turkish lira.

The Abkhazian-Georgian border was closed for a long time (Szczerek 2011). Both countries, Abkhazia (Apsny) and South Ossetia (Hussar Iryston), belong to the Russian economic zone, are based on energy supplies from Russia and are protected by the Russian army. They are, therefore, a *de facto* part of Russia, just like after 2014 Crimea, which independence lasted only 24 hours. Abkhazia, once a Russia's Black See Riviera, today also counts on tourists but only from Russia and its revenues are much smaller than in the times of belonging to Georgia. An important export product is wine. South Ossetia has never been a tourist region and exists only thanks to Russian subsidies, as it practically does not have its own economy.

The passports of these countries allow their citizens to cross the border with Russia, otherwise they are useless, because they rather do not take trips to Venezuela, Nicaragua or Nauru. However, for a trip to other European countries, for example, they must obtain a passport of universally recognized states, therefore most often they apply for citizenship of Russia.

The actual political status of unrecognized countries is also different. With the exception of Somaliland, which has all the characteristics of a sovereign entity, all the others are at least protectorates if not colonies of the metropolises with which they are actually associated (Russia, Armenia and Turkey). In all these cases (with the exception of Somaliland), the aggressor's troops which led to their secession are stationing on their territory.

Only North Cyprus is in a relatively good economic situation, probably better than Turkey itself. All other countries are in a deep economic crisis, or, as in the case of eastern Ukraine, they have only grey economy, because they are the front zone.

Lack of recognition of the state plays an important role in private/internal law. The unrecognized states exercise real control over the area and population living in it, and introduce their own legal and judicial system. Economic and civil trade with these units is a necessity and intensifies the longer they exist (Czubik 2009: 121).

The International Court of Justice's regulations concerning relations with *de facto* regimes or with the belligerents are applicable here, but there are no universal rules established and each state decides about the form of these relations. In the most difficult situation are the countries neighboring the unrecognized state, because in principle they cannot ignore its existence. The relations with the former metropolis and its attitude towards secessionist units are also important. Georgia rejects the existence of countries detached from it by force and Poland treats them in the same way because of friendly relations with Georgia. Syria, on the other hand, recognized both countries in 2018. Despite of the lack of recognition of Transnistria, Poland is one of its main (apart from Russia) trade partners, because the relations from the communist period between these two are still lasting, for example in the steel industry in Rybnica. The Sheriff Company of Tiraspol, dominating in Transnistria, is an importer of goods from Poland. Even Transnistrian authorities include people of Polish descent (Kosienkowski 2012). In August 2018 it was also revealed that the Polish government is importing anthracite from the Donetsk Republic, which was opposed by Ukraine.

Conclusions

States provide a policy framework that regulates (directly or indirectly) many aspects of our lives. Through the idea of the nation, they also play a key role in shaping identity and promoting a sense of community with potentially positive or negative implications (Storey 2017: 121).

Despite their apparent stability, states are not immutable units. They are historically conditioned by the territory (and the life of people on it) that they control. States are not only founded, they are being created and reproduced, and sometimes they are also subjected to challenges and fall. Through various state institutions and agencies, we begin to think territorially and this strongly focused approach to the state serves to rectify the current political and territorial structure. However, countries are not and have never been carefully limited spatial structures. They can still be perceived as dynamically developing individuals shaped by social interactions, economic, cultural and political activity. Despite all global international connections, the state and the idea of its sovereignty do not seem to be in decline. Recognizing its disputable character, the prognosis of the fall of the state and the arrival of a world without borders, still seems a very distant fact. While money flows relatively freely across international boundaries, many people (depending on who they are, where they come from and where they are trying to go) encounter a deterrent infrastructure at border crossings representing a hostile face of the state controlling its territory.

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Czy potrzebujemy państwa i do czego? Rola państwa we współczesnym świecie

Zarys treści: Państwo jest przedmiotem zainteresowania wielu dyscyplin naukowych: prawa konstytucyjnego i międzynarodowego, socjologii, filozofii, nauk administracyjnych, nauk politycznych, psychologii społecznej, nauk ekonomicznych, historii politycznej i gospodarczej, nauk wojskowych, regionalistyki i oczywiście geografii politycznej oraz geopolityki. W toku dziejów, począwszy od starożytności po czasy współczesne, państwo było bardzo różnie definiowane. Autor wychodzi zatem w swych rozważaniach od analizy elementów składających się na różne definicje państwa. Następnie dokonuje przeglądu klasyfikacji funkcji, które pełni współczesne państwo i analizuje sposób, w jaki są one realizowane w różnych krajach na świecie, próbując odpowiedzieć na pytanie: do czego państwo jest potrzebne obywatelom?

Następnie Autor zwraca uwagę na częste podejmowanie tematyki funkcjonowania państwa w światowej literaturze pięknej zarówno w utworach epickich, jak i w dramatach zarówno w przeszłości, jak i obecnie.

Ostatnim zagadnieniem podjętym w wystąpieniu jest analiza funkcjonowania państw nieuznanych, głównie europejskich i konsekwencje faktu ich wykluczenia ze społeczności międzynarodowej dla życia ich mieszkańców, gospodarki i funkcjonowania ich społeczeństw.

Słowa kluczowe: rola państwa, globalizacja, filozofia państwa.

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The State – a necessity or an enemy?

Abstract: This paper seeks to show the State in its historical and analytical approaches. In view of history, we find two principal solutions. In this text they are called metaphysical and contractual. The metaphysical solution is characteristic of the pre-modern era with its Aristotelian claim that we carry the social principle in our human nature; the principle is the spawning ground for the State. Now, the contractual, i.e. the modern, approach defines the State as a result of human negotiation. Historically speaking, there have been many proposals along the spectrum from an overgrown institution to its, much atrophied, form. The author proposes a modest approach to our understanding of the State: it is needed from the well-being of social community. The condition, however, of this well--being is that the State be limited, allowing much space for its society to grow and form indispensable interrelations.

Keywords: history, Hobbes, Locke, limitation, Ludwig von Mises, Nock, Poland, Spencer, State.

Lex facit legem[1]

There are many definitions of the State. Aristotle understood it as a perfection of the social principle inherent in human nature, whereas St. Augustine saw in the State a remedy against human depravity, therefore its main purpose was to curb human evil drives. The State performs a negative function: to prohibit antisocial behaviour. Sinless and perfect human beings would not need any State. St. Thomas Aquinas, for his part, followed the Aristotelian model, i.e. the State understood as a perfection and institutional form of the social principle. The moderns came up with their own definitions. In their view, the State is the result of a social contract, the establishment of the State is negotiable.

Apart from these, say, positive views as to the practicability of the State, history up to now has witnessed numerous attempts to undermine its rationale. Such attempts are not new, for they had already appeared in antiquity among the group of the naturalistically-minded Sophists. They set the model of private lifestyles in opposition to the publically approved rules. As we know, many contemporary

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[1] This phrase was well known both in Poland and in England. It held that the king was bound by the law.

schools of democracy, liberalism or anarchy are founded in antiquity. Nowadays liberal democracy appears to be the most universally advocated political regime. In the western countries it seems to be the only rational form of political institutions.

Some claim, for instance, that democratic states are more prone for peace than others (Rummel 1997: 25–49). Can we accept this conclusion without any reservations? Most probably not, taking into consideration quite recent cases of journalists censored whenever their reports on some current events are contrary to the authorities' expectations, or else they fail to satisfy the requirements of political correctness. (An almost classical example for me is the way journalists cover any conflicts with immigrants from African countries. If the comments go against the official line of propaganda, they are rejected and their authors are ostracised. Some western politicians harbour a grudge against those from Eastern Europe who oppose uncontrolled immigration)[2]. All such measures obviously contradict freedom of speech, which is the bloodstream of democracy, and, at least theoretically, the most cherished value in otherwise democratic countries. Naturally, we have to admit that, potentially, democracy provides certain conditions for peaceful coexistence, but just like any other political system is not immune from corruption.

Presently we may often feel at a loss. We are living in a globalizing world, so we have a very vague sense of state borders, a feeling common especially in the EU countries. Now contemporary States often embark on multicultural policies. Such policies in turn take on a very cosmopolitan form. This comes eventually to rejecting the foundations on which human identity can be established. Who am I if this State, immersed in the maelstrom of globalizing and multicultural influences, abandons its concrete cultural shape? If the State is an outcome of a long historical process, as I claim it is, what happens to the State that denies its identity? Can human identity develop if it is not buttressed by strong identity--making constructions of the State, i.e. socio-cultural institutions?

The above questions are important in any serious discussions about the State. This text seeks to show in brief its basic foundations in their historical outline. Part I focuses on the rise of the modern State, part II claims that for a proper development of society the State must be limited, and part III discusses some elements of Polish history.

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[2] See I. Krastev, 2017, *After Europe*, p. 45. For instance, Krastev's book criticizes the conservatives from Hungary or Poland. He rightly observes that the citizens from Central Europe "for the most of the twentieth century […] were preoccupied either with emigrating or with taking care of immigrants" (p. 46), but at the same time he fails to notice these immigrations were basically within the same culture and presented no danger with which we are confronted at the moment.

The rise of the modern State

The moderns began to consider the essence of the State and its claims when they realized that they could renegotiate its many functions which had up to then been taken for granted. Philosophically speaking, modernity can be defined as a daring project to look a new not only at the scientific but also political picture of the world. As a result, modernity dared to undermine numerous time-honoured institutions. It began to doubt the claims to unconditional obedience to the State, stressed the importance of the individual and social communities to which the individual belongs. An important question arose: is the individual subservient to the State or the State should be subservient to the individual?

As we look at the history of the State, we find two basic sources of its conception: let us call them natural (or: metaphysical) and contractual. The natural source goes back to ancient philosophy, in particular to Aristotle, where we find human nature being a composite of individual and social elements. Thus the State is anchored in human social nature. The structure of the State is therefore not superimposed on otherwise purely individual human beings. It is rather the other way round: the State is a natural development of social character, it is the perfection of social elements inherent in human beings.

Now the contractual vision of the State views the human being as primarily individual and it is for the sake of his individualism that it is invented or, to be precise, negotiated. If the State is not rooted in human nature, there must be some good reasons for inventing it. In relation to various contracts, just as in trading, the State is tailored to human needs. Thomas Hobbes, for that matter, envisioned it as a safeguard against the vulnerable and frail human life. First he defined the hypothetical pre-political State as a very precarious and inauspicious time for human beings in which they may easily lose their lives, for it is the time of blind power. Those who are more powerful prevail. There is no justice and no court of appeal to which the needy can turn; they risk their lives unless they create a State – their Leviathan that will define justice and create an arbitration court. For Hobbes, unlike for Aristotle, the individual is naturally anti-social. The position Hobbes held was already anticipated by the naturalist ancient philosophers.

For John Locke, the pre-political state was not that pessimistic as in Hobbes because the human beings are providentially endowed by God with certain natural goods, the *bona civilia*, including life, liberty, and the right to private property. Henceforth human beings do not have to attend on the State (the contractual entity) to define their communal life. The State's end is much more modest – it is supposed to protect what has otherwise being granted by the Supernatural Being.

Yet another conception of the pre-political state is found in Jean Jacques Rousseau. In his conception, the human being is naturally good but surrounded by artificial conventions. This vision is clearly revolutionary, for the good human

being feels entitled (or even encouraged) to do away with the artificial framework, to decompose it in order to help the free and good human creature live according to his own purposes. The revolution should extricate him from hostile environment.

Despite the fact that at the moment many supranational organizations exist, the nation-States are still present. Modern States were born under very violent circumstances in Europe. Let us mention some of them: the Thirty Years' War (1618–1648). This war had brought the fragile medieval order to an end, a fact that completed the processes initiated by the Reformation. It was waged on a very delicate ground of religious differences and shocked European inhabitants with its cruelty. Therefore the idea of toleration was born in the European minds. Politically speaking it was the Peace of Westphalia (1648) that marked the end of atrocities. Henceforth the state as a sovereign entity came to existence.

Europe came to be dominated by nation-States, and it is at that time that "processes were set in motion that led Europe to dominate the world" (Ray 1990: 188). Not only were European nation-states (Spain, Portugal, Great Britain, and the Netherlands) politically dominant on the global stage, but they also became dominant in the area of economics. The Renaissance ushered in the spirit of exploration and exploitation that began an unprecedented period of European robustness. The Europeans spread civilization all over the world, at least they regarded themselves as such. The American political scientist, James Lee Ray, claims that exploitation boosted global development and although it created many problems, "people who remained isolated from that system did not live in a pristine paradise, either" (Ray 1990: 189).

The eighteenth century was dominated by dynasty conflicts and "a series of balance-of-power wars, with the British and the French being the major opponents" (Ray 1990: 190). It was also cosmopolitan in action. Various countries employed diplomats from other countries, and nationalities intermingled. Royal families intermarried, for they hoped to limit conflicts. Ray observes: "In the eighteenth century, states were cross-pressured in the sense that their antagonism toward each other was softened by the possibility of relatives being in the service of opponents" (Ray 1990: 190). One of the most spectacular conflicts then is the War of the Spanish Succession (1702–1713). Royal families, e.g. the French Bourbons, the Hapsburgs and the English, were very often rivals to domination. Then, towards the end of the eighteenth century, yet another player was gradually stepping onto the global stage, namely the United States of America. Interestingly enough, this player, although at the moment of its inception ridiculed or ignored, would ultimately dominate the stage. It was difficult to retain the balance-of-power principle, therefore this is perhaps why the appearance of a new political body over the Atlantic Ocean was initially treated with mistrust and discontent. Europeans did not believe in the permanent existence of a republic. And here again we find some evidence for the fact that inasmuch as the fragile European order resulted

from short-lived periods of amity in the balance of power, the American order was founded on the modern philosophical ideas. America had not rivals of some political significance to negotiate with, therefore despite the climatic difficulties and the hostility of the aborigines, it was relatively easier to set in motion a series of action. Let us take for example the famous Louisiana Purchase (1803). The owners of Louisiana were far away and involved in conflicts. Louisiana originally belonged to the French and then it was sold to the Spanish. When the idea of retrocession arose in the French minds, for they also cherished the idea of a New France, the Americans stepped in with an offer of a large sum of money. Napoleon desperately needed some recompense for his battles in Europe, so he eventually complied. Sadly enough, Poland in the eighteenth century had ceased to exist; she was partitioned between Prussia, Austria, and Russia.

The French Revolution that erupted towards the end of the eighteenth century is often defined as the climax of modern philosophy in its attempts to liberate the individual and to place him amidst some universal and negotiable context of the legal framework. Inspired by modern philosophy, in its enlightened version, people attempted to recompose the world, placing in its centre the knowing ego (Cartesian *ego cogito*). Initially, the aims of the revolution were modest, simply "liberty, equality, and brotherhood for the French people" (Ray 1990: 190), but then the revolution turned expansionistic[3]. This expansionism, as a way of self-defence reaction on the part of France's enemies, triggered nationalism amongst them. As a consequence of the Napoleonic wars, the spirit of national liberation was born: the Greeks, the Hungarians, the Poles, and the Italians fought for national liberation (to mention just a few examples in Europe, but there were other countries as well that yearned for it). Despite the negative side effects of colonization, Europe was generally looked up and, as Ray states, apart from the critics others "have adhered enthusiastically to the European concept of nationalism and have clearly desired to imitate Europe by developing modern states" (Ray 1990: 194).

In fact we are presently dealing with various modifications of the above models, which mix certain elements. At the moment, at least officially, the inhabitants of the West vacillate between a limited power of the State and demands for an enlarged welfare system. In this dynamic liaison between the State and society, the latter is always trying to retain some space of independence, but at the same time expecting from the State to introduce safety measures. Surprisingly, the contradictory character of such demands is ignored. Let us look briefly at some examples of unlimited power[4]. No matter who holds the power: a king, a president, or a parliament, it must be checked.

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[3] It is interesting to observe that America, for that matter, sought to retain her neutrality rights. In the nineteenth century she was dominated by ideas of expansionism.

[4] See the negative examples of unlimited power in: R.J. Rummel, 1997, *Power Kills. Democracy as a Method of Nonviolence*, *passim*.

The State must be limited or eliminated

In his well-known classic, Herbert Spencer calls the divine right of kings "the great political superstition", and he rightly observes that this superstition still holds because it is transferred on "the divine rights of parliaments". Spencer writes: "The oil of anointing seems unawares to have dipped from the head of the one on to the heads of the many, and given sacredness to them also and to their decrees" (Spencer 1982: 123). The British philosophers ridicule this new attitude, rightly observing that inasmuch as the divine right of kings was incorrect at least it was more consistent than the present reverence for parliaments. Bestowing divine rights upon kings (or any individuals) is just as improper and indicative of idolatry as the naïve belief in the voice of the popular infallible opinion residing in parliaments. Spencer therefore claims that no one has the right to unlimited power or unconditional obedience because no one is in possession of absolute truth. As regards parliaments, the situation in Europe is even more complicated because apart from State parliaments we have the supranational parliament that claims our obedience.

The American Founding Fathers knew well about it, so they included the mechanism of the division of powers and checks and balances in the governmental structure. The State cannot become a machine empowered with uncurbed possibilities. Rather, it should be inherently divided into a multitude of interests which compete with one another.

Modernity had brought many liberal overtones into the thinking about the State. Kalyvas and Katznelson claim that liberalism is a natural consequence of republicanism. Republicanism was a mediate structure between monarchy and liberalism, especially in the period between 1750 and 1830, when "antimonarchical discourse was predominantly republican" (Kalyvas, Katznelson 2008: 4). The issues under consideration focused on how to combine "virtue and self-interest, the common and the personal, sovereignty and representation, authority and freedom, law and ethics" (Kalyvas, Katznelson 2008: 3). All these elements in fact make up the main fabric of any State, therefore we can treat them as an enlarged context of what the State should consist in. No doubt virtuous society is important and may even be treated as a prerequisite for a proper functioning of the State, but modernity argues that it is not the State's role to make people virtuous. In the medieval past the Church was an important moderating factor, but under the circumstances of divided Christianity, plurality of religions, and an array of multicultural ideas religion has ceased to provide a consistent message on what should be done. The situation has become very complicated but not hopeless. We can still rely on the testimonies of concrete people. Witnessing as important though it be, it is not enough, neither does it have to be. When reflecting on the State and on its principal structures, we can still claim that no matter how varied its social elements may be there are certain ingredients without which no State can exist.

If we take the United States of America, for instance, we find there the underpinning elements of Lockean *bona civilia*: life, liberty, and private property translated in the American context into life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. This is the philosophical heritage, aside to many others. Now the theological element is the perception that God created all people equal – such was the underlying principle of the Declaration of Independence. Theoretically speaking, these elements are clear, so that common sense may readily accept them. In practice, however, we know how tedious was the process of understanding and implementing the basic truth that people are equal because God made them equal. The interesting thing is that once this truth is undermined, the philosophical part is refuted as well. If black communities are not treated as consisting of equal human beings, neither are treated their life and liberty (let alone the pursuit of happiness) as deserving the like respect.

The founder of the Austrian School of Economics, Ludwig von Mises, is a realist in his approach to the existence of government. In his *Human Action* we read that "[a government] always furthers the interests of some groups of people at the expense of other groups. It never serves what is called the commonweal of the public welfare" (Mises 1966: 422). He is well aware that human beings are not ideal creatures. Their plans must often be enforced, if they wish to peacefully carry them out. Society is a complex structure of a variety of interrelations. Governments counteract any attempts at the decomposition of asocial forces. Mises certainly realizes that social peace is a necessary condition for the implementation of plans. Therefore there must be provision "for violent prevention and suppression of antisocial action on the part of refractory individuals and groups of individuals" (Mises 1966: 719). Individuals are not ideal creatures, hence violence on the part of the State is not wrong in itself because individuals are often violent and chaotic. The legal order, if it is to mean anything, must carry along enforcement. The individuals understood as rational creatures, that is, capable of recognizing the law, should also be aware that they could be punished for its violation. Government is not an evil in itself, for such a description would boil down to a value judgment. Rather, one should adopt a pragmatic approach, i.e. the State is a means to an end. The State should neither be deified nor denigrated, unless we understand human beings differently than they really are. It follows from this that if we want to realize our plans, we need to be subjected to certain limitations.

Mises lays out this pragmatic order when he writes: "The sphere in which coercion and compulsion is applied and the content of the laws which are to be enforced by the police apparatus are conditioned by the social order adopted. As State and government are designed to make this social system operate safely, the delimitation of governmental functions must be adjusted to its requirements. The only standard for the appreciation of the laws and the methods for their

enforcement is whether or not they are efficient in safeguarding the social order which it is desired to preserve" (Mises 1966: 720).

Contrary to libertarian approach, especially that of anarchocapitalists, Mises does not consider the State as such, an ideal being distilled from its context, a hypostasis of Reason. The State for him is related to the overall social structure and the ends it seeks to attain. In Aristotle, the State results from human social nature; in Mises, it is accrued to utilitarian principle. Aristotle elicits the ingredients of social life from human social nature; Mises refers them to the social system that has been established. Therefore there is no justice as such, there is justice in relation to the system, i.e. related to expediency and welfare. Mises explains: "It is not justice that determines the decision in favour of a definite social system. It is, on the contrary, the social system which determines what should be deemed right and what wrong" (Mises 1966: 721). Here we have what I would call a Platonic approach rather than Aristotelian, or deduction rather than induction. In other words, we deduce justice from our social organization, i.e. first we have the ideal superstructure from which we can define its practical implementation. We cannot understand what is right or wrong outside the social system. Shall we then justify any system as long as it is coherent if we cannot evaluate its elements? There is no metalanguage by which we could evaluate individual elements of a given system. It is therefore futile to criticize for instance intervention as such. We can criticize it, however, in relation to its being useful for social cooperation.

The nineteenth-century political writer, Frédéric Bastiat, provides us with a very important lesson as to our understanding of the State. First of all, we need to make a distinction between what the State is and what our expectations with regard to the State are. Besides, it follows from this distinction that quite frequently we cherish contradictory sentiments. For instance, we want to have our State limited, with a low level of taxes, and at the same time we expect it to lavish benefits on its citizens. One should make a decision: either a modest State or a generous one. We cannot have both. A modest State does not need much money, its bureaucratic staff is reduced, for it does not aspire to solve all the problems; a generous State gives a very misleading sense of sympathy and safety. Is citizens believe that they live under the shelter of a very benevolent government. They fail to notice that their State relies entirely on the money it receives in the form of taxes.

Obviously, some people may argue whether the State needs an identity. I think that in the long run a State without any identity cannot last longer, cannot withstand all the external forces that push it. We should avoid that maelstrom of narrow nationalism, but to cherish patriotic feelings is not coequal to hostile nationalism. As it was once excellently formulated by Agnes Heller, the Jewish Hungarian philosopher, fundamentalism is there where there are no foundations. It follows from this statement that foundations can or even should exist with running the risk of turning into fundamentalism.

In my opinion, all these critical remarks intended to undermine the very existence of the State usually result from two reasons: 1) the State ignores society, 2) the State is used (or, rather, abused) by some groups in order to oppress other groups. If the State, for instance, accrues to itself too much power, different groups compete to politically appropriate it in order to use it for their own benefit. Then a certain phenomenon takes place that is called by Nock "the conversion of social power into State power" (Nock 1989: 11). Talking about States one cannot omit the question of the relationship between power and authority. Are they synonymous or entirely different? Those who hold power do they possess thereby authority? Ray clearly defines it as a "distinction between what a state *possesses* and what a state is able to *do*" (Ray 1990: 194). We may say that if a State is very populous and occupies a large territory it is powerful, namely it has powerful resources, but does it at the same time have authority over the minds of its citizens? In other words, can this State dictate what its citizens should do, whether they can travel abroad, or what they are supposed to produce? The question is therefore about the limits of the State. How powerful should it be and what is the most effective manner in which the State's power can be exploited for the benefit of its citizens?

Nineteenth-century anarchists sought to annihilate the State. Karl Marx believed that the State would gradually cease to exist and be replaced by the international brotherhood of men, but the State was needed at the initial stage of the revolution that was to come.

The unrestricted power is naturally manifested by the ruler who usurps to rule his country with an iron fist, accepts no opposition, and crushes any criticism. In 1984, the Georgian film director Tengiz Abuladze produced a film entitled *Repentance*, a work that was immediately acclaimed as unprecedented and remarkable. Indeed this film deserves to be called a masterpiece, a genial portrayal of the depravity of totalitarian power. The film is full of symbolical, oneiric, realist and surrealist elements. It aspires to depict not a particular ruler, but to portray a dictator as such. It is a kind of cross section of totalitarian rulers no matter in which epoch they live, indeed a synthesis of a dictator, his epitome, be that Caligula, Hitler, Stalin or Pol Pot – all of them fit in the picture[5]. Therefore the actors are dressed in the uniforms of Roman soldiers, which means that the temporal dimension is not important and antiquity can be analysed just like the twentieth century. The audience must be prepared to these rapid shifts of attention and the historical perspective. Everything is immersed in symbolism. Even the name of the main hero is a meaningful symbol. It is Warlam Arawidze, a name which in Georgian means "the son of no one". Why is the totalitarian ruler "the son of no one?". I think that at least two reasons can be given for that:

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[5] See an extensive analysis of the totalitarian State in: L. von Mises, 1985, *Omnipotent Government. The Rise of the Total State and Total War*, *passim*; also F. Oppenheimer, 1997, *The State*, trans. J. Gitterman, *passim*.

1) first he does not need any relations, no external legitimacy for his power, indeed social relations only intrude. The ruler draws inspirations from the immanent world of his ideas rather than from the lives of real persons. He does not need any knowledge about society, what is more, in fact he does not need society at all, he is satisfied with an ideal vision, 2) the ruler does not need to create any social relations. They are even dangerous for the preservation of his power. They inspire opinions independent of, or contrary to, the authorities. Rather, the dictator creates interdependent relationships in which he is always the most important mediator. Society is under constant surveillance. Thus the dictatorial becomes an intimate of complete solitude, an immanent inhabitant of his self-proclaimed kingdom. Not only is there something unsocial in it, but even inhuman.

The State and civil society – the case of Poland

The question of limitation is linked with another question: to what extent, if at all, do we have to foster (and, consequently, value) the societal units in order to obtain a coherent whole? In our attempts to answer this question much depends on the goal of the one who keeps control. But what if there is no control because the structural elements of the State are not sovereign? They are subordinate to foreign institutions. How about the situation when there is too much control? Can we imagine the State as a self-controlled mechanism?

The American sociologist, Amitai Etzioni, writes about societal consciousness. Is the State necessary to preserve it? Poland is a good example that the State may not exist, yet society can retain its fundamental institutions even though it is subjected to enforced emigration. At the time of partitions society was dispersed in other countries. What is therefore retained in societal consciousness? The State does not exist, the invaders have taken over its institution, and yet members of the invaded nation retain something that decides about their identity as Poles. Lack of independence is a good evidence of the importance of meaningful symbols which define the ethos and culture. Etzioni calls them core institutions. In his book we read:

> The development or construction of core *institutions*, limited primarily to the members of a cohesive societal unit, serves to symbolize the unit and to make it more visible to itself and to others, express its identity, and increase interaction among its members to the exclusion of non-members. A major way in which consciousness can be «concretized» is to associate it with a place and a related set of activities (Etzioni 1971: 231).

In order to retain national identity, when living in a foreign country, one must adhere to national values. How can we concretize consciousness in a foreign place? What kind of activities should be cultivated? Now the question is whether societal consciousness precedes collective action or else collective action precedes

societal consciousness. If we consider the Polish uprisings of the nineteenth century, collective action was transformed into some violent expression of the yearning for sovereignty.

In the nineteenth century, at the time when Poland was partitioned and wiped out of the map of Europe, Polish conservative thought flourished – a fact that sounds contradictory. Conservatism is apparently associated with some efforts to preserve the *status quo*. There are in fact two tendencies at work here. Let us call them political and social (or societal). With regard to the political, it was naturally the time of revolutionary upheavals, therefore the time of liberating movements against the political *status quo* (we need to bear in mind that liberalism was born in the first half of the nineteenth century); within the social sphere, however, conservatism meant strong adherence to Polish history, language, religion, and institutions. Therefore the American historian of ideas, Rett Ludwikowski, rightly observes in his book "that the loss of independence need not undermine the foundations of society". And he enumerates: "the hierarchical structure of society, natural solidarity among social groups, the position of the family, religious foundations, and moral values were still intact" (Ludwikowski 1991: 2)[6]. Here the point of reference was the first in Europe (and the second in the modern world) written constitution (May 3, 1791). Now considering the Polish present and past the most important question is what should be preserved and continued and what should be discarded.

The tradition of Polish constitutionalism, i.e. the limitation of the king's power, goes back to the fifteenth century. At the time when other countries sought to reinforce absolutism, King Louis and King Jagiełło transformed Poland's hereditary monarchy into an elective kingdom. The king had to swear from then on to respect and protect fundamental governmental principles (free elections, the legislative power of Parliament, and the nobles' right to refuse obedience to the king if he violated these fundamental principles). The king's power was thus curtailed. Unfortunately, the nobles were given too much lee. They were free to break Parliament by one veto voice and too much concerned with their private affairs. We have to remember that similar processes were under work elsewhere. In Britain, the 1215 Great Charter brought habeas corpus act, but the liberating revolutionary processes in the seventeenth century were still not democratic. They were limited to the elite.

The danger of excess of power may come not only from the ruling authorities; it comes from any source of unrestrained power. The nobles in Polish history are a good example here. Ludwikowski observes: "None of the nobles of Western European countries were as successful as the Polish nobility at increasing their position and gaining greater power over the other estates" (Ludwikowski 1991: 8). Eventually: "By the end of the sixteenth century Poland, with its «democracy

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[6] See more about Poland and her rise to democracy in: W.J. Rose, 1944, *The Rise of Polish Democracy*, *passim*.

of the gentry» looked like an island surrounded by monarchies, which vested legislative, executive, and judicial power in one rule" (Ludwikowski 1991: 9). The principle of the king in Parliament was popular both in England and in Poland. The nobles firmly believed that the Parliament (Seym) was the real decision-making institution in the State. They sought to weaken the alliance between the king and the magnates, attempts that made rise to the concept of the *liberum veto*. The underlying principle was a complete equality among the nobles, and all laws should be passed unanimously. Thus an individual veto could dissolve the Seym or at times bring it to a standstill.

During the Saxon dynasty (1697–1763) this competition between magnates and gentry turned into an anarchy. They were concerned mainly with their private sinecures and vied for whatever vacant offices lavishly bestowed by the Crown and for life. The surrounding neighbours were vitally interested in fanning the flames of Poland's anarchy and "in keeping Poland demilitarized, neutralized, and in a state of anarchy. Since they were interested in maintaining the constitutional *status quo* in Poland, their propaganda argued that any change in the Commonwealth would be dangerous. Further, the anarchy in Poland was used to justify plans to partition off Polish territories" (Ludwikowski 1991: 13).

England, America, and the philosophers of the French Enlightenment were set up as paradigms for Polish democracy. The Constitution was proclaimed on May 3, 1791, and "despite [some] difference, the framers of both constitutions emphasized the significance of religious belief and incorporated this recognition into their constitutions" (Ludwikowski 1991: 27). Both constitutions referred to the will of the people as the founding principle of the laws enacted. The difference, however, resides in the fact that Poland approved of the Commonwealth of the Gentry.

Unfortunately, the Polish kings conceded too many rights on the Polish nobles, a fact that later on conspired against the kings and contributed to the loss of independence. They gained many privileges, therefore Ludwikowski notes: "None of the nobles of Western European countries were as successful as the Polish nobility at increasing their position and gaining greater power over the other estates" (Ludwikowski 1991: 8).

This requirement to limit power runs across the whole spectrum of Polish society. Ludwikowski even goes as far as to compare the relationship between the gentry and peasants in Poland to that of masters and slaves in America, for "the peasants were personally dependent on the gentry and subject to the jurisdiction of the gentry no less than the American slaves were subject to their masters" (Ludwikowski 1991: 30). There are many similarities between the two constitutions. The Polish constitution sought above all to consolidate the nation, they advocated the separation of powers. As regards this separation, it was "meant to balance the excessive freedom of the magnates and to strengthen the authority of the king" (Ludwikowski 1991: 31).

The essential difference between the American and the Polish constitutions consisted in their duration. The former has endured for more than two centuries; the latter only little more than a year. It is interested to observe how Ludwikowski comments on the short duration of the Polish constitution. We read in his book: "successful adoption of a constitution requires a mature constitution consciousness among those politically active in the nation. The readiness to fight for a constitution, to protect it and to observe its provisions, demands positive social sentiments and opinions about its usefulness" (Ludwikowski 1991: 34). This remark is much in accord with the remark made by the nineteenth-century British historian, Lord John Acton, who was very critical of Polish revolutionary upheavals in the nineteenth century. He claimed that freedom is the fruit of a mature civilization. Mature civilization takes time to develop, just like "a mature constitutional consciousness". Naturally a revolution, by its very nature, is a violent attempt to destroy the actual *status quo* without giving much promise for a more stable order that should follow.

The Polish constitution of May 3, just like the American Constitution, outlined only the main frames of the political structure, so that it could be adaptable to the changing conditions. Such a legal approach is called skeleton legislation, the contents of which are then filled in by detailed laws. This structure allows for further flexible interpretation.

The first Polish constitution sought to satisfy many expectations within and without the country. Inside the country it aspired "to satisfy the aspirations of the Polish burghers and the timid anticipations of the peasants without challenging that phobic, anti-revolutionary, and anti-democratic attitudes of the reactionary factions in neighboring, absolutist countries […]" and "this combination of internal and external geopolitical factors, rather than the inherent qualities of the document, that settled the fate of the first Polish Constitution" (Ludwikowski 1991: 38). Ultimately, together with the Third Partition in 1795, the Polish State was eliminated. The 1791 Constitution fell, nevertheless it strengthened the spirit of the nation; it spoke about the rights and duties of the nobility; it approved of the primary function of Catholicism in Poland, but also conveyed some sense of religious tolerance.

From the fact that the State fell while the nation remained some might argue that it is a good proof that the State is of little importance or else that it is an unimportant addition to the nation. The situation in eighteenth- and nineteenth--century Poland indeed shows the durability of the nation despite the loss of the State, but it was never claimed as an example of the victory of the nation over the State. On the contrary, the Poles in the three partitioned segments had always sought to regain their State. There were some weak attempts to revive it (e.g. the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was installed by Napoleon in 1807). Ultimately the 1791 Constitution laid solid foundations for a possible State to come.

Let us notice that usually ardent opponents of the State arrive at their radical opinions when they themselves are confronted with the abuse of the State's power in their day. Bastiat criticized revolutionary France, Nock and Hayek lived throughout the twentieth-century totalitarian regimes of national socialism and communism. Generally, they all saw clearly an essential difference between social action and State's action. Nock writes: "It is unfortunately none too well understood that, just as the State has no money of its own, so it has no power of its own. All the power it has is that society gives it, plus what it confiscates from time to time on one pretext or another; there is no other source from which State power can be drawn. Therefore every assumption of State power, whether by gift or seizure, leaves society with so much less power; there is never, nor can be any strengthening of State power without a corresponding and roughly equivalent depletion of social power" (Nock 1989: 3).

Witnessing the abuses of State power, people formulate very critical remarks addressed at the State and its very existence. Bastiat, for instance, calls the State "the great fictitious entity by which everyone seeks to live at the expense of everyone else" (Bastiat 1975: 144). Bastiat, as a realistic political commentator, is well aware of all the contradictory expectations from the State. Citizens often seek benefits from the State and at the same time expect that taxes will be very low. These two expectations cannot be satisfied.

Polish tragic history is a good proof that when the State usurps too much power, be it a self-confident monarch, wild gentry or greedy magnates, the result is always the same: attempts to take advantage of the situation on behalf of one's own position. Ultimately, the point is to enlarge the scope of power. Now I hope we can understand well the distrust of revolutionary solutions. At most they serve some groups not to improve the situation for the whole of society, but to seize power for one's own purposes. Nock outlines it clearly: the enlargement of State power means, by necessity, the decrease of society's power.

Nock claims that the main purpose of any State is victory and exploitation of the defeated, "the economic exploitation of a defeated group by a conquering group" (Nock 1989: 21). Pointing to Spencer, Nock makes a difference between government and the State. Government creates special conditions for society. Its purpose is social, it secures natural rights for the individual, whereas the State "is purely anti-social" (Nock 1989: 22). It is government that is meant by the Declaration of Independence. The State is anti-social because it is based on the persuasion that the individual has only those rights that are granted by the State. And this is how he assessed the rise of the State from the historical point of view. The State is always against society and in favour of its own aggrandizement, it "moves rapidly and with alacrity towards one that accrues to its own advantage; nor does it ever move towards social purposes on its own initiative, but only under heavy pressure, while its motion towards anti-social purposes is self-sprung"

(Nock 1989: 23). The State accrues power, creates the mass-man (in terms of Ortega y Gasset). Because it is so easy to become powerful by means of the State all the classes eagerly use its mechanisms. Historically speaking, we had the nobility that possessed the State, it was a class-State, just like the merchant--State. In all these cases the State is anti-social and used for the narrow purposes of some classes. Since the State has this tendency for exploitation, likewise citizens tend to use it for their own exploitation. Lord Acton notes:

> Power tends to corrupt and absolute power corrupts absolutely. Great men are almost always bad men, even when they exercise influence and not authority: still more when you superadd the tendency or the certainty of corruption by authority. There is no worse heresy than that the office sanctifies the holder of it. That is the point at which the negation of Catholicism and the negation of Liberalism meet and keep high festival, and the end learns to justify the means (Acton 1955: 335–336).

Primate Jan Paweł Woronicz stressed the pattern set by Sarmationism, the member of which is "a true defender of the democracy of the gentry, of political equality of all nobles, of limited royal and parliamentary powers, of principles of elected rather than hereditary monarchy, and the right of opposition" (Ludwikowski 1991: 54). Another political thinker, Henryk Rzewuski, praised legends and traditions, while he disdained written constitutions. He believed in national consciousness and national wisdom. Rzewuski firmly believed in social hierarchy. This natural hierarchy resides in aristocracy and nobility holding dominant position. Their political views today sound anachronistic. Rzewuski claimed that "[t]he decay of nations resulted from the fall of the nobility and the dissemination of democratic ideas, which undermined the belief in the moral superiority of noblemen and the trust that this social group fulfilled its commitments in accordance with *noblesse oblige*" (Ludwikowski 1991: 59). For him, the existence of the Polish nation was coequal with the existence of nobility. Nobility is identical with the national spirit, and anyone who is not filled with this spirit remains outside the Polish nation. The essence of the Polish spirt was to fight for freedom. Other nations have their own spirits: the German nation – truth, the English nation – utility. Indeed the first part of the nineteenth century in Britain is dominated by utilitarianism. The question is obviously open whether other nations do not crave for freedom. Rzewuski accepted the past of Poland together with its *liberum veto*.

Rzewuski's anachronism consisted basically in the fact that he sought to revive the golden freedom of old within Russian absolute empire (Ludwikowski 1991: 69). Obviously such a pattern for Polish conservatism could not be blindly followed. As we know, conservative itself is not against any change; consequently it does not stick to old values at any cost. One should show wisdom in selecting which values are worthy of imitation and which should be abandoned.

In a totalitarian regime, where often people have to fight against their State (using various methods in accord with the rule that an end sanctifies the means), its citizens learn that opposing it is something positive or even heroic. Being against the State arises to virtue. Then, at the moment of regained independence, when the circumstances are entirely transformed, it is very difficult to unlearn bad practices one has acquired.

Nock formulates his critical remarks under concrete circumstances, namely, the presidency of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and his New Deal policy, which ultimately amounted to the overgrowth of the State. Therefore one can understand his pent--up negative emotions when he writes "that the State owes its citizens a living" (Nock 1989: 4).

Man is a contingent being and he has to make up for his contingency in collaboration with others, through the ups and downs of daily reality. When the State promises to release its citizens of their contingency, of all the ills it is only trying to accumulate power. Nock sees clearly a difference between the State power and social power, and he is certain that the latter is more effective than the former. According to Nock, it can also easily be shown that it is better to mobilize social power at the moment of crisis. Social power, once mobilized, brings about concrete effects, does not waste resources and leaves behind a very practical lesson: in the time of need people learn to rely on one another. If, however, social power is too readily replaced by State power, this causes its depletion. Then, when needed, it looks up to the State rather than to human resources. Social power must be practiced in order to develop into something persistent. The situation resembles that in from the world of bodily physiology, i.e. any organ that is not used undergoes atrophy[7].

Yet, even in Poland, despite the negative attitudes towards the State's abuses, the general tendency was to regain the State, not to do away with it. Another question is interesting: why is the increase of State power accompanied by the depletion of social power? Some people claim that this interdependence does exist[8]. Was German society weak prior to the outbreak of the Second World War? Our intuition seems to be to the contrary. Rather it was strong and alert, firmly united around the leader. Notwithstanding that intuition, we can still say that it was weak because it could not think for itself, it could not think independently, and entirely relied on the will of the ruler. This general alert of society is designed to prepare it for war, indeed for the purposes of the State, to transform it into a uniform and destructive mass. Metaphorically speaking, society becomes the State's iron fist ready to impart a deadly blow at all opponents (without and within the State). We

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[7] See more about that in: J. Woodall (ed.), 1982, *Policy and Politics in Contemporary Poland*, *passim*.

[8] See more on this relationship between the state and society, especially in the period of economic transition from a state-run economy to the free market, J. Bell, 2001, *The Political Economy of Reform in Post-Communist Poland*, *passim*.

find a similar line of thinking in the main representative of the Austrian School of Economics and an ardent opponent of excess State power, Ludwig von Mises, for whom the State can only be strong by the strength of society.

In a democratic regime, however, this depletion of social power is related to adopting a passive attitude, to looking up to the State for all kinds of assistance. In a democratic system, however, society starts to behave like a parasitic organism that saps up the Treasury; expectations are high and social groups look at one another with envy, as competitors to the same money.

Conclusion

Perhaps those who happen to baulk at the State's overactivity in the area of historical policy, in building monuments or holding celebrations are wrong. If they claim that the State should rather be more active in strengthening the economy, do not they thereby demand redistribution? From the point of view of the free market, for instance, would it not be more proper for the State to attendant to national identity rather than to organize the economy? In like manner the State can retain its modest prerogatives and remain committed to the construction of the intellectual, spiritual strongholds (frameworks) of the State. At the same time the State limits its activity to the level of some universal values that can be shared with society. The paradox of this situation is that citizens have great expectations from the State, but the moment it shows up they do not want to see its face, they yearn for a faceless State.

The example of the Polish State and the nation's struggle to regain it shows that the State is important. At the same time we have to agree with those who claim that no social group should gain domination over any other groups. The picture of the State is rightly interpreted through the activity of its government. We can repeat after Americans that government is by the people, for the people, and from the people.

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Państwo – konieczność albo wróg?

Zarys treści: Artykuł przedstawia państwo z historycznego i analitycznego punktu widzenia. Jeśli chodzi o historię, mamy tu dwa rozwiązania. W tekście zostały określone jako rozwiązanie metafizyczne i kontraktowe. Rozwiązanie metafizyczne cechuje epokę przednnowożytną. Tutaj punktem centralnym jest pogląd Arystotelesa, iż zasada społeczna zawarta jest w ludzkiej naturze. Na tej zasadzie zbudowane jest państwo. Podejście kontraktowe charakteryzuje epokę nowożytną – państwo powstaje jako efekt negocjacji. Historycznie rzecz ujmując, powstało wiele propozycji formy państwa: od przerośniętej instytucji do jej bardzo zubożonej formy. Autor proponuje skromne podejście do rozumienia państwa: jest potrzebne dla zdrowia społecznej wspólnoty. Jednakże warunkiem tego zdrowia jest państwo ograniczone, które pozostawia dużo przestrzeni dla rozwoju społeczeństwa i ważnych społecznych relacji.

Słowa kluczowe: historia, Hobbes, Locke, Ludwig von Mises, Nock, ograniczenie, państwo, Polska, Spencer.

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Poles and Finns under Russian rule

Abstract: An attempt to compare Russian Tsar Alexander I was the head of the Grand Duchy of Finland, which the Russian army captured in 1809 as a result of the Russo--Swedish war. The final act of the Congress of Vienna of June 1815 decided to establish the Kingdom of Poland. Beside the title of Grand Duke of Finland tsar, Alexander I was awarded the title of the King of Poland. From that moment on, for over one hundred years, the fate of the Grand Duchy of Finland and the Kingdom of Poland was intertwined during the rule of five Russian tsars.

The aim of this paper is to answer the question whether two different ways on the road to independence – romantic Polish way with national uprisings, and pragmatic Finnish, relative loyal to the Russian tsars – had an impact on their policy towards both nations. The Kingdom of Poland and the Duchy of Finland were autonomous, were in a personal union with Russian tsars, had their own constitutions, parliaments, armies, monetary systems and educational structures, and official activities were held in Polish (Polish Kingdom) and Swedish (in the Grand Duchy of Finland). Both countries also had their own universities.

The first national uprising in the Kingdom of Poland, which broke out in November 1830, resulted in a wave of repression. The Constitution was replaced by the so--called The Organic Statute, the Sejm (the Parliament) and the independent army were liquidated. The Kingdom was occupied by the mighty Russian army, and in 1833 martial law was introduced. The second national uprising of January 1863 led to another wave of repression and intensive Russification of Polish territories. In 1867, the autonomy of the Kingdom of Poland, its name and budget were abolished. From 1872 the Polish language was only an optional choice. After 1863, the policy of the Russian authorities changed towards the Grand Duchy.

A session of the Finnish parliament (Eduskunta) was convened for the first time since 1809, the new parliamentary law allowed the dissemination of the Finnish language. After the deadly assault on Alexander II in 1881, his son Alexander III made attempts to limit also Finland's autonomy. The years 1899–1904 were called the first period of Russification in Finland ("the first period of oppression"). The Manifesto of June 1900 introduced obligatory Russian language in correspondence of officials with Russia. In 1901, the national Finnish army was liquidated. In Russia this was the beginning of the process of the empire's unification into one cultural, political and economic system. After a short thaw as a result of the 1905 revolution in Russia, the Grand Duchy of Finland, the so-called "second period of oppression" and anti-Finnish politics took place. During

the great war of 1914–1918, the Grand Duchy was on the side of Russia. The territories of the former Kingdom of Poland were under German rule since 1915. After the outbreak of the revolution in Russia, the Eduskunta (on 6 December 1917) passed a Declaration of Independence. After a short period of regency, on 19 July 1919, the Finns adopted the republican system with a parliamentary form of government.

On 11 November 1918 Germany surrendered on the Western Front. On that day, the Regency Council in Warsaw handed over military authority to the Polish Legion commander Józef Piłsudski. Although Poland still had to fight for the final shape of the state, the 11th of November 1918 is considered the first day of recovered Polish independence.

Keywords: Russian Empire, Finland, Poland, political systems comparition.

Introduction

In 2018, many European countries celebrated the 100th anniversary of the armistice and end of the Great War, later called the First World War. As a result, three great empires fell – Russia, Austro-Hungary and Turkey. For many nations it meant a chance to create their own nation-state or obtain a right to sovereign existence. Among them was Poland, which after 123 years faced the chance to regain an independent state. The same held true for Finland, which as a result of a combination of various circumstances, what Timothy Snyder calls "an unpredictability of history"[1], managed to create a nation-state and, against all odds, uphold it. Both nations were subjects under dominion of the same monarchs twice. In the 16th century it was Swedish dynasty of Vasa kings and in the 19th century the Russian Romanovs. In case of the latter, the common history of Poles and Finns covers period between the Congress of Vienna and the Congress of Versailles, that is, from the fall of the French Emperor Napoleon to the fall of the Russian tsar Nicholas II. The Congress of Vienna created the Kingdom of Poland and sanctioned existence of the Grand Duchy[2] of Finland under the rule of the Russian tsar Alexander I. From then on, for over a century, the fate of both nations was associated with the fortune of the Russian tsars and the fate of a powerful empire. Both, the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Finland, constituted the western edge of the empire, in terms of civilization as well as in the geography (Fig. 1).

The purpose of the following text is to analyze the fate of the inhabitants of both political structures and an attempt to find an answer to the question whether the

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[1] S. Sierakowski, 2018, *Wyobrazić sobie Polskę. Rozmowa z Thimothym Snyderem, amerykańskim historykiem, o stuleciu polskiej niepodległości*, "Polityka", 45: 14, 7–13 November.

[2] Literally Grand Principality. (Fin.): Suomen suuriruhtinaskunta, (Swed.): Storfurstendömet Finland, (Rus.): Великое княжество Финляндское (Velikoye knyazhestvo Finlyandskoye).

Fig. 1. Political division of the Russian Empire under the rule of the tsar Alexander I
Source: https://www.deviantart.com/spiritswriter123/art/The-Good-Tsar-561246337

revolutionary moods in the Kingdom of Poland and the loyalist attitude of Finns towards legal authority of the Russian monarchs translated into a different tsarist policy towards each of them. A quick look at the history of Finland may create such an impression, but deeper analysis indicates the astonishing resemblance of the Russian policy towards both nations regardless their loyalty. In order to understand why it was possible, it is necessary to recall a few of the most important facts from the history of Finns and Poles.

The common fate of Poles and Finns, in a broader sense, can be roughly divided into three major periods: the Swedish period, the Russian period and the struggle for independence during World War I. There may be a slightly different time span defining the said periods, Finnish independence came one year earlier than the

Polish one. Nevertheless, both Poles and Finns were subjected to the same domestic and foreign policy of the Russian monarchy. I will briefly analyze the similarities and differences of their rule in historical perspective, starting with Finland.

The Swedish period – Under the Vasa rule

The fate of the Scandinavian nations was defined by the goals of the Kalmar Union (1397–1523) (Cieślak 1983: 44). The Union was formed to block German expansion northward into the Baltic region. It was organized under rule of one monarch and was composed of the three kingdoms: Denmark, Sweden and Norway. The Swedish nobleman Gustav Vasa (1496–1560) revolted in 1523 against the Kalmar Union and the rule of the Danish-Norwegian king Christian II (1426–1481). In the so-called Swedish War of Liberation (1521–1523)[3], which is also described as a rebellion or a civil war, the Swedes captured Stockholm in June 1523 and Gustav Vasa was elected the King of Sweden (Cieślak 1983: 55). On 1 September 1524, Sweden signed the Treaty of Malmö and withdrew from the Kalmar Union. Gustav I Vasa founded a dynasty that ruled Sweden-Finland for more than a century. Finland remained integrated with the Swedish state.

The Protestant Reformation, in Martin Luther's version, which he initiated in Germany in 1517, gained popularity among different social groups of Swedes. As an effect, in 1527 the Swedish Parliament (Riksdag) decided to break its ties with Rome. This acceptance of Lutheranism enabled Gustav I Vasa to create a stronger centralized state. After the last Catholic king of Sweden, Sigismund, lost the throne, the Lutheran Church could flourish without any limitations (Cieślak 1983: 57).

In 1581 Finland was made a titular grand duchy by the King John III of Sweden (1537–1592), who had held the title of the Duke of Finland (1556–1563) when he was a young prince. The title Grand Duke of Finland did not result in any Finnish autonomy because Finland was an integrated part of the Kingdom of Sweden and had full parliamentary representation in the Riksdag. However, the title of the Duke of Finland was used by some of John's successors on the throne for next two centuries[4].

Prince John, Duke of Finland, later John III King of Sweden, married in 1562 in Vilnius Catherine Jagellonica (1526–1583), a Lithuanian and Polish princess.

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[3] Also known as Gustav Vasa's Rebellion and the Swedish War of Secession. A. Ganse, *Swedish War of Liberation. 1521–1523*, World History at KMLA (Korean Minjok Leadership Academy), http://www.zum.de/whkmla/military/16cen/sweddan15211523.html

[4] In 1802 the title got new a new dimension. To keep Finland within Sweden in the face of increased Russian pressure, King Gustav IV Adolf gave the title to his new-born son, Prince Carl Gustaf, who died three years later.

His son, Sigismund III Vasa (1566–1632) ascended both the Polish-Lithuanian and Swedish thrones. In the years 1587–1632 he was the king of Poland and in the years 1592–1599 also king of Sweden. He has lost the Swedish crown by an act of the Riksdag and abdicated in 1595 to Charles IX (1550–1611). "His long reign coincided with the apex of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth's prestige, power and economic influence" – wrote Franciszek Siarczyński[5].

During the Swedish period, Finland was merely a group of provinces and not a national entity. Finland was governed from Stockholm, the capital of the Finnish provinces at that time. Consequently, the Swedish legal and social systems took root in Finland. "Feudalism of the continental variety never became rooted in Sweden nor in Norway or Finland" – underlines Franklin Scott (1988: 58). Manorial Serfdom (where freedom of movement is denied) and slavery were explicitly made illegal in Sweden in the 14th century[6]. Finnish peasants were never serfs and they always retained their personal freedom, as it was the case in the Russian empire.

Under Russian rule – Tsar Alexander I

The 19th century Napoleonic wars ended the centuries-old union between Sweden and Finland. In the aftermath of Napoleon's victory over the Russian troops at Friedland (14 June 1807), the treaties of Tilsit were signed in July 1807 (with Russia and Prussia). Under Napoleon's pressure Russia agreed to join the Continental System and the Blockade against Great Britain[7]. As a result, tsar Alexander I invaded Finland. The so-called Finnish War between the Kingdom of Sweden and the Russian Empire lasted from February 1808 to September 1809 (Szordykowska 2011: 83–96). After an overwhelming victory by Russia, Sweden formally ceded Finland to Russia by the Treaty of Hamina (Swedish: Fredrikshamn) on 17 September 1809. The war of 1808–1809 was the last joint war of the Swedish-Finnish union and is called the Final War[8].

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[5] F. Siarczyński, 1843/1858, *Obraz wieku panowania Zygmunta III. Króla Polskiego i Szwedzkiego: zawieraiący opis osób żyiących pod jego panowaniem, znamienitych przez swe czyny pokoiu i woyny, cnoty lub występki dzieła piśmienne, zasługi użyteczne i cele sztuki*, t. I, Poznań 1843, ss. 337; t. II, Poznań 1858, ss. 405; see also: http://travel.yode-lout.com/polish-and-russian-political-history-sigismund-iii-and-the-republic-1588-1632/

[6] *How did Sweden/Scandinavia switch to the feudal system?*, https://www.reddit.com/r/AskHistorians/comments/19zdt8/how_did_swedenscandinavia_switch_to_the_feudal/

[7] *The Continental System and the blockade 1807–1811*, https://www.britannica.com/event/Napoleonic-Wars/The-Continental-System-and-the-blockade-1807-11

[8] *The Final War. The Swedish-Russian War of 1808–1809*, http://www.multi.fi/~goran-fri/index.html

A Finnish historian writes that: "Russia planned at first to annex Finland directly as a province of the Russian Empire, but in order to overcome the Finns' misgivings about Russian rule, tsar Alexander I offered them the following solution. Finland was not annexed to the Russian Empire but was joined to Russia instead through the person of the tsar. In addition, Finland was made an autonomous state – the Grand Duchy of Finland – with its inherited traditions intact. Thus, the laws and constitution of Finland remained unchanged, and the tsar took the place of the Swedish king as sovereign. The official forms of government inherited from the era of Swedish absolutism were sufficiently autocratic to allow the tsar to accept them largely intact"[9].

* * *

Two years earlier, under the Tilsit Treaty, in July 1807, the Duchy of Warsaw was established. It comprised, in general, the lands taken over by the Prussians during the three partitions of the Polish Kingdom at the end of the 18th century. In 1809, as a result of an unsuccessful attack of Austria on the Napoleon army, the Duchy was additionally enlarged by the lands from the Austrian partition. The final shape of the Duchy of Warsaw was a compromise between Napoleon and Alexander.

On 22 June 1812, Napoleon announced the beginning of the Second Polish War. The Parliament of the Duchy of Warsaw (Sejm) announced restoration of the Kingdom of Poland. After the defeat of Napoleon in 1812, Russian troops entered the territory of the Duchy and *de facto* put an end to its existence. However, the Duchy of Warsaw *de jure* ceased to exist three years later. Compromises and decisions on the future of the Polish territories were made on the 3rd May 1815, at the Congress of Vienna. Russia signed with Prussia and Austria bilateral conventions on the division of the Duchy of Warsaw and a tripartite convention on the establishment of the Free City of Kraków and the Grand Duchy of Poznań. The Congress of Vienna took a decision about a personal union of the Kingdom of Poland with the tsar of Russia. The ruling tsar, Alexander I was awarded the title of Polish king.

Finns under the Russian rule
From Alexander I to Alexander Sergeyevich Menshikov

In 1809 the Finnish Diet acknowledged tsar Alexander I as a Grand Duke. For his part, Alexander confirmed the rights of the Finns, in particular, freedom to pursue their customs and religion and to maintain their identity: "Providence having placed us in possession of the Grand Duchy of Finland, we have desired by the present act to confirm and ratify the religion and the fundamental laws of the land, as well as the privileges and rights which each class in the said Grand Duchy in

[9] http://motherearthtravel.com/history/finland/history-4.htm

particular, and all the inhabitants in general, be their position high or low, have hitherto enjoyed according to their constitution. We promise to maintain all these benefits and laws firm and unshaken in their full force" (Johnson *et al*. 1899: 198) – announced Alexander I to the members of the Diet.

Alexander I had a rather positive attitude toward Finland. He especially favored the old University of Turku, which was a Swedish university from 1640 until the Finnish War in 1808 (Cieślak 1983: 84). The University's name "The Royal Academy of Turku", after creation of Duchy of Finland in 1809, was changed to the Imperial Academy of Turku. In order to exercise control over the Grand Duchy more easily, Alexander decided in 1812 to move the Finnish capital from Turku to Helsinki, which was in proximity to the capital of Russia, Saint Petersburg. After a big fire in Turku, which destroyed the old University, Russian authorities decided to transfer it in 1827 to Helsinki. In 1828 it was renamed again and called the Imperial Alexander University in Finland (Cieślak 1983: 137–138; Szordykowska 2011: 124–125). The change of the name was in honor of Emperor Alexander I, who had expanded its staff and doubled the budget[10].

Another positive movement from tsar took place in 1812. Alexander I decided to return to Finland some lands Russia had annexed in the eighteenth century (Fig. 2). "These conciliatory measures were effective, and, as long as Russia respected this arrangement, the Finns proved to be loyal subjects of the Russian Empire, The Diet was formally the lawmaking body of the government; it could not initiate legislation, however, but could only petition the tsar to introduce legislation. The tsar, moreover, could summon and could dismiss the Senate without reference to the Diet. There was an independent judicial system. Finland even maintained its own customs system, and taxes collected in Finland remained in the country. Finns were exempted from conscription into the Russian army" – writes a Finnish historian[11].

The agreement reached between the Diet and the tsar gave him direct control over the government of Finland. To execute his authority the tsar appointed a Governor-General as his representative and advisor. The first chief governing institution in the Grand Duchy was the Governing Council, which consisted of two divisions, one for the administration and executing the law, the other for the direction of the national economy, and was composed of fourteen Finns appointed by the tsar (Kirby 2006: 83). In 1816 it was renamed the Imperial Senate of Finland and was subordinated to the Committee for Finnish Affairs in St. Petersburg, which presented Finnish requests to the tsar. The Governor-General was constitutionally the chairman of the Senate of Finland. With one exception, all the governor--generals were Russian.

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[10] https://www.helsinki.fi/en/helsinki-university-museum/about-us/history-of-the-university

[11] *The Russian Grand Duchy of Finland*, http://countrystudies.us/finland/10.htm

Fig. 2. Russian map of the Grand Duchy of Finland
Source: based on Brockhaus and Efron Encyclopedic Dictionary (ca. 1900).

The interests of the Grand Duchy of Finland in the imperial court in St. Petersburg was represented by a Minister – Secretary of State for Finland in Helsinki (before 1834 the title was secretary of state). All acts of the Emperor concerning the Grand Duchy, were to be countersigned by this State Secretary, or deputized officials.

The key role in establishing Finnish institutions played Arseny Zakrevsky (1783–1865), Governor-General of Grand Duchy of Finland in the years 1823–1831. He was a controversial figure. He perceived his stay in Finland as a necessary evil. He treated this country in a hostile way, he said many times that

he treats Finland as a swift Siberia, and therefore a place of exile (Szordykowska 2011: 107–108). The Committee for Finnish Affairs was wound up in 1826 at the instigation of Governor-General and replaced by a non-advisory State--Secretariat for Finnish Affairs in Petersburg. It shifted the balance decisively to the Senate in Helsinki. Zakrevsky may have won the right to present directly to the emperor matters relating Finland, but he also obtained permission to absent himself from the sessions of the Senate because he was not able to follow without an interpreter (Kirby 2006: 85). Being a military man and a hard-liner, he was trusted by the Emperor Nicholas II and in the period 1828–1831, he also briefly served as the Minister of Interior of the entire empire. From 1828 he resided in St. Petersburg[12]. "However, internal administration of Finland remained separated from that of empire, and in spite of his formal position as chairman of the Senate, the Governor-General, was not able to exert much influence" – writes David Kirby (2014: 80).

In 1831 he was replaced by Alexander Sergeyevich Menshikov (1787–1869) who resided in St. Petersburg and who was simultaneously the Russian Minister of the Navy. During his functioning as a Governor-General there was a certain duality of administrative institutions – there were two offices of the Governor--General, one official in Helsinki and the other unofficial in St. Petersburg. "A Governor-General's assistant, called to life in 1812, served the monarch in the Senate's absence. This position existed until 1854, it is the office of the prince of Menshikov who is in office until the end" – writes Barbara Szordykowska[13].

Despite all the efforts to build joint institutions for binding Grand Duchy with the Empire, Finns felt the autocratic power of the tsar. The Finnish Diet was dismissed in 1809, and it was not reconvened for more than fifty years.

"Although the government of the grand duchy represented an uneasy balance between the traditions of Finnish self-government and those of Russian autocracy, as long as the Russians respected the balance, the Finnish people were satisfied. The period of Russian rule was characterized by peaceful internal development, largely because, for the first time in centuries, Finland was free of war"[14].

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[12] He was elevated to the title of count in the Finnish Nobility and was registered in the House of Nobility under the name Zakrewsky as the Finnish comital house number nine. This made him and his family "Finnish citizens", which also meant that afterwards, when out of office, they did not need passports to go to the territory of the grand duchy from the Russian side of the border, a coveted privilege, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arseny_Zakrevsky

[13] This position was restored in 1885 and existed until the end of the Empire. B. Szordykowska (2011: 109).

[14] *The Russian Grand Duchy of Finland, 1809–1917*, http://countrystudies.us/finland/10.htm, p. 5.

The Russian tsars and the Kingdom of Poland
From Konstantin Pavlovich of Russia to Crimean War

The Kingdom of Poland was formally established on the basis of the Russian--Austrian-Prussian Treaty of 3 May 1815[15]. Article V of this treaty stated that the lands of the Duchy of Warsaw remaining under Russian control were bound to Russia by their constitution and handed over to eternally into the hands of the "Enlightened Emperor of All Russia" (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Kingdom of Poland – physical and political-administrative maps
Source: https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/7/70/KingdomofPoland1815.jpg

Alexander I, the King of Poland 1815–1825, raised high expectations. In his youth and during the early years of his reign, Alexander often used liberal rhetoric. As the tsar he initiated some social reforms and liberal educational reforms. In the years 1815–1832 the Kingdom of Poland had its own constitution, own Parliament (Sejm), army, currency and the University of Warsaw. Official activities were held in Polish. The foreign policy of the Kingdom belonged to the royal prerogatives.

In the years 1815–1832 the government was based on the Constitution of the Kingdom of Poland. The first *Namiestnik* (representative, governor) of Kingdom of Poland was general Józef Zajączek (1752–1826), former commander of the

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[15] It was also called the Congress Kingdom.

16th Division of Infantry during Napoleon's war with Russia. His position then was comparable to that of a viceroy (Magocsi *et al*. 1974: 77–78). However, an unofficial governor of the Kingdom of Poland 1815–1831 was Konstantin Pavlovich of Russia (1779–1831), the Grand Duke, brother of tsar Alexander. He received also the post of commander-in-chief of the forces of the Kingdom, to which later (1819) was added the command of the Lithuanian troops and of those of the Russian provinces that had formerly belonged to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.

Over the time, the freedoms granted to the Kingdom were gradually taken back and the constitution was more and more ignored by the Russian authorities. Alexander I of Russia never formally crowned himself as the King of Poland.

Under the Nicholas (1796–1855), emperor of Russia and King of Poland in the years 1825–1855, Grand Duke Konstantin maintained his position. He had no intention of respecting the Polish constitution, one of the most progressive in Europe at that time. He eliminated Polish social and patriotic organizations, the liberal opposition, and replaced Poles with Russians in important administrative positions. He was commonly considered as an enemy of the Polish nation and his command over Polish Army led to serious conflicts within the officer corps. These frictions led to various conspiracies throughout the country, most notably within the army. Armed struggle began when a group of conspirators led by a young cadet from the Warsaw officers' school, took arms on 29 November 1830 and attacked the Belvedere Palace, the main seat of the Grand Duke. The spark that ignited the military mutiny in Warsaw was a Russian plan to use the Polish Army to suppress France's July Revolution and the Belgian one, in clear violation of the Polish constitution. The uprising began on 29 November 1830 ended on 21 October 1831. It caused mass emigration, which involved thousands of Poles, particularly from the political and cultural elites.

Things dramatically worsened after the November uprising. On February 1832, tsar Nicholas I (1796–1855) decreed that Poland was an integral part of Russia. The university was closed. The martial law was implemented in 1833 and Russian laws and currency were introduced. The constitution was replaced by an "Organic Statute". The tsar ordered the liquidation of the Sejm and an independent army (Słownik encyklopedyczny 1997/1998: 377). Warsaw was only little more than a military garrison.

The Crimean War 1853–1856 brought fundamental change in the domestic policy of the Russian Empire. The war arose from the conflict of great powers in the Middle-East and was more directly caused by Russian demands to exercise protection over the Orthodox Christian subjects of the Ottoman sultan. Another major factor was the dispute between Russia and France over the privileges of the Russian Orthodox and Roman Catholic churches in the holy places in Palestine. The Crimean War was managed and commanded very poorly on both sides.

The war, however, forced the new Russian emperor Alexander II (who suc-
ceeded Nicholas I in March 1855) to undertake measures to overcome Russia's
backwardness in order to compete successfully with the other European powers[16].
One of the first steps was abolition of serfdom in 1861. He hoped that agricultural
production could be modernized and made more efficient and this would help the
transformation of Russia from a backward agricultural economy into a modern
industrial and capitalist economy. Alexander I agreed to introduce some reforms,
which would make Russia more modern society. Among these were the creation
of representative bodies called *zemstva*, in effect a form of local government
in villages and provinces. He also begun to reform the army and navy and the
penalty code. An amnesty for the Polish participants of the November Uprising
raised hopes for relaxation of the system.

But while Alexander's reforms satisfied some, they did not go far enough for
radicals, who demanded political change at higher levels. The amount of anti-
-tsarist dissent and unrest increased after the reforms of the 1860s. By the 1870s
Alexander's reformist spirit had dwindled and he was forced to impose repressive
measures[17]. After an assassination attempt in 1866, Alexander adopted a somewhat
more reactionary stance.

The Russian-Finnish political see-saw
From the Crimean War to the first "era of oppression" (1899–1905)

There was also a Finnish chapter of the Crimean War (Anderson 1969). The
proximity of St. Petersburg, the Russian capital to water was a tempting target for
an Anglo-French fleet, which in April 1854 entered the Baltic twice to attack the
Russian naval base at Kronstadt. The outnumbered Russian Baltic Fleet confined
its movements to the areas around its fortifications. At the same time, the British
and French commanders considered the Sveaborg fortress too well-defended to
engage and limited shelling of the Russian batteries to two attempts in 1854 and
1855, and initially, the attacking fleets limited their actions to blockading Russian
trade in the Gulf of Finland. Naval attacks on other ports on the island of Hogland
in the Gulf proved more successful. Allies conducted also raids on less fortified
sections of the Finnish coast (Colvile 1940). These battles are known in Finland
as the Åland War (Ponting 2011: 2–3).

Alexander II's significant reforms gave Finland new hope. The biggest change
was brought to the position of the language. In 1858, Finnish was made the official
language of local self-governments in provinces, where Finnish was the majority

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[16] *Crimean War*, [in:] *Encyclopaedia Britannica*, https://www.britannica.com/event/
Crimean-War

[17] https://alphahistory.com/russianrevolution/reform-and-reaction-in-russia/; M. Ko-
zelsky (2012).

the language spoken. After over half a century, Alexander called in 1863 the Diet and announced that the Finnish language would have equal position to Swedish and Russian in the Grand Duchy. The law was expanded in 1865 and declared that the state offices must serve the public in Finnish if requested. In the 1870s the education laws gave a right for secondary schools to teach in Finnish.

The position of the Diet was also strengthened. Since 1869 it could initiate various legislation and the tsar was obliged to summon the Diet every five years. The same year an act on religion was also passed, which limited the influence of the State on the church. On top of it, Finland got the right to implement its own monetary system (the Finnish markka) (Szordykowska 2011: 151–153) and could maintain own national army.

On 1 March 1881 Alexander fell victim to an assassination plot in the Russian capital St. Petersburg. It was the sixth of assassination effort, this time the final one. Ironically, on the very day he was killed, he signed a proclamation – the so--called Loris-Melikov constitution. "Just the day before he died, Alexander II had completed plans to create an elected parliament and he intended to release these plans within a few days. Perhaps if Alexander II had lived Russia would have become a constitutional monarchy and not been led down the path the country ultimately took" – speculates an author on the Site for Royal News and Discussion[18].

Alexander II was succeeded by his 36-year-old son, Alexander III, who rejected the Loris-Melikov constitution. All the internal reforms initiated by his father the new tsar considered to be too liberal. In his opinion, Russia must be saved from anarchical disorders and revolutionary agitation not by the parliamentary institutions and so-called liberalism of western Europe by three principles: Orthodoxy, autocracy, and Russification [*narodnost'*/nationality]. Alexander's political ideal was a nation composed of only one nationality, one language, one religion, and one form of administration. He planned to achieve his goal in three steps: imposition "of the Russian language and Russian schools on his German, Polish, and Finnish subjects, by fostering Orthodoxy at the expense of other confessions, by persecuting the Jews, and by destroying the remnants of German, Polish, and Swedish institutions in the outlying provinces"[19].

The February Manifesto of 1899, was an imperial decree that ensured direct tsarist rule of Finland without consulting either the Finnish Senate or the Diet (Cieślak 1983: 182). In fact, it reduced Finland to the status of the other provinces of the Russian Empire, and it paved the way for further Russification. This triggered a wave of protests to in the form of petitions called the Great Address, signed with more than 500,000 Finns. In March 1899 these petitions were submitted Alexander III, who ignored them (Szordykowska 2011: 190).

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[18] http://www.unofficialroyalty.com/march-13-1881-assassination-of-tsar-alexander--ii-of-russia/

[19] https://www.britannica.com/biography/Alexander-III-emperor-of-Russia

The next acts made the situation even worse. The Language Manifesto of 1900, made the Russian the main official language of the Empire in administration and in government offices (Szordykowska 2011: 193–194). What finally transformed Finnish resistance into a mass movement was the new conscription law of 1901 and the new role of the Finnish army (Szordykowska 2011: 201–202). It was originally called into being as an independent army with the sole mission of defending Finland. The new law incorporated the Finnish army into the organizational structure of Empire's army, which from then on could be put into action anywhere. The Finns responded again with a massive petition and again it was ignored by the tsar. This time the Finns decided to take action and responded with a campaign of passive resistance. To the first conscription based on new law in 1902 that dramatically altered the nature of the Finnish army they responded with the so-called Army Strike. In practical terms it meant limited response to the draft, from about half in 1903 to about four-fifths 1904 of eligible did not report. The Russian military command considered the Finns unreliable for military purposes, and… released them from military service in return for the levy of an extra tax payable to the imperial government.

The domestic policy of the Russian government in this period took a turn for the worse and repressive measures against the Finns were applied. The Finnish civil servants, which opposed Russification were fired and replaced by those which were ready to act accordingly to the new laws. The censorship was expanded and in April 1903 and Governor-General Nikolai Bobrikov[20] was granted dictatorial powers. General Bobrikov was a notorious reactionary who had been given "dictatorial powers of extraordinary extent" by the tsar, set out "to break the national spirit and wipe out the constitutional liberties of a people who loved freedom, and who enjoyed it by virtue of the fundamental laws of the land, which their Russian Sovereigns have successively sworn on their accession to observe. General Bobrikoff" – reported the "Times" in June 1904[21].

It is little known that Russian oppression was met with a growth of an active and conspiratorial resistance. The movement, called the Kagal (Kagaali) (Cieślak 1983: 185), named after a similar Jewish resistance organization in Russia, succeeded in assassinating Bobrikov by the Finnish Senate clerk Eugen

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[20] Governor-General Nikolay Ivanovich Bobrikoff [Bobrikov] (1839–1904); B. Szordykowska (2011: 187–188).

[21] "The Times" (London), 17 June 1904, p. 9, [in]: Jensen R., 2018, *The 1904 Assassination of Governor General Bobrikov in the Context of the Era of Anarchist Terrorism*; *Terrorism in Nordic Countries*, "Terrorism and Political Violence", 30(5): 828–843.

Schauman in June 1904[22]. The first era of Russification came to an end with the outbreak of revolution in Russia.

A Finnish historian give four reasons why the Russian nationalists had reasons to favor the Russification of Finland[23].

"First, continued suspicions about Finnish separatism gained plausibility with the rise of Finnish nationalism.

Second, Finnish commercial competition began in the 1880s.

Third, Russia feared that Germany might capitalize on its considerable influence in Sweden to use Finland as a staging base for an invasion of Russia. The Russian government was concerned especially for the security of St. Petersburg.

Fourth, there was a growing desire that the Finns, who enjoyed the protection of the Russian Empire, should contribute to that protection by allowing the conscription of Finnish youth into the Russian army. These military considerations were decisive in leading the tsarist government to implement Russification, and it was a Russian military officer, Nikolai Ivanovich Bobrikov, who, in October 1898, became the new Governor-General and the eventual instrument of the policy"[24].

From January Uprising to 1905 Revolution

After Alexander II (1818–1881) became emperor of Russia and king of Poland in 1855, he decided to relax the strict and repressive regime that had been imposed on Poland as a result of the November Insurrection. Alexander granted a few minor political concessions to the Poles, including granting amnesty for exiled Poles in Siberia and the reopening of the Polish Medical Academy. He raised hopes among the Poles that they might regain some degree of independence. Reform movements in Russia began to spread to Poland in 1861. "Secret societies among the gentry and the intelligentsia began to organize themselves, spurred by the success of the unification movement in Italy and the abolition of serfdom in Russia" (Kieniewicz 1967: 132–133). Conspiratorial groups opposed any form of Russian rule in Poland remained active and gained support, particularly among students and other groups of urban youth.

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[22] It is counted as perhaps the first political assassination in Finnish history, or at least as the first since the Middle Ages. H. Aittokoski, *Finland shaken 100 years ago by murder of Governor-General Bobrikov*, Helsingin Sanomat International Edition, 15 June 2004, http://www.hs.fi/english/article/1076153076611

[23] Also called "Finnish separatism," a policy started during the "first era of oppression" (1899–1905) and continued during the second era (1909–1917). *Main outlines of Finnish History*, https://finland.fi/life-society/main-outlines-of-finnish-history/

[24] *The Rise of Nationalism in Finland*, http://countrystudies.us/finland/11.htm

The plan to recruit all radical youth into the Russian army and the announced conscription, on 14–15 January 1863, led to a national insurrection. "Although the insurgent army survived the winter of 1863–1964 in southern Poland, leaders of the rebellion who had not already fled the country were arrested in April 1864. Their execution four month later marked the end of the January Insurrection"[25]. The "January Uprising" of 1863–1864 was suppressed after eighteen months of fighting. Hundreds of Poles were executed, and thousands were deported to Siberia (Morfill 1902: 429). Thousands of Polish insurgents were transported to the "Nerchimsk silver-mining district" (Kennan 1981: 280). All territories of the former Poland-Lithuania were excluded from liberal policies introduced by Alexander II. The martial law in Lithuania, introduced in 1863, lasted for the next 40 years. Native languages, Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Belarusian were completely banned from printed texts. The Polish language was prohibited in both oral and written form from all provinces except Congress Poland, where it was allowed in private conversations only (Davies 1996: 828).

The January Uprising led to the formal abolition of the political and administrative autonomy. The Kingdom was divided into ten provinces, each with an appointed Russian military governor and all under the control of the Governor--General in Warsaw. All former Polish government functionaries were deprived of their positions and replaced by Russian officials. In effort to stronger integration with the Russian Empire (although Russian emperors wore the title of the king of Poland and were represented by their governors) semi-official use of the name of the Land on Vistula River (Nadwislanski Kraj, Privislinsky Krai) began to be used, although the name "Kingdom of Poland" still functioned.

On 13 March 1881, Alexander fell victim to an assassination plot in Saint Petersburg by member of the *Narodnaya Volya*, [People's Will party], Ignacy Hryniewiecki.

His successor Alexander III was determined to restore law and order in Russia. He ordered the execution of the leaders of his father's assassination and exiled many leaders of revolutionary political groups. Furthermore, Alexander enforced strict censorship laws on political pamphlets and repealed many of the reforms and liberties that had been granted by his father. He undertook measures to weaken Judaism through persecution of the Jews. The latter policy was implemented in the "May Laws" of 1882, which banned Jews from inhabiting rural areas and shtetls [village settlements] (even within the Pale of Settlement) and restricted the occupations in which they could engage[26].

Nicholas II (1868–1918) was given nicknamed Nicholas the Bloody by his political adversaries due to the Khodynka Tragedy, when over 1,300 people were

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[25] https://www.britannica.com/event/January-Insurrection
[26] *The May Laws*, http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/articles/1132-alexander-iii--alexandrovich-emperor-of-russia

killed and another 1,300 injured in a human stampede at his coronation, and also because of anti-Semitic pogroms during his reign. "The tsar's subsequent poor handling of the Bloody Sunday [workers' demonstration] also contributed to his image as ruthless, uncaring and unsympathetic to the needs of the people. Instead of engaging in a dialogue with peaceful demonstrators, he left St. Petersburg and allowed his generals and the police to deploy troops and shoot unarmed people"[27]. In the time of the unrest and revolution in 1905, the nickname "Nicholas the Bloody" became popular and was often repeated in the press.

Bloody Sunday, the violent suppression of the 1905 Russian Revolution, the executions of political opponents, and his responsibility for the effects Russo--Japanese War.

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The Revolution in the Kingdom of Poland (1905–1907), also known as the Polish Revolution of 1905, was a major part of the Russian Revolution of 1905 in Russian-partitioned Poland (Ascher 1994: 157–158). One of the major events of that period was the insurrection in capital of textile industrial city of Łódź, in June 1905. The demands of the demonstrating masses included both requests for the improvement of the workers' living conditions, as well as political freedoms. The question of autonomy for Poland was also frequently raised. In 1905, Poland was at the verge of a new uprising, revolution, or a civil war. Some Polish historians even consider the events of that period a fourth Polish uprising against the Russian Empire. National consciousness had risen among the Polish peasants.

Despite the failure of the revolution[28], the Russian government conceded to some of the demands, in particular, russification was partially reversed in education in Poland.

From 1905 Revolution to Civil War
The second era of oppression (1909–1917)

A policy also known as Russification, started during the "first era of oppression" (1899–1905) and continued during the second era (1909–1917)[29]. As I wrote before, in 1905 Russia faced a humiliating defeat in the Russo-Japanese War and amidst the turmoil in St. Petersburg. The Revolution which broke out this year in Russia gave Finland a short breathing spell and a room for a new legislative reform (Cieślak 1983: 191). In 1906, the tsar proposed that the antiquated Finnish Diet be replaced by a modern, unicameral parliament. The Finns accepted the

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[27] *People, Nicholas II of Russia*, https://www.bl.uk/people/nicholas-ii-of-russia
[28] More details: N. Davies (2005: 273–278).
[29] *Main outlines of Finnish history*, https://finland.fi/life-society/main-outlines-of-fin-nish-history/. According to Polish author: 1907–1914, B. Szordykowska (2011: 214–222).

proposal, and the Eduskunta was created (Szordykowska 2011: 211–212). Also included in the tsar's proposal was the provision that the parliament be elected by universal suffrage, a plan that the Finns accepted, thanks to the spirit of national solidarity they had gained through the struggle against Russification[30].

However, the idea of reforms in Finland was not shared by the most influential person in Russia at that time – prime-minister Pyotr Stolypin (1862–1911). The second period of oppression begun round 1907. In Autumn of this year he formed the Special Conference of the Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Finland to deal with the so-called "Finnish problem". In 1909 he obtained permission from Nicholas II to call into being a Special Committee on Matters Dealing with the Grand Duchy of Finland and got a free hand to re-arrange relations between Helsinki and St. Petersburg. Nicholas II especially disliked the Finns. As he put it during his conversation with German ambassador in 1907, "the Finns were at very low cultural level with regard to morality, and nothing good is to be expected from them" (Ascher 2002: 307).

He denied the rights of the Eduskunta to legislate on matters of general state interests. "Stolypin's 1910 legislation decreed that all laws were to be made by Russian imperial institutions, with the Senate and Eduskunta merely having the right to voice an opinion" (Kirby 1980: 234). Stolypin wished to destroy Finland's autonomy and disregarded native tongues and cultures of non-Russian subjects, believing them to be traditional and ritualistic at best. The Finnish Diet tried once again to combat Stolypin, but his position was strong enough to win and he had support from Nicholas II. Of course, Stolypin was unaware that such actions only fanned the flames, and as result of his policy he was assassinated on 14 September 1911 by Dmitry Bogrov, a Ukrainian, "leftist revolutionary".

From Stolypin's death henceforward, the Russian form of rule can be called a monarchist dictatorship until Russia's collapse during the Russian Revolution.

Great War and independence

What Britannica defines briefly as: "World War I, also called First World War or Great War, an international conflict that in 1914–1918 embroiled most of the nations of Europe along with Russia, the United States, the Middle-East, and other regions. The war pitted the Central Powers – mainly Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Turkey – against the Allies – mainly France, Great Britain, Russia, Italy, Japan, and, from 1917, the United States. It ended with the defeat of the Central Powers[31], was contemporaneously described as the "war to end all wars"[32]. But its

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[30] *The Russian Empire*, http://countrystudies.us/finland/13.htm

[31] https://www.britannica.com/event/World-War-I

[32] The phrase is often associated with Woodrow Wilson, the US President, https://www.quora.com/Why-is-the-quote-The-War-to-End-All-Wars-ironic

costs were beyond imagination. It was one of the largest wars in history, it led to the mobilization of more than 70 million military personnel, including 60 million Europeans, over 16 million people-soldiers and civilians alike – were killed and the war itself was unprecedented in the slaughter, carnage, and destruction. Yet, the same time with collapse of the three empires it gave a hope to some European nations to rewrite their own history and create independent states, like Poland and Finland.

The Polish road to independence

Russian troops left Warsaw on the 15th of July 1915 and German troops marched in. The Russian rule was over. The new occupying forces restored many national symbols illegal under the Russian partition. It was possible to use the Polish language in offices again, the celebration of the 3rd May Constitution was resumed, and Warsaw could return to its former name, the capital city. During the German military campaign in the ethnically Polish territory, Poles were subjected to forced labor and confiscation of food and private property. After the German and Austrian failures on west European front their attitude to Poles changed and the Germans postulated the establishment of a dependent state, which would help to create a Polish army to replace German losses. The Act of the 5th of November 1916 was a declaration, signed by Emperors Wilhelm II of Germany and Franz Joseph of Austria, which promised the creation of a Kingdom of Poland in exchange for a draft of new recruits from German-occupied Poland for the war with Russia. On 14 January 1917, a Provisional Council of State was created, and a provisional government, consisting of fifteen members chosen by the German and ten by the Austrian authorities. On 21 April 1917, the Council of State passed a proclamation in favor of the formation of a Polish army (Polnische Wehrmacht).

The relations between Polish military forces and Germany and Austria were complex. In August 1914 Polish Legion (the name of the Polish military force) was established in Galicia. The Legion and their leader Józef Pilsudski became "a founding myth for the creation of modern Poland". The unit was an independent formation of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Initially Pilsudski supported the Central Powers against Russia, but in 1917 he realized that they were in no position to guarantee the independence of Poland. He decided to turn to Entente, particularly to France and the United Kingdom. When in July 1917, the Central Powers demanded that the soldiers of the Polish Legion swear allegiance and obedience to the Emperor Wilhelm II, Pilsudski and most of the soldiers of the 1st and 3rd Brigades of the Legions refused to make the oath. Pilsudski and his chief of staff Kazimierz Sosnowski were arrested on 22 July 1917 and interned in the German fortress of Magdeburg. Polish units were disbanded and the men were incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian Army.

In the meantime, a new structure the Regency Council of the Kingdom of Poland (*Rada Regencyjna*, or *Rada Regencyjna Królestwa Polskiego*) was temporarily appointed as the highest authority until a monarch or Regent would be appointed.

The next step was taken on 7 October 1918. The Regency Council of Kingdom of Poland declared the independence of Poland. On 23 October 1918 a government, with Józef Świeżyński as prime Minister, was established, without approval of the German authorities. From 1 November branches of the Polish Military Organization began disarming German and Austrian soldiers, 6/7 November 1918 socialist Ignacy Daszyński established in Lublin a Provisional Government of the People's Republic of Poland.

On 10 November 1918 Józef Pilsudski came to Warsaw having been previously released from prison in Magdeburg. 11 November 1918 – Pilsudski was appointed Commander-in-Chief by the Regency Council and was entrusted with creating a national government for the restored Polish State.

In the symbolic sphere this date has been recognized as the birth of the independent state, the Second Republic of Poland.

The Finnish way

Although Finland was an autonomous Great Duchy within the Empire it could not escape the negative effects of a World War, if Russia was involved. On the other hand, in the summer of 1914, the Russians were afraid that the Finns might revolt or that the Swedes would attack Finland. For the Russians it was a very sensitive area because as it was in close proximity to Saint Petersburg. To control situation, on the 30th of July in the Grand Duchy a state of war was declared. Taking into consideration a possible offensive of German forces near the capital of their Empire, by the end of 1914 about 35,000 Russian soldiers were deployed to different locations in Finland.

The Finns did not have an army and they were not required to send soldiers to the front. At the same time, many Finns joined the Russian Army as volunteers. The best known of Finns, Carl Gustaf Emil Mannerheim, the future Marshal of Finland and president of the country, reached even the rank of general. There were only 500 Finns that volunteered to fight in the Russian army in the autumn of 1914. This number included doctors and nurses who worked at the front[33].

Not all Finns were loyal to the Russian Empire. Some of them perceived Russian actions during the war were as an attempt at total assimilation. In May 1915, a group of Finnish activists made an agreement with the Germans, which allowed for about 2,000 volunteers that fled from Finland to benefit from military training in Germany

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[33] *The Finns in the First World War*, http://www.europecentenary.eu/the-finns-in-the--first-world-war/

(Kubiak 2017: 68). These Finnish volunteers formed a military unit called the Jäger Bataillon, and in May 1916 they were sent to fight on the Eastern Front[34].

The war significantly affected the Finnish economy. The most important industry, the wood industry, had been severely hit by the loss of Western export markets. However, the metallurgical industry benefited from Russian war orders, which made possible an unprecedented development. Production values increased fourfold in three years, and the number of employees doubled in only two years. Finland's relative economic flourishing lasted until 1917, when Russian orders ceased, leading to massive layoffs that affected the entire country[35].

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The Russian Revolution of 1917 change situation of Finns dramatically. Events in Russia developed rapidly and can be described as a two-step-process: from the February Revolution to the October Revolution. The February Revolution was a popular uprising, and developed spontaneously on the streets of St. Petersburg, when the tsar was visiting troops on the front. The tsar Nicholas II was removed from power and on 15 March 1917 signed officially abdicated the Russian throne. The October Revolution (also called the Bolshevik Revolution) was a much more deliberate event, run by a small group of people, which called themselves the Bolsheviks. When they realized there no chance to maintain power in an election-based system without sharing power with other parties, they formally abandoned the democratic process and in January 1918 declared a "dictatorship of the proletariat". This led to a civil war between two factions, of the so called the Reds and the Whites. The Red Army fought for the Vladimir Lenin's ideology supported by the Bolsheviks and the White Army represented a large group of loosely allied forces, including monarchists, industrialists and supporters of democratic socialism (Szordykowska 2011: 231–236).

The Decree on Peace, written by Lenin, which passed on the second day of the Second Congress of the Soviet of Workers', Soldiers', and Peasants' Deputies on the 8th November 1917, change the situation again. "In the Decree on Peace, Lenin appealed to the governments of all the warring states and to their peoples to conclude an immediate truce. The truce would last no less than three months to allow for the completion of peace negotiations by representatives of all peoples dragged into war and for the convocations of popular assemblies of all countries for the confirmation of peace conditions. Thus, while the language was careful, it was, in effect, a call for European-wide revolution. The world was astonished, fighting on the Eastern Front was instantly suspended and Russian forces evaporated"[36].

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[34] Kurland, but soon it was withdrawn from the front line and stationed in Lipawa. B. Szordykowska (2011: 226).

[35] http://www.europecentenary.eu/the-finns-in-the-first-world-war/

[36] https://encyclopedia.1914-1918-online.net/article/decree_on_peace

The second act, the Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia signed by Lenin and Stalin on 8 November 1917, proclaimed "The right of the peoples of Russia to free self-determination, even to the point of separation and the formation of an independent state"[37]. Collapse of the Russian Empire caused a power vacuum in Finland, and a subsequent struggle for dominance leading to militarization and escalation of the crisis between the left-wing labor movement and the conservatives. The Russian Bolsheviks polarized Finnish society and in course of 1917 two semi-paramilitary forces – the Red Guards (the Reds) and a Self-defense Corps (White Guards, Whites) – were created (Kubiak 2017: 69). Growing social unrest and five-day general strike led to election of a new government of Pehr Evind Svinhufvud (1861–1944) and to summon the so-called Independence Senate. New prime-minister presented a declaration to Eduskunta, which on the 6th of December 1917 passed a Finnish proclamation of independence (Szordykowska 2011: 228).

On 27 January 1918, the Finnish government ordered the disarmament of all remaining Russian garrisons by the forces of the White Guard, and on the same day the Reds proclaimed a revolution. The violent clashes between the two parts led to a bloody civil war, which lasted from 27 of January 1918 to the 15th of May 1918. The Reds carried out an unsuccessful general offensive in February 1918, supplied with weapons from Soviet Russia. A counteroffensive by the Whites began in March and was reinforced by the German military detachments in April. Decisive battles took place in Tampere and Vyborg. Both were won by the Whites. The next two, the battles of Helsinki and Lahti, were won by German troops. The Whites (led by General Mannerheim) were better organized and benefited from the involvement of members of the Jäger movement and had commanding officers with experience in the Russian Army.

Political violence became a part of this warfare. Around 12,500 Red prisoners of war died of malnutrition and disease in camps. About 39,000 people, of whom 36,000 were Finns, perished in the conflict.

In the aftermath, the Finns passed from Russian governance to the German sphere of influence with a plan to establish a German led Finnish monarchy. Juho Kusti Paasikivi, and his government offered the crown to Prince Frederick Charles of Hesse, brother-in-law of Wilhelm II. When elected as the king instead of grand duke, this would mark a new status, that of an independent nation. But before Frederic managed to reach Finland, on 9 November 1918, Wilhelm II left the scene and Germany was declared a republic. Two days later, on 11 November 1918, the armistice between the belligerents of World War I was signed. Wilhelm II abdicated and the king-elect Frederick (Finnish name Väinö I) renounced the throne (14 December 1918).

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[37] *Declaration of the Rights of the Peoples of Russia*, https://www.marxists.org/history/ussr/government/1917/11/02.htm

Pehr Svinhufvud, prime-minister of the first independent Finnish government resigned on 12 December 1918 and general Gustav Mannerheim, moderate monarchist, the leader of the Whites during the Finnish Civil War, was appointed as a Regent (Kubiak 2017: 70–71; Mannerheim 2017: 131). Social democrats won three quarters of the parliament's seats in the election of 1919 and Finland adopted a republican constitution (Kubiak 2017: 71). In July 1919, Finland's first president Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg (1919–1925) replaced Mannerheim. Finland became a republic (Mannerheim 2017: 145).

The new Act on the Formation of a Government (a new republican constitution) was adopted by the Eduskunta on 21 June 1919 and on 19 July entered into force. The Finns adopted the republican system with the parliamentary government (Cieślak 1983: 232).

Pilsudski and Mannerheim compared

The independence of Poles and Finns has been in an inseparable way associated with two outstanding personalities: Józef Klemens Pilsudski and Carl Gustaf Mannerheim. Although they had different backgrounds and different attitudes concerning Russia, they also shared some astounding similarities. They were born in 1867, they both became marshals. The first one held the honorable title of First Marshal of Poland until the end of his life, the second was the only Finnish officer who had this degree in Finland's entire history. Mannerheim was drafted into the Finnish Cadet Corps, the equivalent of today's middle school military. He gained the qualifications of a professional soldier and at the age of 20 he was already an officer. Later, in 1887, he joined the tsarist army and started his military career as a simple officer in the 15th Alexandria Cavalry Regiment in Kalisz, then in the guard of the tsaritsa Maria Feodorovna, and during the Russian-Japanese war he became a lieutenant general based merits in the Battle of Mukden. In 1907 he was transferred to the Kingdom of Poland, where he was the commander of the Uhlans regiment in Mińsk Mazowiecki, the regiment of the Imperial Guard in Warsaw and finally the cavalry corps in Kalisz[38].

Pilsudski and Mannerheim came from landowners' families. Pilsudski, related to the old Lithuanian nobility, Mannerheim came from the Swedish-Dutch aristocracy, whose representatives had titles of counts and barons. They were both patriots, but they manifested their love for their homeland in a completely different way.

They both loved horses. Pilsudski had his favorite mare, Kasztanka, Mannerheim devoted all his free time to breeding horses and had many favorite animals, including a stallion bearing his second name Gustaf.

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[38] Memories of seven years of military service in Kingdom of Poland Mannerhiem described in: C.G. Mannerheim (2017: 41).

Pilsudski and Mannerheim had an incredible political intuition. Both cooperated with partition countries, although the idea of independence was obvious to Pilsudski from the very beginning. Mannerheim in 1917 stood at the head of the Finnish army, whose first task turned out to be the suppression of the Bolshevik movement in Finland. He accomplished this with the support of the Germans. When in December 1918, Finland formally became an independent state, he was chosen to be a regent, replacing the prince Frederic Wilhelm of Hesse, aspiring to the throne in Helsinki. He helped to introduce of the social democrat republican regime with the strong executive power of the president. In the first election of 1919, he lost to Kaarlo Juho Ståhlberg. After the electoral defeat, he removed himself from political life for a time and started breeding his favorite steeds.

After returning to Warsaw, Pilsudski received on the 11th of November, the day of signing the ceasefire between Germany and the western allies in the Compiegné forest, full military power and, then, full civilian three days later. Thus, he replaced the Regency Council, although unlike his Finnish "colleagues" he did not think seriously about resurrecting any monarchy in Poland.

Both men met for the first time in 1919. Mannerheim visited Pilsudski in Belvedere in the course the Polish-Russian war (Mannerheim 2017: 151–152). Marshall Pilsudski died in 1935 and did not witness the atrocities of World War II. General Mannerheim was called in again to defend his country against the Soviet Union in Winter War (30 November – 13 March 1940) and the Continuation War (1941–1944). Chosen the sixth President of Finland in 1944, since 1942 the marshal of Finland, Mannerheim signed the armistice with the Soviets and declared war on Germany. In 1946 he resigned from his position, left Finland and settled down in Switzerland, where he died in 1951.

Conclusions

After the defeat of Napoleon, the alliance of Three Black Eagles (the emperor of Austria, the king of Prussia and the tsar of Russia), was meant to protect Europe from any new revolutionary ideas and ensure eternal peace. The decisions adopted at the Congress of Vienna were to serve this purpose. The Russian tsar Alexander I, at the beginning of his reign an enlightened and quite liberal monarch, strengthened Russians positions on the north-western and western flanks by extending his power to Finnish and Polish territories. The establishment of the Grand Duchy of Finland should prevent any invasion of St. Petersburg from the north (in a straight line from Helsinki it is only 302 km/188 miles). The Kingdom of Poland was a link with Western Europe and could serve as an experimental platform in the field of industrial innovation, which later with the successes could be applied in the other corners of the empire.

The Finnish nation and the Polish nation, which by historical coincidence, were placed under the rule of Russian tsars, started from a completely different position. The Poles had a state-long tradition and a strong national identity. Finns were part of the Kingdom of Sweden and lived in the shadow of the dominance of Swedish culture. They did not have real autonomy, and, in addition, their official language was Swedish, which fulfilled this role for the greater part of the 19th century.

The number of concessions granted to Finns by Alexander II, especially in the field of language and education, seemed to be the right way to develop relations with tsarist Russia. A great blow and surprise for the Finns were the governments of successive tsars, who had completely abandoned and reversed the liberal political reforms of Alexander II. Two waves of Russification not only polarized Finnish society but also influenced and strengthened the national movement.

Paradoxically, the policy of Russification carried out by the Russian government in the Kingdom of Poland, which was mostly the repression and punishment for waves of national uprisings, were eased as a result of the Polish revolt of 1905. In Finland Russification after 1905 reached another, more intense level.

The outbreak of World War I aroused the anxiety of the Finns, but they were not directly involved on the battle fields. The Poles, on the contrary. Not only did they hope for a consequential conflict between the states responsible for partitions of Poland, but they actively participated in the war on both sides of the front. All of them hoped that under the wings of one of them a free Polish state would emerge.

The fate of the Grand Duchy of Finland was directly connected with the situation in Russia and was treated by the States of the Entente as a zone of Russian influence. The situation was different in the case of the Poland. President of United States, Woodrow Wilson's 1917 State of the Union Address left no doubts that the independent Polish state would regain the independence.

The Bolshevik Revolution and the Civil War that broke out in nearby St. Petersburg, found a bloody reflection in Helsinki. The fights between the Whites and the Reds ended with the victory of the first ones. Confronted with the political vacuum that emerged after the Lenin's decrees, the Finnish monarchists on 6 December 1917 declared the independence of Finland. The Finns' military cooperation with the Germans in the last phase of the war made it harder for the Entente states to recognize Finland's independence (Szordykowska 2011: 230).

In the domestic policy, the monarchists lost the election in favor of social democrats and declared Finland a republic. The existence of Finland was however threatened again by the Bolsheviks. The peace treaty with the Soviet Russia signed in Tartu in 1920 ended that state of insecurity. That year the Republic of Finland joined the League of Nations.

Also, Poland, despite, American support, had a long way to true independence. The Greater Poland Uprising and the Silesian uprisings, as well as the diplomatic struggle with the Council of Ambassadors in Paris about the final shape of the Polish borders ended only in 1921.

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Back to the question that I posed in the preface to this article. The problem of Russification of Finland has been and still is a puzzle for many people interested in Russian-Finnish relations. Here is one of such question put recently on the Internet forum "Paradox interactive": "The russification, introduced with typical Imperial Russian adroitness, proved to be counterproductive […] This is mind boggling for me. I understand the reasons behind the russification of formerly Polish territories. <u>The Poles were always a rebellious element and were not willing to accept being part of Russia ever. But Finland?</u> [underlined by R.Ż.] The Finns were so loyal that they formed volunteer corps for various imperial wars, including the crushing of Polish uprisings, where they performed spectacularly. During Polish campaigns the Imperial army was plagued by officer resignations, desertions and ever entire units going over to the Poles. The Finns had no problem with that, despite taking part in crushing of liberal rebellions.

I have no answer why did the Czars decided time for Finland to become Russian? Didn't they have more pressing problems to solve and better ways to satisfy the Russian extreme nationalists?"[39].

There are many possible answers to such a question. The easiest, though least fertile from a scientific point of view, is the reference to national characteristics, as it is the case of the question found on the internet (Poles are rebels and the Finns are a calm and loyal people). In global politics, this statement is irrelevant. The second half of the 19th century and the Crimean War showed Russia that existing policy towards different nations of the Empire is no longer possible and effective. The multitude of languages in the empire, the different ways of administering the administrative units, and even various armies, which in theory were not subject to Russian tsars (Finland) required the centralization of the state. To compete with modern European states Russia had to go through a painful process of the full centralization and unification of the state. Numerous unification processes in Europe showed that was the only way to modernize a state (Germany, Italy). Russification was the most severe method to achieve that goal. It can therefore be said, with some certainty, that local national interests had to fall victim to the modernization of the Empire. In the case of an authoritarian state, like Russia, this process had a more brutal and more speculative course than in countries with democratic institutions.

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[39] https://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/index.php?threads/what-was-the-reason-
-for-russification-of-finland.783856/

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Polacy i Finowie pod panowaniem rosyjskim

Zarys treści: Car rosyjski Aleksander I był głową Wielkiego Księstwa Finlandii, które rosyjska armia zajęła w 1809 roku w wyniku wojny rosyjsko-szwedzkiej. Ostateczny akt potwierdzający zdobycz uchwalił Kongres Wiedeński w czerwcu 1815 roku, na którym postanowiono także ustanowić Królestwo Polskie. Obok tytułu cara i Wielkiego Księcia Finlandii, Aleksander I otrzymał tytuł króla Polski. Od tego momentu, przez ponad sto lat, losy Wielkiego Księstwa Finlandii i Królestwa Polskiego splotły się pod rządami pięciu kolejnych rosyjskich carów.

Celem artykułu jest próba odpowiedzi na pytanie, czy dwa różne sposoby na zdobycie niepodległości – romantyczny sposób polski z powstaniami narodowymi i pragmatyczny fiński, względnie lojalny wobec caratu, miały wpływ na politykę Rosji wobec obu narodów. Królestwo Polskie i Księstwo Finlandii były autonomiczne, miały charakter unii personalnej z carami rosyjskimi, kraje te posiadały własne konstytucje, parlamenty, armie, odrębne systemy monetarne oraz edukacyjne, a życie urzędowe toczyło się w języku polskim (Królestwo Polskie) i szwedzkim (w Wielkim Księstwie Finlandii). Oba kraje miały także własne uniwersytety. Dopiero po pierwszym powstaniu narodowym w Królestwie Polskim, które wybuchło w listopadzie 1830 roku, w wyniku fali represji konstytucja została zastąpiona przez tzw. Statut Organiczny, a Sejm i odrębna armia zlikwidowane. Królestwo było okupowane przez potężną armię rosyjską, a w 1833 roku wprowadzono stan wojenny. Drugie powstanie narodowe ze stycznia 1863 roku doprowadziło do kolejnej fali represji i intensywnej rusyfikacji ziem polskich. W 1867 roku Autonomia Królestwa Polskiego, jego nazwa i budżet zostały zniesione. Od 1872 roku język polski był tylko wyborem opcjonalnym.

Po 1863 roku zmieniła się także polityka władz rosyjskich w stosunku do Wielkiego Księstwa Fińskiego. Posiedzenie fińskiego parlamentu (Eduskunta) zostało zwołane po raz pierwszy w 1809 roku, nowa ustawa parlamentarna umożliwiła rozpowszechnianie języka fińskiego. Po śmiertelnym ataku na Aleksandra II w 1881 roku, jego syn Aleksander III również próbował ograniczyć autonomię Finlandii. Lata 1899–1904 nazwano pierwszym okresem rusyfikacji Finlandii („pierwszy okres ucisku"). Manifestem z czerwca 1900 r. język rosyjski został wprowadzony obowiązkowo w korespondencji urzędników z Rosją. W 1901 roku została zlikwidowana narodowa fińska armia. W Rosji był to początek procesu unifikacji imperium w jeden system kulturowy, polityczny i gospodarczy. Po krótkiej odwilży, w wyniku rewolucji w Rosji w 1905 r., w Wielkim Księstwie Fińskim nastąpił tzw. „drugi okres ucisku" i pogłębiła się polityka antyfińska. Podczas wielkiej wojny 1914–1918 Wielkie Księstwo stanęło po stronie Rosji.

Natomiast tereny byłego Królestwa Polskiego znalazły się od 1915 roku pod panowaniem niemieckim. Po wybuchu rewolucji w Rosji, fińska Eduskunta uchwaliła 6 grudnia 1917 roku deklarację niepodległości. Po krótkim okresie regencji, 19 lipca 1919 roku, Finlandia przyjęła system republikański z parlamentarną formą rządu. 11 listopada 1918 roku Niemcy poddały się na froncie zachodnim. Tego dnia Rada Regencyjna w Warszawie przekazała władzę wojskową dowódcy Legionów Polskich – Józefowi Piłsudskiemu. Chociaż Polska wciąż musiała walczyć o ostateczny kształt państwa, dzień 11 listopada 1918 roku jest uważany za pierwszy dzień odzyskania polskiej niepodległości.

Słowa kluczowe: Cesarstwo Rosyjskie, Finlandia, Polska, porównanie ustroju politycznego.

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Syria's ordeal: A modern state's disintegration in an age of fake news and superpower regional rivalry

Abstract: The negative impact of globalization is readily observed in today's Syria. Ravished by seven years of internal conflict stimulated initially by Tunisia's Arab awakening, this once proud state has become a magnet for religious fanatics and their wealthy sponsors in conservative Saudi Arabia and other countries far and near seeking geopolitical advantage. Not least Syria has experienced the seemingly futile endeavors by those in the United Nations and elsewhere seeking a solution to this country's enduring turmoil. Military intervention by Iran and Russia has changed the configuration of the conflict at the critical point in time when Israeli and American intervention provides a dangerous environment for superpower conflict. All the while, Syrians remaining in the country suffer, and those seeking safety elsewhere are threatening to destabilize Lebanon, Turkey and Jordan and, farther afield, the cohesion of the European Community.

Keywords: Syria, Iran, Turkey, Israel, Arab Spring, terrorism, regional geopolitics, Kurdish problem, refugees, superpower confrontation.

Syria's ordeal

In the eyes of many, the Middle East has been the scene of many a recent tragedy. How best to define the words tragedy and recent opens up the proverbial Pandora's box. For the purposes of this paper, the Armenian Genocide[1] in mid-World War I

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[1] The Armenian displacements and deaths during the early years of World War I, particularly in 1915, continues to sour relations with the successor government to the Ottoman Regime in power at the time of this tragic event. Was it genocide or harsh actions caused in part by Russia's invasion and suspected cooperation by Armenians in eastern Anatolia? The latter is the rationale most often employed by the present regime in Turkey. Conversely, there is ample evidence that longstanding distrust and distaste for the Ottoman Empire's Armenian community, coupled with wartime issues, provided the opportunity for the regime to finally settle the issue by destroying this sizeable Christian community.

The American Ambassador to Constantinople at the time of the massacres leaves no doubt as to who was responsible. His Chapter 24 'The Murder of a Nation' in *Ambassador Morgenthau's Story* (Morgenthau 1918) is a horrific compendium of events reported to him by American consular officials and other sources. It is not easy reading – rape, murder, starvation and death marches into the Syrian Desert coupled with the grabbing-up

is as good a starting point as any. To this day, the official Turkish explanation disclaims genocide – a position increasingly at odds with significant world opinion[2]. The Turks fare better in the case of how outsiders view the expulsion of the historic Greek-speaking community in western Anatolia after Greek troops arrived, when the Ottoman order was disintegrating and Turkish nationalism not fully developed (Milton 2008). In hindsight, flawed as the Treaty of Versailles proved to be for Europe and elsewhere, denying the Kurds their own state in the never ratified 1920 Treaty of Sevres[3] has been the kernel of rapidly growing discontent in a region stretching from northern Iran to the Mediterranean.

Those who attempt to justify the official rationale behind the American-led coalition to depose Saddam Hussein and devastate Iraq are akin to a vanishing species. Even the earlier intervention to remove Iraqi forces from Kuwait seems not to be as black and white as once thought to be the case. There has been

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of attractive Armenian females for slavery and concubines by Kurds whose voraciousness was encouraged by the regime. A German medical officer Armin T. Weigner against orders compiled a photographic compendium of what he witnessed in 1915 while stationed along the Berlin-to-Baghdad railway in the vicinity of Deir-es-Zor. His photographs provide a visual reminder of the horrific events of the time ("Wegner Photo Collection" – Armenian National Institute, www.armenian genocide.org, Washington D.C). Chancellor Adolph Hitler, in an August 22, 1939 speech to senior army (Wehrmacht) officers in his Obersaltzburg home is purportedly to have ended the speech that dealt with proposed forthcoming harsh treatment of Poles in the soon-to-commence conflict by stating "Who, after all, speaks today of the annihilation of the Armenians?" (Lochner 1942). Lochner claimed to have received a copy of this speech while in Berlin. The post war Nuremburg Tribunal received his copy as well as others from different sources. Questions of authenticity arose due to the fact that Hitler apparently gave two speeches that day and only one had the Armenian Genocide reference.

[2] The Armenian National Institute in Washington, D.C. identifies countries that recognize the Armenian Genocide. While few in number these countries include most of Europe (Austria, Belgium, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Russia, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, Switzerland and Vatican City), Canada and the United States, Lebanon and several Latin America states (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Paraguay, Venezuela and Uruguay). Aside from Lebanon, notably absent from the list are countries with significant Muslim populations; Asian and sub-Asian countries and Africa south of the Sahara.

[3] "Treaty of Sevres August 10, 1920 – Protection of Minorities Articles 140–151". *World War I Document Archive*, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah. Also: W.D. Durham (2010). Durham suggests that British and postwar Turkish geostrategies coupled with concern for Soviet expansion into Halford MacKinder's 'Eurasian Heartland' outweighed a proliferation of newly minted mini-states in the region. The Kurdish 'problem' continues. An op ed piece in the "International New York Times" September 27, 2018 by Aliza Marcus notes that our Kurdish allies in Syria "are not disposable allies". She chastises Washington for not providing the Kurds in Syria political backing against Turkish intrusions as well as weapons support.

speculation that hidden in state documents is possible evidence to support the theory that Kuwait's intransigence regarding seemingly reasonable Iraqi demands had its origin in the West and were designed to goad Iraq into invading Kuwait. The decade long Iraqi-Iranian conflict assuaged doubts of those who feared a resurgent Iran or a too militarily powerful Iraq[4]. The always present Palestinian--Israeli problem brought the United States into the region but hardly as an impartial actor[5]. Indeed, protecting questionable Israeli actions by blocking UN Security

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[4] The conflict between Iraq and Iran began in September 1980 and lasted eight years; it was started by Iraq's Saddam Hussein who feared Iran's Islamic revolution and new leader Ayatollah Khomeini. The initial cause likely was the earlier, pre-Islamic Revolution, and favorable-to-Iran demarcation of the Shatt al-Arab waterway separating the two countries that constricted Iraq's oil exports. Iran, for its part, condemned Iraq's treatment of its Shia majority population. What was meant to be a short conflict dragged on and exhausted both countries. The United States provided aerial intelligence supporting both sides depending on which country was in the ascendancy and possibly helped to prepare the groundwork for the First Gulf War a few years later. The financial costs to both countries were massive and, in Iraq's case, partially alleviated by donations from other Arab oil-producing countries. That Kuwait later insisted that its financial support was loans and not donations was a factor in Iraq's later invasion. Besides mutual exhaustion, it was attacks on other countries' oil tankers that got Washington directly involved by providing temporary U.S. Registration and implied military protection for Kuwati tankers (Hardy 2005). The seminal assessment of this eight year conflict and what led to it is Robert Fisk's *The Great War for Civilization: The Conquest of the Middle East* (2006). Chapters Five 'The Path to War' and Six 'The Whirlwind War,' p. 139–217, provide in-depth details of events. Fisk a foreign journalist witnessed first-hand many of the tumultuous events in the war.

[5] Washington's support for Israel is longstanding but recently has reached a point where neutrality in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict has been replaced by blatant support for one side. There are numerous components to this support but two stand out: (1) The financially--generated political power of pro-Israeli American Jews and non-Jews by way of individual contributions and especially money provided by AIPAC (The American Israel Public Affairs Committee) for sitting representatives and candidates for election in critical congressional races. The American political system and its single-member congressional districts invite attention and financial support for or against candidates in the earlier political party primary election where votes in Washington concerning Israel are viewed favorably or unfavorably. The scale of AIPAC financial support for particular members of the U.S. Congress is staggering ("Washington Report On Middle East Affairs", American Educational Trust, Washington, nine issues per year). Its "Report Card for the Congress in session" identifies the amount of money provided to members of Congress by name, district and state. Founded in 1951, AIPAC has become a significant power in influencing congressional votes favorable to Israel (and defeating congressional endeavors to punish Israel).

Recent moves by the present administration (2018) to move the American Embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem; the cutting of financial support to the very organization (United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine) established in 1948 with active American participation and support for displaced Palestinians following the war that gave birth to

Council responses, not to mention massive financial and military support, has fueled no small portion of the region's current instability.

Looking at the larger and still earlier environment one should mention Britain's betrayal of Prince Faisal's hope of sustaining an Arab political position in Damascus and Palestine where Ottoman rule in 1918 was rapidly dissolving[6].

Israel and in no small measure was the cause of the refugee problem in the first place; and closing the Palestinian Representative Office in Washington. These actions support the increasing bias in Washington against the Palestinian people. (2) One should mention the emotional impact of the World War II Jewish Holocaust on Americans and the still weak but growing political impact of the Arab-American and Muslim-American populations. This almost total transformation of American policy in favor of Israel stands in sharp contrast to policies pursued by previous American administrations and the directives for allocating Ottoman lands established in the San Remo Conference in April, 1920. Here, resolutions passed determining allocation of Class "A" League of Nations mandates for the administration of three former Ottoman territories – Palestine, Syria and Mesopotamia. Syria and Mesopotamia were provisionally recognized as states; Palestine was not (https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/San_Remo_conference). For example, Article 22 notes that English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic". Whatever their intentions in the early structuring of what might eventually be a Jewish Homeland and how these morphed into an independent Israel where non-Jews are treated as second-class citizens or apartheid--comparable subjects residing in occupied territory is a stark reminder of the victor's progression from survivor to conqueror. Sir Isaiah Berlin commented in 1953 in a lecture at The Royal Society of Arts in London to Members of the Anglo-Israel Association that "The ideals the Jews imported, and the culture they were able to build in the relative vacuum of Palestine – with a minimum of counter-influence on account of the evident feebleness of the Moslem culture in this corner of the Arab world". The Origins of Israel in: W.Z. Laqueur (1958). It must be countered if only in part by J.A. Fayez's *The Colonization of Palestine: Lest the Civilized World Forget* (2015). Identified by name are 452 depopulated or destroyed Palestinian towns and villages from the 1948 war for Israeli independence; W. Khalidi's *Before Their Diaspora: A Photographic History of the Palestinians 1876–1948* (1984); and *The Holy Land: Yesterday and Today, Lithographs and Diaries by David Roberts, R.A.* (1994). These provide an alternative interpretation to Sir Isaiah Berlin's demeaning assessment of Palestine and its non-Jewish inhabitants before Israel's birth.

[6] World Future Fund (http://www.worldfuturefund.org) – "British Lies to the Arabs in World War I. The McMahon-Hussein Correspondence 1915–1916". The McMahon--Hussein Correspondence, was an exchange of letters (July 14th, 1915 – January 30th, 1916) during World War I, between the Sharif of Mecca, Husayn bin Ali, and Sir Henry McMahon, British High Commissioner in Egypt, concerning the political status of lands under the Ottoman Empire. "Now the Arab side was already planning a large revolt against the Ottoman Empire; however, the British further encouraged the Arabs to revolt under their direction and command, with promises of independence and their own territory". The Arab view was that Palestine was included in the area promised to them. Conflict with the Balfour Declaration and promises made to the Zionists clearly were an embarrassment to

The wartime Sykes-Picot agreement between France and Britain assured these two European War allies postwar political control in Syria, Lebanon, Mesopotamia (Iraq) and soon to be created Trans-Jordan (Jordan). Britain gained control over the primary oil producing areas whereas France returned to its historical protection of the Christians[7].

Mandates assigned after World War I with League of Nations supervision had been otherwise and the promise made earlier by the British High Commissioner in Egypt to Prince Faisal's father the Sharif of Hejaz about post-war Arab governance over greater Syria had come to fruition? There was at least one, albeit fragile, alternative in light of the terrible deaths incurred by Britain and France during the war. This was an endeavor by President Wilson to explore alternative options for these former Ottoman lands, The King-Crane Commission[8]. It was an outgrowth of the Paris Peace Conference and referred to as the 1919 Inter-Allied Commission on Mandates in Turkey. Begun as an official investigation staffed by the French, British, Italian and Americans, it ended as a sole American endeavor as the other countries withdrew to avoid being confronted with an unfavorable report seconded by their own nationals. Publication was suppressed by the U.S. State Department until December 1922.

The Commission recommended that the coastal area peopled largely by minority Christians, who already had a special administrative relationship under Ottoman rule, and who for many years had been given support by France, not be separated the rest of mostly Muslim Sunni Syria. France soon did just that and the state of Lebanon was born. The Commission also spoke out against the Zionist designs for Palestine and proposals in the controversial 1917 Balfour Declaration. Last but not least, the Commission favored the United States assuming the mandate, one incorporating both Palestine and Syria with an international organization to monitor Jerusalem's holy sites. Nothing came of these and Wilson was physically incapacitated by the time he received the report. Whether

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Britain. In 1922 the senior civil servant in the Colonial Office advised his government that "there is sufficient doubt in the matter to make it desirable not to drag the controversy out into the daylight", https://www.balfourproject.org/the-mcmahonpromise

[7] The then secret Sykes-Picot treaty divided certain Ottoman lands into French and British spheres of influence. Britain coveted the primary oil producing regions and France greater Syria. France had to subdue militarily significant local opposition in 1920 amongst Syrians who sought to retain their newly established independent Arab government and in 1946 when they literally burned down the building housing Syria's parliament. Contrary to post-World-War I decisions and allocation of mandates, France in 1920 separated the Christian populations in and about Mt. Lebanon into the new state of Lebanon (Fisk 2012).

[8] W. Laqueur (1969) edited and introductory comments (Document 9: "Recommendations of the King-Crane Commission", August 28, 1919: 23–31 and Document 10: "Memorandum Presented to the King-Crane Commission by the General Syrian Congress", July 2, 1919: 31–33). Also: http://www.hri.org./docs/king-crane-recomm.html

Wilson would have had the courage to confront Britain and France is something else; America's entry into the war made possible the Allies' final success, but Britain and France suffered more and seemed determined to gain Ottoman lands. The Sykes-Picot agreement and Balfour declaration withstood the test of time and their detractors. The current Middle East is the product of these events. The United States declined to be a member of The League of Nations and Britain's Lloyd George, when faced with the possible option of having to offend France by not supporting its claim to Syria, commented that "the friendship of France is worth ten Syrias"[9]. France's pending takeover of former Ottoman Syria was not popular with the local inhabitants, whose views and petitions were collected by the King-Crane Commission in 1919[10].

When threatened by the rise of Hitler and fearful of Turkey making common cause with Germany, the French sought to align Ankara to the Allied cause in the looming conflict by ceding the Alexandretta (Iskenderun in today's Turkey) region[11] to the Turks who had long coveted it. Needless to say, Syrian leaders had no say in this transaction and Turkey chose neutrality in the war. Alexandretta was the historical maritime outlet for Syria's Aleppo region.

Where does Syria fit into this mosaic? Perhaps more importantly, how does Syria's relatively moderate religious outlook function in a region where the religious extreme of Islam is held by the most important of the two wealthiest oil sheikdoms? There is evidence that ultra conservative Saudi clerics and their followers provided monetary and logistical support to jihadists from the Middle East and Western Europe to wreak havoc against those supporting the Assad regime[12]. Turkey openly called for the end of the government in Damascus, thus

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[9] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/King-Crane_Commission

[10] During the Commission's tour of Palestine and Syria June 10 – July 21, 1919, "[...] 1,875 petitions were received from local inhabitants. The vast majority favored an independent Syria free of any French mandate and 72% were hostile to the Zionist plan for a Jewish national home in Palestine", https://www.britannica.com/topic/King-Crane--Commission

[11] Iskenderun (Alexandretta) was one of two pieces of Syrian territory removed during the period of French control: Lebanon in 1920 to provide Christians with their own state and Alexandretta in 1939 to induce Turkey to join the Allied cause at the start of World War II, (Fisk, *Ibid.*). France's bias in favor of Lebanon's Christians is seen in the country's constitution which states that the president must be Christian, the Prime Minister a Sunni and the Speaker of the Parliament a Shia. The United States copied the spirit of this formula in post-Saddam Hussein Iraq when the three critical posts in the country's parliament were assigned to a Sunni, a Shia and a Kurd. The two situations differ inasmuch as the last census in Lebanon was in 1932 when Maronite and Orthodox Christians combined might possibly have constituted a majority in the country's French-defined boundary. Most observers are of the opinion that the Shia are now the majority population and have been for many years.

[12] In 2013 Syria's Ministry of Information released a disturbing propaganda video "Terror against Syria" produced by the Public Authority for Radio and Television

enabling jihadists to use Istanbul's airports and land routes for access to northern Syria. Undercutting ecumenical toleration throughout Syrian society clearly was an objective stated or otherwise of this invasion. Others sought to give birth to a new, less oppressive regime using the Arab Spring and lingering opposition to the regime for justification[13].

The late Hafez al-Assad took control of Syria in a bloodless 1971 military coup; his family and supporters have managed to maintain control over most of the country in spite of a ferocious civil conflict, and much of the world's disdain for its actions and even its legitimacy. Assad's regime never endeared itself to Washington, primarily because it opposed Israel and its policies in what had once been Palestine. The elder Assad was an Arab, an outspoken nationalist for Arab causes who led his country into two of the three wars between Syria and Israel. These actions led to the loss of the strategic Golan Heights to Israel in 1967. The late father and his son are not religious fundamentalists; their religious policies are conspicuous for toleration and in stark contrast to those of some neighboring Arab-speaking states. In 1982, long before the world knew of ISIS, the elder Assad violently crushed a Muslim Brotherhood-inspired uprising in Hama, purportedly killing at least 10,000 insurgents, mostly Sunni. Shortly afterwards, President Hafez Assad gave a speech declaring:

> Nothing is more dangerous to Islam than distorting its meanings and concepts while you are posing as a Muslim. This is what the criminal brothers are doing... They are killing in the name of Islam. They are butchering children, women and old people in the name of Islam. They are wiping out entire families in the name of Islam... Death a thousand times to the Muslim Brothers, the criminal Brothers, the corrupt Brothers[14].

Amongst Syrians joining the fight against their own government were many who were radicalized by the Hama insurrection but also others who sought

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depicting horrific scenes in northern Syria where foreign jihadists were fighting. Many of the fighters killed by government forces carried mobile devices visually depicting scenes where individual or group atrocities had taken place. A definitive connection was established between these foreign fighters and their supporters especially in Saudi Arabia.

[13] *Can it get together?*... "The Economist" (Middle East and Africa) (September 3, 2011: 46). Conflicts between Syrians living abroad for some time and those still in Syria or who left after 2011 were further complicated by the role of Turkey with its Islamist government hosting most of the meetings.

[14] R. Fisk (1997). Quote from a speech by late President Hafez Assad March 7, 1982. Computer Archives Assad Library, Damascus. While strolling through a park near his Damascus hotel, this author noticed couples holding hands, lying together on the grass or participating in family picnics. On another occasion, he joined a gathering sponsored by a local Orthodox priest and the neighboring Sunni imam. Their houses of worship were close together; the task at hand was to neutralize calls by some of their followers to join the fight against Assad rule.

a more liberal and less oppressive government and certainly one where corruption was less rampant. These latter were often collectively viewed outside of Syria as a liberal opposition to a tyrannical regime. As the conflict progressed with mounting deaths, the internal and external refugee flow to safety and the widespread physical destruction of Syria's cities, many fighters morphed into various factions whose anti-liberal credentials seemed all too familiar to the ones attributed to foreign jihadists. Today, many of the country's Sunni majority continue, if reluctantly, to support Assad rule, as well as overwhelming portions of the country's other important religious groups – Alawite, Orthodox, Armenian, Protestant and Catholic. These people may not like Assad or support all of his policies, but they know too well what the alternative might be if any agreement to end the conflict permitted the radicalized opposition and foreign jihadists a role in governing. Better the devil you know!

President Assad and his late father before him govern one of the more culturally and religiously diverse countries in the Middle East. Maintaining adherence and respect for the national identity in this part of the world is taxing. As elsewhere, corruption also seemed to be a way of life and, as with Tunisia where the 'Arab Spring' began, ending it was a common rallying cry for many of the protesters. Unfortunately, seven years of conflict and endless atrocities and destruction by all combatants have changed some of the original dynamics for protest. Revenge, no quarter and 'die or leave' have assumed a life of their own with increasing internationalization of the conflict.

Syria has also been the focus of widespread condemnation for the use of prohibited chemical weapons. As is so often the case, it is the government in Damascus that is accused of using these weapons, but seldom accused are any of the violent opposition groups. An immediate response to photos showing a collection of dying or critically ill young children in the same room is suspicious. It is possible that the children were collected elsewhere and moved into one room for medical attention or moved there for publicity purposes so as to embarrass the government. There also is the possibility that the government was not responsible. Why would the regime in an earlier attack have gassed its own opposition citizens at the very moment a UN inspection team had arrived on site to ascertain who was responsible for the atrocity? Assad might do stupid things, but he isn't that stupid. Opposition groups are well attuned to the propaganda value of pointing to the regime when chemical attacks occur. Excluding extremists fighting the Assad government from perpetrating some of the chemical weapon attacks is oversimplifying a complex environment in which all parties seek to blame others for terrible acts of violence. That said, there is a body of evidence pointing to the regime in Damascus as having perpetrated many, if not most, of these chemical attacks. A joint investigation by BBC Panorama and BBC Arabic identify the sites of 106 chemical attacks in Syria since September 2013. Particularly damning to the government's public relations agenda is BBC's finding that chlorine chemical

attacks have increased in marked intensity in those opposition-controlled areas already under intensive artillery and air attack and immediately prior to their surrender[15]. The inference drawn is that chemical attacks by air are the last straw leading to final surrender. Only the regime and Russian allies control the air. Israeli and American aircraft are also there but are not implicated in recent chemical attacks although Israeli planes are known to have dropped phosphorous bombs in Lebanon[16]. President Assad remains adamant that the country's chemical weapons arsenal was surrendered earlier in 2013. Either the president is lying or ill-informed by his own people or, alternatively, certain opposition groups are exceptionally skilled in masking their own chemical weapons potential and is using them to propaganda advantage. This is more likely the case where non-chorine agents such as Sarin have been identified and can be delivered overland.

There arises the question as to why Washington is involved in Syria in the first place. There has been no invitation from Damascus. Perhaps it was the initial success of ISIS in Iraq and its atrocious behavior with well-publicized decapitations and the like; equally plausible is Washington's goal to discourage emerging overland links between Iran and Hezbollah in southern Lebanon and in the process to protect Israel's eastern flank. Neither of the latter justifies a potential worldwide conflict. In light of Washington's current threats of military action against Syria[17] and Syria's ally to the east, it is appropriate to reassess more accurately the dynamics of this tragic conflict, now in its seventh year, and possibly assign blame for some of the horror.

Libya was to become the second domino in this scenario. Its leadership had earlier given up its nuclear ambitions and had paid substantial money to the families of the deceased for its purported role in the December 1988 Lockerbie Pan Am disaster[18]. The invasion of Muammar Gaddafi's Libya was a classic

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[15] N. Al-Maghafi (2018). "The BBC researchers discounted all incidents where there was only one source, or where they concluded there was not sufficient evidence. In all, they determined there was enough credible evidence to be confident a chemical weapon was used in 106 incidents. The BBC team were not allowed access to film on the ground in Syria and could not visit the scenes of reported incidents, and therefore were not able to categorially verify the evidence...", https://www.bbc.com/news/world/middle_east

[16] While at the University of South Carolina, the writer sat on a doctoral committee examination of a young Lebanese student who recounted in detail suffering a painful wound from such a weapon delivered by an Israeli aircraft. At the time, he was living in Lebanon's upper Bekka Valley. He heard the plane and explosion and readily connected it to his personal wound. The student is Dr Naim Salem who, at this writing, is on the faculty at Notre Dame College in Beirut, Lebanon.

[17] *Trump warns Syria not to 'recklessly' attack Idlib Province*, "The Daily Star" (Beirut), September 4, 2018.

[18] *New Lockerbie Report says Libyan (Abdelbaset al-Megrahi) was framed to conceal real bombers*, "The Independent" (London), March 11, 2014. This report claims that the downing of the Pan Am plane was originally concocted by Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah

military operation with air attacks, misinformation and journalists doubling as intelligence agents – all influencing Damascus in its concept of how its emerging civil war would be reported to the outside world. The international press was not permitted into Regime-controlled Syria. In hindsight, leaving the field to the opposition went a long way in setting the stage for what has been too frequently a distorted reporting of a complicated conflict. The U.K.-based Syrian Observatory for Human Rights comprises exiles, and informative as is much of its reporting, clearly represents the anti-Assad opposition in Syria. The internet and iPhones facilitate reporting of news, fake or otherwise. Western journalists venturing into Syria from opposition – controlled areas quickly had second thoughts after the emergence of ISIS and some well-publicized beheadings. As less violent opposition groups stopped fighting or joined more violent emergent organizations, Syrians from all faiths and walks of life began voting with their feet[19], becoming internal and international migrants or consolidating behind the Damascus government. Liberated Syrian women were not about to support a return to the social Dark Ages which clearly was a major tenet of ISIS and its social agenda.

How is it that a revolt by Syrians morphed into something more sinister and almost worldwide in scope? What was the clarion call that brought so many non--Syrians into Syria to do battle? Ultra-conservatives in Saudi Arabia recruited and sponsored any number of volunteers to fight in Syria. Most were provided with iPhones in order that military or other successes could be reported back to their sponsors. Many of these devices were collected from bodies of those killed; thus, Damascus has a visual history of many atrocities. No less important is how these volunteers reached the battlefields of Syria. Unlike jihadists from the Muslim south of Russia and points east who usually used Iraq as a gateway, most Middle

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Khomeini in response to the shooting down six months earlier of a scheduled Iranian passenger plane over the Persian Gulf by the American cruiser Vincennes with the death of 290 crew and passengers followed by questionable explanations by the crew of the Vincennes and their being awarded medals. The likely perpetrator was the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-GC at the time housed in Damascus. The 1979 conflict with Saddam Hussein's Iraq was looming and an agreement between President George Bush and Britain's Margaret Thatcher to shift any hint of responsibility away from Syria and Iran was to avoid discouraging Syria from joining the emerging military coalition being organized for the first Gulf War. Al-Megrahi and the Malta connection to the bomb were fabricated, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/new-lockerbie-report-says-libyan-was-framed-to-conceal-the-real-bombers-9185163.htnl

   [19] In 2013 the writer visited a UN Refugee Processing Center in Lebanon's Lower Bekka Valley close to the Syrian border. Long lines of orderly Syrians were awaiting their turn for interviews and housing assignments. A preponderance of female adults with children suggested that some men had joined the fight in Syria. One could only be impressed by the patience and behavior of both children and their parents and the efficiency of the UN personnel.

Eastern and Western fighters arrived by way of Turkey. Flights to Istanbul were followed by motor vehicle conveyance to the Syrian border and farther south. That such movements were not noticed by the Turkish government is fantasy; Turkey has sought to replace the Assad government in Syria.

Turkey's massive water projects on both the upriver Tigris and Euphrates were undertaken without meaningful consultation with either Bagdad or Damascus. In January 2018, Turkish troops and warplanes in conjunction with allied Arab fighters invaded northwest Syria to force U.S.-trained Kurds to retreat from the Afrin area near the Turkey-Syria border. This brings into better focus the developing political relationship among Turkey, Iran and Russia. It likely can be traced to fear on the part of Turkey and Iran for possible consolidation of their Kurdish minorities into an independent Kurdish political entity. Russia wants to maintain its long--standing role in Syria and welcomes Turkey as a friendly economic cohort as with Iran, while at the same time using the situation to devalue the NATO alliance.

Enter Iran and Russia

Significant numbers of Iranians began to appear in 2013. It was common knowledge that cheaper hotels in Damascus were temporarily housing these new 'pilgrims'. Tehran clearly was concerned for the survival of the Assad government and the security of its overland communication routes with the Bekka Valley in neighboring Lebanon. It was in southern Lebanon that its Hezbollah allies were concentrated. It is to be recalled that of all the Arab states and militias that fought against Israel since 1948 only Hezbollah could claim a modicum of success when it held Israeli forces to a rough draw in 2006. That it became such a thorn in the Israeli scheme of things is due in large measure to Israel's arrogance and its lengthy occupation of mostly Shia Muslim southern Lebanon following the 1982 invasion of Lebanon to combat the PLO and their allies. Israel stayed too long and alienated the local population. If ever there was a classic model of the unintended consequences of war, the coming of age of Hezbollah to combat the Israeli intruders and their Maronite Christian allies residing in southern Lebanon is an outstanding example. Israel was obliged to retreat from southern Lebanon and, in doing so, to lay the foundation for an increasingly militant Hezbollah determined to arm itself with Iranian assistance. Those extremist Maronite Christians who too closely aligned themselves with the Israeli occupiers and who were involved in the notorious Sabra and Chatila refugee camp massacres in south Beirut were to lose historic communities in southern Lebanon that had long resided in relative tranquility with their Shia neighbors.

Russia returned to Syria in 2015 and in strength. The Assad regime was in serious trouble. Russia was determined not to be caught off-guard by the West as in Libya, where the UN Security Council created a no-fly zone that set the

stage for the destruction of Gaddafi's government. Not only had the Syrian opposition inside and outside of the country grown in strength but was receiving increasing support from the United States in material and training. It also was being acknowledged as having a world power at its back. At the same time, ISIS had expanded its reach by taking Mosul in Iraq, hence having a fixed base of support for its operations. ISIS was also making significant intrusions into Syria. Russia had retained a minor naval facility near Tartous since it entered the Middle East back in the 1950s to support Egypt's new Aswan Dam project on the Nile River after promised American funding failed to materialize[20]. The Soviet Union was soon to become the primary supplier of military equipment for the Egyptian and Syrian armies.

Fast forward to 2015 and Russia's decision to help save the Assad regime. Once committed, Russia set in motion a massive military airlift to expand existing facilities on Syria's Mediterranean coast. A major military center was in operation with a potent air arm destined to alter the balance of power in Syria by ruthlessly attacking opposition and ISIS targets. Simultaneously, Iranian allied militias comprising Shia fighters from several countries as well as Hezbollah troops were having success on the ground. The geopolitical dynamics were rapidly changing.

Turkey, once determined to see the end of the Assad regime, was now faced with well-trained Syrian Kurdish cadres determined to recover territory in northern Syria occupied by pro-Turkish militias and ISIS. Turkey feared a possible future political juncture of these troops and Kurdish insurgents in Turkey's eastern Anatolia. Complicating matters was the fact that both Turkey and the United States are members of NATO; the Americans for many years have maintained a major air base near Izmir in western Anatolia. Planes stationed there were almost daily attacking ISIS targets in Syria and Iraq. Russian planes from their base in western Syria were hitting many of these same ISIS targets and even more Syrian opposition targets. Israeli planes were striking Iranian and Hezbollah targets and complicating an already confused environment in the air and on the ground. By 2018, and after a botched September 18 shooting down of a Russian electronic intelligence gathering aircraft by Syrian air defense missiles aimed at Israeli planes purportedly using the Russian plane as cover while attacking targets in Syria,

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[20] *We Don't Give a Dam – The Feud over Financing the Aswan High Dam – Moments in U.S. Diplomatic History*, "Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training", June, 2016. In July, 1956, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles notified the Egyptian Ambassador that the United States was withdrawing its earlier offer to help finance the construction of Egypt's Aswan High Dam citing growing Congressional disapproval of Egypt's obtaining military weapons from Czechoslovakia and concern for Israel's security. One week later, President Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal and set in motion the Suez crisis. The USSR assumed the constructions costs for the Aswan project. Henceforth, Moscow became the primary supplier of weaponry to both Egypt and Syria.

Russia delivered a long-promised S-300 surface-to-air missile system to Syria[21]. The delivery of this system had been promised in 2011 but didn't materialize due to objections by Israel and the United States. Russia appeared to be sending a message that its neutrality regarding Israeli air operations in Syria was over. Would the Americans abandon their trustworthy and battlefield successful Kurdish allies? They did just that! Would Turkey seek to block further Kurdish success in northern Syria? They did just that! Would Russia press on with its air campaign to help the Assad forces recover lost territory? They have done just that and vigorously so.

Simultaneously, the refugee crisis threatens to destroy European Community cohesiveness and common goals. Lebanon, Jordan and even Turkey are facing serious internal fissures due to the influx of Syrian refugees. Washington wants to quit the region but not at the expense of putting Israel at more risk. Iraq has had new elections and continues with a Shia-dominated government still friendly with Iran. The Syrian opposition maintains its firm but increasingly unrealistic stance that the Assad regime must go before it will talk about the future. President Assad and his Russian allies prepare for the final battle in northwestern Idlib Province. Israel continues its unrealistic stance that Iran must abandon Syria or at the least remove all of its military from the country. Israel threatens to destroy Lebanon if Hezbollah continues to strengthen itself militarily in defense against promised Israeli intrusions.

Washington, governing the world's most nuclear armed country, in not so subtle ways threatens to remove the Iranian regime if it restarts its nuclear weapons program. All the while Syria suffers. The potential for the United States and Russia to engage in armed conflict over what happens in Syria is serious. Threat of a World War III no longer can be ignored.

A future fraught with problems

The September 23, 2018 Russia-Turkey agreement in Sochi, Russia is an attempt to defuse an approaching government invasion and inevitable tragedy for all concerned in Syria's northwestern Idlib Province. The agreement to establish

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[21] J. Marcus (2018). Initially promised in 2011, a Russian S-300 surface-to-air missile system was finally delivered to its Syrian ally in spite of sharp opposition by the United States and Israel. What prompted the delivery at this particular time was the downing of a Russian Ilyushin electronic intelligence gathering plane and the deaths of its crew by Syrian air defense units aiming at Israeli aircraft attacking nearby targets in Syria. Russia claimed that the Israeli planes were using the downed Russian plane as cover. Apparently some voices in the Russian Defense Ministry were advocating direct retaliatory attacks on airfields in Israel proper. "BBC News", September 24, 2018, https://www.bbc.com/new/world-middle-east-45625388

a 15–20 kilometer demilitarized zone between government and rebel forces and the withdrawal of all tanks, artillery, mortars and multiple launch rocket systems by October 10, 2018[22] was tenuous and already has failed[23]. The agreement also calls for joint Russian-Turkish military patrols to insure the keeping of the terms of the agreement. The Sochi agreement is fraught with serious and longer-term danger. By constraining Damascus in seeking recovery of the last significant part of Syria not under government control, this agreement sanctions what likely could be a permanent opposition-controlled piece of Syrian territory. This is intolerable for a regime that has suffered so much and for so long along with millions of Syrians, whether pro-government or anti-Assad. The agreement essentially codifies a permanent opposition government in situ (in Syria proper). No mention has been made regarding a process or timetable to remove or eliminate the scores of ISIS fighters presently in Idlib Province. Who will do the cleansing?

Too often the Syrian opposition has been co-opted by ISIS or its affiliates to fight the regime. If and when ISIS is effectively removed from Idlib, will the 'moderate' opposition be permitted to maintain its weaponry or to import new arms? For that matter, will they be permitted to continue political agitation? Turkey is the logical entry point for weapons and policing but its past role in facilitating entry into Syria of foreign jihadists puts to question its objectivity. Furthermore, best not to forget the pre-conflict population in Idlib. Their numbers have been greatly increased by ISIS, opposition fighters and their families. These people evacuated other areas under attack by Russia and the regime and accepted safe conduct passage to what has amounted to the Idlib dumping ground for defeated insurgents. Once provided with security, will any appreciable numbers of displaced Syrians in Idlib accept government assurances to live in peace elsewhere in the country?[24]. Accepting a permanent cancer to its national integrity may be asking too much of a regime that has seen so many tragedies prior to its more recent military successes. Russia and even allied Iran may need to reassess this agreement with Turkey. It cannot stand the test of time.

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[22] J. Macaron (2018).

[23] *Rebels fire shells from Syria buffer despite heavy arms pullout: activists*, "The Daily Star" (Beirut), October 24, 2018. See also *Syrian rebels hold out in final enclave*, "The Wall Street Journal" (World News), October 16, 2018.

[24] *Syria offers amnesty to deserters and draft dodgers*, "The Daily Star" (Beirut), October 9, 2018. Amnesty covers Syrians in and out of the country. The proclamation does not include 'criminals' and army defectors some of whom are still fighting against the government. Deserters and draft dodgers in Syria have four months and those abroad have six months to turn themselves in to the authorities.

Summary

The lands of the eastern Mediterranean are storied for their historical lore. Birthplace for two important religions, the objective for the great crusades seeking religious-political transformation, the carving-up of the last of the great empires centered in Constantinople, this area has now drawn Washington's interest if only half-throttle. Seldom has there existed a more confused and convoluted array of players and purported objectives. The Arab Spring that began with such high hope in Tunisia soon stuttered to a slow shift once the West and the United States in particular recognized some of the negative collateral implications to regime change. Military rule was more reliable than what many viewed as mob rule with no consideration for political alliances or special interests.

Short-lived, the Arab Spring emerged from the discontent of the masses and initially caused great excitement in the Arab-speaking world and elsewhere. Longstanding dictatorial rule was at risk as was the region's geopolitical fabric that emerged following World War I. Also at risk were the Egyptian-Israeli linkages resulting from the 1973 war and follow-up endeavors by President Carter in the Camp David meetings with President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin. Initial euphoria over free elections in Egypt and the arrest of President Mubarak soured early in President Morsi's tenure. He sought a different parameter for the country's external relations, Israel and Hamas in particular. This clearly was of concern in Washington. Whether the United States had a hand in Morsi's overthrow is irrelevant. The fact of the matter is that the military takeover of the country's first elected president, while condemned, did not stop Washington from renewing military assistance and providing diplomatic recognition. Was Washington's about-face due to incidents related to persecution of Coptic Christians or sabotage of gas pipelines serving Israel's energy needs? Anti-Israeli incidents were increasing, and Morsi's government seemed unable or unwilling to bring the situation under control.

From the outset, Syria seemed to be a special problem. Scores of disaffected citizens rallied to the spirit of the Arab Spring; poorly thought-out, heavy-handed responses by Damascus served only to inflame an increasingly combustible situation. Relying on the minority Alawites and other fringe confessional groups for core support, the government was faced with significant opposition from within the majority Sunni population including many moderates and most fundamentalists. The Assad regime had long maintained control with force and exhibited little tolerance for Islamic fundamentalism in a secular country with numerous ethnic and confessional flashpoints. Defections from the Syrian army and disaffection with the regime added to the ranks of those in opposition to Assad rule. Yet it appears that the majority of Syria's population supported the government, fearful of the consequences that might follow with a less tolerant leadership. Unlike Tunisia, Egypt or Algeria in its earlier ill-fated prelude to

an Arab Spring where the citizenry seeking change clearly were in a majority, the situation in Syria was less clear. Even the outgoing American Ambassador in Damascus admitted that at least 60% of the country's population supported the Assad regime. This figure is given still greater credence by assessments that the great majority of Syrians who fled civil war into neighboring countries would choose to live in government controlled areas were they comfortable in returning.

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Przypadek Syrii: rozpad nowoczesnego państwa w dobie fałszywych wiadomości i regionalnej rywalizacji supermocarstw

Zarys treści: Negatywny wpływ globalizacji łatwo zauważyć w dzisiejszej Syrii. Artykuł poświęcony jest siedmioletniemu konfliktowi wewnętrznemu, którego początek był reakcją na wydarzenia w Tunezji zwane arabskim przebudzeniem. Syria, niegdyś dobrze funkcjonujące państwo, stała się magnesem dla fanatyków religijnych i ich bogatych sponsorów z konserwatywnej Arabii Saudyjskiej i innych odległych państw szukających korzyści geopolitycznych. Syria doświadczyła daremnych starań podejmowanych przez ONZ w celu trwałego rozwiązania konfliktu w tym kraju. Interwencja wojskowa Iranu i Rosji zmieniła konfigurację konfliktu w krytycznym momencie, podczas gdy interwencja Izraela i Stanów Zjednoczonych stanowi zagrożenie konfliktem supermocarstw. Przez cały czas Syryjczycy pozostający w tym kraju cierpią, a ci, którzy szukają bezpieczeństwa gdzie indziej, stanowią zagrożenie dla stabilizacji politycznej Libanu, Turcji i Jordanii, a w dalszej perspektywie także dla spójności polityki Unii Europejskiej.

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A historical and politico-geographical analysis of Hungarian-Polish border before 1939 in the Hungarian historical geography

Abstract: The historical development of the common borders took place in many respects simultaneously since the epoch of the two states' establishment. The territories and borders of both states have greatly changed ever since, yet during the periods of joined kingdom the common borders always showed a high degree of stability.

The first description of the common state borders can be found in the Anonymous Latin Gesta by around 1200 AD. From the 15th century on, the Hungarian Parliament on several occasions appointed and sent different committees by legal acts to the borders of neighbouring countries, including Poland, in order to delimit or adjust its state borders.

Due to the threefold dissolution of the Polish State, the former common border fundamentally changed. After the First World War, the common state border between the reborn Poland and the historical Hungary completely vanished after the latter lost some two-thirds of its territory.

During the Second World War the common borders were restored for a short time through which thousands of Polish escaped to Hungary.

Thus, the partially shared state history and the changing (disappearing and reappearing) common state border represent an international singularity in many respects.

Keywords: Poland, Hungary, borders.

Introduction

Internet users have an almost unlimited access to a wealth of (more or less accurate and credible) animations illustrating the transformation of European borders over the past one thousand, five hundred, two hundred, *etc*. years. These provide seemingly exhaustive and instantly available information on the evolution of European state territories and borders. In Hungarian geographical research, the interwar years brought a new impetus to the study of "state biographies" and "state border biographies". The issue has long since been explored by representatives of "traditional cartography" in most countries of Europe (generating process analyses that went beyond a mere presentation of the actual characteristics of territories and borders in diverse historical atlases). However, the study of these

processes gained special momentum in the post-World War I period. In Hungary, Pál Teleki, Albert Halász, and András Rónai were the most prominent figures of this strand of research in a Hungarian and European context.

The paper provides a brief review of efforts in Hungarian historical-political geography (focusing on the work of Albert Halász[1] and András Rónai[2]) targeting the description and interpretation of these historical processes. Albert Halász (1890–1945), owing to his cooperation with statisticians, historians and the construction of a research database, obtained access to the entirety of historical (scientific and educational) atlases published in Europe. (He attempted to provide an exhaustive outlook through the use and inclusion of atlases published in the then Soviet Union among his bibliographical references).

The main point of reference for Halász was the core territory of the continent (he did not include the British Isles or Scandinavia in his analyses), since his work was mainly focussed on Central European processes. He illustrated historical divisions on transparent tracing papers, inserting the natural geographical base map of the continent underneath. Halász's awareness of identical natural geographical milieus presenting distinct political divisions sets him apart from the current of geographical determinism.

He was immediately confronted with the presence of heterogeneous spatial and border configurations in his diverse sources depicting the same era, which necessitated certain compromising decisions on his behalf regarding the selection of credible and reliable sources.

Such contradictions and compromises challenged the credibility of the information displayed on Albert Halász' maps, yet he took full responsibility of the consequences and debatable nature of his decisions. In the case of Hungary, the high stakes of identifying the power-political space of the country or the kingdom as an "evident" underlying basis of his research was not without problems, either.

The economist András Rónai (1905–1991) began to study Central European states and state biographies from the early 1930s. His chief area of interest was the perennity of states and borders, he performed comparative research, devoting considerable energies to studying the unique history of Poland. His Central European Atlas published in 1945 is a basic reference point for anyone doing research on this specific area.

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[1] Albert Halász was born in 1890, and after concluding his studies in chemical engineering, devoted most of his energies to economic statistics. Post-1918, his research was focussed on the exploration of spatial processes and the history of borders in Central Europe. Albert Halász, rendering a great service to the Hungarian nation through his outstanding and significant scientific work, became an exile and later a victim of fascism in 1945.

[2] András Rónai (1905–1991) was the student of Pál Teleki at the Faculty of Economics of the University of Budapest, and later his colleague in the Institute of Economics and Political Geography. Rónai was a prominent figure of Hungarian border studies in Central Europe from the early 1930s until 1948.

The constant evolution of European political space

The restructuring of political power, relations of domination and state territorialities was a permanent feature of the European continent under Barbarian and Christian rule alike. National and overview atlases of European history – particularly those covering early historical periods – do not tend to provide a uniform description of state territorial relations. Besides a lack of data, this stems from the existence of countries where the "current" state of affairs was the privileged subject of research and others where the retro-projected character of their actual territory was being stressed.

Since the period of the Conquest (895/896), the Hungarian settlement area, and the later on the territory of Hungary has been aligned to the dominant European trends of the day. It is not by chance that the lengthy and uncertainty-
-laden monograph of Sándor Márki was published during the ceremonies commemorating the 1000th anniversary of the Conquest. The presentation of state geographies and territorialities of Europe during the period of the Conquest was a serious challenge for Márki, a historian well trained in historical geography as well. Available sources and the extensive international literature did not allow for a wholesale reconstruction of the existing conditions in every area. His attempt to define the position of Poland – despite his utilisation of Polish sources – has been limited (Márki 1897).

The evolution of European political space saw periods of relative stability of state borders, while various fault lines were triggered by concrete events or post-war territorial reorganisations that effected a fundamental modification of the spatial order of Europe. The evolution of the hierarchical system of European state territorialities and borders was shaped by post-war bi- or multilateral peace treaties (Marczali 1920).

Albert Halász carried out preliminary studies that made it possible for him to select the temporal scope of his research. To avoid national bias, his choice fell not on the period of the Hungarian Conquest but the year 950. The over 500-year-
-long period of territorial reorganisations between 950–1519 (Fig. 1) constitutes a particularly exciting phase in the history of Europe (from the perspective of its Central and Eastern components). Hungary and its current neighbourhood were in a constant flux during these years (with only the Hungarian-Polish border displaying a high degree of stability). The period also saw frequent and fundamental territorial reorganisations along the southern border sections. In the case of the Balkans, imperiality, the changing of empires, and small state processes and strives were coextensive.

In Poland, the birth of the Christian Kingdom and dynastic relationships between the Hungarian-Polish royal families created remarkably peaceful conditions along the common borders of contemporary Europe. Poland, within the

context of the long-term system of Hungarian foreign policy (Herczegh 1987) and military conflicts (Bánlaky 1928) represented a "peaceful and friendly neighbour" in the eyes of the Hungarian political leadership.

Fig. 1. The evolution of Central European and Hungarian state borders, 950–1519
Source: A. Halász (1936).

The spatial development of the two countries was quite heterogeneous from the 1500s onwards. Hungary fell apart after the 1526 defeat by the Ottomans (and was divided into four parts for a brief period) while Poland was transformed into an effective European great power during certain periods. Nonetheless, peaceful conditions reigned uninterrupted along their common borders.

During the period between the Treaty of Westphalia (1648) and the post--Napoleonic reorganisations, (Fig. 2) state borders already begin to show signs of nodalisation and become solidified along extensive territories, while various border intersections remained quite turbulent. Poland had a central role in the expulsion of the Ottomans from Central Europe. The Polish king, John III Sobieski had a key role in the relief of Vienna from the Ottomans in 1683, and the Polish troops joined the battles in Hungary, participating in the reconquest of Buda in 1686.

Fig. 2. The evolution of Central European and Hungarian state borders, 1648–1816
Source: A. Halász (1936).

Hungary was integrated into the Habsburg Empire in the 18th century (becoming a *de jure* hereditary Habsburg Kingdom through male/female lineage), while Poland fell victim to adjacent great powers (Habsburg Empire, Russian Empire, Kingdom of Prussia). Both of these nations, boasting their long historical past, unique European position and independence, resisted oppression through uprisings.

The summary figure of Halász's maps (Fig. 3) on the period between 1878 and 1935 present the main features of the great Balkan and post-World War I reorganisations. Whilst omitting certain elements of the transformations, it clearly indicates the direction of the processes.

In a peculiar way, Poland became the key subject of Hungarian historical and political geographical analyses under World War I. Aurél Hézser (Hézser 1915), in his discussion of Russian Poland, presented the historical-territorial transformations of Poland: Great Poland (1634), "small Polands" (1807–1809 Grand Duchy of Warsaw, 1815–1830 Polish Kingdom, and "Divided Poland", 1772, 1793, 1795). Besides sympathy towards the Poles, Hézser also attributed great significance to neighbourhood relations with the major powers which in his view, cemented the community of destiny of Hungary and Poland.

Under World War I, Ödön Vécsey interrogated the role of "geographical foundations" in shaping the historical fate of Poland (Vécsey 1917). According to Vécsey, Poland was a target of German and Russian power ambitions in the natural geographical and political space alike. In the case of Poland, it was not geographical specifics but power ambitions that shaped territorial processes. The Hungarian-Polish neighbourhood and the common border were not laden with conflicts, though.

Fig. 3. The evolution of Central European and Hungarian state borders, 1878–1935

Source: A. Halász (1936).

András Rónai, whose research targeted territorial and border changes, analysed various aspects of the stability of given state border sections. Basically, he was studying very long-term processes (Fig. 4) just like Albert Halász, however, his main interest was not in providing a snapshot of the conditions of a particular period of time. Instead, he used generalised figures to illustrate the state territorial and border dynamics specific to the area.

Through the example of "emblematic countries", Rónai illustrated how general European processes affected particular countries in diverse ways. Hungary and Poland were both included in his comparative research. Whilst he demonstrated the existence of certain similarities between the two countries, he showed that divergencies and discontinuous development paths were more the norm.

Fig. 4. The stability of Central European state borders, 800–1920
Source: A. Rónai, ed. (1945).

Fig. 5. The spatial biographies of diverse European states, 800–1920
Source: A. Rónai, ed. (1945).

Fig. 6. The neighbourhood environment of "Greater Poland
and Smaller Hungary" in Europe, 1920
Source: Central Statistical Office of Hungary.

The Paris Peace Treaties of 1919 that concluded World War I turned Europe upside down, creating a new situation for Poland and Hungary becoming second neighbours. Poland, emerging victorious from the war, was among the signatories of the Hungarian Peace Treaty and procured some smaller territories from historical Hungary, yet this didn't prevent interwar Hungarian geography from "exempting it from blame".

The short period between autumn 1938 and 1939 saw the destinies of the two countries – regaining a common border – merge once more. Both countries silently assisted the division of Czechoslovakia and, later on, with the independence of Slovakia and its truncation by Hungary (or the liberation of Subcarpathia in March 1939 from the Hungarian perspective) they became neighbours once more. The shared Carpathian border (301 km) gained outstanding significance in September 1939 with tens of thousands of Poles fleeing German and Soviet occupation (Fig. 7).

Fig. 7. Common Hungarian Polish borders from April of 1939 until September of 1939
Source: Földrajzi Zsebkönyv (1940).

András Rónai (Rónai 1947) was still able to register post-World War II territorial and state border changes and present the new political geographical position of the new Poland (becoming a second neighbour to Hungary once more) and its significance before the complete banning of political geographical research in Hungary in 1948.

Summary

The short overview of European, Central European, Hungarian and Polish state building and state border changes (which for reasons of space could not go into details) indicates and (partially) documents the extremely problematic historical and geographical questions inherent in the development of Central European political space. The "European problem" and, more specifically, the "Central European knot" were constantly recurring elements against the backdrop of changing power configurations.

Immediate neighbourhood relations and common borders raised bilateral and multilateral issues at the same time. Throughout history, Hungarian-Polish relations were characterised by peaceful co-existence with minor territorial conflicts along and across shared borders that cast a shadow on their mutual relations only at earlier periods.

The two countries' external relationships share common features due to their neighbourhood relations with one or several great powers in the course of their historical evolution. They were equally subjected to the imperialist ambitions of major powers.

Post-World War I, the two countries embarked on diverging development paths: Poland recovered its greatness, while Hungary emerged "truncated" from the world cataclysm in terms of both territory and population.

The territory of Poland was divided between Germany and the Soviets at the beginning of World War II and was subjected to German rule from the summer of 1941. Hungary was also occupied by Germany from March 19, 1944. In spring 1945, both countries became Soviet-liberated/occupied zones, Poland as victor, and Hungary as a defeated ally.

The special significance of the figures constructed by Albert Halász depicting state geographies, the history of states and state borders lies not only in their contribution to the history of science, they have also raised a whole host of methodological issues. His research presents the bulk share of spatial historical processes – in a non-comprehensive, sometimes questionable manner. Nonetheless, I highly recommend studying the (theoretical and methodological) issues raised by Halász since YouTube and other "neatly moving" European flowcharts depict the very same processes. Lucky are those European nations – and how few – whose citizens are familiar with the long-term evolution of their state territory and may notice how slight the changes between the "now" and the "then" are in reality.

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Historyczna i polityczno-geograficzna analiza węgiersko-polskich granic sprzed 1939 roku w węgierskiej geografii historycznej

Zarys treści: Historia rozwoju wspólnych granic Polski i Węgier zaczęła sie zasadniczo wraz z ustanowieniem obu tych państw. Od tego czasu terytoria i granice obu państw znacznie się zmieniły, jednak w okresach Rzeczpospolitej Obojga Narodów wspólne granice zawsze wykazywały wysoki stopień stabilności.

Pierwszy opis wspólnych granic państwowych znajdujemy u Galla Anonima (około 1200 r.). Od XV wieku parlament węgierski, na mocy aktów prawnych, kilkukrotnie ustanawiał różne komisje do wytyczenia granic z krajami ościennymi, a zatem także z Polską. Komisje te wyznaczały granice i dokonywały ich korekt.

W wyniku trzykrotnego zaniku państwowości polskiej, ustanowiona treść umów o wspólnych granicach uległa zasadniczej zmianie. Po pierwszej wojnie światowej wspólna granica pomiędzy oboma państwami, czyli odradzającą się Polską i historycznymi Węgrami całkowicie zniknęła, gdyż Węgry utraciły około dwóch trzecich swojego terytorium państwowego.

W przededniu II wojny światowej przywrócono na krótko wspólną granicę, przez którą po wrześniu 1939 roku tysiące Polaków uciekło na Węgry.

Ta częściowo wspólna dla obu państw historia pojawiającej się i zanikającej granicy polsko-węgierskiej stanowi swoisty międzynarodowy ewenement.

Słowa kluczowe: Polska, Węgry, granice.

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Challenges to the state policy towards migration processes in Poland

Abstract: In quantitative dimension, Poland is a significant émigré country in which the scale of external outflow has been maintained at the level of about 2 million people for many years. In the light of (Central Statistical Office) data in 2016, 2 million 515 thousand Poles were abroad temporarily for a period of more than 3 months.

An important task of migration policy is therefore to minimise the negative effects of mass emigration and to maximise the benefits resulting from this process. At the same time, in the decade after 2010, the volume of foreigners coming to Poland increased significantly and it should be expected that, as the socio-economic attractiveness of the country has grown, this group would be increasing as well. According to the Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy (*Ministerstwo Rodziny, Pracy i Polityki Społecznej*) data, 235 626 work permits were issued in 2017, including 192 547 to Ukrainian citizens (ca. 82%). To compare, in the same year, the district employment offices (*Powiatowy Urząd Pracy*) registered 1 824 464 declarations of intention to work to foreigners, including 1 714 891 towards the citizens of Ukraine (94%). The discussion on the nature of immigration policy is therefore unavoidable. The growing inflow of foreigners is gaining a special demographic, social and political significance in the context of unfavourable forecast of population changes in Poland. It also has an important regional dimension. From this perspective, foreigners will be needed on the Polish labour market to alleviate already existing and projected shortages of labour resources.

An important challenge is to develop a strategy for the integration of social, economic and cultural foreigners into the Polish society. Consequently, the persistent mass emigration, growing immigration, unflagging migration potential and, more expected than real, the return of Poles from emigration are a great challenge for the Polish economy and society as well as for regions. This multidimensional nature of foreign migration in Poland makes the emergence of migration policy system, corresponding to internal and external conditions, a necessity.

The postulate of the formulation of the foundations of a migration policy appeared in Poland at the beginning of the 1990s, but until now a coherent system of this policy has failed to develop as a complementary element of the socio-economic policy of the country.

Keywords: Poland, migration processes, migration Policy, labour market.

Introduction

Poland is an important European emigration country where for many years the scale of emigration has remained at the same level of around 2 million people. As data from GUS (Central Statistical Office) show, in 2016, 2 million 515 thousand Poles were temporarily staying abroad for the period of over 3 months (*Informacja o rozmiarach i kierunkach...* 2017: 2). At the same time, the number of foreigners coming to Poland has significantly increased in recent years. Data from the MRPiPS (Ministry of Family, Labour and Social Policy) show that in 2017, 235 626 work permits were issued, including 192 547 permits for Ukrainian citizens (81.7%). In the same year, 1 824 464 state-ments of intention to entrust work to a foreigner were registered in district labour offices, including 1 714 891 for Ukrainian citizens (94%) (*Liczba i struktura oświadczeń...* 2017).

In this situation, the large scale of emigration, especially dynamically growing immigration, is becoming a real challenge for the Polish economy and society. The creation of the system of migration policy that would become a complementary element of socio-economic policy of the state is one of them[1]. An important task of this policy should be to minimise the negative effects of mass migration and to maximise the benefits resulting from this process, especially to develop the strategy of social, economic and cultural integration of foreigners into the Polish society.

Migration policy in Poland

The postulate of formulation of the foundations of a migration policy first appeared in Poland at the beginning of the 1990s as a consequence of the processes of transformation and democratisation, as well as progressive liberalisation of the principles of crossing borders and the growing scale of migration movements. However, so far neither a coherent system of migration policy, nor the final shape of the migration doctrine reflecting Polish national interest and state philosophy on the basis of which the principles of this policy could be formulated have been developed. However, accession to the EU and the necessity to adopt the Community law in this area caused significant changes in the migration policy of Poland. This was because it was necessary to adapt the national law to the principles of the Schengen Agreement and to introduce its provisions in the sphere of border control, refugee policy, visa system and migration policy (Balicki, Stalker 2006: 351). At the same time, Poland was obliged to prepare the main principles of the national migration policy, embedded in the framework of European migration policy and subordinated to the principle of subsidiarity[2].

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[1] Compare: M. Okólski (2012: 23–44).
[2] *Wyzwania dla narodowej polityki migracyjnej...* (2004: 39).

The act regulating the entry and stay of the European Union citizens and their families on the territory of Poland was adopted on the accession day. It was a part of *acquis* and constituted mandatory and basic legal solutions promoting freedom of movement of the citizens within the EU. Furthermore, on the basis of experiences of Western European countries, the *Act on Foreigners* was adopted in 1997. It was very restrictive and limiting to legal migration channels (Górny *et al*. 2010: 8; Balicki, Wells 2006). However, in subsequent years it has been changed and amended several times. At the same time, the new Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 1997 guaranteed foreigners the right to seek asylum in Poland. There were also debates concerning the draft of the *Polish Charter Act* which came into force in 2008 and the *Repatriation Act* passed in 2000.

The *Act on Foreigners* regulates the principles and conditions for foreigners' entry into, transit through, stay and exit from Poland, as well as the conditions for granting protection to foreigners. Clearly increasing liberalisation of foreigners' access to the Polish labour market has been observed in recent years.

Further facilitations in the employment of migrants involved the reduction of costs of issuing work permits, abolishing the institution of promise of issuing work permit, acceleration of the so-called "labour market test" or the possibility of its abandonment (Matkowska 2013: 77–92). The latest, and significant, amendment to the *Act on Foreigners* occurred in 2018. It introduced several changes in the regulations that should cause streamlining of the proceedings and partial change in the requirements that concern granting individual residence permits. For example, a formal requirement to enclose, with the application, the so-called poviat governor's information on the lack of possibility to meet employer's staffing needs on the basis of registers of the unemployed and those seeking employment or on the negative result of recruitment process organised for the employer[3] was abolished. The above change concerns the applications to grant temporary residence permits and work permits, as well as applications for temporary residence permit to perform work demanding high qualifications.

In 2009, Inter-ministerial Committee for Migration started the work on the development of the principles of a migration policy that was adopted in 2012 in the form of a document entitled: *Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postulowane działania* (*Migration policy of Poland – current situation and postulated actions*)[4]. In addition to the summary of the principles of the migration policy of the state, the document included the directions and recommended actions in this area. At the time, the document was presumed to be the interpretation of the operating migration strategy of the state. In 2014, the plan of its implementation was adopted. It included a catalogue of actions and proposals for solutions aimed

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[3] Urząd do Spraw Cudzoziemców, https://udsc.gov.pl/nowelizacja-ustawy-o-cudzo-ziemcach/

[4] *Polityka migracyjna Polski…* (2012).

at achieving the of adopted policies along with an indication of the entities responsible for their implementation as well as a determination of the costs of implemented instruments and sources of financing for planned expenditures[5]. Concurrently with the work on *Migration policy of Poland…*, development was started on the next document entitled *Polish policy of foreigners' integration – principles and guidelines*. Its draft was approved in 2014, yet it was not adopted and did not perform a significant role in the creation of the integration policy (Wach 2018: 347–369; Kubiciel-Lodzińska, Solga 2017: 797–810).

The so-called migration crisis and the mass influx of migrants into Europe started in 2015 caused a spike in the interest in the issues of migration, while at the same time resulting in significant politicisation of this problem (Lesińska, Duszczyk 2018: 251–264; Bonifazi 2008: 107–128; Heffner, Solga 2008: 49–62). However, increased interest in migration policy has not brought considerable changes in the formation of the system of migration policy of Poland. On the contrary, some of the previous strategic documents, including *Migration policy of Poland…*, were withdrawn in 2016. In 2018, very general priorities of the new migration policy were described in the document entitled *Priorytety społeczno--gospodarcze polityki migracyjnej* (*Socio-economic priorities of migration policy*).

Most important challenges in the sphere of migration policy

From the perspective of the present migration situation in Poland, as well as from the point of view of the very definition of migration policy, which frames it as a system comprising the actions of the state towards its own diaspora and towards foreigners residing in its territory, Poland faces serious challenges. Certainly, Poland as a democratic country has limited possibilities of real impact on individual decisions that concern remaining in the country, departure or return (Chałupczak *et al*. 2014: 307–331). However, an appropriate system of institutional support addressed to immigrants and people returning from abroad, as well as information policy aimed at those making decisions about emigration can be created. At the same time, public institutions have a decisive impact on these socio-economic spheres that directly determine decisions concerning emigration related to stable employment, remuneration, quality of the social security system, and the level of education.

The outflow of young and educated Poles justifies the need to include in migration policy the actions targeted at people returning from abroad. Facilitation of returns, if they are permanent and consistent, can become an important factor allowing for the utilisation of re-emigrant's potential (Heffner, Solga 2009: 137–146). Such system of support may include assistance in quick implementation

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[5] *Plan wdrażania dla dokumentu „Polityka migracyjna Polski – stan obecny i postu-lowane działania"* (2013).

of returnee's investment plans or actions aimed at overcoming socio-occupational exclusion (e.g. trainings organised by employment agencies, professional career advisory services or psychological workshops).

Due to a dynamic increase in the inflow of foreigners, the policy of social, economic and cultural integration is facing serious challenges (Szymańska--Zybertowicz 2011). In the context of foreigners' influx to Poland, forecasted unfavourable demographic changes also need to be taken into consideration. Considerable population loss, deep changes in the population structure by age and population ageing over the next few decades will be serious problems for the economy and society. Consequently, immigrants will be needed on the Polish labour market to alleviate the anticipated shortages and to become the source of acquisition of new workers. The purpose of immigration policy in this context would be the flexible replenishment of shortages emerging on the Polish labour market, both in seasonal and long term perspectives, and the prevention of foreign nationals' inflow being an alternative to the employment of Polish or other EU nationals (Szylko-Skoczny, Duszczyk 2008; Szylko-Skoczny 2013: 80–92).

In this approach, migration policy should be a comprehensive system, comprising both the issues concerning immigration as well as migration, re-emigration and even potential emigration. It should also be integrated with other public policies (Solga 2015: 133–147).

Instruments of migration policy – selected issues

The identification of instruments of socio-economic policy that enable effective control of migration processes and the formation of an institutional system aimed at supporting migrants are extremely important in creating a migration policy. Traditional factors such as good law, stable economy, guarantee of work and its high quality, well-developed technological infrastructure, properly functioning system of social security are fundamental in this policy. They will always be a magnet for people who consider leaving the country, returning to the country or migration for economic reasons. Among them, the instruments strengthening the labour market are particularly important. Active approach in the sphere of employment policy may involve training programmes for people returning from abroad and offering them assistance in finding their place on the labour market, support in re-training, programmes of acclimatisation and assistance in starting their own business activity. In the case of immigrants, this includes significant simplifications while starting work, the possibility to establish companies and the perspective of migration for settlement (Lesińska, Stefańska 2010; Kubiciel--Lodzińska, Ruszczak 2018: 425–440). This means that, as already indicated, the instruments of a migration policy should be an element of a coherent and coordinated system and apply to all migration groups – emigrants residing abroad,

people returning from abroad, immigrants, and potential emigrants (Solga 2013: 325–330; Heffner, Solga 2017: 11–26). In the case of expatriates, actions aimed at the maintenance of migrants' bond with their country/region of origin, for example through portals informing about the current situation in the country, about the housing situation or the situation on the labour market and the possibilities to establish their own company seem the most important. Measures promoting changes occurring in the country/region or even organisation of meetings with representatives of specific institutions, e.g. local governments, entrepreneurs, labour market experts in the places of largest Polish community concentration can also bring positive results (Van Mol, de Valk 2016). Finally, involvement of emigrants in socio-cultural life of the region of origin (e.g. through local associations) will support maintenance of bonds with the country of origin.

Similarly, in the case of people who are planning to return or have already returned from abroad, reliable information about the country/region, especially the opportunities related to employment are the most important. Institutional support concerning official issues related to return, career guidance and training offers allowing for raising qualifications or re-training are the elements of the catalogue of instruments targeted at re-emigrants. Certainly, specific psychological tools should be developed and applied in frequently difficult processes of re-integration of returnees. Special attention should be focused on people who graduated from universities abroad. They should be offered the possibility to write their Ph.D. dissertation or encouraged to implement innovative research projects in scientific institutions.

In the case of immigrants, this is about improvement of the recruitment mechanisms (institutions and procedures) and advisory services related to official matters concerning arrival, work permit, extension of stay, residency registration, change of address, etc. Development of integration strategy is a big challenge facing Polish society. This task is broad and can concern many areas including economic, legal, civic, political, social, cultural, religious, identity as well as spatial matters (Podgórska, Trevena 2018: 265–282). Educational actions addressed at employers hiring foreigners, in the field of culture of the country of workers' origin and development of the skill of prevention of conflicts between Polish workers and foreigners are also its important elements.

Last but not least, activities aimed at potential emigrants are also vital so that their decisions to leave are taken rationally. Therefore, information about the possibility to find employment abroad and social security systems in individual countries is also important. Career guidance comprising analysis of career paths that includes (or not) migration abroad ought to be developed on the basis of individual capabilities and occupational plans, assistance in selection of the best direction of migration and occupational activity as well as raising awareness of non-work-related consequences of the decision about emigration.

Conclusions

Discussion on the issues of migration policy in Poland is important for at least three reasons. Firstly, because Poland is still a significant emigration country in which the scale of migration is considerable. At the same time, substantial transformations occur in the demographic structure of migrants and their directions of migration, and consequences of migration are still felt in both demographic and economic matters. Due to this, minimisation of negative effects of mass migration and maximisation of benefits resulting from this process are an important objective of the migration policy that is being shaped.

Dynamically growing number of foreigners coming to Poland is another reason for the discussion on the shape of migration policy. Therefore, discussion on the nature of immigration policy, especially integration policy, is becoming essential and inevitable.

Finally, the rising influx of foreigners and still considerable scale of emigration from Poland finally gain special importance in the context of forecasted demographic changes. Considerable population loss, dramatic changes in the structure of population by age and population ageing in the perspective of the next few decades are becoming a serious challenge facing Polish society. Migration policy can also represent an important tool that supports solving problems that result from demographic changes. It is complementary towards other public policies, especially pro-family and labour market policies.

However, it is important that migration policy should become a tool of socio--economic development that controls the processes of changes on labour market and in its social environment. Apart from activities targeted at economic development and improvement of living conditions that are essential from the point of view of population mobility, many further instruments of socio-economic policy aimed at migrants and consequently enabling efficient use of the opportunities and balancing the loss that is the result of migration should be identified and then used. The system created in this way would be aimed at simultaneous application of diverse activities towards each of migration groups in order to prepare people for departure, return and migration, as well as at implementation of tools through which decisions about departure, return and possibly also immigration would be conscious and rational.

A state migration policy should take into consideration the needs of regions in this sphere. This means that solutions developed within a migration policy at the central level are not sufficient; they should be complemented by the instruments for local governments, specific legal and financial principles and even the entities executing tasks in the sphere of broadly perceived migration issues.

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Wyzwania dla polityki państwa wobec procesów migracyjnych w Polsce

Zarys treści: Ze względu na wielkość, Polska jest znaczącym krajem emigracyjnym, w którym od wielu lat utrzymuje się skala odpływu zewnętrznego na poziomie około 2 mln ludzi. W świetle danych Głównego Urzędu Statystycznego, w 2016 r. 2 mln 515 tys. Polaków przebywało tymczasowo za granicą przez okres dłuższy niż 3 miesiące.

Ważnym zadaniem polityki migracyjnej jest zatem zminimalizowanie negatywnych skutków masowej emigracji i maksymalizacja korzyści wynikających z tego procesu. Jednocześnie w dekadzie po 2010 roku znacznie wzrosła liczba cudzoziemców przybywających do Polski i należy oczekiwać, że w miarę wzrostu atrakcyjności społeczno--ekonomicznej kraju grupa ta będzie rosła. Według danych Ministerstwa Rodziny, Pracy i Polityki Społecznej w 2017 roku wydano 235 626 zezwoleń na pracę, w tym 192 547 dla obywateli Ukrainy (ok. 82%). Równolegle w tym samym roku powiatowe urzędy pracy zarejestrowały 1 824 464 deklaracji zamiaru podjęcia pracy przez cudzoziemców, w tym 1 714 891 przez obywateli Ukrainy (94%). Dyskusja na temat charakteru polityki imigracyjnej jest zatem nieunikniona. Rosnący napływ cudzoziemców nabiera szczególnego znaczenia demograficznego, społecznego i politycznego w kontekście niekorzystnych prognozowanych zmian populacji w Polsce, ma także istotny wymiar regionalny. Z tej perspektywy cudzoziemcy będą potrzebni na polskim rynku pracy, aby złagodzić już istniejące i prognozowane niedobory zasobów pracy.

Ważnym wyzwaniem jest opracowanie kompleksowej strategii integracji społecznej, gospodarczej i kulturalnej cudzoziemców ze społeczeństwem polskim. W związku z tym utrzymująca się masowa emigracja, rosnąca imigracja, niesłabnący potencjał migracyjny oraz – bardziej oczekiwany, niż rzeczywisty – powrót Polaków z emigracji stanowią wielkie wyzwanie dla polskiej gospodarki i społeczeństwa, a także dla regionów. Ten wielowymiarowy charakter migracji zagranicznych w Polsce powoduje, że pojawienie się systemowej polityki migracyjnej, odpowiadającej warunkom wewnętrznym i zewnętrznym, staje się koniecznością.

Postulat sformułowania założeń polityki migracyjnej pojawił się w Polsce na początku lat 90., ale do tej pory spójny system tej polityki nie rozwinął się jako uzupełniający element polityki społeczno-gospodarczej kraju.

Słowa kluczowe: Polska, procesy migracyjne, polityka migracyjna, rynek pracy.

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Corrado Montagnoli

From the Adriatic to the Black Sea: The Italian economic and military expansion endeavour in the Balkan-Danube area

Abstract: During the years that followed the end of the Great War, the Adriatic area found itself in a period of deep economic crisis due to the emptiness caused by the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The ancient Habsburg harbours, which had recently turned Italian, had lost their natural positions of Mitteleuropean economic outlets toward the Mediterranean due to the new political order of Central-Eastern Europe. Rome, then, attempted a series of economic manoeuvres aimed at improving Italian trade in the Julian harbours, first of all the port of Trieste, and at encouraging Italian entrepreneurial penetration in the Balkans. Resolved in a failure, the desire for commercial boost toward the oriental Adriatic shore coincided with the Dalmatian Irredentism and became a topic for claiming the 1941 military intervention across the Balkan peninsula. Italian geopoliticians, who had just developed the geopolitical discipline in Italy, made the Adriatic-Balkan area one of their most discussed topics. The fascist geopolitical project aimed at creating an economic aisle between the Adriatic and the Black Sea, in order to bypass the Turkish straits and become completion and outlet toward the Mediterranean of the Nazi Baltic-Mitteleuropean space in the north. Rome attempted the agreement with the other Danubian States, which subscribed the Tripartite Pact, in order to create a kind of economic cooperation area under the Italian lead. Therefore, the eastern Italian geopolitical border would have been traced farther from national limes. Rome would have projected his own interests as far as the Danubian right riverside, sharing with Berlin the southern part of that area consisting of territories historically comprehended (and contented) between German and Russian spheres of interest, which the Reich intended to reorganise after the alleged Soviet Union defeat. These Countries, framed by the Baltic, Mediterranean and Black See shores, found themselves entangled once more by geopolitical ties enforced by the interests of foreign Countries.

However, these projects remained restricted to paper: the invasion of Yugoslavia turned into a failure and exposed Italy's military weakness; Rome proved to have no authority about the New Order organisation. Italy could dream up about its power only among magazines pages.

Keywords: Geopolitics, Balkans, Fascist Italy.

Introduction

Fascist Italy, mindful of its Latin heritage[1], considered itself a global power operating in three strategical theatres: the Mediterranean basin, the Balkan area and the African continent. Securing both of the Adriatic shores and a naval supremacy in the Mediterranean would have guaranteed ideal conditions for the outset of economic penetration into the Danubian basin through the Balkans. The African continent, on the other hand, would have been a colonial territory, where to find raw materials, as well as an oceanic outlet. Sea hegemony would have been the starting point for fascist expansionism, empowered by a new international attitude: the final goal would have been the creation of a Mediterranean *greater space*[2] which would have put European, African and Asian *greater spaces* in communication.

The Adriatic Sea found itself serving the role of a link between Mediterranean and Danubian-continental fascist interests. Italy was already holding the whole western shore, and following the 1920 Rapallo Treaties[3], gained the Eastern Julian coastline, Istria and Cherso, Lussino, Pelagosa and Lagosa islands.

However, the Dalmatian regions, provided for in the Secret Pact of London (1915)[4], were not annexed, although Italian troops occupied them for several years after the Great War.

Trieste, an important harbour city, became Italian but even though its geographical position had not changed, the commercial role drastically had: with the dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, six customs barriers appeared in the hinterland, behind the port, which meant perpetual delays for freight trains coming from Mitteleuropa and burdensome customs duties.

The need to revive Trieste's economy and the disappointment for the non--allocation of Dalmatia at Versailles were the main causes of the desired expansion outside the oriental border.

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[1] With the shift of the capital city from Florence to Rome in 1871, it also determined a geographical and political shift from Piedmont toward the Mediterranean sea. Resurfaced memories from ancient Rome and Latin heritage began to merge with Savoy culture, becoming Italian foreign policy's common *cliché*.

[2] *Großraum*, or an exclusive influence area for a hegemonic Power. Word coined by Carl Schmitt (1888–1985).

[3] The Treaty signed on 12 November 1920 between the Kingdom of Italy and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, with which the two States reciprocally established their own borders and sovereignties.

[4] On 26 April the Italian government secretly signed the Pact of London, which sanctioned the Italian war commitment alongside the Entente Powers. According to art. 5 of the Pact, the Dalmatian territories would have belonged to Italy. However, at the end of the Great War, because of the opposition of the U.S. President Wilson and the other Entente Power, only some areas of what was agreed were assigned to Italy.

Lastly, but not less important, there was Albania, a keystone in the Adriatic theatre. After establishing a protectorate between 1919 and 1920, Italy occupied the country in April of 1939, opening a new direction of expansion toward the Balkans and the oriental Mediterranean.

For these reasons, at the end of the Great War, when Italian Adriatic territorial claims found international recognition, geographers immediately contributed to prove the legitimacy of the expansion across the sea. Moreover, the Balkan--Danube area became one of the most debated and analysed topics for Italian geopoliticians: in those years *Geopolitica. Rassegna mensile di geografia politica, economica, sociale, coloniale*[5] saw the light, a monthly which, taking a leaf from the German Geopolitik᾽s book, became the Italian theoretical manifesto of geopolitical current of thought[6].

In spite of the short lifespan of the paper and its low readership, its pages offer precious testimony to the views on foreign affairs that were spread in the Italian athenaei, often in significant discrepancy with the true intentions of the Duce. "Geopolitica" will be used as the primary source of reference for the present contribution.

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[5] The apex of geographical studies during the fascist period was reached at the end of the era. In these years, the studies of political geography, a branch of the discipline was used to identify the systems of "laws" relating to the territory of the states (Caldo 1982). In the years immediately preceding the war, modelled after the initiative carried out in Germany by general Karl Haushofer with the magazine "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik", Italy formed a nucleus of intellectuals who took an interest in the so-called geopolitics, the branch of geography that studied the territory and the states using scientific principles adapted then to the political needs of the moment. In January 1939 the first issue of "Geopolitica", founded by Ernesto Massi and Giorgio Roletto, was born, under the auspices of the national education minister Bottai. Published in Milan by *Sperling and Kupfer*, the magazine had the University of Trieste as its intellectual cradle. See A. Vinci (1990), M. Antonsich (1994), G.M. Losano (2011), Sinibaldi (2010).

[6] Although inspired by French and German schools of thought, Italian geopolitics developed its own connotations that differed from the experience beyond the Alps. The Italian school was based on two pillars: the scientificity and historical-statistical implications. However, the difficulties encountered at the academic level to achieve the recognition of geopolitics as a science convinced the geopoliticians to emphasize the importance of the second pillar. The Italian geopolitics, moreover, recovered an *ante-litteram* geographical-political heritage that, although of different ideological inspiration, contrasting and often decontextualised, allowed it to reach the aim of giving Italian geopolitics an even older tradition than that of French and German schools. The cartographic representations of geopolitical factors edited by Dante Lunder and Mario Morandi enriched and briefly explained the studies published with a graphic language never used before.

Gazing East

In 1939, the third number of "Geopolitica" was almost entirely focused on Trieste, and not without reason: a few days earlier the Third Reich had invaded Czechoslovakia and pervaded deeper into the economy of eastern Europe. Acting as the only Habsburg port, the historical function of Trieste was that of a transit and distribution centre for the countries of central Europe, of the Mediterranean and the Middle East (Grioni 1939). The port specialised, for decades, in a particular sector of commerce, that was defined as "transit trade"[7]. The city was guaranteed a percentage with the sole passage of goods through its port, to the point where it was possible to talk about "exportation". Unfortunately for Trieste, following the new European asset created at the end of the Great War, the transit trade fell into decline, precisely when the city was being *redenta*[8]. As already mentioned, the break-up of the Austro-Hungaric empire brought enormous imbalance of trade in the area: for centuries, Trieste had been a port of the Habsburg monarchy, whose customs, needs and languages were followed; now the port was serving a state separated from its historical inland (La Marca 1979). Although the new states born from the ruins of the empire did not have their own fleets, let alone adequate ones, since the greater part of the Austrian tonnage was handed to Italy, no swift occasion for economic expansion opened up for Rome.

Entrepreneurs from Trieste understood at once the variety of problems that were about to arise: from the Austrian ashes six new States arose, and with them six new customs barriers. This resulted in long stops for travellers and for the influx of goods alike; the golden era when loads travelling from Vienna used to find prompt shipping in Trieste was definitely over. Moreover, the rivalry between Italy and Yugoslavia further undermined the trade to Hungary and the Danubian region.

The Fascist Trade Union of Trieste developed orders to protect the function of transit trade, allowing special treatment to companies specialised in these operations and guaranteeing commerce with those countries with free currency that allowed the use of *clearings*[9] and hard currency. Due to the *Anschluss* and the Munich Agreements, the port was nevertheless at risk of a new era of decadence.

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[7] "*Commercio di transito*" in Italian. This name meant all commercial operations determined by the purchase abroad of a consignment of goods, which was then resold on a foreign market and, once passed through Trieste, manipulated and processed. Transit trade mainly took place between Central and Danubian Europe on one side and the Mediterranean and Levant countries on the other.

[8] Redeemed.

[9] The settlement of accounts or exchange of financial instruments especially between banks.

The damage to Trieste's economy was caused by the fact that the majority of the city's commerce was taking place in territories now under the Reich. If it was previously possible to establish bilateral trade agreements regarding the goods coming from Germany with Austria and Czechoslovakia, now the city wasn't able to play that intermediary role with the territories recently annexed by Berlin. For the first part of 1939, "Geopolitica" followed closely the fate of Trieste, but it did not propose many valid solutions. One must keep in mind that the major investors and promoters of the magazine belonged to the *élite entrepreneurs* of Trieste, who would have suffered the most from the decline of the port.

The review managed to foresee, albeit in a veiled way, the dangers for the Italian economical interests in the area. According to "Geopolitica" the only viable solution to save the port would have been to reconstruct Trieste's inland, in order to lift the city from its geographical reality, perhaps by investing in infrastructure that could link the Black Sea to Trieste, since, "while the ports of Northern Europe had canals and lowlands behind them, Trieste had mountains and on this geographical factor did the competition stand"[10] (Rachello 1939). The missed economic upturn of the Friulian city became an additional argument to the Dalmatian irredentism. Although the thesis on the "Italianness" of Dalmatia were refuted many times since 1915[11], the fascist doctrine continued to nourish the irredentist feeling with far-stretched geographical and historical motivations. The authors of the periodical also thought that the Velebit-Dinaric ridge was only the southern extension of the Italian mountain range of the Julian Alps, separating the Dalmatian peninsula from the Balkan inland (Carelli 1941). Furthermore, according to geopoliticians, the settlement on the two shores of the Adriatic, established by the Roman domain, was uninterrupted until the fall of the Roman Empire. Subsequently, the Republic of Venice kept the two shores united for about eight centuries, albeit with some border changes. With the cession of Veneto to Austria and the end of the Napoleonic Kingdom of Italy, Dalmatia stopped being the bastion of "Italianness" and began its connections with the Habsburg power. The myth of the "mutilated victory"[12] was triggered by the fact that the Secret London Pact had not been complied with; this was also one of the topics that favoured the rise of fascism. Moreover, the formation of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia created an obstacle to Italy's goals and a heated Adriatic rivalry. For the editorial board though, the only natural way out for the Italian economy in that region was to aim at the east and the Balkans[13].

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[10] *Mentre i porti del Nord Europa avevano alle spalle canali e pianure, Trieste aveva alle spalle la montagna e su questo fattore geografico giocava la concorrenza.*

[11] See for example the work of Giuseppe Prezzolini, 1915, *La Dalmazia*.

[12] *Vittoria mutilata.*

[13] However, starting from the second half of 1939, "Geopolitica" took no interest in the city: probably with the outbreak of war the editorial staff abandoned the question to avoid uncomfortable situations of friction with the Axis allies, first of all Germany.

The perfect summary of all the topics used throughout the years by the paper regarding the Adriatic matter was the *Sintesi Geopolitica*[14], published by Mario Morandi in 1941, right at the end of the military campaigns. The map was divided into five areas, the main one, representing the Adriatic situation up until April 1941, contained the other four thematic pictures. The horizontal parallel lines, which represented the sea, finally put both Adriatic shores in direct communication. The mountains, represented in an extremely stylised way, created a chain that began from Sicily, passed through the Apennines and the Alps and entered into the Balkan territories via the Dinaric Alps, uninterruptedly. Italian industrial areas, marked by a point-like motif, were finally able to extend their economic power to the east. Trieste's port radiated a bundle of lines, a metaphor for Italian business dynamism. The Balkan area became the aisle that put Italian peninsula into communication with the Danubian region and with the area between the Vardar river and the Aegean sea, bounded by regular geometrical lines. Even the coastlines were finally safe: the continuity between the Italian, Dalmatian, and Albanian shores is underlined by a thick dark line with a motif reminiscent of the merlons of a medieval rampart. Such a line follows through the Strait of Otranto, now definitively sealed up as far as the coasts of the Aegean Sea (Morandi 1941)[15] – Fig. 1.

In March of 1939 Mussolini found himself thinking about Italian relations with its Teutonic ally: Hitler's initiatives in Austria and Prague had been carried out without consulting Rome and without taking into account Italian interests. In a speech held at the Grand Council of Fascism, in the aftermath of German action in Czechoslovakia, Mussolini came to the conclusion that Italy's problem was "the balance of forces inside the Axis"; it was necessary to enhance the stature towards the neo-transalpine comrade and to curb Hitler. Furthermore, the lack of English and French activity persuaded the Duce that the deployment of the Axis could have brought in results in only one direction.

In order to demonstrate Italy's autonomy in regard to Germany and because of the strong Italian interests in the Balkans, Albania's occupation was seen as the better solution for the imbalance generated by the actions of the Reich (Di Nolfo 2006). Albania's crown was taken by Vittorio Emanuele III. With the acquisition of Albania, Italy gained the geopolitical security of having the domain over the Adriatic Sea.

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[14] Geopolitical Synthesis, a column by Mario Morandi, which consisted in a geopolitical map focused on a topic.

[15] The Republic of Venice, the territories promised to Italy in the Secret Pact of London, the danger of the encirclement of the Little Entente and a map of the summer climates are represented in the minor side maps: the isothermia between the two peninsulas was one of the topics to which geopolitics clung to show the proximity of Italy to those territories.

Fig. 1. Map of Morandi's *Sintesi geopolitiche, No. 22: L'Adriatico*
Source: M. Morandi (1941: 294–295).

The advantages following the gaining of Albania were several: the new Adriatic situation guaranteed full Italian control over the Strait of Otranto, strategically reinforcing Italy and the Axis in the Mediterranean and Balkan scene. Yugoslavia, seeing a substantial increase in the shared border, would have been induced to continue its pro-Italy policy and to find new reasons to collaborate with Rome. Greece would have also been coaxed in a policy of appeasement towards Italy and of increased restraint towards Great Britain. Finally, following the geopolitical theories, the acquisition of a new *vital space* would have allowed Italy to access agricultural, forestry and mineral (especially oil) resources of the *Land of the Eagles* (Massi 1939). The Italian sphere of interest widened to the southern part of the Balkans: "Geopolitica" often addressed the matter of Albania's territories[16], by then considered well and truly an integral part of the Italian empire and a steppingstone for a future eastern expansion.

A fast and superficial glance at the geographic map will be enough to understand the geopolitical significance that is held by the [Albanian] territory as key position for the Adriatic, as a dam against any expansionist velleity and as bridgehead

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[16] See D. Lunder (1939), E. Massi (1939), D. Jaranoff (1940), R. Pess (1940).

for our political and economical penetration in the Balkans. In order to explicate its function of Mediterranean power, Italy must secure the Adriatic Sea, in other words, Italy must have control over it. […] regarding the crucial problem of our political and economical penetration in the Balkans, Albania turns out to be an optimal irradiation base, given that it confines with Greece […] baring the roots (of) the British power in the Aegean sea[17] (Pess 1940).

In 1940 the paper gave news of the beginning of the construction of a great trans-Balkan railroad, starting from the shores of Albania and reaching Thessaloniki and Bulgaria. This railway line would have supplemented the Italian economy with the ones from the Balkans and Eastern Europe, making it possible for Italy to exchange its manufactured goods for mineral and agricultural products (Lunder 1940).

Throughout the fascist period, the primary aim of foreign policy in the region was to destabilise the area as much as possible, in order to undermine the pro-French alliance named the *Little Entente*[18]. That is why the dissolution of Yugoslavia was sought, and the dialogue with the confining countries, such as Austria, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria was favoured. Key privileged partners were found in Hungary and Bulgaria, the losers of the Great War, which shared their revisionist spirit with Rome. Moreover, similarly to Italy, these countries knew fascist-inspired movements, which, even if in alternate and not always fortunate moments, were also in power.

The greatest degree of consideration was given to the area extending from the Balkans to the Danube, being the link between central Europe, the territories under German influence, and the Mediterranean, the Italian influence sector. Owing to this function of *limes* between the two spheres of influence, the area was the focal point of political friction between the two regimes (Antonsich 1994).

In the spring of 1941 the "Völkischer Beobachter", German National Socialism affiliate newspaper, drew the border between the two hegemonies: every land that extended north of the Danube belonged to German interests, every land that

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[17] *Un rapido e superficiale sguardo alla carta geografica basterà a farci comprendere la portata geopolitica che ha il territorio [albanese] come posizione chiave per l'Adriatico, come argine contro eventuali velleità espansionistiche e come testa di ponte per una nostra penetrazione politico-economica nei Balcani. L'Italia per esplicare la sua funzione di potenza mediterranea deve avere la sicurezza dell'Adriatico, in atre parole deve averne il controllo. […] per quanto riguarda il problema importantissimo della nostra penetrazione politico-economica nei Balcani, l'Albania si rivela per noi un'ottima base di irradiazione, in quanto essa confina con la Grecia […] scalzando così la potenza inglese dall'Egeo.*

[18] Alliance between Romania, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia arose, after the First World War, with the aim of preventing the revision of the peace treaties, and particularly that of Trianon, for the benefit of Hungary. The alliance, welded between 1920 and 1921, also counted on the collaboration of France.

extended south, on the other hand, belonged to the Italian sphere of influence. The two allies, therefore, would have parceled out that huge area framed by the Baltic sea, the Adriatic and the Black Sea; a geopolitical key area for trade between the north and the south of the continent, and also between Europe and Russian territories. The editorial staff of "Geopolitica" shared the German newspaper's opinion and adopted its view even if, with regards to Italy, it was far from the truth.

The geopolitical map published in December 1939 by Mario Morandi is explanatory: *Sintesi geopolitiche No. 10: il Bacino Danubiano* (Geopolitical Synthesis No. 10: the Danubian Basin), which not only was exquisitely functional but also had a remarkable composition. Symmetry was the key in understanding this square map: the first element that caught the reader's eye was the Danube, a dark thick line dividing the map horizontally in two equal sectors: each representing the sphere of influence assigned to the two powers of the Axis. An imaginary line, coinciding with the binding of the pages, connected the Baltic sea to the Strait of Otranto, dividing the map vertically. This way the area taken in analysis was divided into four equal sectors: Italy, Germany, Eastern Europe and the Balkan-Danubian basin, were all fitted into this regular geometric shape, each occupying a quarter. Morandi placed in each corner of these squares the symbol of the Powers contending the area: at the top left the swastika, spreading its influence from the port of Hamburg; at the top right the hammer and sickle stood out[19]. On the other hand, in the lower part, two Lictorian fasces appeared, denoting the corners of the Italian peninsula and of the Greek and Balkan area. A further division was laid down by the area of commercial influence of the two major ports, which spread circularly like ripples on the water: the north was ruled by Hamburg, the south by Trieste (Morandi 1939) – Fig. 2.

The Reich could have, undoubtedly, made claims of hegemony in the Danubian area using politics, economy and, most importantly, warfare, while Italy could only daydream throughout propaganda and the pages of "Geopolitica". As already mentioned, the methodology used by Italian geopoliticians was the extensive use of statistics, which held a quantitative foundation apt for the study of certain phenomena. Alongside this, a historical context was built, which allowed a dynamic environment to fit and support events.

For the development of their arguments, Italian geopoliticians used historical analysis, which was founded upon ancient political traditions and geographical ideas deeply rooted in the history of the Italian peninsula. With regard to the Balkan case, for example, the myth of ancient Rome and the Venetian domination of the *Serenissima* Republic on the Dalmatian coastlines during the modern era were used, so as to trace some kind of historical continuity between the empires.

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[19] The Axis powers and the USSR were still bounded by the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact at the time of publication of this charter.

Fig. 2. Map of Morandi's *Sintesi geopolitiche, No. 10: Il bacino Danubiano*
Source: M. Morandi (1939b: 628–629).

The political thinking of the republican Giuseppe Mazzini (1805–1872) was also reinstated: his thoughts, expressed in the *Lettere Slave*[20], were decontextualised and distorted in order to build a solid excuse for Italian expansionism (Scocchi 1940: 486–490).

Italy's expansion, at first, looked more like a desire for economic collaboration between states rather than an attempt at military submission. All the studies carried out by "Geopolitica" before 1941 confirm this assumption. In the years between 1918 and 1938 (thus even before the beginning of fascism), Italy had tried expanding its economic initiatives in the Balkans, failing for the most part because of a lack of entrepreneurial activities and for the constraints posed on bank activity (La Marca 1979). According to "Geopolitica", the "world that came out after Versailles", expression of British imperialism, was doomed to fail, and would later be regenerated under the guidance of the Tripartite Pact. With the Italian conquest of Albania, a new era of change was opening up for Rome, which would have had a new economic and political role in the world's scenario. For all these reasons a new attempt at expansion in the east was necessary (Pracchi 1940).

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[20] A short essay from 1871 in which Mazzini described the directions of the future international politics of Italy.

An *ad hoc* conflict: the illusion of the "parallel war"

While the German forces had already defeated Poland and the Netherlands, and France was close to falling, Mussolini was forced to remain neutral to the conflict because of the unpreparedness of the Italian army. The "non-belligerence", however, was a bitter pill for the Duce, who had founded his political programme and the regime authority on military expansion and warriorlike ethics. When in 1940 the German victories on the field caused the material obstacles and internal politics of the intervention to vanish, Mussolini decided to enter the fray. On 10 June 1940, Rome declared war on Paris and London. After a clumsy military offensive in the Alps, Mussolini managed to secure an armistice with the already defeated France at the start. Becoming aware that there was no fair military effort, and consequently there would have been no equitable division of the spoils of war, Mussolini hastened to cut out an exclusive area for Italy in the Balkans, before Hitler turned his attention to it.

For this reason, an *ad hoc* war was created, which "Geopolitica" had the chance to reflect on. The base from which the Italian ambitions started were as usual anchored to ancient history and to Latin culture, but there was no shortage of ideas based on racial and economic reasons. In the months preceding the Greek and Yugoslavian campaigns, the magazine published a series of articles in which, through complicated racial analysis and reconstructing a partial and biased historical context, it was possible to demonstrate the proximity between the modern Yugoslavs and the Italians and, at the same time, the inferiority of the "southern Slavs" compared to the Mediterranean-Italic race (Battaglia 1939; Anonymous 1941). These articles served to undermine the credibility of the Yugoslavian state, portrayed as an artificial *collage* of different ethnicities, races and languages.

The real invasion began in March 1941. On 25 March, Yugoslavia, in order to avoid diplomatic encirclement, joined the tripartite pact for about forty-eight hours. The Italian indignation was not long in coming, since the entry of the Slavic country was seen as a betrayal, not only towards the fascist objectives but also towards the original principles of the Pact. "On 25 March [...] we felt it [...] almost like a day of mourning. For the first time a false element, ethnically ill and notoriously treacherous, was admitted to enter the healthy family of the Tripartite" (Carelli 1941). The situation changed rapidly: to avoid joining the Axis, a *coup* by a group of pro-British Serb officials deposed Prince Regent Pavle and the Prime Minister. In response, a few days later the Axis forces invaded Yugoslavia: the war operations took place between 6 and 17 April, when the high Yugoslav command was forced to surrender (Cattaruzza 2015). The cold shower for the interventionists arrived soon: after the Yugoslav capitulation, Italy had to deal with the Reich's presence in the area as a "third factor". The German-

-speaking element, which remained discrete during the Weimar Republic and the first five years of the Nazi regime, had begun to show closeness to the National Socialist party, after the *Anschluss*: this was an important factor that determined the structure that Hitler eventually decided to give to the region (Wörsdörfer 2004). When Germany proceeded with the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the spoils of war were divided equally between Italy, Bulgaria and Hungary; in this way, Italian expansionism had a reduced room for manoeuvre. The provinces of Ljubljana, Split and Kotor were assigned to Italy while the provinces of Rijeka and Zadar were enlarged. Montenegro was temporarily ruled by a civil commissariat, while a large part of Kosovo and Macedonia were annexed to Albania. Furthermore, the Independent State of Croatia, an Italian-German military *condominium*, was created. The State was formally a monarchy[21] and a protectorate subjected to Italy. The government was placed in the hands of the far-right nationalist party Ustaše and its Poglavnik: Ante Pavelić.

Apparently, Italy had thus fulfilled the highest aspirations of radical nationalism, owning directly and indirectly all the eastern Adriatic coast, from Trieste to Albania. However, the context in which these territorial expansions matured was not the most reassuring. The German occupation of part of Slovenia, which had never been nationalist, took place to prevent the Italian presence in the immediate eastern border, already weakened by the major presence of allogenous populations, on which one could make little reliance during war (Violante 2013). In April 1941, Mussolini complained: "After the Yugoslavia collapse, we found half of a province on our hands and, we must add, the poorest half. The Germans communicated a boundary to us: we could not but acknowledge it" (Susmel 1960). Despite the Duce's proclamations, Italy remained a medium power, unable to determine the conditions for its foreign policy.

Even the editorial staff of Geopolitics was able to express subtle disappointment; however, in the critical situation of conflict there was no room for complaints, the magazine immediately aligned itself with the Duce's decision. The Italian aspirations were finally put aside in favour of an apparent compactness of the Axis front and of an obsequious respect for the decisions coming from beyond the Alps. The case of the Independent State of Croatia is perhaps the most emblematic to demonstrate how "Geopolitica" was always at the service of fascist politics. The same instruments that had been used until a few months before to justify military intervention in Dalmatia were used to raise the new and unexpected ally to the level of the other Axis forces[22].

According to the magazine, with the entry of the Kingdom of Croatia into the "family" of the Tripartite Pact, the problem of Italian security on the eastern border was overcome, therefore an expansion in that direction was no longer necessary.

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[21] The Prince Aimone of Savoia-Aosta was appointed, but he never set foot in Croatia.
[22] See G. Carelli (1941), R. Sertoli Salis (1941).

The Italian claims against the eastern coast were completely abandoned. The peoples who, until a few months before were called "swarm of Slavs", now became valiant populations, unjustly set by the Habsburgs against the Italian peninsula, to placate the ethnic minority wishes of independence. The Croatian economy, mainly agricultural, would have been perfectly complementary to Germany, an industrial country, and to Italy, an agricultural-industrial country. Moreover, the proximity of Croatia to the Danube economic basin would have guaranteed Italy the much-desired commercial mobility to the east. The contradiction of the new geopolitical vision was summarised in this sentence:

> Few thousands of Italians from Dalmatia would not have been enough justification for a total annexation of the Adriatic coast [...] to sacrifice our influence in Croatia for some historical memory and for a few kilometres of coastline once you could still get the most absolute security in Adriatic, it would have been a mistake. This is not a compromise solution, but an unequivocally realistic solution (Salis 1941).

With the *Wehrmacht*'s intervention in Yugoslavia in April 1941, not only the clumsy Italian campaign in the peninsula ceased, but also the military credibility of Rome: the dream of a "parallel war", where Rome would have managed the conflict in autonomy and fought on equal terms alongside Berlin, then dissecting Europe according to their hegemonic desires, finally ended. The tensions between the Axis powers in the Danube area, the mutual lack of esteem and trust between the regimes' hierarchies and, finally, the campaigns in Yugoslavia and Greece clearly indicated that Rome could only obey the decisions taken in Berlin, the only true power between the two (Deakin 1962). With this string of events, "Geopolitica" was slowly preparing to make its readers accept the reality of fact, a relationship of subordination in terms of economic competition in that geographical sector (Vinci 1990). For this reason, all subsequent articles on the subject were cautious in establishing the Italian primacy, preferring compromising proposals with the Germans, for example in the economic field, or using subtle arguments, such as ones relating to race.

The "Geopolitica's" coverage of the Greek campaign was also subtle. On 12 October 1940, Berlin notified Rome that, following Romania's request, a German military mission would go to Bucharest and that *Luftwaffe* airplanes would defend oil wells (Knox 1982). The Duce was outraged by the occupation of Romania, a decision taken without consulting him: once again Hitler made Mussolini face the facts. Thus, it was decided to invade Greece via Albania: "This time I will pay him back with his own coin: he will know from the newspapers that I have invaded Greece. Thus, the equilibrium will be restored" (Ciano 1980), the Duce affirmed. The invasion of Greece, which lasted until April 1941, was an organisational disaster and humiliation for the Italian army.

"Geopolitica", however, when reporting the military venture used triumphal tone as early as November 1940. While Italy suffered heavy defeats in the Hellenic mountains, the magazine dedicated an article to Greece, where the country was presented as poor and backward, projected exclusively to the sea and slave to London, to which it delegated its military defence. For this reason, it was accused of being a state with little sense of national independence: according to the authors, the greatest sin committed by the Greek people was having favoured British politics and therefore being a potential threat to Italy, despite having signed a promise of neutrality with the Axis countries (An asterisk[23] 1940). The Greek campaign was long and bloody: not only did the army not complete the invasion in a short time, but also gave way to the Greek army to carry out a counterattack in the Italian territories in Albania, which took place from November 1940, thanks also to the support from the RAF. Geopolitics did not give further information about the Greek campaign until the capitulation of Athens: in April 1941, a geographic map of Greece was published, edited by Mario Morandi, in which the Hellenic territories were analysed (Morandi 1941).

Here the roles were switched. Greece was presented as a country that had tried to rise to Aegean power, encroaching beyond its geographical boundaries: the invaded became the invader. In the following months, after fighting in the peninsula and establishing a collaborationist regime, Geopolitics made a sharp turn and rewrote Greek history and its relations with Italy: the Greek peninsula had always been subject to foreign powers, due to its very important function as a natural link between the West and the East. The amputation of Thrace and Macedonian departments in favour of Bulgaria was the price to pay for having supported London. It was not specified who was the new master of Greece but certainly with the conclusion of the Hellenic campaign also the project of "parallel war" failed once again. The partition zones were defined and assigned by Berlin without any consultation with Rome: Geopolitics no longer dedicated any further study to the turbulent peninsula.

Towards the Black Sea: neighbourhood policies with Hungary, Bulgaria and Romania

The Italian geopolitics agreed in supporting, even if never openly, the need to avoid direct contact between the *vital spaces* of the two main Axis powers in the Danube area. For this reason, there was a strong focus on Hungary: a perfect buffer between the spheres of influence, a country that came out defeated by the Great War and which found itself mutilated in various territories in favour of neighbouring countries. The Italian diplomatic apparatus and "Geopolitica"

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[23] It was common for the editors of the magazine to sign with one, two or three asterisks concealing the name of the true author of the article.

were always very careful to maintain frequent and friendly relations with their Hungarian ally.

The magazine dedicated numerous articles to the Magyar country, supporting more than once the territorial claims and the need for the establishment of a "Great Hungary" that could organise the Danubian area under its own influence. In particular, Hungary was openly supported to resolve its dispute with Romania regarding Transylvania, a region lost by the Magyar country following the Treaty of Versailles: "the Italian border is on the Carpathians [...] the Fascist Government cannot tolerate variations that do not lead to a strengthening of Hungary or at least to its consolidation" (Three asterisks 1939), the magazine declared in 1939. In May of the same year, the editors published a study on Transylvania, where they did not only expose the territorial dispute, but also used the occasion to demonstrate, with various historic fabrications, how Hungary and Italy were linked: this is how the Magyar country became an ancient Roman bastion against the Slavs and Turks[24], which since ancient times was inspired by the Mediterranean's "civilising breaths" (Three asterisks 1939).

According to the editorial staff, the line of demarcation between East and West passed through Transylvania[25]: the authors pretended not to be biased in finding a solution but suggested a way of compromise, where the Western Latin culture, strong in Transylvania, could represent a point of encounter between the Magyars and the Romanian people, brothers in culture of the Italian people, though Greek by faith. According to the authors, the Hungarian influence would have "purged" the Romanian culture of the Greek component, allowing it to come into contact with the Latin heritage.

"Geopolitica" also expressed open sympathy for Italian-Hungarian cultural relations and promoted an academic friendship between Rome and Budapest, demonstrating the desire for tight cultural exchange between the two countries (Anonymous 1940). However, the vaunted proximity between Italy and Hungary was more in the print than the facts: once again, "Geopolitica" depicted a diplomatic context that was far from reality[26].

As for Hungary, "Geopolitica" had immediate sympathy for Bulgaria, which supported the desire to review the borders. The country was defeated in both the Balkan Wars and the Great War and gave up the southern Dobrugia to Romania and the Western Thrace to Greece as a result of the Treaty of Neully, effectively losing access to the Mediterranean Sea. "Geopolitica" continued to insist on the

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[24] And, following Operation Barbarossa, also anti-Soviet.

[25] It was common to speak about the "European mission of the Hungarian nation", where St. Stephen's crown was able to gather and unite different cultures and ethnicities of the Danube. See N.d.d (1939), Three asterisks (1940), D. Cametti Aspri (1940), P. Scrosoppi (1941), G.D. (1939).

[26] See Ciano's diary notes: G. Ciano (1980: 384).

idea of a mutilated Bulgarian country, regarding sea access, vital for its economy, but also of a link with the Mediterranean culture and dynamism. In the vision of the Danubian area as a watershed between the Italian and the German spheres of influence, the magazine called for a Bulgarian friendship to bring Sofia closer into Rome's orbit. The magazine's Bulgarian contributor and correspondent Dimitri Jaranoff argued that the Danube made Bulgaria an essential country because of the connection between the states of the basin and central Europe. Across the river, the economies of large countries such as Czechoslovakia, Austria and Germany could be easily connected to the Black Sea, where the railway network and the large Bulgarian ports could push Mitteleuropa's goods to the Balkans and to the Mediterranean. However, the proximity to the Danubian system was, according to Jaranoff, artificial and temporary: the true Bulgarian vocation was Mediterranean (Jaranoff 1940). The magazine devoted few articles to Bulgaria, mostly focused on the friction with Romania.

One may ask, therefore, why "Geopolitica" had neglected the relations between Italy and Romania, even though the two Latin countries were effectively united by ancient cultural bonds. The motivation is found in Italian foreign policy, which, albeit seeking a diplomatic friendship, never completely succeeded in finding a favourable echo in Bucharest. An agreement between the two countries was attempted from the second half of the twenties, when General Averescu came to power in Romania. However, even though he was in favour of fascism, he always avoided jeopardizing the stability of the Little Entente and the relations with France. Although there were mutual interests to establish stable commercial contacts, these were conditioned by belonging to different political constellations. The activity carried out between 1933 and 1936 by Nicolae Titulescu, a Romanian diplomat and politician, drastically deteriorated the relations between the two nations, in response to the policy of the Four-Power Pact, which was particularly disliked by France and by the countries of the Little Entente. Rome's open support for the revisionism of the countries bordering Romania, first and foremost Hungary, could certainly not be welcomed in Bucharest. Romania also supported the Western democracies in imposing economic sanctions on Italy in 1936. When in August 1936 Victor Antonescu replaced Titulescu, the Italian press cheered for the elimination of an obstacle to friendly Italian-Romanian relations. However, the political-diplomatic situation was now compromised and relations between Bucharest and Rome remained tense (Grego 2010).

Therefore, "Geopolitica" followed the official Italian foreign policy line too: even without hostility, the magazine always took the side of the countries that opposed Romania, with regard to territorial disputes, namely Hungary and Bulgaria. The only occasion "Geopolitica" sided with Romania was in December 1939, when the Soviet Union put pressure on Bucharest to obtain Bessarabia. The surreal solution proposed by the magazine for Bucharest was to peacefully

liquidate the disputes with Hungary and Bulgaria and to embrace the Italian influence in the Balkan-Danubian region: a solution, according to the authors, "well seen by many chancelleries". The geopolitical influences from both the continent (with reference to Germany) and the east could only be balanced by Mediterranean influences (Three asterisks 1939).

Conclusions

As we have seen, the attempt of a military and economic expansion beyond the eastern border was one of the main themes of the fascist foreign policy. In the production of "Geopolitica"'s articles, two phases can be identified. In the first phase, prior to military intervention, Italy was depicted as a hegemonic power in progress, which by picking up the legacy of ancient Rome, was preparing to rebuild a Mediterranean imperial unit. Equal to its German ally both from a diplomatic and military point of view, Italy could afford to express its expansionist goals, grasping every pretext and any justification both geographical and historical. In the second phase, which followed the entry into war, the editorial staff played a role of mediation and compromise: military unpreparedness was unmasked, so "Geopolitica" worked in the production of articles that would make their readers accept the status of a secondary power that Italy had to play in relation to Germany. Prudence and respect for Berlin were necessary measures to not irritate the powerful ally.

Although it has always remained independent of the will of the regime and never became its megaphone[27], "Geopolitica", with its articles, well represents the collapse of the Italian hegemonic dream, which attempted to rebuild a Mediterranean geopolitical unit, independent of Berlin, and the completion of the German Mitteleuropa, which extended from the Baltic to the Danube, thus dividing the two halves of that great geopolitical area known as *Trimarium*.

Once the war ended, geopolitical studies, compromised by the instrumental use by the Axis regimes, were denied for decades. In the same way, Italian relations with the Balkan and eastern countries remained in line with the United States until the end of the Cold War.

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[27] The magazine was founded under the regime's auspices but was never used as direct voice of power. On the contrary, the exponents of the government, despite not having any kind of hostility, showed misunderstanding and underestimation of the journal's propaganda potential.

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Od Adriatyku po Morze Czarne: włoska ekspansja gospodarcza i militarna na Bałkanach i w obszarze naddunajskim

Zarys treści: Po zakończeniu I wojny światowej region Adriatyku znalazł się w okresie głębokiego kryzysu gospodarczego z powodu pustki spowodowanej upadkiem Cesarstwa Austro-Węgierskiego. Dawne porty Habsburgów, które dostały się Włochom, straciły swoje naturalne zaplecze jako okna Europy Środkowej (Mitteleuropy) na Morze Śródziemne z powodu ustanowienia nowego porządku politycznego w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej. Rzym podjął zatem szereg działań ekonomicznych mających na celu poprawę włoskiego handlu w portach juliańskich, przede wszystkim w porcie w Trieście oraz zachęcenie włoskich przedsiębiorców do penetracji Bałkanów. Realizowane bez powodzenia działania mające na celu pobudzenie handlowe wschodniego wybrzeża Adriatyku, połączone z dalmatyńskim irredentyzmem, stało się powodem oczekiwań na interwencję wojskową, która nastąpiła w roku 1941. Włoscy geopolitycy, którzy wówczas rozwinęli właśnie tę dyscyplinę, uczynili obszar Adriatyku wraz z Bałkanami jednym z najczęściej dyskutowanych tematów. Faszystowski projekt geopolityczny miał na celu stworzenie włoskiego szlaku handlowego między Adriatykiem a Morzem Czarnym, ominięcie cieśnin

tureckich oraz ekspansję z północy w kierunku Morza Śródziemnego nazistowskiej przestrzeni bałtycko-środkowoeuropejskiej. Rzym podjął próbę porozumienia się z innymi państwami naddunajskimi, które podpisały Pakt Trójstronny, aby stworzyć rodzaj obszaru współpracy gospodarczej pod przewodnictwem Włoch. Dlatego wschodnią granicę wpływów geopolitycznych Włoch wytyczono daleko od granic narodowych.

Rzym planował objąć swoją kontrolą obszar aż do prawego brzegu Dunaju, dzieląc się z Berlinem jego częścią południową, składającą się z terytoriów historycznie traktowanych (i akceptujących to) jako niemiecką i rosyjską strefę interesów, którą Rzesza zamierzała zreorganizować po oczekiwanej klęsce Związku Radzieckiego.

Kraje te, położone pomiędzy brzegami Mórz Bałtyckiego, Śródziemnego i Czarnego, zostały ponownie uwikłane w więzi geopolityczne narzucone przez interesy obcych krajów. Jednak projekty te pozostały jedynie na papierze, gdyż włoska inwazja na Jugosławię przerodziła się w porażkę i ujawniła słabość militarną Włoch. Rzym okazał się nie mieć wpływu na organizację powojennego Nowego Porządku. Włochy mogły marzyć o swojej potędze tylko na stronach czasopism.

Słowa kluczowe: Geopolityka, Bałkany, faszystowskie Włochy.

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The Baltic Sea as the mediterranean of the North The Baltic Region and Poland in the periodical "Geopolitica" (1939–1942)

Abstract: In January 1939, the first issue of the Italian magazine "Geopolitica" came out: it would go on monthly until 1942. Founded in the scientific circles of Trieste by two geographers, Giorgio Roletto (1885–1967) and Ernesto Massi (1909–1997), who went on to become editor and co-editor-in-chief, respectively, the magazine was inspired by the German periodical "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik" by Karl Haushofer. However, its approach to geopolitical issues used autonomous conceptional bases quite different from those of the German school. In the intentions of its founders, "Geopolitica" should have contributed to a re-evaluation of didactics of geography and to support the imperialistic politics of Mussolini's regime, even though it never got to have a substantial role in Italy's governing policies. It never even obtained full recognition by the academic geographical establishment that in fact denied geopolitics its own scientific autonomy.

Frequent issues discussed in the magazine were the Mediterranean basin, the Balkans and Africa, close to the Italian geostrategic interests; but there was also cautious interest towards Poland, considered to be fully integrated into the German *Lebensraum*. Therefore, we could say there was some reticence in approaching this theme, along with a sort of reverence towards the German ally who was also "competition", despite the fact that its territory saw strategic and political events of utmost importance during the entire four years of the magazine's life.

On the other hand, the attention towards the Baltic region was free of any conditioning. It was perceived as a sort of a "Nordic Mediterranean", wanted both by Germans and Soviets, and an object of desire also of the states who wanted to defend their difficult neutrality in the war that was raging throughout Europe.

Keywords: Italian geopolitics, Baltic region, territorial conquests.

Introduction

On January 31st, 1939, the first issue of the periodical "Geopolitica" was published in Milan. The publishing went on monthly until the end of 1942 when the war – entirely unfavorably to Italy – ended its existence abruptly. "Geopolitica"[1] with

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[1] The periodical was founded in Trieste and its base was at the Institute of Geography of the city's University. For the first four years of its existence, it was under the direction

its editor-in-chief Giorgio Roletto (1885–1976)[2] and co-editor-in-chief Ernesto Massi (1909–1997)[3], despite being inspired by the German periodical "Zeitschrift für Geopolitik" by Karl Haushofer[4], immediately distanced itself from their inspiration, especially because of the bases and aims of the very geopolitics. The intentions of autonomy from the German periodical can be seen already in the opening article signed by both of the two editors. Named *Per una geopolitica Italiana* (For an Italian geopolitics), it is indeed a true structure manifesto of this discipline which was relatively new to Italy. The opening essay gives heavy critique to the way geopolitics was approached in foreign countries, used as basis for their interests and "ideological settings", "masked as scientific objectivity". Such points of view were to be disrupted in the name of "that autarchy of thought that legitimately belongs to the Italian Empire"[5]. Going into detail of the issue, the two authors critiqued German geopolitics because of its setting deriving from Ratzel's determinism and school. According to Roletto and Massi, this point of

of Giorgio Roletto, an economic geography professor there. Therefore, Trieste kept its role of the main diffusion centre of Italian geopolitics. However, its editorial staff was based in Milan in the same offices as its editing house Sperling & Kupfer. For more information regarding the circumstances that have led to the foundation of "Geopolitica", see M. Antonsich (1994: 271–272), G. Sinibaldi (2010: 25–27).

[2] Giorgio Roletto was born in Bobbio Pellice in Piedmont in 1885. At first a teacher in technical institutes, from 1927 to 1969 he was professor of economic geography at the Trieste University, where he would also become head of department and vice-dean. Among his scientific interests in the first part of his career he studied environments and settlements in Western Alps. Successively, he took interest particularly in political geography and would go on to found, alongside Ernesto Massi, the monthly "Geopolitica" that he would direct for the entire four years of its existence from 1939 to 1942.

[3] Ernesto Massi, born in 1909 in Trieste, was a student of Roletto's. With political geography as his main interest, he founded "Geopolitica" with Roletto in 1939 while he was professor of economic geography at the Sacred Heart Catholic University of Milan and Pavia's University. A convinced fascist, during the WW2 he went on to fight on the Russian front and from October 1943 on adhered to the Italian Social Republic. His fascist militancy banned him from teaching after the war; he went back to be a professor from 1955 on at the University of Milan and successively in Rome. From 1978 to 1987 he was president of the Italian Geographical Society. From a political point of view, he was in the executive of the Italian Social Movement, a party founded in 1946 that took inspiration from the Mussolini's Republic fascism.

[4] An article by Haushofer himself appears already in the first issue of "Geopolitica", but significantly, only then: "Der italianischen "Geopolitik" als Dank und Gruus!" (p. 12–15).

[5] Quotes taken from page 6. of this article published in the first issue of the periodical. The "thought autarchy" named here imitates the economical autarchy adopted in Italy following economic sanctions inflicted to the League of Nations as an act of retaliation for the Italian aggression on Ethiopia.

view was alimented by the frustration felt by the German population, forced to suffer borders "unnatural" to their country, imposed by the winners of World War One. Less accentuated but nevertheless incisive is the critique to French geopolitics[6], influenced by the concept of *genre de vie* theorised by Vidal de la Blache, where "opposed to state geography is nations' geography, which… aimed for a scientific justification of borders designed by peace treaties". According to the position sustained by "Geopolitica" and illustrated by Roletto and Massi, geopolitical laws are based on balance *instead of contraposition* between the German "environmental determinism" and the French "geographical humanism and possibility". Specifically, the "pure" determinism of the post-Ratzel era was rejected by the two authors on the bases of a principle they attributed to the "Boss" (meaning Mussolini himself), according to which "among the factors determining the life of the nation, the spiritual and dynamic element surpasses and wins environmental adversities". In other words, there will be no forced dependence on the environment, because human will shall have the last word[7]. However, in the

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[6] The methodological confutation against the French geopolitics launched by Edoardo Funajoli in the second issue of "Geopolitica" is even heavier (*La geopolitica e la sua legittimità di scienza*, Year I, No. 2, February 28th, 1939: 91–95). According to him the French have supposedly reduced "the geopolitical issues to relations between state and territory […] and have become an empirical classification and numeration of facts, seen fundamentally in their present instead of their future". Furthermore, Funajoli has criticized Febvre for his concept of State considered to be not a fact but a man's continuous creation; the consequence was that geopolitics became a sort of a "science of the spirit" (creator) and stopped being a geographical science (art. quoted, p. 92).

[7] This is a choice of Roletto's Trieste school that according to Costantino Caldo's analysis (Caldo 1982: 184) "abandoned the positivity point of view which was accused of being spoiled by determinism, in order to replace it with that geographical voluntarism that supports the idealistic 'Man' dominating natural events". This anti-determinism as distinctive trait of the Italian geopolitics of the time, compared to its German contemporary, was repeated ex-post by Massi himself in 1986 (Massi 1986: 18–20). Even though, if we look closely, the influence of that environment over human action had been downsized already in 1924 by Luigi De Marchi (Milano, 1857 – Padova, 1936), an academic geographer and the Kingdom's senator from 1934, in his speech called *Politica geografica* and delivered on June 22nd, 1924 at the Venetian Royal Institute of Sciences, Literature and Arts. On that occasion, the scholar presented and adopted Benedetto Croce's thesis according to which the environmental influences compared to "spiritual efforts" are "all irrelevant if taken singularly, lifeless and incapable of leading to any conclusion whatsoever". De Marchi deduced that Croce "considers therefore spiritual effort to be a manifestation of a quid that is outside and above physical nature, that gives him only the conditions and means to its work" (De Marchi 1929: 182–183). It could be concluded that already in the 1920s and therefore prior to any stance taken by Italian geopolitics scholars, following the aftermath of Croce's positions, the environmental determinism did not take root in Italian geographers.

analysis of positions assumed towards Poland and the Soviet Union for the Baltic area, it will appear clear how free human initiative is not considered at all or only in an entirely negative light for Poland, a country hardly taken into account after it lost its independence in September 1939. The Soviet Union will see recognition of its policy that coincided with the one sustained by the tsarist Russia, based on Baltic expansion and following the same direction despite the regime change[8]. Therefore, the periodical would show the Soviet interest towards the Baltic region and towards annexation of a part of Poland, as the result of "natural" dynamics and therefore detached from the decisional dynamism theorised in the first issue of the journal.

There is particular interest in the change of evaluation of these policies in the eyes of "Geopolitica": in 1939, it considered the Soviet Union a hostile power, yet afterwards, if not an ally, at least an *obtorto collo*, a "non-enemy" after the Molotov–Ribbentrop non-aggression pact, and finally again a bitter enemy after Hitler's June 1941 invasion. On the other hand, there was close to no legitimation of Poland as an independent political entity, except for its dispute with Lithuania regarding Vilnius which caused in the 1930s the failure of extension of the Baltic countries' alliance.

However, the project at the base that had been delineated[9] and then attempted to put into motion by the periodical was particularly ambitious: to make Italian geopolitics "the geographical doctrine of the Empire", following a geographical--political method that was presented as "scientific", considering the dynamism typical of those times and inherent to the very fascist mentality. However, the periodical and geopolitics in general both failed to carry out such guidance role in foreign policy of Mussolini's government. On the contrary, without managing to get full legitimation as a scientific discipline recognised by at least some part of academic geographers[10], geopolitics suffered – instead of guiding – strategic and political choices of the government dictated by power logic and accidental interests detached from the analysis of scientists[11]. The present analysis of geopolitical essays in the periodical considered Poland and the Baltic area that was of interest to great powers of Germania and the Soviet Union, precisely because they were

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[8] The thesis at the root of a continuity of directions of Russian expansionism expressed by "Geopolitica", already noticed by G. Sinibaldi (2010: 104–105).

[9] Article of the issue I, p. 11.

[10] In regard to this, M. Antonsich (1994: 273), G. Sinibaldi (2010: 28–30), M.G. Losano (2011: 153).

[11] According to Carlo Jean's analysis (Jean 1995: 243–244) it was the geographers who became immerged in fascism, not the fascist regime "to follow a geopolitical approach to definition of Italian national interests or policies or strategies to adopt in order to reach them". In fact, the periodical could only justify ex-post the initiatives which were not contemplated previously in their analysis, such as, for example, the invasion of Yugoslavia in April 1941.

not regions with direct strategic interest to Italy[12]. Such detail is preferable in order to verify the analysis methods described as "scientific" in the structural manifesto of "Geopolitica".

Poland and the Baltic in pre-war 1939

The first study involving the Baltic area in "Geopolitica" appeared in April 1939 signed by Aldo Festa[13]. It analysed the situation of the region following the Baltic Pact signed in Geneva on September 12th, 1934 by Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The author highlights three fundamental reasons that caused its lack of efficiency and weakness of the three republics generated by this regional agreement. First of all, the lack of a juridical personality inside the Baltic agreement that, due to the lack of social organs did not have any rights and obligations towards each other, which are each member states' prerogatives. The consequence was that potential decisions would not have been brought by a common organism, but only through an agreement between single states.

The other reason for this agreement's weakness was the lack of participation of Finland and Poland, determined by the absence of common interests between the five states, both economic and political: there was no need for Finnish and Polish economies to cooperate with those of the other Baltic states, alongside diversified geopolitical orientations. In fact, especially in the view of its position, Finland has a tendency to aim for closeness with northern states, while Poland – tight between Germany and Russia – should have "actuated a policy as free and as autonomous as possible"[14] according to Festa's analysis; Poland was also too influenced by hostile relations with Lithuania over the Vilnius dispute to be able to inaugurate a friendship policy towards Lithuania. The only common political motivation that made it desirable to form an alliance pact between all five of those states – but, as the author noticed, unseen by them – was the necessity to block a possible Russian expansion over the Baltic region. In April 1939 this was a simple thesis, however it became real few months after with the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact.

The third reason – the declaration of neutrality of the three countries of the *Baltic Agreement* – "was, however, not supported by an adequate military organisation" leaving "many doubts over its efficiency". It should also be noted

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[12] A regional power, Italy had maritime interests over the Adriatic, the Tyrrhenian and more generally the Mediterranean, while those on land centred on the Balkans, Corse, north-western Italian borders and Africa because of the colonies. Therefore, studies of these regions were particularly numerous in the four years of "Geopolitica's" existence.

[13] "L'intesa Baltica", Year I, No. 4, April 1939: 222–228.

[14] It can be deduced that, according to this interpretation, Poland (hat had the Gdansk "corridor" as its only access to the Baltic) would have been more involved in the European continental policy than in the Baltic one.

that the latter of Festa's observations showed his geopolitical foresight in the light of dramatic events that would follow after the beginning of World War Two.

This article was supported by cartography designed by Mario Morandi, the author of *Sintesi geopolitiche* which were present in every issue of the periodical. They present geographical charts opportunely adapted in order to make a certain thesis or a geopolitical point of view more credible with an adequate visual impact. The result that it generally obtained is that of images of accentuated dynamics, apparently objective but really far from really being that[15]. The chart inserted into Festa's article (pages 224–225) seems to be rich in barriers and divides both physical and, especially, political, over the entire northern Europe. In particular, there is distinct contrast between the "Bolshevik" area and the rest of the European continent, immediately identified by a thick graphical divisor line showing it as insurmountable: such contrast is repeated further by the Nazi swastika on the left side of the chart and the communist hammer and sickle on the right, the only ideological symbols that the chart displays (Fig. 1).

A similar topic is brought up also in the editorial *A chi il Baltico?* in the June 30th 1939 issue[16], that in the absence of a name of the author is to be considered the result of a shared editorial line of thought. The thesis sustained in it is that the new domination of the Baltic by the national-socialist Germany is not a menace to Baltic states. The real menace is the Soviet Union which, according to the article and because of the British Royal Navy's support, could attack the neutrality and the very existence of the small republics facing the eastern Baltic. This alliance between the Soviet Union and England supposedly happened because of the intent to defend their "vital interests", opposed to the policy of "vital space" of the totalitarian powers (meaning Germany). Therefore, a couple of months before the German invasion of Poland[17] it was not Germany but England who threatened the neutrality of the Baltic states alongside the peace in the region; and all of that benefitted the Soviet Union. Yet there is more. It is insinuated that England – the true polemic target of this article – despite acting as guarantor of neutrality of the small European states could have attacked other states' independence if it decided to "scarify the neutrality of Baltic states" [*sic*], damaging for example

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[15] A good example in this matter is Edoardo Boria's comment to Mario Morandi's chart *Equilibrio statale mediterraneo*, published on "Geopolitica", Year I, No. 10, October 31st 1939: 523: "the object to be depicted was not the thing itself but the effect that it produced. The geopoliticians' charts lack any interest whatsoever for tangible subjects and they concentrate on abstract elements: force lines, penetration goals, strategic axes *etc*." (Boria 2011: 305). For a discussion of cartography used as means of propaganda in favour of a preconceived thesis, see also D. Atkinson (1995: 155–183), E. Boria (2007, 2012).

[16] "Geopolitica", Year I, No. 6, June 30th 1939: 327–329.

[17] It is to be considered a Baltic state too because of Gdansk's status as a free city, not given to Germany after the Versailles treaty.

Fig. 1. Map of Morandi's *Sintesi geopolitiche*
Source: from A. Festa's article *The Soviet threat over the Baltic*, pages 224–225.

Belgium, Holland and Portugal. Consequently, it is easy to see slight irony in this, considering that the Nazi Germany violated Belgium, Holland and Denmark's neutrality the following year, after doing the same in 1938 and 1939 to Austria and Czechoslovakia.

It is easy to conclude that this article represents England as a *democracy* (defined as such in evidently derogatory way) that destabilises a peaceful status quo, even that of Germany, who after the Versailles humiliation had taken back the role of the guarantor of free coexistence in the Baltic area. On the other hand, the role that appears to be designated for the Soviet Union is quite different: it is indicated as a power pursuing an expansionist policy in the Baltic region not because of its strategic choices, but because of the revival of the old Tsarist policy based on a strong regional presence. In other words, the Soviet Union is credited for an attempt of territorial enlargement provoked – according to notions close to environmental determinism applied to political subjects – by the tendency of imperial powers to try and occupy all the available space at the expense of their neighbours, often small and weak: an effect of compliance to nature's laws

inspired by Darwinism and theorised in Ratzel's political geography, instead of being initiatives resulting from precise choices.

Another essay which is significant to the present research is not a true article, but a contribution in the section *Note e attualità* named "Gdansk and the Vistula"[18]. The name of the author is missing, which is a sign of collective work of the entire editorial room, giving the periodical a line of thought to follow. In the month Poland was invaded by Germany, "Geopolitica" conducted an exclusively economic analysis on the fluvial traffic on Vistula, up to its estuary near Gdansk. The dominant topic of the article was the under-use of this river and its terminal destination Gdansk, especially when it comes to transportation of products such as rice and legumes that – until the begin of the World War (1914–1918) – went from the Baltic to the internal areas of the country, even as it was politically divided between Austria, Prussia and Russia. Successively, after the end of the war and despite hopes for a revival of Gdansk's role thanks to the political unification and creation of the "Polish corridor" as the exit to the sea for the new state, and despite a project of a connection between the Baltic and the Black Sea through Vistula, Bug, Pripyat and Dnieper, there were no significant changes compared to before the war. It is easy to see the consequences of this in the fact that Poland's main river did not obtain the role of a modern fluvial artery (there was also mention of the lack of an adequate canal), alongside a barely marginal function for Gdansk – a city annihilated, among other things, by the development of the neighbouring Gdynia[19]. The latter was already the terminus of the main Polish railroad going towards the Baltic, and also the final point of a canal projected to serve as a connection to the coal basin in Upper Silesia.

Therefore, if we read into this editorial not as an essay in traditional political geography, but through the geopolitical lens following guidelines provided by Roletto and Massi in their January 1939 introductory article, Poland's economic initiatives would show quite a depressing picture. In fact, the theoretical premise of the two editors called into question the validity of the determinist Ratzel--inspired approach, attributed to the 20th century German geopolitics; in its place, "the spiritual and dynamic element" was to be enhanced, "surpassing and winning environmental adversities", highly championed by the two Italians. According to the latter presumption, it would appear that Poland would not have been capable of benefitting from its extremely favourable environmental conditions, with its big river crossing the country as an excellent transport artery. Consequently, there were none of that "dynamic elements aiming to win over the adverse environment", while it was possible to highlight a guilty inertia of one that was not able to take advantage of profitable environmental conditions. However, such considerations

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[18] "Geopolitica", Year I, No. 9, September 1939: 502–503.

[19] In the port of Gdynia, Poland's military and commercial exit in the Baltic (Giannini 1940: 64–66).

do not appear in the September 1939 editorial, which shows a more traditional political-geographical orientation which was preferred to innovative geopolitics despite the declared intentions expressed in the programming manifesto of the two editors. Such scarce consideration towards Poland manifested by "Geopolitica" is surprising. September 1939 was the month that saw its destruction as a political entity. However, already in months prior the beginning of war, the Country was threatened by Nazi Germany exactly under the pretext of the Gdansk issue, showing a not-so-remote possibility of a European conflict, which most certainly was not in Mussolini's plans despite the Pact of Steel made with Hitler. Among other things, in the period between two wars Italian cultural circles saw the myth of Poland as the bulwark of the western catholic society, standing against external enemies, whether Byzantine, Lutheran Germans and then Bolsheviks. In fact, the Mussolini regime gave ample space to publications in favour of Poland, in the name of "spiritual closeness" between the two countries, even in issues such as the Gdansk dispute by assuming anti-German positions, defining Hitler's demands "a return of the pan-German long-living expansionism on the Baltic"[20]. In short, according to an analysis of the issue conducted by Stefano Santoro (2005: 154), the Italian debate arrived at a paradoxical conclusion where the Polish were preserved by "Latin" characteristics from a sense of spiritual belonging to both the Slavic world and Germany. Yet nothing of this debate appears in "Geopolitica", not in the 1939 September issue, and not in those which followed, once the true intentions of the Reich over the Polish population and territory were revealed and became reality. Under the mask of an apparent objectivity, the periodical's approach to the Polish issue stayed firmly anchored in mere descriptions of the existing and mentioning the lack of initiative of the Polish populations, implying support to German positions.

The consequences of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact in "Geopolitica"

The October 1939 issue is interesting for Baltic and Poland: it came out soon after the beginning of the European war and therefore it ignored its developments, which at the time could not be predicted. Even this issue has no real articles signed

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[20] According to Stefano Santoro (2005: 154). In the matter of the "spiritual proximity" between Italy and Poland and the use of the German danger to support the necessity of "Italy's historical function as an unbiased spiritual guide of the Polish people towards freedom", see S. Santoro (2005: 154). For Poland's role as bulwark against the external "barbarity" see N. Davies (1997: 145) – "The myth of Poland's role, as the "Bulwark of Christendom", the *antemurale christianitatis*, had a very long career. Initially inspired by the wars against Turks and Tartars, it was later employed to justify Poland's defence of Catholic Europe against Orthodox Muscovites, and later against communism and fascism".

by authors, but rather a joint editorial named "The Russian front"[21], alongside the resumé of an article published in Poland in May of the same year about navigable canals from the Baltic to the Black Sea[22]. The way the subject was treated in "The Russian Front" is affected by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact which, however, is not named. The Russian advancement in the Baltic does not affect any immediate Italian interests, while the authors see it as a defeat of the English, whose Baltic policy – as the article states – is to stop the Russians from advancing. Afterwards, it is noticed that the Baltic is in no danger of going under the Bolshevik influence as there are no industrial countries on it. It is highlighted how this possibility would become even lesser because of Germany, as it could guarantee the geopolitical equilibrium of the region. From this way of illustrating the regional Baltic situation, it can be deduced that the polemic target of the editorial is again Great Britain, even though it was not at war with Italy, but was particularly unpopular to Mussolini's government both because of its Mediterranean naval presence (where the Mediterranean was conceived as an "Italian" space), and because of its war declaration towards Germany, at the time Italy's tightest ally following the Pact of Steel, and therefore qualifying as a stability guarantor. On the other hand, the representation of the Soviet Union is quite ambiguous. Despite being an ideological enemy of fascist Italy because of its role of guiding the country of international communism, it made sure to have a programme of territorial expansion in accord with Germany[23]. Therefore, it was inappropriate for "Geopolitica" – unwilling to assume even the role of opposition to government policy – to highlight the Soviet Union in an explicitly negative way; instead, it appears as a sort of a giant who is indeed potentially dangerous but quiet and still easily controllable. There is obvious embarrassment by the periodical in not being able to consider the Soviet Union an open enemy because of the "almost-alliance" pact that tied it to Germany, where the latter constituted – through the Pact of Steel – the main key to Italian foreign policy. This explains the relief visible only after June 22nd, 1941 and noticed by Sinibaldi in his essay about Italian geopolitics (Sinibaldi 2010: 106), in treating the Soviet Union as an ideological and political enemy that was such even prior to the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact.

In the other essay inside the October 1939 issue, there is a certain insistence on the Polish opportunity to take advantage of the fluvial route of Vistula–San–Dniester–Prut–Danube by building specific connection canals, thus making the connection between the Baltic and the Black Sea, which was preferable to the one along Rhine–Main–Danube as, instead of crossing seven countries, it would

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[21] "Geopolitica", Year I, No. 10, October 31st 1939: 519–521.

[22] "Geopolitica", Year I, No. 10, October 31st 1939: 555–557, that mentions *Poland's geopolitical axes*, in: "Problemy Europy Wschodniej", Warszawa, May 1939.

[23] A plan that was always denied by Moscow until the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 (Buttar 2018: 48).

have crossed just Poland and Romania. However the recent invasion endured by Poland, even if not mentioned explicitly, proved this study obsolete by the very authors.

The following article regarding the area in question which appeared in the 1939 annual closing issue[24] attributes to the populations of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland a rejection of the war induced by a long addiction to "a diligent peace and wellness present in almost all social classes": such a situation inspired a policy of neutrality. Yet despite this there is mention of potential threats to Denmark and Finland because of their proximity to big powers: Germany for Denmark and Russia to Finland. In particular, Finland's position is described as very precarious, because "it was well known that Russia never got over the loss of the old Grand Duchy [of Finland]" and had limited its presence in the Baltic to Finland Gulf only. These were the premises that Festa isolated after the failure of every mediation attempt, because of the Soviet attack to Finland on November 30th. The article describes the behaviour of the other three Nordic states following this aggression, which does not go beyond a generic solidarity to Finland and is based on the rigid neutrality that they maintained. Furthermore, a map by Morandi, integrated in the article, shows visibly the Soviet aggression to the Baltic area through the territories of Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, following a representation through low gravitational areas, directions of the attack from the USSR space and objectives to reach, all of it entirely coherent with the goals of cartography used as means of propaganda (Fig. 2).

In view of this Russian-Finnish war that had only begun, Festa's vivid sympathy towards Finland is immediately visible, though not expressed explicitly, being a country under attack by a great power and lacking in allies. However, this author and "Geopolitica" itself could not condemn openly the Soviet Union, tied to Germany through a pact, and the latter united to Italy through the Pact of Steel of May 22nd, 1939. Consequently, there was no way of condemning the benevolent German acquiescence towards the Soviets. However, there is some anti-German critique emerging from the article as the official Berlin position is commented upon and found to have "too many unilateral and polemic arguments to be objective and have constructive value". The Italian geopolitics periodical did not dare go further than this enigmatic observation regarding Germany.

The anti-Russian and pro-Finnish line makes a timid appearance in the last issue of 1939 and shows fully in the first one of the following year[25]: in *The Baltic dominion* inside the *Rilievi* section, there is a sort of an appeal for help for Finland in order to avoid it "succumbing oppressed by the Russian bear".

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[24] A. Festa, *La neutralità degli Stati nordici*, "Geopolitica", Year I, No. 12, December 31st 1939: 623–627.

[25] *The Baltic dominion*, "Geopolitica", Year II, No. 1, January 31st 1940: 31; L. Cossovich, *Ai margini della questione finlandese*, ivi, p. 32–34.

Fig. 2. Map of Morandi's: Soviet pressure in the Baltic area

Source: from A. Festa's article in "Geopolitica", Year I, No. 12, December 31st 1939: 625.

There is even a reference to the "heroism of its soldiers who fight for freedom of their home country". Finally, there is no mention of France and Great Britain supporting Finland – embarrassing to "Geopolitica" – or to Germany's tacit consent to the Soviet aggression, which only gave away the deal of territorial divisions in the Baltic area and eastern Europe between the two powers[26]. In any case, this was an embarrassing and paradoxical situation for "Geopolitica", which found itself showing sympathy for a country supported by Italy's potential enemies – France and Great Britain[27]. Not only that, but it was also induced to stay silent in regard

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[26] As it is well known today, the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact was not merely an agreement of non-aggression between the Soviet Union and Germany but had an added secret protocol that inside art. 1 delimited areas of interest of the two parties involved, separated by the northern Lithuanian border. Therefore Finland, Latvia and Estonia – explicitly mentioned in the very agreement – were fully inside the Soviet area. The existence of Secret Protocols was definitely confirmed following the opening of Soviet archives in 1991 when the original text of the Pact was found. However, already in August 1939, immediately following its entry into force, the Finnish did not fail to notice that alongside the non-aggression pact between Germany and the USSR there could be also a secret agreement between these two countries that gave the Soviets free rule in the Baltic. Naturally, at the time Germany denied the existence of such agreement to the Finnish government. In regard to this see T. Snyder (2011: 314).

[27] Following the French and British declaration of war to Germany and also Poland's invasion on September 1st, 1939, Mussolini's Italy did not stand as neutral, but as "not

to the ally tied to Italy through the Pact of Steel – Germany, a country that was not exactly applauding Bolshevik Russia but was not hostile to its war initiative against Finland, because of the programme of division among the two countries that recognised the Soviet Union's territorial rights in the Baltic area[28].

The fact that sympathy went entirely to Finland is confirmed in the short article by Leone Cossovich *Ai margini della questione finlandese*. Its inhabitants are described as a population who has "a vivacious and clear national conscience", while the country itself is presented both as anti-communist (as that particular ideology never took roots there) and as a land able to utilize fully its own natural resources. The praise for the Baltic state did not end with this particular remark: the Finnish people are described as serious, honest, hard-working and tenacious, the country has almost zero illiterates, since even the peasants entertain the habit of reading. However, there is a note of condescension too, since the author finds that the Finnish population "is not made of geniuses", even though it is "a cultured one". On the other hand, Germany – who could not benefit from any support, not even moral, as that one went in favour of Finland because of the agreements between it and the Soviets – is somehow revaluated from a cultural point of view, meaning that Cossovich highlights the influence of German culture and language over Finland, presented as more widespread there than the Slavic one.

The sympathy that the periodical shows for the Finnish cause is not different than the one of the Italian government itself, which still had not gotten over the German–USSR pact of August 23rd, 1939 or the attack on Poland on September 1st, 1939 that Hitler ordered without any previous warning to Mussolini. Consequently, the Italian support to Finland was an act of hostility not only towards the Soviet Union but also towards its German ally. It was not only moral and ideological

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belligerent". A slight difference that aimed to signal an Italian position in the conflict, which was not equally distant between the parties involved, but close to Hitler's Germany, to which Italy was tied by the Pact of Steel, despite having not fought together against the common French-British enemy.

[28] Made explicit in the articles 1 and 2 of the Secret Protocols of the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact who read: "1) In the event of a territorial and political transformation in the territories belonging to the Baltic states (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), the northern frontier of Lithuania shall represent the frontier of the spheres of interest both of Germany and the U.S.S.R. In this connection the interest of Lithuania in the Vilnius territory is recognised by both parties. 2) In the event of a territorial and political transformation of the territories belonging to the Polish State, the spheres of interest of both Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San […]", https://www.nytimes.com/1989/08/24/world/text-of-secret-protocols-to-1939-hitler-stalin-pact.html. The Pact's content was modified partially on September 28th 1939, including Lithuania in the Soviet sphere of interest: "a bitter pill to swallow for Hitler that was not sweetened at all by the German acquisition of larger Polish territories" (Cinnella 2013: 77).

support against Bolshevism, but also tangible help in terms of weapons and ammunition, whose second largest provider was indeed Italy, other than being the first country to sell airplanes to Finland (Kanervo 2013: 160–162). On the contrary, Germany was the only country supporting the Soviet Union[29], while the rest of the world showed sympathy for "the brave little Finland" (Read, Fisher 1989: 472). Furthermore, in order not to provoke hostility in the Soviets, Hitler had prohibited the deliveries to Finland of weapons already purchased prior to the war (Longo Adorno 2013: 218), and also blocked the passage through German territories of weapons going towards Finland (Read, Fisher 1989: 473). Besides, the Winter War happened in concomitance to the worst phase when it came to the relationship between Italian and German allies following the signing of the Pact of Steel, when Italy had the opportunity to distance itself politically from the Berlin–Moscow axis (Longo Adorno 2013: 218). In fact, the Foreign Minister of Italy Galeazzo Ciano (also Mussolini's son in law) instituted a "Finland Office" on January 15th, 1940 that was to coordinate military and economic help to the Finnish state (Pasqualetti 2013: 231). However, other than vivid sympathy for Finland as a small country attacked by the Bolsheviks, "Geopolitica" does not mention government support in its favour, which could have distanced Italy from its uncomfortable alliance with Germany if only Finland did not surrender on March 12th, 1940 (Pasqualetti 2013: 234) and could have drawn it closer to France and Great Britain, both Finland's supporters.

The evolution of political relations and territorial situation between Russia and Poland is approached by Giorgio Pullé in the April 1940 issue[30]. After a short historical excursion, the consequences of the renewed Russian acquisition of Belarus and western Ukraine are highlighted, consisting in the extension of western borders to the line of Neman–Bug–San, and especially full control of the Baltic–Black Sea isthmus. These results were obtained to Poland's detriment, again vanished from geography charts as a sovereign state, "without or almost without a single gunshot, with minimum aggressive military action that has always been repugnant to the Slavic-Russian". Obviously, this refers to Soviet territorial acquisitions obtained thanks to the division of Poland with Nazi Germany. The present research finds particular interest in the analysis of the changed strategic situation on the Baltic alongside previsions regarding the future. There is the end of the small Soviet access to the Baltic, at first limited to Leningrad and the naval base of Kronstadt, while afterwards it was enlarged to a "respect zone" made of Karelia's isthmus. When it comes to future Soviet perspectives, Pullé speculates of full access to the Baltic based on the incorporation (as new Soviet republics) of three Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Therefore, there

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[29] Expelled from the League of Nations with a unanimous vote on December 14th 1939, because of the aggression against Finland.

[30] G. Pullé, *Russia e Polonia*, "Geopolitica", Year II, No. 4, April 30th 1940: 176–177.

was never a more correct geopolitical forecast, considering the disappearance of these sovereign states that happened that very summer. In conclusion, there is recognition of communist Russia's expansion over the Baltic that is analogous only to the one made by the Tsarist Russia but without further, more ambitious goals.

Aldo Festa's examination of the Baltic policy of the Soviet Union is more thorough in the October issue[31], when Italy was at war for only four months by Germany's side and against France and Great Britain. There is a reiteration of inevitability for Russia of more Baltic pressure, resulting from a new communist imperialism that was following the same territorial and strategic directions of the previous Tsarist one. This happened first with Poland, followed by the three little states of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and all of them endured the consequences. There is another map designed by Morandi that is extremely efficient in representing this Russian push: from Finnish naval bases and the three Baltic republics, there is a series of arrows showing a threat towards Sweden, in order to show much better than words the Soviet ambition to exert full control over this entire sea (Fig. 3).

The present research also finds interesting the narration of the stages of Soviet Union's meddling in internal policies of the three republics in 1940, making them states with limited sovereignty afterwards and finally, transforming them into three Soviet republics. There is a show of distinctive sympathy towards those states, considered victims of potent power deriving from mere physical power and not law. However, the author could not go as far as to critique openly such policy. In fact, the Soviet Union – among other things, under a communist regime that incarnated a clear antithesis of Mussolini's dictatorship – was not a true ally. It was, however, tied to Germany by the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact that only involved non-aggression, but also included clauses regarding territorial divisions between the two powers, to the detriment of neighbouring small countries[32]. Furthermore: Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, incorporated into the Soviet Union in August of the same year following elections with "social-communist" lists only, were beneficiaries of traditional sympathy by France and Great Britain, abhorred democracies that Italy fought in war alongside Germany.

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[31] A. Festa, *La Russia sul Baltico*, "Geopolitica", Year II, No. 10, October 31st 1940: 445–450.

[32] The added secret protocol indicated in its Article 1 that in case of territorial and political change in the sectors corresponding to the Baltic States (Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania) the border of the German sphere of influence was to coincide with the northern Lithuanian border. Therefore Finland, Latvia and Estonia, explicitly mentioned in the agreement, were in the Soviet area. Even though successively and before the war between Germany and the Soviet Union, Lithuania too was incorporated consensually in the Soviet sphere of interest.

Fig. 3. Map of Morandi`s: The Soviet hegemony projects for the Baltic area
following the annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia

Source: from A. Festa's article in "Geopolitica", Year II, No. 10, October 31st 1940: 447.

A different attitude of "Geopolitica" towards the Baltic policy of the USSR during the Winter War and in the following phase is easily perceivable, in view of the annexation of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia to the Soviet Union: explicit hostility in the former case and substantial acceptance in the latter. In this circumstance, the periodical did not distance itself from the Italian government's positions and the USSR was represented as a ferocious aggressor at first and the author of territorial policy arranged with Germany afterwards. In fact, only six days after the end of the Winter War, on March 18th, 1940, Mussolini and Hitler met at the Brenner Pass and recomposed their fractured alliance, which resulted in USSR aligning fully its policy with Germany. At that point Italy could not consider it an enemy anymore.

Poland and the Baltic in front of the new Soviet enemy

After the start of Operation Barbarossa that transformed the Soviet Union – attacked by Germany – into an open enemy of Italy too, "Geopolitica" took a firm stance towards the Baltic region and in particular towards Finland, along with its unfortunate neighbour, which was not different from what the periodical showed up to that point. In fact, if the communist force became "the" enemy and a supporter of an aggressive policy towards the entire Baltic, Finland was now an ally of the Axis, to be praised and valued without any reticence.

This change can be perceived already in a Morandi's article on Finland published in October 1941[33]. He highlighted its function of a divisor between a German West and a Slavic East, showing also its function of bulwark between the western society and another one, foreign to it:

> Both because of its position and geography and for the racial and geopolitical structure, in the past Finland was always an area of contrast between the Atlantic West (seaside) and the continental East, between the northern-Germanic and Slavic civilizations. It represents a divisor wedge that is racially different from both contenders, with particular characteristics which are mainly developed from the local environment it evolved from[34].

However, there is more. When it comes to Finland as a land of contrasts and competition up to that point in time, the same article foresees that it "not only will represent in the Baltic a balance element of pure differentiation, but with its economy it should be and will be an advocate of rational exploitation of the Antarctic areas [*sic*], which not even the future Europe will be able to ignore following victory". Therefore, Finland was given the choice of adhering to the West in both political and economic fields, and the aftermath of the Axis war win was a given.

When it comes to Nordic policy in the Soviet Union, in October 1941 it was entirely negatively outlined. In regard to this, an article by Festa[35] analysed a decidedly aggressive Soviet policy towards the West, indicated as a threat not only to Finland and Sweden but also to Norway. This observation pushed these

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[33] M. Morandi, *Appunti per una geopolitica degli stati nordici. I° La Finlandia*, "Geopolitica", Year II, No. 10, October 31st 1941: 472–481.

[34] Article quoted in note 24, p. 477: *La Finlandia, sia per la sua posizione e struttura geografica, che per quella razziale e geopolitica, fu sempre, per il passato, un campo di contrasti tra l'Occidente atlantico, ossia marittimo, e l'Oriente continentale, tra la civiltà nord-germanica e quella slava. Essa rappresenta un cuneo separatore, razzialmente differenziatosi tra entrambi i contendenti, con particolari caratteristiche, maggiormente sviluppate dall'ambiente locale, in cui esso si evolvette.*

[35] A. Festa, *Ulteriori considerazioni sugli avvenimenti dello scacchiere nordico*, "Geopolitica", Year III, No. 10, October 31st 1941: 486–489.

three countries into a defensive alliance. It would be possible to read in this an interpretation of political and strategic Soviet directives which is quite different from the one in the "Geopolitica" editorial *A chi il Baltico* from June 1939 which was previously mentioned. In fact, the Russian expansion was presented then as both a mere sequel to the tsarist interests over the Baltic region and as a mandatory consequence of "natural" dynamics according to Ratzel's concept. On the other hand, two years later the accent was thrown on policy as a stubborn expansion intending to spread all over the whole Baltic area, based on blackmail against smaller neighbour countries, which was opportunely prevented by the Axis:

> On this occasion too (meaning because of the obligation to de-militarise the Finnish archipelago of Aland, October 1940) the Soviet diplomacy followed what could be called the policy of progressive extortions, using and abusing the blackmailing systems so dear to it, the very same it attempted to use towards Germany and which resulted in a known situation: the Axis action prevented the Soviet Union's attempt to achieve its hegemonic design, with the ambition of conquering Finland only its small part and a necessary prerequisite[36].

The interest towards the Baltic region continued in November and December 1941 with two articles respectively about three Baltic republics of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia[37] which were by then "de-Sovietised", and about other Nordic states of Sweden, Norway and Denmark[38]. In both, the Baltic basin is described as a "Nordic Mediterranean", symmetrically opposed to the real one, defined as seven times smaller. From a political point of view, an anti-Soviet function of these states is pointed out. In particular, Estonia gets the geopolitical role of a barrier against the Russian expansion in the Baltic area, after the primary one, which is really Finland[39]. Morandi's praise of Finland is expressed yet again in assigning this state a role of a guide of the entire Baltic region: "Perhaps in the future it could be Finland, which is neither of German or Slavic race, and which is dynamic especially at its eastern borders, the one to have a directional role in all

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[36] Article quoted, in note 26, p. 489: *La diplomazia sovietica anche in questa occasione (cioè per l'obbligo a demilitarizzare l'arcipelago finlandese delle Aland, ottobre 1940) seguì quella che potrebbesi chiamare la politica delle estorsioni progressive, usando e abusando di quei sistemi ricattatori che le erano tanto cari, gli stessi che tentò di usare nei riguardi della Germania con quel risultato che ci è noto: l'azione dell'Asse ha sventato il tentative dell'Unione Sovietica di realizzare il suo disegno egemonico del quale le ambizioni di conquista nei riguardi della Finlandia, non costituivano che una piccola parte e un necessario presupposto*.

[37] M. Morandi, *Appunti per una geopolitica degli stati nordici. II° L'Estonia, la Lettonia, la Lituania*, "Geopolitica", Year III, No. 11, November 30th 1941: 543–549.

[38] M. Morandi, *Appunti per una geopolitica degli stati nordici. La Svezia, la Norvegia e la Danimarca* "Geopolitica", Year III, No. 12, December 31st 1941: 587–593.

[39] Art. quoted, in note 28, p. 545.

of the Baltic block"[40]. Such credit to the Finnish state is not surprising considering that among sovereign states in the Baltic, in 1941 this one was the biggest among those openly sided with the Axis.

With the disappearance of Poland as a sovereign state, the periodical did not have any more geopolitical interest towards it. However, it still held some interest from an economic point of view. In fact, as the Axis advanced towards east, Poland's territory annexed to the Reich and the area included in the General Government of Poland are recognised by "Geopolitica" as a rear zone functional to Germany's interests in an article by Armando Troni within the "Geoeconomia" section of the last 1941 issue[41]. Topics similar to the fluvial viability are mentioned in September and October 1939 issues, when Poland – which was about to be disbanded as a political entity – was still an independent country. However, towards the end of 1941 the accent is placed on the previous Polish government's inertia, especially when it comes to development works on the Vistula river as a navigation route, opposed to a big project of reorganisation of fluvial waters in central and eastern Europe promoted by the Reich government, both in order to connect industrial and commercial centres and to favour agriculture through irrigation, and to facilitate the transport of timber from nearby woods. Five fluvial regions were distinguished, most important of them being the Vistula river basin with its valley tributaries. A grandiose plan of connecting the river with Bug and Dnieper is envisioned through canals built by the "great German Reich", especially considering "a better arrangement and a larger development which both meet the needs of a new European asset"[42]. In this case, it is implicitly a given that the Axis shall win the war, therefore a functional network of water courses would have been "a noticeable contribution from nature itself to a rapid organisation of rear areas of an extremely large front"[43].

Old and new project for Central-Eastern and Baltic Europe

Such a plan of development of fluvial routes – similar to what the periodical published on the topic even in 1939 – corresponds to an intention to extend communications through internal water from the Baltic to the Black Sea, contributing to an economic recovery of the whole microregion facing the isthmus between these two seas. At the end, it was a project quite similar to the Trimarium announced in 2015 by Croatia and Poland's presidents Kolinda Grabar-Kitarović

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[40] Art. quoted, in note 29, p. 593.

[41] A. Troni, *Le comunicazioni nelle retrovie del fronte orientale. Le vie fluviali del Governorato Generale di Polonia e nei territori ex polacchi annessi alla Germania*, "Geopolitica", Year III, No. 12, December 31st 1941: 594–598.

[42] Art. quoted, in note 32, p. 594.

[43] *Ibidem*.

and Andrzej Duda, aiming to connect through internal routes the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Adriatic[44]. In 1939–1941 the attention was focused on fluvial routes – and there was only marginal interest for the railroad development between the carbon basin of Silesia and the Baltic – while today the goal is to reinforce road axis along the north-south route (Zieliński 2017: 94–95), even though the intention to intensify commercial traffic on this axis is unchanged. Such development of connections auspicated by "Geopolitica" can relate much more to today's Trimarium than to the Intermarium project envisioned by Józef Piłsudski in the 1920s. The latter was supposed to be a defensive alliance and a deterrent from aggression towards countries between the Baltic and the Black Sea by the two main powers from central and eastern Europe: Germany and Russia (Soviet Union at the time). When it comes to today's Trimarium, the controversy is in the fact that economic goals prevail over those openly political of a reinforcement of states along the Baltic–Black Sea axis that was supposed to hold back the western EU countries on one side and Russia on the other[45]. In "Geopolitica", the development programme of fluvial communications in the

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[44] For a review of the projected north-south route axis, Żurawski vel Grajewski (2017: 109–111).

[45] For a primarily political meaning of the Trimarium, see C. Mutti (2017). According to this author, the Trimarium's goal – conceived by the Obama administration and inaugurated by Trump on July 6th 2017 during his visit to Warsaw – from an economic point of view is to limit the Russian gas exports to Europe by favouring the natural gas exports from America through the Baltic port of Świnoujście and other terminals, including in Croatia. This way, the macroregion between three seas would have been reinforced through energy ties alongside military ones [the countries of the Trimarium are almost all NATO members], and tied more to Washington than to Brussels and Berlin. This led to a *de facto* breaking point of the EU, that by involving Ukraine in the Trimarium tightened a sanitary cordon alongside Russian borders. While Zieliński is a supporter of a merely economic role, he sees the Trimarium – in contrast to the Intermarium which was conceived in order to front a bilateral threat of Germany and the Soviet Union – as something that should not exist by opposition to a similar double threat. On the contrary, it was supposedly created in order to operate within the EU and not to satisfy interests external to it (ivi, p. 97). However, according to the author, Zieliński's opinion that the Trimarium is not "against" anyone is not common. In fact, if the countries involved in the project need to build and implement infrastructures "that allow foreign gas and petrol imports by diversifying supply sources" (ivi, p. 95) – meaning from the USA too and not almost exclusively from Russia anymore, it is difficult to imagine a peaceful acceptance by the Eurasian power of an inevitable decrease in gas exports towards Europe. For an interpretation of the Trimarium as an anti--Russian but not anti-western barrier (Ilari 2017: 99–106). For a Trimarium considered not to be a merely lobbying project under Poland's guidance aiming to give more value to the Visegrád countries, the Baltic ones and Balkan countries within the EU (Vitale 2017: 175–180).

large area between the two seas is described as a mere economic project, detached from political goals. In fact, at the time this macroregion was either integrated into the Reich or administered by it, or otherwise in an entirely exploitable territory, thus creating a large European space integrated into an entity without potential rivals who could contend it, not in western Europe, nor in the east in communist Russia. In fact, at the end of 1941 "Geopolitica", along with Axis governments, predicted a certain war victory even if it was not to happen immediately as it was popularly believed months before, thus creating a new European order without rivals to the east and west. However, the Italian periodical does not mention anything regarding the plan to also "Germanise" demographically the Baltic area and the huge hinterland between it and the Black Sea. Its situation, as it is largely recognised today[46], would have produced a division on an alleged racial basis between the German *Herrenvolk* and the Slavic *Untermensch*, where the latter could have lived only as work force benefitting the superior German race.

If we should draw some conclusions between the experiences from the past and those of today which are to develop in future, and beyond the monstrosity of Hitler's plans which were never acknowledged by "Geopolitica", not in 1941 and not in the following year after they had been reshaped[47], we can see two characteristics shared by all three of them. First, even though for different reasons the declared projects were not realised, despite the fact that it is premature to evaluate the Trimarium today; secondly, all of them were aiming to separate Russia in the east from the rest of Europe.

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[46] Already in May 1941, Hitler had decided to starve the entire Soviet population which was considered useless to the Reich. Therefore, 30 million north-western citizens of Russia, Belarus and Ukraine cities should have been eliminated in winter 1941–1942. Cities and industries would have been destroyed and their farmlands, now abandoned, turned into natural forests. On the contrary, the large spaces of fertile Ukraine would have been used for the sustenance of the German population. In regard to this (Snyder 2011: 194–198). Regarding the project to starve the populations of conquered territories it is useful to see Hitler's order to Göring of May 23rd, 1941 which says not to do anything to save the population from starvation following the famine that would have been the consequence of the destruction of the occupied region's productive structures (Read, Fisher 1989: 675).

[47] In summer 1941, Hitler's intentions were focused on four points: 1) destruction of the USSR within a few months, 2) a rapid starvation for 30 million people considered useless to the Reich's interests, 3) elimination of Jews after the war was over, 4) downgrading the western Soviet Union to a German colony. However, once it was clear that points 1, 2 and 4 could not be accomplished shortly, the German priority was to eliminate the Jewish population already during the war: a definitive solution that was to be accomplished without the intermediate passage of enslaving the Jews (Snyder 2011: 223–224).

Conclusions

After the end of 1941, the periodical ceased studies about the Polish territory and the Baltic area[48]. This is a comprehensible omission considering that the Axis' victory over the eastern front – which was given for certain two or three months from the beginning of Barbarossa operation – was still far from reality in winter of that year. The Soviet Union did not disintegrate[49] or would proceed to do so following offensive actions which came afterwards. Therefore, neither the eastern front which in 1942 kept swallowing men and resources of the Axis without giving decisive results, nor the rear Baltic fronts and the General Polish Government could be a truly interesting topic for geopolitical studies within "Geopolitica", which was strictly fascist-oriented and without any mistrust or aversion towards the German ally.

Furthermore, when it came to Poland and the Baltic area, the periodical failed to provide innovative proposals in the geopolitical sector, contrary to what its initial programming manifesto had announced in January 1939. The impression that can be derived today while reading the articles on this topic is that the editorial board and the authors limited themselves to acknowledging the situation and its evolution from 1939 to 1941, but without suggesting or indicating any guidelines for the political actors. What inhibited a major dynamism, which was only theorised but unexpressed, were the sudden geostrategic changes that Mussolini's regime was not able to control or that the Italian geopolitics could foresee, as it was always Germany who dictated the rules while Italy was relegated to accepting facts. This way the Soviet Union, once an ideological and political enemy *par excellence* of the anti-communist dictatorships, after the Molotov–Ribbentrop Pact became Germany's "ally" and therefore was not to be openly opposed anymore. This produced an analysis of the Winter War distinguished by a certain dose of embarrassment because Finland – the recipient of "Geopolitica's" (and more generally, Italy's) sympathy which was impossible to hide – was supported by Great Britain and France, potential enemies for Italy. Therefore, the Soviet Union was indicated as the aggressor country until the end of the Winter War, despite the fact that it was fully supported by Germany. Afterwards, following the encounter between Hitler and Mussolini at the Brenner Pass on March 18th, 1940 that mended the fracture between Germany and Italy, "Geopolitica" perceived that the USSR could no longer be the target of open critique, not even after the

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[48] With the exception of Morandi's article, *Stoccolma*, "Geopolitica", Year IV, No. 10, October 31st, 1942: 443–453. An analysis of the position of the city and its communication routes whose extent was mainly local, and the capital of the only neutral state of the region, which was not occupied by the Axis, and without contemplating a larger geopolitical vision.

[49] As it was bitterly observed by a German general already in September 1941 (Snyder 2011: 202).

disappearance of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia as sovereign states, engulfed by the "Russian bear". A new turnaround happened with the Barbarossa operation. In its aftermath, the Soviet Union became the loathed Bolshevik enemy, even though in this case the lack of victory in a brief war after the end of 1941 would have made embarrassing the attempt to treat this rear front as a region integrated into a new European order. If we should draw final conclusions regarding the directives of the periodical in the matter of these European regions which were far from immediate Italian interests, there are two possible observations.

Firstly, "Geopolitica" detached itself from the guidelines adopted by Mussolini's government in a couple of cases and thus confirmed its own partial judgement autonomy which was not always following blindly the government's positions. This can be seen at first in not defining Poland as an almost "Latin" country, an expression dear to Italian institutions and culture, which saw Poland as a sort of a wedge between the German and the Slavic worlds. On the contrary, "Geopolitica" pointed out mostly its negative aspects, meaning the lack of initiative and technological weakness. It could also be perceived when the Winter War failed to highlight the fracture of the Pact of Steel between Italy and Germany, caused by the German consent to the Soviet aggression of Finland. In both cases "Geopolitica" emerged more pro-Germany than the fascist government itself, by avoiding both a cultural valorisation of Poland when it was crushed by Germany and also avoiding any critique towards Hitler in view of his benevolent acquiescence towards the Soviet attack on Finland. This is a guideline that was really a counter-trend compared to the rest of Italy's mood, when aversion to Germany was a largely generalised feeling in the public opinion and was also shared by many hierarchs of the Mussolinian regime, in a period when dissent towards the USSR as a communist country was tolerated, but not towards Nazi Germany whose regime was affiliated with the fascist one. In order to understand the pervasiveness of these feelings it is useful to take a look at Ciano's diary which shows sentiments not even mentioned in "Geopolitica".

> The Italian population is becoming increasingly anti-German. Also, this growing wave of anti-Bolshevism is merely an anti-German thing. Finland's destiny would be much more indifferent to Italians if Russians were not practically Germany's allies" (December 3rd 1939). "In all the Italian cities there are students' manifestations in favour of Finland and against Russia. Yet we should not forget that the people are shouting «death to Russia» and are really thinking «death to Germany»" (December 4th 1939)[50].

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[50] *Il popolo italiano è sempre più antitedesco. Anche questa fioritura crescente di antibolscevismo è fatta soltanto in funzione antigermanica. La sorte dei finlandesi sarebbe molto più indifferente agli italiani, se i russi non fossero praticamente alleati della Germania (3 dicembre 1939). In tutte le città italiane scoppiettano qua e là manifestazioni di studenti in favore della Finlandia e contro la Russia. Ma non bisogna dimenticare che la gente grida "morte alla Russia" e pensa "morte alla Germania" (4 dicembre 1939).*

Secondly, the Italian periodical ignored entirely the destructive goals of genocide pursued by the Nazi on territories conquered in 1939 and 1941. Such procedures were presented as aseptic territorial reorganisation prior to the realisation of a new order within the dominion of the Reich, despite the acquisition of *Lebensraum* which was obtained through enslavement of entire populations, mass deportations and extermination of unwelcome populations, by applying secret plans which were revealed following these invasions (Vitale 2013: 114).

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Bałtyk jako morze śródziemne Północy. Region Bałtycki i Polska w periodyku „Geopolitica" (1939–1942)

Zarys treści: W styczniu 1939 roku ukazał się pierwszy numer włoskiego magazynu „Geopolitica", który wydawany był co miesiąc do 1942 roku. Założony został w środowisku naukowym Triestu przez dwóch geografów – Giorgio Roletto (1885–1967) i Ernesto Massiego (1909–1997), którzy zostali odpowiednio redaktorem naczelnym i współredaktorem. Magazyn inspirowany był niemieckim czasopismem „Zeitschrift für Geopolitik" Karla Haushofera. Jednak w podejściu do kwestii geopolitycznych zastosowano własne podstawy koncepcyjne, całkowicie odmiene od tych w geopolityce niemieckiej. W zamyśle założycieli „Geopolitica" powinna była przyczynić się do ponownej oceny szkolnej dydaktyki geografii i wspierać imperialistyczną politykę reżimu Mussoliniego, chociaż nigdy nie musiała odgrywać znaczącej roli w polityce rządzącej Włochami. Nigdy nawet nie uzyskała pełnego uznania ze strony akademickiego środowiska geograficznego, które w rzeczywistości odmówiło geopolityce cech autonomii naukowej.

Najczęściej poruszanymi problemami w tym magazynie były basen Morza Śródziemnego, Bałkany i Afryka, regiony bliskie włoskim interesom geostrategicznym; ale było też ostrożne zainteresowanie Polską, uważaną za w pełni zintegrowaną z niemieckim „Lebensraumem". Można zatem powiedzieć, że „Geopolitica" podchodziła do tego tematu z pewną powściągliwością, a także ze swoistą czcią wobec niemieckiego

sojusznika, który był także „konkurencją", pomimo faktu, że na jego terytorium przez całe cztery lata obserwowano wydarzenia strategiczne i polityczne o najwyższym znaczeniu.

Z drugiej strony uwaga skierowana na region bałtycki była wolna od jakichkolwiek uwarunkowań. Był on postrzegany jako swoisty „nordycki region Morza Śródziemnego", pożądany zarówno przez Niemców, jak i Sowietów, a także jako obiekt pożądania państw, które chciały bronić trudnej neutralności w wojnie szalejącej w Europie.

Słowa kluczowe: geopolityka włoska, region bałtycki, podboje terytorialne.

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The Sikhs – religion and nation
Chosen political and social determinants of functioning

Abstract: The article attempts to estimate the influence of the geographical and political conditions on the transformation of a Sikhs community after the decolonisation of India in 1947. The authors have used, among other things, the results of their own field research, statistical analysis and scientific works. The main aim of the paper is to explain the specificity of the functioning of Sikhs who despite extremely unfavourable geopolitical conditions and relatively small number have been able to maintain their own identity and achieve a level of social and economic development higher than average for India and Pakistan. Contemporary Sikhs are often perceived as both – a religious and national community. In general, their main characteristics are sharp cultural and moral distinction and very strong awareness of their identity. They manifestate strong bond to their region. Sikhs play crucial roles in social, political, and especially economic and military functioning of the state. Due to their concentration on the India-Pakistan borderland, strong militarisation and separatistic tendencies, Sikhs play crucial role in the domestic and foreign policy of India.

Keywords: Sikhism, India, Pakistan, Punjab, borderland, multiculturalism.

Introduction

Sikhism is the youngest of the world's great monotheistic religions. It was formed at the end of the 15th century in pre-Partition Punjab. However, as many of Sikhism principles came from Hinduism and, even more so from Islam, it is unique for example because of understanding of the divine and the universe and the nature of humanity. Guru Nanak (1469–1539) is considered to be the founder of Sikhism, but another nine gurus (spiritual preceptors) played an important role in giving the new religion its ultimate shape. The word "Sikh" is derived from the Sanskrit *śisya*, meaning a student exploring religious knowledge (Macauliffe 1909; Owen, Sambhi 2005).

One of the first actions by Nanak was an attempt at eradicating all religious differences between people. He argued that there is a single impersonal God of many names, before whom all are equal. In this region of the world this was a revolutionary idea, which struck at the base of the Hindu caste system. The

teachings of Nanak were an attractive alternative because regardless of earlier origin and social identification, in Sikhism, as in Islam, all people became brothers and sisters in faith. Sikhism also introduced a real, and not only verbal, principle of equality between men and women. It was very important, as the position of women was traditionally significantly lower than that of men in the hierarchical society of India, both among Hindus and Muslims. Moreover, one of its main objectives was to bring the followers of Hinduism and Islam closer together, promote brotherhood, personal freedom and equality of all communities in India. Therefore, for many different reasons, the expansion of Sikhism should be considered in socio-religious and not only religious terms (Banerjee 1983; Kalsi 2005; Brekke 2014).

Sikhism is based on three basic principles: *Naam Japno* (pray, meditate) *Kirat Karō* (work) and *Vaṇḍ Chhakō* (share with others). It promotes honest and industrious life, independent maintenance of a family, prohibits begging, teaches respect for others and promotes equality and fraternity in the relations between people, as well as stresses the importance of social solidarity and serving others. It rejects characteristic Hindu concept of ritual purity and defilement, proclaiming that only moral purity has true meaning. Being the most egalitarian of the Indian religious and social systems, it removes the divisions of castes, religions, races and genders. The place of worship is *Gurdwara*, acting as the temple (Nesbitt 2005).

Sikhism in its original assumptions was a partial synthesis, a compilation of Hinduism and Islam, yet fundamentally different from them, especially from the most common religion in India. The main differences between Sikhism and Hinduism are:
– monotheism,
– adoption of a holy book,
– lack of clergy,
– condemnation of the cult of statues and images,
– condemnation of divination and astrology,
– lack of caste system (the equality of all believers),
– actual empowerment of women.

On the other hand, the most important similarities between these two religions are the belief in reincarnation and the large role of meditation.

Despite the apparent closeness of Sikhism and Islam (such as monotheism, the religion of one book, a ban on presenting images of God), the lack of recognition of Allah as God and the failure to acknowledge Koran as a holy book of the Sikhs caused them to be treated as infidels. Although situation was more complicated and depended strongly on successive Mughal rulers, who demonstrated different attitudes towards Sikhs. In the second half of the 16th century, the Fourth Guru, Guru Ram Das, founds the city of Amritsar, where Sikhs raise in the years 1581–1601, what will become after the early nineteenth

century, the "Golden Temple", which still remains the main centre of the faith, the most important sanctuary and spiritual capital of Sikhism (Fig. 1, 2). In the 17th century, persecution and fights against Sikhs led by Mughal and Afghans intensify. As a result, successive gurus become martyrs and the Sikh socio--religious group transforms into a military community (*Khalsa*), the Sikh law is codified, and the tenth Guru, Govind Singh finally elevates the Sikh scripture to the position of Guru and so the *Guru Granth Sahib* which is also called the "eleventh guru", the highest religious authority and the central part of the liturgy (Banerjee 1983; Owen, Sambhi 2005; Nesbitt 2005).

Fig. 1. The Golden Temple
(*Sri Harmandir Sahib*), Amritsar
Photo by M. Barwiński

Fig. 2. Devout Sikhs in the
Golden Temple, Amritsar
Photo by M. Barwiński

The most important consequence of this period was very strong militarisation of the followers of Sikhism, which for the next few hundred years, until modern times, has become one of the most characteristic features of this community. As part of the fight to defend the community, the faith, justice and truth, the most important rules of conduct of every Sikh were and continue to be, the maintenance of the five attributes of belonging to the community, the so-called "Five K" – *Kirpan* (sword), *Kara* (steel bracelet), *Kachera* (short trousers), *Kesh* (uncut hair), *Kangha* (a comb supporting pinned hair) and the prohibition of eating meat from the Muslim ritual slaughter, the use of tobacco and drugs. Sikhs are distinguished by the characteristic turbans and the suffix *Singh* (lion) with male names or *Kaur* (princess) with female names. These elements are the basis of Sikh identity and the external attributes of every Sikh (Macauliffe 1909; Banerjee 1983; Kalsi 2005) (Fig. 2).

The transformation of the Sikh tradition from socio-religious movement into a military community prevented the eradication of Sikhs by the Muslim armies of Indian rulers of the time, allowed the newly-founded religion to survive, considerably strengthened and solidified the sense of community and independence (religious, cultural, social, economic), and thus led to the transformation from

a religious into a national movement, and creating cultural, linguistic and ethnic identity. This is part of the dominant narrative put forward today by Sikh authorities, but it should be noted that not all Sikhs agree with such an interpretation (Sumail 2007; Harsimranjeet 2010; Jaswinder 2011).

After prolonged persecution from the followers of Islam, during which Punjab was divided into twelve politically and culturally connected Sikh principalities, in the early nineteenth century the position of Sikhism in India increasingly began to be threatened by traditional Hindu beliefs. The increasing activities of Hindus and Christian missionaries forced the Sikhs to take decisive actions. Close relations in Hinduism were proclaimed to be a threat to Sikh culture and attempts were started to go back to "pure" Sikhism (Harsimranjeet 2010).

When the Afghans began their raids of India, the Sikhs took advantage and won their own kingdom in Punjab. Ranjit Singh (1780–1839) led to the military and political unification of the Punjab, signed a favourable peace treaty with the British East India Company and became completely independent in 1805. The Sikh Kingdom has been extended to the conquered provinces of Jammu and Kashmir and occupied a wide triangle from the city of Peshawar and the Khyber pass in the north-west to the Himalayas in the north-east and the plains of Delhi to the south-east. In the south, the Sutlej river separated it from India, where the British were growing in strength. The capital was initially located in Lahore, but it was moved to Amritsar. Punjab became an independent state. However, it lasted only ten years after the death of its founder.

On February 19, 1846 the British defeat the Sikhs in a bloody battle. A treaty was signed in Lahore, under which Jammu and Kashmir were sold to Gulab Singh, whose descendants ruled Kashmir until the decolonisation of India in 1947, not accepting the annexation of these lands to Pakistan. The capital city of the Punjab, Lahore, was occupied by British troops, which controlled the puppet Sikh government. In 1849, the British, suppressing another Sikh mutiny, formally annex Punjab. This move gives them a perfect agricultural base for their possessions in India. Alluvial plains of five rivers crossing the province and numerous drainage channels allowed for the expansion of fields of grain, millet, rice and cotton. In addition, the enrolment of great Sikh soldiers into British-ruled Indian Army eventually brought many strategic benefits, and Sikhs, apart from Nepalese Gurkhas, became the most valuable soldiers in the service of the British in the Indian subcontinent (Owen, Sambhi 1987, 2005; Sumail 2007).

The borderland nation. Sikhs during the decolonisation of India

After the end of the Second World War, the authorities of the ruling Labour Party in the United Kingdom have opted for granting India independence. There were two main obstacles – the conflict between the Hindu majority represented by the

Indian National Congress and the Muslim ⅓ of the population of India represented by the Muslin League, and the status of 565 Principalities formally under British authority but ruled by local rulers. They were ⅓ of the territory of British India. The Government in London, the British Viceroy of India and leader of the Indian National Congress argued for the unity of the future independent India, which was strongly opposed by the Muslim League, which called for the establishment of Pakistan – a new Muslim state occupying the areas with Muslim majority. Because of the inability to reconcile the conflicting interests, mutual distrust of the leaders of the Indian National Congress and the Muslim League, more frequent and bloodier pogroms of Muslims and Hindus, the British authorities decided to divide the country while granting its independence. This did not prevent further bloodshed, new conflicts, separatist movements and ongoing hostility between the two newly established states.

As a consequence of decolonisation, carried out according to the religious criterion, Hindus (India) and Muslims (Pakistan, East Pakistan, now Bangladesh), privileged by British administrators in India, received their own states. Sikhs, a community incomparably less numerous than the followers of Hinduism and Islam not only did not get their own state, but the province most of them inhabited, the cradle of their religion and nation, Punjab, was cut in half by the Indian--Pakistani border, that effectively tore this region apart (Moore 1982).

The division of British India was a tragedy for Sikhs. It destroyed the unity of their native Punjab, caused tens of thousands of casualties, forced more than two million Sikhs to emigrate from Pakistan to India and abandon their life possessions, and since Sikh leaders were more sympathetic to the claims of newly emergent India it tore Sikhs away from their sacred geography, from Lahore and from Nankana Sahib, the site of the birth of their founder Guru Nanak, for example. The holy city of Amritsar, 50 km east of the new border, was however left in India. During the extremely violent riots that swept through Punjab in mid-1947, Sikhs fought Muslims with the cruelty totally foreign to the theoretical assumptions of their religion, while only occasionally raising their sword to Hindus. Muslim districts of Amritsar and other cities in eastern Punjab turned into ashes, Muslims had to choose to flee to Pakistan or be killed. With their centuries of combat experience and military organisation of the community, Sikhs proved to be very effective killers. On the other hand, on the other side of the border Muslims were mass murdering Sikhs and forcing them to flee from Lahore and surrounding towns and villages, taking their houses, shops and farms. Apart from religious, historical and political reasons, this mutual slaughter was also strongly economically motivated (Moore 1982; Boyce 1999; Sandhu 2012).

Modern Punjab

Punjab is the birthplace of Sikhism and a region recognised by Sikhs as their religious and national homeland. It is a land of five rivers, all tributaries of the Indus – Beas, Chenab, Jhelum, Ravi and Sutlej. Historical boundaries of this region in northern India stretch from Himalayan ranges in the north to the deserts of Rajasthan in the south (Fig. 3). Contemporary Punjab, divided in 1947 between India and Pakistan, is only part of the historical region.

The Indian part, located in the north-western tip of the country, covers an area of 50.4 thousand km² and in 2011 was inhabited by 27,743,338 people. The state capital is located in Chandigarh (together with the state of Haryana). The Pakistani part of Punjab is much larger, with 205.3 thousand km². Its population is also larger, according to government data, in 2015 there were 101,391,000 inhabitants. The provincial capital is Lahore (Fig. 3).

The Indian part of Punjab has the best road and rail infrastructure and is the second richest state in India. Its prosperity is mainly due to well-developed agriculture and the small business sector related to it. The main crops include wheat, rice, cotton, sugarcane, fruit and vegetables. It is estimated that the relatively small Punjab produces 1% of world rice harvest, 2% wheat and 2% cotton. The most important industries are: engineering and electromechanical (agricultural machinery, moulding, automotive parts), chemical and textile industry, food processing, chemical, pharmaceutical. Indian Punjab is the province that can boast one of the highest (approx. 60%) rates of literacy in the country (Ghuman 2012).

Pakistani Punjab also stands out against the background of the country. It is the most densely populated province of Pakistan. From the east, it borders with the Indian states of Punjab and Jammu, Kashmir and Rajasthan. It is one of the most industrialized provinces of the country. It has developed textile, electro--mechanical and sporting goods industries. Just as in India, despite the dry climate, a well-developed melioration system makes it one of the most fertile areas. Rice, sugarcane, fruit and vegetables are grown.

Despite the number of cities founded by them, Sikhs are traditionally attached to land and agriculture; 66% of the population of Sikhs in Indian Punjab live in non-urbanised areas (Ghuman 2012). According to E. Nesbitt (2005), despite several generations of migration from the villages of Punjab, many Sikhs still identify themselves as a rural, unsophisticated, farming people, in contrast to the more urban Hindu community. This is confirmed by a popular Punjabi joke that says that "Sikhs have no culture other than agriculture" (Fig. 4).

Due to its natural conditions and the work of many generations of farmers, Punjab still remains India's granary. Approximately 70% of all traditional cereals (except for rice) in India are produced in Indian Punjab and Haryana. Unfortunately, despite the long tradition of agriculture and high agricultural

Fig. 3. Contemporary political and administrative division of Punjab

Source: own study based on E. Nesbitt (2005: 9).

culture, many small farmers in Punjabi live below or on the border of poverty. Some 200,000 smallholders have been "forced out" of agriculture, and part of the most indebted people committed suicide, which is a very common phenomenon in rural India. In just 15–20 years, some 10,000 farmers committed suicide because of losing liquidity (Ghuman 2012).

Another problem is the maintenance of the seasonal agricultural workers who do not have their own land. One attempt to cater for this situation is the operation of two Punjabi border crossings between Pakistan and India at Wagah and Hussainiwala, meant to encourage trade and the revival of economic relations on both sides of the border. Unfortunately, due to the unstable political situation on the border between Pakistan and India, mutual hostility and distrust between citizens and frequent conflicts between Sikhs and Hindus and Muslims, both economic growth and the inflow of tourists to this region is significantly lower than the potential.

Fig. 4. Sugarcane harvest in Punjab
Photo by M. Barwiński

Fig. 5. Daily Wagah Attari Border
Closing Ceremony
Photo by M. Barwiński

One characteristic symbol of the modern relations between India and Pakistan is the unique, over an hour long spectacle of closing the border in Wagah, just 30 km from Amritsar. It takes place every day of the year, an hour before sunset, each time gathering 3–5 thousand participants. The ceremony, regarded as a sign of rivalry between two warring states, starts with a multi-coloured military parade, accompanied by the mutual demonstration of power and determination, and ends with solemn coordinated lowering of both flags and the closure of the border. All this is accompanied by pompous atmosphere of numerous spectators. Despite appearances, foreign tourists are only a slight minority among the group. The border spectacle is a unique form of patriotic show, aimed at integrating the citizens of both India and Pakistan (Fig. 5). Unfortunately, it is not always limited to colourful rivalry. In the past, there were several violent incidents during the show. The last bloody attack took place in November of 2014. A bomb detonated on the Pakistani side of the border immediately after the daily ceremony killed 62 people and wounded more than 100. Taliban fighting the Pakistani government took responsibility.

Sikhs – a nation on the border between India and Pakistan

After India's independence, despite their small numbers, Sikhs started having more and more influence on Indian politics, economy and military, while Sikh parties were strongly nationalist. In 1966, Indian authorities carried out the administrative reform of the country, during which the Indian part of Punjab was divided into the states of Himachal Pradesh and Haryana (Fig. 3). This division agitated many Sikhs and was the beginning of an extremist, separatist movement seeking Sikh territorial autonomy or even the creation of a Sikh state. The idea to create a separate Sikh state first appeared back in the 1940s, near the end of

British rule, and was inspired by a political-religious movement, then transformed into a political party Akali Dal (The Army of Those who worship the Immortal God). The party again gained popularity in the early 1980s, mainly because of the growing dissatisfaction with the administrative division of the Punjab.

The growing aggression between Sikhs and Hindus again caused more and more casualties. The demands for autonomy for Punjab were impossible to meet for the Indian authorities, mainly because of both the location of this state in the immediate vicinity of the border with what the Indian government generally considered hostile Pakistan and, consequently, it's very important strategic and political and economic role of the region. The Indian government introduced a state of emergency, and on 6 June 1984 troops on orders of Prime Minister Indira Ghandi conducted Operation Blue Star, during which they stormed and subsequently took control of the Golden Temple in Amritsar, by then the main headquarters of Akali Dal separatists. According to official information, some 493 Sikhs were killed during the fighting in the temple complex, unofficially the number exceeded 1000. This resulted in an escalation of tensions and further fighting. On October 31, 1984, in retaliation for the pacification and the desecration of the Golden Temple, two Sikh bodyguards of the Indian Prime Minister, Indira Gandhi, successfully assassinated her. After her death, in many parts of India, there were pogroms targeting the Sikhs, with the bloodiest one in Delhi. These were the most serious forms of unrest since the decolonisation of India, with approximately 3000 dead (Bryjak 1985; Leaf 1985; Paroha 1993).

After the death of Indira Gandhi, her son Rajiv Gandhi took over, while the internal situation was still destabilised by the events in Punjab. Despite the pacification in Amritsar, and the signing of the Punjab Treaty by the government and the moderate separatists in 1985, the conflict soon escalated again. Radical supporters of an independent Khalistan (the imagined Sikh state) again resorted to violence and terrorist methods, and the Indian authorities again responded by introducing a state of emergency and sending thousands of police and troops to the Punjab. The authorities also accused the Sikhs of being supported by the Pakistani intelligence in order to break up the unity of India. Support from Pakistan to Sikh separatists at the time has later been repeatedly confirmed. Fighting expanded beyond Punjab, and included Rajasthan and Uttar Pradesh. The number of victims on both sides of the conflict grew from year to year. In 1988, 1,949 civilians were killed in Punjab alone. The conflict was far more politically than religiously motivated. This state of emergency was lifted until the early 1990s. But almost immediately the social, religious and economic situation of Sikhs in India started to improve. One of the political signs of normalisation was the appointment of Sikh Prime Minister between 2004–2014. Manmohan Singh from the Indian National Congress (Lutz 2017).

The number and location of Sikhs in India

Historical documents from the seventeenth century indicate that the main places of concentration of Sikh community was Punjab and cities such as Agra, Gwalior, Uljana, Burhanpur, Prayag, Patna, Rajmahal and even Dhaka in eastern India (now Bangladesh). Over time, the area inhabited by Sikh population ranged from the Yamuna in the east to the Indus in the west. The first reliable estimates give a number of around 10 million Sikhs in Punjab at the turn of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. It is believed that this number reduced after the fall of the Sikh state in the nineteenth century. In the first census conducted by the British in 1868, only 1,141,848 Sikhs were reported. The next census of 1881 showed 1,853,426 members of the Sikh community (Tab. 1). From now on, we can observe a systematic increase in the number of Sikhs, whose population according to the census of 1911 exceeded 3 million people. A significant increase in the number of Sikhs in the period of twenty years preceding the census of 1921 was explained by the Indian authorities as a result of the development of a sense of identity and actions intended to create a separate national community. Sikh numbers have also been increased by a large number of pariahs. Conversion to Sikhism was for them an opportunity to restore their dignity and personal development, as well as improve their social and living conditions (Iyer 2002; Nesbitt 2005; Harsimranjeet 2010). An important event that influenced the decrease in the growth rate of Sikh population was the division of Punjab in 1947 and the creation of Pakistan. A large number of Sikhs were killed in riots and fights.

In 1966, there were further administrative changes, the state of Punjab shrunk considerably, with parts of it annexed by neighbouring states of Haryana and the unified territory of Chandigarh. Some Sikhs also found themselves in the state of Himachal Pradesh. As a result, the number of Sikhs within the new, limited borders of Punjab, grew (Fig. 6). At the same time, until the 1960s the number of Sikhs in India steadily and dynamically grew (Tab. 1). This growth finally broke as a consequence of foreign migrations during the persecution of the 1980s. The director of the Census Centre for Studies and Research (CCSR) at Punjabi University in Pati, Harvinder Singh Bhatti, said that this was due to the political situation in the country and the persecution of the Sikhs (Iyer 2002; Ghuman 2012).

The share of the population of Sikhs in Punjab, following increases in the second half of the twentieth century, fell during the last two decades. The results of the census of 2001 show that Punjab was inhabited by 24,358,999 people, and 14,592,387 (59.9%) were Sikhs. The same study repeated 10 years later revealed a total of 27,743,338 inhabitants of the Punjab, of which 16,004,754 people were Sikhs (57.69%). It is clear that, despite the increase in the absolute number of Sikhs and still continuing domination of the community among the residents of Punjab, the percentage decreases.

Table 1. Changes in the number of Sikhs in India in the years 1881–2011

Year of the national census	The number of Sikhs in India	The increase compared to the previous study period [%]
1881	1 853 426	not applicable
1891	1 907 883	2.9
1901	2 195 339	15.1
1911	3 014 466	37.3
1921	3 238 803	7.4
1931	4 306 442	33.3
1941	5 691 447	32.1
1951	6 219 134	9.2
1961	7 845 915	26.1
1971	10 378 797	32.2
1981	13 070 000	25.9
1991	17 178 080	31.4
2001	19 215 730	11.9
2011	20 833 116	8.4

Source: Office of the Registrar General & Census Commissioner, India, 2011, *Census Data*, http://www.censusindia.gov.in/ and *The Sikh Encyclopedia. Population* [15.12.2016].

The last census from 2011 showed that among 16,004,754 Punjabi Sikhs, 12,348,455 people live in rural areas and only 3,656,299 people in the cities. The same data for the Sikh population in the entire country are as follows: 20,833,116 Sikhs, of which 14,930,792 people live in rural areas and 5,902,324 people live in cities.

Such structure of residence is not a new situation. The director of CCSR, having analysed the population structure of Punjab, concludes that the Sikh community of the region, unlike Hindus, who migrate en masse to cities, is traditionally tied to land and farming. This is also proven by the official statistical data from other regions of India.

Analysing the distribution of Sikh population in the Indian subcontinent, we will notice that it is a community with a very strong territorial concentration, attachment to their own native region – Punjab where, according to 2011 data, 76.8% of all Sikhs in India live. Other states with a high concentration of Sikhs

are: Chandigarh (16.1%), Haryana (5.5%), Delhi (4.0%), Uttaranchal (2.5%) and Jammu & Kashmir (2.0%) are other important States/UTs having Sikh population (Fig. 6).

Fig. 6. The percentage of Sikhs in various administrative units
in India, according to data from the census in 2011
Source: own study based on: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sikhism_in_India

Religious basis for economic success of Sikhs

Sikhs are generally required to follow a number of rules regarding personal development, way of life and approach to others. They should demonstrate the features and take actions that are beneficial to one's neighbour, the nearest community, as well as actively participate in social life. According to Ch. Singh (2016), the key factors for the development of societies of South Asia in view of professed religious ideas include: the role of the caste system and social mobility, status of women in society, and attitude towards literacy, wealth and family life, and the reward system in after-life in terms of heaven and hell. The caste system

in the Hindu community leads to many social inequalities and the failure to reach a certain social status and privileges for members of other castes. Another distinguishing feature of many religious systems is the low social and religious status of women, who must be strictly subjected to men and are considered ritually unclean. Sikhism condemned the caste system, low social status assigned to women and encouraged social mobility and escaping the innate material and social status (Singh 2016: 15).

Charity, social service, sharing with others regardless of their professed faith, gender or position, are among the basic duties of believers. Additionally, Sikhs cannot support themselves by begging or live off welfare. They should be able to maintain themselves and support the needy with fruits of their labour. Living a dignified life with hard work is one of the main principles of Sikhism. According to tradition, the Sikh Gurus also work on their living as farmers, shopkeepers and traders (Kaur 1990; Singh 2016; Kalkat 2017). Sikh philosophy encourages investment, especially capital. Accumulation of wealth and idle savings beyond what is adequate to meet immediate or planned consumption, is discouraged. It seeks to cultivate austerity and modest living, thereby avoiding conspicuous consumption. A Sikh is expected to be enterprising and pursue progress in all walks of life (Singh 2016).

In the social life Sikhs were obliged to follow certain rules. These rulers applied not only to common Sikhs, but also the elite. The people in power were expected, among others, to ensure the possibility of treating the sick. The duties of the followers of Sikhism included subsidising the temples and the local community.

Fig. 7. Private business run by Sikh community member in Punjab
Photo by M. Barwiński

Fig. 8. Amritsar city centre
Photo by Ł. Musiaka

Major Sikh temples today distribute food and medicine to those in need. Such basic tenets of Sikhism were the foundation for the prosperity, economic strength and unity of Sikhs. According to Ch. Singh (2016), Sikhs very quickly, in just a few years after the division of Punjab and mass migration, were able to organise

and settle in a new place, reaching the highest *per capita* income in India. Another distinguishing feature of the Sikh community was the establishment of new towns: Amritsar, Anandpur Sahib, Goindwal, Kartarpur, Kiratpur, Paonta Sahib and Tarn Taran. Cities were created mainly thanks to the commitment of the faithful not receiving fees for their work, as well as by high-class artists and architects. Amritsar, the capital of the Sikhs from the seventeenth century, was an important centre of commerce. Other Sikh cities have enjoyed economic prosperity until today (Nesbitt 2005; Singh 2016).

Conclusions

Sikhs are both a religious and an ethnic group. In addition, they are culturally and socially distinct and have a very strong, historically formed identity and separateness. It is a community with an exceptionally strong regionalism. Punjab is not only a religious and historical cradle of Sikhism, but today the only region where Sikhs predominate and where their religious, cultural, social, economic and political lives focus.

Despite the relatively small number of Sikhs in Indian society, their entrepreneurship and internal organisation, as well as community solidarity, they play an important role in the social, political and, especially, economic and military life of India. They stand out especially in areas such as the army, trade, agriculture, engineering sciences, telecommunications and banking. Entrepreneurship, hard work and professional activity typical of the Sikhs is a consequence of the principles of their religion, in which the basic rules and obligations include honest work and self-sufficiency. In addition, because of their concentration on the border between India and Pakistan, strong militarisation of the community and still active separatist tendencies, their role can also be seen in the domestic and foreign policies of India. Sikhs in many ways can be compared to the Jews. Both nations, in spite of their total geographical, geopolitical and cultural distinctiveness, have surprisingly much in common, both in their history and the present situation. This applies to a similar degree to their national-religious, military, economic, social or political-territorial features. The basic ones include:
– unity of religious and ethnic identities,
– the importance of the holy book, both in religious and everyday life,
– a clear influence of religious dogma on the social and economic life,
– centuries-long history of religious and ethnic persecutions,
– a strong sense of identity, individuality and community,
– despite the large diaspora, great importance of the region treated as home-land,
– above-average economic activity and efficiency,
– hostility of neighbouring countries,
– the division of historical lands, territorial claims,

- military effectiveness,
- the ability to survive in more numerous, hostile and completely different religious, political, social, cultural environments,
- the politico-economic and cultural important exceeding their relatively small demographic potential.

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Sikhowie - religia i naród
Wybrane polityczne i społeczne uwarunkowania funkcjonowania

Zarys treści: W artykule podjęto próbę oszacowania wpływu warunków geograficznych i politycznych na transformację społeczności Sikhów po dekolonizacji Indii w 1947 roku. Autorzy wykorzystali, między innymi, wyniki własnych badań terenowych, analiz statystycznych i opracowań naukowych.

Głównym celem artykułu jest wyjaśnienie specyfiki funkcjonowania Sikhów, którzy pomimo wyjątkowo niesprzyjających warunków geopolitycznych i stosunkowo niewielkiej populacji byli w stanie utrzymać własną tożsamość i osiągnąć poziom rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego wyższy niż średnia dla Indii i Pakistanu. Współcześni Sikhowie są często postrzegani zarówno jako wspólnota religijna, jak i narodowa. Zasadniczo ich głównymi cechami są wyraźne różnice kulturowe i moralne oraz bardzo silna świadomość ich tożsamości. Przejawiają silną więź ze swoim regionem. Sikhowie odgrywają kluczową rolę w społecznym, politycznym, a zwłaszcza gospodarczym i wojskowym funkcjonowaniu państwa. Z powodu koncentracji na pograniczu indyjsko-pakistańskim, silnej militaryzacji i tendencji separatystycznych Sikhowie odgrywają kluczową rolę w polityce wewnętrznej i zagranicznej Indii.

Słowa kluczowe: Sikhizm, Indie, Pakistan, Pendżab, pogranicze, wielokulturowość.

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Robert Wieczorek

Integration around regional development goals Discourse concerning the European Social Fund utilisation in Opolskie region

Abstract: The article presents an analysis of the discourse of the European Social Found (ESF) component in Regional Operating Programme of Opolskie Voivodeship present in regional media. The paper shows multilevel institutional conditions for the regional ESF discourse that concerns the integration around regional development goals. Next, it includes an analysis of the EFS discourse in regional media. The comparison of regulations and regional media discourse shows important discrepancies between them, which becomes an argument for considering regional media discourse on ESF as somewhat independent from institutional regulations. The article also shows that the integration around regional development goals is not the main focal point in it and is not realised precisely in according to the external regulations.

Keywords: regional development, European Social Found, Discourse Analysis, Opolskie Voivodeship.

Introduction

For the discourse analysis of ESF utilisation in Opolskie region, it is important to place the region on a vertical scale of the European Union, the Republic of Poland and Opolskie Voivodeship. What analytically binds together those entities of different size is the institutional approach to the region. In this perspective, a region is seen in "the categories of relational links of space, institutions, regional population, and the symbols and myths generated in the public discourse" (Poniedziałek 2015: 85).

In a region seen from this perspective, regional government is conditioned in defining its aims by larger-scale institutions such as the state and the European Union. In the case of Polish regions, these conditions are determined by the national legal system, as well as the European Regional Policy, European Cohesion Policy, and the European Social Fund. However, those top-down determinations are not applied automatically, but they are reshaped in the region. The reshaping

and changes are not merely the result of a rational decision process. Instead they are conditioned by the (institutional) character of the region, that consists of such factors as long-term processes, regional identity (Paasi 2001: 7–28; 2003: 475–485) and established institutional patterns. Moreover, the regional policy formed by the regional government is not implemented without reflection. Other social actors may assume different attitudes towards it, from total reinforcement to full opposition.

In the case of Opolskie Voivodeship, the main participants of the discourse related to ESF are the Office of the Marshal of the Opolskie Voivodeship as the managing institution for the Regional Operational Programme (ROP), and the Provincial Labour Office in Opole as the intermediary institution for the regional component of the Operational Programme Knowledge Education Development (OP KED), as well as regional media and social actors.

In this paper, I am using the term "discourses" as proposed by James Paul Gee, who defines them as:

> different ways in which we humans integrate language with non-language 'stuff', such as different ways of thinking, acting, interacting, valuing, feeling, believing, and using symbols, tools, and objects in the right places and at the right times so as to enact and recognize different identities and activities, give the material world certain meanings, distribute social goods in a certain way, make certain sorts of meaningful connections in our experience, and privilege certain symbol systems and ways of knowing over others (Gee 2001).

The discourses exist in the world as social practices, mental entities and material entities (Gee 2001: 23). Thus, discourse analysis:

> focuses on the thread of language […] used in the situation network. Any piece of language, oral or written, is composed of a set of grammatical cues or clues (Gumperz 1982) that help listeners or readers (in negotiation and collaboration with others in an interaction) to build […] interlinked 'representations', that is, 're-presentings' (Gee 2001: 85).

Its aim is to search for patterns and connections in and across utterances to hypothesise about the ways that meaning is constructed and organised (Gee 2001: 99). One way of reaching this goal is to focus on the "ways in which different sorts of texts and styles of language intermingle to create and transform meaning" (Gee 2001: 41), i.e. intertextuality.

In the present paper, I want to show how the regional government is trying to involve non-governmental actors (entrepreneurs, NGOs *etc*.) in activities that contribute to regional development goals. In my analysis, I am focusing on the public discursive aspects of this activating and encouraging, that takes place in Opolskie Voivodeship. The Opolskie region is placed on a multilevel scale. For the purpose of my analysis, the scales that must be taken under consideration are: the European Union, the Republic of Poland and the local government of Opolskie

Voivodeship. All these different scale entities meet at the regional level and shape the discourse around ESF in Opolskie. The reason why the research on ESF in a region is so interesting is the fact that it mainly involves actions that, in principle, are not economically profitable for those who engage in their implementation. The second reason is that ESF operations involve non-governmental actors who are contesting for the funds in order to implement projects that need to be better than those of other contestants and be selected by a competent managing authority (that is the Voivodeship's Marshal Office or the Provincial Labour Office). Hence the intertextual lens promises to be the most valid approach to the problem.

> The European Social Fund is Europe's main instrument for supporting jobs, helping people get better jobs and ensuring fairer job opportunities for all EU citizens. It works by investing in Europe's human capital – its workers, its young people and all those seeking a job[1].

The simplified explanation of how ESF can be used as an example of regional integration around development goals is that the EU on its part sets funds for different goals, that are aligned to the "Europe 2020" strategy. Those funds are then utilised in member countries and regions. On the other hand, the countries and regions set their own interrelated development goals to follow. The EU regions try to use the goals of the European funds to meet their own goals, to be able to use these funds. Therefore, the utilisation of European funds in the regions should be understood as a way to achieve regional developmental goals.

Every level has its own institutions, which lay down their own regulations. Starting from the top, the European Union (European Parliament and Council (EU) Regulations 1303/2013[2] and 1304/2013[3]), the Republic of Poland (The act of July 11th, 2014 on the Rules for the Implementation of the Programmes in Cohesion Policy range financed in 2014–2020 financing perspective[4]; Strategy

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[1] http://ec.europa.eu/esf/main.jsp?catId=35&langId=en [20.07.2018].

[2] Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006.

[3] Regulation (EU) No. 1304/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the European Social Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1081/2006.

[4] *Ustawa z dnia 11 lipca 2014 roku o zasadach realizacji programów w zakresie polityki spójności finansowanych w perspektywie finansowej 2014–2020* (Dz.U., 2014, poz. 1146 z późn. zm.).

for the Cohesion Policy Communication for the years 2014–2020[5]) and the Opolskie Voivodeship (The Development Strategy for the Opolskie Voivodeship until 2020; The Regional Operational Programme for Opolskie Voivodeship[6]; The Communication Strategy of European Funds in Opolskie Voivodeship for 2014–2020[7]).

European regulations

The first PE Regulation mentioned above is a general act on the European funds and on their main procedures. Its role is to lay down the guidelines for using the European funds to achieve the goals set in the "Europe 2020. A European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth"[8]. The second PE Regulation is a specific ESF legal act detailing its prerogatives.

The general act on European funds[9] emphasises communication as a way to integrate people around strategic developmental goals. Although the main body of the law barely touches on the aspect of activation by mentioning that "the Member States and managing authorities shall be responsible for: a) drawing up communication strategies"[10] (also, Article 32(4) refers to letter e) of Article 35(1) and mentions the possibility of using funds for "animation of the community-led local development strategy"). Elaboration of the information and communication

[5] Strategia komunikacji polityki spójności na lata 2014–2020, 30 czerwca 2015 r., http://power.wupopole.praca.gov.pl/wiadomosci/-/asset_publisher/87JXLw8OIbCw/content/3279823-strategia-komunikacji-polityki-spojnosci-na-lata-2014-2020/pop_up?_101_INSTANCE_87JXLw8OIbCw_viewMode=prin [2.07.2018].

[6] Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Opolskiego na lata 2014–2020. Wersja nr 3.0, http://rpo.opolskie.pl/wp-content/uploads/RPO-WO-2014-2020_wersja--nr-3-lipiec-2018.pdf [15.07.2018].

[7] Strategia komunikacji funduszy europejskich w województwie opolskim na lata 2014–2020. Dokument zatwierdzony przez Komitet Monitorujący Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Opolskiego na lata 2014–2020 uchwałą nr 182/2018 z dnia 10 maja 2018 r., http://rpo.opolskie.pl/wp-content/uploads/Strategia-komunikacji-fundu-szy-europejskich-2018.pdf [10.07.2018].

[8] http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20%20%20007%20-%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf

[9] Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006.

[10] Article 115(1) (a).

strategy can be found in Annex XII. There, the EP and EC specify what means of communication, information and partners involvement are required.

Amongst others, these measures are as follow:

(a) organising a major information activity publicising the launch of the operational programme or programmes […];

(b) organising one major information activity a year which promotes the funding opportunities and the strategies pursued and presents the achievements of the operational programme or programmes, including, where relevant, major projects, joint action plans and other project examples[11].

The subsequent clause states that the managing authority should involve the following partners in its communication and information efforts:

(a) competent urban and other public authorities;

(b) economic and social partners; and

(c) relevant bodies representing civil society, including environmental partners, non-governmental organisations, and bodies responsible for promoting social inclusion, gender equality and non-discrimination[12];

(d) educational and research institutions[13].

The other European regulation[14], specific to the ESF, outlines further ways of integrating and mobilising social actors around the strategic development goals. According to its preamble,

> The mobilisation of regional and local stakeholders should help to deliver the Europe 2020 strategy and its headline targets. Territorial pacts, local initiatives for employment and social inclusion, sustainable and inclusive community-led local development strategies in urban and rural areas and sustainable urban development strategies may be used and supported to involve more actively regional and local authorities, cities, social partners and non-governmental organisations throughout the preparation and implementation of operational programmes[15].

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[11] Annex XII, Point 2.1(2), Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 laying down common provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund, the European Agricultural Fund for Rural Development and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and laying down general provisions on the European Regional Development Fund, the European Social Fund, the Cohesion Fund and the European Maritime and Fisheries Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1083/2006.

[12] Article 5 of Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013.

[13] Annex XII, Point 2.1(3), Regulation (EU) No. 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013.

[14] Regulation (EU) No. 1304/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 December 2013 on the European Social Fund and repealing Council Regulation (EC) No. 1081/2006.

[15] *Ibidem*, paragraph (23) of the preamble.

Furthermore, in article 6(2) and (3), it is specified that in a Member States eligible for support from the Cohesion Fund (such as Poland) or in regions under 90% of average EU27 GDP (such as Opolskie Voivodeship), certain actions can be taken and financed from the ESF. The managing authorities of an operational programme should use adequate amount of funds from the ESF and use it to encourage social partners by "capacity building activities, in the form of training, networking measures, and strengthening of the social dialogue, and to activities jointly undertaken by the social partners"[16]. To encourage the participation of non-governmental organisations, the same authorities should use ESF funds for NGO capacity building[17]. This shows that the European institutions have set a framework for integrating around developmental goals which includes communication and information measures for all European funds, while it also provides for non-discursive possibilities in the case of ESF[18], although there still exists the question if the traces of those actions can be found in public discourse.

Polish regulations

The next level of institutions that shape the discourse on ESF utilisation in Opolskie is national. The main legal documents here are the Partnership Agreement and the Act of July 11th, 2014. The Partnership Agreement puts the obligation of creating a horizontal communication strategy for the Cohesion Policy upon the minister competent for regional development. This strategy then serves as a foundation for the communication strategies created by competent managing authorities for each operational programme[19]. The Act is obliging the minister competent for regional development and each managing authority to ensure ample information and promotion of operational programmes. The minister competent for regional development oversees and can issue instruction to the managing authorities.

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[16] *Ibidem*, Article 6(2).

[17] *Ibidem*, Article 6(3).

[18] This is the main reason why this paper only discusses some part of the issue ot integration around development goals in ESF utilisation.

[19] Art. 4 ust 2, pkt 6; art. 5 ust. 1; art. 9 ust. 1, pkt. 12 *Ustawy z dnia 11 lipca 2014 roku o zasadach realizacji programów w zakresie polityki spójności finansowanych w perspektywie finansowej 2014–2020* (Dz.U., 2014, poz. 1146 z późn. zm.).

National Communication Strategy

"The Communication Strategy of Cohesion Policy for 2014–2020"[20] is the national, horizontal document and a model for all EF communication strategies in Poland, including the one from Opolskie Voivodeship. The national communication strategy gives directions on why the information is needed, and about why and how to inform people about the EF.

The main challenges for information and communication operations set in this strategy are to "activate the polish society"[21] and to "eliminate the barriers stemming from the attitudes and beliefs that impede taking advantage of the opportunities offered by the European funds"[22]. It shows that the search for the obstacles in utilisation of EF should take place among the inhabitants of Poland, who pose the challenges.

The main purpose set for communication of EF in this strategy is to aid the utilization of European funds in order to realise the national development goals[23]. The strategy enumerates detailed goals which include, among others, "1) activating the Polish society in applying for support from EF […], 4) ensuring wide acceptance for development activities carried out with the help of European Funds"[24]. The national communication strategy is strict about applying its general message. It says that "every topic of an informational or promotional campaign and every creative idea should be compliant with the general message, no matter the institution realising an operation or the operational level"[25]. The general message describes the way in which a recipient should perceive the EF and states that: "The European funds support those who, by implementing good ideas, expand the opportunities and improve the quality of life of the inhabitants of Poland"[26].

The general message, according to the strategy, should be constructed around 4 main topics: the EF, the change leaders, the changes, the effects. The EF should be portrayed as a driving force, an enabler of change; change leaders (beneficiaries) are agents needing help from the EF to realise their ideas of change; changes are

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[20] *Strategia komunikacji polityki spójności na lata 2014–2020*, 30 czerwca 2015 r., http://power.wupopole.praca.gov.pl/wiadomosci/-/asset_publisher/87JXLw8OIbCw/content/3279823-strategia-komunikacji-polityki-spojnosci-na-lata-2014-2020/pop_up?_101_INSTANCE_87JXLw8OIbCw_viewMode=prin [2.07.2018].

[21] *Ibidem*, p. 7.

[22] *Ibidem*.

[23] *Ibidem*, p. 12.

[24] *Ibidem*.

[25] *Ibidem*, p.13.

[26] *Ibidem* (*Fundusze Europejskie wspierają tych, którzy realizując dobre pomysły, zwiększają możliwości i poprawiają jakość życia mieszkańców Polski*).

the effects of projects executed by the leaders; and the <u>effect</u> is the country-wide development, understood as a collection of benefits for all inhabitants of Poland[27].

The information and communication on the European funds should present the following roles of EF: help to those who want to develop Poland and its regions; a catalyst of change; support mechanism; support for big and small changes, including personal changes; encouragement for cooperation of the inhabitants of Poland[28].

The main recipients of the communication about ESF are the change leaders, i.e. the beneficiaries, both actual and potential[29]. This is connected with the prospect of presenting benefits, previously called "the effects", so the strategy puts an equation mark between the effects and the benefits. Three main perspectives on benefits are enumerated. First and foremost, the perspective of "I", which should show the personal experience and gains, the benefits of an active attitude and change to the "I's" closest environment. The second perspective should show community experience, the cooperation paying off in terms of bigger impact and greater gains. The third perspective should present the national and regional changes from a personal viewpoint[30].

The strong preference given to the first-person perspective is justified in the document by reference to social research, although the strategists seem to overlook the underlining individualism in this resolution. It may be debated whether this way of promoting EFs is especially tempting to actors who involve themselves only for personal gains or aimed specifically at this kind of people, as those who mostly out of altruistic reasons are already active. One justification for such a solution is given in the preface of the strategy, where the authors refer to research data showing that the inhabitants of Poland tend not to see the benefits they can gain from European funds. Another comes from the table that shows the mechanism to reach target groups where prospective beneficiaries and project participants are defined as having a potential (resources, skills) and actively searching for solutions to their own problems or with a low motivation for involvement"[31].

Regional Communication Strategy

The regional version of the national document is called "Communication Strategy for European Funds in Opolskie Voivodeship for 2014–2020"[32]. This

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[27] *Ibidem*.

[28] *Ibidem*, p. 14.

[29] *Ibidem*, p. 15.

[30] *Ibidem*, p. 16–17.

[31] *Ibidem*, p. 21 – *Posiadający potencjał (zasoby, umiejętności) i aktywnie poszukujący rozwiązań swoich problemów lub o niskiej motywacji do zaangażowania*.

[32] *Strategia komunikacji funduszy europejskich w województwie opolskim na lata 2014–2020*. Dokument zatwierdzony przez Komitet Monitorujący Regionalny Program

document produced by the competent department of the Marshal Office is based on the national communication strategy. The main difference between these two is the scale, national in the latter and regional in the former. The main challenges that are put forth in the regional strategy are the same as in the national strategy, i.e. activating Polish society and eliminating barriers stemming from the attitudes and beliefs that impede taking the opportunities offered by the European funds.

The main purpose of the regional strategy is slightly different. It is to aid the utilisation of funds from ROP OV 2014–2020[33] in order to realise the regional development goals[34]. That shows that the regional communication strategy applies not to all operations financed from European funds taking place in Opolskie region, but only to those financed from the Regional Operational Programme. Therefore, the detailed purposes are also smaller in scale, instead of activating and ensuring acceptance of all inhabitants of Poland, it is focusing only on the inhabitants of the Opolskie Voivodeship.

This leads to a general message that is narrower in spatial terms: "The European funds help those who, by realising good ideas, enlarge the opportunities and improve the quality of life of the inhabitants of Opolskie Voivodeship". The regional communication strategy also lists supplemental messages for ROP OV 2014–2020, which are representing the region-specific messages. The European funds in Opolskie Voivodeship:

– improve the competitiveness of enterprises and support the development of an innovative, knowledge-based economy;
– affect the improvement of the environment and the protection of cultural and national heritage;
– improve the quality of life of the region's inhabitants by supporting sustainable transport and investments in social infrastructure;
– support personal and professional development of the region's inhabitants through actions in the area of labour market, as well as social inclusion and investment in the education system[35].

Despite the fact that those messages are identified as region-specific in the document, similar phrases on the European funds can be found in the section "Communication of change" of the national communication strategy. The latter strategy lists messages about change that include statements about introducing Poland into a new era of development based on knowledge, information and innovation (sec. 3), about changing human environment to be friendlier, cleaner

Operacyjny Województwa Opolskiego na lata 2014–2020 Uchwałą nr 182/2018 z dnia 10 maja 2018 r., http://rpo.opolskie.pl/wp-content/uploads/Strategia-komunikacji-funduszy-europejskich-2018.pdf [10.07.2018].

[33] Regional Operational Programme of Opolskie Voivodeship for 2014–2020 (*Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Opolskiego na lata 2014–2020*).

[34] *Ibidem*, p. 19.

[35] *Ibidem*, p. 20.

and contributing to human well-being (sec. 8), caring about the cultural heritage (sec. 9), supporting social integration and collaborative actions (sec. 6)[36]. This shows that the real region-specific messages on European funds in Opolskie Voivodeship's communication strategy include the <u>improvement of competitiveness of enterprises, caring for the national heritage, investments in sustainable transport and social infrastructure, investments in the system of education</u>.

Another important difference between the two communication strategies involve the scheduled period for activating people to apply for European funds. The national strategy anticipates the need for such effort in the years 2015–2020, but the regional strategy anticipates undertaking these activities only in the period of 2015–2019.

The regional strategy is also very specific about the labour division between the regional institutions in regard to communication and information. It also points out that the managing authority should use regional or local media for the purposes of communication[37]. Therefore, the regional discourse analysis material was gathered from regional press releases and articles.

Regional media

The analysis included all articles printed in NTO (*Nowa Trybuna Opolska* – the New Opole Tribune) and in WR (*Wiadomości Regionalne* – the Regional News) between September 2017 and September 2018. In order to be included in the analysis, an article needed to refer to the ESF in Opolskie Voivodeship[38]. NTO is a regional, daily newspaper, while WR is an informational monthly bulletin in a form of a newspaper published by the voivodeship's local government. Both of these papers have their on-line versions. In addition to these printed papers, the news section of the webpage of the regional government[39] (UMWO News)

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[36] *Strategia komunikacji polityki spójności na lata 2014–2020*, 30 czerwca 2015 r., http://power.wupopole.praca.gov.pl/wiadomosci/-/asset_publisher/87JXLw8OIbCw/content/3279823-strategia-komunikacji-polityki-spojnosci-na-lata-2014-2020/pop_up?_101_INSTANCE_87JXLw8OIbCw_viewMode=prin, p. 14–15 [2.07.2018].

[37] *Strategia komunikacji funduszy europejskich w województwie opolskim na lata 2014–2020*. Dokument zatwierdzony przez Komitet Monitorujący Regionalny Program Operacyjny Województwa Opolskiego na lata 2014–2020 Uchwałą nr 182/2018 z dnia 10 maja 2018 r., p. 33, http://rpo.opolskie.pl/wp-content/uploads/Strategia-komunikacji--funduszy-europejskich-2018.pdf [10.07.2018].

[38] I was originally aiming also to include the promotional leaflets and folders about the ESF created in Opolskie. However, the small number of available materials (3 leaflets) concerning ESF made the analysis invalid.

[39] http://www.opolskie.pl/aktualnosci/ [4.09.2018].

was also included in the analysis. Online news went through the same sampling procedure as printed articles, meaning that any article or announcement published in the news section needed to refer to ESF to be included in the analysis[40]. In the period between September 1st, 2017 and September 1st, 2018 there have been 12 articles concerning ESF in NTO and 20 articles in WR (including 16 articles co-financed from the ESF itself). 28 online news articles that were also included in the analysis.

Relatively to the rest of the analysed material, the NTO contained the smallest amount of data on the ESF in Opolskie Voivodeship. The articles were mainly focused on who does what for European money. They are limited to praising the beneficiaries who manage to gain the financing or the regional government which has assigned the money to them. The articles in NTO are mainly addressed to the people of Opolskie regions who could use the projects' operations.

WR contained 20 articles on EFS implementation and utilisation in Opolskie. These are written by the Marshal's Office functionaries. Some of the articles have even been financed from the EFS (until the end of 2017), while some have not (since 2018). The main difference between these two groups of articles is clear, as the EFS-sponsored articles always contain detailed information about the funding scheme.

Between September 1st, 2017 and 2018, the number of articles concerning ESF was the highest on the local government news page. The news was authored by officials who report on the events that involve the local government office or actions that are part of the office activity and require the participation of actors from outside of the institution.

In the first step of the regional media analysis, I have categorised the topics in above-mentioned articles and news items and counted them across different source materials. The categorisation is based on both the material contents and their strategy of communication.

The category that includes the highest number of references is the "amount of money". It includes only the references to specific figures in the research material. This category is constructed purely from the research material, as opposed to the prescriptions form communication strategies. It shows that the most frequently discussed matter in communication about ESF is the topic of the money that come from the EU. For every article in NTO there are approx. 1.6 references to the amount of money, compared to 1.1 in UMWO News and 1.0 in WR. It shows that this feature of ESF discourse in Opolskie is so important that, on average, it is represented in every article. The EU money are depicted in different contexts. As a pool available for all who are interested:

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[40] The ESF reference need not to be a direct one, the contextual situatedness or vague references were enough to include a material into the research data.

The largest fund – over PLN 5.6 million went to PUP Opole[41];
The 'Opole for the Family' programme is 373 million euros earmarked for projects under all four packages of the program[42].

The amount may also a resource owned by the regional government:

Co-financing of projects from the European Regional Development Fund will amount to about PLN 14.65 million, and their total value (together with their own contribution declared by companies) exceeds PLN 25 million[43];
Almost PLN 14.3 million of co-financing was allocated by the Opolskie Voivodeship authorities from the EU pool for the region to projects for the elderly and dependent people[44].

The frequency of referencing the amount of money shows that the money remains the main issue in ESF discourse, despite the communication strategy prescriptions.

The category with the second highest number of references is the "event" category. It includes all references to the events mentioned in researched articles. Table 1 clearly shows the diversity in this category. Starting from the most frequent information about trainings on EU funds, especially concerning announcements and schedules of such trainings, which contain not only the information about a possibility to gain new knowledge but also an accompanying event:

The trainings concern calls for: prevention of skin cancers, prophylactics of osteoporosis, prevention of chronic obstructive pulmonary disease, postnatal depression[45];
The meeting will present the rules for applying for support under the abovementioned contest (including detailed conditions, selection criteria, indicators). After the meeting, we invite you for individual consultations[46];
Eligibility of expenditure for projects co-financed by the ESF[47].

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[41] *Największa pula środków – ponad 5,6 mln zł trafiło do PUP Opole* – UMWO News, March 29th, 2018.

[42] *Program ˈOpolskie dla Rodzinyˈ to 373 mln euro przeznaczonych na projekty w ramach wszystkich czterech pakietów programu* – UMWO News, February 20th, 2018.

[43] *Dofinansowanie projektów z Europejskiego Funduszu Rozwoju Regionalnego wyniesie około 14,65 mln zł, a ich całkowita wartość (wraz z wkładem własnym deklarowanym przez firmy) przekracza 25 mln zł* – NTO, March 2nd, 2018.

[44] *Niemal 14,3 mln zł dofinansowania przeznaczyły władze województwa opolskiego z unijnej puli dla regionu na projekty dla osób starszych i niesamodzielnych* – NTO, July 31th, 2018.

[45] *Szkolenia dotyczą naborów na: profilaktykę nowotworów skóry, profilaktykę osteoporozy, profilaktykę przewlekłej obturacyjnej choroby płuc, depresji poporodowej* – UMWO News, May 10th, 2018.

[46] *Na spotkaniu przedstawione zostaną zasady ubiegania się o wsparcie w ramach ww. konkursu (m.in. warunki szczegółowe, kryteria wyboru, wskaźniki). Po zakończeniu spotkania zapraszamy na konsultacje indywidualne* – UMWO News, October 25th, 2017.

[47] *Kwalifikowalność wydatków dla projektów współfinansowanych z EFS* – UMWO News, August 23th, 2018.

Main category	Subcategory	Sub-sub-category	UMWO News	NTO	Wiadomości Regionalne	Total in main categories	Total in subcategories	% of main category*
Amount of money			19	21	32	72		15,6
Event			18	15	19	59		12,7
	Competition		2	0	0		2	
	Call for projects		2	4	4		10	
	Apportionment of EU funds		0	5	4		9	
	Project realisation information		0	2	2		4	
	Informational meetings		5	0	2		7	
		Cancelled	1	0	0		1	
		Meeting organiser	2	0	0		2	
		Conditions for participation	3	0	0		3	
	Training		3	0	0		12	
		Trainings programme	5	0	0		5	

						Avg
Trainings announcement	4		0	0	4	
Trade fairs and conferences	5		2	2	1	
Promotional event	6		3	2	1	
Leading event	2		1	0	1	
Incentive for contact	2		2	0	0	
Purpose for the funds		43	17	11	15	9,3
Projects operations	12		6	6	0	
Beneficiary		41	13	23	5	8,9
Self-government unit	12		2	5	5	
Firm	19		6	13	0	
Public sector	1		0	0	1	
NGOs	10		5	5	0	
Benefits		39	19	7	13	8,4
Graduates, students and pupils	2		1	0	1	

Occupation and education alignment		1	0	0	1
Quality of life		0	0	5	5
Firms upgrade		2	4	3	9
Regional economy upgrade		4	2	2	8
Regional upgrade		0	0	1	1
Public services upgrade		5	2	12	19
	Education	4	0	1	5
	Healthcare	1	2	9	12
	Social care	0	2	2	4
Employees qualifications		0	1	2	3
Seniors		0	1	4	5
Professional and private life balance		1	0	2	3

Project name	7,1		33	14	13	6
Persons	6,5		30	16	7	7
ESF	6,5		30	27	1	2
Financed actions		12		9	1	2
Disclaimer (article co-financed…)		16		16	0	0
Organisations involved	6,3		29	13	9	7
Governmental institutions		3		1	1	1
Local government institutions		16		5	5	6
Firms		7		5	2	0
NGOs		4		2	2	0
Recipients	3,9		18	8	2	8
EF-financing	3,5		16	12	3	1
Exploitation		1		1	0	0

RPO WO	5	2	5	12		2,6
EF future	4	4	4	12		2,6
Financial perspectives	2	1	3		6	
EF challenges	2	3	1		6	
Difficulty in obtaining the financing	2	5	1	8		1,7
Ability of using EF	4	0	4	8		1,7
EF role – enabler	0	0	5	5		1,1
Addressing the recipient	3	0	0	3		0,6
Informal addressing	3	0	0		3	
Envisioned change	0	0	3	3		0,6
Interview with an expert	0	0	2	2		0,4

*refers to the percentage of the main category references in the sum of all main category references

Source: own work.

It shows that it is not the only goal of the authors to provide information about the trainings. It is often used to convey other, relevant information, such opening opportunities for applying for EU funds in new contests. This "trainings" subcategory is closely connected with the fourth most frequent subcategory, namely "informational meetings". The distinction between the two is made as the trainings are multi-day workshops allowing the participants to gain new knowledge and abilities, while informational meetings are one-day events meant only to transmit knowledge. The following quote shows what kind of information is provided given during such meetings:

> What subsidies for companies are still available? Where to find EU loans without fees and commissions? What has changed in the tax regulations for companies in recent times? You can find out all this at poviat-level meetings, for which entrepreneurs are invited by the marshal of the Opolskie Voivodeship Andrzej Buła[48].

The second most frequent subcategory in the event category is "calls for projects". This again is connected with the opportunities of open contests for projects financed by ESF. It often refers to the results of previous calls for projects. This subcategory marks the importance of the distribution of funds in the discourse. It also includes the information about the outcomes of already closed calls.

Another important subcategory of events is the "apportionment of EU funds" category which refers to the reports of the division of EU money between beneficiaries.

> The Municipal Health Centre in Gogolin has just signed a contract for co--financing its seventh project[49];
> PLN 14.65 million from the Regional Operational Programme for the Opolskie Voivodeship 2014–2020 was divided by the Marshal's office among entrepreneurs[50].

The category "event" includes all the events reported in researched material, but it can easily be seen that all of them are shown in a specific context, with getting access to the EU funds being the most prominent. On the one hand, it shows the possibilities of obtaining the know-how and know-what during different types of meetings, while on the other, it directs readers' attention to open calls for projects. At the same time, it is shown who gets money from the EU and how much they

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[48] *Jakie dotacje dla firm są jeszcze do wzięcia? Gdzie znaleźć unijne pożyczki bez opłat i prowizji? Co zmieniło się w przepisach podatkowych dla firm w ostatnim czasie? Tego wszystkiego dowiedzieć się można na spotkaniach w powiatach, na które przedsiębiorców zaprasza marszałek województwa opolskiego Andrzej Buła* – WR, March 2018: 11.

[49] *Gminny Ośrodek Zdrowia w Gogolinie właśnie podpisał umowę na dofinansowanie siódmego projektu* – WR, September 2018: 5.

[50] *14,65 mln zł z Regionalnego Programu Operacyjnego Województwa Opolskiego 2014–2020 podzielił Urząd Marszałkowski dla przedsiębiorców* – NTO, March 2nd, 2018.

get as examples of success. The second most frequent category is showing what the money was or can be spent on, as well as who the main beneficiaries were.

The third most frequent category includes different purposes for the EU funds that can be found in the regional discourse. The table above shows that in some cases the purposes are put in a narrower sense, as project operations. The main category refers to regional-scale activities, defined in general terms, that are or will be realised with the support of EU funds. Following quotes are examples of such purposes:

> The aim of both projects is the same: to provide the sick, the disabled, often lonely, with access to medical care[51];
>
> In August, the full pool of money was not used. 'Financing of this type of investment supports our actions in the «Opole for the family». Projects that will be implemented by entrepreneurs within this call will not only help to create care places for the youngest inhabitants of our region, but also help their parents reconcile their professional and private lives', says Andrzej Buła, the Marshal of the Opolskie Voivodeship. Within the framework of this call, you can get financing for investments in infrastructure and installations[52].

The "project operations" subcategory refers to more specific actions that are taken up by the beneficiaries during their project realisation period. They name specific activities, places and times when they will be implemented:

> Euromedyk wants to organise a comprehensive range of health services addressed to elderly, dependent people, at risk of poverty or social exclusion. A total of 130 people will take part in them, 65 in each cycle, which will last half a year. Free care is planned in the project both in the homes of the disabled and at Euromedyk's headquarters, which has a full range of medical and rehabilitation facilities (including an indoor swimming pool)[53];
>
> The programme will last until 2019. A variety of services are provided to women, including: educational meetings for pregnant women who have not completed

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[51] *Cel obu projektów jest ten sam: zapewnić ludziom chorym, niepełnosprawnym, często też samotnym, dostęp do opieki medycznej* – WR, September 2017: 5.

[52] *W sierpniu, nie wykorzystano pełnej puli pieniędzy.* 'Finansowanie tego rodzaju inwestycji wspiera nasze działania w programie «Opolskie dla rodziny». Projekty, które będą w ramach tego naboru realizować przedsiębiorcy, nie tylko przyczynią się do utworzenia miejsc opieki dla najmłodszych mieszkańców naszego regionu, ale mają też służyć godzeniu życia zawodowego i prywatnego ich rodzicom' – mówi marszałek województwa opolskiego Andrzej Buła. W ramach tego naboru można dostać dofinansowanie na inwestycje w infrastrukturę i wyposażenie miejsc – WR, September 2017: 10.

[53] *Euromedyk chce zorganizować kompleksową ofertę usług zdrowotnych adresowaną do osób starszych, niesamodzielnych, zagrożonych ubóstwem lub wykluczeniem społecznym. Weźmie w nich udział łącznie 130 osób, po 65 w jednym cyklu, który trwać będzie pół roku. W projekcie zaplanowano bezpłatną opiekę zarówno w domach niepełnosprawnych, jak i w siedzibie Euromedyka, który dysponuje pełną bazą medyczną i rehabilitacyjną (łącznie z krytym basenem)* – WR, September 2017: 6.

their 21st week of pregnancy; prenatal tests for pregnant women under 35; midwifery care; lactation counseling; support for child development, including psychosomatic development; support for parents experiencing loss of a child and expecting a child with a lethal defect; vaccinations against pneumococcus; a telephone for life and a house of life; or a 24-hour 'helpline' where women will receive help and/or be directed to a place where she will receive psychological, material, legal support *etc*.[54]

The category with the fourth largest number of references is the "beneficiary" category, which includes different types of institutions and organisation that are depicted in research material as actors realising projects financed from the EU funds. Companies or private entrepreneurs are the most frequently depicted group, nearly a half of all beneficiaries. Next, over a quarter of all depicted beneficiaries are local government entities, and almost a quarter are NGOs. There is also mention of one public sector organisation. The seventh most frequently referenced category, "persons", is somewhat reverse to the previous one, as it includes and counts all named people, mainly spokespersons or representatives of these abovementioned organisation. This category also includes the managing authorises officials, as well as experts who share their opinions about ESF in the region during interviews. The research material shows that organisations are more important than individuals in utilizing the ESF. Moreover, the comparison of the number of references in "recipient"[55] (18 references) and "beneficiary" (41 references) categories shows that organisations which do the work of ESF utilisation are more important than the people who, in principle, are the main target of the ESF. To be clear, it has to be noted that the category "organisations involved" includes a categorised list of nonredundant organisation names taken from other categories.

The category "benefits" includes the good or helpful outcomes that are or should be achieved through the ESF utilisation. It is a category with the sixth largest number of references. The research material gives a wide range of different benefits, but the largest part of it can be included in the subcategory of "public services upgrade". This subcategory involves healthcare, social care and educational

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[54] *Program potrwa do 2019 roku. Na rzecz kobiet świadczone są różnorodne usługi, w tym: spotkania edukacyjne dla ciężarnych, które nie ukończyły 21. tygodnia ciąży; badania prenatalne dla ciężarnych kobiet, które nie ukończyły 35. roku życia; ponadstandardowa opieka położnej; poradnictwo laktacyjne; wsparcie rozwoju dziecka między innymi w zakresie rozwoju psychosomatycznego; wsparcie dla rodziców doświadczonych stratą dziecka i oczekujących dziecka z wadą letalną; szczepienia przeciwko pneumokokom; telefon dla życia i dom życia, czy całodobowy 'telefon zaufania', pod którym kobieta otrzyma pomoc i/lub zostanie pokierowana w miejsce, gdzie uzyska wsparcie psychologiczne, materialne, prawne itp*. – NTO, August 6th, 2018.

[55] This category entails references to people who are getting aid thanks to the ESF utilisation in Opolskie region.

benefits. Next subcategories, which correspond to each other substantially, include a similar number of references, namely "firms upgrade" and "regional economy upgrade". The former subcategory includes statements such as:

> The amount of funding nearly of PLN 14.6 million was awarded to 50 projects of companies, whose implementation is to serve, among others, acquiring new sales markets by these companies and promoting their products at home and abroad[56];
> We hope that this money will serve our entrepreneurs to improve the qualifications of their employees, and thus to improve the competitiveness of their companies[57].

While the latter subcategory includes statements such as:

> This is another sum of money from the Regional Operational Programme of the Opolskie Voivodeship, which is meant to reach entrepreneurs and help them develop their businesses and our economy[58].

The sixth category with the largest number of references includes project names present in the research material. Project names can be found in the context of reporting what was or would be done in each of the projects, but mainly such project names were placed in the context of money and beneficiaries. Some examples of project names found in the research material:

> More than PLN 5.5 million has been awarded to the University Clinical Hospital in Opole for the implementation of their project 'My Inner Self – Healthcare Program to Prevent the Incidence of Colon Cancer'[59];
> Prenatal tests are conducted in Opole and Nysa for pregnant women before the age of 35. They can be done as part of the EU project 'Giving birth in Opolskie', lead by 'Healthy Family'[60].

Also in the sixth place is the "ESF" category, which is constructed from all direct mentions of the ESF. Most of them comes from the WR and is a part of a footnote disclaimer saying that the article is co-financed by the ESF funds. The articles co-financed by ESF ceased to come out since the beginning of the year

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[56] *Do dofinansowania kwotą blisko 14,6 mln zł przyjęto w nim 50 projektów firm, których realizacja ma służyć m.in. zdobywaniu przez te firmy nowych rynków zbytu i promocji ich produktów w kraju i za granicą* – NTO, January 4th, 2018.

[57] *Mamy nadzieję, że te pieniądze posłużą naszym przedsiębiorcom do podniesienia kwalifikacji pracowników, a przez to do poprawy konkurencyjności ich firm* – WR, October 2017: 9.

[58] *To kolejne pieniądze z Regionalnego Programu Operacyjnego Województwa Opolskiego, które mają trafić do przedsiębiorców i pomóc im rozwijać firmy oraz naszą gospodarkę* – NTO, January 4th, 2018.

[59] *Ponad 5,5 mln złotych dofinansowania otrzymał Uniwersytecki Szpital Kliniczny w Opolu na realizację projektu „Moje wewnętrzne ja – program zdrowotny przeciwdziałający zachorowaniom na raka jelita grubego"* – WR, September 2017: 5.

[60] *W Opolu i Nysie prowadzone są badania prenatalne dla kobiet w ciąży przed 35. rokiem życia. Można je zrobić w ramach projektu unijnego „Rodziny w opolskim", którego liderem jest „Zdrowa Rodzina"* – NTO, August 6th, 2018.

2018. The second part of the "ESF" references comes from the information on projects and operation financing:

The project is financed by the European Social Fund, and participation in it is free[61];

Project co-financed by the European Union from the European Social Fund under the Regional Operational Programme of the Opolskie Voivodeship for 2014–2020[62].

All the above-mentioned categories comprise up to 81,3% of all categorised references. That means that they are the main core of the regional public discourse. As the table shows, there are more information about the integration around development goals in Opolskie Region, but it is rather rare, hence not important in the discourse.

Conclusions

The analysis has shown the existing conditions for communication on EFS in region and the actual communication about ESF in Opolskie Voivodeship. The prescriptions from communication strategies are not reflected in the research material from regional media. The regional public discourse on EFS talks mainly about money, events, purposes for money, beneficiaries and the benefits. None of these things is a topic stemming from the communication strategies.

Nonetheless, the Opolskie Voivodeship is so far the most efficient region in EF utilisation[63]. This shows not only the efforts of the regional institutions, but also the involvement of the people of the region, the entrepreneurs and NGOs. One way of convincing people to take part in the process of utilisation of EF is the communication. A major part of such communication is the public discourse. In case of regional issues – a regionally-produced one.

The regional discourse analysis on EFS utilisation in Opolskie Voivodeship has shown that it plays a minimal role in integration around the development goals. The contents of regional public discourse mainly serve the informative and reporting functions, while the promotional, activating and integrative functions are marginalised.

Nevertheless, some traces of attempts to integrate regional community around the development goals can be found in the research material. The most frequent category, the money, can be considered as an information about providing

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[61] *Projekt jest finansowany ze środków Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego, a udział w nim jest bezpłatny* – UMWO News, October 18th, 2017.

[62] *Projekt współfinansowany przez Unię Europejską ze środków Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego w ramach Regionalnego Programu Operacyjnego Województwa Opolskiego na lata 2014–2020* – UMWO News, July 26th, 2017.

[63] WR, May 2018: 8.

resources to act towards meeting these regional goals. The "event" category may be considered as opportunities for partaking and attempts to involve new actors. The category "purpose for the funds" gives information about the regional development goals, as well as the actions, including very specific ones, that are intended to lead to the goals. The "beneficiaries" category shows what kind of regional actors have been integrated around regional goals, while the benefits show which goals have been met during the ESF utilisation.

These leads to a conclusion that it is not only through the public discourse that the region's inhabitants are integrated around regional development goals. The discourse bears some traces of all the actions needed for the integration and its outcomes, but it cannot be responsible by itself for the integration around the regional development goals. Discourse analysis only gives a fragmented picture of the whole process of integration. To get a fuller view, further research is needed.

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Ustawa z dnia 11 lipca 2014 roku o zasadach realizacji programów w zakresie polityki spójności finansowanych w perspektywie finansowej 2014–2020 (Dz.U., 2014, poz. 1146 z późn. zm.).

Integracja wokół regionalnych celów rozwojowych Dyskurs wykorzystywania Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego w województwie opolskim

Zarys treści: Artykuł prezentuje analizę dyskursu dotyczącego Europejskiego Funduszu Społecznego (EFS) w Regionalnym Programie Operacyjnym Województwa Opolskiego, obecnego w regionalnych mediach. Artykuł przedstawia wielopoziomowe uwarunkowania instytucjonalne odnośnie dyskursu na temat EFS, który toczy się wokół integracji celów rozwoju regionalnego. Następnie w artykule dokonano analizy dyskursu EFS w regionalnych mediach. Porównanie uregulowań z dyskursem medialnym pokazuje istotne rozbieżności między nimi, co staje się argumentem na rzecz pewnej niezależności dyskursu regionalnego od regulacji instytucjonalnych. Artykuł wyjaśnia, że integracja wokół celów rozwoju regionalnego nie jest głównym dążeniem oraz nie jest realizowana zgodnie z uregulowaniami zewnętrznymi.

Słowa kluczowe: rozwój regionalny, Europejski Fundusz Społeczny, analiza dyskursu, województwo opolskie.

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NSZZ "Solidarity's" notions for the state's role in social life Their social and political roots and status in 3rd Republic of Poland

Abstract: The paper portrays the origins and ideological foundations of NSZZ "Solidarity" (Independent Self-governing Trade Union "Solidarity") and their meaning in social life at the time of the communist regime in PRL (Polish People's Republic). There are references to strikes (June '56 in Poznan, polish March '68, June '76, July '80 in Lublin and Swidnica and August '80) and, in 1980, the creation of Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee, which developed and published 21 demands aimed at the authorities. In the study, it is acknowledged that those demands are the ideological sources of Solidarity. The author of the text thinks that John Paul II sermons and encyclicals as well as Fr. Józef Tischner's texts (published in the book *Etyka solidarności oraz Homo sovieticus – Solidarity's ethics and homo soviecticus*) also had an influence on the formation of these ideas, which could bring back moral order, the rule of law, dignity and freedom for the society enslaved by Soviets. "Solidarity" also desired to improve the economic status of the country, particularly by ending the crisis. Those thoughts were, and are, beautiful; unfortunately, nowadays many of them exist only in the sphere of ideas or demands written in NSZZ *Solidarity's statute*. Therefore, the article contains a sad conclusion, that in the 3rd Republic of Poland's reality, "Solidarity's" ideas are not attractive anymore. It happened because modern society is guided by consumerism and has become banausic. Trade union membership is not beneficial anymore, sometimes even being bothersome and seen as exceptional. That is why people, for the sake of keeping their jobs or other benefits, are leaving NSZZ "Solidarity". Considering the ideas behind trade unions (especially the protection of worker's affairs) – it is a peculiar paradox.

Keywords: ideals of "Solidarity", workers' demands, freedom, human dignity, communist government, regime, historic paradox.

NSZZ "Solidarity" came into existence in a very special moment in the 20st century history. The balance of forces in politics, which occurred after the Second World War in Europe caused a division of the old continent into two main blocs; the eastern, where the communist party was in charge of the country, and the western, where the capitalist system was dominating. The propaganda of communist countries aimed at shaping societies where, as it was claimed, the

equality and righteous treatment of the citizens called 'comrades' were to be found. Communist slogans were false. They have been exposed by George Orwell in his literary conceptualisation *Animal Farm* near the end of the Second World War. The author used allegories to present Stalinism. He spread awareness and warned people of any totalitarian system, including communism. It is crucial to mention that the communist ideas and visions are not bad in themselves, however they have no application in the real world – they are a utopian vision that is impossible to be implemented in practice.

Communists, by murdering each other, acquired specific authority. Their 'tools of terror' were being successfully used to intimidate and oppress the Russian society. Similar methods and approaches have been used in order to cope with other countries which became a part of the Eastern Bloc after the Second World War. The citizens of the countries remaining under USSR's supremacy noticed pressure, extraordinary abnormalities and abuses from the Soviet authorities. This situation has become a source of social and political conflicts and principles on an international scale (Kostecki, Wojciechowska-Łysek 1983; Pastusiak 1983; Łoś-Nowak 1989; Mielecki 1989; Stefanowicz 1989; Pietraś 1989; Friszke 1994). Protests, which in the countries of the Eastern Bloc turned into bloodily suppressed strikes, were an effect of the social dissonance occurring in the countries of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON). Uprisings of workers, students and intellectuals broke out before August 1980 in Poland, giving hope for a better tomorrow, but at the same time being a source of concern. Jacek Kuroń described this moment in Polish history as a "sharp bend" on which one can easily fall out (Kuroń 1984: 151–156). After almost forty years, this apt metaphor of Kuroń about the events in which he participated, and about the times he observed, can also refer to the recent history of the Republic of Poland which, it seems, has once again found itself in a bend of history.

Rebellions were a spontaneous reaction of the society to terrible socio-economic conditions and the regime (especially the lack of freedom of speech and ever-present surveillance)[1]. Demonstrations and strikes were considered to be the only effective way of showing disapproval of the government which was not living up to the citizens' expectations and failed to perform the basic functions that were assigned to it. Neither economic, nor judicial order was present in the PRL. There were institutions like the citizens' militia, the army, emergency services and fire departments in People's Poland, and their role was to provide safety, but they were subordinated to the authorities and only meant to execute their politics. The government used the services and departments (aside from emergency service

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[1] We can mention here the uprising in East Berlin – 16.06.1953 (GDR), disturbance and incidents in Pilsen – 1.06.1956 (CSRS), demonstrations in Budapest – 23.10–10.11.1956 (Hungary), protests in Novocherkassk – 1–2.06.1962 (USSR) and the events of 1968 (CSRS and Poland).

and fire brigade) to reach their own goals. This has been confirmed by documents which have already been published (Hemmerling, Nadolski 1991, Hemmerling, Nadolski 1994), as well as others, not verified yet or remaining in the archives of the Institute of National Remembrance, which have not been declassified. There was an illusion that the authorities cared for the citizens. In reality, though, people were not defended by any institutions or laws. There was no peace guaranteed by the political leaders and state authorities and, so the citizens were let down when it came to the most basic and fundamental role, such the creation of proper conditions for economic and intellectual development, as well as providing the citizens with 1) the tools to improve existential aspects of their lives and 2) the access to cultural goods, while preserving respect toward the ethnic and religious diversity among the citizens.

The politics in PRL discredited the minorities as part of the Polish society, aimed at artificial elimination of the cultural differences. There was a status of a relic, a folk knick-knack, assigned to regional differences. Regional education almost did not exist, while new traditions were being created. The mechanisms of PRL's systemic disintegration were brilliantly unmasked and in a Polish comedy film from 1980 called *Miś* (Teddy bear) directed by Stanisław Bareja. The phenomenal Stanisław Tym was both the main actor and the screenwriter of this movie. The grotesque scenes from bars, offices and shops put a new light on the absurdity of everyday existence of Polish citizens. The film presents the paradoxes of the life of a regular citizen (though it is possible that situations shown in it can only be understood by those who lived in those times). We may laugh at it now, but I can assure you that people living back then had no reason to laugh. The reality of Poland in the 1980s is shown in a funhouse mirror, and therefore encourages reflection on that times. Sometimes it was almost absurd and caused frustration in the society.

The economic crisis in PRL, combined with political censorship and violence could not have appeared without a reaction. Society's protests were bloodily suppressed. The authorities used intelligence services: Citizens' Militia (*Milicja Obywatelska*), Motorised Reserves of the Citizens' Militia (*Zmotoryzowane Odwody Milicji Obywatelskiej*), Volunteer Reserve of the Citizens' Militia (*Ochotnicza Rezerwa Milicji Obywatelskiej*) and the army. Their brutal approach caused social dissatisfaction to escalate. Worker outbreaks in PRL, similarly to those in other countries dominated by the Soviets, lasted for many decades. Thousands of people were arrested. The authorities used repression and tortures which lead to fatalities. 57 victims were a result of the June '56 pacification in Poznań. The incidents of March 1968 in Poland caused an anti-Semite purge and blacklisting of students. The pressure on Polish residents, who were not ethnically Poles, but of Jewish descent, was the strongest at that time and they were forced to emigrate. The protest of the citizen masses in December of 1970 ended up

with 45 people killed: the youngest victim, Zbyszek Godlewski, was 15 years old (Marciniak 2010; Eisler 2012; Romanow 2015)[2]. Participants of strikes in June 1976, July 1980 in Lublin and Świdnica, and finally August 1980 did not avoid these repercussions either.

After the June strikes in Radom, Ursus and Płock, a Workers' Defense Committee (KOR) was established; it operated from September 1976 to September 1977. It was an opposition organisation whose members opposed the Polish People's Republic's policy and helped the repressed people. In 1977, when the communist authorities partially fulfilled KOR's demands (including the liberation of imprisoned workers), this organisation evolved into the Social Self-Defence Committee (KSS KOR), which operated from September 1977 to September 1981.

The strikes in Lublin and Świdnica, which happened in July due to economic reasons, as well as the activities of the Social Self-Defence Committee, started the era of Solidarity (Friszke 2011). It is worth recalling that September 23rd, 1976 was the day when the Workers' Defence Committee came into existence. It was organising legal, medical and material aid for workers and their families, victimised for taking part in the incidents of July '76. The creation of KOR was predated by a relief action initiated by the so-called "Wandering Patrol", operating within the 1st Warsaw Scout Troop "Black One" (in charge of the group was Antoni Macierewicz), supported by members of the Club of Catholic Intelligentsia (headed by Jan Józef Lipski). Apart from Macierewicz and Lipski, the third initiator of KOR was Jacek Kuroń (these are only selected activists, there were many others involved in the social and political processes beside them, such as Andrzej Gwiazda and his wife Joanna, Anna Walentynowicz, Henryka Krzywonos, Bogdan Borusewicz, Jerzy Borowczak, Bogdan Felski, Ludwik Prądzyński, Zbigniew Bujak and Bogdan Lis). At that time, the dialogue with Catholic Church was established and Kuroń proclaimed an idea of peaceful disassembly of the communist system. This idea was expressed by a motto: "Don't burn committees. Create your own".

Lublin was an example of the power of protests and creativity of the participants (they welded the locomotives to the railroad tracks). Due to the events in Lublin, the strikes began to spread to nearby regions and finally to all cities around the country. The July protests in Lublin were a signal for the strikes on the coast in August. The Free Trade Unions of the Coast started the most important strike on August 14th in the Gdańsk Shipyard. The participants demanded the reinstatement of Anna Walentynowicz and Lech Wałęsa to work, as well as a raise in payments and building a memorial for the victims of December 1970. August 1980 was one

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[2] Zbyszek Godlewski is considered a symbol of December's victims; Ballada about Janek Wiśniewski tells a story of his death. Movies that refer to those tragic events ainclue Andrzej Wajda's *Man of Iron* (1981), in which Polish actress Krystyna Janda sings the ballad and *Black Thursday. Janek Wiśniewski fell* (2011) directed by Antoni Krauze.

of the most important months in shaping PRL's history. It is known for the strikes and the conclusion of four August agreements.

Formally, the beginning of the Independent Self-governing Trade Union Solidarity is connected with the September events. In the evening September 16th, 1980, the Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee (MKS) was formed in the Gdańsk Shipyard. Before this, the Gdańsk Shipyard Strike Committee had started consultations with 21 delegations from other plants. Soon after, MKS Commitees were created in other cities in Poland, namely Szczecin and Wrocław. There were strikes and demonstrations in the whole country. The participants' demands included system changes. MKS in Gdańsk, which later was transformed into the Independent Self-governing Trade Union Solidarity, presented the demands in detail on the night of August 16–17th, 1980 in the form of a list of 21 items (chosen out of thousands of suggested ideas). The list of demands was developed by the leaders of the strike including Andrzej and Joanna Gwiazda, Bogdan Lis, Alina Pieńkowska and Lech Wałęsa. It was edited by Bogdan Borusewicz. On August 18th, the leaders of MKS decided to make the list of demands public (Kerski, Knoch 2015: 26–27). Wooden boards with demands were placed on entrance gate number 2 in the Gdańsk Shipyard. Today they are in the former EHS Hall (Fig. 1) and anyone interested can see them (Fig. 2). The boards survived thanks to employees of the Central Maritime Museum, Wiesław Urbański (chairman of the factory Solidarity) and Dariusz Chełkowski (driver), who on December 14, 1981 took them to Urbański's house in Wrzeszcz, where they were hidden in the partition wall in the attic. In 1996, they were returned to the museum, and since March 2003 they have been an exhibit of the Road to Freedom exhibition at the shipyard.

Fig. 1. EHS Hall of the Gdańsk Shipyard. August 31, 2018
Photo by K. Krawiec-Złotkowska

Fig. 2. Boards with demands

Photo by K. Krawiec-Złotkowska

In 2003, the boards with demands were included in UNESCO's world list of cultural heritage – Memory of the World as one of the most important documents of the 20th century. The boards created by Arkadiusz Rybicki and Maciej Grzywaczewski are an evidence of the events which had a huge influence on the political, system and economic changes in all countries of the Eastern Bloc. Gdańsk Shipyard is the birthplace of those changes.

The demands started with a call to create free trade unions. Other points on the list referred to respecting constitutional rights and freedoms (especially free press and media), end of repression towards people for their political views, abolishing party privileges and improving the general standard of living. The demands had political grounds and, therefore, were hard to accept for the authorities. Workers wanted to create free trade unions which could speak to the worker-peasant government in the name of "working people of cities and villages". By doing that, they questioned the credibility of the Communist Party (PZPR). The party was supposed to rule on behalf of the proletariat. The workers have also presented their economic and social expectations. They demanded economic restructuring in order to lead the country out of the crisis. They called for help for the people raising children, raises in wages, as well as in expatration and subsistence allowance. Lowering the retirement age and a reform of the healthcare system have also been mentioned among the demands. The last issue involved free Saturdays. The participants wanted to create a "socialism with a human face". After Jacek Kuroń and KOR activists' manifestoes, they repeated the call to not burn party committees, but to set up their own (Kuroń 2010). They were certain that people's country can be reformed, and they believed that the fate and standard of living for regular people can be improved due to

fundamental changes. On August 31st, in Gdańsk Shipyard's EHS room, an agreement between MKS (representing over 700 workplaces) and a government delegation was signed. There was a disagreement about political prisoners, whose release was one of the conditions presented by Lech Wałęsa. Finally, the deputy prime minister Mieczysław Jagielski agreed to sign written guarantees to release the prisoners. The final document was signed at 4 pm (Fig. 3).

Fig. 3. Signing of the August agreements
Source: photo exhibited at the Road to Freedom exhibition at the EHS Hall
in the Gdańsk Shipyard (photo by K. Krawiec-Złotkowska).

As a result of signing the Gdańsk Agreement, a new movement was born. It was later transformed into a 10 million NSZZ union and officially registered on the November 10th, 1980 by the provincial court in Warsaw. Since 2006, NSZZ Solidarity has been a member of the International Confederation of Trade Unions, and since 2014, the patron of Solidarity is the blessed Jerzy Popiełuszko (based on the decree of the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments, acting under the authority of Pope Francis of August 25th, 2014). 21 Inter-Enterprise Strike Committee's (MKS) demands can be treated as a fundament for the ideas of the free trade union. It was based on the problems concerning human rights and the respect for one's views and dignity. Unfortunately, the fifteen-month period of Polish freedom ended with martial law, which lasted from December 13th, 1981 to July 22nd, 1983. After its introduction, NSZZ "Solidarity" was outlawed formally on October 8th, 1982 as a result of the adoption by the Polish parliament of the new law on trade unions and farmers' organisations, which in essence abolished all union headquarters operating before December 13th, 1981. Despite the repression of strikes and the internment of several thousand activists, Solidarity was rebuilt

in underground structures. However, it was a social movement without central authorities, ideologically and organisationally diverse. The federal structure of the Union and the independence of the regions were confirmed by the secret Temporary Coordination Commission established in April 1982, and then by the overt National Executive Commission established in 1987. While operating in the underground, Solidarity assumed an attitude of gradually building an alternative society, independent of the PZPR. Union activists organised street strikes and demonstrations (most numerous in May and August 1982), published underground press, created the so-called the second publishing circuit and Radio Solidarity, they announced a boycott of institutions subject to government control (for example, state television by actors), coordinated self-help (in which the Catholic Church had a huge share), cooperated with international trade unions. Some of the activists who demanded the use of radical methods of political struggle (for example a general strike in 1982) formed the Fighting Solidarity, headed by Kornel Morawiecki. After the strikes in April and August 1988 in connection with the preparations for the Round Table, an informal political representation of Solidarity was established. It was the Citizens' Committee with the chairman of NSZZ "Solidarity" Lech Wałęsa, who participated in the talks and the conclusion of an agreement.

Apart from MKS demands, Pope John Paul II and priest Józef Tischner have also played a crucial role in shaping the image of Solidarity, as well as views and ideas presented by it.

Enslaved Poles found strength and inspiration in Pope's words. His voice, the voice of a known and respected member of the Catholic church was a support and an authority for citizens. Polish Pope represented a man of work and a paradigm of human dignity and freedom. In this context, the *Laborem exercens* encyclical (Jan Paweł II 1981) and *Holy Father* homilies, where he spoke of freedom and dignity, seem to be the most important ones.

The encyclical *Laborem exercens* was created on September 14, 1981 on the occasion of the 90th anniversary of the *Rerum Novarum*. Its publication took place at the same time as the First National Congress of Delegates of NSZZ "Solidarity" in Gdańsk Oliwa (Kuroń 1991: 214; Majchrzak, Owsiński 2011; Friszke 2014: 571), on which a proclamation known as the First Congress of Delegates of NSZZ "Solidarity" to the Working People in Eastern Europe was passed. The appeal published on September 8th, 1981 had a huge impact and reaction, social classes and nations. It called the trade unionists of the Soviet Bloc countries to fight together for the right to create free trade unions[3]. And,

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[3] The originator of this document was Dr. Henryk Siciński, and the author of the text was Bogusław Śliwa. The government of the Polish People's Republic recognised it as a "manifestation of political adventurism" and accused the unionists of meddling in the internal affairs of socialist countries. In the USSR, Leonid Brezhnev, at a meeting of

although it is widely available on the Internet, it is worth recalling its content here:

> Delegates gathered in Gdańsk at the First Congress of Delegates of the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union "Solidarity" send workers: Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, German Democratic Republic, Romania, Hungary and all nations of the Soviet Union – greetings and words of support. As the first independent trade union in our post-war history, we deeply feel the community of our fate. We assure you that, against the lies spread in your countries, we are an authentic 10-million representation of the employees called up, an organisation formed as a result of workers' strikes. Our goal is to fight to improve the lives of all working people. We support those of you who have decided to enter the difficult path of struggle for a free trade union movement. We believe that soon your representatives and ours will be able to meet in order to exchange union experiences.

In the "hot" time of change initiated by workers, the Pope wrote that work is the core and foundation of human life. The *Holy Father* also noticed that work ennobles people and that is why it has a very positive and creative character. According to John Paul II, it is very important because of its utilitarian nature, it is the source of the well-being of society, family and neighbours. The Pope taught that a person should constantly develop in their preferred field, in terms of culture, morality, technology. He also stressed that the first, important and undoubtedly difficult, school of work for every man is his family. At the same time, he noted that it must be honestly rewarded and provide people with decent living conditions.

The demands of the encyclical were further developed in papal homilies, especially those made during pilgrimages to his homeland. Poles took the teachings of John Paul II to heart and stood against the communists as "steadfast" (Marek 2017), although they often paid a high price for their anti-communist views (Marecki, Grądzka-Rejak 2016). The papal words were confirmed from the very beginning of the pontificate. Already in the homily (1978) after he was inaugurated, the Pope appealed: "Do not be afraid". A year later (on June 2nd, 1979) at the Victory Square in Warsaw, the sermon ended with a prophetic call:

> I am calling, I, the son of Polish land, and I, John Paul II, the Pope. I am calling from all the depth of this Millennium, I am calling on the eve of the Pentecost, I am calling with all of you: Let Your Spirit descend! Let Your Spirit descend and renew the face of the land. This land!

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the Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, stated: "It is a dangerous and provocative document. There are not many words in it, but they all hit one point. Its authors would like to be confused in socialist countries, to encourage groups of all kinds of renegades". The Soviet authorities sent a letter to the Polish government demanding immediate and radical steps to cut the malicious anti--Soviet propaganda and hostile actions against the Soviet Union, https://nowahistoria.interia.pl/kartka-z-kalendarza/news-8-wrzesnia-1981-r-poslanie-i-zjazdu-delegatow-nszz--solidarnosc,nId,1496417

The Pope's appeal for the renewal of the face of "this land" was all too legible and found its way to the right ground. The "Solidarity" people understood the intentions of the Pope who in his words strengthened their actions and ideas aimed at improving working conditions and everyday life, but above all, abolishing the Soviet regime and regaining constitutional rights. John Paul II was loved by millions. Crowds came to the masses he celebrated during his pilgrimage to Poland. These meetings were also an opportunity for the society to manifest disagreement to the policy of the communist authorities (Fig. 4, 5).

Fig. 4. Gdańsk Zaspa, June 12th, 1987. In anticipation of the Holy Mass,
attended by about one million pilgrims
Photo by A. Pytlak

A big part in shaping the Union's ideals was also played by Polish priest Jerzy Popiełuszko, called the chaplain of Solidarity (Czaczkowska, Wiścicki 2004). He based his pastoral activity and teaching on the message: "Do not be overcome by evil, but overcome evil with good" (St. Paul, Rom 12:21)[4]. For Father Jerzy, truth was the supreme value. He sought to destroy all lies, believed that working people could not be exploited. He was associated with working-class circles since August 1980. After the imposition of martial law, he started his charity work to support persecuted and harmed people. He organised the distribution of foreign humanitarian aid. From February 28th, 1982, he organised Masses for the Homeland at St. Stanisław Kostka church in Warsaw[5]. He proclaimed bravery to be the greatest

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[4] This attitude was promoted by the Primate of the Millennium, Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński, who – as the first hierarch in the history of the Catholic Church – made an agreement with the communist authorities on February 14th, 1950, for which he fell into disfavour of Pope Pius XII (Czaczkowska 2009).

[5] Such masses – inspired by the idea of Father Jerzy – are celebrated until today in the Sacred Heart of Jesus' church in Słupsk; they are associated with the subsequent anniver-

virtue and he served this virtue until the end. He did not bow and remained faithful to his until his martyr's death on October 19th, 1984. For the people of "Solidarity", priest Jerzy is an icon and his teachings are a testimony of the past.

Fig. 5. Participants of Mass on Zaspa heading towards the Monument
to the Fallen Shipyard Workers in December 1970

Photo by A. Pytlak

The Pope and Jerzy Popiełuszko spoke in a tone similar to another priest, Józef Tischner. In shaping the ideals of "Solidarity", he played a role as important as the Polish Pope. Tischner opened the second and subsequent days of the 1st Congress of Delegates of NSZZ "Solidarity" in Gdańsk-Oliwa. The first homily he gave there was a sermon about the ethics of "Solidarity". Father Tischner repeated in it what he concluded in the homily of October 19th, 1980 delivered to the leaders of "Solidarity" with Lech Wałęsa at the head of those participating in the Mass on Jasna Góra. In this sermon, he clearly defined the essence and idea of human solidarity:

> The word "solidarity" gathers our haunting hopes, stimulates bravery and clear thinking, connects people who were far away yesterday. History creates words so that words can shape history. The word "solidarity" has joined today's other, most Polish words to give a new shape to our days. There are several such words: "freedom", "independence", "human dignity" – and today "solidarity". Each one of us feels the great weight of the content hidden in this word. With this burden, we stand today on the Wawel Hill, among the coffins of the Piasts, the Jagiellons, next to the ashes of Mickiewicz, Słowacki, before the altar of the Son of God (Tischner 1992: 9–13).

Putting the word "solidarity" on an equal footing with "freedom", "independence" and "human dignity" was of fundamental importance, as it placed it among the terms that linked the highest moral values and sovereign political

saries of the death of the "Solidarity" chaplain whose monument stands in front of this temple.

status of a human being. One should also remember about the place where these words were spoken, the most important Polish necropolis, the place of coronation of Polish kings, a mythical place in the context of Polish history and the most important one in the religious sense. Addressed to people who believe and entrust their lives to the protection of Our Lady of Częstochowa, they could not remain unnoticed. Tischner's teaching that to be solidary means "to bear the burden of another man" (he refers to Saint Paul here: Gal 6, 2) became an axiom for the member of "Solidarity". Under its influence, they were ready to take this burden on their shoulders. The philosopher argued for the necessity of mutual support because no man is a "lonely island", people are fused together even when they are not aware of it. They are connected by landscape, body and blood, work and speech. According to the priest, the dignity of a person is based on their conscience, and the deepest solidarity is solidarity of conscience!

This and other homilies of the priest-philosopher, delivered in various places or printed in "Tygodnik Powszechny" were an unequivocal signpost for the public. I recall them today – alongside the demands of MKS, the words of John Paul II and the appeals of the First Congress of Delegates of NSZZ "Solidarity" – with nostalgia and sadness. The texts that shaped the ideals of "Solidarity" are of contemporary archival significance rather than inspiring us to act and put them into practice. The pro-social demands, focused on human beings and improving their living conditions in all existential and ideological aspects, have now become a political tool. The phenomenon of NSZZ "Solidarity", which was born and most actively operated in the century called "the age of blood" by Wołoszański (Wołoszański 2017) – is something incomprehensible nowadays. Archaic and almost unbelievable are the slogans about supporting oneself, feeling the community and devoting oneself to an idea or involvement in *pro publico bono* actions. And in the 1980s, "Solidarity" was shaken by the capitals of powerful empires – Moscow and Beijing. The leader of the Tibetans, Dalai Lama, recognised the idea of "Solidarity" as one of the inspirations for the struggle for the independence of their nation. After the imposition of martial law on December 13, 1981, US President Ronald Reagan announced January 30, 1982, International Solidarity Day.

Positive and affirmative reception of NSZZ "Solidarity" almost all over the world has its justification in the fact that this trade union sought democratic transformation without the use of violence. Demonstrations and protests of workers, students, and Polish intelligentsia were the result of determination, reaction to abuses and regime government policy.

These forms of protest were again used when the economic crisis deepened, reinforced by the introduction of martial law by the communist authorities and subsequent price increases. The structures of the Union went underground (Friszke 2006), and by the end of 1987, repression of these structured increased considerably. In the spring of 1988, "Solidarity" began to apply to the courts for

registration of its Plant Commissions. However, the authorities slowed down the registration process, which exacerbated public frustration caused by earlier price increases. The effect of those events was a wave of so-called spring strikes that spread all over Poland. In addition to workers, students were also involved in the protests. It is worth emphasising that they were peaceful demonstrations. On May 1, 1988, they were organised on an unprecedented scale since the lifting of martial law in 1983. The next day, a strike broke out in the Gdańsk Shipyard and the Strike Committee demanded registration of "Solidarity". On May 3, Tadeusz Mazowiecki and Andrzej Wielowieyski came to the shipyard with a representative of the Episcopate. Their dialogue with the shipyard management did not bring any results. The shipyard workers' protest was supported by street demonstrations and an occupation strike by Tri-City students (Fig. 6, 7, 8, 9): students of the University of Gdańsk, University of Technology and the State College of Fine Arts.

Fig. 6. Students during the 1988 strike.
University of Gdańsk building, Wit Stwosz street 51
Photo by A. Pytlak

Fig. 7. Students' manifestation in the streets of Gdańsk, 1988
Photo by A. Pytlak

Fig. 8. Students' manifestation in the streets of Gdańsk, 1988
Photo by A. Pytlak

Fig. 9. Students' manifestation in the streets of Gdańsk, 1988. Main train station
Photo by A. Pytlak

The 1988 strikes lasted until September. Their nationwide dimension and scale made the PRL authorities aware that they are not able to stop social and political change in the country. The negotiations of the Round Table (lasting from February 6th till April 5th, 1989) proved that a peaceful agreement between the communist authorities and the opposition is possible. One of the leading figures participating in those deliberations and the signing of the August Agreements was Lech Wałęsa – currently judged as a controversial figure, secret collaborator Bolek, a person involved in cooperation with the Security Service. However, in that reality, at this crucial moment in the history of the Polish state, the Round Table was of fundamental importance, as in June of that year it led to partially free parliamentary elections and the establishment of a government led by Solidarity. In 1990, Lech Wałęsa ran for the office of the President (Fig. 10) and after the victory he became the first-ever President of the Republic of Poland elected in general elections.

Fig. 10. After the election results are announced. Gdańsk 1990

Photo by A. Pytlak

The model of Solidarity movement was followed by representatives of democratic movements in other countries of the Eastern Bloc – Hungary, Germany and the Czech Republic[6]. The transformations in these states took place on the basis of the ideals of a peaceful struggle for freedom, which spread and settled down through the victory of Solidarity.

NSZZ "Solidarity", which was established in 1980 to defend workers' rights, and until 1989 was one of the main centres of opposition against the communist government of the Polish People's Republic, achieved quite considerable political influence in the Third Republic of Poland. One example of this surely is the "Solidarity" Electoral Action (AWS), formed on June 8th, 1996 (Paszkiewicz 2004: 224). AWS' centre-right coalition government ruled Poland between 1997 and 2001. Its founder and chairman was Marian Krzaklewski. The group gathered many groups of diverse views, mainly Christian-Democratic and centre-right. In the period from November 10th, 1997 to June 6th, 2000, AWS formed a government coalition with the Freedom Union (UW), and then, after UW left the coalition – a minority government that lasted till October 19th, 2001. Unfortunately, the period of political prosperity of AWS, and hence "Solidarity", after 2001 was significantly weakened. NSZZ "Solidarity" as it was remembered by the participants of the events in 1980–1981 and the following years was history.

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[6] In 1989, the Hungarians organised their own Triangle Table. It resulted in free elections that took place in May 1990 and ended the communist rule. Germany opened its borders and the communist authorities of the GDR started negotiations with the Federal Republic of Germany, which resulted in the demolition of the Berlin Wall by the residents on November 9th, 1989. On November 17th, protests commenced with the "Velvet Revolution" in Czechoslovakia; on December 29th, 1989, opposition leader Václav Havel was elected president of Czechoslovakia.

Contemporary society is characterised by utilitarianism and consumerism. People asked join NSZZ "Solidarity" primarily want to know what they would gain by it. They are not convinced by the fact that a trade union, in accordance with its statute, will care for their employee interests. As arguments against signing up for an organisation that has such a beautiful history and played a huge role in the history of the 20th century Europe, they give its low effectiveness in action and its politicisation, which are difficult to argue against. Unfortunately, this is the sad reality, there is little left from the 10-million organisation. According to data from 1989, the number of its members dropped significantly and amounted to 1.5 million members. In the following years there was a further decline. For example, according to Marek Wąs, in 2010 Solidarity ceased to exist in its original shape. On August 20, in "Gazeta Wyborcza", the journalist said that the number of members in 2010 fell to about 400 thousand (Wąs 2010). However, we find a completely different number in the press four days later, August 24 – it is much larger and amounts to 680 thousand members (Sandecki, Wąs 2010).

On the other hand, in a strike log of January 14th, 2015 addressed to General Director of the International Labour Office in Geneva, Guy Ryder, there is a precise number of NSZZ members, which is 586,909. With such a large discrepancy, it is difficult to say which information is reliable. Especially considering that in recent years there has been a disturbing phenomenon of "silencing" Union membership with a threat of job loss or tangible benefits (for example in the form of 1 and ½ part time or overtime at school). This phenomenon is not only sad, but immoral, non-ethical, not to say pathological, bearing the marks of mobbing or corruption (depending on the position held).

Every year on August 31, celebrations commemorating the events from the past are held in Gdańsk (Fig. 11, 12, 13). In many churches in Poland, holy masses are paid in honour of the victims of December '70, commemorated by the occasional liturgies of the "Solidarity" chaplain, Fr. Jerzy Popiełuszko, who was murdered by UB officers.

To sum up the considerations above, one can ask the question what role in the public space is played by anniversary celebrations and monuments commemorating the victims of the communist regime. For example: the monument to the Fallen Shipyard Workers in Gdańsk (Fig. 11), the monument to the Poznań June '56 (Fig. 14), the monument to the Victims of Communism in Łódź, the monument at the Lublin Castle, the monument to the Victims of Communism in Prague and many others. Do people participating in these celebrations or looking at these testimonies of the past associate them with NSZZ "Solidarity" and the ideals of this union? In the light of past events, does commemorating the subsequent anniversaries of August '80 mean anything? The attendance at this kind of celebrations is not satisfactory nor optimistic. Perhaps the reason for this is that they are more and more often a routinised ritual, and fewer and fewer people

Fig. 11. After laying flowers in front of
the second gate by the President of the
Republic of Poland, Andrzej Duda
(August 31, 2018)

Photo by K. Krawiec-Złotkowska

Fig. 12. August celebrations
in Gdańsk in front of the second gate
and at the Monument to the Fallen
Shipyard Workers in December 1970

Photo by K. Krawiec-Złotkowska

Fig. 13. August celebrations in
Gdańsk. Liturgy of mass in the church
St. Bridget, August 31, 2018

Photo by K. Krawiec-Złotkowska

Fig. 14. Monument to the Victims
of Poznań June '56

Photo by M. Kaleniecki

remember the meaning of remembering the past. And history repeats itself. People who have contributed to the creation of NSZZ "Solidarity" and even sacrificed their lives for the Union, gave it their private time (often at the expense of their own families), were interned and imprisoned, are today forgotten and plunged into the darkness of history. An example of such process may be Ewa Kubasińska-Houée, who was sentenced to the highest sentence that was issued at the time, 10 years imprisonment for distributing a leaflet calling for active resistance against martial law. After the amnesty and release in May 1983, she received a one-way passport and could again cross the borders of her homeland only many years later (Kubasiewicz-Houée 2007).

In the context of the above considerations, unfortunately, there is a very bitter reflection that is best expressed by the thought contained in the poem *Fortepian Szopena* (Chopin's piano) by Cyprian Kamil Norwid (Norwid 1990: 177–184). The poet, in the sounds of Fryderyk's music saw Poland "from that zenith/ Perfections of history", the Poland of "wheelwrights transformed" that he would have known "though at life's brow", because it was his homeland, "where you were raised" like the "Publica Res". Unfortunately, the instrument, which in the romantic delight praised the glory of Poland, "crushed on the granite squares". In the symbolic dimension "now brought low on the pavement". Today also "with groaning – stories gone deaf" and remind us of the ideals of those who left their footprints on them, those who fled from the militias of MO, ZOMO, ORMO and the army subordinate to the regime's power.

People who have remained faithful to the ideals of NSZZ "Solidarity" today often become the object of mockery and jokes. They are the "remnant" of a huge movement that has burned out and became history. Perhaps it has already fulfilled its historical role. But as a "leftover", a remnant, even a relic of the past, these people give hope. Maybe if today these ideals have fallen so much that they reached the "pavement", they may resound in the future and ring in the ears and hearts of Poles like the most beautiful music. So "Rejoice, o you child who will be" when "the Ideal – now brought low on the pavement", enjoy, people of future generations, because only you are our hope and you can rebuild what has been lost.

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Ideały NSZZ „Solidarność" dotyczące roli państwa w życiu społecznym
Ich społeczne i polityczne korzenie oraz ich realizacja
w III Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej

Zarys treści: W artykule zostały przedstawione geneza i ideologiczne podstawy Niezależnego Samorządnego Związku Zawodowego „Solidarność" i jego znaczenie w życiu społecznym w czasach PRL. Genezę organizacji wywodzi się od sekwencji strajków (Czerwiec '56 w Poznaniu, Polski Marzec '68, Czerwiec '76, Lipiec '80 w Lublinie i Świdnicy oraz Sierpień '80). W 1980 roku utworzono Międzyzakładowy Komitet Strajkowy, który opracował i opublikował 21 żądań skierowanych do władz. W artykule uzasadniono, że żądania te są ideologicznymi źródłami „Solidarności". Autorka uważa, że kazania i encykliki Jana Pawła II oraz teksty ks. Józefa Tischnera (wydane w książce *Etyka solidarności oraz Homo sovieticus*) również miały wpływ na tworzenie tych żądań. Były to idee, które mogły przywrócić porządek moralny, praworządność, godność i wolność społeczeństwa zniewolonego przez sowietów. Solidarność pragnęła również poprawić status ekonomiczny kraju, zwłaszcza poprzez zakończenie kryzysu. Te myśli były – i są – piękne; niestety, obecnie wiele z nich istnieje tylko w sferze pomysłów lub żądań zapisanych w statucie NSZZ „Solidarność". Stąd artykuł kończy smutny wniosek, że w rzeczywistości III Rzeczypospolitej idee „Solidarności" nie są już atrakcyjne. Stało się tak, ponieważ współczesne społeczeństwo kieruje się konsumpcjonizmem i staje się banalne. Działanie w związkach zawodowych nie jest już opłacalne, czasem wręcz kłopotliwe i postrzegane jako wyjątkowe. Dlatego ludzie dla zachowania pracy lub innych zysków opuszczają NSZZ „Solidarność". Biorąc pod uwagę idee stojące za związkami zawodowymi (zwłaszcza ochronę spraw pracowniczych) – jest to swoisty paradoks.

Słowa kluczowe: ideały Solidarności, postulaty robotnicze, wolność, godność ludzka, rząd komunistyczny, reżim, historyczny paradoks.

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Locality in the era of globalization
Carriers of the memory of historical landscapes – studies on the Evangelical cemeteries of the Masuria region (Poland)

Abstract: The main purpose of this article was to present contemporary narratives (social and scientific discourse) about the Evangelical cemeteries of Masuria, based on the examples of the activities under two projects, whose common denominator are the restoration of memory and the protection of cultural heritage. The present elaboration concerns selected issues of the functioning of the tangible cultural heritage in the Masuria region (in Pasym and one of the deserted villages). This piece of writing also describes how the spaces of Protestant cemeteries can be interpreted anew, especially as a result of documentative works.

Keywords: cultural heritage, history, documentation, interdisciplinary research projects, Protestantism, East Prussia, local communities.

> *Oh yes, you would have to visit this old cemetery. Cemeteries say a lot about the past. Whoever wants to learn something about history, must start with cemeteries…*[1]

Introduction

"The fate of cemeteries overlaps with the fate of people. When people leave, their cemeteries die too", wrote Wiktor Knercer, an expert on the Masurian landscape (2003: 160). But, because of their materiality, cemeteries can 'store' information about the lives of former local communities for a long time to come. In the words of Krystyna Dąbrowska-Budziło (2011: 229), they have a distinct *genius loci* – "they are endowed with content so deep that even repurposing or destruction of their form cannot erase it". Even if cultural continuity is maintained, many historical burial sites are a valuable source of knowledge about the life of past generations, and sometimes 'speak' about that part of history which has been blurred in the living discourse of memory. Thus, cemeteries are kind of repositories

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[1] A. Surminski (2008: 39).

of history (carriers of memory – Kula 2002). Functioning in a changing cultural landscape, they constitute a link between the past and the present. They are sites anchored both 'there' and 'here and now'.

The main purpose of this article is to present contemporary narratives (social and scientific discourse) about the Evangelical cemeteries of Masuria, based on the examples of the activities under two projects, whose common denominator are the restoration of memory and the protection of cultural heritage. The present elaboration concerns selected issues of the functioning of the tangible cultural heritage in the Masuria region:

– the area of the old Evangelical cemetery in Pasym (under the project entitled: *Evidently important: documentation of the cemetery and the chapel in Pasym*);
– the area of the Evangelical cemetery in Wilki (a deserted village) (under the project entitled: *Lost Villages of the Pisz Forest* (Fig. 1).

Fig. 1. Localization of cemeteries discussed in the case studies

Source: own elaboration.

This piece of writing also describes how the spaces of Protestant cemeteries can be interpreted anew, especially as a result of documentative works. Focus on individual elements of the geographical environment (in this case the components of the on-the-ground structure of cemeteries, as well as microhistorical analyses) shows how, in the age of globalization, people turn towards what is regional and local, towards the so-called 'small homelands' of the present and former rural communities of Masuria, and – several dozen decades ago – East Prussia.

Research into the Evangelical cemeteries of Masuria, conducted to date, has defined two main trends that significantly differ in terms of their research optics, including the selection and interpretation of information about Protestant cemetery planning schemes and their functioning in the geographical environment:

– a humanist trend that includes: basic documentary research into individual elements of a cemetery planning scheme (spatial layout, grave markings, epitaphs), specialized analyses (e.g. in the field of landscape architecture, thanatourism, epigraphy);
– a natural trend that includes: documenting, and narrow-specialization analyzing (e.g. phytosociological, dendrological, pedological analyses carried out within the areas of the cemetery planning schemes).

The pioneer in documentative works on the Evangelical cemeteries of Masuria was the Provincial Heritage Monuments Protection Office, which in the 1970s initiated their methodical inventory-taking[2]. Another turning point came in the early 90s when, after the political transformations, people started making appeals for saving seriously devastated and neglected cemeteries (Jasiński 1993). A conference organized in 1992 by the Polish Historical Society, the Wojciech Kętrzyński Centre for Scientific Research, and the Commission for the Preservation of Monuments at the Polish Tourist and Sightseeing Society in Olsztyn, led to establishing the Social Committee for Saving the Old Cemeteries in Warmia and Masuria (Jamiołkowska 1993: 241). It undertook a number of activities aimed at popularizing the idea of cleaning up cemeteries and raising awareness of the need to protect them as well as spreading knowledge on them (including scientific conferences and publications). However, it focused its activities on the western part of the present-day province, while the eastern and southern parts were omitted.

Nevertheless, the subject of the Masurian cemeteries has been becoming more and more popular since the 1990s, gaining a place among the issues of protection of cultural heritage sites as well as within the currently developing research trend concerning transformations that happen in the cultural landscapes of contemporary Poland. Among others, at the University of Warmia and Masuria in Olsztyn, students began writing papers on individual sites[3].

Issues concerning the Masurian cemeteries are presented by monographic publications, including co-authored publications (*vide* e.g.: Żurkowska 2008, *Nekropolie Warmii*… 2016). A number of smaller contributory works have been created too (*inter alia*: Bielawny 2006; Bitowt 1999; Knercer 2003; Kudrzycki 2009; Majewska 2016). Morever, studies appeared concerning elements of cemetery planning schemes, considered, among other things, as sources in research into local history (*vide* e.g. Mazurowska 2009). In turn, the research program concerning the Masurian Evangelical cemeteries, carried out by the

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[2] It resulted in, inter alia, the publication of a list of sites in 1984 by the Office of the Provincial Conservator of Monuments (Jasiński 2003).

[3] As mentioned by J. Chłosta (2011: 730), at least 21 master's theses were written that constituted monographs on cemeteries (they concerned, among others, sites located in: Świętajno, Mikołajki, Szczytno, Giżycko, Dźwierzuty, and Korsze).

Warsaw University of Life Sciences, was focused on geospatial issues, including landscape architecture and the geography of tourism (thanatourism[4]) (*vide inter alia*: Długozima *et al.* 2013, 2015[5]).

An important branch is constituted by research into the natural environment of cemeteries – mainly vegetation (*inter alia*: Majgier 2012; Majgier, Rahmonov 2013; Żurkowska 1999, 2000), but narrow-specialization analyses in the fields of dendrology (Ploszaj-Witkowska, Leoniak 2010) and pedology (Majgier 2010; Majgier, Rahmonov 2012)[6] are being conducted too.

The projects that have been discussed in this work stand out significantly from other activities performed for the cultural heritage of Masuria, in particular the sepulchral heritage. They bring a new formula to activities aimed at its protection, among others, to the activities that integrate documentative works with social activities (voluntary and community). This means inclusion – into the current regional identity – of sites which, after the interruption of cultural continuity in the territory of former East Prussia, have become forgotten or unwanted heritage and for many years remained in the margins of social interest.

Case studies

Old Evangelical cemetery in Pasym

Project: *Evidently important: documentation of the cemetery and the chapel in Pasym*

Organizer's perspective

Pasym is the oldest town of Southern Masuria[7]. In this small village there is an active, historical Evangelical church. This religious building is one of the best--preserved pieces of architecture in all of Masuria. Today, it is being maintained by a small Protestant community of Pasym. In Pasym, there is also a place that, despite being a historical memory carrier located almost in the city center, seems to be abandoned and somewhat forgotten. It is an old Evangelical cemetery. Perhaps, this is because the last burials were conducted there in the late 19th century.

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[4] Thanatourism – a term introduced by A.V. Seaton (1996) which, most generally speaking, means "tourism to places that document and commemorate death" (Tanaś 2006: 85).

[5] In this work, 67 Evangelical cemeteries in the Maskulińskie and Pisz Forest Districts were valorized.

[6] Some smaller studies, which have not been discussed due to the volumetric constraints of the text, are listed in the bibliography of the history of culture and cultural heritage of Warmia and Masuria for the years 1990–2009 elaborated by I. Lewandowska and A. Romulewicz (2010).

[7] The settlement unit acquired town privileges in 1386 (Orłowicz 1991: 144).

The cemetery gates were closed for the last time then. This was due to the fact that, on the outskirts of the village, the community organized a new cemetery, where burials have been taking place to this day (Knercer 2006: 721). The old Evangelical cemetery has existed since at least the first half of the 18th century, as evidenced by the archival plan from 1750 on which it is marked (Knercer *et al.* 2013: 6). On a slight elevation in the northern part of the cemetery planning scheme, surrounded by old trees (over 70 years old), there is a prominent burial chapel, built in 1856 (Pestka 2013: 3; Knercer *et al*. 2013: 57). It is severely devastated, with, among other things, numerous defects in the plasterwork and brickwork, as well as an almost entirely collapsed internal flooring (the crypt is filled with rubble) (*vide* Chlebowicz, Strużyński 1995; Pawłowska 2013; Pestka 2013: 6). According to A. Letkiewicz, the history of the building is connected with a family tragedy: the wife and two children of the head of the local post office were poisoned to death by mushrooms. This was why he built the chapel in the cemetery, where the embalmed bodies of the family were buried (Letkiewicz 2006: 18–19). However, the text of the foundation plaque located on the southern facade of the building only mentions the two spouses[8]. The cemetery itself – which still has a partially legible spatial layout, gravestones, and partially preserved historical vegetation (among others, the trees planted along the main avenue) – constitutes, as emphasized by W. Knercer, "an autonomous, clearly spatially accentuated mass, which is a dominant feature in the landscape of the city" (Knercer 2008). Still, this cultural heritage site is subject to continuous destruction.

The cemetery has been the subject of the documentary research and workshops under the project entitled "Evidently important: documentation of the cemetery and the chapel in Pasym" organized by the Jantar Association and a partner – the "Światowid" Center for European Meetings in Elbląg (financed by the National Heritage Institute), with the support of the Provincial Heritage Monuments Protection Office in Olsztyn, the City and Commune Hall in Pasym, institutions of Pasym – the Municipal Cultural Center, the Municipal Public Library, the Elementary School in Pasym, and the Evangelical-Augsburg Parish in Pasym.

The main objectives of the project were:
– raising the awareness of Pasym's inhabitants about the historical value of this city's oldest Evangelical cemetery;
– preparing documentation of the historical Evangelical cemetery and the Rutkowski family's burial chapel located there;
– increasing the competence of the volunteers, in the field of cultural heritage documentation.

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[8] Translated from German: "Resting place/of the Prussian royal expeditor/Samuel and Ewa née Biendara, spouses by the name of Rutkowski/funded/in the year of great suffering of 1856/by the surviving husband" (Pestka 2013: 4).

The first activities under the project were the field workshops for volunteers, attended by 13 people, mostly undergraduate students in their senior year, postgraduate students, and doctoral students majoring in: history, art history, archeology, cultural and natural heritage. They took part in workshops on scanning, photogrammetry, photography, and preparation of record cards. During the field workshops, the participants – together with specialists who normally work at the Regional Digitization Workshop that operates at the "Światowid" Center for European Meetings – documented the historical Evangelical cemetery and the Rutkowski family's burial chapel. The prepared inventory cards, map, photographs, and 3D animations, made available at cyfrowewm.pl (Fig. 2), were also submitted to the Provincial Heritage Monuments Protection Office in Olsztyn, and to the City and Commune Hall in Pasym (Fig. 2). The activities under the project were primarily aimed at preserving and emphasizing the existing grave curbs and gravestones. The finding of funds, and the securing of a monument until the development design has been completed, are the responsibilities of the owner of a monument.

Fig. 2. 3D model of the Rutkowski family's burial chapel in Pasym, developed
on the basis of a point cloud from ground-based laser scanning
(author of the project: Paweł Kondraciuk, 2018
– Regional Digitization Workshop, Elbląg)

Source: the model is available at: http://www.cyfrowewm.pl/obiekt/549/
kaplica-grobowa-rodziny-rutkowskich-w-pasymiu [28.01.2019].

An important issue, emphasized also during the meetings with the inhabitants and students, was the heritage of these lands and the origin of the cemetery. After the Second World War, in the territory of the present-day Warmia and Masuria Province, a practically complete exchange of people happened. The cultural continuity of these areas was interrupted (*cf.* Domagała 1992). The new inhabitants, leaving their homes, came to a land that was foreign to them (*vide* e.g. *Bagaż doświadczeń i wspomnień*… 2018). Often, they even hated its former inhabitants and tried to erase their traces, filling in the created 'cultural gap' with their own cultural heritage (*cf.* Knercer 2003). Cemeteries – as material traces of people who had previously lived in those areas – deprived of care, were subject to degradation. The gravestones located there were in many cases irretrievably lost, becoming a source of stone (information about the transformations of the Masurian cemeteries can be found, *inter alia*, in: Lewandowska 2013). The new inhabitants did not understand their importance as testimonies to the past of those lands, and had no respect for their former inhabitants, which made it even more difficult to build a regional identity. Gradually, local historians, conservators, local authorities, but also ordinary inhabitants began to pay attention to the historical necropolises (*vide* Jasiński 1993). This process is ongoing now. Successive generations know history, but it did not 'touch' them directly, so there are no negative emotions that determined the attitude of their grandparents or great--grandparents to sites such as old Evangelical cemeteries. Today, we look at them through the prism of monuments that testify to the rich local history that had been created by the people buried there (e.g. the three 19th century mayors of Pasym). In order to show the inhabitants the richness of the local cultural heritage, as well as Pasym from a different perspective, somewhat 'from the outside', the volunteers were tasked with preparing short presentations for the residents. Making the inhabitants of Pasym aware of the value of this city's oldest necropolis, we tried to sensitize them to the importance of local cultural heritage. We created a positive emotional bond between the present residents of Pasym and the cultural heritage of their predecessors forced to emigrate in the wake of the war. We supported the restoration of the broken cultural continuity and respect for the material mementos of the prewar inhabitants. The current residents, accepting them as their own cultural heritage, will be able to build on its basis a sense of their regional identity.

Thanks to such a meeting and selection of topics, the volunteers had an opportunity to discuss the topics tackled during the workshops first with each other, and later also with the inhabitants of the city. An extremely valuable experience, for both the residents who came to the meeting and the volunteers, was the opportunity to talk together. Not only did the inhabitants learn something new about Pasym, but also the project participants heard some stories from the life of the local community, which they had not yet had an opportunity to learn. This meeting was also a needed and successful attempt at proving that researchers

can go to the local community, meet it on neutral ground, and talk about their experiences and activities in a convention that is favorable to both sides of the dialog (similar activities, *inter alia*: Karpińska 2016: 36–41).

Implementation of all the activities planned under the project (workshops for children and youth, a location-based game, lectures) was supposed to increase the awareness of the inhabitants about the cultural heritage, the value of Pasym's monuments, and the local Evangelical cemetery. Several dozen residents of Pasym took part in the activities. Based on the questionnaires filled in during the events, it can be concluded that this goal was achieved to a large extent. The activities carried out during the implementation of the project entitled "Evidently important: documentation of the cemetery and the chapel in Pasym" show just how important interest coming from outside, beneficial activities, new ideas, and cultural heritage education are for such a small community.

Participant's perspective

Our goal was to document the current state of cultural and natural heritage of the cemetery using traditional (e.g. cemetery cards, photography) and new (e.g. photogrammetry, laser scanning, structured-light scanning) tools, methods, and techniques for monument documentation[9] (Fig. 2, 3). The use of a laser scanner allowed, among other things, to develop the 3D model of the Rutkowski family's burial chapel, based on which it is possible, inter alia, to observe and evaluate the structural elements of the building and the degree of their damage, thanks to the highly detailed measurements. What is more, the multidimensionality allows to examine the relation between the internal vaulting and the external roofing (*vide* Fig. 2 – the bottom illustration). This type of analysis lets us look at the sites of the 19th century Evangelical heritage from a different perspective. Sites which, as a result of cultural and natural processes, assume the form a permanent ruin, are nowadays becoming (among others in archeology) the subject of research into the decomposition that takes place in the cultural landscape (*vide* e.g. Kobiałka 2014).

During the inventory-taking of the cemetery area, next to the original elements of the cemetery structure from the period of its use for burial purposes (fragments of gravestones, fences of burial fields, fragments of ceramic torches – Fig. 4), relics showing its later history were identified too (e.g. a contemporary coin, plenty of litter).

I think that such documentation can successfully capture the transient, ephemeral landscape of the cemetery. 'Ephemeral' because the composition of its landscape is strongly associated with the growth cycle and changes of the time periods (Fig. 2). In each period, especially in the historic ones, the cemetery had

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[9] We also participated in the workshops, during which we learned to apply the newest documentation techniques.

a set of unique, elusive features of the ephemeral space (e.g. Brassley 1998). The individual photographs and visualizations that we made, preserve our knowledge as well as the perception of this landscape at a given point in time – it is also the so-called frozen palimpsest (Kijowska *et al.* 2011).


Fig. 3. 3D model of a gravestone in the old Evangelical cemetery in Pasym, developed on the basis of photographic documentation made during the inventory--taking works under the project entitled Evidently important: documentation of the cemetery and the chapel in Pasym

Source: elaborated by A. Majewska (2018).

Fig. 4. Material carriers of information about the history of the burial space; Elements of the on-the-ground structure of the Evangelical cemetery in Pasym – a selection

Photo by A. Majewska (2018).

It is an example of retrieval (remembrance) of space and its history, because of the fact that the cemetery is located within an inhabited town, it also has an Evangelical community – a certain cultural continuity has been maintained. The cemetery is in various ways and functions, and to a varying degree, present in the local social discourse, which can also be seen in its space in which there is abundant evidence for the presence of people. At the same time, this cemetery has become a natural-cultural space (Kobiałka 2018), a place where animals reside and are fed. At the end of the research, a meeting with residents was organized during which we not only presented the results, but which was also a complement to the process of remembrance of the space of the cemetery – its relying on recalling its history, and at the same time confronting what we know with social narratives, memories, local discourse.

Evangelical cemetery in Wilki (a deserted village)

Project: *Lost Villages of the Pisz Forest*

Organizer's perspective

The plot of Ernst Wiechert's Masurian saga "The Jeromin children" takes place in the village of Sowiróg on Lake Nidzkie, one of those small villages in the Pisz Forest which the writer called 'lost' and compared to 'sunken graves' (*cf.* also: Bałtroczyk 1993; Konończuk 1993). This comparison turned out to be prophetic because, after the end of World War II, all that remained of the literary Jeromins' village were looted ruins and an abandoned cemetery. A similar fate befell many 'lost' villages in the Pisz Forest, in the area from the Pisa River to Lake Nidzkie, whose names remain only on old, sufficiently detailed maps.

The years and reasons for establishing these villages were various, but the two world wars led to the end of them all, making this their common denominator. The First World War caused huge material losses (which, paradoxically, led to the modernization of the countryside during its reconstruction, and improvement in the living conditions of its inhabitants), and the Second World War closed the history of East Prussia and interrupted the functioning of many villages, among others in the Pisz Forest. After the front line shifted in late January 1945, the area of today's Pisz County, like the whole Masuria, was almost completely depopulated. A time of looting and robberies came, committed by Russian soldiers, Polish militia, neighbors from beyond the former border, and newcomers from more distant parts of the country (*vide* e.g. Zaremba 2012: 275). First, Soviet soldiers looted everything they could. Later, the deserted villages fell victim to Polish looters. Furniture, household appliances and farming equipment were stolen, entire homesteads were disassembled, treating abandoned villages as storehouses of construction materials used to build new houses or for renovations. Gangs of looters sometimes set fire to wooden buildings in order to erase the traces or to

distract the attention of inhabitants remaining in the village and make the criminal activities easier for themselves. In this way, villages disappeared from the Pisz Forest one by one. The only proof that they existed visible in the landscape are the foundations of houses and the abandoned cemeteries.

My interest in cemeteries as traces of the history and culture of Masuria recorded in the landscape, the reading of "The Jeromin children" by Wiechert, and the searching for the village of Sowiróg described there now completely depopulated, inspired me to elaborate an original project in 2008 entitled "Lost villages of the Pisz Forest" (Worobiec 2008). Its main assumptions are:

– discovering – what for more than half a century, hidden in the forest, has remained of the former villages, and what is slowly being absorbed by nature; recognizing and identifying those hidden and illegible places on site;

– making legible – tidying the cemeteries up, securing them against further destruction: fencing them in, setting up information boards *etc*.; cleaning, preserving, and reconstructing inscriptions on gravestones, inventory-taking of the *status quo*;

– restoring – the memory of the history of places and people living there, usually written down on gravestones of which there are fewer and fewer; preparing a book publication (currently in the editorial office), preparing a map (already published), marking out a tourist route and setting up boards with a short note about them in each village;

– educating – 'practical history lessons', encouraging the activity of local communities and popularizing the idea of volunteering (Fig. 5).

I presented the elaborated idea for the project in written form in May 2008 to the "Sadyba" partners from the "Borussia" Cultural Community of Olsztyn[10]. In April 2009, a cooperation agreement was concluded between: The "Borussia" Foundation from Olsztyn, the National Center for Research and Documentation of Monuments in Warsaw (currently the National Heritage Institute), the Pisz Forest District Office, and the initiator, i.e. the "Sadyba" Association for the Protection of the Cultural Landscape of Masuria (from Kadzidłowo). Its aim was to organize a three-year series of summer workshops for volunteers from Poland, Russia, and Germany. According to the agreement, "Sadyba" presented the concept of the project and undertook to cooperate with regard to factual information, and to organize accommodation for project participants. "Borussia" conducted the recruitment of volunteers and co-financed the project. The NCRDM conducted the recruitment among Polish volunteers, co-financed the project, and took care of the factual information. The Pisz Forest District Office provided logistic assistance

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[10] The project aroused the interest of Beata Samojłowicz (then the President of the Association) and Iwona Liżewska (acting as the head of the Regional Center for Research and Documentation of Monuments in Olsztyn) and, with the support of Pisz Forest District Manager Ryszard Grzywiński, a decision was made to carry it out.

on site and co-financed promotional activities. The project was carried out[11] for three consecutive summer seasons in the years 2009–2011, and, after a break of several years, has been continued since 2017 thanks to an agreement concluded between: "Sadyba", "Borussia", the "Stowarzyszenie Przyjaciół Starego Ogól-niaka" association from Pisz, the "Stiftung Gerhart-Hauptmann-Haus" foundation from Düsseldorf, and the Pisz Forest District Office, in cooperation with the University of Warmia and Masuria in Olsztyn.

General cleaning works in cemeteries (removal of shrubs and trees, setting up overturned gravestones, fencing) are carried out by volunteers – students and graduates, during summer camps. Apart from working, project participants also take part in lectures on volunteering, the history and cultural landscape of Masuria, the history of lost villages, as well as in workshops on documentation of monuments. In addition, they have the opportunity to get to know interesting places connected with the history of the Pisz Forest (Wojnowo and Kadzidłowo) and admire the beauty of Masurian nature while kayaking down the Pisa River.

Cemeteries that have been tidied up require constant care. This is necessary especially in places where there used to grow dense bushes of the common snowberry – an invasive species that quickly reproduces by sprouting from its roots – they must be systematically removed. This is why, since 2009, high school students from Pisz have also been getting involved in the continuation of the volunteers' work[12]. In addition to helping during summer camps, successive classes of first- and second-year students also tidy up the cemetery in Wądołek every year (where the common snowberry grows back the fastest), thus becoming 'guardians of memory'[13] and setting a good example to the local community.

To date, under five editions of the project, 10 cemeteries in the Pisz Forest have been tidied up and fenced – in the following localities (listed in chronological order): Sowiróg, Wądołek (2009), Przerośl, Szast (2010), Piskorzewo, Wolisko Wielkie (2011), Paski Małe and Paski Wielkie (2017), Wilki and Pogobie Przednie (2018) (vede the activities in Fig. 5). Successive stages of the project ended in setting up information boards (in Polish and German) about the abandoned villages in which the volunteers worked (11 boards were set up in 7 villages). The ideas and objectives of the project as well as its implementation and work of the volunteers aroused great interest of the media and became the subject of many

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[11] As a result of a typographical error, the "Lost villages of the Pisz Forest" project functioned under the Polish name of *Zaginione wioski Puszczy Piskiej* (instead of *Zagubione wioski…*).

[12] Students from the Complex of General Education Schools, currently the High School in Pisz under the direction of history teacher Agnieszka Tuzinowska.

[13] This term was used as the title of the documentary about their work shot by TVP Olsztyn (*Winda regionu: Strażnicy pamięci* 2012).

Fig. 5. Activities under the project entitled "Lost villages of the Pisz Forest":
A – making legible – preserving (Wądołek – 2009), B – consolidating and securing
– fencing (Przerośl – 2010), C – documenting – inventory-taking (Sowiróg – 2009),
D – restoring the memory and educating – information boards (Sowiróg – 2010)

Photo by K.A. Worobiec

articles in daily press and periodicals[14], radio and television programs, including the "Wioska jak las" series of programs broadcast on Radio Olsztyn (Kulik 2013), and two documentary films made for TVP[15]. Issues related to the depopulated localities of the Pisz Forest (their relics, e.g. cemeteries) also became the subject of scientific elaborations (*inter alia*: Długozima *et al.* 2015[16]; Kardach 2015; Majewska 2017, 2018; Żurkowska 2008; Żywiczyński 2017).

[14] Among others, a series of 25 articles published in "Gazeta Piska" from 7 March to 29 August 2014 – *vide*, *inter alia*, K.A. Worobiec 2014a,b,c as well as the numbers from: 7 August 2009, 13 August 2010, 19 August 2011. Articles were also published in: "Gazeta Wyborcza" (Olsztyn, 29 May 2009; 8 August 2009); "Tygodnik Piski" (2 August 2009; 13 August 2009; 5 August 2010; 18 June 2011; 20 June 2011; 16 August 2011; 7 November 2013); "Borussia. Kultura. Historia. Literatura" (2009/No. 46); "Johannisburger Heimatbrief" (2011); "Biuletyn Informacyjny Urzędu Miasta i Gminy Ruciane-Nida" (2011/ No 9; 2014/No. 1) Polska Agencja Prasowa (30 July 2009); "Gazeta Współczesna" (5 August 2009); "Przekrój" (6 August 2009); "Kontakt. Magazyn Nieuziemiony" (2015/No. 28).

[15] B. Hyży-Czołpińska, *Zaginione wioski* (12'08''), and *Zagubione wioski Puszczy Piskiej* (24'), TVP S.A.

[16] The elaboration contains the results of the largest (to date) research project concerning the Protestant cemeteries of Masuria. It was carried out by a research team from the Warsaw University of Life Sciences. The research conducted in the territory of the Pisz Forest District included 46 cemeteries.

Participant's perspective

The second project is more connected with the reconstruction of the past than with its remembrance, because it does not take place with the participation of a still living social local discourse. These include activities that are undertaken under the project entitled "Lost Villages of the Pisz Forest". During this project, the so-called restoration of memory was facilitated by archival materials and the use of information obtained during cataloging, thanks to which – the history of the village and its image were (re)constructed.

The first step was to search for information about abandoned villages and cemeteries within their documentation in the city archives. Then, the project assumed inventory of the cemetery area of Wilki – one of deserted villages (including identification of its border), cataloging and pre-conservation of the tombstones. During the work carried out in the cemetery, movable historical objects were also identified and inventoried, constituting relics of the cemetery's structure (for example, a letter cut out of sheet metal, probably a fragment of a grave mark – Fig. 6) and even the former functioning of the village, like an iron fragment of a vessel (Fig. 6).


Fig. 6. Movable objects identified and documented *in situ*
(Evangelical cemetery in the abandoned settlement of Wilki)
Source: photo and elaboration by A. Majewska (2018).

In the Evangelical cemetery in the village of Wilki, within several dozen years from the end of its functioning as an active burial place, there has been a significant succession of vegetation, which had not previously been an element of the cemetery planning scheme. This has significantly disrupted the legibility of the spatial layout of the on-the-ground part of the cemetery. Cleanup and conservation works made it possible to identify numerous grave markings, which had previously been imperceptible in the cemetery's landscape. A map of the cemetery planning scheme was elaborated, based on inventory data. Unexpectedly,

a successful reconstruction was also performed on one of the cemetery carriers of information and memory of the site's history and the associated community of the depopulated village – a broken opaque-glass epitaph plate of one of the gravestones (Fig. 7).

Fig. 7. Reconstruction of an opaque-glass grave plate in the Evangelical cemetery in the area of the depopulated settlement of Wilki in Piła County

Photo by A. Majewska (2018).

The activities undertaken in cemeteries in the abandoned villages under this project are also shaping historical memory to an extent greater than activities aimed only at the protection and preservation of the tangible cultural heritage. The boards set up in cemeteries or at the centers of depopulated villages provide information on the history of this deserted landscape, which has been silenced for many years.

Conclusion

The projects, which are the subject of this elaboration, have gone beyond the narrow disciplinary framework that has dominated in research works to date. Their interdisciplinary assumptions place them in the group of contemporary landscape studies focused on multifaceted analyses, going beyond traditional inventory-taking works. An integral part of the projects are social and educational activities aimed at popularizing knowledge of cultural heritage, methods for its protection and conservation, as well as increasing awareness of its value among local communities. The structures of the Evangelical cemeteries are carriers

of the memory of the former cultural landscape of Masuria, and thanks to the activities taken under the presented projects, the history of those places is read and preserved for future generations. Their microhistorical perspective is also a tribute to locality in the so-called era of globalization.

The use of various (including the latest) methods and techniques of documentation, as well as the drawing on the approaches of various disciplines, make it possible to gain new knowledge of tangible cultural heritage sites and the communities which created and used them – sites that undergo continuous transformations, both natural and anthropogenic. This is of particular importance in activities concerning sites which today often operate in isolation from the original socio-cultural context, although they can be considered to be heritage related to recent past. In the landscape of Masuria, we can see numerous 'reflections' of socio-political transformations connected with the course and consequences of the Second World War. It is only after several decades that activities are initiated which constitute bridges between the material and non-material values of the past and present cultural landscape.

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Lokalność w erze globalizacji. Nosiciele pamięci historycznych krajobrazów – badania ewangelickich cmentarzy mazurskich

Zarys treści: Głównym celem artykułu było przedstawienie współczesnych narracji (dyskursu społecznego i naukowego) na temat mazurskich cmentarzy ewangelickich. Temat zrealizowano w oparciu o przykłady działań dokonywanych w ramach dwóch projektów, których głównym założeniem jest przywrócenie pamięci o dziedzictwie kulturowym oraz objęcie go ochroną. Opracowanie dotyczy wybranych zagadnień z zakresu funkcjonowania materialnego dziedzictwa kulturowego na Mazurach (w szczególności

w Pasymiu oraz jednej z opuszczonych wsi). W artykule omówiono jak wciąż na nowo interpretować można przestrzenie cmentarzy protestanckich, zwłaszcza w świetle wyników prowadzonych prac dokumentacyjnych.

Słowa kluczowe: dziedzictwo kulturowe, historia, dokumentacja, interdyscyplinarne projekty badawcze, protestantyzm, Prusy Wschodnie, lokalne społeczności.

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PRO MEMORIA

Vidmantas Daugirdas (1967–2019)

fot. R. Šilagalis

W dniu 17 lutego 2019 roku w Wilnie zmarł nagle prof. dr Vidmantas Daugirdas, wybitny litewski geograf społeczno-ekonomiczny. Serce Vidmantasa zatrzymało się w trakcie pracy nad kolejną monografią geograficzną.

Vidmantas Daugirdas urodził się 3 października 1967 roku w Pagėgiai (pol. Pojegi), w okręgu Šilutė (pol. Szyłokarczma) nad dolnym Niemnem, w historycznym regionie Małej Litwy. W 1975 roku zamieszkał wraz z rodzicami w mieście Viešvilė (pol. Wieszwile), którego został gorącym patriotą. Szkołę średnią ukończył w 1985 roku w Smalininkai (pol. Smolniki) i podjął studia na kierunku geograficznym Uniwersytetu Wileńskiego. Po ukończeniu studiów w 1992 roku, został zatrudniony na macierzystej uczelni. Pracę doktorską na temat: *Historyczno-geograficzna analiza podziału administracyjnego Litwy*, napisaną pod kierunkiem prof. Pauliusa Kavaliauskasa, obronił w 1997 roku. Po doktoracie był pracownikiem naukowym w Zakładzie Geografii Regionalnej Instytutu Geografii Uniwersytetu Wileńskiego. Podczas pracy w Instytucie Geologii i Geografii w Wilnie, w 2004 roku Vidmantas Daugirdas był współorganizatorem, wraz z Katedrą Geografii Politycznej i Studiów Regionalnych Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego, IX Międzynarodowej „Łódzkiej" Konferencji z Geografii Politycznej na temat: *Role of the borderlands in the united Europe*, której obrady przeprowadzono w polskich Wigrach (lit. Vigriai) i litewskim Vištitis (pol. Wisztyniec). W 2012 roku rozpoczął równolegle pracę na stanowisku adiunkta w Instytucie Geografii Człowieka i Demografii Litewskiego Centrum Badań Społecznych w Wilnie.

Zainteresowania badawcze V. Daugirdasa koncentrowały się zasadniczo na czterech dyscyplinach: geografii kultury, geografii ludności, geografii politycznej oraz geografii historycznej. Vidmantas Daugirdas był współautorem wartościowych monografii geograficznych – *Litewskie regiony metropolitalne. Przestrzenne zróżnicowanie populacji na początku XXI w.* w 2017 roku, ponad 60 artykułów naukowych opublikowanych w najważniejszych litewskich czasopismach geograficznych, ale także za granicą (w tym w Polsce m.in. w „Region and Regionalism", „Geopolitical Studies", „Europa XXI"). Opracował także dwie mapy do Narodowego Atlasu Litwy: *Litwini na świecie i litewskie przedstawicielstwa gospodarczo-kulturalne* (2008) oraz *Narodowości w Europie* (2009). Był inicjatorem 3 narodowych litewskich projektów badawczych, 6 projektów regionalnych, ponadto kierował ponad 20 innymi projektami naukowymi. Jest autorem dwóch podręczników akademickich: *Teorie rozwoju społecznego* (2000) i *Geografia kultury: ewolucja idei determinizmu geograficznego* (2008) i współautorem podręcznika szkolnego do geografii dla klasy 9 (2005, 2013). W ostatnich latach zajmował się problematyką depopulacji obszarów wiejskich, czego plonem była monografia wydana pod Jego redakcją zatytułowana *Słabo zaludnione obszary Litwy* (2013). W miesiącach poprzedzających przedwczesne odejście prowadził studia nad zróżnicowaniem regionalnym dobrobytu na Litwie, czego plonem miała być kolejna monografia.

Wyniki swoich badań prezentował na ponad 50 konferencjach naukowych, w tym 36 międzynarodowych w kraju i za granicą. Był stałym uczestnikiem serii konferencji z geografii politycznej i geografii komunikacji, organizowanych począwszy od lat 90. XX w. przez prof. Jerzego Kitowskiego z Uniwersytetu Rzeszowskiego w Polańczyku i Arłamowie.

Był bardzo dobrym dydaktykiem, szczególnie cenionym przez studentów przygotowujących prace na stopień magistra i doktorantów. Wypromował pięciu doktorów.

V. Daugirdas był członkiem Rady Redakcyjnej czasopisma naukowego „Geografijos metraštis" („Annales Geographicae, The Geographical Yearbook") wydawanego przez Litewskie Towarzystwo Geograficzne, Centrum Badań Przyrody i Litewskie Centrum Badań Społecznych i aktywnym członkiem Litewskiego Towarzystwa Geograficznego.

V. Daugirdas był gorącym litewskim patriotą. W kluczowym momencie dziejów Litwy, kiedy ważyły się losy jej niepodległości od ZSRR, aktywnie działał w Ruchu Odrodzenia „Sąjūdis" oraz był ochotnikiem w Narodowych Siłach Obrony. Z racji miejsca urodzenia deklarował się, nieco żartobliwie, jako Żmudzin. Był zarazem orędownikiem dobrych relacji z Polską, współpracował z polskimi geografami na wielu płaszczyznach i miał pośród nich licznych przyjaciół. Od

2012 roku był członkiem zagranicznym Rady Naukowej czasopisma „Studia z Geografii Politycznej i Historycznej" wydawanego przez Uniwersytet Łódzki.

Vidmantas Daugirdas był człowiekiem lubianym w środowisku geografów, także polskich, był niezwykle uczynny, towarzyski, przyjazny i zawsze uśmiechnięty, otwarty na współpracę, również tą ponadgraniczną.

Jego artystyczna dusza sprawiała, że był dobrym kompanem podczas wieczornych biesiad po zakończeniu całodziennych badań terenowych lub obrad konferencji naukowych. Już w młodości zainteresował się muzyką i poezją. Grał na gitarze, komponował muzykę do poezji Henrikasa Radauskasa i innych poetów oraz śpiewał. Jeszcze jako student został laureatem konkursu poetyckiego „Jesień Filologii" (Filologijos ruduo). Cechowała Go bezpośredniość w kontaktach i otwartość na innych ludzi, ale jego hobby kojarzy się raczej z izolacją i samotnością. Był bowiem zamiłowanym wędkarzem i grzybiarzem, samotnie wędrował po kraju dążąc do bliskiego kontaktu z ojczystą przyrodą, którą kochał i chronił.

Vidmanatas osierocił żonę Aušrę i dwie córki Viltė i Austėję. Pochowany został nad Niemnem, w grobie matki na cmentarzu w Veliuona (pol. Wielona). Litewska społeczność naukowa utraciła wybitnego naukowca, nauczyciela i przyjaciela, a z racji licznych związków z naszym krajem jest to również strata dla geografii polskiej. Vidmantas pozostanie w naszej pamięci, a jego prace naukowe jeszcze długo będą inspirować do dalszych studiów nad geografią społeczną Litwy.

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KOMUNIKATY

VI Ogólnopolska Konferencja Naukowa Geografii Historycznej *Przestrzenny Wymiar Badań Dziedzictwa Kulturowego* – Łódź, 14–15 listopada 2019 r.

W połowie listopada 2019 roku w budynkach *Collegium Geographicum* Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego odbyła się kolejna, szósta edycja ogólnopolskiej konferencji geograficzno-historycznej. Organizatorami konferencji były: Katedra Geografii Politycznej, Historycznej i Studiów Regionalnych UŁ, we współpracy z Komisją Geografii Politycznej i Historycznej Polskiego Towarzystwa Geograficznego oraz Komisją Geografii Historycznej Polskiego Towarzystwa Historycznego. Patronat nad konferencją objęli JM rektor Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego prof. dr hab. Antoni Różalski, dziekan Wydziału Nauk Geograficznych UŁ dr hab. Bogdan Włodarczyk, prof. UŁ, Marszałek Województwa Łódzkiego Grzegorz Schreiber oraz Narodowy Instytut Dziedzictwa w Warszawie. Wspomniane instytucje i osoby, w tym także Komisja Geografii Historycznej Polskiego Towarzystwa Historycznego, udzieliły materialnego lub/i organizacyjnego wsparcia przy organizacji wydarzenia. Głównym celem szóstej edycji konferencji była dyskusja na temat zagadnień teoretyczno-metodycznych oraz prezentacja wyników studiów empirycznych w aspekcie badań dziedzictwa kulturowego. Główny nacisk położono na wielopłaszczyznową refleksję nad rolą i znaczeniem geografii historycznej w badaniach nad dziedzictwem kulturowym. Uczestnicy konferencji podjęli próbę odpowiedzi na istotne pytania dotyczące ewolucji podejścia badawczego do dziedzictwa kulturowego w efekcie zmieniającej się roli dziedzictwa w społeczeństwie i gospodarce. Prelegenci pochylili się także nad zagadnieniem wpływu rosnącej interdyscyplinarności w badaniach dziedzictwa (*heritage studies*). Wydarzenie w założeniu miało stanowić interdyscyplinarne spotkanie badaczy podejmujących studia geograficzno-historyczne i przyczynić się do ich dalszej współpracy. Wśród szczegółowych zagadnień, które znalazły odzwierciedlenie w programie konferencji należy wymienić: koncepcje teoretyczne w zakresie studiów geograficzno-historycznych nad dziedzictwem kulturowym i ich recepcja w badaniach

empirycznych (w tym ujęcia modelowe, typologie i próby regionalizacji); aspekty metodyczne wykorzystania bazy źródłowej, w tym materiałów kartograficznych w badaniach dziedzictwa kulturowego i krajobrazu kulturowego, kwestia zastosowania tradycyjnych i nowoczesnych narzędzi badawczych w geografii historycznej (w tym HGIS); problematyka pochodzenia i determinanty przemian dziedzictwa w różnych skalach czasowych i przestrzennych; studia nad procesem rozwoju struktur przestrzennych osadnictwa, w tym problematyka kształtowania sieci osadniczej oraz genezy i przemian morfologicznych miast i wsi, a także badania wielokulturowości w ujęciu geograficzno-historycznym (w tym rola mniejszości narodowych i religijnych w kształtowaniu dziedzictwa kulturowego).

Obrady konferencyjne trwały dwa dni i obejmowały referaty oraz towarzyszące im dyskusje w ramach wydzielonych 10 sesji problemowych (w tym sesji posterowej). Konferencję rozpoczęły okolicznościowe wystąpienia dr hab. Bogdana Włodarczyka, prof. UŁ – dziekana Wydziału Nauk Geograficznych, prof. dr hab. Marka Sobczyńskiego – kierownika Katedry Geografii Politycznej, Historycznej i Studiów Regionalnych UŁ oraz dr Łukasza Musiaki – przewodniczącego Komitetu Organizacyjnego konferencji. Wykład otwierający konferencję wygłoszony został przez kierownika Oddziału Łódzkiego Narodowego Instytutu Dziedzictwa mgr inż. Pawła Filipowicza i poświęcony prezentacji zagadnień związanych z problematyką badań i ochrony materialnego dziedzictwa kulturowego w województwie łódzkim oraz działalności łódzkiej komórki NID. Następnie uczestnicy wysłuchali wystąpień mieszczących się w problematyce dziedzictwa kulturowego w kartografii. W ramach tej części referaty wygłosili: dr hab. Beata Konopska, prof. UMCS i dr hab. Marek Barwiński, prof. UŁ, którzy zrelacjonowali postępy badań materiałów kartograficznych wykorzystanych na konferencji paryskiej w 1919 roku; dr hab. Bogumił Szady, prof. KUL i mgr Michał Gochna IH PAN z tematem dotyczącym analiz dzieła *Geograficzno-statystyczne opisanie parafiów Królestwa Polskiego* Karola Perthéesa, mgr Stanisław Zawadzki (Uniwersytet Warszawski) o roli map w administrowaniu ekonomiami królewskimi w Wielkim Księstwie Litewskim za panowania Stanisława Augusta, dr Grzegorz Kęsik (Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie), który swoją prezentację poświęcił analizie archiwalnego planu Ciechanowa z 1851 roku oraz mgr Jacek Jeremicz (Ośrodek „Brama Grodzka – Teatr NN" w Lublinie), który zaprezentował źródła i metody badawcze użyte do multimedialnej rekonstrukcji mapy miasta Lublina z okresu Unii Lubelskiej.

Kolejna sesja odnosiła się do problematyki badań dziedzictwa wielokulturowego i regionów wielokulturowych. W ramach tej sesji referaty wygłosili: dr hab. Mariusz Kowalski (IGPZ PAN) o procesach germanizacji na wschód od Łaby i Soławy w kontekście wyników badań genetycznych, kolejno dr hab. Izabela Lewandowska, prof. UWM z analizą porównawczą historycznych związków Prus Wschodnich i Bawarii, dr hab. Andrzej Rykała, prof. UŁ omawiający temat

szkoły im. I.L. Pereca w Łodzi na tle szkolnictwa żydowskiego w Polsce w pierwszych latach powojennych, następnie dr Michał Dolata (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu) z tematem: *Materialne dziedzictwo kulturowe polsko-niemieckiego obszaru przygranicznego – geneza, stan i perspektywy. Studium przypadku ziemi lubuskiej*, a kończyła sesję dr Anna Wilk (Fundacja „Hereditas"), analizując czynniki kształtujące pogranicze etniczne Łemkowszczyzny. W ramach sesji dotyczącej problematyki zastosowania metod geoinformacyjnych w badaniach dziedzictwa kulturowego wystąpili kolejno: dr Tomasz Panecki (Instytut Historii PAN), który swój referat poświęcił relacjom między cyfrowymi edycjami map a kartograficznym dziedzictwem kulturowym, następnie dr Mateusz Zawadzki (Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie), który odniósł się do metodyki rekonstrukcji obrazu staropolskiej sieci komunikacyjnej, w dalszej kolejności zespół autorski: dr Krzysztof Ostafin, dr Dominik Kaim i dr Mateusz Troll z Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego (reprezentowany przez dwie pierwsze osoby), z tematem dotyczącym delimitacji historycznych jednostek terytorialnych i administracyjnych Galicji i Śląska Austriackiego, później wystąpił reprezentant zespołu dr Dominik Kaim, mgr Marcin Szwagrzyk, mgr inż. Monika Dobosz, dr Jakub Taczanowski, dr Mateusz Troll, dr Krzysztof Ostafin (UJ) z referatem poświęconym konstruowaniu bazy danych budynków oraz infrastruktury transportowej Galicji i Śląska Austriackiego, kolejnym referentem był dr Jakub Kuna (Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie), który przybliżył technologiczne wyzwania i możliwości portalu teatrnn.pl – *Lublin w czasach Unii Lubelskiej*, jako przedostatni w omawianej sesji wystąpił duet autorski: dr Marta Nalej z UŁ i dr Łukasz Musiaka (przewodniczący komitetu organizacyjnego konferencji), dotykając zagadnień użycia miar centrograficznych w analizach rozmieszczenia zamków wpisanych do rejestru zabytków nieruchomych. Sesję zamykało wystąpienie mgr Angelika Jasion, reprezentującej Uniwersytet Łódzki, z tematem dotyczącym opracowania interaktywnej mapy Starego Cmentarza w Łodzi. Kolejna sesja posiadała odmienny charakter, gdyż uczestnicy konferencji mieli okazję wysłuchać prezentacji posterów naukowych. W kolejności duetu Katarzyna Kuzara i Anna Płaczek (Uniwersytet Wrocławski), na temat przyrodniczych uwarunkowań osadnictwa i gospodarki w Sudetach, mgr inż. arch. Anna Siniecka (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu) o finansowaniu ochrony i opieki nad zabytkami oraz dr Sławomira Mielnika (Katolicki Uniwersytet Lubelski) w temacie wybranych mniejszościowych kościołów i związków wyznaniowych w Polsce po 1945 roku. Dwa pozostałe postery, ze względu na trudności referentów z dojazdem do Łodzi, zostały wygłoszone kolejnego dnia. Zespół autorski dr Irina Zakutińska, dr Roman Slyvka (Podkarpacki Uniwersytet Narodowy im. Wasyla Stefanyka, Ivano-Frankivk) i dr Lubov Slyvka (Ivano-Frankivski Narodowy Uniwersytet Medyczny) dokonali krótkiej analizy roli dziedzictwa kulturowego w genezie konfliktu krymskiego, a dr Irina

Zakutińska przybliżyła ponadto kwestię rewitalizacji twierdzy stanisławowskiej na Ukrainie. Warto podkreślić, że goście z Ukrainy nadali konferencji charakter międzynarodowy. Pierwszy dzień obrad konferencyjnych kończyły dwie sesje równoległe. W ramach pierwszej z nich, nazwanej *Dziedzictwo zapamiętane, dziedzictwo wyobrażone*, wystąpiły następujące osoby: dr hab. Monika Murzyn-Kupisz, prof. UJ, która dokonała analizy dziedzictwa kulturowego Krakowa w polskich powieściach kryminalnych z początku XXI wieku, następnie dr hab. Krystyna Krawiec-Złotkowska, prof. Akademii Pomorskiej w Słupsku, która przybliżyła historię wędrujących pomników w przestrzeni Słupska przed i po drugiej wojnie światowej, kolejno dr Paweł Weszpiński (Muzeum Warszawy), który zaprezentował koncepcję wędrówek ulic w kontekście ochrony dziedzictwa toponomastycznego na przykładzie Warszawy, a sesję zakończyło wystąpienie mgr Anny Majewskiej z UŁ, która zaprezentowała badania przestrzeni miejscowości z obszaru dawnych Prus Wschodnich po przerwaniu ciągłości osadnictwa. Sesja równoległa poświęcona była zagadnieniom dziedzictwa kulturowego jako elementu krajobrazu kulturowego. Referat na temat struktury krajobrazu militarnego drugowojennej Pozycji Pomorskiej wygłosił dr hab. Michał Kupiec (prezentacja przygotowana wraz z Magdaleną Olejniczak – Uniwersytet Szczeciński), jako kolejny zaprezentował się dr Janusz Łach (Uniwersytet Wrocławski), z tematem dotyczącym roli wołoskiego dziedzictwa kulturowego w rozwoju i ochronie osadnictwa sezonowego regionu karpackiego, później wystąpiła mgr Paulina Gorazd-Dziuban (Uniwersytet Rzeszowski), przybliżając badania najstarszych, cysterskich klasztorów Małopolski doby wczesnego średniowiecza, a jako ostatniego wystąpienia, uczestnicy mieli okazję wysłuchać referatu mgr Zachariasza Mosakowskiego i dr Dariusza Brykały (Instytut Geografii i Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania PAN z Torunia) o zabytkowych obiektach przemysłu młynarskiego w Polsce. Obrady kontynuowane były drugiego dnia w ramach czterech sesji tematycznych, poświęconych badaniom wielokulturowego dziedzictwa i regionów wielokulturowych, dziedzictwa kulturowego w badaniach morfogenezy i morfologii osadnictwa (dwie sesje), oraz społeczno-ekonomicznej roli dziedzictwa kulturowego i zarządzaniu dziedzictwem kulturowym. W ramach pierwszej sesji omówiono aspekty dotyczące stanu zachowania, ochrony, promocji wielokulturowego dziedzictwa wsi Pokój (dawnego *Carlsruhe*) w województwie opolskim (dr Monika Adamska z Politechniki Opolskiej), następnie dr hab. Joanna Szczepankiewicz-Battek, prof. Wyższej Szkoły Bankowej we Wrocławiu przybliżyła problematykę kształtowania i współczesnego stanu zachowania protestanckiego dziedzictwa kulturowego Mazur. Kolejne wystąpienie, zaprezentowane przez dr Małgorzatę Skulimowską (Uniwersytet Rzeszowski), dotyczyło roli mniejszości narodowych, etnicznych i religijnych w kształtowaniu dziedzictwa kulturowego w obszarze wschodniego Podkarpacia. Następne wystąpienie, dr Anny Kruś (UŁ) oraz mgr Piotra Dolaty, poświęcone było tematyce

ewangelickich cmentarzy województwa łódzkiego, a jako ostatni w tej sesji zaprezentował się mgr Patryk Orlewski z UŁ z analizą porównawczą materialnego dziedzictwa kultury żydowskiej w Sieradzu, Zduńskiej Woli i Łasku. Pierwszą z dwóch sesji dotyczących morfogenezy i morfologii osadnictwa rozpoczął prof. dr hab. Marek Sobczyński z dobrze udokumentowanym wystąpieniem o przemianach w XX i XXI w. zagospodarowania przestrzeni części przemysłowej XIX dzielnicy katastralnej Krakowa – Grzegórzek na przykładzie zakładów L. Zieleniewskiego, po nim referat zatytułowany *Stopień zachowania cech miejskich w miastach zdegradowanych Śląska Dolnego i Opolskiego*, wygłosił dr hab. Robert Szmytkie z Uniwersytetu Wrocławskiego. Kolejną prelegentką była dr Monika M. Cysek-Pawlak z Politechniki Łódzkiej, która omawiała zasady Nowego Urbanizmu w kontekście tożsamości miejsca. Jako ostatnia w tej sesji wystąpiła dr Magdalena Deptuła z UŁ, omawiając zagadnienie dziedzictwa podziału miast granicą i jego przestrzennymi wymiarami. Sesję równoległą, dotyczącą społeczno-ekonomicznej roli dziedzictwa kulturowego i zarządzania dziedzictwem, rozpoczęła dr Marta Chmielewska z Uniwersytetu Śląskiego, wygłaszając referat o roli pogórniczego dziedzictwa kulturowego we współczesnej przestrzeni miast konurbacji katowickiej w kontekście korzyści i problemów wykorzystania. Następną prelegentką była dr Magdalena Duda-Seifert (Uniwersytet Wrocławski) z tematem: *Nośniki pamięci mniejszości żydowskiej w Gdańsku w procesie przekształcania w dziedzictwo*. Mgr Kamil Stasiak (Muzeum Krakowa) przybliżył natomiast aspekty edukacji muzealnej jako elementu zarządzania dziedzictwem urbanistycznym na przykładzie Muzeum Krakowa. Ostatnie wystąpienie w tej sesji, mgr Artura Żyto (Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu), poświęcone było dziedzictwu kulturowemu rejonu Gór Stołowych, w perspektywie zainteresowania turystów. Ostatnią sesję drugiego dnia, jak i całej konferencji, otworzył dr Tomasz Figlus z UŁ z tematem o układach ruralistycznych jako zabytkowych elementach krajobrazu kulturowego wsi w Polsce. Kolejną prelegentką była mgr Monika Cepil, również reprezentantka gospodarzy, która zaprezentowała temat: *Zabytkowe układy przestrzenne wsi józefińskich na obszarze dawnej Galicji*. Doktor Mariusz Lamprecht z WNG UŁ dokonał analizy historycznych układów urbanistycznych w interpretacji składni przestrzeni na przykładzie Łodzi. Ostatnim wystąpieniem konferencji była prezentacja przewodniczącego Komitetu Organizacyjnego – dr Łukasza Musiaki, poświęcona przemianom morfologicznym wybranych miast mazurskich w latach 1945–1989 w świetle badań jakościowych mieszkańców. Po ożywionej dyskusji, podsumowania i zamknięcia konferencji dokonał dr Łukasz Musiaka.

Uczestnicy konferencji w liczbie 50, reprezentowali szereg ośrodków akademickich, placówek muzealnych i innych podmiotów z całego kraju. W kolejności alfabetycznej były to: Akademia Pomorska w Słupsku, Fundacja „Hereditas" z Warszawy, Ivano-Frankivski Narodowy Uniwersytet Medyczny, Katolicki

Uniwersytet Lubelski, Narodowy Instytut Dziedzictwa, Ośrodek „Brama Grodzka – Teatr NN" z Lublina, Podkarpacki Uniwersytet Narodowy im. Wasyla Stefanyka w Ivano-Frankivsku, Politechnika Krakowska, Politechnika Łódzka, Politechnika Opolska, Instytut Geografii i Zagospodarowania PAN z Warszawy i oddziału w Toruniu, Instytut Historii PAN z Warszawy, Muzeum Krakowa, Muzeum Warszawy, Uniwersytet im. Adama Mickiewicza w Poznaniu, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, Uniwersytet Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego w Warszawie, Uniwersytet Łódzki, Uniwersytet Marii Curie-Skłodowskiej w Lublinie, Uniwersytet im. Mikołaja Kopernika w Toruniu, Uniwersytet Rzeszowski, Uniwersytet Szczeciński, Uniwersytet Śląski, Uniwersytet Warmińsko-Mazurski w Olsztynie, Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Wyższa Szkoła Bankowa we Wrocławiu. Łącznie w trakcie obrad konferencyjnych wygłoszono 47 referatów zgrupowanych w 10 sesjach (do tej liczby należy dodać jeszcze wykład inaugurujący). Ciekawym uzupełnieniem konferencji była wystawa pod tytułem: *1919–2019. Sto lat województwa łódzkiego w zbiorach Biblioteki UŁ*, przygotowana przez Bibliotekę Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego i Oddział Łódzki Polskiego Towarzystwa Geograficznego, którą zaprezentowano na galerii Auli im. prof. Stanisława Liszewskiego.

Podsumowując warto podkreślić, że szósta edycja konferencji wyróżniała się interdyscyplinarnym charakterem. Ujawniło się to w szerokim spektrum dziedzin badawczych, reprezentowanych przez uczestników konferencji, jak i w tematycznym zróżnicowaniu wystąpień. Znaczna liczba uczestników, w tym biorących udział w konferencji po raz pierwszy, znacząca reprezentacja wielu ośrodków naukowych z Polski i zagranicy, a także zróżnicowanie zaprezentowanych perspektyw badawczych, pozwalają mieć nadzieję na dalszą integrację środowiska naukowego na gruncie geografii historycznej. Wspomniane czynniki, jak i pozytywne opinie uczestników VI Ogólnopolskiej Konferencji Geografii Historycznej, stanowić mogą optymistyczny prognostyk dla kolejnych edycji konferencji.

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