Resilience and Crisis as Modalities of Subjectivity Across Its Trajectories

Małgorzata Stochmal^*

https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8385-2844

Rezyliencja i kryzys jako modalności podmiotowości w jej trajektoriach

Introduction to the problem

Resilient subjectivity and crisis subjectivity delineate possible representations of the subject’s existence in the world. Both categories have attracted the attention of scholars across multiple disciplines, because they enable the capture of the dynamics by which individual and collective subjectivities respond to the challenges of the contemporary world (Calvente and Smicker 2019: 141–155). Both modalities are rooted in the same ontological structure of the subject and become manifest depending on the context, available resources, and structural pressures that may either support or block the actualisation of agential potentialities. In this article, resilience and crisis are understood not as enduring attributes of subjects or as opposing states, but as modal actualisations of the same ontological structure of subjectivity. In this sense, resilience and crisis constitute possible modalities of subjectivity, shaping the qualities of human well-being. Their actualisation is processual and temporal in character; they unfold across the life trajectories of individuals and collectivities, revealing different ways of negotiating burdens, pressures, and agential potentials. In the scholarly literature, resilience and crisis most often function as opposing categories. Although this perspective is intuitively persuasive, it fails to capture the ontological complexity of subjectivity and the modal character of its actualisation over time.

This article aims to provide a theoretical account of subjectivity in moments of resilience and crisis from the perspective of critical realism, with particular attention to the processes through which the potentialities of agential subjecthood are constructed and deconstructed in the face of adversity. Subjectivity is understood here as an emergent structure of agential potentialities, whose actualisation unfolds in relation to social and cultural structures and is modal and temporal in character. The article distinguishes three categories of potentialities that operate as buffers of resilience: (1) socio-relational, (2) cognitive-psychological, and (3) institutional-cultural. The analysis focuses on those resources and potentialities for action that may be temporarily blocked, weakened, or disorganised, but need not be permanently lost. It also identifies the “buffers of resilience” that may limit the effects of social destabilisation and support processes of renewal in individual and collective agency across the trajectories of subjectivity.

The horizons of reference and meaning in critical social realism

Thomas Brante notes that, under the conditions of an increasing fragmentation within sociology, it becomes necessary to develop a shared philosophical foundation capable of integrating dispersed research approaches (Brante 2001: 168). Critical social realism can fulfil this function as an analytical and theoretical framework, offering a coherent ontological grounding for strengthening the psychosocial accounts of agential subjecthood. This, however, does not mean that such a perspective can be equated with the lived experience of subjects themselves. Here, it is useful to draw on Krzysztof Wielecki’s concept of the horizon of reference. A horizon of reference is a mental map of the world, i.e. a set of beliefs, values, and assumptions that confer meaning upon experience and define the boundaries of what is possible, important, and intelligible for the subject (Wielecki 2003a: 330–331). It constitutes the interpretive framework within which individuals situate themselves and their actions, shaping both themselves and others. In this article, critical realism remains the theoretical perspective, whereas the horizon of reference serves as a category for describing the experience and meaning-orientation of acting subjects.

In the social sciences, one cannot speak of the capacities and resources of subjects without considering how meanings are conferred upon experience. Language plays a crucial role here as a space in which meanings are negotiated and a shared image of the world is constructed – a world within which the subject acts and interprets what befalls them (Elder-Vass 2012: 77–138). As Krzysztof Wielecki observes, communication is an act of linguistically co-creating the horizons of reference of a shared lifeworld. This world provides not only cultural resources but also agreed interpretive patterns that make the construction of meaning possible. It is, therefore, necessary to adopt a particular horizon of reference, i.e. a framework within which interpreting the world and acting within it becomes possible. Language, as a symbolic medium, opens up the space of meaning within which the knowing and acting subject moves (Wielecki 2003b: 297). From the perspective of critical realism, such horizons may themselves become objects of analysis within the relational interplay among structure, culture, and agency. The central horizon of meaning in critical social realism is the ontological distinctness of structure, agency, and culture (SAC: Structure–Agency–Culture) as the real constituents of social reality (Archer 1995: 1–25). In this light, the discussion that follows focuses on the modal actualisations of agential subjectivity within this configuration.

Social structures and culture are ontologically prior, while the subject possesses the potential to enter into relations with others. Krzysztof Wielecki expresses the idea of subjectivity in the following way:

For the moment, we know at least this much: the subject is someone who is capable of acting, of being the agent of something as a result of their own activity. It is someone, not something, someone differentiated from things and from other subjects. It exists in the sense of being in the world, in reality, in being. Yet it is also a mode of being that stands out from that reality, world, things, and other subjects. It is, in some measure, autonomous. It is this someone precisely, and not someone else. As I have mentioned, it is distinguished from others and remains identical with itself, rather than with someone else. It stands out from being through its actions, through its capacity for its own, separate, and to some extent self-directed and autonomous activity. To some extent, it is also aware of its actions and its aims. It is likewise, to a certain degree, aware of the effects of its action. Being a subject is therefore also bound up with responsibility. The subject is also someone who appears in a certain context, in relation to someone or something, and thus within certain relations (Wielecki 2003b: 302).

Subjectivity constitutes both an epistemological and an axiological challenge, insofar as it presupposes that individuals not only know and interpret the world, but also bear responsibility for themselves and for others. Subjectivity may express the meaningfulness of an individual’s life insofar as that individual recognises a world of values to which they relate their conduct. Above all, subjectivity involves assuming responsibility for one’s own identity and fate, as well as for the identity and fate of others. In this sense, subjectivity is understood as a real, emergent agential potential that is actualised in moments of choice, resistance to routine, a reinterpretation of experience, or a redefinition of one’s role in the world. It is relational and processual in character, developing, transforming, and becoming internalised through interactions with others and in response to the challenges arising from the sociocultural context. Reflexivity performs the function of a mediating operator between structure and agency, since it is precisely through the internal capacity for reflexive action that the subject can not only adapt to changing conditions but also intentionally and consciously shape the structures within which they operate.

In this account, then, subjectivity is not merely an abstract theoretical category, but a real and distinctive potential possessed by every individual or collective social actor. This potential may be developed, suppressed, or strengthened depending on social conditions, available resources, and the support provided by others. In moments of crisis, tension, or rupture, it may become a crucial source of inner strength that sustains or restores agency. Subjectivity thus appears as a fundamental component of human action in the social world, in both its reproductive and transformative dimensions. Its actualisations are modal in character and manifest across the trajectories of individuals’ and collectivities’ lives. Subjectivity remains a dynamic potential that enables the shaping of transformations at the interface between structure and agency. At this point, we may, of course, distinguish between individual and collective subjectivity.

Every human being is both the bearer and co-creator of social relations that preexist and condition them, which is a point central to understanding individual subjectivity (Vandenberghe 2007: 512). Collective subjectivity, by contrast, in the critical realist account, arises from the conviction that social groups are not merely sums of individuals but emergent entities capable of articulating interests, coordinating action, and producing causal effects. Their constitution unfolds in stages. First, there is a moment of symbolic identification, when the collectivity begins to perceive itself as a “we”/“us”, i.e. as a common subject bound together by the awareness of belonging and shared fate (2007: 505–506). Next comes organisational and technical mediation, in which stabilising interactions are supported by institutions and procedures that enable coordinated collective action (Vandenberghe 2007: 504–506). The next stage is representation, in which an emergent spokesperson confers upon the group the status of a “higher-order subject” acting in the public sphere. Finally, through relations among institutions and organisations, as well as second- and third-order relations, fully developed collective subjectivity takes shape, endowed with emergent agential properties irreducible to individuals (2007: 509–510). Such a subject is a real social actor, stabilised through cultural and material relations that grant it relative autonomy. Agency thus refers to people’s capacity to act and to reflect upon the relatively broad context in which they are embedded. Structure and culture may shape the conditions under which agency is actualised, but within Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach, they do not determine it absolutely.

Resilient capacities as buffering resources

If subjectivity is understood in this way, i.e. as an ontological and emergent entity endowed with specific potentialities, resilience appears as one of the key modal dispositions inscribed within this structure. It is not an autonomous trait or a stable property of the subject. Still, it refers instead to a mode of actualising agential potentialities under the conditions of uncertainty, disruption, or structural pressure. Resilience, understood as the life capacity to regain balance, adapt, and respond creatively to challenges in difficult or liminal situations, is a processual and relational phenomenon. It is not a static characteristic, but a dynamic form of life-sustaining resilience embedded in the agential powers of subjectivity. It denotes the human capacity to project one’s own personal potential into the surrounding social space, regardless of the degree of comfort afforded by social conditions (Лазарева Л.П. /Lazareva L.P. 2020: 32). In this sense, it functions as a mechanism that enables subjectivity to be sustained in contexts of destabilisation, threat, or structural pressure. Resilience thus conditions the possibility of the subject’s transformative action when the previously established frameworks of functioning begin to erode.

The scholarly literature distinguishes various approaches to defining resilience. One of them, often described as “heroic”, focuses on the individual characteristics that enable people to cope successfully with adversity. Critics of this approach, however, have pointed to its limitations, particularly its neglect of the influence of social structures on people’s capacity to overcome hardship. For this reason, a more complex sociological account of resilience has been proposed, one that takes into consideration both the mobilisation of resources – whether economic, social, cultural, or environmental – and the displacement of risk across time and space (Estêvão, Calado, and Capucha 2017: 9–25). At the level of the subject, resilience activates reflexive, intentional, and interpretive potentialities that enable the subject to redefine a situation and take action within the existing structural and cultural constraints. Such agency is, therefore, reflexively grounded in the subject’s consciousness, while reflexivity enables individuals to recognise their own concerns and choose possible strategies of action.

Social resilience emerges as a property of the relational interaction between the agential subject, whether individual or collective, and the sociocultural structure. It is not a simple sum of resources or merely the outcome of individual competencies, but arises within the entanglements of social, institutional, and cultural relations. Social resilience thus includes the potential to enter into relations with others that enable the continuity of action under conditions of disruption, as well as the capacity to transform both the self and the environment when the circumstances require it. In this sense, resilience reflects powers to bring about transformation rather than forces that merely protect against change. What is at stake here is powers that enable change when the maintenance of a previous equilibrium is no longer possible.

Regardless of whether these potentialities are individual or collective, resilience capital can be systematically accumulated and strengthened. Social capital is one of the key mechanisms that buffer the effects of disasters and crises. Examples of its three forms are drawn from the report titled The 2024 Flood in Poland from the Perspective of the Social Aspects of One Public Health (Jarynowski et al. 2025). Bonding capital refers to strong ties within local communities and is expressed, among other things, through joint evacuations of people and animals, the organisation of accommodation, or spontaneous neighbourly assistance. What becomes visible here is a high level of trust, reciprocity, and a sense of responsibility for “one’s own”. Bridging capital refers to relations between different social groups, as illustrated, for example, by cooperation between school students and older people in dealing with the effects of flooding, or by joint efforts of residents from different parts of a municipality. Linking capital, in turn, refers to relations among local communities, institutions of authority, and crisis-management structures, such as Volunteer Fire Brigades, local officials, or community leaders. These forms are not merely empirical resources, but carriers of resilient potentialities that may be activated in specific situational contexts.

Resilient resources require long-term maintenance to serve as a buffer in times of crisis. They include, among other things, the capacity to sustain and rebuild relationships, the ability to reflect upon one’s own emotions and beliefs, an agential sense of a meaningful action, practices that reinforce belonging and continuity, as well as the cultivation of trust, reciprocity, and recognition. Resilient capacities are “resources to buffer” (Adger et al. 2005: 1038) the negative consequences for the well-being of individual or collective subjects. Owing to these capacities, it becomes possible not only to limit damage but also to actively shape survival and developmental strategies under the conditions of uncertainty. Individual and collective subjects possess resources that can buffer against threats under polycrisis conditions (Izumi et al. 2024). In this account, resilience is hybrid, combining psychosocial, institutional, and material elements. It cannot be reduced to any single sphere of functioning. The consistent support for these resources may not only reduce communities’ vulnerability to the adverse effects of polycrises but also strengthen their capacity to proactively shape the future under the conditions of uncertainty.

Resilient capacities can be characterised by a high degree of variability (Glantz and Johnson 2002: 24). Their intensity can differ across subjects and change over time, becoming manifest or receding depending on biographical and structural contexts. This variability confirms the modal character of resilience, understood as a mode of actualising agential potentialities at specific moments in the trajectory of subjectivity. Markus Keck and Patrick Sakdapolrak proposed a three-part conception of social resilience. They define social resilience in the following terms:

• coping capacities – the capacities of social actors to cope with and overcome all kinds of adversity;
• adaptive capacities – the capacities to adjust to the environment based on past experiences in anticipation of the future;
• transformative capacities – the capacities to create institutional arrangements that support individual well-being and sustainable social resilience in the face of future crises (Keck and Sakdapolrak 2013: 5).

Coping capacities involve reactive and absorptive forms of action. They are activated after a threat has materialised and involve mobilising the available resources to overcome difficulties or reduce their negative effects. Their primary aim is to restore the subject to a state of well-being, or at least to the relative equilibrium that had existed before the crisis.

Adaptive capacities refer to proactive measures undertaken before a threat occurs. They enable individuals to learn from experience, anticipate future risks, and adjust their ways of life to secure future well-being. Resilience reflects the extent to which a complex adaptive system is capable of self-organisation and of developing capacities for learning and modifying its responses (Adger et al. 2005: 1036–1039). In this sense, adaptive capacities constitute a modal way of actualising agential potentialities under the conditions of a recognised, though not yet fully realised, destabilisation. Resilience thus includes precisely those adaptive capacities that build preparedness for unexpected events and enable the domestication of what is new, unfamiliar, and unforeseen. Adaptation becomes a key mechanism of survival and development, and, in doing so, shapes the trajectories of subjectivity over the longer term, which is indispensable for their durable functioning and well-being.

Transformative capacities refer to the potential of subjects to rebuild and reconfigure social structures in response to experiences of threat. When the existing order is disrupted, individuals and collectivities undertake action aimed not only at restoring the pre-crisis condition, but also at qualitatively transforming the spaces of life so that they become more resilient to future challenges. The transformative dimension of resilience appears here as a modality of agency that goes beyond adaptation, activated when the existing structural and cultural frameworks no longer permit continued functioning. In the literature, transformative capacities are defined as the ability to access resources and support from the wider sociopolitical arena as well as to participate in decision-making processes aimed at creating new institutions and systems of action. They imply radical change aimed at improving present and future well-being, rather than merely securing it. In this sense, transformation does not consist in returning to a former equilibrium, but in creatively moving beyond it by reconfiguring relations among structure, culture, and agency, and producing new forms of social organisation.

Subjectivity under the conditions of crisis: The modal weakening of agency

Various kinds of a social crisis may coexist simultaneously, not least because of their prolonged and extended temporal character. Social crises are no longer perceived as incidental or exceptional events but, rather, as a durable component of social experience, one that fills – and indeed saturates – everyday life. Of particular importance here is the temporality of crisis itself, which rarely takes the form of a single event and more often unfolds as an evolving sequence of disruptions affecting how situations are interpreted, how possibilities for action are assessed, and how far subjects are able to mobilise their own agential potentialities.

Crises overlap, creating complex configurations of overload in which particular dimensions of destabilisation reinforce one another, weakening individuals’ and collectivities’ capacity to respond effectively. These complex configurations are not simply the sum of individual crises, but an emergent effect of the interaction of the different mechanisms that generate them. Such entangled constellations produce states of chronic uncertainty in which it becomes difficult not only to reconstruct agency but even to understand the sources of one’s own helplessness. These crises reveal their consequences across different spheres of life, meaning that their impact on subjects is always noticeable to some degree. In this context, it becomes legitimate to ask about the constitution of crisis subjectivities, understood not as enduring states or types of subject, but as modal forms of the actualisation of agency under the conditions of overload, disorganisation, or temporary resource scarcity.

Unlike resilient capacities, which are activated as buffering mechanisms in response to destabilisation, crisis modalities become visible where agential potentialities remain temporarily blocked, weakened, or dispersed under the pressure of realised overloads. They do not, however, constitute the negative reverse of resili-ence or its simple absence, but, rather, the modal dimension of the same ontological structure of subjectivity, within which agential powers may wane, oscillate, or undergo temporary disorganisation. In this sense, a crisis reveals tensions in the relation between structure, culture, and the subject; excessive structural pressures, chronic uncertainty, and the destabilisation of interpretive frameworks can temporarily limit the capacity to mediate between reflexivity and action, without abolishing the ontological possibility of agency itself.

Crisis subjectivities are the effect of the social and cultural reconstruction of subjectivity under the conditions of chronic uncertainty, rather than merely the result of individuals’ deficits. They are produced within dominant discourses that not only describe but also normatively regulate ways of coping with a crisis, classifying individuals according to their capacity to adapt. In this sense, three analytical figures can be distinguished: the exhausted subject, who, though apparently resilient, has reached the limit of their capacity to function under permanent tension; the deferring subject, suspended in a state of liminality, attempting to recover strength and a sense of purpose but unable to find a stable foothold; and the rejected subject, who is constitutively excluded from the time of progress, does not participate in narratives of development, and does not belong to modernising projects. These figures belong to the broader field of “failed subjects”, who are the products of and sites of the operation of structural crises (Calvente and Smicker 2019: 145–146).

Crisis subjectivities do not stand in opposition to resilient subjectivities. Both refer to the same ontological reality of the subject and express the internal differentiation of the modal actualisations of agency. Dominant potentialities can generate resilient subjectivity, while other aspects of the same subjectivity display features of crisis subjectivity. A crisis condition need not imply a permanent absence of potentialities, but can instead take the form of their temporary absence, dormancy, or disorganisation. Such powerlessness is not a final state and can be overcome through the reconstruction of resources and the restoration of the conditions for the actualisation of agency.

Crisis subjectivity can be understood as a particular moment in an individual’s or a collectivity’s life trajectory, conditioned by situational and structural contexts. In dominant media discourses, crisis subjectivities whose agency is temporarily suspended or constrained are often represented in simplified and biased ways. These narratives rely on categories such as victimhood, weakness, ineptitude, dependency, or helplessness, reducing complex processes to moralising judgements and stigmatising labels. From the perspective of critical realism, it is necessary to challenge these superficial classifications and to undertake an immanent critique of the language of description, exposing the inadequacy of its epistemic claims in relation to the deeper, irreducible layers of social reality. In line with the ontology of powers, or power without activity, even the most withdrawn or disorganised forms of being in the world may contain dormant potentialities for the recovery of agency. These potentialities require recognition and appropriate conditions for their activation.

Let us recall that Wielecki understands the horizon of reference as a mental order of meaning – a map of beliefs, values, and interpretations that enables human beings to orient themselves in the world and build identity. Under the conditions of the contemporary civilisational crisis, driven by the dominance of secularised instrumental rationality, these horizons are eroded, leading to the loss of frameworks of meaning and the disruption of life practices (Wielecki 2020). The disintegration of the horizons of reference weakens reflexivity and the capacity for mediation between structure and action, generating crisis subjectivity, a condition of disorientation, anxious internal conversation, and a loss of agency, which renders human beings vulnerable to frustration and destructive forms of response (Wielecki 2018: 7–9). In this sense, the crisis of the horizons of reference constitutes not only a cultural disruption of meaning, but also a mechanism that undermines the conditions for the actualisation of agency without abolishing its ontological possibility.

In this context, it is worth noting that the weakening of the horizons of reference not only concerns the cognitive order but also extends to the mechanisms of the normative regulation of action, which operate to a significant degree through emotions. Research at the intersection of sociology and neuroscience indicates that moral emotions such as shame, guilt, and moral outrage serve a mediating function between norms and action, supporting the internalisation of the normative order and stabilising subjects’ orientation in the social world. This approach distinguishes between biologically-grounded moral capacity and specific moral norms, which are historically and culturally variable, yet may act effectively precisely because of the emotional “scaffolding” of behavioural regulation (Georgiev 2025). The erosion of the horizons of reference, therefore, leads not only to a loss of meaning but also to a weakening of the emotional mechanisms of normative self-regulation, which further hinders the actualisation of agency under the conditions of crisis. From the perspective of critical realism, moral emotions can thus be understood as elements of relational mechanisms linking normative structure to agential subjecthood, and their disorganisation fosters the manifestation of crisis modalities of subjectivity.

Selected resources that may function as buffers and their components

The literature increasingly foregrounds the agential powers that equip subjects with resilient capacities. Agential powers are understood here as potentialities inscribed within the ontological structure of subjectivity, which subjects may draw upon in situations that require action. They are not traits or enduring dispositions, but possibilities that may, though need not, be activated under the conditions of destabilisation. In this sense, resilient capacities are not a fixed property of subjects, but a dynamic resource that can be actualised in response to specific situational conditions.

These potentialities are diverse and embedded in the relational ontology of social reality. They emerge through processes of interaction among individuals and collectivities, social structures, and the cultural dimension. They are emergent in character; they cannot be directly reduced either to individual characteristics or to structural influences, but arise at the intersection of individual resources – whether physical, psychological, or cognitive – and external conditions which, from the perspective of a given subject, can be either enabling or constraining. In the proposed account, the aim is not to identify individual deficits, but to analyse the social and cultural conditions under which specific agential potentialities can be strengthened, weakened, or blocked. Consequently, the agential powers that enable the manifestation of resilient capacities can be organised into three key types of potentiality: relational-social, cognitive-psychological, and institutional-cultural.

Relational-social potentialities refer to the relations among members of a community. Several components can be distinguished here. The first one is social support networks, i.e. the availability of material, emotional, and informational support from significant others and neighbours. The second element is reciprocity, understood as norms of resource exchange and solidarity that function as a form of informal social insurance (Onyx and Bullen 2000). Another important indicator is the intensity of social contact, referring to the frequency of interactions that strengthen the circulation of resources and information (ibid.). This category also includes place attachment, i.e. the emotional and identity-based rootedness of residents in the local community (Mayer 2019). The final indicator in this group is the quality of emotional support, referring to the experienced sense of care, understanding, and closeness in social relations, which particularly strengthens readiness to act in times of a crisis (ibid.). These are not characteristics of individuals but, rather, relationally-produced conditions for the actualisation of agency, which enable action under stress, uncertainty, and limited information.

Cognitive-psychological potentialities refer to the interpretive and evaluative capacities through which subjects orient themselves in the world and make action possible. This category includes social and institutional trust, which lowers the costs of cooperation and facilitates coordinated action (Onyx and Bullen 2000; Mayer 2019). Also important are norms of cooperation and collaboration, i.e. values conducive to problem-solving and to readiness for collective action (Onyx and Bullen 2000). In the informational domain, one crucial element is access to information and communicative flows, including the ability to obtain information, its credibility, and the quality of the communication channel (Aldrich and Kyne 2019; Mayer 2019; Adamowski 2020). Another indicator is collective efficacy, understood as the belief that a community is capable of achieving intended outcomes and coping with a crisis (Mayer 2019; Nakagawa and Shaw 2004). This category is complemented by a sense of justice and inclusion, which refers to the extent to which residents regard the distribution of resources and support as fair and inclusive (Matin, Forrester, and Ensor 2018). These potentialities form the core of subject-based resilience, understood not as passive survival but as the active shaping of one’s relation to the world in the face of crisis experiences. Resilience grows out of the “ordinary magic of ordinary resources” (Wright and Masten 2005: 235) – resources embedded in the subject’s mind and emotional dispositions, which enable the recovery of equilibrium even under the conditions of chronic destabilisation.

Institutional-cultural potentialities are rooted in durable structures and patterns that organise collective life. The first element of this dimension is collective action, i.e. the capacity to mobilise and organise action in crises (Nakagawa and Shaw 2004). Another indicator is network diversity in the form of bridging and linking ties which refer to connections between different social groups and relations with public institutions (Kyne and Aldrich 2020). An important role is also played by intermediary organisations – such as NGOs, Volunteer Fire Brigades, or local groups – which provide channels for coordination and resource mobilisation (ibid.). Structural indicators also include the density of civic and religious organisations, understood as the number of associations, religious groups, and NGOs operating in a given region (ibid.). Also subject to assessment is the level of political and institutional connectedness, including participation in public consultations, electoral turnout, or access to decision-makers (Kyne and Aldrich 2020). The final indicator is the community’s communicative capacity, including access to communication infrastructure such as telephones, the Internet, or local media, which significantly affects mobilisation and the management of information in times of a crisis (Kyne and Aldrich 2020; Mayer 2019). These resources are expressed through established communal practices, a strong group identity, collective memory, and communities’ capacities for symbolic and organisational reconfiguration in the face of a threat. Their presence not only stabilises the social system, but also supports the emergence of forms of life capable of flourishing under the conditions of unpredictability. These potentialities create the institutional-cultural conditions for the actualisation of agency, enabling communities not only to stabilise themselves, but also to reconfigure the symbolic and organisational forms of social life.

These resources do not operate in isolation. Rather, they dynamically reinforce or erode one another depending on the context. Their synergistic operation can constitute an important component of the morphogenesis of resilient subjectivity, making possible not only survival under the conditions of a crisis, but also the active co-creation of the conditions of future social well-being.

Conclusion

From the perspective of critical social realism, resilience emerges as a property of subjectivity, arising from the relations between social structures, culture, and agential subjecthood. This three-dimensional frame of reference, rooted in Margaret Archer’s morphogenetic approach, makes it possible to understand resilience not as a stable trait or an individual competence, but as a modal way of actualising agential potentialities under specific sociocultural conditions. In this account, “resilient capacities” do not constitute a set of psychological or social traits, but, rather, involve a complex and dynamic architecture of practices, relations, and resources that enables the reconfiguration of social reality under the conditions of destabilisation.

From the perspective of the trajectories of subjectivity, resilience and crisis appear as coexisting and interrelated modalities of agency that shape the course of biographical and collective experience. A crisis reveals the tensions and constraints inherent in the current configuration of agency. In contrast, resilience – grounded in coping, adaptive, and transformative capacities – delineates possible directions of response to those constraints. Whether a given trajectory leads to recovery, reinforcement, transformation, or, conversely, to the temporary suspension or marginalisation of agency depends on the specific conditions under which subjective potentialities are actualised in a given structural and cultural context. In this sense, the trajectories of subjectivity are not determined in advance; a crisis can both constrain and initiate morphogenetic processes, while resilience functions as a mechanism that enables movement from disorganisation towards new forms of agency and meaningful action.

These conclusions are significant not only in theoretical but also in practical terms. They point to the need to design public policies and social institutions that do not merely manage adaptation to crises, but create conditions for the real participation of subjects in processes of social transformation. The proposed concept of “resilient life spaces” may serve as a heuristic framework for social and educational activities aimed at strengthening agency and long-term well-being at both the individual and the collective levels.

Future research should extend this perspective through empirical analyses that capture how the modal actualisations of resilient and crisis subjectivity are realised in specific local contexts in response to threat and uncertainty. Particularly promising in this regard are transdis ciplinary approaches integrating sociology with social psychology, engaged anthropology, and institutional theory. Only then will it become possible not simply to ‘measure’ resilience as an indicator, but to support it in a real sense as a dynamic, relational, and ontologically-grounded dimension of human being-together in the world.