Abstract
In contrast to those who more characteristically approach emotion as an individual realm of experience of more distinctive physiological and/or psychological sorts, this paper addresses emotionality as a socially experienced, linguistically enabled, activity-based process.

While conceptually and methodologically situated within contemporary symbolic interactionist thought (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Strauss 1993; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus and Grills 2003), this statement is centrally informed by the pragmatist considerations of emotionality that Aristotle (circa 384-322 BCE) develops in Rhetoric.

Although barely known to those in the human sciences, Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides a great deal of insight into people’s definitions of, and experiences with, a wide array of emotions. Addressing matters of persuasive interchange in political, judicial, and evaluative contexts, Aristotle gives particular attention to the intensification and neutralization of people’s emotional states. This includes (1) anger and calm, (2) friendship and enmity, (3) fear and confidence, (4) shame and shamelessness, (5) kindness and inconsideration, (6) pity and indignation, and (7) envy and emulation. Following an introduction to “rhetoric” (as the study of persuasive interchange) and “emotionality,” this paper briefly (1) outlines a pragmatist/interactionist approach to the study of emotionality, (2) considers Aristotle as a sociological pragmatist, (3) locates Aristotle’s work within the context of classical Greek thought, (4) acknowledges the relationship of emotionality and morality, and (5) addresses emotionality as a generic social process. Following (6) a more sustained consideration of emotionality within the context of Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the paper concludes with (7) a short discussion of the importance of Aristotle’s work for studying emotionality as a realm of human lived experience on a contemporary plane.

Keywords
Emotionality; Theory; Ethnography; Aristotle; Rhetoric; Pragmatism; Interactionism; Persuasion; Negotiated Reality

Generating, Intensifying, and Redirecting Emotionality: Conceptual and Ethnographic Implications of Aristotle’s Rhetoric

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Generating, Intensifying, and Redirecting Emotionality: Conceptual and Ethnographic Implications of Aristotle’s Rhetoric

It may seem strange to many readers that a 21st century analysis of emotionality would be based so directly and thoroughly on a text from the classical Greek era (circa 700-300 BCE). As well, whereas emotionality is typically envisioned as an internal, primarily individual, physiological, and/or psychological phenomenon, this paper approaches emotionality primarily in community-based, interactive ways. Likewise, although the term “rhetoric” is frequently used in pejorative terms to refer to more superficial persuasive endeavors, this statement recognizes rhetoric as an integral feature of contested reality as well as human interchange more generally.

Writing as an accomplished scholar in the field, Carroll Izard (2009) has provided an exceptionally thorough overview of the neurobiological and cognitive psychological literature on emotionality.¹

Although developed prior to the Stets and Turner and the Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Feldman Barrett collections, Thoits’ (1989; 1995) commentaries on the sociological and psychological literature remain notably accurate in that most of the analysis and research on emotionality has remained conceptually structuralist and factor (variable) oriented. While the literature in psychology has become somewhat more attuned to sociological variables (e.g., gender, race, class), much sociological analysis has assumed more of a psychological orientation in developing explanations of emotionality. Despite a general acknowledgment of emotionality as a realm of human lived experience, relatively little attention has been given to pragmatist social thought or ethnographic inquiry. Relatedly, most research on emotionality in the social sciences neglects the intersubjectivist nature of human knowing and acting as well as the ways that people as agents actively participate in the developmental flows of community life (also see Blumer 1969; Prus 1996; 2007c; Grills and Prus 2008).

Although there are many points of correspondence between Izard’s statement and the present analysis of emotionality, there are also some important differences that attest to the necessity of approaching the study of emotionality in more sustained pragmatist/interactionist terms. To highlight some of the more consequential differences, I address three matters of particular relevance and then briefly respond to each in turn.

First, although Izard indicates some appreciation of the enabling features of language and the civilizing process for people’s experiences with emotionality, it is apparent that the centering point for research in neurobiological and psychologically-oriented research pertains to the causal connections (as factors) between particular neural-biological conditions and researcher observations (and inferences about the emotional experiences) of human subjects.

Second, while acknowledging the problematic matter of defining emotionality, Izard claims that emotionality is always present and that it is the

1 Revised version of a paper presented at the conference “Emotions in Everyday Life” (Faculty of Economics and Sociology, University of Lodz, Poland, June 15-17, 2011).

2 In what follows, I dialogue more directly with Izard’s (2009) statement. However, readers also may be interested in examining the materials on emotionality found in the volumes edited by Stets and Turner (2007) and Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Feldman Barrett (2010). The Stets and Turner volume is a multi-authored, multiperspectival collection of papers that not only examines some specific emotional themes, such as love, anger, sympathy, empathy, and grief. Whereas some of the contributors to this volume would more readily connect with the pragmatist, activity-oriented emphasis that Aristotle represents, as well as his detailed considerations of the ways that people as agents might shape the emotional experiences, definitions of situations, and ensuing lines of action of others, this essentially interactive aspect of emotionality is not adequately represented in the Stets and Turner volume. Likewise, given the multitude of approaches represented within, only limited attention is given to ethnographic examinations of emotionality and the sustained quest for concepts of more generic or transsituational processual sorts.

3 Revised version of a paper presented at the conference “Emotions in Everyday Life” (Faculty of Economics and Sociology, University of Lodz, Poland, June 15-17, 2011).
brain that assigns direction and emphases to the emotionality that human organisms experience.

Third, there is a tendency on the part of physiologically and/or psychologically-oriented behaviorists to invoke the concepts of psychopathology or maladaptation to account for emotional experiences that might be considered inappropriate (i.e., socially undesirable) in some way.

In the first instance, we acknowledge (with Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics) that all animals have capacities for tension (as in states of relaxation and agitation) and that human experiences with emotionality are contingent on a (comparatively developed) species-related neural-biological base. However, with the exception of brain injuries, the centering position in this paper is that emotionality is a socially derived, linguistically enabled, activity-based, interactively engaged process.

Somewhat ironically, these latter matters are most overlooked by those studying emotionality in physiological and/or psychological terms – as also are the ways that people as (knowing, purposive) agents define, make sense of, adjust to, and redefine emotions within the meaningful instances of human group life in which they find themselves.

As well, in contrast to the inferences made by researchers adopting neurobiological or cognitive approaches, our focus is on human lived experience – the ways that people as participants make sense of the situations (emotions included) in which they find themselves as they engage and live through the phenomena at hand.

The inference that the brain gives direction to people’s experiences with emotionality represents another major point of divergence. Although it can be agreed that the human neural-physiological system (and some interventions on the part of other people) provides the essential base for human “encounters” with sensation and motion, the acquisition of some language (and the associated access to “the conceptual whatness of the human community”) radically transforms the entire matter of human knowing and acting. It is this transformation that is so much neglected in considerations of emotionality on the part of those assuming physiological and psychological approaches. In the quest for factors-oriented explanations, the essential features of human group life and the processes by which humans fit into the particular versions of the “whatness” (i.e., conceptions and related activities pertaining to “what is” and “what is not”) of the communities in which they live, act, and know are so centrally neglected.

From a pragmatist/interactionist viewpoint, people’s experiences with emotionality are seen as part of a much larger, emergent set of community-based processes, wherein the meanings (and significations thereof) of any and all matters of people’s awareness reflect applications of the “whatness” (as in concepts, practices, and productions) of the particular contexts in which instances of human group life take place.

Expressed in other words, there is no duality of the individual and the community, of self and other, or of activity and knowing. These aspects of the human condition exist as developmental flows that cannot be comprehended except in synthetic, adjutive relation to the other.

Ironically, as well, it is only in acquiring some language – in achieving some degree of oneness with the community-based other – in accessing and sharing the reality or operational “whatness” of community life that people develop an awareness of self apart from the other, acting in more knowing (purposive or intentional) terms, and meaningfully attend to matters of similarity and difference among members of the community.

Even though one encounters a greater attentiveness to “the impact of the group” on people’s attitudes and behaviors in the subfield of social psychology in psychology, this literature also (a) is primarily focused on individuals as the central unit of analysis, (b) stresses factors/variables rather than people’s interpretations of the situations and (c) generally disregards language and the realism that emerges within groups (as humans intersubjectively experience the “whatness” of community life in conjunction with others), and (d) fails to attend to the emergent, actively constructed nature of people’s activities, viewpoints, and interchanges.3

3 Albeit less prominent than the objectivist approaches that characterize most psychological analyses of emotionality, some psychologists have taken more distinctly subjectivist approaches to the study of emotionality. From a subjectivist viewpoint, it is assumed that human emotion is an uniquely individual realm of experience. Thus, while some physiological base is typically presumed, subjectivist explanations envision expressions of human emotion as the product of people’s more particularized conditions, feelings, and interpretations thereof. Focusing on individuals as the centering point of knowing, subjectivist approaches disregard and/or marginalize human relations and interchange.

Whereas the objectivists primary place emphasis on the observable physiological aspects of tension (and their own assignments of emotionality to the organisms under consideration), the subjectivists focus on individual interpretations of any emotional state – and contend that emotionality is an uniquely experienced phenomenon that is informed from within. The pragmatists also envision people as experiencing emotionality on individual levels. However, the pragmatists emphasize the community-based foundations of all humanly experienced emotion. That is, emotionality is a social construct – a socially achieved linguistically-enabled phenomenon – and only as people acquire language do they develop some conceptions of “the whatness of community life” and it is only within the broader context of community knowing and acting that people acquire conceptions of, and experiences with, emotionality.

These familiar with the interactionist viewpoint will recognize that this is consistent with a pragmatist approach. From this viewpoint, nothing is inherently good, bad, or meaningful in any other terms. Meaning does not inhere in phenomena – as in materials, sensations, tension, motions, or direction – nor, relatedly, is meaning (or reasoning) “built into the brain.” Thus, whereas human physiology provides capacities for various kinds of cognitive processing, “the whatness of meaning” (and associated matters of definition, interpretation, intention, and knowing enactment and adjustment) denotes a group-based symbolization or conceptualization process. Meaning does not inhere in human physiology but is the product of human group life. Meaning is generated through symbolic interchange, activity, and reflective consideration of the matters to which people attend as co-participants in a linguistically-enabled community.

It also should be noted that the same conceptualizations, methodologies, and limitations associated with physiological and psychological approaches to the study of emotionality also apply to the study of memory. Albeit also physiologically enabled, the “whatness” of memory (like emotionality) is to be understood as a socially achieved process (Prus 2007b) that is integrally and inter-subjectively related to people’s experiences with emotionality.

From a pragmatist viewpoint, there is no emotionality in the absence of language. All animals may experience tensions, sensations, and the capacity for motion – although with varying abilities to acquire learned patterns of behaviors or habits and/or make other situated adjustments. In the absence of language and the capacity for reflectivity that accompanies the matter of attending to the “whatness” of the human lifeworlds at hand, there is no knowing (written orientations). And, in the absence of knowing, there is nothing to be defined as emotionality. People may assign (or infer) emotionality to pre-linguistic humans and other animals, but they can only do so by analogy (i.e., anthropomorphizing).
Focusing on persuasive interchange as this might be developed in the (a) political, (b) judicial, and (c) morally evaluative contexts in his own time, Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* provides us with what essentially is a pragmatist or constructionist approach to the study of human relations. Thus, Aristotle attends to the activities, intentions, and strategic adjustments of speakers, the contents and emphases of their speeches, and the roles that people may assume as auditors or judges. Relatedly, he considers speaker preparations, interchanges, and adjustments (as they define and reconsider their situations and reengage their positions and tactics) amidst the positions expressed by others in the setting.

Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* is a complex, detailed, and densely compacted statement on influence work. Further, while Aristotle discusses emotionality in more sustained terms in Book II (chapters 2-11 of *Rhetoric*), wherein he establishes the conceptual frame for his fuller analysis of influence work, his considerations of emotionality run through the entire volume. Accordingly, even though Aristotle’s analysis of emotionality is just one aspect of his depiction of rhetoric as a humanly engaged phenomenon, his attentiveness to people’s emotional experiences is still so substantial that even this aspect of rhetoric can only be partially captured in the present paper.

To better comprehend the ways that speakers may define, invoke, and shape the emotional experiences of their auditors, Aristotle deems it essential that readers understand what emotionality is, the major forms that emotionality assumes in rhetorical contexts, and how and when people experience particular emotional states.

In contrast to those who have approached Aristotle’s works as theologians, moralists, logicians, grammarians, rationalist or behaviorist philosophers, or structuralist social scientists, the present analysis assumes a symbolic interactionist approach (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Strauss 1993; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus and Grills 2003) to the study of human group life. Rooted in American pragmatism and the ethnographic research tradition, interactionism emphasizes the problematic, linguistically-known, multiperspectival, activity-based, reflective, negotiated, situated, and relational features of community life.

Building on the conceptual and methodological emphases of Chicago-style interactionism (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969) and the broader ethnographic and constructionist traditions, twelve premises or assumptions that inform the present venture are briefly outlined:

1. **Human group life is intersubjective.** Human group life is accomplished (and becomes meaningful) through community-based, linguistic interchange. The ensuing “mutuality or sharedness of reference points” is fundamental to all realms of human knowing and acting.

2. **Human group life is knowingly problematic.** It is through symbol-based references that people begin to distinguish realms of “the known” and (later) “the unknown.” Still, the viability of existing conceptions of knowing may be subject to modification as people “test out” their notions of “whatness” as they do things and relate to others.

3. **Human group life is object-oriental.** Denoting anything that can be referenced (observed, referred to, indicated, acted toward, or otherwise knowingly experienced), objects constitute the contextual and operational essence of the humanly known environment.

4. **Human group life is multiperspectival.** As groups of people engage the world on an ongoing basis, they develop viewpoints, conceptual frameworks, or notions of reality that may differ from those of other groups.

5. **Human group life is reflective.** It is by taking the perspective of the other into account with respect to one’s own being that people become “objects unto themselves” (and act accordingly).

6. **Human group life is sensory/embodied and (knowingly) materialized.** Among the realms of humanly knowing “what is” and “what is not,” people develop an awareness of [the material or physical things] that others in the community recognize. This includes appreciations of the [sensory/body/physiological] essences of human beings (self and other); acknowledging capacities for stimulation and activity as well as denoting realms of practical (enacted, embodied) limitation and fragility.

7. **Human group life is activity-based.** The interactionists approach human activity (as in interacting, doing, assessing, and adjusting) as meaningful, purposive, formulative endeavor.

8. **Human group life is negotiable.** Because human activity frequently involves direct interactions with others, people may anticipate and strive to influence others as well as acknowledge and resist the influences of others.

9. **Human group life is relational.** People do things within group contexts; people act mindfully of, and in conjunction with, specific other people.

10. **Human group life is processual.** Human lived experiences (and activities) are viewed in emergent, ongoing, or temporally developed terms.

11. **Human group life takes place in instances.** Group life is best known through the consideration and study of the particular occasions in which people engage things. Conceptions of human experience are developed mindfully of, and tested against, the particular occasions or instances in which people attend to and otherwise act toward things in the humanly known world.

12. **Human group life is historically informed, historically enabled.** As an emergent process that takes place in instances and entails situated adjustments and innovations, human group life builds on earlier group-based conceptions, practices, and productions. This takes place as people accept, resist, and modify aspects of the “whatness” they have come to know from others more generally and through their more particular considerations of subsequent activities (also see Prus 2013:32-33).

Methodologically, a fuller appreciation of these assumptions would require that social scientists attend to (1) the ways in which people make sense of the world in the course of symbolic (linguistic) interchange, (2) the problematic or ambiguous nature of human knowing (and experience), (3) the object-oriented worlds in which humans operate, (4) people’s capacities for developing and adopting multiple viewpoints on [objects], (5) people’s abilities to take themselves and others into account in engaging [objects], (6) people’s sensory-related

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*The term *rhetoric* comes from the early Greeks, as relatedly do *praga*, *praxis*, and *logos*, the latter terms referring respectively to objects, activity, and speech/thought. The word *oratory* is from the Latin *oratoria* but will be used interchangeably with rhetoric in this statement.*
capacities and [linguistically meaningful] experiences, (7) the meaningful, formulative, and enabling features of human activity, (8) people's capacities for influencing, acknowledging, and resisting one another, (9) the ways that people take their associates into account in developing their lines of action, (10) the ongoing or emergent features of community life, (11) the ways that people experience and participate in all aspects of community life in the specific “here and now” occasions in which they find themselves “doing things,” and (12) the ongoing flows of community life in each area of human endeavor, even as people linguistically, mindingly, and behaviorally build on, accept, resist, and reconfigure aspects of the “whatness” they have inherited and come to know from others and through their considerations of subsequent activities.

Defining interactionist emphases in terms of these sorts, the present paper asks if, and in what ways, Aristotle's consideration of emotionality might parallel and inform contemporary interactionist analysis of and research on human interchange and people's experiences with emotionality. Having identified numerous interactionist and conceptually affiliated statements on emotionality ([Prus 1996:173-201] and influence work ([Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus and Grills 2003]), the present paper provides an opportunity to examine emotionality in comparative analytic terms, with Aristotle's *Rhetoric* serving as an exceptionally instructive transhistorical reference point.

Because this paper builds on an earlier, more extended depiction of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* ([Prus 2008a]), readers can refer to that statement for fuller considerations of (a) rhetoric as a field of activity, (b) Aristotle's *Rhetoric* as a text from the classical Greek era, (c) the linkages of Plato and Aristotle, (d) the modes and emphases of rhetoric in political, judicial, and evaluative (praise and/or condemnation) contexts, as well as (e) the problematic features of wrongdoing and justice, along with (f) the more distinctively enacted aspects of rhetoric.

Still, to better locate Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and his material on emotionality relative to contemporary scholarship, it is important to comment on (a) Aristotle's pragmatist emphasis; (b) the linkages of morality and emotionality; and (c) a processual, concept-oriented approach to the study of emotionality.

**Aristotle's Pragmatist Emphasis**

Whereas both Plato and Aristotle openly build on, and debate with, positions developed by various pre-Platonic thinkers as well as their own contemporaries, most debates one encounters in the humanities and social sciences can be traced to one or other positions that Plato and/or Aristotle articulated in their works. As Plato's student, Aristotle has learned much from Plato and his work displays many affinities with Plato's scholarship. Nevertheless, Plato and Aristotle stand as consequential counterparts to one another in many respects.4

4 In developing his dialogues, Plato typically employs a series of speakers who represent an assortment of views on particular topics. The speakers commonly engage the topic at hand from a multiplicity of perspectives and associated qualifications, shedding considerable light on the forms, possibilities, and limitations of particular viewpoints and practices. By contrast, Aristotle more directly (a) reviews fields of thought on specific topics, (b) defines sources and concepts with reference to more viable and weaker positions, and then (c) proceeds to articulate and analyze what is known about particular subject matters.

Perhaps most consequentially, although Plato maintains some loyalties to Socrates' notions of a divinely-enabled reality (and a suprahuman rationality) that stands outside of, and renders consequential matters pertaining to, the humanly known sensate world, Aristotle grounds his considerations of people's realms of knowledge within the parameters of the humanly experienced world. Relatedly, whereas Plato’s speakers (following Socrates) sometimes insist on the existence of an external set of *a priori* concepts of which human perceptions are but imperfect representations (of these pure or ideal forms), Aristotle contends that people's conceptions of things are derived through comparative analysis (and inferences thereof) of people's sensate experiences with the phenomena under consideration.

Still, although Plato often is dismissed as “an idealist,” those who more carefully examine Plato's *Republic* and *Laws* will find that Plato's speakers are much more attentive to the ways in which people accomplish human group life than many who claim to be empiricists, reformers, advocates, and the like. Thus, Plato's speakers are notably attentive to the processes and problematics of organizing and sustaining governing practices across a wide array of social institutions. In addition to the uncertainties and negotiated nature of planning and implementing realms of community life, people are aware of multiple viewpoints, objectives, and tactics, adjustments, cooperation, resistance, and the interconnectedness of people's organizational life-worlds.5

Whereas Aristotle is often envisioned as “an objectivist,” he does not reduce human existence and knowing to physical objects, physiology, or sensations. Clearly, Aristotle is attentive to people's biological essences and the things that humans encounter as sensate beings. Further, in conjunction with human capacities for experiencing sensations through touch, sight, sound, smell, and taste, all of which are facilitated by people's capacities for locomotion (mobility) and manipulation (handling), Aristotle’s (On the Soul, Sense and Sensibilia, On Memory) also directly acknowledges people's abilities to learn things and to remember things in deliberately recollective terms (also see Prus 2007b).

Still, more is involved, and Aristotle not only insists that people are community creatures (political animals) but also that humans are fundamentally dependent on the acquisition of language for knowing about and meaningfully acting toward the sensate world in which they find themselves:

[These considerations make it clear, then, that the state is one of those things which exist by nature, and that man is by nature an animal fit for a state. Anyone who by his nature and not by ill-luck has no state is either a wretch or superhuman...Speech, on the other hand, serves to make clear what is beneficial and what is harmful, and so also what is just and what is unjust. For by contrast with the other animals man has this peculiarity: he alone has sense of

5 For more sustained thematic considerations of pragmatist emphases in Plato's works, see (a) education and scholarship ([Prus 2011a]), (b) morality, deviance, and regulation ([Prus 2011c]), (c) religious representations and skepticism ([Prus 2013]), (d) poetic endeavor ([Prus 2009]), and (e) love and friendship ([Prus and Camara 2010]).
Whereas Aristotle (as conveyed so effectively in Spangler's [1998] *Aristotle on Teaching*) contends that knowing is an instructed, socially accomplished, community-based process rather than something that individuals might attain on their own, it is in *Nicomachean Ethics* that Aristotle most clearly considers the relationship of the individual to the community and the centrality of speech for human knowing and acting.

Written in part as the base for political science or the study of the social ordering of community life, Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics* is at once an analysis of human group life and the developmental flows of people’s activities, relationships, and experiences within. In this foundational consideration of human knowing and acting, Aristotle not only addresses (a) the interactive connectedness of the individual within the group and (b) character as a humanly engaged, activity-based process but he also considers (c) the developmental unity of human sensations, activities, and linguistically-enabled thought.

For Aristotle, there is no duality of self and other, of individual and community, of speech and thought, of mind and body, of activity and knowing, of human knowing and the environment, or of emotionality and reason. Thus, although he discusses these and other matters in more focused terms, Aristotle sees these aspects of the human condition as interfused with one another in emergent, developmentally formulative terms.

While observing that pre-linguistic humans can develop stylistic habits, routines, patterns of behavior, or tendencies thereof, Aristotle points out that there are no inherent meanings in tension, sensation, motion, direction, or repetition. He distinguishes these non-rational (non-informed) pre-linguistic tendencies and the more closely associated “virtues of habit” people develop from “virtues of thought” (the more characteristic things that people do in more knowing terms – as a consequence of language acquisition, interchange, and associated capacities for deliberation and choice). However, and mindful of the developmental process of human acting and knowing, Aristotle observes that people’s (linguistically-enabled) qualities of thought do not exist as separate entities but rather become interfused with the more particular pre-linguistic (and more linguistically limited) habits that these people had earlier developed.

Aristotle envisions some tension as essential for all animal life, but contends that these states of agitation and relaxation (and any manifestations thereof) become known or defined as tensions, emotions, sensations (or any other matters) only as humans acquire some language and the associated conceptions of “whatness” (including notions of goodness and wrongness) that are embedded within the language of the communities in which they reside.

Moreover, even though pre-linguistic humans may lack an awareness of “the whatness of the human community,” their caretakers and other (linguistic) associates not only may define the characters (habits, tendencies) of these newcomers in ways that are meaningful and desirable within the broader community but these knowing others may also actively attempt to shape the characters, emotional dispositions, and other notions of “whatness” of any newcomers with whom they have contact.

Whereas Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*; also see Prus 2007a) identifies a set of “character tendencies” that people develop in both pre-linguistic and linguistically-enabled terms, he is also aware that linguistically socialized humans (as agents unto themselves) may monitor and attempt to shape their own character-related tendencies. Still, Aristotle recognizes that it is one thing to encourage others and/or oneself to strive for more balanced, dispositional, and interactional character styles and a very different matter for people to achieve this amidst their earlier habits, practices, associates, modes of thought, and their shifting, sometimes overlapping, sets of intentions and activities.

Although encompassing much more than “emotionality,” these character dispositions and situated instances of acting and relating to others become intermeshed with “the particular senses of emotionality” that people knowingly experience – even as they are learning about themselves in linguistic-conceptual terms. Accordingly, for Aristotle, it is linguistically-informed activity in which and through which people achieve the most consequential features of human interchange as they knowingly (as agents causally) enter into the flows of the “whatness” of ongoing community life.

From Aristotle’s viewpoint as well, linguistically-informed humans not only develop capacities to think in terms of the past, present, and future but they also may knowingly anticipate, imagine, and intentionally engage or act toward things in terms of the ends they have in mind. Further, people can deliberate about their options both on a solitary basis and in association with others. Moreover, Aristotle recognizes people’s capacities for affection, sincerity, and cooperation as well as disaffection, deception, and conflict in developing their relations with others (also see Prus 2003a; 2004; 2007a; 2008a; 2009; Prus and Camara 2010).7 Those familiar with Mead (1934) and Blumer (1969) will recognize much in Aristotle’s works that parallel American pragmatist and symbolic interactionist conceptions of reality as a situated, emergent, collectively accomplished process (Prus 2003a; 2007a; 2008a; 2009) that is more or less continuously “tested out” and potentially modified as people do things and assess outcomes and objectives in relation to their earlier and present lines of activity.

In developing *Rhetoric*, Aristotle is profoundly aware of people’s abilities (as agents) not only to formulate a variety of views on the particular matters to which they attend but also of people’s potential to persuade others of the viability of any viewpoints that they intend to represent. Moreover, as Aristotle develops his materials, it is apparent that speakers not only may try to anticipate the various interests and vulnerabilities of their audiences (i.e., judges) but that they also

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7 It should be noted that Plato references many of these points and related matters in various of his dialogues (e.g., *Theaetetus*, *Sophist*, *Parmenides*, *Gorgias*, *Protagoras*, *Statesman*, *Republic*, and *Laws*), often in strikingly crystalline ways. However, whereas Plato typically presents these pragmatist viewpoints amidst contrary positions (often assumed by his speaker Socrates), Aristotle much more centrally builds his analyses on these aspects of pragmatist thought.

Although Plato is much more prescriptive than is Aristotle overall, Aristotle also fuses some of his analyses with moral viewpoints. Nevertheless, important differences are apparent here as well. Thus, while Plato (following Socrates) often appears to support a more theologically-oriented or divine-ly-inspired stance that supersedes humanly known reality (Prus 2013), Aristotle seems intent on achieving excellence in more general human (comparative) terms. Aristotle’s emphasis is more completely focused on comprehending the humanly known and engaged world.

7 Relatedly, those familiar with the works of Schütz (1962; 1964), Berger and Luckmann (1966), and Garfinkel (1967) also will find much in Aristotle’s texts that resonates with the intersubjective/constructionist approaches that these phenomenological social scientists adopt in reference to the human condition.
may endeavor to disqualify earlier definitions of situations that their auditors may have held. No less consequentially, Aristotle also recognizes that speakers may plan to render ineffectual the viewpoints earlier expressed by other speakers as well as those positions they anticipate that other speakers might invoke.

Aristotle envisions speakers as having the capacity not only to adjust to the representations [of reality] presented by oppositionary speakers but also to anticipate the claims that their opponents might make when preparing their own positions. In this way, speakers not only may develop presentations that would be more invincible to the arguments developed by others but also may more effectively neutralize the positions that others might later develop. Although success is always contingent on audience acknowledgment, speakers can strategically emphasize the viability of the images they present while trying to neutralize, diminish, or otherwise disqualify the claims that others might make.

As well, in developing their cases (as in addressing “what occurred” or “seems likely to have happened”), speakers may invoke broad arrays of images pertaining to “possibilities and probabilities” as well as proposing (and/or challenging) particular “proofs” and sanctions as they strive to shape the broader frames of reference in which the events in question are contextualized and in which speakers strive to shape their definitions of morality and persuasive communication are relevant to a vast array of the emotional states that people experience.

Clearly, people need not approach situations involving the judgments of people or other definitions of “whatness” in more obvious emotional terms. Indeed, they may take great care to maintain rational-logical standpoints. Nevertheless, insofar as those promoting or discouraging specific viewpoints or positions either (a) become caught up in particular emotional themes of sorts themselves and/or (b) consider it advantageous to present their positions in ways that engage others in emotional terms, it is contingent on those who intend to understand human decision-making to attend to these definitional features of the situation – as well as to the ways people may manage any emotional states even in more “rationalist” contexts.

Although it may be tempting to focus on individuals more exclusively as moral agents unto themselves, it should be emphasized that Aristotle’s conception of morality in Nicomachean Ethics centrally hinges on the moral order of the community and the ways that people become absorbed into community life in developmental, adjutice, activity-oriented terms. Their (associated) notions of emotional reflect the moral order of the community contexts in which they live, act, and think.

In developing his position, Aristotle discusses a series of character dispositions (e.g., courage, generosity, pride, sincerity, self-restraint, composure, congeniality, fairness, dedication, kindness) as longer-term or more enduring moral virtues and introduces the concept of a “midpoint” as an ideal approximation of these matters of character. However, he also is highly mindful of morality as an enacted, situated process that not only presumes a voluntary quality but that also reflects people’s objectives or goals, stocks of knowledge, and sense making and reasoning practices as well as the wisdom they have accumulated regarding the connections between things (including the feasibility, probability, and desirability of particular outcomes).

While we may begin to appreciate the more profound embeddedness of people’s emotional experiences within the moral order of community life in Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle’s Rhetoric provides scholars with yet more extensive insight into “morality in the making.” This is because Aristotle centrally addresses: (a) collective decision-making and activity (deliberative rhetoric), (b) expressions of community values (demonstrative or evaluative rhetoric), and (c) formally contested instances of activities, outcomes, and accountability (judicial rhetoric).

Those who examine Rhetoric will find that Aristotle is remarkably thorough and precise in developing his analysis of persuasive interchange as this pertains to the matters of wrongdoing, regulation, identity, and negotiated outcomes.**

** Emotionality as a Generic Social Process

Because emotionality is such an important feature of human group life, a great many ethnographies, especially more comprehensive inquiries, address aspects of emotionality in some detail. Thus, one finds some particularly insightful accounts of people’s experiences with emotionality in studies of

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8 As indicated in Prus (1975a; 1975b; 1996; 1997; 1999) and Prus and Grills (2003), somewhat parallel sets of issues have been pursued by sociologists approaching morality and deviance as interactionists, constructionists, and labeling theorists.

9 As indicated in Prus (1973a; 1973b; 1996; 1997; 1999) and Prus and Grills (2003), somewhat parallel sets of issues have been pursued by sociologists approaching morality and deviance as interactionists, constructionists, and labeling theorists.

10 In developing Rhetoric, Aristotle compares the roles and tactics of rhetoricians with those of poets (playwrights). In addition to acknowledging the contrived features of both sets of productions, Aristotle stresses the roles that both sets of performers may assume in shaping the emotional experiences of their audiences.

Elsewhere (in Poetics; also see Prus 2010), Aristotle generates a particularly astute analysis of fictional endeavor as a media-related realm of human interchange. Thus, he provides an insightful depiction of the production of pity and fear within the context of authors developing more captivating tragedies. In addition to emphasizing the centrality of action and the fitness of the characters portrayed with the audiences for whom these dramas are to be performed, Aristotle stresses the importance of conveying coherence and authenticity in the ways that the matters of character, speech, timing, and circumstances are portrayed within the broader account being developed.

As well, Aristotle encourages authors to anticipate and adjust to their audiences as they develop and test out their scripts to more effectively shape the definitions of pity and fear that their audiences might experience in these fictionalized representations. Given the same natural qualifications, he who feels seeing everything with the vividness of an eye-witness as it were, he will devise what is appropriate, and be least likely to overlook the incongruities... As far as may be, too, the poet should even act his story with the very gestures of his personages. Given the same natural qualifications, he who feels the emotions to be described will be the most convincing... (Aristotle 1984:1455a).

One can learn much about emotionality from spe-cific instances of ethnographic inquiry, and there is a cumulative value to these texts as general points of reference points for comprehending peo-ple’s experiences with emotionality.12 Nevertheless, it is important to develop a more thorough, more focused conceptualization of emotional-ity as a humanly engaged, humanly experienced process – to attend to the more generic, transcontextual features of emotionality as realms of human lived experience. Building on Blumer’s (1969) statement on symbolic interaction, Denzin’s (1984) volume on emotion, and an assortment of interactionist ethnographies, Prus’ (1996:173-201) addresses experiencing emotionality as a generic social process (GSP). Like Denzin, Prus views emotions as self-body sensations that are intersubjectively informed or become meaningful only within the conceptual “whatness” of community life.13 Whereas Prus stresses the study of emotionality in more directly engaged (i.e., situated, enacted, experienced) terms than does Denzin, both Denzin and Prus (as with the interactionists and pragmatists more generally) take the viewpoint that emotionality is to be understood within the intersubjective context of community life rather than as something that exists as either an objective or subjective essence unto itself.14 Thus, the matter of “experiencing emotionality” is to be understood within the particular life-worlds in which people, as co-interactants, live, act, and comprehend things. Like people’s experiences with identities, relationships, and involvements more generally (all of which also presume physiological capacities), emotionality is best understood in more holistic terms, as part of a larger set of pro cesses that emerge in the natural course of people’s life-world participation in the community.

Mindful of this broader standpoint, Prus’ (1996: 141-201) provides an extended consideration of generic social processes (GSPs) or basic, transcontextual features of community life. This material focuses on people acquiring perspectives, achieving identity, being involved, doing activity, develop ing relationships, forming and coordinating associations, and experiencing emotionality.15 Although often taken for granted in sociologi cal circles, emotionality is pertinent to all realms and instances of human group life. In discussing emotionality as a generic social process (Prus 1996: 173-186), the objective was to articulate a set of conceptual themes that not only would epitomize aspects of emotionality as these appeared more generally in the ethnographic literature but that also would serve as focal points for subsequent research and analyses of people’s experiences with emotionality.

Prus’ (1996) analysis of emotionality did not benefit from an awareness of Aristotle’s Rhetoric or other texts from the classical Greek and Roman eras (e.g., see Prus 2007a; 2007b; 2007c; 2009; 2010; 2011c; 2013; Prus and Camara 2010) but was in tended to enable scholars to examine the full range of people’s solitary and transpersonal emotional experi ences. Accordingly, in addressing people’s “solitary experiences with emotionality” as well as their “interactive emotional entanglements,” the emphasis is on the developmental flows (the processes/emergence) of people’s experiences with emotionality.

This includes an attentiveness to (a) people’s ini tial involvements in emotional themes, (b) contin uities and intensifications of emotional themes and interchanges, and (c) the disengagement or disentanglement process.16

Attending to the flows of people’s experiences with emotionality, Prus’ analysis is organized around the matters of: (1) learning to define emotional experiences, (2) developing techniques for expressing and controlling emotional experiences, and (3) experiencing emotional episodes and entanglements.

Since each of these subthemes offers a vantage point for considering and dialoguing with Aristotle’s analysis of emotionality within the context of persuasive interchange, I will briefly indicate sets of subprocesses encompassed within these three subthemes.

Learning to Define Emotional Experiences

The subprocesses listed here draw attention to people acquiring perspectives on the “whatness” of group-based conceptions of emotionality – as this pertains to people encountering, learning, and applying defini tions of this aspect of human group life through emotionality in more directly engaged (i.e., situat ed, enacted, experienced) terms than does Denzin, both Denzin and Prus (as with the interactionists and pragmatists more generally) take the viewpoint that emotionality is to be understood within the intersubjective context of community life rather than as something that exists as either an objective or subjective essence unto itself.14 Thus, the matter of “experiencing emotionality” is to be understood within the particular life-worlds in which people, as co-interactants, live, act, and comprehend things. Like people’s experiences with identities, relationships, and involvements more generally (all of which also presume physiological capacities), emotionality is best understood in more holistic terms, as part of a larger set of processes that emerge in the natural course of people’s life-world participation in the community.

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(ongoing, adjunctive) interchange with others in the community:

- Learning cultural perspectives on (and understandings of) emotional states;
- Learning cultural recipes for defining situations in emotional terms;
- Invoking or applying cultural emotional recipes in specific situations;
- Encountering, assessing, and assimilating notions, recipes, and situational definitions of emotions from others.

Developing Techniques for Expressing and Controlling Emotional Experiences

It is to be understood, as well, that emotions not only represent social essences of sorts but they also are to be examined as realms of activity. Thus, beyond acquiring stocks of knowledge and rules of thumb regarding the existence and nature of emotional situations and states, people also learn how to “do emotional activity.” Relatedly, the conceptual consideration of “doing activity” (Prus 1996:156-158) – encompassing the matters of doing performances, influencing others, and making commitments – appears quite consequential for appreciating the nature of “emotion work.”

At a performance level, people not only learn (typically enabled by explicit instruction) how to monitor their own situations and behaviors but they also learn when and how to express and manage particular emotional themes and states. These notions presume an attentiveness to Mead’s (1934) “generalized other,” human capacities for self-reflectivity, and people’s adjustments to situations as these develop. Further, beyond learning ways of monitoring, expressing, and controlling their own emotional states, people generally also learn ways of monitoring, assessing, and influencing (affecting) the emotional states that others around them may experience. Although success is problematic at all points in the process and often is centrally dependent on the definitions that others in the setting may apply to the instances at hand, relevant processes include:

- Learning to attend to emotional themes in the setting at hand;
- Learning ways of expressing emotional themes;
- Learning ways of controlling emotional themes;
- Coordinating emotional themes with others (team members and others);
- Dealing with ambiguity, obstacles, resistances, and distractions;
- Conveying images of competence (displaying ability, composure);
- Encountering competition in defining, expressing, and controlling emotional expressions;
- Making ongoing assessments of, and adjustments to, one’s emotional expressions;
- Monitoring, assessing, influencing others’ emotional practices and experiences.

Experiencing Emotional Episodes and Entanglements

Attending to the processual features of people’s involvements in situations more generally, we may ask when and how people begin to initially experience emotional episodes, when these are likely to continue and perhaps intensify, when and how they are likely to dissipate, and when and how emotional episodes may become reengaged or reconstituted. Extending an earlier discussion of people’s involvements (Prus 1996:153-156), the following subprocesses appear particularly consequential in accounting for initial involvements:

- Being recruited or encouraged to participate in particular emotional themes;
- Developing interests in, or fascinations with, particular emotional themes;
- Envisioning instrumentalist advantages to assuming particular emotional states;
- Feeling obligated to experience/express/control particular emotional themes;
- Overcoming reservations about involvement in particular emotional themes;
- Defining unexpected (inadvertent, accidental) experiences in emotional terms.

While people may learn notions of emotional states and ways of applying these notions to the situations in which they find themselves in a general sense, it is important to appreciate that emotions may be experienced on a more solitary (sometimes totally secretive) or isolated basis as well as in more direct, interactive contexts. It might be argued that most, if not all, experiences of emotionality have some solitary or unshared components to them since people may have difficulty in completely and accurately communicating their feelings with others. Likewise, most, if not all, instances of solitary emotion entail some awareness of, attentiveness to, or interaction with others (on a specific or generalized basis). Still, it seems instructive to acknowledge the somewhat differing dynamics of more solitary versus more interactive instances of emotional experiences and expressions.

Solitary Emotional Episodes

Because people develop capacities for reflectivity or “becoming objects unto themselves” through association with others (Mead 1934), they commonly experience emotional states on their own (in more solitary terms) even in the midst of others on many occasions.

Although continuities in particular situations often reflect some mutuality (i.e., acknowledgement, acceptance, or enthusiasm) of interchange on the part of others, people (as self-reflective entities) sometimes will sustain particular emotional themes in the absence of any explicit interaction with, or encouragement from, others. Thus, while affective states such as love, hatred, jealousy, embarrassment, or excitement may reach very intense states as a result of ongoing interpersonal exchange, people may nonetheless maintain particular emotional themes on a more secretive, solitary basis – in the absence of support (as with disregard or even with more extensive resistances, challenges, and sanctions) from others. The processes that seem relevant to these prolonged solitary pursuits are:

- Developing more intensive fascinations with particular emotional themes;
- Experiencing more acute obligations to pursue particular emotional themes;
- Making more extensive commitments to (or becoming reliant on) particular emotional themes;
- Avoiding, disattending to, or dismissing communications with others, which discourage focal emotional themes;
- Failing to attend to or define alternative emotional themes as viable modes of involvement.
Interactive Emotional Episodes

Mindful of the interactionist literature on “continuities” more generally, we may expect that people’s participation in emotional themes involving others are more likely to be sustained when people find themselves:

- Encountering viewpoints (definitions, justifications, encouragements) conducive to particular emotional themes;
- Attaining identities (self and other definitions) consistent with particular emotional themes;
- Becoming more adept at utilizing particular emotional themes in dealing with others;
- Making commitments to (developing strategies, stylistic practices of implementing, reliance on) particular emotional themes in the community of others;
- Developing relationships around particular emotional themes (e.g., friendships and animosities);
- Participating in broader, more encompassing instants of collective events;
- Foregoing alternative emotional themes (neglecting or disregarding other emotional themes).

In addition to helping sustain other people’s involvements in particular emotional themes over time, one’s associates also may intensify or escalate other people’s sense of emotionality on a “here and now” basis. Some of these interchanges may be relatively isolated events between interactants but others may reflect earlier or anticipated exchanges to which one or other participants may refer in interpreting, defining, and acting toward the situation at hand.

Since situations become emotional experiences only when they are so defined by one or other parties, the nature and direction of any emotional theme seem rather precarious. Definitions of situations as emotional ones, thus, may very well depend on people’s pre-existing interests and on the particular aspects of the other(s) to which they attend in more immediate terms. Still, the concept of emergence (and adaptive interchange) has particular consequence here and may result in people ending up in lines of interchange and associated emotional states that they may have had no intention or desire whatsoever of pursuing. Nevertheless, insofar as the other is seen to offend or exemplify the ideals of some particular emotional theme to which someone attends or invokes, then the encounter is apt to become defined as a more noteworthy emotional experience. Expressing these matters in process terms, particular attention may be given to:

- Defining the immediate situation more explicitly in emotional terms;
- Overtly displaying or expressing emotional themes in the immediate situation;
- Carrying emotional themes over from earlier (outside) encounters (spill-overs);
- Establishing a mutuality of focus with the other around particular emotional themes;
- Developing more uniform modes of viewing and acting toward the other with respect to particular emotional themes.

Like continuities, disinvolvments from emotional episodes may reflect the activities of others as well as the participants’ own, more individualized redefinitions of situations. Generally speaking, as with other involvements, people seem less likely to sustain emotional states on their own. Thus, many emotional interchanges (and themes) dissipate when the interactants fail to endorse or acknowledge one another’s expressed interests or affectations. As well, even when people have been extensively caught up in particular emotional themes, they may begin to question aspects of their situations on their own or with some prompting from others. Denoting an extension of an earlier (Prus 1996) discussion of disinvolvment, the following subprocesses seem particularly relevant to an understanding of the emotional disengagement or disentanglement process:

- Questioning earlier invoked perspectives (and definitions) regarding particular emotional themes;
- Finding that the activities entailed in pursuing particular emotional states are difficult to sustain;
- Disliking the sets of self and other identities associated with particular emotional entanglements;
- Reassessing the commitments (risks, costs, relative gains, longer-term implications) entailed in maintaining particular emotional states or entanglements;
- Defining alternative emotional states or entanglements as more viable (more desirable, readily accessible, encouraged by others);
- Encountering initiatives from others – interactants, third parties – to establish emotional breaks;
- Achieving desired emotional states or other objectives;
- Acknowledging acquiescence, accommodations, or other satisfactory concessions from the other;
- Recognizing incapacities or inabilities on the part of the other to continue.

While many emotionally focused interchanges have clearer or more definite endings, others may be subject to considerable vacillation. Whether these occur on a more solitary or interactive basis, they may be characterized by an unlimited number of disinvolvments and reinvolvments as the participants attempt to come to terms with the diverse sets of perspectives, identities, activities, commitments, and relationships that they associate with particular emotional themes, the parties involved, and the interactional contexts that have emerged to particular points in time.

Aristotle’s Rhetoric

[To provide a more adequate consideration of Aristotle’s analysis of emotionality as well as briefly situate his analysis of emotionality within the context of rhetoric, I have extracted materials from an earlier statement on Aristotle’s Rhetoric (Prus 2008a). Whereas the preceding discussion (Prus 1996) is valuable for comprehending emotionality as a generic social process, we would be most remiss if we were not to centrally acknowledge Aristotle’s conceptually detailed, highly enabling analysis of emotionality. In addition to embedded textual references to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, page references to extracts from the QSR (Prus 2008a) publication are indicated.]

In developing Rhetoric Aristotle provides a remarkable philosophic analysis of rationality in the making. He presents readers with a comprehensive, highly instructive depiction of image work as a linguistically accomplished (and potentially contested) process.

Thus, while Aristotle discusses (I) the characters (reputations), abilities, and tactical plays of speakers,
and (2) the contents of people’s speeches and the ways in which speakers present their cases to judges, Aristotle more centrally (3) focuses on the ways that speakers may appeal to (and alter) the viewpoints of the judges to whom messages are pitched.

Outlining an orientational frame and a set of operational tactics for embarking on influence work, Aristotle is highly attentive to the processual and problematic features of influence work.

Accordingly, Aristotle expects that speakers will not only try to anticipate and adjust the viewpoints of judges on an emergent basis but that speakers also would try to anticipate and adjust to other speakers (e.g., as competitors/opponents) whenever these other parties enter into the process.

The speakers involved in instances of persuasive interchange may vary greatly in backgrounds, initiative, preparations, presentations, and the like, but there is no doubt on Aristotle’s part of people’s capacities for deliberative, meaningful activity and adjutive interaction.

Recognizing that most readers are apt not to be familiar with Aristotle’s Rhetoric, the overall flow of this volume has been maintained. This should enable readers to establish more direct links with Aristotle’s statement and, hopefully, encourage use of this material for their own studies of human relations. At the same time, though, readers are cautioned that, far from amplifying Aristotle’s analysis, this statement only partially captures the depth, detail, and potency of Aristotle’s Rhetoric.

In introducing Rhetoric, Aristotle (B1, I-II) states that rhetoric represents the study of the available means of persuasion on any subject matter. He also observes that his concern is not limited to matters of successful techniques but represents an attempt to discover the ways in which persuasion work may be engaged in the instances in which this takes place.

Largely disregarding Plato’s intense condemnations of rhetoric, Aristotle notes that rhetoric (like other arts or technologies) may be used for variety of ends. Aristotle also observes that, in contrast to many realms of study (e.g., architecture, medicine) that have comparatively specific applications or parameters of operation, rhetoric (like logic) may be used in an unlimited set of contexts in the human community.

Whereas rhetoric relies primarily on linguistic communication, Aristotle’s Rhetoric clearly attests to the limitations of words as persuasive elements in themselves. Thus, throughout this volume, Aristotle is highly attentive to (1) the speaker (interests, abilities, and images of the speaker), (2) the speech (contents, ordering, and presentation), and (3) the audience (dispositions, viewpoints, inferential tendencies, and resistances). He also is mindful of (4) the anticipatory, adjutive interchanges that oppositionary speakers may develop as they vie for the commitments of the auditors in the setting.

For Aristotle, rhetoric does not consist of sets of disembodied words, phrases, or even more sustained texts but implies a distinctively comprehensive consideration of the ways that speakers might meaningfully engage others in order to encourage those people (individually or in groups) to embark on the lines of action desired by the speaker.

As a cautionary note to readers, it may be noted that while I have maintained the overall flow of Aristotle’s text and have provided specific chapter references to particular materials, I have assumed some liberty in the headings I have used to organize this presentation. [Prus 2008a:30]

Realms and Emphases of Persuasion

Aristotle divides rhetoric into three major primary categories (B1, III-IV), relative to their objectives. These are (1) deliberative, (2) forensic, and (3) epideictic rhetoric. Deliberative or political rhetoric is intended to encourage people to act or, alternatively, to discourage them from acting in certain ways. Concerned with decision and commitment making process, deliberative speaking presumes a distinctively futuristic orientation.

Forensic or judicial rhetoric is used to charge others with offenses of some sort or, relatively, to defend people from the charges of others. Whether these claims are invoked on behalf of individuals, groups, or the state, forensic speeches deal primarily with matters alleged to have happened in the past.

Referring to the praise or censure of people or things, epideictic or demonstrative rhetoric is notably more expressive in emphasis. It deals largely with celebrations or condemnations of some target or humanly-experienced circumstances. Demonstrative rhetoric is typically developed around some present (as in recent or current) occasion, event, or situation.

While acknowledging the time-frames characterizing each of these three oratorical themes, Aristotle also observes that rhetoricians focusing on any of these three objectives may make reference to the past, the present, and the future as these speakers present their positions to others.

Working across these three broader sets of rhetorical objectives, Aristotle (B1, III-VII) acknowledges a full range of persuasive arenas, varying from dyadic encounters to political practices and interchanges of all sorts. Approaching rhetoric, thusly, Aristotle provides a highly generic statement on the ways in which people try to generate, shape, and resist other people’s viewpoints, decisions, and activities within the human community.

Further, while Aristotle gives greater attention to forensic oratory (given the typically greater complexities of court-related cases) than to deliberative or epideictic rhetoric, it should be appreciated that forensic cases also subsume decision-making dimensions (as definitions of activities, assessments of guilt, and assignments of penalties) and demonstrative features (as in condemnations or exoneration of the defendants). [Prus 2008a:31]

Focusing on Emotionality

Recognizing people’s general tendencies to define and act toward situations in terms of their emotional states (e.g., anger, indignation, pity, pride, fear), Aristotle (B1, II-XI) explicitly addresses a series of emotions to which speakers may attend in their attempts to deal more affectively with the audiences at hand.

Those who examine this material will find in Aristotle’s Rhetoric the foundations of a theory of emotions. Defining emotions or passions as feelings or dispositions pertaining to pleasure (and pain) that have a capacity to affect people’s judgments, Aristotle intends to establish the relevancy of people’s emotions for influence work.

Thus, as a prelude to speakers doing “emotion work” within the context of persuasive communication,
wherein one knowingly and deliberately attempts to intensify or minimize certain emotional viewpoints, Aristotle discusses people’s experiences with various emotions in a more generic sense.

In what follows, Aristotle deals with (1) anger and calm, (2) feelings of friendship and enmity, (3) fear and confidence, (4) shame and shamelessness, (5) kindness and inconsideration, (6) pity and indignation, (7) envy and emulation.

In addition to providing (a) instructive definitions of these emotional states, Aristotle considers (b) the foundations of these emotional states, (c) the ways that these emotions are experienced (by whom, in what ways, and with what behavioral consequences), and (d) how speakers may enter into and shape the emotional sensations, viewpoints, and actions of others. [Prus 2008a:37]

Anger and Calm

Aristotle (BII, II) defines anger as a focused desire for revenge that reflects an unwarranted slight or injustice directed toward oneself or one’s friends by some other.

Aristotle distinguishes three types of slights or senses of mistreatment associated with anger: (1) instances of contempt, in which others (as agents) are seen to disparage things that targets deem important; (2) spite, wherein others obstruct target from achieving their objectives, not as rivals for the same objects but more singularly to prevent targets from achieving those ends; and (3) insolence, wherein others derogate targets through word or deed, with the apparent intention of achieving agent superiority through the ill treatment of the target.

Relatedly, Aristotle contends, people (as targets) are more apt to become angered with others (as agents) when they see these others as: (a) preventing targets (directly or indirectly) from obtaining things targets are eager to have; (b) promoting effects contrary to those that targets desire; (c) ridiculing, despising, or denigrating targets, including their interests and talents in some way; or (d) deprecating people for whom targets have affection.

Likewise, while denigrations seem more distasteful when they are (e) produced by those to whom targets view as inferiors (vs. equals or superiors), Aristotle also notes that slights also are more hurtful when they arise from (f) people that targets had envisioned as friends or (g) people whom targets have treated well in the past.

As well, Aristotle observes that people (as targets) are apt to direct anger toward people who (h) delight in, or fail to sympathize with, target misfortunes; (i) present bad news to targets; and (j) readily listen to and talk about target failures with others.

Aristotle is also attentive to people’s tendencies to become variably incensed with others (agents), depending on those who witness particular agent slights. Thus, perceived mistreatment tends to generate heightened anger on the part of targets when it takes place in front of (a) targets’ rivals, (b) people whom targets admire, (c) those from whom targets desire admiration, (d) those whom targets respect, and (e) those from whom targets desire respect.

People (agents) may also encourage anger on the part of others (targets) when: (a) targets feel obliged to defend others (third parties) whom agents have slighted; (b) agents fail to settle debts with targets or do not return favors; (c) agents ridicule target interests or otherwise fail to respect concerns with target sincerity; (d) agents fail to treat targets as favorably as agents treat comparable others; and (e) agents forget or otherwise disregard particular things that targets consider important.

Aristotle explicitly reminds speakers that these are the themes they may use to bring their auditors into appropriate frames of mind; to generate anger in the minds of their audiences and to direct this anger toward their opponents so as to encourage auditor decisions that are more favorable to speaker objectives.

Still, Aristotle’s treatment of anger is not complete. Thus, Aristotle (BII, III) enters into a related consideration of calm or placitude; how this emotion is experienced by people and how speakers may calm, pacify, or reconcile themselves with audiences who may otherwise be disposed to anger (via the circumstances, the case at hand, or the neutralizing effects of the opposing speaker) with respect to speakers or their positions.

Addressing the conditions under which people become calm, Aristotle observes that anger must be minimized when people (as targets): (a) view incidents involving agents as involuntary, unintended, or beyond their control; (b) realize that agents treat them the same the way they treat themselves; (c) encounter agents who admit their faults and sincerely express regret for target injuries; (d) face agents who are humble and accept roles as inferiors to targets in the matters at hand; (e) share target senses of seriousness on matters of importance to targets; (f) exhibit greater kindness toward targets than vice-versa; and (g) generally do not direct slights toward others.

Aristotle also contends that people are less likely to become angry with (h) those whom they fear (as concerns with fear are more paramount) and are less likely to remain angry with (i) those who are thought to have engaged in undesired acts while in states of anger (having acted passionately rather than deliberately).

As well, Aristotle notes that people are less likely to be disposed to anger when (j) they (targets) are in better spirits (as in the midst of enjoying amusements, celebrations, or other pleasurable states); (k) some time has passed since the slight occurred; (l) targets recently have extracted some vengeance or exercised their anger on another source; (m) perpetrators (agents) have suffered other noteworthy setbacks; and (n) offended persons have had opportunities to inflict preliminary (even if much less) punishments on perpetrators. Finally, Aristotle notes that people’s anger is apt to dissipate when (o) those with whom they are angry are thought unable to acknowledge target anger (as with those who are absent, incapable of comprehending the events at hand, or deceased). [Prus 2008a:38-39]

Friendship and Enmity

Engaging the topics of friendship and enmity as affective states of mind, Aristotle (BII, IV) explicitly defines a friendly feeling toward another as both (a) wishing for good things for another and (b) attempting to bring these things about for the other.

Aristotle posits that people (herein targets) feel affection for those (agents): (a) who have treated targets well (also those people and other things that targets value); (b) whom targets anticipate will
treat them (targets) well in the future; and (c) who devalue target enemies and other sources of target disaffection.

Relatedly, people (as targets) tend to value those (agents) who: (d) are generous toward targets, (e) are courageous in defending targets, (f) more independently look after their own affairs, (g) are fair-minded, and (h) tend not to try into target affairs.

Similarly, people tend to develop friendly feelings toward those who (i) have pleasant dispositions and a sense of humor, and (j) assume understanding, accepting orientations toward targets.

Among those more appreciated, as well, are people who (k) praise target qualities, (l) minimize target-directed criticisms, (m) do not maintain grievances against targets, and (n) do not oppose targets when targets are angered or otherwise are sincere in their efforts.

Aristotle also pointedly notes that affections more readily develop among people who (o) share various affinities or common circumstances, interests, and activities, provided that these matters do not put them in oppositionary (as in competitive) terms.

Aristotle further observes that people (targets) develop friendly feelings toward those: (p) in front of whom targets still feel accepted should targets make mistakes; (q) who willingly cooperate in pursuing target objectives; (r) who act as friendly toward targets in target absences as in target presence; (s) who are supportive of targets’ friends; and (t) who are open with targets, sharing agents’ own weaknesses and failings with targets.

After noting that it is difficult for people to experience friendly feelings in the midst of fear and other discomforts, Aristotle concludes that friendship is apt to be generated when (u) people do things intended to benefit the other; especially when they do so willingly, without being asked, and without expectation of compensation.

Aristotle’s (BII, IV) treatment of enmity or hatred is much less developed than his analysis of friendship. While observing that enmity may arise from instances of anger, Aristotle also notes that people may hate others more arbitrarily and diffusely for what they take to be other people’s characters, activities, or group (or category) affiliations.

In contrast to angered states, which can be more readily neutralized, Aristotle sees hatred as much more totalizing, enduring, and intense than anger. Instead of seeking revenge, thus, the emphasis in enmity, more completely, is on the destruction of the other. [Prus 2008a:39-40]

Fear and Confidence

Aristotle (BII, V) defines fear as the discomfiture or anxiety associated with some impending injury or loss. Fear, thus, is an anticipatory state, one that is intensified by concerns with more potent and immediate destructive forces (sources).

Among those that people (as prospective targets) are apt to fear (assuming agent capacities to do harm), Aristotle identifies those (agents) who: (a) are angry or appear to hate targets; (b) are seen as unjust in their dealings with others; (c) earlier had been insulted by targets; (d) believe themselves to have been harmed by targets; (e) are rivals; (f) invoke fear among those whom targets consider superior to themselves; (g) have injured people thought advantaged over targets; (h) have begun attacking those who are weaker than targets (thereby developing greater agent ambitions and resources); and (i) appear quiet but are thought to be unscrupulous.

Aristotle also contends that people are more apt to be fearful of others more generally when (j) they (as prospective targets) have made mistakes that they are not able to undo (leaving themselves vulnerable to others). Aristotle notes, too, that people are apt to experience fear (k) around the things that invoke their pity when they witness others in those situations.

Observing that people’s fears are apt to intensify when (l) they believe that something specific is likely to befall them (through particular agents, in particular ways, and at particular times), Aristotle emphasizes the importance of speakers who wish to invoke fear on the part of their audiences making dangers appear as direct and imminent to those audiences as they are able.

Defining confidence as the opposite of fear, wherein people anticipate that they are safe or far removed from destructive elements, Aristotle (BII, V) subsequently endeavors to specify the conditions under which people are apt to feel invulnerable.

Among the circumstances inspiring confidence are (a) the apparent remoteness of dangerous matters; (b) the greater proximity of elements of safety; (c) people’s abilities to absorb or avert losses; (d) people’s inexperiences with difficult times; (e) an apparent lack of rivals or enemies; (f) the powerless states of any (agents) who may be affected with them (targets); and (g) the possession of powerful and helpful friends.

People also seem apt to experience greater confidence when they (h) have been successful in their undertakings or (i) have encountered risk but escaped suffering.

People appear more assured, too, when they (j) observe that the circumstances in which they find themselves do not cause any particular concerns among their associates who are in similar circumstances to themselves.

People’s senses of confidence also seem enhanced when they (k) believe that they are advantaged over any rivals (as in wealth, friends, territory, preparations, and the like); (l) are angry with others; (m) are in positions to attack first; or (n) fully expect to succeed in the end. [Prus 2008a:40-41]

Shame and Shamelessness

Aristotle (BII, VI) defines shame as a feeling of pain or discomfort associated with things in the present, past, or future that are likely to discredit or result in a loss of one’s character.

By contrast, shamelessness or impudence is envisioned as a disregard, contempt, or indifference to matters of disrepute. Shame, according to Aristotle, revolves around things envisioned as disgraceful to oneself or to those for whom one has regard.

Among the kinds of things around which people more commonly experience shame, Aristotle references: (a) cowardice; (b) treating others unfairly in financial matters; (c) exhibiting excessive frivolity; (d) victimizing those who are helpless; (e) taking advantage of the kindness of others; (f) begging; (g) grieving excessively over losses; (h) avoiding responsibility; (i) exhibiting vanity; (j) engaging
in sexually licentious behaviors; and (k) avoiding participation in things expected of, or lacking possessions generally associated with, equals.

Further, while noting centrally that shame is apt to be intensified in all discreditable matters when (a) these things are deemed voluntary and thus, one’s fault, Aristotle also observes that (b) people also may feel shame about dishonorable things that have been done, are presently being done, or seem likely to be done to them by others.

Acknowledging the anticipatory or imaginative reactions of others, as well as actual instances of experiencing disgrace, Aristotle subsequently identifies the witnesses or others in front of whom people (as targets) are apt to experience greater shame.

Most centrally, these witnesses include people whom targets hold in higher esteem (respect, honor) and admire (friendship, love) as well as those from whom they (targets) desire respect and affective regard. People (as targets) also are likely to experience heightened senses of shame when they are disgraced in front of those who have control of things that targets desire to obtain, those whom targets view as rivals, and those whom targets view as honorable and wise.

Observing that targets are particularly susceptible to shame when dishonorable things occur in more public arenas, Aristotle also posits that people (as targets) are likely to feel greater shame when the witnesses include people who: are more innocent of things of this sort; adopt more intolerant viewpoints; and generally delight in revealing the faults of others.

Another set of witnesses or audiences in front of whom people (as targets) are more likely to experience disgrace include: those before whom [targets] have experienced success or been highly regarded; those who have not requested things of [targets]; those who recently have sought [target] friendship; and those likely to inform other people of [target] shame-related matters.

As well, Aristotle states that people (as targets) also are apt to experience shame through things associated with the activities or misfortunes of their relatives and other people with whom targets have close connections (i.e., experience an extension of the stigma attached to their associates).

Shame also seems intensified when people anticipate that they will remain in the presence of those who know of their losses of character. By contrast, Aristotle suggests that people are less apt to experience embarrassment among those who are thought inattentive or insensitive to such matters.

Relatedly, while Aristotle notes that people may feel comfortable with certain [otherwise questionable circumstances or practices] in front of intimates versus strangers, he also states that people (as targets) are apt to experience intensified shame among intimates with respect to things that are regarded as particularly disgraceful in those settings.

However, among those that they encounter as strangers, discredited people tend to be concerned only about more immediate matters of convention. Aristotle ends his analysis of shame with the observation that shamelessness or the corresponding insensitivity to stigma will be known through its opposite. [Prus 2008a:41-42]

Kindness and Inconsideration

Aristotle (BII, VII) next deals with kindness or benevolence and, by contrast, a disregard for the other. Aristotle defines kindness as benefits that one person confers on another, without anticipation of any compensation but with the intention of helping the other.

Although observing that acts of kindness are more apt to be appreciated by those in more desperate conditions, Aristotle also posits that people’s generousities become more noteworthy when the benefactors (a) do things more exclusively on their own, (b) are the first to offer assistance, or (c) provide the greatest amount of help.

Alternatively, Aristotle observes, speakers attempting to discredit particular benefactors may encourage auditors to view these people as inconsiderate of others by alleging that the benefactors: (a) acted primarily for their own advantage; (b) helped others inadvertently (versus intentionally); or (c) felt obligated to act in these manners for other reasons.

Likewise, kindness may be discredited when (d) benefactors’ assistance is defined as comparably insignificant within their overall capacities to help others. [Prus 2008a:42-43]

Pity and Indignation

In addressing pity or the sense of sorrow that people feel on behalf of others, Aristotle (BII, VIII) provides another highly instructive analysis of emotionality. Aristotle defines pity as the feeling of pain associated with the actual or impending injury or loss experienced by someone who is thought not to deserve conditions of this sort.

Because pity assumes that people can anticipate or experience the viewpoint of the other, Aristotle contends that this feeling is premised on the recognition that a similar, unfortunate fate could befall oneself or one’s close associates. Somewhat relatedly, Aristotle claims that pity is unlikely to be felt by people who are completely ruined (have nothing left to lose) as well as by people who view themselves as highly privileged (and invulnerable).

Instead, he posits that pity is more likely to be experienced by those who: (a) have encountered and survived related difficulties; (b) are older and wiser (recognizing human frailties); (c) are weaker and inclined to cowardice; (d) are better educated and can anticipate fuller consequences; and (e) have stronger family ties and can imagine misfortunes befalling their loved ones.

Obversely, Aristotle envisions pity as less likely from those: (a) experiencing anger or confidence; (b) who care little about others; or (e) who think people generally are of little worth or basically deserve misfortune.

Aristotle also states that (d) people in heightened states of fear or horror have little capacity for feeling pity because they are so preoccupied with their own precarious circumstances. Likewise, when people’s close associates are in great danger and people experience intense fears for them, people are unlikely to feel compassion for third parties who are further removed from themselves.
Among the things that more compellingly encourage pity on the part of others Aristotle not only references things that are (a) directly destructive (as in death, injury, disease) but also cites (b) debilitating chance events and (c) undeserved circumstances.

The latter two elements include things such as friendlessness, the loss of close friends, deformity, evil treatment from those who should treat those people better, the repeated occurrence of misfortune, and help arriving too late to offset a great loss.

While stating that people often feel pity for others with respect to (d) matters for which they themselves have fears (albeit not of an highly imminent or intense sort), Aristotle also observes that people feel sorrow for others when: (e) the unfortunates are more like themselves in character, age, or other circumstances; (f) the sympathizers could more readily experience the particular sorts of misfortunes that have happened to others; and (g) the unfortunate people are closer to themselves (as in time, location).

Focusimg attention more directly on speakers, Aristotle states that those who wish to invoke pity on behalf of their audiences should strive to present their materials in more vivid and dramatic fashions (through their gestures, tones, and appearances) so that their audiences might achieve greater, more immediate senses of pity—related emotion.

In addition to the newly wealthy, Aristotle notes that indignation is often felt toward those who benefit undeservedly from office, friends, or family connections, particularly when they overtly display the effects of these advantages.

Among those who are most inclined to become indignant at the unwarranted good fortune of others, Aristotle identifies those who: (a) deserve and have acquired similar advantages; (b) insist on justice as a matter of practice; (c) desire the things that these others now possess; and (d) consider themselves deserving of the sorts of things these others now have.

By using these themes to invoke resentment on the part of auditors, Aristotle contends that speakers may render ineffective or redirect their opponents’ pleas for pity. [Prus 2008a:43-44]

Envy and Emulation

Aristotle (BII, X) envisions envy as a painful feeling or resentment associated with the good fortune of one’s equals. By equals Aristotle means those who are comparable to oneself in ways deemed consequential (as in position, age, character, activities) by the person feeling envy.

Among those particularly inclined to be envious, Aristotle references (a) those who already have experienced considerable success but have not attained all relevant successes in some area; and (b) those who are ambitious in the more specific respect (including wisdom, fame, finances, or other advantages) in which comparisons are made. Aristotle also observes that, for some people, (c) virtually anything thought desirable in some way may become a focus of their envy.

After stating that people commonly envy (d) those who are closer to themselves in circumstances, time, and location (notably family members, neighbors, associates, rivals), Aristotle also suggests that people may be envious of equals who, when compared to themselves, succeed with (e) less difficulty, (f) in shorter periods of time, or (g) with less expense or other sacrifices. On some occasions, too, people may be envious of (h) those who possess or acquire things they, themselves, once had. Recognizing that people do not pity those whom they envy, Aristotle indicates that speakers who are able to generate and direct auditor envy (as with indignation) toward speakers’ opponents will neutralize auditor sympathy for their opponents.

Next, Aristotle (BII, XI) turns to emulation. For Aristotle, emulation is characterized not by any resentment or envy of things that others have but by a longing for these things to also belong to oneself. In contrast to envy, Aristotle describes emulation as a generally virtuous emotion. In emulation, one strives to be more like those who possess admirable things (typically, things thought to be within one’s eventual reach). Extending these notions still further, Aristotle also notes that those who emulate or wish to be like certain people in the things these people possess also are apt to be contemptuous of third parties who fail to exhibit, pursue, or respect desirable qualities of these sorts.

Although this concludes the most directly focused of Aristotle’s analyses of emotions, his consideration of emotionality is far from exhausted. Indeed, the preceding material (and the subsequent depiction of variations of people’s generalized emotional viewpoints) represents only a partial account of Aristotle’s statement on emotion work within Rhetoric. [Prus 2008a:44-45]

In Perspective

Whereas this paper has concentrated on Aristotle’s consideration of emotionality in Rhetoric, Aristotle clearly was not the first to address emotionality or rhetoric in the classical Greek era. Thus, considerations of emotionality, activity, and relationships can be found in the works of Homer (circa 700 BCE), Hesiod (circa 700 BCE), and the classical Greek playwrights who followed them (Prus 2009) as well as a notably wide array of rhetoricians, historians, and philosophers from the classical Greek era (Prus 2004).
Those more familiar with the classical Greek literature will recognize that Plato also has much to offer to the study of emotionality through some of his dialogues. Thus, in addition to the considerations of emotionality within the contexts of organizational life and interchange, morality and regulation, and activity and character that one encounters in Plato's Republic and Laws, Plato addresses matters of great importance for a fuller understanding of emotionality as a community essence in Charmides (temperance), Laches (courage), Lysis (love), Symposium (love), and Philebus (wisdom, pleasure). Still, it is Aristotle (in Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric) who has generated the most extended, focused, and conceptually coherent discussion of emotionality on record from the classical Greek era.

Providing a temporal, developmental approach to the study of people's emotional dispositions and expressions in Nicomachean Ethics (especially Books 2-4; also see Prus 2007a [particularly 9-23]), Aristotle attends to emotionality as this pertains to the basic features of human knowing and acting, the emergence of character, the connectedness of character and emotionality with friendship, and the pursuit of happiness.

In developing Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle emphasizes the centrality of activity in the emergence of earlier (essentially pre-linguistic) creature acquired habits as well as those (processually interfused) practices that are subsequently achieved through instruction, reflective thought, and self-monitoring practices. Thus, Aristotle envisions people's known emotional tendencies as taking shape within the activities that inhere in language acquisition, instruction, deliberation, and choice-making practices. He also considers the ways in which people express various aspects of character and manage their emotions as they attend to the morality of the broader community and relate more directly with (and mindfully of) particular others amidst their day-to-day activities. Still, even though Nicomachean Ethics has exceptional value for comprehending emotionality as a realm of human lived experience, it is in Rhetoric that Aristotle focuses yet more directly on emotionality as a situated, negotiable, definitional phenomenon.

Envisioning community life as revolving around sets of meaningful, deliberatively engaged, and actively constructed processes (and interchanges), Aristotle is mindful of people's capacities for: instructing, learning, and intentional recollection; knowingly attending to the past, present, and future; anticipating the viewpoints of single and multiple others; managing the impressions given off to others; contemplating and developing images of “whatness” and defining, assessing, invoking, and challenging instances of deception. Relatedly, he is highly attentive to the matters of people pursuing objectives, making choices, and implementing and monitoring their own activities as well as defining, making assessments of, and adjustments to, others within the fuller range of human interchange. This would include instances of cooperation, competition, resistance, and conflict; performing, sustaining, and severing alliances; and defining, experiencing, and expressing affection and disaffection toward oneself as well as others.

In contrast to most texts produced by rhetoricians, philosophers, and social scientists, Aristotle's Rhetoric provides an instructive set of contingent statements about people's experiences with emotionality that can be more directly addressed, examined, assessed, and conceptually qualified and/or extended through ethnographic inquiry and comparative analysis.

Because Aristotle is so direct, clear, and specific in detailing the processes of interchange and the emphasis associated with the intensification and neutralization of several emotional states in Rhetoric, this material has exceptional value as a set of highly focused generic social processes. Thus, the question or challenge is how to relate Aristotle's materials to contemporary considerations of emotionality.

The problem, ironically, is not one of connecting a more diffuse statement from the past with more conceptually sophisticated statements from the more recent present but quite the reverse. Indeed, Aristotle's highly detailed conceptual, pragmatist analysis of emotionality is much more attentive to human interchange as “something in the making” than are most contemporary considerations of emotionality (see the introduction to the present paper).

Aristotle does not offer a distinctive methodological study for studying emotionality as a feature of human interchange, but contemporary scholars may appreciate his general insistence on examining things in the instances in which they occur so that one might develop a more adequate base for comprehending the essence of the things under consideration. Relatedly, Aristotle stresses the importance of people arriving at the meanings of things through comparative analysis (analytic induction) in which instances are examined with reference to similarities and differences, as well as the flows and connections, to better establish the more basic features of the phenomena under consideration and the conceptual implications thereof.

Since Aristotle's work is process-based and so fundamentally attentive to activity, agency, and interchange, his analysis of emotionality is highly amenable to Chicago-style ethnographic inquiry. As well, Aristotle's more general emphasis on...
examining things in instances and subjecting instances to sustained analytic induction is strikingly consistent with the quest for the articulation of basic or generic social processes encouraged by theorists working in Chicago-style symbolic interactionism.\textsuperscript{21}

Prus' (1996) statement on emotionality was developed without direct exposure to the analyses of emotionality found in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* or *Rhetoric* (or other related materials from the classical Greek and Latin eras), but the texts developed by Aristotle and Prus (1996) have a distinctively complementary quality. In addition to shared emphases on multiple participant viewpoints, activity, interaction, reflectivity, agency and resistance, and minded adjustment — as well as a particularly explicit recognition of emotionality as a consequential feature of community life — both authors are highly attentive to the problematic, socially achieved nature of people’s “definitions of the situation.”

Still, whereas Aristotle is somewhat more definite in defining the parameters of emotionality as a resource within rhetorical contexts, Prus is more explicitly inquisitive and conceptually tentative in developing a research agenda for studying emotionality in ethnographic instances. Likewise, although Aristotle focuses more centrally on the role of rhetoricians, Prus attends to targets and tacticians in more proportioned terms. As well, whereas Aristotle considers the intensification and neutralization of emotionality in more formalized, public contexts, Prus is more mindful of the fuller range of people's involvements and continuities in emotionality. Still, both authors are highly mindful of both targets and tacticians and how they may more routinely enter into the theater of operations at hand.

When compared with Aristotle's more specific, thematically engaged discussion of emotions in *Rhetoric* (211-B11), Prus' (1996) treatment of emotionality as a generic social process is notably limited with respect to specific realms of emotional experience. The GSP material Prus presents allows for a fuller range of emotional states of the very sort that Aristotle engages but does not provide equivalents to the highly detailed contingency statements that Aristotle develops in dealing with particular emotional states, such as “anger and calm” or “pity and disregard,” for instance.

At the same time, however, Prus' analysis of emotionality is notably consistent with Aristotle's considerations of people's emotional experiences in both *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Rhetoric*. In addition to suggesting many departure points for subsequent inquiry, Prus' (1996) statement also constitutes a frame for more explicitly conceptualizing people's emotional experiences in comparative, transcontextual terms.

Aristotle may have focused primarily on speakers who more routinely operate in public arenas but the emotions of anger and calm, friendship and enmity, fear and confidence, shame and shamelessness, kindness and inconsideration, pity and indignation, and *evony and emulation* — that he so cogently addresses — are of exceptional relevance for examining the ways that people learn about, define, express their viewpoints and interests, and enter into extended arrays of interchanges with others in virtually all realms of human group life.\textsuperscript{22}

Given the conceptual depth that Aristotle provides in his analysis of emotionality, *Rhetoric* suggests a great many points of inquiry into the ways that people may define, comprehend, assess, and potentially shape (promote, neutralize, and more directly contest) the affective states that others experience as well as the commitments auditors (as targets) make to particular viewpoints and lines of activity.\textsuperscript{21}

Moreover, because his material was developed in another place and time, Aristotle's analysis of emotionality represents a resource of exceptional value for more comprehensive transcontextual and transhistorical comparative analyses of influence work and emotionality as well as the interconnectedness of these two highly consequential features of human group life.

Scholars interested in the matters of emotionality and influence work, as well as the ways in which the contested realities of community life take place on a day-to-day basis, will find a conceptual/analytic treasure chest of great value in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

Still, given the affinities of Aristotle's approach to the study of human knowing and acting with the American pragmatist tradition associated with George Herbert Mead and Herbert Blumer, there is even more to be gained for students of the human condition when Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is integrated with the theoretical, methodological, and ethnographic resources of Chicago-style symbolic interactionism.

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\textsuperscript{21} As an extension of some of these notions, it would seem instructive to examine people’s experiences as adjudicators, claimants, defendants, victims, and third-party associates in instances of influence work — asking about their involvements, activities, and emotional experiences “before, during, and after” encounters in particular instances of contested reality. Indeed, it should not be assumed that those other (seemingly background) participants are the mere targets of the more visible speakers but may actively assume roles as tacticians in initiating and otherwise entering into the developmental flows of the interchanges at hand. See Prus (1999) for a fuller statement on “the interchangeability of target and tactician roles.”

\textsuperscript{22} In addition to those assuming roles as agents of influence in political, judicial, and evaluative settings, Aristotle's depiction of emotionality also seems highly pertinent to studies of those working as entertainers, educators, service workers, marketers and salespeople, managers and administrators, and religious leaders, as well as those involved in more casual realms (e.g., love, friendship, recreation) of human association.

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\[20\] Those familiar with Glaser and Strauss (1967) and Blumer (1969) will recognize the basic affinities of their positions on studying instances and utilizing comparative analysis with those of Aristotle on these matters — as suggested also in Prus (1996, 1997, 1999; 2003b; 2007b), Prus and Grills (2003), and Prus and Mitchell (2009).
References


