

Vol. **11.2** 2013

Research **in** Language



WYDAWNICTWO
UNIWERSYTETU
ŁÓDZKIEGO

RL Vol. 11.2 2013

Research in Language

edited by
EWA WANIEK-KLIMCZAK



WYDAWNICTWO
UNIWERSYTETU
ŁÓDZKIEGO

ŁÓDŹ 2013

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COVER DESIGN

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Printed directly from camera-ready materials provided to the Łódź University Press

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Published by Łódź University Press
First Edition. W.06622.14.0.C

ISSN 1731-7533

Online version is a primary one (vol. 11.2)

Łódź University Press
90-131 Łódź, Lindleya 8
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phone (42) 665 58 63, fax (42) 665 58 62

Print and setting: Quick Druk

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RESEARCHING MEANING, CONTEXT AND COGNITION EDITORIAL TO RIL SPECIAL ISSUE

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The present issue of Research in Language has been inspired by discussions conducted during the meetings of the annual international conference “Meaning, Context & Cognition” (MCC), held in University of Łódź, Poland, since 2011. MCC, organised by the Department of English Language and Applied Linguistics, focuses on topics relevant to the fields of speech actions and natural language processing. The goal of the conference has been to integrate and promote both theoretical and applied research from the interface of semantics and pragmatics.

The papers included in the volume, even though few in number, reflect the wide range of interests represented by MCC participants and complement other collections inspired by MCC meetings (cf. Witczak-Plisiecka 2013). They are diverse in the choice of particular research programmes, but well integrated by the authors’ interest in the processes hidden behind linguistic action. The papers explore how meaning arises in particular contexts, and how language studies intersect with other fields of human action. Among the languages discussed in the articles there are: Basque, Czech, French, English, Polish, Arabic, Mandarin Chinese, and Italian. The cognitive-pragmatic research frameworks include, *inter alia*, relevance theory, Langacker’s cognitive grammar, critical pragmatics, and conversation analysis.

The first paper “(Non-)Determining the original speaker: reportative particles *versus* verbs”, by **Larraitz Zubeldia**, focuses on the Basque reportative particle *omen*. The discussion is based on Korta and Perry’s (2007, 2011) conception of propositional content, on the basis of which the author claims that the presence of “omen” contributes to the propositional content of the utterance. The author also explicitly subscribes to relevance theoretic framework (Sperber and Wilson 1986/1995). With data obtained from an assent/dissent test and a controlled experiment, it is argued, against the received view, that the function of both “omen” and a relater verb, “esan” (“to say”), goes beyond that of an illocutionary force indicator and that there is a theoretically important difference between the meaning of *omen*-sentences and the contents of *omen*-utterances. The nature of “omen”, as well as its relation to “esan”, is discussed with reference to varied methodological tools, not only experiments, but also native speakers’ intuitions and corpora. The paper is also a contribution in the field of research focused on evidentiality, respecting Wilson’s proposal (2011) to distinguish between lexicalized and grammaticalised evidentials and epistemic modals. It reports facts from the Basque language and poses Basque-related questions.

The theme of evidentiality is further explored by **Milada Hirschová** in “Sentence adverbials and evidentiality”, a paper discussing expressions of evidence (originating in perception, inference or reported information) and their role in sentence/utterance pragmatic modification. The paper focuses on the role of the so-called sentence adverbials, citing numerous examples from Czech and providing a thorough description of their varied forms and functions. It is claimed that in languages not expressing evidence as a grameme, the embodiment of the evidentiality-related element can occur in almost any sentence position. Expressing evidences overlap with pragmatic modifications, or with expressing communicative strategies like reasoning or explanation, in other words, with the so-called subsidiary illocutions, which are entirely pragmatic. In languages like Czech, evidentiality is shown to fall into the semantic/pragmatic domain, merging with other, i.e. non-evidential, pragmatic modifications of a sentence/utterance.

“Discourse-driven meaning construction in neosemantic noun-to-verb conversions” is the topic of the next paper authored by **Rafal Augustyn**. Conversions of the type *beer* → *to beer*, *door* → *to door*, *pink* → *to pink*, are discussed within a cognitive linguistics approach as items which involve discourse-guided and context-based interpretation. Methodologically, the analysis draws on Fauconnier and Turner’s (e.g. 2002) Conceptual Integration Theory and Langacker’s (e.g. 2008) Current Discourse Space.

Federico Farini’s paper entitled “The pragmatics of emotions in interlinguistic healthcare settings” is a data-based study of medical interactions which involve migrant patients. The focus is on the interpreters’ role and proficiency in rendering emotionally-loaded concerns expressed by the patients in intercultural settings. The data under analysis includes 300 transcripts of interactions which took place in Italy, which are discussed within an intercultural pragmatic framework (e.g. Angelelli 2004) and the methodology of conversation analysis.

The last two papers are focused on political discourse. In “‘Energy independence’: President Obama’s rhetoric of a success story”, **Stephanie Bonnefile** explores the tropes used in President Obama’s rhetoric on energy and environmental issues. Using corpus linguistics methodology, the author indicates how well known topics, such the Space Race, the Cold War, or 9/11, receive a new value by defining reasoning related to other issues. It is argued that the cognitive linguistic approach to rhetoric (e.g. Sperber (2007 [1975]), Gibbs (1994)) is able to elucidate conceptualisation mechanisms active in shaping the image of a consistent political position, and create a virtual success story.

Ewa Gieron-Czeczor’s text, “Verbal warfare in the Polish media: An analysis of conceptual metaphors in political discourse”, further explores political rhetoric in a cognitive linguistic approach, focusing on Polish data. In the author’s opinion, Polish political discourse, in contrast to widely discussed discourses of, e.g. Obama and Bush, is primarily focused on Polish internal issues. As a result, the Polish political discourse mirrors the most visible feature of Polish politics, which is conflict. On the basis of corpus data, culled between September 2011 and mid-January 2012, the study traces conceptual metaphors used by Polish politicians and the metaphors that journalists use when narrating political events in Poland. The sources also include daily news published on popular portals and online services of selected Polish dailies and magazines. It is suggested that the analyses of spoken and written data reveals that political, social and economic antagonisms are propelled by language which highlights dichotomies and

depicts “the others” as a source of evil. The metaphors of the Polish language are shown to be consistent with the patterns investigated and described by Anglo-American cognitive linguists (e.g. Lakoff 1987; Lakoff & Johnson 1980), providing a wealth of material to support the claim that ARGUMENT IS WAR.

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(NON)-DETERMINING THE ORIGINAL SPEAKER: REPORTATIVE PARTICLES *VERBVS* *VERBS*¹

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Abstract

This work argues that the Basque reportative particle *omen* contributes to the propositional contents of the utterance, and it is not an illocutionary force indicator, contrary to what seems to be suggested by the standard view on *omen*. The results of the application of the assent/dissent test for the case of *omen* show that subjects not only accept a rejection of the reported content (*p*), but also a rejection of the evidential content (*p_{omen}*) itself. The results are similar to those of the verb *esan* ‘to say’. It is, then, proposed that the difference between these two elements can be explained by distinguishing between the contents of the utterances (with Korta & Perry 2007, 2011), regarding the (non-)articulation of the original speaker.

Keywords: Basque, pragmatics, semantics, proposition

1. Introduction

The aim of this work is to provide a brief account of the main semantic and pragmatic properties of the Basque *reportative* particle *omen*,² by means of distinguishing and determining the meaning of *omen*-sentences and the contents of *omen*-utterances

¹ I would like to thank Dr. Kepa Korta, for his indispensable help when developing the ideas of this work, which is based on my PhD dissertation. And Prof. Robyn Carston, for her very helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper. Thanks are due, as well, to Kasper Boye, Richard Breheny, Eros Corazza, Bert Cornillie, Thiago Galery, Joana Garmendia, Bittor Hidalgo, Mikhail Kissine, Jesus M. Larrazabal, Maria Ponte, Nausicaa Pouscoulous, Kate Scott and Ye Tian for their comments at previous presentations of some of the ideas of this work. I will like to thank the audience at the MCC conference presentation, especially Corey Benom and Daniel Sax, for their comments. And to Jyrki Tuomainen, for his help analysing the results of the experiment. All the mistakes are my own, of course. Last but not least my sincere gratitude to Iwona Witczak-Plisiecka for her kindness and patience. This work was partially supported by grants of the Basque Government (IT323-10) and the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation (FFI2009-08574 and FFI2012-37726). The author is a researcher in the postdoctoral program of the Department of Education, Universities and Research of the Basque Government.

² I will use simple quotation marks (‘...’) to mention expressions and as scare quotes, whereas double quotation marks (“...”) to mark utterances. I will give the examples of sentences without any quotation marks, but numbered. Finally, I will make use of SMALL CAPITAL LETTERS to represent propositions.

(following the distinctions made by Kaplan (1989) and Perry (2001)). I make use, for that aim, of the comparison with the verb *esan* ‘to say’. I think *omen* is worth studying for two main reasons. First, it is important from the point of view of Basque linguistics, where syntax has enjoyed a privileged place, whereas semantics and pragmatics have only occasionally been touched on. Until now, little research work has been done on the meaning and use of the Basque particles, like (reportative, ‘it is said’), *ei* (reportative, ‘it is said’), *ote* (used in questions), *al* (used in polar questions) or *bide* (inferential, ‘apparently’, ‘probably’) (see, for example, Jendraschek 2003 and Etxepare 2010, for recent works). That is why it is quite comprehensible that so many questions have been posed regarding the use of these particles. What is more, Basque grammarians and lexicographers have often taken neighbour languages (especially Spanish and French) as their reference. And it looks like this strategy has led them to a wrong approach, which I aim to correct. Second, it is interesting because it brings more information to the existing body of works on evidentiality, where it is often pointed out that, in order to produce a more general picture of this category, data from and analysis of more languages is needed (see Aikhenvald 2004: 23, Faller 2006: 17-18, McCready & Ogata 2007: 198 and Matthewson 2013: 2-3, among others).

This work is an attempt in that direction. I take the Basque particles that normally appear in the verbal complex as the subject of my work. By narrowing down the field of study even further, I centre my attention more particularly on the particle *omen*. To give an example:

- (1) “*Euri-a* *ari* *omen* *d-u*”³
 rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have
 ‘It is said that it’s raining.’

In its canonical use, *omen* is attached to conjugated verbs as part of the verbal complex.⁴

So, in this work, I will first take into account what has been said up to now about *omen* in linguistic literature, grammar and dictionaries of Basque language (what we take to be the standard view on *omen*) (part 2). Then, I will contend that *omen* contributes to the propositional contents of the utterance, and not to its illocutionary content (part 3). Finally, I will make a proposal regarding the contribution *omen* makes to the utterance, providing an analysis of both the meaning of *omen*-sentences and the contents of *omen*-utterances,⁵ and distinguishing them from the meaning and contents of the verb *esan* (part 4). I will finish with the conclusions and the work planned for the near future (part 5).

³ Abbreviations used: 1 = first person, 2 = second person, 3 = third person, ABS = absolutive, ADL = adlative, ALLOC = allocutive, COMP = complementizer, DAT = dative, DET = determiner, ERG = ergative, GEN = genitive, IPFV = imperfective, LOC = locative, PFV = perfective, PL = plural, PROG = progressive, PROSP = prospective, PRS = present, PRTV = partitive, PST = past, PTCP = participle, Q = question particle, REP = reportative, SG = singular.

⁴ It is this canonical use that all Basque dialects share.

⁵ I distinguish between *sentence* and *utterance*, and the *meaning* (or the *character*) of a sentence and the *contents* of an utterance, following Kaplan (1989) and Perry (2001). So, as for *omen*, too, I differentiate between two things: on the one hand, the meaning of an *omen*-sentence and, on the other hand, the contents of an *omen*-utterance and the contributions *omen* makes to them.

2. The standard view

Three claims can be taken to sum up what we call ‘the standard view’ on the particle *omen*:

- a. *Omen* signals that the proposition the speaker⁶ expresses was said by someone other than herself.
- b. The speaker expresses uncertainty on the truth (or falsity) of the proposition expressed.
- c. It is the equivalent of the Spanish *se dice (que)*, *parece (que)*, *dicen (que)*, and French *on dit (que)*, *il paraît (que)*, *semble-t-il*.

I think that (a), (b) and (c) point to some basic properties of the meaning and use of *omen*, but they are misleading in several respects. Concerning the claim (b), I propose that the content of uncertainty often related to *omen* is not part of the meaning of *omen*-sentences, as seems to be implied by the descriptions or definitions of many grammarians and lexicographers (Euskaltzaindia [the Royal Academy of the Basque language] 1987, among others), but a conversational implicature that can be generated by an *omen*-utterance. I conclude this by applying Grice’s (1967a, 1967b) cancellability test. When the speaker expresses her certainty about the truth or falsity of the reported proposition, no contradiction arises. The uncertainty would just disappear.

In the same way, the claim (c) needs to be revised, as not all of the mentioned constructions are equivalent to *omen*; some of them, rather, are synonymous with another particle: *bide* (an inferential evidential).

However, in the present work, I will focus on the first claim (a), leaving aside (b) and (c) (see Korta & Zubeldia (2014) and Zubeldia (2010) for arguments for the revision of the other two claims).

3. Contribution to the propositional content *vs.* being an illocutionary force indicator⁷

The description in (a), which summarizes the definitions given by two renowned Basque linguists and philologists, Mitxelena (1987) and Sarasola (1996), seems to claim that the proposition expressed by the speaker of an *omen*-utterance corresponds just to what the speaker of the reported utterance (or the original speaker) stated. They both would express the same proposition *p*. In speech-act theoretic terms (Searle 1969), this would imply that *omen* does not contribute to the propositional content of the utterance, but it is rather an illocutionary force indicator. That is, for example, the position taken by Faller (2002) on the analysis of the Cuzco Quechua reportative enclitic *-si*, which is very comparable to *omen* in some aspects. Following her proposal, an illocutionary force indicator like this will affect the illocutionary force of the utterance; in other words, when an utterance that without the enclitic would count as a statement includes the enclitic, this new utterance has some other illocutionary force, associated with reporting

⁶ I will use ‘speaker’ meaning speaker, writer, narrator, etc.

⁷ The ideas presented in this section are originally (and more extensively) presented in Korta and Zubeldia (2014).

speech acts. She originates a new illocutionary force, called ‘presentation’, to explain the behaviour of *-si*, and represents the sentence ‘It is raining’ with *-si* as follows:

Para-sha-n-si.
rain-PROG-3-si

p = ‘It is raining.’

ILL = PRESENT(p)

SINC = $\{\exists s_2 [Assert(s_2, p) \wedge s_2 \notin \{h, s\}]\}$

The illocutionary force (ILL) is that of PRESENT, and it indicates that the current speaker’s speech act is a *presentation* of another speaker’s assertion p . The sincerity condition (SINC) related to PRESENT states that there is some speaker s_2 who asserted p , and that s_2 is neither the hearer h nor the current speaker s . There is no condition that s believes p .

Nevertheless, we find two problems with this proposal. First of all, in Faller’s proposal it is not very clear how exactly this new illocutionary force, ‘present’, would fit in the framework of speech act theory: what are its illocutionary point, its conditions of satisfaction and success, etc. that distinguish it from *assert*? And second, it looks like the sincerity condition provided for ‘present’ is not correct, for it does not include a mental state of the speaker (as speech act theory requests for the sincerity condition), but instead the existence of a state of affairs that there is a speech act of presenting another speaker’s assertion. Furthermore, the assent/dissent test Faller uses for *-si* gives different results in the case of *omen*.

3.1 Assent/dissent test

We will, see, first, what the assent/dissent test consists on (see, for example, Faller 2006): that if an element can be directly questioned, doubted, rejected or accepted, it contributes to the propositional content of the speech act; otherwise, it should be taken as an illocutionary force indicator. If we apply the test to a simple utterance such as (1) above (“*Euria ari omen du*” [“It is said that it is raining”]), it involves answers like the following:

- (a) “*egia* *al* *da* *hori?*”
 true.DET.SG Q 3SG.ABS.PRS.be that
 ‘is that true?’; or
- (b) “*ez* *da* *egia* *hori?*”
 no 3SG.ABS.PRS.be true.DET.SG that
 ‘that’s not true?’; or
- (c) “*egia*”
 true.DET.SG
 ‘true’.

A question arises then: what are we challenging by (a), rejecting by (b) or accepting by (c):

- that it is raining (p)? or
- that someone else said that it is raining (p_{omen})?

If just the former is the case, then it indicates that the particle does not contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance.

However, our intuitions about the application of the test to the case of the Basque particle give a different result from the speech act account: the challenge, rejection or acceptance can be either about p (as in (2)) (which it seems to be the most common case),

(2)

a: “*Egia da da euri-a ari*
 true.DET.SG Q 3SG.ABS.PRS.be rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG
d-u-ela? *Eguraldi on-a*
 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP weather good-DET.SG.ABS
ze-go-en-eta iragarri-ta”
 3SG.ABS.PST-be-PST-and predict-PTCP
 ‘Is it true that it’s raining? Because they predicted good weather!’

b: “*Ez da egia euri-a ari*
 no 3SG.ABS.PRS.be true.DET.SG rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG
d-u-ela, balkoi-ko lorontzi-eta-tik ari
 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP balcony-LOC vase-DET.PL-ABL PROG
da eror-tzen ur-a”
 3SG.ABS.PRS.be fall-IPFV water-DET.SG
 ‘It’s not true that it’s raining, the water is coming from the vase on the balcony.’

c: “*Egia da euri-a ari*
 true.DET.SG 3SG.ABS.PRS.be rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG
d-u-ela, Ezagun d-u sabai-a-ren
 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP evident 3SG.ABS.PRS-have roof-DET.SG-GEN
hots-ean”
 noise-DET.SG.LOC

‘It’s true that it’s raining. You can tell from the noise from the roof.’

or about the *omen*-utterance (p_{omen}) (as in (3)):

(3)

a: “*Egia al da hori? Benetan norbait-ek*
 true.DET.SG Q 3SG.ABS.PRS.be that really someone-ERG
esan di-zu hori?”
 say.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS.have-2SG.DAT that
 ‘Is it true? Did really anybody tell you that?’

b: “*Ez da egia hori. Ez*
 no 3SG.ABS.PRS.be true.DET.SG that no
di-zu inor-k esan, zu-k
 3SG.ABS.PRS.have-2SG.DAT someone-ERG say.PFV you-ERG
asma-tu d-u-zu”
 make.up-PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS.have-2SG.ERG
 ‘That’s not true. Nobody told you that, you’ve made it up.’

c: “*Egia. Ni-ri ere esan di-da-te*”
 true.DET.SG I-DAT also tell-PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS.have-1SG.DAT 1PL.ERG
 ‘True. I was also told that.’

I ran an experiment, based on the assent/dissent test, with the aim of checking those intuitions. It was restricted to the dissenting response (compare this with the truth value judgement task of Noveck (2001)).

The assent/dissent test is used, hence, as a proof to decide about the possible contribution of an element to the truth-conditions of the utterance. Some authors (Faller 2006; Matthewson et al. 2007; Murray 2010 and Matthewson 2013 among others) use this test as a proof for the case of evidential elements. Likewise, in the present work it is used to decide whether the particle *omen* contributes to the truth-conditions of the utterance containing it or not. I predicted that the participants would accept rejecting the evidential content of the *omen*-utterance, as they would accept rejecting the reported content *p*.

3.1.1 Method

Participants

Twenty-two native Basque speakers, between 22 and 64 years old (mean age: 40.2), participated in the experiment; 11 female and 11 male. They were speakers of different dialects of Basque: twelve from the Gipuzkoa dialect, five from the Navarre dialect and other five from the Northern dialects.

Materials and design

The experiment, based on the assent/dissent test, was restricted to the rejecting response. It was run on a laptop, making use of slides. The experiment had four scenarios or contexts along with conversations:⁸ two scenarios with *omen*-utterances, the real experimental scenarios; and other two scenarios for utterances with the verb *esan* ‘to say’, which were employed as a control. The reason for this was that there is a consensus that this verb contributes to the propositional content of the utterance, and is not an illocutionary force indicator. The same scenarios designed for *omen*-utterances were employed for *esan*-utterances, after changing the characters.

In each scenario, the participants first saw the context; that is to say, the situation and the characters were presented. After this, a conversation between two characters occurred, in which a character uttered an *omen*-sentence. Finally, two rejection



⁸ They were six scenarios originally. However, two were omitted from the analysis, because they show minor problems with the design, which could and did, in fact, hinder proper understanding.

utterances (target utterances) were displayed, which were responses given by the second character or conversational counterpart: one was the rejection of the evidential content (p_{omen}) and another one the rejection of the reported content (p). In each scenario the subject's task was to evaluate separately or independently these two items, according to a four-point scale of acceptance. So, it was a 2x2 design, with element ($omen$ vs. $esan$) and rejection (of p vs. p_{omen}/p_{esan}) as within-subjects factors.

The scenarios, as well as the two items to be judged in each scenario, were presented randomly to the participants.

Both the conversations and responses were supplemented by audio recordings, namely, the participants heard them aloud while they were reading the conversations from the slides.

Let us see an example of a scenario in its original language, translated into English below (see Zubeldia 2010 for further details and examples):

<p>Unai eta Nora anai-arrebek amonarentzako oparia erostera joan behar dute.</p> <p>Unairi ez zaio gehiegi gustatzen erosketak egitea.</p> <p>Biharko hitzordua jartzen ari dira.</p>	
<p>Nora Izarorekin egon da aurretik.</p> <p>Unai esandakoaren aurrean, Noraren zein erantzunek du aukera edo probabilitate handiagoa?</p> <p>Adierazi erantzun bakoitza emateko aukera 1etik 4ra.</p>	 <p>Aukerak:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Onartuko nuke, naturala da. 2. Ez da oso naturala, baina onartuko nuke. 3. Ez nuke erraz onartuko, ez da oso naturala. 4. Ez nuke onartuko inola ere.

English translation:

Slide 1. The siblings Unai and Nora have to buy a present for their grandmother. Unai doesn't like going shopping at all. They are making an appointment for tomorrow.

Slide 2.

- Nora: Are you free tomorrow?
- Unai: No, Izaro has to finish [*omen*] a work for the day after tomorrow, and she has asked me for help. (It is said that Izaro has to finish an assignment for the day after tomorrow, and she has asked me for help.)

Slide 3. Nora talked to Izaro before. Taking into account what Unai said, which of the following of Nora's answers is more likely probable? Rate each answer from 1 to 4.

Slide 4.

- a. That's not true, I know that you haven't talked to her.
- b. That's not true, she's already finished her work.

Choices:

1. I'd accept it, it's natural.
2. It's not so natural, but I'd accept it.
3. I wouldn't accept it so easily, it's not so natural.
4. I wouldn't accept it at all.

Procedure

Before starting the experiment, the task was presented to the participants, along with instructions, and they had the opportunity to ask questions to clarify possible doubts they might have. When they were ready, the experiment started. The participants were permitted to go back and forth through the slides of the same scenario, whenever they considered necessary. A black slide at the end of the scenario was the signal that a new scenario would start. The participants were asked to give their responses aloud, so that the experimenter wrote them down.

The post-experiment interview showed that none of the participants noticed the objective of the experiment.

3.1.2 Results and discussion


The results of the descriptive statistics (see table 1) are reported below, along with the histograms 1-4.

Descriptive statistics				
	Mean	Median	Values	
			Minimum	Maximum
p_{omen}	4.6608	4.7857	3.57	5.00
$p(omen)$	4.6251	4.7143	3.71	5.00
p_{esan}	4.6429	4.6429	3.86	5.00
$p(esan)$	4.6696	4.7143	4.14	5.00

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the assent/dissent experiment

The mean and median shown in the table refer to the average and middle score of the scores of all subjects in each of the four conditions (p (in the case of *omen*), p_{omen} , p (in the case of *esan*) and p_{esan}). While the minimum and maximum values refer to the minimum and maximum values from the means of the scores of each subject in each condition. Regarding these results, most of the participants accept rejecting the evidential content and the *esan*-content, in the same way as they accept the rejection of the reported content (see, too, the histograms below).

Histograms



(The y-axis indicates the number of subjects, whereas the x-axis the scale of acceptability of rejection, from 1 totally accept to 4 not accept at all.)

The Wilcoxon Matched-Pairs Signed Rank test signaled that there is a non-significant difference between the rejection of the reported content and the rejection of the evidential content, taking both the case of the particle *omen* ($Z=.000$, $n=16$, $p=1.000$, two-tailed) and the verb *esan* ($Z=-.212$, $n=16$, $p=.832$). Similarly, it indicated that the difference between the rejection of the reported content in the case of *omen* as compared with the case of *esan* ($Z=-.210$, $n=16$, $p=.833$) is no significant, and neither is the difference between the rejection of the evidential content compared in the two cases ($Z=-.268$, $n=16$, $p=.788$).

Then, considering these null results, the null hypothesis cannot be rejected. But, nor can we accept it. Thus, there is no experimental support, there is no effect, in favor of the stated hypothesis that the subjects will accept both rejecting the reported content and the evidential content. Yet, a fact is quite clear: participants' intuitions agree with ours. And the results obtained point towards a fact: should you have a context, it is acceptable to

reject directly the evidential content of an *omen*-utterance, contrary to what it seems to be the case of evidential elements cross-linguistically.⁹ That is why I think these results, despite being non-significant, are still interesting. The subjects took that the rejection can target either the reported content (p) or the evidential content (p_{omen}). And what is more significant: the results are similar to those for the verb *esan* ‘to say’. And no author would take a reporting phrase like ‘they say that’ as not contributing to the propositional content of the utterance containing it, and being instead an illocutionary force indicator.

So, taking into account the results of this experiment, we cannot obtain a firm conclusion with statistical support about the possible contribution of *omen* to the propositional content. Nevertheless, these results show that other people’s intuitions coincide with and strengthen ours. And, if this fact was not a sufficient argument for the conclusion that *omen* does contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance, there are still the results of another test, the scope test, which gives us strong evidence for that conclusion.

3.2. Scope test

Regarding the scope criterion (see, for example, Recanati 1989), if the meaning of an expression falls within the scope of a logical operator, then it contributes to the truth-conditions of the utterance. If we apply the test to the case of *omen*, we notice that it takes narrow scope within several scope-bearing operators, that its semantic contribution is, more precisely, within the following operator’s scope: sentential (external) negation, communication predicates (like *esan* ‘to say’, *erantzun* ‘to answer’) and knowledge and realization predicates (*konturatu* ‘to realise’, for instance).

It can be embedded under sentential (external) negation:

- (4) “*Ez da egia euri-a ari omen*
 no 3SG.ABS.PRS.be true.DET.SG rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG REP
d-u-ela”
 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP
 ‘It is not true that it is said that it is raining.’

In this case, the utterance must be interpreted as

- (5) IT IS NOT TRUE THAT SOMEONE ELSE SAID THAT IT IS RAINING,

rather than as

- (6) SOMEONE ELSE SAID THAT IT IS NOT TRUE THAT IT IS RAINING.

So, *omen*’s semantic contribution falls within the scope of external negation.

⁹ It seems that *omen* is an exception regarding the fact of passing the assent/dissent test, apparently in addition to the evidentials in Nuu-chah-nulth. Waldie et al. (2009) say that with evidentials in Nuu-chah-nulth it looks like possible to disagree with the evidence type of the evidential element, but they acknowledge that more research is needed in order to have clearer results.

Let us see, now, an example using a knowledge and realization predicate; more precisely, *konturatu* ‘to realize’:

- (7) [When I recovered, I could not move a finger, but I could hear. And, as far as what they were saying,]

(...) *kontura-tu* *nintzen* *artean* *mina-ondo-an* *nen-go-e-la*,
 realize-PFV 1SG.PST yet mine.DET.SG-next-DET.SG.LOC 1SG-to.be-PST-COMP
eta aurpegi-a-n *ez* ***omen*** *n-euka-la*
 and face-DET.SG-LOC not REP 1SG-have.PST-COMP
odol-a *eta* *haragi* *zirtzil-du-a baizik*. (Quiroga 2009: 109)
 blood-DET.SG and meet scruffy-PFV-DET.SG but

‘I realized that I was yet next to the mine, and that it is said that I didn’t have but blood and scruffy meet in my face.’

The utterance should be interpreted as

- (8) I REALIZED THAT I WAS YET NEXT TO THE MINE, AND THAT SOMEONE ELSE SAID THAT I DIDN’T HAVE BUT BLOOD AND SCRUFFY MEET IN MY FACE,

and not as

- (9) SOMEONE ELSE SAID THAT I REALIZED THAT I WAS YET NEXT TO THE MINE, AND THAT I DIDN’T HAVE BUT BLOOD AND SCRUFFY MEET IN MY FACE.

Again, *omen* takes narrow scope within this kind of predicate.

We will see, lastly, an example where *omen* is embedded under a communicative predicate, more precisely under the verb *esan* ‘to say’:

- (10) “*Alegri-ko* *orr-ek*, *Donjose-k* *bai*
 Alegri-GEN this-ERG Donjose-ERG yes
esan-tzi-ake-n! (...) *Larraitz-en* *zeak* *bals-eko*
 say.PFV-3SG.PST.ERG-1SG.DAT-ALLOC-PST Larraitz-LOC like waltz-GEN
soñu-e *jo-tzen* *as-i* ***emen-tzie-la***”¹⁰ (Oral)
 tune-DET.SG play-IPFV start-PFV REP-3PL.PST-COMP

‘This person from Alegria, Don Jose, yes, told me (...) that it is said that they started to play a waltz tune in Larraitz.’

In this example, the speaker, an ex-mayor of the small village Abaltzisketa, in the Gipuzkoan region of the Basque Country, is telling his listeners what happened many years ago near their village. It seems that there was a party in Larraitz, a petite neighbourhood 1,5 km far from Abaltzisketa. The speaker is bringing the words of the original speaker, the priest Don Jose. Reportedly, some people played the accordion at that party. Having in mind that this story happened many years ago, in a little Catholic village, it can be thought that the priest would not have been at the party; even though, we cannot know it for sure. Who knows whether this was in fact the case or he attended

¹⁰ *Emen* is a dialectal variant of *omen*, which is used in some subdialects of the Central dialect. Many times *omen* and the predicate make a single phonetic element.

the party. If we consider that he was not there, we can think that the original speaker, as well, would get the information from some other person; and, hence, he would have used *omen*, or a predicate alike to ‘they said that...’, when transmitting the information he got to the actual speaker.

Thus, following my intuitions, the utterance (10) has to be interpreted as:

- (11) DON JOSE TOLD ME THAT SOMEONE ELSE TOLD HIM THAT THEY STARTED TO PLAY A WALTZ TUNE IN LARRAITZ

And not as

- (12) SOMEONE ELSE TOLD THAT DON JOSE TOLD ME THAT THEY STARTED TO PLAY A WALTZ TUNE IN LARRAITZ

Then, *omen* can get narrow scope within communicative predicates, too.^{11,12}

These results, in addition to others, lead us to the conclusion that *omen* does contribute to the propositional content of the *omen*-utterance.¹³

It is possible to add a simpler test to the previous ones. Are the following utterances acceptable?

- (13) “*Euri-a* *ari* *omen* *d-u,* *baina* *ez*
rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have but no
d-u-t *uste* *huri-rik* *ari*
3SG.ABS.PRS-have-1SG.ERG think rain-PRTV PROG
d-u-en-ik”
3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP-PRTV
‘It is said that it is raining, but I do not believe it is raining.’

- (14) “*Euri-a* *ari* *omen* *d-u,* *baina* *ez*
rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have but no
d-u *ari* *huri-rik*”
3SG.ABS.PRS-have PROG rain-PRTV
‘It is said that it is raining, but it is not raining.’

¹¹ See, however, the subsection 4.1 for a remark on this kind of utterances.

¹² Roughly, *omen* behaves like some other evidential elements regarding scope. For instance, allegedly, the following evidentials take narrow scope within certain operators: Japanese evidentials (McCready & Ogata 2007: 167-171, McCready 2008), the evidentials *ku7*, *k’a*, *-an’* and *lakw7a* in St’at’imcets (Matthewson et al. 2007: 227-231, Matthewson 2013: 14-17), German *sollen* (Schenner 2008, 2009), evidentials in Bulgarian (Sauerland & Schenner 2007) and Tibetan (Garrett 2001), Gitksan evidentials *=ima* and *=kat* (Peterson 2010), and Greek *taha* (Ifantidou 2001: 176-180).

¹³ Other arguments reinforce this conclusion. First, there is the fact that a subordinate *omen*-utterance and a subordinate utterance without *omen* have different truth-conditions. Second, the point that the negation of an *omen*-utterance is a propositional negation and not a metalinguistic negation. Nevertheless, I will not go into details on these points (see Zubeldia 2010 for further information).

It appears to me that they are completely acceptable: no contradiction arises when saying, after the *omen*-utterance, the utterances that follow the discourse connective. But, in contrast, a contradiction does generate when uttering (15):

- (15) #“*Euri-a* *ari* *omen* *d-u*, *baina* *inor-k*
rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have but someone-ERG
ez d-u *esan* *euri-a* *ari* *d-u-ela*”
no 3SG.ABS.PRS-have say.PFV rain-DET.SG.ABS PROG 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP
‘It is said that it is raining, but nobody said that it is raining.’

Hence, my proposal is that an *omen*-utterance is an assertion. What adding *omen* affects is the propositional content of the utterance, rather than its illocutionary force. An *omen*-utterance reporting p does not assert that p , but that someone else stated that p .¹⁴

This conclusion is alike to the results found in, for example, the works of McCready & Ogata (2007) for Japanese evidentials, Ifantidou’s (2001) for Greek *taha* and Schenner’s (2008) for German *sollen*.

Therefore, taking into account these results, it can be concluded that the distinction implied by claim (a) from the standard view is not correct. In the case of an *omen*-utterance, we do not have to differentiate between the assertion and the nuance *omen* adds to it, but rather between two different propositions: the proposition p expressed by an utterance without *omen* and the proposition p_{omen} expressed by an *omen*-utterance. Both utterances are statements, but they state different things, not the same one.

Thus, I conclude that the speaker, with the use of *omen*, signals that the reported proposition was said (or written) by someone other than herself, and that the function of *omen* is best analysed as contributing to the truth-conditions of the utterance, and not to its illocutionary force. But, now, we should ask: what kind of contribution does the particle make?

4. Distinguishing *omen* from *esan*

With respect to the context-invariant (semantic) meaning of *omen*-sentences, my proposal is that, given a sentence S , the proposition p expressed by an utterance of S , and an utterance u_{omen} reporting p , the meaning of an *omen*-sentence ($M-S_{omen}$) can be stated as follows:

($M-S_{omen}$) p WAS STATED BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE SPEAKER OF u_{omen} .

I use ‘stated’ because *omen* can only report statements, that is, utterances of declarative sentences, whatever their illocutionary point (assertive, commissive, or

¹⁴ I contend that we need to distinguish between two concepts: a *statement* and an *assertion*. I take the former, as usual, to refer to the utterance of a declarative sentence. Taking it this way, a statement can constitute an assertion within speech act theory (an utterance intending to represent a state of affairs as real; with a words-to-world direction of fit); but it need not. It can have either a commissive, declarative or expressive illocutionary point. This difference will be pertinent when making the meaning of *omen*-sentences precise (see the next section).

expressive). In contrast, *omen*-utterances themselves always have assertive illocutionary points, and, so, they cannot be utterances of interrogative, exclamative and imperative sentences.¹⁵ Thus, by using ‘stated’ instead of ‘said’, we exclude these other kinds of sentences and are left with only the declarative ones.¹⁶

So, we can precise the things a little bit more, and say that u_{omen} asserts that p was stated by someone other than the speaker. This is what we take to be the context invariant meaning of an *omen*-sentence, the type of content that all *omen*-utterances share.

Now we will compare *omen*-utterances with those utterances that contain the verb *esan* as in the following:

- (16) “*Eguraldi on-a egin-go omen d-u bihar*”
 weather good-DET.SG.ABS do-PROSP REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have tomorrow
 ‘It is said that there will be good weather tomorrow.’”
- (17) “*Esan d-u bihar eguraldi on-a*
 say.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have tomorrow weather good-DET.SG.ABS
egin-go d-u-ela”
 do-PROSP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP
 ‘(S)he has said that there will be good weather tomorrow.’”

It seems that *omen* and *esan* are used for the same purpose, namely, the speaker uses both to express that she is reporting what someone else said. Then, if, as I am proposing, *omen* contributes to the propositional contents of the utterance (as does the verb *esan*), the question is: how do they differ (if they do)?

In the syntactic structure of (17) there a silent third-person singular pronoun *pro* demanded by the verb *esan*, which corresponds to the speaker of the reported utterance, and the determination of the ‘explicit referential content’ of the *esan*-utterance asks to fits the reference of this pronoun.¹⁷ So, in the case of the verb, there exists the full range of grammatical persons articulated in the sentence as a noun phrase.

On the other hand, *omen* does not subcategorize any noun phrase for the role of the original speaker. Then, we do not need to determine the speaker of the reported utterance in order to gain the explicit referential content of the *omen*-utterance. In this sense, this original speaker can be left indeterminate. So, the particle is much more general, indeterminate than the verb in this respect: the only thing we know is that the speaker of the reported utterance is different from the current speaker. The formulation presented as the meaning of an *omen*-utterance would be the minimal type content of any utterance of any *omen*-sentence. It reads ‘someone other than the speaker of u_{omen} ’, alluding to the reported utterance. In fact, *omen* allows any options as far as the original speaker’s status is concerned: it can be between fully determinate original speaker and fully indeterminate or non-specific one. In other words, *omen*-sentences, out of context, are silent with respect to the determination of the original speaker. This is one of the

¹⁵ I am talking about sentences type here; that is to say, about syntax, and not about what can done with those sentences.

¹⁶ See subsection 4.2 for some examples.

¹⁷ See footnote 21 for a description.

characteristics that differentiate the both elements; namely, *omen* and *esan* (see the table 2 below).

So, we do not need to determine the speaker of the reported utterance to obtain the explicit referential content of the *omen*-utterance. Yet, this content can be ‘enriched’, providing a specific source for the reported utterance, excluding the current speaker herself. The speaker cannot use *omen* to inform about something she herself said before. When the speaker uses *omen*, it is always understood that she is reporting what someone other than herself said. To give an example, Leire cannot utter

- (18) “*Txile-n izan omen nintzen*”
 Chile-LOC be.PFV REP 1SG.ABS.PST.be
 ‘It is said that I was in Chile.’

she being the original speaker. But, in contrast, she can utter

- (19) “*Esan d-u-t Txile-n izan nintze-la*”
 say.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-1SG.ERG Chile-LOC be.PFV 1SG.ABS.PST.be-COMP
 ‘I’ve said that I was in Chile.’

An observation has to be made with respect to the first person plural. There are cases where the very speaker can be part of the reference of ‘we’, given that she was not the person who spoke on behalf of the people gathered in ‘we’. Let us consider an example. While we, some friends, are looking for a place to have lunch, another friend calls me by phone, and invites us to go to have lunch to her place. I ask to my friends what they fancy do, and one of them, after discussing between them, answers:

- (20) “*Joan-go gara*”
 go-PROSP 1PL.ABS.PRS.be
 ‘We’ll go.’

If the friend on the phone asks me

- (21) “*Etorr-i-ko al zarete?*”
 come-PTCP-PROSP Q 2PL.ABS.PRS.be
 ‘Will you come?’

can I answer

- (22) “*Joan-go omen gara*”
 go-PROSP REP 1PL.ABS.PRS.be
 ‘It is said we’ll go?’

My intuition says that I could, but only provided that it was not me who said (20). If it was me, then I would have to say to my friend on the phone the same utterance (20).

Person		<i>esan</i>	<i>omen</i>
sg.	1	<i>esan dut</i> ‘I have said’	—
	2	<i>esan duk/n</i> ‘You have said’ (alloc.) <i>esan duzu</i> ¹⁸ ‘You have said’	‘It was said by someone other than the speaker of <i>u_{omen}</i> ’
	(3)	<i>esan du</i> ¹⁹ ‘(S)he said’	‘It was said by someone other than the speaker of <i>u_{omen}</i> ’
pl.	1	<i>esan dugu</i> ‘We have said’	— ²⁰
	2	<i>esan duzue</i> ‘You have said’	‘It was said by someone other than the speaker of <i>u_{omen}</i> ’
	(3)	<i>esan dute</i> ‘They have said’	‘It was said by someone other than the speaker of <i>u_{omen}</i> ’

Table 2: The difference between the verb *esan* and the particle *omen*.

And I want to propose that there is way to explain this indeterminate nature of *omen*, by taking into consideration the idea that an utterance has a variety of contents (reflexive or utterance-bound, explicit referential and enriched contents, at least),²¹ rather than assuming just a content, THE content (in the singular) of the utterance, that is to say assuming the general idea that the utterance of a sentence is associated with one and only one content. I follow Kortá & Perry’s theory of critical pragmatics (2007, 2011), distinguishing between different contents, by abandoning the traditional ‘monopositionalism’ position.

Then, *omen* does not subcategorize any noun phrase corresponding to the speaker of the reported utterance in the sentence. But, still, the original speaker can be determined,

¹⁸ Even though *zu* ‘you’ is plural morphologically, as it was a plural pronoun at a first stage, I have classified it with singular pronouns for the purposes here, as it is now a pronoun to refer to the second person singular.

¹⁹ Even though the third person is called ‘non-person’ (it is shown in Basque with the absence of a mark inside the verbal form), I have classified both the third person singular and plural along with the other persons for the purposes here.

²⁰ Remember, however, the remark made above.

²¹ The contents distinguished can be described as follows, in the sense they are used in this work:

- Reflexive or utterance-bound content: the content of the utterance given only facts about the meaning of the sentence used.
- Explicit referential content: the content that is determined given the above plus fixing the references of the referential expressions used and resolving possible ambiguities.
- Enriched content: the content determined by the facts above plus unarticulated constituents, elements of the content of the utterance that are not represented in the syntax and semantics of the sentence uttered.

See Perry (2001/2012) and Kortá & Perry (2011, 2013) for a systematic theory of utterance-contents.

taking into account the contextual knowledge and speaker's communicative intention, that is to say, by a pragmatic process widely recognized as 'enrichment' of the content (Sperber & Wilson 1986/1995).

Then, if we take into account the (context-invariant) meaning of an *omen*-sentence in its context, we obtain various truth-conditions or contents, depending on the original speaker's nature.

If we know that the current speaker of a certain *omen*-utterance is X, we get that

(23) *p* WAS STATED BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN X.

The context, then, can help to clarify whether X is just thinking about an indeterminate source, or she has some particular source in mind. If the former is the case, the content can be roughly like

(24) THEY STATED THAT *p*,

with an 'impersonal' 'they' (or, 'it is said'). On the other hand, if the latter was the case, you would have something like

(25) Y STATED THAT *p*,

where Y can be an individual person or a group of people.

So, considering the difference between subcategorizing or not a noun phrase concerning the speaker of the reported utterance, I propose that even though an *omen*-utterance and its *esan*-utterance counterpart would have the same enriched content, they will, in contrast, differ both in their reflexive or utterance-bound content and in their explicit referential content. In the case of an *esan*-utterance, the proposition in which the speaker of the reported utterance is determined would count as a referential explicit content, whereas, in the case of an *omen*-utterance, as an enriched content. And even though they would have the same enriched content, they could well differ in the enriched elements, for an *omen*-utterance would have more enriched contents than an *esan*-utterance, because the determination of the original speaker would be an enrichment. See the table 3 below for a summary:

Content	<i>Omen</i> -utterance	<i>Esan</i> -utterance
Reflexive/utterance-bound	Not articulated	Articulated
Explicit referential	Not determined	Determined
Enriched	Enriched	Inherited (from above)

Table 3: The original speaker

4.1 An illustration

We will consider, again, the utterances (16) and (17) mentioned in the previous section. Let us imagine the following scenario: Unai and Izaro are going skiing on Sunday, to Aralar (a well-known mountain range in the Basque Country), if it is good weather. Izaro listens to the weather forecast of Pello Zabala (a well-known weatherman in the Basque Country) every single Saturday. Unai knows that she is keen on following his predictions, and that she thinks they always have credibility. Today is Saturday, 21st of December, and Izaro, after listening to the weather forecast, has talked to Unai on the phone, saying (16), repeated here as (26):

(26) “*Eguraldi ona egingo omen du bihar*” [‘It is said that there will be good weather tomorrow’]

Unai, knowing how keen Izaro is on Zabala’s weather forecasts, can infer that it was Zabala the speaker of the reported utterance, and he can grasp the following content of the *omen*-utterance:

(27) IT WAS STATED BY PELLO ZABALA THAT THERE WILL BE GOOD WEATHER ON THE 21ST OF DECEMBER IN ARALAR.

This is a proposition in which the original speaker’s reference is enriched (as is the reference corresponding to the place). And the counterpart *esan*-utterance (17), repeated here as (28)

(28) “*Bihar eguraldi ona egingo duela esan du*” [‘(S)he has said that there will be good weather tomorrow’],

would have a similar enriched content:

(29) PELLO ZABALA SAID THAT THERE WILL BE GOOD WEATHER ON THE 21ST OF DECEMBER IN ARALAR,

even though both utterances would differ in the amount of enriched contents. In the case of the *esan*-utterance, there is just an enrichment, that corresponding to the reference of the place.

Nevertheless, the *omen*-utterance (26) and the *esan*-utterance (28) would differ in their explicit referential contents, (30) and (31), respectively:

(30) IT WAS STATED BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN IZARO THAT THERE WILL BE GOOD WEATHER ON THE 21ST OF DECEMBER.²²

²² The unarticulated constituent corresponding to the place should be indicated, as well, both in the explicit referential contents (30) and (31) and in the reflexive or utterance-bound contents (32) and (33), giving something like ‘THE PLACE THE SPEAKER OF THE UTTERANCE X HAS IN MIND’. But I am leaving aside it here for simplicity.

- (31) PELLO ZABALA SAID THAT THERE WILL BE GOOD WEATHER ON THE 21ST OF DECEMBER.

In the case of the *omen*-utterance, the reference of the speaker of the reported utterance need not to be determined, but we have to fix the reference of the current speaker, at least; Izaro, in this case. In contrast, in the case of the *esan*-utterance, we do have to fix the original speaker's reference; namely, Pello Zabala. Besides, the reference of the time is fixed in both cases.

Finally, the *omen*-utterance and its counterpart *esan*-utterance will also diverge in their reflexive or utterance-bound content, (32) and (33) respectively, because the *omen*-utterance does not have a linguistically articulated constituent concerning the original speaker, while the *esan*-utterance does.

- (32) IT WAS STATED BY SOMEONE OTHER THAN THE SPEAKER OF (26) THAT THERE WILL BE GOOD WEATHER THE DAY AFTER (26) WAS UTTERED.

- (33) IT WAS SAID BY THE REFERENCE OF 'pro' THAT THERE WILL BE GOOD WEATHER THE DAY AFTER (28) WAS UTTERED.

So, although an *omen*- and an *esan*-sentence have a comparable meaning and I make the proposal to analyse *omen* as contributing to the propositional content of the utterance, they can be differentiated in the contents of their utterances, taking into account the proposal of critical pragmatics, as the result of their difference regarding the articulation of the original speaker.

Furthermore, in addition to this principal difference, they have some other.

4.2 Additional differences

1. *Omen* always takes wide scope over simple negation,

- (34) *Ez* *omen* *d-u* *huri-rik ari*
 no REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have rain-PRTV PROG
 'It is said that it is not raining.'

Any content of any utterance of the sentence (34) has the following form:

- (35) *OMEN* [*EZ* (*EURIA ARI DU*)]
 (IT IS SAID [NO (IT IS RAINING)]),

and never the following one:

- (36) **EZ* [*OMEN* (*EURIA ARI DU*)]
 (NO [IT IS SAID (IT IS RAINING)]).

In contrast, *esan* does not have this kind of restriction, it can get both narrow and wide scope with respect to negation:

(37) *ESAN* [EZ (EURIA ARI DU)]
(SAY [NO (IT IS RAINING)])

(38) EZ [*ESAN* (EURIA ARI DU)]
(NO [SAY (IT IS RAINING)])

2. *Omen* is attached to declarative sentences (see (39)). It cannot appear in interrogative, exclamative and imperative sentences (see, for instance, the interrogative sentence (40)).

(39) *Bihar-ko buka-tu-ko omen d-u lan-a.*
tomorrow-by finish-PTCP-PROSP REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have work-DET.SG.ABS
'It is said that she will finish her work by tomorrow.'

(40) **Bihar-ko buka-tu-ko omen d-u lan-a?*
tomorrow-by finish-PTCP-PROSP REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have work-DET.SG.ABS
'It is said that she will finish her work by tomorrow?'

Esan, on the contrary, can appear in any sentence type, as it is expected. See, for example, the declarative sentence (41) and the interrogative (42):

(41) *Esan d-u bihar-ko buka-tu-ko*
say.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have tomorrow-by finish-PTCP-PROSP
d-u-ela lan-a.
3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP work-DET.SG.ABS
'She has said that she will finish her work by tomorrow.'

(42) *Lan-a bihar-ko buka-tu-ko d-u-ela*
work-DET.SG.ABS tomorrow-by finish-PTCP-PROSP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP
esan d-u?
say 3SG.ABS.PRS-have
'Have she said that she will finish her work by tomorrow?'

3. *Omen* cannot be iterated, that is to say, it cannot appear more than once in the same simple sentence,²³

(43) **Eguraldi on-a egin-go omen d-u bihar omen*
weather good-DET.SG do-PROSP REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have tomorrow REP
'It is said that it is said that there will be good weather tomorrow.'

in contrast, *esan* can:

²³ It is said that the particle *dizque* can be repeated more than once to indicate the degree of hearsay, in some varieties of Brazilian Portuguese spoken in Northwest Amazonia (Aikhenvald 2004: 179).

- (44) *Esan* *d-u-te* *esan* *du-te-la*
 say.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-3PL.ERG say.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-3PL.ERG-COMP
eguraldi *on-a* *egin-go* *d-u-ela* *bihar*
 weather good-DET.SG do-PROSP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP tomorrow
 ‘They said that they said that there will be good weather tomorrow.’

So, *esan* is recursive, whereas *omen* is not. What is aimed to be expressed by (43) can be given as

- (45) *Esan* *d-u-te* *eguraldi* *on-a*
 say.PFV 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-3PL.ERG weather good-DET.SG
egin-go *omen* *d-u-ela* *bihar*
 do-PROSP REP 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-COMP tomorrow
 ‘They have said that it is said that there will be good weather tomorrow’.

In this example, *omen* is combined with the verb *esan* in the same sentence, as in example (10) mentioned in section 3.2.

4. *Omen* has constraints to appear in some subordinate sentences (more precisely, it cannot appear in the antecedent of a conditional, purpose sentences and subjunctive completive sentences). Let us take, as an example, a conditional sentence:

- (46) **Eta* *berdin da,* *euskaldun-ek* *ber-ek*
 and same 3SG.ABS.PRS.be Basque-PL.DET.ERG themselves-DET.PL.ERG
ez omen *ba-d-u-te* *zuzen* *joka-tu.* (Azurmendi 2006: 12)
 no REP if-3SG.ABS.PRS-have-3PL.ERG correctly act-PFV
 ‘And it does not matter if it is said that the Basques themselves did not act correctly.’

On the contrary, it does not look like *esan* has such a restriction:

- (47) *Eta* *berdin da,* *esa-ten* *ba-d-u-te*
 and same 3SG.ABS.PRS.be say-IPFV if-3SG.ABS.PRS-have-3PL.ERG
euskaldun-ek *ber-ek* *ez* *d-u-te-la*
 Basque-DET.PL.ERG themselves-PL.DET.ERG no 3SG.ABS.PRS-have-3PL.ERG-COMP
zuzen *joka-tu.* (Azurmendi 2006: 12)
 correctly act-PFV
 ‘And it does not matter if they say that the Basques themselves did not act correctly.’

See the following table 4 for a summary of the differences.

	<i>omen</i>	<i>esan</i>
1. Scope: simple negation	Wide	Wide/narrow
2. In what kind of sentences?	Declaratives	Any
3. Iterated?	No	Yes
4. In subordinate sentences?	Restrictions	Not restrictions

Table 4: differences between *omen*- and *esan*-sentences.

4.3 Combination of *esan* and *omen*

As we saw, in subsection 3.2 and in the previous one, *omen* and *esan* can be combined in the very same utterance. The particle can be embedded under the verb *esan*, and it takes narrow scope within it, as we noticed by the example (10). But let us have a look to the following example:

- (48) “*Nafarroa-ko lekuizen kontu-e-tan aditu-a*
 Nafarroa-GEN place.name matter-DET.PL-LOC expert-DET.SG
d-en Mikel Belasko jaun-a-k esan
 3SG.ABS.PRS.be-COMP Mikel Belasko sir-DET.SG-ERG say.PFV
di-t, eskuizkribu zaharr-etan behin eta berriz
 3SG.ABS.PRS-1SG.DAT manuscript old-DET.PL.LOC time.and.time.again
*ager-i omen d-ela*²⁴ *Arrias-Oranza hori*
 appear-PFV REP 3SG.ABS.PRS.be-COMP Arrias-Oranza that
 (...)” (Perurena 2004: 161)
 ‘Sir Mikel Belasko, who is expert on issues about names of places, told me that that Arrias-Oranza appears time and time again in the old manuscripts’

In this example, the particle is embedded within the utterance of the declarative sentence under the verb *esan* (“*eskuizkribu zaharretan behin eta berriz ageri omen dela*”). If we took the utterance that contains both the communicative predicate *esan dit* ‘he has said to me’ and *omen* out of context, it would be understood that Sir Mikel Belasko was informed by some other person that the name Arrias-Oranza appears time and time again in the old manuscripts. Namely, the utterance must be interpreted as

- (49) SIR MIKEL BELASKO TOLD ME THAT THEY SAY THAT THAT ARRIAS-ORANZA APPEARS TIME AND TIME AGAIN IN THE OLD MANUSCRIPTS.

However, some signs guide one to consider that this utterance must be interpreted in a different way. I seems that the speaker’s intentions direct somewhere else. The speaker of the reported utterance, namely Mikel Belasko, is an expert, so it is natural to think that he himself would see the manuscripts. So, this conducts one to consider that nobody informed Belasko that that name appears repeatedly in old manuscripts, but rather it was, in fact, himself who said that to the current speaker. It looks like the contextual evidence guides us towards the following interpretation:

- (50) SIR MIKEL BELASKO SAID TO ME THAT THAT ARRIAS-ORANZA APPEARS TIME AND TIME AGAIN IN OLD MANUSCRIPTS.

In other words, it can be thought that the original speaker did not use the particle to report that, but rather he made an utterance similar to the following one:

- (51) “*Eskuizkribu zaharr-etan behin eta berriz ageri-i*
 manuscript old-DET.PL.LOC time.and.time.again appear-PFV

²⁴ It is our underlining.

<i>da</i> 3SG.ABS.PRS.be	<i>Arrias-Oranza</i> Arrias-Oranza	<i>hori (...)</i> that
-----------------------------	---------------------------------------	---------------------------

‘That Arrias-Oranza appears time and time again in old manuscripts.’

So, it looks as if, in this example, we are facing a crash or confusion between the two interpretations. Hence, it seems to me that an awkward or inappropriate utterance is generated; which I will call ‘redundant’ utterance.²⁵ In the utterance (48), the particle *omen* guides one towards another speaker; however, it looks like this is not the intention of the speaker. So, it seems that, in this kind of cases, the speaker has to make a decision between using the particle or the predicate. Why is this? Because if the utterance must be interpreted as if *omen* was not used, it is redundant to use both elements, since they have a similar meaning, to a great extent. In this case, there is an inappropriate redundancy, as the hearer is not led to the intended interpretation. In this kind of cases, the utterance of the subordinate sentence is not intended to express that whatever (let us say *p*) was said by someone other than the speaker, but rather that just that *p*. And why use, then, both elements, *esan* and *omen*, if this is what is just meant? It looks as if this kind of utterance is not appropriate, except if what is intended, in fact, is that the original speaker himself was told *p* by someone else.

4.4 Analysing the evidential content as a presupposition

We will consider, now, whether analysing the evidential content of the evidential element as a presupposition could be a possible way of distinguishing the particle from the verb.

It has to be mentioned that some authors (see, for instance, Izvorski 1997 and Matthewson et al. 2007) propose to analyse reportative evidentials like *omen* as epistemic modal elements with an evidential presupposition. According to their proposal, these evidential elements contribute a modal content to the proposition (that *p* is possibly or necessarily true), and the evidential content is a presupposition that restricts the modal base, following Kratzer’s (1981, 1991) possible world semantics. In their view, a different thing is asserted when uttering a sentence with the verb ‘say’ and when the same sentence but with an evidential instead is uttered:

A consequence of this analysis of reportatives is that a reportative sentence containing an embedded proposition *p* does not mean the same thing as “Someone / Mary said that *p*”. (Matthewson et al. 2007: 210).²⁶

Recall that the modal analysis clearly differentiates a reportative from a verb of saying. A verb of saying asserts that a certain report was made, and makes no claim about the truth or falsity of that report. A modal reportative presupposes that a report was made, and asserts that the report was at least possibly true. (Matthewson et al. 2007: 215)

²⁵ ‘Redundancy’ and ‘redundant’ are used, in this work, in the sense of emerging a pragmatic inappropriateness or anomaly.

²⁶ They analyse the evidential elements in St’át’imcets language; the reportative *ku7*, for instance.

Thus, following their proposal, in the case of the ‘say’-utterance, it is asserted that p was said by someone other than the speaker; in contrast, with the evidential-utterance, the evidential content is considered to be a presupposition, and what is asserted is that p is possibly or necessarily true, given that presupposition.

It can be thought that this analysis of evidential contents is proposed to avoid having the same kind of analysis for both elements; namely, the evidential element and the verb. Nevertheless, if I have understood this line of study correctly, it looks like we would have some problems in analysing *omen*-utterances this way. To start with, many authors argue that presuppositions are cancellable (see, for instance, Beaver 2001: 14-18; Green 2000: 459-465; Potts 2007: 484 and Soames 1989: 573-582). Nevertheless, the evidential component of an *omen*-utterance cannot be cancelled: a contradiction arises when trying to do that, as we have seen from example (15).

In addition, we would have a problem related to the facts about scope. It has been signaled that the embedding cases cannot be explained properly by the presuppositional analysis (see, for example, McCready & Ogata 2007: 179). Thus, if this claim is right, considering the evidential content as a presupposition, we would not be able to explain the cases where *omen* gets narrow scope within some kind of operators; more precisely within external negation, communication predicates, and knowledge and realization predicates (as seen by examples (4), (7) and (10) discussed in subsection 4.2 above).

Hence, these facts suggest that the evidential content of an *omen*-utterance cannot be analyzed as generating a presupposition. But it seems to me that, in the case of Basque, at least, it is not needed a different analysis for the verb and the evidential particle. The reason is that they differ in an important feature, namely in the (non-)articulation of the original speaker, as we have seen, and, as a consequence, in their utterance contents (in addition to other differences mentioned above). So, as for my understanding of these proposals, I do not see any problem in analysing both the particle and the verb as contributing to the propositional content of the utterance.

5. Conclusions

Three claims were highlighted at the beginning of this paper, as conforming the standard view on *omen*, and I focused on the first one. I argued that *omen* contributes to the truth-conditions of the utterance, and it is not an illocutionary force indicator. The current speaker and the original speaker express different propositions: p_{omen} and p , respectively, contrary to what the standard view seems to suggest. In order to argue this, I used results from two tests (the assent/dissent test and the scope test) and a controlled experiment. I, then, proposed what contribution *omen* makes to the utterance, by making a distinction between the meaning of *omen*-sentences and the contents of *omen*-utterances. I concluded that its behaviour is similar to that of the verb *esan*. But, they differ, among other things, in the (non-)articulation of the speaker of the reported utterance, and, so, in the contents of their utterances.

Hence, summing up, my proposal is a try to analyse the meaning and use of the particle *omen*, by comparing it with the verb *esan*, with the purpose of giving a theoretical basis to the standard view on it, making use, for that end, of some of the concepts and theories of semantics and pragmatics.

At the same time, this work combines several methodological tools (speakers' intuitions, corpora and experiments) with the intention of either strengthening some hypothesis and claims or changing and improving them.

Besides, it contributes another proposal to the existing works on evidentiality, adding an analysis of another language.

Of course, there remain still many issues to be analysed regarding this research object. In particular, I aim to go more deeply into the experimental approach to the assent/dissent test, by testing participants' reactions to utterances accepting and doubting or challenging the content of the *omen*-utterance, as I did with the case of rejection.

Furthermore, I find interesting to analyse, theoretically, among other things, whether there exists the possibility to study the difference between the particle *omen* and the verb *esan* based on the conceptual *vs.* procedural distinction proposed by relevance theory. Although both contribute to the truth-conditions of the utterance, *esan* would be analysed as a conceptual expression, whereas *omen* may be procedural, following the proposal of Wilson (2011) to differentiate between lexicalized and grammaticalised evidentials and epistemic modals, following the conceptual *vs.* procedural distinction. By the application of such an analysis to our case of study, *omen* would conduct the hearer in his inferential process, indicating that the speaker is asserting that she obtained the information from some other person.

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SENTENCE ADVERBIALS AND EVIDENTIALITY

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Abstract

The paper deals with expressions of evidence (originating in perception, inference or reported information) and their role in sentence/utterance pragmatic modification. It concentrates on the role of the so-called sentence adverbials, showing them as scoping / focussing elements the main function of which is a/ to mark focus of an utterance b/ to support speaker's reasoning. Formal properties of evidential expressions are dissimilar to that point that they cannot be comprised into a unified category.

Keywords: evidentiality, semantics, pragmatics, Czech

1. Introduction

The goal of this paper is to explore the role of sentence adverbials within the realm of evidential meanings. The language in question is Czech, nevertheless, extensions to other European languages will appear, too. The paper is anchored in the semantic-pragmatic interface.

Main topics to be discussed are the following: a/ The links of sentence adverbials and evidentiality; b/ Functions of sentence adverbials with evidential meanings; c/ Status of evidentiality in a Slavic language like Czech.

2. Sentence adverbials and evidentiality

As sentence adverbials, mostly two groups of expressions are presented: (a) *určitě/certainly*, *upřímně/frankly*, *překvapivě/surprisingly*, *k mému překvapení/to my surprise*, *pravděpodobně/probably*, *předpokladatelně/presumably*, *podle mě, podle mého/in my opinion*, *viditelně/visibly*, *vážně/seriously* etc.; (b) *jen, pouze/only*, *také/also*, *ještě/still/yet/in addition to/further*, *již/už/already/yet/as early as*. Group (a) includes expressions exhibiting full lexical semantics, many of which are derived from verbs (deverbal adjectives) and have a form of (morphological) adverbs. Their most prominent features: Their semantics can be related to the whole sentence (they are not mere adjuncts within a VP) and, they are paraphrasable (and logically representable) by predicates. In Czech, though, many of them, e.g. *vážně (seriously)*, *nepochybně (undoubtedly)*, *určitě (certainly)*, *logicky (logically)* are homonymous with "real" (qualitative) adverbs modifying only predicate; the difference of their functions can be

recognized on the basis of functional sentence perspective: In a sentence *Celý večer mluvil vážně* ‘The whole evening he talked seriously’, *vážně* (seriously) is a verb modifier, because it is the focus/rheme of the sentence, while in *Vážně mluvil celý večer* ‘Seriously, he talked/kept talking the whole evening’ *vážně* is a sentence adverbial modifying (in the epistemic sense) the whole sentence, paraphrasable as “I say seriously/I mean that ...“. Expressions in the group (b) do not exhibit full lexical semantics, they cannot be paraphrased by predicates (and, in Czech grammars, they are classified as particles, so basically they will not be dealt with in this paper). The scope of b/group expressions is related to a part of a sentence, i.e. they work as focussing expressions / rhematizers: *Jenom Karel udělal tu zkoušku* ‘(It was) only Karel (who) passed the exam’ – *Karel udělal jenom tu zkoušku* ‘Karel passed only the exam’. On the other hand, as we will see, the function of a rhematizer can be seen also at some of the expressions of the group (a).

3. Evidentiality in its own sense

As for evidentiality, it is mostly defined as marking one’s information source, indicating the way in which an information conveyed by a predicate was acquired. In about a quarter of world’s languages indicative verbal forms include a morpheme telling (in addition to other grammatical meaning/s) the “evidence“ (specificating it as a result of a direct perception, speaker’s assumption, hearsay etc.). Forms of indicative mood simultaneously express one’s information source, i.e. they express evidence for speaker’s assertion. Since some kind of means expressing an evidence is always a part of the indicative form, in the languages exhibiting this feature such a specification can be considered a grammatical category called “evidentiality“. For example, in Tariana, an Arawac language (northwest Amazonia), the sentence *José played football* can occur in the following forms:

(1)

Juse irida di- manika-ka
 José football 3sg - play- Rec.P. VIS
 -ka = recent past + visual evidence
 “José played football (we saw it)”

(2)

Juse irida di-manika-mahka
 José football 3sg - play Rec.P. NONVIS
 -mahka = recent past + non-visual (hearing) evidence
 “José played football (we heard it)”

The same sentence can occur in three more variations expressing inference/deduction, assumption and hearsay (cf. A.Y. Aikhenvald 2004:2-3). Not all the languages with evidentiality as a grammar category express all the mentioned meanings, some languages differentiate between one (any kind of) evidential and no evidence, or visual evidence vs. no evidence at all, visual vs. all the others vs. reported, firsthand or reported etc.

Some languages use more terms naming evidence, e.g. “verificational” or “validational” information. (The presence of an evidence in a sentence is not connected with its truth-value.) Also, in languages with evidentiality as a grammar category, sentences like *vidím/viděl jsem; je/bylo vidět, že ...; slyším/slyšel jsem; bylo cítit, že ...* (‘I can see/ I have seen; It is / was visible that ...; I can hear / I have heard; I could smell that ...’) can occur. In Aikhenvald’s book, similar sentences are described as “lexical reinforcement“, paraphrases or metalinguistic expressions of evidentiality (p. 339-343).

3. Expressing evidentiality in European languages

In most European languages (incl. Czech), evidential meanings are expressed by lexical items, specifically by (deverbative) adverbs *viditelně/visibly, slyšitelně/audibly, zdánlivě/apparently, údajně/allegedly*; related adjectives (from which the adverbs are derived) *viditelný/ visible, slyšitelný/ audible, zdánlivý /apparent*; adverbial case forms *podle BBC/according to BBC, podle předpovědi/according to the forecast*; particles *prý/“reportedly”*, verbs *zdá se/it seems, vypadá to/it looks, jeví se/it appears*); syntactic constructions, mostly matrix sentences with verbs of perception and cognition – *vidím /viděl jsem – I have seen, slyším – I have heard, soudím – I believe/think, domnívám se, že – I assume, that ...* etc. (Cf. also Polish *podobno* ‘apparently’, *rzekomo* ‘allegedly’, *widać* ‘it can be seen/visibly’, *mojim zdaniem* ‘in my opinion’; Russian *očividno* ‘visibly’, *jakoby* ‘as if/allegedly’, *kažetsja* ‘it seems/seemingly’; English *visibly, reportedly, apparently, allegedly, supposedly*. All the means of expression conveying evidences are sometimes considered one group called evidential markers. Whether or not such a claim is legitimate will be questioned in the following parts of this paper.

4. Evidentiality and epistemic modality

Expressing evidentiality is not identical with epistemic modality. Evidential meanings specify the source, the knowledge of which authorizes the speaker to assert something, gives the speaker grounding to present an information while epistemic modality expresses evaluation, (momentary, subjective) conviction, belief of the speaker towards the truthfulness of his/her assertion. Even though these two fields are close and sometimes are not strictly differentiated, they cannot be considered identical. In Palmer (1986), both subjective evaluation of the sentence proposition (judgements) and stating the evidences (prominently hearsay) are subsumed in the realm of epistemic modality because they both include speaker’s commitment towards the status of the sentence proposition (cf. Palmer 1986: 51-76). In Simon Dik’s Theory of Functional Grammar, evidential meanings are treated as “modalities“, (Dik 1997/1: 242, 296) as long as they are expressed by grammatical means. When expressed by lexical means, they are rated among “attitudinal satellites“ (1997/1: 297). However, in the speech of native speakers, these two domains overlap and, many of the expressions pertaining both to evidentials and to epistemic modality can be considered ambiguous (modal verbs *muset, moci, mít*) and often reading either the evidential or the modal meaning is only context-bound. For instance, the sentence with Czech verb *mít* (have/presume, Germ. *sollen*)

(3)

*Minulý čtvrtek měl navštívit N. v jeho kanceláři**Last Thursday he ("měl" – 3Sg Preterite) visited N. in his office.*

can have the following readings depending on the context of an utterance:

- a/ "he was told/asked to visit N. ...", i.e. with the verb *mít* expressing deontic meaning;
- b/ "he may have visited N. ...", where *mít* expresses epistemic meaning ("I do not know for sure");
- c/ "he allegedly/reportedly visited N. ...", i.e. hearsay (reported information as a source).

4.1. Lexical variations and evidence

The lexical expressions with the evidential meaning can cover all the semantic variations of "evidence":

1. Direct evidence – a/ visual evidence

Byl očividně / viditelně / zjevně vyčerpaný.

he was visibly exhausted

Ta nabídka ho viditelně zaskočila

he was visibly abashed by the suggestion

b/ non-visual evidence

sensoric evidence

Civilizaci nám zde slyšitelně připomínají vlaky na blízké trati.

we are audibly reminded of the civilization by the close railroad

Všechny ty cetky hmatatelně ilustrují vkus majitelů.

all the tinsels palpably illustrate their owners' taste

Zítřka se citelně ochladí.

tomorrow the weather will get noticeably /appreciably colder

internal evidence

Cítím / jsem si jist, že ... I can feel that / I am sure that

2. Non-direct evidence - a/ assumptions

Pravděpodobně / předstíraně / ostentativně se nudí / nudil/bavil.

he is/was presumably/professedly/ostensibly bored/amused

b/ deductions/inference

Nesporně / nutně / logicky / očekávatelně / nevyhnutelně / předpokládatelně to

budí / budilo / rozruch.

the issue undoubtedly/necessarilly/logically/expectedly/inevitably /assumably

is/will be a source of excitement

c/ reported information

hearsay *Prý / údajně / chce kandidovat do senátu* (the source is anonymous)
reportedly / allegedly he wants to run for the Senate

quotative *Podle televizních zpráv chce kandidovat do senátu* (the source is actual)
according to TV news he wants to run for the Senate

Also, it is possible to simplify the overview of above mentioned meanings into three groups: experiential evidences (all the direct evidences), inferential evidences and hearsay evidences (Dik 1997/1: 296-297).

4.2. Evidential information in Czech

Most frequent Czech reported information expression, particle *prý/allegedly, reportedly* can be combined with all other lexical “evidentials“ (except for itself):

- (4)
- a. *Byl prý viditelně vyčerpaný/He was allegedly visibly exhausted;*
 - b. *Mlha prý hmatatelně zhoustla/Allegedly, the fog got palpably denser;*
 - c. *Prý se pravděpodobně nudil/Reportedly, he was presumably bored;*
 - d. *Prý to logicky odmítl vysvětlit / Reportedly, he logically refused to explain it;*
 - e. *Prý údajně chce kandidovat do senátu /Reportedly allegedly he wants to run for the Senate;*
 - f. *Podle televizních zpráv prý chce kandidovat do senátu/ According to TV news he reportedly wants to run for the Senate.*

As for the last two sentences, while the combination *prý údajně/údajně prý* (Czech National Corpus shows both cases of such word order) can be seen as an example of a careless/inattentive formulation, each of the combinations *podle X.Y prý/prý podle X.Y.* (‘according to X.Y. allegedly/allegedly according to X.Y.’) can convey different meaning:

- (4f) *Podle televize prý chce kandidovat do senátu* = ‘the TV says that someone else says that ...’,

but

- (5) *Prý podle televize chce kandidovat do senátu* = ‘Someone says that the TV says that ...’

i.e. it can mark the difference between the anonymous and actual source of the information.

4.3. Adverbial “markers”

The adverbs of the type *viditelně*, *slyšitelně* (perceptual evidence), *údajně*, particle *prý* (hearsay) and adverbial case forms can function as “markers”. They are not parts of a sentence proposition and work as sentence adverbials/rhematizers/modifiers, i. e. scoping expressions - what is in their scope is the focus/rheme of an utterance (in other words, the speaker positions them in front of what he presents as a focus/rheme):

(6)

(Eva’s hands were visibly shaky)

(Eva’s hands were reportedly shaky)

a/ *Evě se viditelně třáslly ruce*

a/ *Evě se prý třáslly ruce*

b/ *Ruce se Evě viditelně třáslly*

b/ *Ruce se Evě prý třáslly*

c/ *Ruce se třáslly viditelně Evě*

c/ *Ruce se třáslly prý Evě*

d/ *Evě se třáslly viditelně ruce*

d/ *Evě se třáslly prý ruce*

In sentences like (a) to (d), the adverb’s scope is not the whole sentence but they still can be paraphrased by a predicate (“It was visible, that...”, “I have heard that ...”). The crucial property enabling this group of evidential expressions to work this way is both their form making them an independent (not inflected, incongruent), therefore movable element and their meaning giving the speaker a chance to select a word in a sentence which is presented as a focused (by being the evidence) constituent. Assumptive, inferential and reportive evidentials work in the same way if their form is the one of an adverb or an adverbial case form (with a preposition):

Assumptives: ‘Yesterday, Jan got probably/undoubtedly drunk.’

a/ *Jan se včera pravděpodobně/nepochybně opil.*

b/ *Jan se opil pravděpodobně/nepochybně včera.*

c/ *Včera se opil pravděpodobně/nepochybně Jan.*

Inferentials: ‘Yesterday, Jan got necessarily/logically drunk.’

a/ *Jan se včera nutně/logicky opil.*

b/ *Jan se opil nutně/logicky včera.*

c/ *Včera se opil nutně/logicky Jan.*

Hearsay – quotative: ‘According to Frank, Jan got drunk yesterday.’

a/ *Podle Franka se Jan včera prý opil.*

b/ *Jan se opil podle Franka včera.*

c/ *Včera se opil podle Franka Jan.*

4.4. Evidentials – variety in form and function

Evidentials with different form function in a different way even though their meaning is identical. In sentences

(7)

a) *Vidím/viděl jsem; Je/bylo vidět, že ...* ‘I (can) see/ I have seen ... /It is/it was visible that ...’; *Slyším/slyšel jsem, že ...* ‘I (can) hear / I have heard...’;

b) *Cítím, že ... ; Je/bylo cítit, že ..* ‘I can feel that .../ It is/was perceptible that ...’;

c) *Zdá se/vypadá to/soudím, že je Pavel unavený* – ‘It seems/looks/I think that Paul is tired’; *Pavel se zdá unavený* – ‘Paul seems to be tired’;

the evidential element is a proposition predicate so the “evidence“ is expressed by a sentence description of a situation. The adjectives related to verbs (and adverbs) conveying evidential meaning also become a part of the sentence proposition . They can occur both in the predicate (as a copula complement) or in an attributive position:

(8)

a) *Rozdíl mezi nimi je viditelný/slyšitelný* - ‘The difference between them is visible/audible’

b) *Jeho viditelná/slyšitelná nervozita_všechny rušila* - ‘His visible /audible nervousness disturbed everybody.’

5. Evidentials in argumentation and reasoning

As we have just seen, an evidential element with identical meaning (e.g., visual evidence) can be found in three (or four) different syntactic constructions. Examples (9a1) and (9a2) show an evidential as a scoping/focussing sentence adverb, (9b) presents a related verb in a matrix sentence and (9c) a deverbal adjective as a copula complement:

(9)

(a1) *(Nevěřím mu,) on viditelně lže* - ‘I do not trust him, he is visibly lying’;

(a2) *(Nevěřím mu), lže viditelně on* – ‘I do not trust him, it is visibly he who is lying’;

- (b) (*Nevěřím mu,*) vidím/je vidět, že lže - ‘I do not trust him, I can see / it is visible that he is lying’;
- (c) (*Nevěřím mu,*) *to jeho lhaní je viditelné* - ‘I do not trust him, that lying of his is visible’.

It cannot be maintained that the style value of the sentences (a) to (c) is the same (e.g., adverbs of the type *viditelně, slyšitelně* are not very frequent in colloquial Czech, on the other hand, they are abundant in journalistic texts); what is the same, though, is the nature of the evidence presented. In this viewpoint, (a) to (c) can be considered pragmatic equivalents. In all the examples, the sentence containing the evidential element can serve as a substantiation / explanation for any sentence preceding or following it – *Nevěřím mu, protože viditelně lže* – *On viditelně lže, proto mu nevěřím* (‘I do not trust him, because he is visibly lying – He is visibly lying, therefore I do not trust him’). In this viewpoint, presenting both direct and indirect evidence in one’s statement /assertion can be compared to an element called ‘warrant’– an integral part of the layout of an argument (cf. Toulmin 1958: 94-113):

D (datum)	C (claim)
<i>I do not trust him</i>	<i>He is a liar</i>
“since“	
W (warrant)	
<i>I can see it</i>	
<i>It is visible</i>	

Even though in Toulmin’s treatise the “warrant“ is a logical conjunction (represented as “since“ subsuming an untold fact (proposition) in reasoning using evidentials it is exactly the evidential element implying the “since“). The presence of an evidential element (the form of which is not the prominent factor) in one’s speech is a part of reasoning, it supports the credibility and plausibility of the utterance.

6. Conclusions

As for the nature and status of evidential expressions we dare to conclude with the following remarks: In languages **not** expressing evidence as a grameme, the embodiment of this semantic element can occur in almost any sentence position. Expressing evidences overlap with expressing other speaker’s attitudes towards the utterance content, i.e. with pragmatic modifications, or with expressing **communicative strategies** like reasoning or explanation, i.e. with the so-called **subsidiary illocutions**.

Formal properties of these modifications are dissimilar to that point that “evidentiality expressions“ cannot be comprised into a unified category. What seems most adequate in

languages like Czech is to account for evidential meanings as a part multilayered semantic–pragmatic domain, merging with other pragmatic modifications of a sentence.

Put the very essence in the end crudely: lexical expressing of evidences overlaps with expressing other speaker's attitudes towards the utterance content, i.e. with pragmatic modifications. It is also close to communicative strategies describable as arguing, reasoning and explanation, which belong to the pragmatic dimension of a language entirely. In other words, if not being a grameme, evidentiality is one of the fuzzy pragmatic concepts, not a category.

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DISCOURSE-DRIVEN MEANING CONSTRUCTION IN NEOSEMANTIC NOUN-TO-VERB CONVERSIONS [MEANING CONSTRUCTION IN NOUN-TO-VERB CONVERSIONS]

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Abstract

Neosemantic noun-to-verb conversions such as *beer* → *to beer*, *door* → *to door*, *pink* → *to pink*, etc., constitute a particularly interesting field of study for Cognitive Linguistics in that they call for a discourse-guided and context-based analysis of meaning construction. The present article takes a closer look at the cognitive motivation for the conversion process involved in the noun-verb alterations with a view to explaining the semantics of some conversion formations in relation to the user-centred discourse context. The analysis developed in this article draws from the combined insights of Fauconnier and Turner's (2002) Conceptual Integration Theory and Langacker's (2005, 2008) Current Discourse Space.

Keywords: conversion, cognitive linguistic, conceptual integration, discourse space

1. Introduction

Cognitive Linguistics holds that meaning is something that speakers get from both linguistic and non-linguistic inputs, relying on contextual and background knowledge (cf. Coulson 2001, Langacker 2008). Indeed, it seems that one cannot satisfactorily account for the meaning construction process unless (i) the *encyclopaedic view of semantics* in the sense of Langacker (1987, 1991) and Taylor (2003) is envisioned, (ii) Fauconnier and Turner's (2002, 2007) *Conceptual Integration Theory (CIT)* (see also Libura (2007), accounting for different domains of the conceptualiser's knowledge representation, is adopted and (iii) Langacker's (2005, 2008) notion of the *Current Discourse Space (CDS)*, which emphasises the role of speaker-hearer interaction, is applied in the meaning construction analysis.

With these theoretical considerations in mind, we address the question of how to account for the 'neosemantised' meanings of denominal verbs. The paper argues that in order to fully grasp new ideas residing in novel expressions which code the human cognitive experience of the world and arise, *inter alia*, via 'neosemantisation' processes, meaning should principally be analysed with reference to both the conceptualisations that give rise to it and to the context-dependent interpretation of it (cf. Kemmer 2003,

Kardela 2006). In particular, it is claimed that *CIT* and *CDS* form a joint semanto-pragmatic interface which can ensure proper, context-dependent interpretation of 'neosemantic' verbs.¹

2. Conversion as a creative force in language

The world, which language users inhabit, is a constantly evolving environment, not only in its physical dimension, but also in terms of conceptual contents that may be conveyed by the conceptualising subjects. However, the speakers are commonly faced with the dilemma that most conceptualisations they wish to symbolise are most probably unique and lack vocalised representations. Hence, in need of responding to new experiences people, having only a limited language repertoire at their disposal, are expected to categorise new abstract conceptual constructs in terms of already available resources, i.e. they reuse established linguistic items to encode new concepts and ideas. Such innovative 'recycling' of the overall repository of lexical units may take a number of different forms, e.g. through derivational processes involving novel combinations of free morphemes (compounding) or the attachment of bound morphemes to free morphemes (affixation), merging two or more lexical items into one novel unit (lexical blends), clipping or abbreviation, reduplication of syllables or single letters, syntactic alterations of component elements, etc.

Yet another process that enables language users to convey novel concepts by virtue of conventionalised lexical units, with no apparent change in the morphological composition of the lexical items, is *conversion*. A particularly interesting case of conversion is the lexical alteration of the type *noun-to-verb conversion*, a process which produces adnominal neosemantic verbs.

The study presented here is illustrated by the selected examples from the corpus of over 200 very recent neosemantic noun-to-verb conversions encountered, *inter alia*, on the Internet fora and in online articles. In order to account for the meanings of these neologic conversion formations we also made extensive use of the explanations provided in the online resources: *Urban Dictionary* (retrieved February 10, 2011, from <http://www.urbandictionary.com/>), a vast repository of modern slang, and the *Rice University Neologisms Database* (retrieved February 10, 2011, from <http://neologisms.rice.edu/index.php>), Suzanne Kemmer and her students' project, both of which collect up-to-date new-fangled linguistic expressions that emerge as products of creative English speakers' language usage, as well as attempt to partially explicate and interpret them. For each case of novel verbal conversion adduced below we limit ourselves to present only the immediate textual environment, i.e. usually a sentence-length co-text, in which a particular neologic form appeared. The following examples provide merely a general overview of the process we have analysed:

¹ For the purpose of our study we use the notions of *neosemantism* and *neosemantic* in the similar vein to Herberg and Kinne (1998: 1-2) who characterise neosemantisms as lexical units that in a given language had already had an established (conventionalised) meaning, but to the same form a new meaning was assigned by language users (cf. *inter alia* Grabias 1980: 85-86 and Elsen 2004: 21-23).

- (1) Hey man, can you *beer* me the television remote?
[*to beer* – to hand or fetch something]
- (2) Don't forget to *blitz* me sometime and I'll write back.
[*to blitz* – to write an e-mail]
- (3) She's such a golddigger. She only dates him because he's *caking* her.
[*to cake* – to buy someone everything they want]
- (4) He totally *jocks* you.
[*to jock* – to have a heavy crush on someone]
- (5) a. That person's been *swining* around me lately.
b. I think he's going to *swine* next, so I'd steer clear.
[*to swine* – to have swine influenza]
- (6) a. So here is where I need help: I came back home Monday and totally *spaced* her birthday (which was Monday)! She didn't say anything until Today!
b. Dude, I totally *spaced* Grandma's funeral!
[*to space* – to forget something]
- (7) One day Jeff woke up and felt totally *porched* by all his friends. They had been *windowing* him for weeks and he couldn't stop them. He knew that eventually the worst would happen... he would be *doored* by all for what they knew of him.
[*to porch* - to shun someone, to set something temporarily aside]
[*to window* – to look into someone's life from the outside]
[*to door* – to permanently exclude someone, to discard something]

In the following, we shall argue that the examples listed above, as well as any other examples of novel noun-to-verb conversions, are “a suitable mirror of intelligent human behaviour” revealing intelligent creative behaviour that “exploits basic knowledge-resources and the information processing capacities of the human mind” (Langlotz 2006: 10). In all examples cited, the neosemantic verbs employed could be easily replaced by conventional expressions (e.g. the verb *to cake* in sentence (3) might be as well substituted by the phrase “to indulge one's whims”), it may be rather the case that people use such creative conversions as a means of expressing themselves in an interesting or entertaining manner. This may be an important part of information the speakers wish to communicate using a given neosemantic verb, apart from the uniqueness of their conceptualisations. It appears that neosemantic noun-to-verb conversions do not merely serve a decorative role in a text; they often serve as dense descriptors that convey a great deal of information in a single lexical design. (cf. Veale and Butnariu 2010: 399).

3. The cognitive basis for conversion

Within mainstream linguistics *conversion* is held to constitute a special case of derivational morphology.² Whereas in standard derivation cases an affix is added to a stem, in the case of conversion the stem takes a zero form, i.e. “one that is present, but not perceptible” (Dirven and Verspoor 2004: 64). Similarly, Katamba (1994) recognises conversion as a type of derivational process, noting that

[...] in English very often lexical items are created not by affixation but by conversion or zero derivation, i.e. without any alteration being made to the shape of the input base. The word-form remains the same, but it realises a different lexical item. (Katamba 1994: 70)

It is noteworthy that no evident morphological change with simultaneous transition of a particular lexical item from one word class to another is the hallmark of conversion. For instance, the lexeme *bank*, apart from being a homonymous word, takes reference (for all its three homonyms) to two lexical categories. It may function as a noun or as a verb, and thus is associated with both the nominal and verbal meanings. Among its numerous senses, it denotes “a financial institution” or “a long raised mass of earth” (nominal senses), but also it means “to deposit money in a bank” or “to enclose with a bank” (verbal senses).

Twardzisz (1997: 41-61, 87-174), adopting a cognitive approach, views conversion as an intrinsically semantic phenomenon, analysing it in terms of a much broader process involving semantic extension through elaboration of a number of lower-level subschemas from more abstract schemas (e.g. [[PROCESS]→[THING]] or [[THING]→[PROCESS]]) to sanction the instantiations of particular conversion formations (cf. also Langacker 1987, 1991; and Taylor 2003). Consider the extension schema [[TOOL (THING)]→[TOOL' (PROCESS)]] suggested by Twardzisz to account for the processual extensions of the thing-prototype tool in the following set of examples (after Twardzisz 1997: 101):

- (8) a. Bob took two big planks and began to *hammer* them into a cross.
 b. They *nailed* signs to the trees all along Lame Walk.
 c. I'm going to *brush* my teeth.
 d. They *chained* themselves to the fence.
 e. I saw him *whipping* his team of mules.

Although semantic extensions of the sort discussed above are not entirely descriptively predictable, the lack of full predictability does not pose a problem for cognitivists (cf. Twardzisz 1997: 195). In particular, Langacker (1987 and elsewhere) repudiates the

²However, this view is not shared by all linguists. For instance, Lieber (2004: 93) argues against such treatment of conversion maintaining that “conversion does not behave semantically like derivation with use of [affixation]”. Therefore, it is not a derivational process. Instead, Lieber proposes that conversion should be regarded rather as the process of relisting, i.e. the entrenchment of an old form–new meaning pairing and addition of the new entry into the lexicon. She claims specifically that “conversion occurs when an item already listed in the lexicon is re-entered as an item of a different category” (p. 90). Such a claim is reminiscent of Clark and Clark's (1979) view of conversion as innovative language coinage.

need for a linguistic model to be able to account for absolute predictability. Language, Langacker asserts, is intrinsically a psychological phenomenon, not a computational one (cf. e.g. Langacker 1991: 262).

To provide a cognitive framework for the investigation of conversion we shall take into account profiling, a fundamental cognitive operation involved in scene construal. An expression's profile permits us to establish what a particular expression actually designates, for it "stands out as the specific focus of attention within the immediate scope or conceptual base of this expression" (Langacker 2008: 66). Subsequently, we shall resort to Langacker's (2008: 103) proposal that "essential grammatical notions can be characterized semantically." It means that, for instance, the categories of nouns and verbs can be defined basically in terms of what they profile. Following Langacker (2008: 98, 100) we shall say that nouns profile things, whereas verbs profile processes. Thus, from cognitive perspective, conversion from a noun to a verb appears to be commensurate with a shift in an expression's profile, i.e. within the semantic content of the evoked lexical item the focus of attention is relocated from the thing to the processual relationship as a whole. The alteration of this kind is conceivable, as first, things, although may be conceptually autonomous, usually participate in some relations, and second, processes always require some participants to occur. By way of example examine the sentence below:

- (9) I am *homeworking* right now!
[to *homework* – to do homework]

In example (9), the action of doing homework presupposes two participants, an agent performing the action and the patient undergoing some transformation in the course of the action. In the analysed sentence the agent is pronoun *I* who simultaneously is the trajector in the process of *homeworking*. The implicit, yet logical patient in the described action is the noun *homework* that at the same time is the covert landmark in the processual relationship not realised at the sentential level, but existent at the conceptual level (cf. also Twardzisz 1997: 90-96).

Certainly, as defined above, the schema [[THING]→[PROCESS]] is a very general one lacking the descriptive predictability with reference to possible semantic extensions such conversions may produce. Owing to this, for most cases of noun-to-verb conversions, the semantic content of verbs converted from different nouns is underspecified to a great extent. However, this does not seem to pose a problem for actual language users, since the proliferation of novel verbal conversions bears testimony to the contrary. In fact, this opens up the possibility of virtually infinite unrestrained (creative) associations of different senses with adnominal verbal conversions, provided that the extended senses of these converted verbs are somehow sanctioned by their context of use. For instance, consider the verbal usages of the eponymous noun *oprah* in the following sentences:

- (10) a. I never manage to maintain a stable weight. I always seem to *oprah* all time.
[to *oprah* – to 'yo-yo' over and over again; the term alludes to Oprah Winfrey's battle with overweight]

b. He was *oprah-ing* female insecurities to sell books.

[*to oprah* – to exploit someone or something; this verbal usage exposes the coiner’s antipathetic attitude towards Oprah]

c. I: What is your most over-rated book?

MR: “The Corrections” by Jonathan Franzen. A book that started well and then totally overstayed its welcome. I hurled it against the wall in frustration. And then to see Franzen get “*Oprah-ed*” (i.e. sell heaps of books because one is selected for the Oprah Book Club) despite the fact that he dissed Oprah was just too much! Oprah made him and I doubt he’ll write another big book again. [conversion self-explained by the coiner]

d. Covered in Cheetos dust, Amir *oprahed* on about losing weight, then heated up a burrito.

[*to oprah* – to announce you’re going to do something, but then not to do it for two years]

Although the distinct senses of the verb *to oprah* listed above appear to be unrelated and the semantic content of the possible resulting extensions from the noun *Oprah* are rather unforeseeable, each of the senses illustrated with appropriate examples is motivated by a specific context of use and involves metonymic or/and metaphoric projections linking selected elements of the conceptual content of the source noun and converted verbs.

Recapitulating our theoretical considerations presented above and based on Langacker’s (1999: 203-205) notion of *conceptual arrangement*, we could represent the conversion process schematically as a shift of an expression’s profile (marked by bold lines) within the immediate scope (IS) of this expression attended by a speaker or hearer (S/H) acting as a conceptualiser encoding or decoding a particular linguistic utterance (see Figure 1.). Further, our claim is that in order to understand the utterance containing a novel conversion, the shift from profiling a thing to profiling a process must be recognised by the conceptualiser.




Figure 1: Schematic representation of thing-to-process conversion

Given the schematic representation of noun-to-verb conversion process the issue remains still unresolved of how to account for the meaning of novel instances of adnominal verbal conversions. In what follows, we propose a possible solution to the problem.

4. Conceptual blending

One of the approaches to model linguistic structure in the process of meaning construction is represented by the *Conceptual Integration Theory* (CIT, also referred to as *Conceptual Blending Theory*) as proposed by Fauconnier and Turner (1994, 1998, 2002), a theory which developed out of the theory of mental spaces as postulated by Fauconnier (1985, 1994).

Blending or *conceptual integration* “is concerned with on-line dynamical cognitive work people do to construct meaning for local purposes of thought and action” (Fauconnier and Turner 2007: 370). Put differently, the CIT aims at modelling the dynamic evolution of speakers’ “on-line” representations through creation of networks of connections between mental spaces.

One may envisage *mental spaces* as “temporary containers”, evoking relevant information about a particular domain and containing a partial representation of the entities and relations of a given factual or non-factual scenario as construed by a conceptualiser. In the process of conceptual blending, partial structure from two or more mental spaces is dynamically combined, i.e. selectively projected into a blended space. Blending processes unfold in an array of mental spaces known as a *Conceptual Integration Network*. A basic integration network model (as shown in Figure 2) consists of:

- (i) two (or more) *input spaces*, containing relevant information from respective domains of knowledge representation that are linked on the basis of the so-called

- partial cross-space mappings* (i.e. abstract correspondences between elements and relations in different spaces) connecting respective counterparts from separate inputs;
- (ii) a *generic space* that represents abstract commonalities of the input spaces;
 - (iii) and finally, a *blended space* that inherits some structure from each of the inputs as well as novel *emergent structure* not available in both inputs.




Figure 2: A basic integration network

To account for the dynamic meaning construction process and to explicate the emergent meaning, the CIT model exploits the activation of background knowledge and frequently involves the use of mental imagery and mental simulation (cf. Fauconnier 1997, Fauconnier and Turner 2002, Libura 2007). Nonetheless, the authors of the CIT caution against treating blending as a process generating unified interpretations of particular concepts. Rather, it should be regarded as a mental operation enabling infinite possibilities of meaning construal and interpretation.

Conceptual blending operates largely behind the scenes. We are not consciously aware of its hidden complexities, any more than we are consciously aware of the complexities of perception involved in, for example, seeing a blue cup. Almost invisibly

to consciousness, conceptual blending choreographs vast networks of conceptual meaning, yielding cognitive products that, at conscious level, appear simple. The way we think is NOT the way we think we think. Everyday thought seems straightforward, but even our simplest thinking is astonishingly complex. (Fauconnier and Turner 2002: v)

5. Blending-determined semantic extensions

In order to demonstrate the blending theory at work let us examine the following examples featuring the neosemantic verb *to pink*:

- (11) I saddled up the Olds and drove quickly south on Military Drive in order to keep my date with Bobby. In the process, I *pinked* a few lights and caused more than one fellow driver to salute me in the traditional way one does to drivers without manners.
- (12) I didn't run it, I *pinked* it. [commenting on passing the intersection on red light]

Both uses of *to pink* in example (8) and (9) reveal full semantic overlap and designate the event of “crossing an intersection as the traffic light changes from yellow to red.” I suggest that the direct motivation for this semantic extension may be a visual blend of two colours – red and white. Nevertheless, even this perceptually-grounded explication of the adnominal verb *to pink* is insufficient, as the proper semantic description must take into consideration a deeper level of conceptualisation associated with sensory stimuli.

If so, we have to look for an explanation somewhere else. It seems that Fauconnier and Turner's *CIT* can offer a viable solution in this case. In order to fully understand the extended meaning of the lexeme *pink*, from which the verb *to pink* appearing in sentences (11) and (12) has been metonymically converted, one has to integrate two mental spaces construed around the colour concepts WHITE and RED. Figure 3 demonstrates graphically the conceptual blending for these input spaces (this, however, shall be treated as a proposal, one of the many possible mental simulations generated in the blend). Each input is structured by a cultural frame evoking relevant partial information from extralinguistic knowledge pertaining to rich symbolism associated with the colour *white* and *red* encoded in and specific to Western culture. Additionally, for the RED input the ‘road traffic’ frame is activated. The mentally activated elements from the inputs are linked to one another via cross-space mappings based on the relation of disanalogy, and then selectively projected into the blended space depending on their relevance to the conceptualiser and overall context of the utterance, in this case road traffic situation.³

³ Note that in the blend, as it has been mentioned before, one may run a number of different simulations producing different new qualities. For instance, if one thinks of the Polish national flag as a blend using the same two input spaces WHITE and RED, the emergent structure is not PINK as in the example analysed here. This is because the process of selective projection of elements from the inputs onto the blend, and subsequently running the blend (elaboration) is




Figure 3: Conceptual Integration Network for the verb *to pink*

In the blend, which inherits its 'road traffic' frame from the red input, the disanalogous elements from the inputs are compressed into identity (cf. Libura 2007: 42), and thus in the 'road traffic culture' context *pink* appears to be an illusory traffic light, which allows the hasty driver to cross the intersection although, pursuant to binding traffic regulations, one must not do this due to one's own life threat and possibility of posing a potential risk for other "fellow drivers". Being aware of that fact the driver, upon running a 'pink

dependent upon and sanctioned by the activated frames and context of the expression. In the case of the Polish flag the context includes the history and cultural heritage of Poland, whereas for the 'pink light' the context encompasses the cross-cultural symbolism of the colours 'white' and 'red' as well as the 'road traffic' frame.

light', may suffer from moral remorse; however, performing the action seems for him to be more rewarding than dangerous and, perhaps due to relatively low risk of punishment, the driver feels absolved from his traffic misdemeanour. Consequently, the verb *to pink* designates the action of passing through an intersection on such a 'pink light'.

6. Context and meaning construction in discourse

We shall focus now on the process of meaning construction or, as Langacker (2008) calls it, *conceptual construction*. Says Langacker:

An expression's meaning presupposes an extensive, multifaceted **conceptual substrate** that supports it, shapes it, and renders it coherent. Among the facets of this substrate are (i) the conceptions evoked or created through the previous discourse; (ii) engagement in the speech event itself, as part of the interlocutors' social interaction; (iii) apprehension of the physical, social, and cultural context; and (iv) any domains of knowledge that might prove relevant. A lexical item does not have a fully determinate meaning. Instead, its semantic value resides in conventional paths of access (some well-trodden, others less so) to open-ended domains of knowledge. Precisely what it means on a given occasion—which portions of this encyclopedic knowledge are activated, and to what degree—depends on all the factors cited. (Langacker 2008: 42)

A "realistic" definition of *linguistic meaning* that arises in the process of meaning construction, as Langacker calls it, which draws on "open-ended domains of knowledge", has been formulated by him as follows:

[...] besides elements that are indisputably semantic, an expression's meaning includes as much additional structure as is needed to render the conceptualization coherent and reflect what speakers would naively regard as being meant and said, while excluding factors that are indisputably pragmatic and not necessary to make sense of what is linguistically encoded. (Langacker 2008: 42/464)

From this it follows that a major task for the speaker is to form an utterance that will lead to the desired interpretation on the hearer's part. It is precisely the context that helps accomplish this though. The most important aspects of the discourse context relate to the linguistic expressions used in the discourse, as well as those components of general social and cultural knowledge that have indirect impact on the context of a particular usage event. As Gilles Fauconnier (1997) observes

[...] discourse configurations are highly organized and complex within wider social and cultural contexts, and the *raison d'être* of grammatical constructions and words within them is to provide us with (imperfect) clues as to what discourse configurations to set up. (Fauconnier 1997: 5)

Fauconnier emphasises also the role of full discourse context in the processes of meaning construction, as evidenced by the following quotation:

A language expression *E* does not have meaning in itself, rather it has a *meaning potential*, and it is only within a complete discourse and in context that the meaning [concrete sense] will actually be produced. (Fauconnier 1997: 37)

The foregoing discussion makes it possible for us to schematically illustrate the nature of meaning construction incorporating contextual factors (on the basis of a modified version of the model proposed by Evans and Green 2006: 458):




Figure 4: Meaning construction embedded in context

As shown in Figure 4, the whole meaning construction process is anchored in and guided by context. In the process, the interlocutors, a speaker (S) and a hearer (H), who at the same time are subjects of the conceptualisation (i.e. they are conceptualisers C₁ and C₂), perceive (and produce) sensory stimuli (e.g. acoustic signals, visual stimuli, etc.) of the external world, which combined with the subjective experience of their introspective view on the world, give rise to mental representations of the world. Those representations constitute parts of the conceptualisers' encyclopaedic knowledge which is structured by frames, domains, ICMs, mental spaces, etc. Motivated by language, these representations are then subject to dynamic processing involving basic construal strategies and operations such as profiling or conceptual integration. As a result, meanings are produced, which in turn contribute to and affect language itself, e.g. through meaning extension, language change, etc. This model of language is designed to

account for meaning construction, as determined by both linguistic and extralinguistic context. The former relates to language and linguistic knowledge, while the latter encompasses such dimensions as physical context (sensory experience and the interaction between the interlocutors) and knowledge context (cultural, social and encyclopaedic knowledge). We wish to stress at this point that the graphical representation of meaning construction provided here is largely an extensively simplified picture of the whole process and by its very nature cannot account for all the intricacies pertaining to it. Nonetheless, it allows one to envisage how context, particularly in its two main facets (linguistic and extralinguistic), is related to specific aspects of the meaning construction process.

7. Current Discourse Space

The foregoing discussion has revealed that in Cognitive Linguistics the pragmatic aspects are an integral parcel of the semantic value of an expression. More concretely, cognitive linguists argue that meaning, while it is relatively stable and evokes a certain range of knowledge, is not completely fixed and given in the text explicitly, but rather is construed on-line on the basis of hints in the form of language expressions and discourse context used (cf., *inter alia*, Langacker 1987: 425-426 and 2008: 39; Taylor 2002: 107; Evans and Green 2006: 352; Libura 2007:15).

The issue requiring characterisation now is the question of how discourse is comprehended in cognitive paradigm. According to Langacker (2008: 457), a discourse comprises a series of *usage events*, i.e. “the instances of language use in all their complexity and specificity” or, put differently, a usage event embraces “an expression’s full contextual understanding, a portion of which can be identified as linguistic meaning” (p. 465). A discourse is thus a highly interactive process on the part of at least two interlocutors, a speaker and a hearer, in which the speaker exerts some influence on an actual or imagined hearer. A particular usage event is never absolutely identical for both the speaker and hearer, but still, for the communication to be successful, substantial overlap of some salient aspects of the scene as construed by the speaker and hearer is necessary (cf. Taylor 2002: 108).

In his attempt to provide a common ground for interlocutors engaged in discourse as well as for discourse interpretation, Langacker (2005, 2008) introduces the notion of *Current Discourse Space* (CDS):

It [CDS] comprises everything presumed to be shared by the speaker and hearer as the basis for communication at a given moment. Part of the CDS, of course, is the current discourse itself, including both previous usage events and any that might be anticipated. Also part of the CDS are other mutually evident aspects of the transient context, as well as any stable knowledge required for their apprehension or otherwise invoked. All of these may figure in an expression’s full contextual understanding and in those portions that constitute its linguistic meaning. (Langacker 2008: 466)

The idea of Current Discourse Space coded by linguistic structure is presented graphically in Figure 5.




Figure 5: Standard model of *Current Discourse Space*

A key factor in establishing the linguistic meaning in this model is the interaction between the speaker and the hearer, both of whom actively evaluate the other's knowledge and intentions. Since the hearer interprets the meanings conveyed to him by the speaking entity, the proper understanding of a linguistic expression requires the hearer to actively participate in the ongoing discourse as well as to put mental effort in establishing the actual meaning of this expression. As a consequence, the information included in the message conveyed to him by the speaker must be confronted with his vast repository of encyclopaedic knowledge (cf. Langacker 2008: 464-465). Simultaneously, context in all its dimensions as well as the discourse context (previous usage events and anticipations relating to potential successive usage events) facilitate or help to structure the conceptualisations arising in the speaker's mind, eventually enabling the hearer to construe the meaning of the relevant expression.

8. Integrated (CIT and CDS-based) meaning analysis

On the basis of the foregoing discussion we argue for an integrated meaning analysis of neosemantic noun-to-verb conversions (see Figure 6. depicting schematically the process of meaning construction in discourse) in that we apply the notion of CDS and combine it with our observation that an expression's meaning arises as a result of conceptual blending of the meaning potentials of the lexical concepts used in a particular utterance (represented by the upper ellipse). Specifically, while construing meaning in discourse, the interlocutors develop conceptualisation of the scene coded by linguistic utterances. Similarly to the *conceptual arrangement* (Langacker 1999: 203-205, see also Figure 2.), where conceptualisers are able to construe conceptualisations of only those entities and

relations that are in the immediate scope of the scene construed, in unfolding discourse, only a part of the utterance that is within what Langacker (2005: 130) refers to as “viewing frame”, or “immediate scope” (IS) of a given expression (current usage event) is processed. Within the viewing frame, in turn, a profile of a particular expression is put into focus of attention. Langacker suggests that it is the speaker who directs the attention of the hearer to the conceptual content profile of a linguistic unit by using a specific expression (ibid.). Since linguistic units in Cognitive Linguistics are held to constitute bipolar symbolic assemblies comprising the semantic and phonological poles, then the expression’s meaning emerging in the process of conceptual blending of semantic potentials of lexical concepts abstracted for a particular expression constitutes the semantic pole of the expression in the speaker’s focus of attention (cf. also e.g. Kardela 2007).




Figure 6: Discourse-guided meaning construction

At this point we want to emphasise that only selected parts of activated meaning potentials (presented here as elements) that are sanctioned by linguistic and extralinguistic context are projected into the blend and contribute to the utterance meaning. After the composition of these selected elements in the blend, contextual

factors prompt for the completion of the structure in the blend, giving rise to novel, emergent semantic constituents (encapsulated in the dotted-line ellipse). Then, it is only in the process of elaboration, i.e. mental simulation of events based on the conceptual structure assembled in the blend that the actual meaning of a particular expression is produced.

Returning to the models of meaning construction embedded in context (see Figures 4. and 5.) we want to reiterate that in these models speaker and hearer, both acting as conceptualisers and belonging to the ground of the ongoing meaning construction process, play a vital role in it, as both construe mental representations of the world on the basis of linguistic expressions used in the discourse. The task of the speaker is to design such a linguistic utterance, i.e. to encode linguistically his or her mental representations of a particular scene in such a way that the speaker is able to decode it properly and conceptually arrive at mental representations as close as possible to those intended by the speaker. This task is not simple, however, since mental representations are unstable and depend upon the encyclopaedic knowledge of a relevant conceptualising subject; also the encyclopaedic knowledge which involves conceptualiser's subjective experience of the world will differ from one conceptualiser to the next. Still, as Langacker (2008: 466) points out, a substantial overlap of the scene as construed by the speaker and hearer is sufficient to produce a conceptualisation along with the coherent meaning of the linguistic utterance.

9. Contextual constraints on dynamic construal of meaning

As we could observe in the foregoing, neosemantic forms such as noun-to-verb conversions derive their meaning from the overall meaning of the utterance in which they were used. This points to the fact that the novel sense is strongly embedded in specific context of its use. Apart from determining meaning construction, context imposes certain, sometimes even severe, constraints on the dynamic construal of meaning. These *contextual constraints*, as Croft and Cruse (2004: 102-103) label them,⁴ involve:

- (i) *linguistic context*, which imposes constraints on the meaning construction process due to previous discourse configurations (or basically what we referred to previously as discourse context), immediate linguistic environment (direct phrasal or sentential context) and the type of discourse (including genre, register and thematic field);
- (ii) *physical context*, which draws on any perceptual stimuli having influence on discourse participants in their immediate surroundings;
- (iii) *social context*, which encompasses situational circumstances and the social relations between the discourse participants;

⁴ The contextual constraints introduced by Croft and Cruse (2004) relate to Clark's (1996: 92ff.) conception of *common ground*. Langacker's (2005, 2008) notion of Current Discourse Space may be perceived, *de facto*, as an instance of a common ground with shared actional, personal, perceptual and knowledge basis, as well as mental representations established by and between interlocutors for communicative purposes (cf. Clark 1996: 94-96).

- (iv) *stored knowledge*, i.e. all expressions uttered in the course of the discourse are processed against the background of stored experiences and knowledge which, as it were, ‘supervise’ the meaning construction process and sanction or inhibit particular construals.

All of these constraints exert strong influence on the dynamic process of meaning construal. This is made particularly evident, for instance, in the case of the verb *to obama*, which is popularly used in a number of different and largely incompatible senses. Below we present just a sample of usages:

- (13) a. Hey Jimmy, I need you to *obama* my car.
[*to obama* – to fix]
b. If you have poor vision, wearing glasses will *obama* your eyesight.
[*to obama* – to improve]
- (14) His fear to *obama* the change needed prompted him to hire an entire new team.
[*to obama* – to fail to fix something by relying on the same people who destroyed it]
- (15) Don’t *Obama* our last roll of toilet paper, we can’t buy more until tomorrow.
[*to obama* – to waste something]
- (16) We are all going to suffer if the Democrats keep *obamaing* our tax dollars.
[*to obama* – to unjustly take something away from someone]
- (17) Oh my gosh, we were playing team rummikub the other night and my partner Fred totally *obama’d* this massive move and made me take all the blame.
[*to obama* – to blame someone else for someone’s own mistakes]
- (18) I just *obama’d* a fly man, it was awesome!
[*to obama* – to kill a fly in midair]

Although the noun-to-verb conversion *to obama* instantiates a simple metonymic extension, following the schema agent involved in the action for the action, all uses in examples (13) through (18) refer to a number of totally different activities. This should not be surprising, since the incumbent US-president Barack Obama is a public figure whose actions are carefully monitored by both his adherents and opponents and extensively commented on. Very often the name of the President emerges in people’s everyday discussions serving as a certain point of reference. The examples invoked demonstrate eloquently the importance of discourse context mediation in the process of meaning construction of novel linguistic expressions. In order to interpret the verb *to obama* in all these examples, the context of speaker’s stored knowledge pertaining to current affairs of state must be seen to play a particularly important role.

The sense of *to obama* in (13) might have been coined by the President’s followers satisfied with the policy of his administration which is perceived as the cure to all problems of the state; hence by virtue of conversion the verb designates the action of fixing something (13a). The sense in (13b) seems to be the case of a semantic extension from (13a) via metaphoric generalisation. Curiously enough, the sense in (14) is just the

opposite of (13); it has undergone a semantic narrowing, since it does not refer to “failing to do something” generally, but is restricted to those cases when the failure is the result of entrusting someone who contributed to the failure with a task to repair it. This clearly alludes to the oil spill disaster in the Gulf of Mexico that happened last year, and when the president charged the same oil concern that was responsible for the catastrophe with the task to rectify their disastrous error.

Senses (14) through (17) are generally ‘negative senses’ in that the actions described by them are considered to be detrimental for the overall welfare of people or things affected by them. These could have been coined by speakers displeased with the President Obama or his policy. For instance, the meaning of *to obama* in (15) refers to someone’s subjective impression that the President throws tax payers’ money around without much care. In (16) the verb has been used in such a way that it insinuates that the President (who stands metonymically for the whole government) takes away money from those that earn it through hard work and gives it to those who don’t deserve it.⁵ This sense appears to be also related to that in (15). *To obama* in (17) also invokes the speaker’s prejudice towards the President’s political performance and here the verb does not pertain strictly to the domain of political action but is extended to other domains of action (e.g. gaming situation). The motivation for this sense given by Urban Dictionary is that it refers to the way how the President is reported to talk grandly for hours about a future move he is going to make and after making the move he realises it was wrong, but then he starts blaming it on someone else, usually the opposite party.

The meaning of *to obama* in (18) is different in this regard from all the previous examples in that it is rather a neutral, or at most a humorous term, based on a real incident from June 2009, when President Obama during a live interview for CNBC channel killed a fly in the studio.

10. Conclusion

To construct a discourse that will mediate the meaning construction of a neosemantic expression as envisaged in this article, discourse participants, i.e. a speaker and a hearer must invoke an appropriate context, relevant to the expression used. As a matter of fact, it seems, the global discourse context arises as the effect of merging different subcontexts pertaining, *inter alia*, to general encyclopaedic and cultural knowledge of discourse participants, common knowledge shared by speaker and hearer in the current discourse space, the activated domain of the unfolding discourse and discourse genre, the socio-cultural settings of the discourse, previous and current usage events with special emphasis on the immediate linguistic co-textual environment of the profiled expression in the current usage event. These different aspects of context are subject to ongoing

⁵ This particular usage is motivated by the bias of the speaker-coiner towards the President and may refer to the democrat economic crisis plan from 2008/2009 resulting in pumping billions of dollars into financial markets in an attempt to stop the economic free-fall. The negative attitude of the speaker encoded in the verb may affect the way how a potential hearer will perceive the actual person whose name was used to designate the action. This seems to constitute an interesting socio-cultural ‘side effect’ of the otherwise neutral linguistic phenomenon such as noun-to-verb conversion.

change as each successive usage event ‘updates’ the overall context which has direct influence on the online meaning construction of the utterance deployed in the discourse (cf. also Gumperz 1992 and Roberts 2004).

The discourse context in all its facets (linguistic, sentential, physical, cultural, social, encyclopaedic knowledge, etc.) facilitates structuring the unfolding CDS and enables the hearer to focus on the profiled expression (e.g. neosemantic noun-to-verb conversion) within a particular utterance. Of course, the context as perceived by the speaker and hearer may differ slightly owing to different construals of the scene or stored encyclopaedic knowledge, which is primarily due to different subjective experiences of discourse participants; however, a substantial overlap of their different perspectives is sufficient so that we could speak of a common contextual space in which discourse is embedded.

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THE PRAGMATICS OF EMOTIONS IN INTERLINGUISTIC HEALTHCARE SETTINGS

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Abstract

Data-based studies on interlinguistic medical interaction show that frequently migrant patients encounter difficulties in expressing their emotions and concerns. Such difficulties are not always overcome through the intervention of an interpreter, as emotional expressions tend to “get missed” in translations which focus on problems and treatments in medical terms.

The main question addressed here is: what types of interpreters’ actions cut out, or make relevant, migrant patients’ emotions? Our data is based on a corpus of 300 interlinguistic medical interactions in Arabic, Mandarin Chinese and Italian in two public hospitals in Italy. The conversations involve one Italian healthcare provider, an interpreter and a migrant patient. The corpus is analyzed drawing upon Conversation Analysis, studies on Dialogue Interpreting and Intercultural Pragmatics.

Keywords: conversational analysis, medical interaction, pragmatics, emotion, intercultural communication

1. Introduction

Situations requiring interpreters are increasingly common in Western medical systems where healthcare providers encounter migrant patients. *Interpreter-mediated interaction*, that is, triadic interaction involving an interpreter as the third party in a communication process between individuals speaking a different language, is considered one of the most important practices used by institutions to encourage foreign patients to access public healthcare services.

Parallel to its increasing importance for healthcare institutions, interpreted-mediated interaction in public services has become the object of empirical studies from applied linguistics, with respect to collections and transcriptions of conversations (Cambridge, 1999; Pöchhacker and Kadric, 1999; Tebble, 1999; Angelelli, 2004; Baker, 2006; Baraldi and Gavioli, 2011).

In the same period, standards of conducts for healthcare professionals have been devoting more attention the development of an emotional sensitive rapport with patients. Research on different medical settings across the last fifteen years show that the treatment of emotions is now widely considered important for the successful outcome of medical treatment and care (Charles *et al.*, 1999; Epstein *et al.*, 2005; Mead and Bower, 2000; Zandbelt *et al.*, 2006). Patients’ emotions and the doctors’ affective involvement

in the interaction are now considered of primary importance in helping patients comply with treatment (Barry *et al.*, 2001; Kiesler and Auerbach, 2003; Mangione-Smith *et al.*, 2003; Heritage and Maynard, 2005; Robinson and Heritage, 2005). In this respect, healthcare providers are invited to observe illness through the patient's lens and "*treat the patient, rather than just the disease*" (Heritage and Maynard, 2006: 355).

However, with regard to interpreter-mediated medical interactions, some peculiar difficulties in handling emotional expressions have been observed in several studies; in particular, doubts have been raised about the effectiveness of interpreting in promoting balanced power relationships. Davidson's research (2000; 2001) suggest that in healthcare settings interpreters can act as *gatekeepers*, controlling what is passed between doctor and patient and fuelling asymmetric power relations between the two parties. In these situations, instead of relaying patients' concerns in full to doctors, interpreters tend to summarise what patients have said, focusing on medical problems and treatments; consequently, emotional expressions may be overlooked or omitted (Hsieh, 2010). Performing the role of gatekeeper, interpreters work as a pre-filter, evaluating the importance of the patient's contributions before translating them (Bolden, 2000).

Stimulated by empirical evidence of the difficulties encountered by migrant patients in presenting their case histories and concerns in interpreted-mediated interactions (Bolden, 2000; Davidson, 2001; Hsieh, 2010; Meyer and Bührig, 2004), this article discusses how interpreted-mediated interactions may empower, but also inhibit, migrant patients' participation in medical encounters.

The discussion is based on the analysis of medical interactions recorded in two public healthcare services in region Emilia-Romagna of Italy, the *Centro per la salute delle famiglie straniere* (Healthcare support centre for foreign families) in the sanitary district of Reggio Emilia and the *Consultorio* (Local centre for health and social services) in Vignola, a small town pertaining to the sanitary district of Modena.

2. Background

2.1 Interpreting as mediation

With regard to interpreted-mediated interactions in public services, it may be helpful to consider empirical studies from applied linguistics, with respect to collections and transcriptions of mediated conversations. These studies clarify that interpreting can be seen as a triadic interaction involving two primary participants (service provider and service user) and a third one (the interpreter), who has to allow the user to access the service by translating from the user's language to the agent's language, making both aware of each other's differences, and also allows the service provider to provide the user with the service requested (Mason, 2006).

In order to explain the type and amount of work that interpreters do in the interaction, Wadensjö (1998) suggests that interpreters play a double role in the conversation, they *translate* and they also *coordinate* the talk activity. Such coordinating activity is aimed at making the interaction between the participants of different languages possible and

successful and it is concerned with the promotion of their participation and understanding. Interpreters, therefore, need to consider the meanings and purposes that are achieved through a conversation; for this reason *interpreting may be understood as a form of mediation* and interpreter may be understood as mediators in interlinguistic and intercultural settings. According to Wadensjö (1998), the most important function of the interpreter-mediator (henceforth: the mediator) is not simply the faithful translation of what the participants say, but has to do with the promotion of a shared knowledge and with coordination. In other words, the mediator is an independent agent who must be seen as an active participant, influencing the orientation of the communication, the expectation towards the roles of doctor and patient and the meanings of healthcare (Baraldi, 2009).

2.2 Context and outline of the study

This article is based on a dataset collected within a research project undertaken in 2010 in two sanitary districts of Region Emilia Romagna: the Modena district and the Reggio Emilia district. The research project, titled *Interlinguistic and intercultural communication: analysis of interpretation as a form of mediation for the bilingual dialogue between foreign citizens and institutions* aimed to create a method of analysis of healthcare practices, drawing up specific criteria to identify good practices and developing guide-lines to be used in personnel training.

In the last fifteen years, the areas pertaining to the Modena and Reggio Emilia districts have been experiencing waves of migration from Northern and Western Africa and West Balkans. More recently, new migration waves have originated from China and Southern Asia. While in 2001 the migrants in both areas were less than 4% of the resident population, data from 2012 indicate that migrants in the area of the Modena district are 89,346, (12.7% of the resident population) and in the area of Reggio Emilia they amount to 69,060 (13% of the resident population). In both districts, the majority of migrants originate from Morocco and Albania. Modena also has a population of Tunisian migrants and Reggio Emilia has quite large Indian and the Chinese communities. Facing these demographic trends, a major challenge for healthcare services is to provide appropriate service for migrants. As a result, healthcare institutions have been encouraged to reorganize their services in innovative ways based on migrant-friendly models (Chiarenza, 2008, 2012).

For example, mediators have been appointed by the General Hospital Board and Local Health Board in Modena to help in reception, obstetrics, nursery, paediatrics, gynaecology, neonatology and the family advice bureau. For its part, Reggio Emilia Local Health Board uses intercultural mediators in the outpatients' departments and specialized units for the care of women and children.

2.3 Participants, data collection and analysis

Four doctors, four nurses and four interpreters took part in the research. All the healthcare professionals are of Italian origins and native speakers of Italian. The

interpreters, who comes from Tunisia and Jordan (Arab speaking) and Northern China (Chinese speaking) have been living in Italy for at least 6 years at the moment of the registration, undergoing formal training to enable them to work as intercultural mediators. Resolution 265 of the Regional Government of Emilia-Romagna (2005), establishes training standards for intercultural mediators. In order to be qualified as intercultural mediators in public services, it is necessary to follow courses organized by training centres validated by the regional authorities. The minimum duration of training course is 200 hours, including at least 40 hours of traineeship.

In the contexts of the research, mediation services are predominantly used in the nursery-infant and women areas; thus, most of the patients involved in the research are women (92%); in both districts migrant women represent the most delicate target for healthcare services: in accessing healthcare services they often encounter different and unfamiliar cultural constructions of health, disease, therapy, sexuality, motherhood which their husbands and fathers may not understand or approve and may, therefore, be a source of conflict.

With regard to the institutional goals of mediation services, Emilia Romagna Regional Law 5/2004, affirms that

The Region promotes, also through the Local Health Units and Hospitals, the development of informational interventions aimed at immigrant foreign citizens, along with activities of intercultural mediation within the social-health field, finalized at ensuring appropriate cognitive elements, in order to facilitate access to health and social-health services

Hence, the research concerns medical encounters wherein the mediators are expected to promote the coordination between the principal interlocutors, preserving the functionality of the healthcare system.

The research on which this article is based originated the recording of 300 conversations involving migrants speaking Arabic, Chinese, Albanian, Russian, Igbo, Rumanian, Urdu, Hindi and other languages. For the sake of this article a subset of 57 conversation has been used, composed of the medical encounters involving Arabic and Chinese speaking women in two public healthcare services: the *Centro per la salute delle famiglie straniere* (Healthcare support centre for foreign families) in Reggio Emilia and the *Consultorio* (Local centre for health and social services) in Vignola (a small town in the sanitary district of Modena).

The conversations involve at least one Italian doctor (D), an Arabic-speaking or Chinese-speaking mediator (M) and an Arabic-speaking or Chinese-speaking patient (P).

Transcriptions of recorded conversation were carried out by researchers occasionally with the help of mediators who were not involved in the collection of data. The Arabic and Chinese turns of talk were transcribed in the Latin font type-set, as commonly used in international chat lines. Transcription of Arabic posed some problems because of the variety of dialects used by the patients. In some cases the transcriber understood the sense of the utterance but could not transcribe it precisely. In those cases an approximate translation of the turn is provided.

2.4 Ethical considerations

The project was reviewed and approved by a Management Coordination Committee, composed of the research coordinator and the coordinators of healthcare services in the two districts. The Management Coordination Committee was in charge of decision making on knowledge protection, ethical and legal issues.

Written information about the project was provided for doctors, interpreters and patients. This included a details of the aim of the project, request for permission to audio-record each conversation and how the results would be used. Written permission was requested from patients, interpreters and doctors. The privacy of participants was preserved according to the Italian Data Protection Act 675 (31.12.1996). Due to the sensitiveness of the situations, the research was authorised to collect audio, but not video, recordings, which did not allow observation of non-verbal action produced through gaze, gesture, facial expression, body posture, etc.

Before any encounter, participants were reminded about the aims of the research and their right to withdraw. Assurances about anonymity were important to avoid anyone being blamed or stigmatized as a result of taking part in the research. If removing or changing names was not enough to ensure anonymity, the ethical need for anonymity was prioritized over scientific considerations of documentation.

These ethical considerations are not, and cannot possibly, be exhaustive. Ethical research practice requires continuous reflexivity and coping with ethical problems as they arise. This requires dialogue on two levels: between researchers as a means of collectively sharing experience, and between researchers and participants in the ongoing research project.

2.5 Theoretical and methodological considerations

The theoretical and methodological premise of the present work is that language works to create meaning and to influence mutual behaviour, therefore language-in-interaction constitutes a unique object for a research motivated by an interest in the methods used by people to negotiate, in any social encounter, the meanings of roles, expectations and normative values (Schegloff, 2007). This article uses two methods for analyzing language-in-interaction: the first method follows the principles of Conversation Analysis, the second method derives from intercultural pragmatics.

Conversation Analysis (CA) is aimed at determining the methods and resources that the interactional participants use and rely on to produce interactional contributions and make sense of the contributions of others. Thus CA is designed to model the resources and methods, or *procedures*, by which participants in interactions perform their social identities and negotiate their relationships. In the last forty years, all basic interactional procedures have been subject of CA studies: the set of practices through which turns are allocated in conversation, the *turn-taking* (Sacks *et al.* 1974), the methods used by parties in conversation to deal with problems in speaking, hearing, or understanding. (Schegloff, *et al.* 1977), the preference in conversation for some types of actions (within sequences of action) over other actions. (Pomerantz 1984), the management of epistemic status (Heritage, 2012).

The object of CA as a method of sociological research is to discover how identities are generated in interaction while participants understand and respond to one another in conversation (Hutchby and Wooffitt, 1998; ten Have, 1999; Sidnell & Stivers, 2012), by means of practices that, behind the apparent contingency of conversation, constitutes the roots of human sociality (Enfield & Levinson, 2007).

The CA theoretical presupposition of the mutual influence of interaction and social order is explained by Mona Baker when she states:

we perform our gender, we step in and out of professional and other roles numerous times during the course of a single conversation, and therefore whether a participant behaves and responds (...) at any moment depends on a variety of factors and can change during the course of a single interaction. (Baker, 2006: 326)

The second methods used in analyzing interaction is based on intercultural pragmatics (Gumperz, 1992; Koole and Ten Thjie 2001; Carbaugh 2005; Verschueren 2008; Tannen, 2009) and it is concerned with the influence of linguistic and interactional features in the negotiation of social relationships in medical encounters.

According to intercultural pragmatics, in any social encounter participants rely on repertoires of cultural presuppositions to foreground the expectations of others, therefore being able to choose how to act, and to re-act to the actions of others. Cultural presuppositions are sets of expectations depending on socialization patterns, that concern role performances, actions and understanding of action. For instance, medical discourse, be it the discourse on healthcare (medicine) and discourses in healthcare (medical interaction), is permeated by cultural presuppositions concerning differentiated role performances and the interrelation of doctors' actions and patients' actions.

The cultural presuppositions of interaction are observable empirically if one focuses on the participants' management of *contextualization cues*. The analytical concept of contextualization cues was introduced in intercultural pragmatics by Gumperz, to refer to verbal and non-verbal signs which are selected by interlocutors to "relate what is said at any one time and in any one place to knowledge acquired through past experience" (Gumperz 1992: 230). Contextualization cues could be identified at any discursive level: prosody (intonation, pitch shift), paralinguistic signs (tempo, pausing and hesitation, latching or overlapping of speaking turns), code choice (style, language) and choice of lexical forms or formulaic expressions.

How contextualization cues are managed, that is, which linguistic and paralinguistic signs are identified by participants as contextualization cues depends on their knowledge and past experiences as much as on their expectations; the management of contextualization cues "highlight, foreground or make salient the cultural presuppositions of the interaction" (Gumperz 1992: 232), for the participants as well as for the analyst.

CA and intercultural pragmatics share the analytical principle that language, culture and social organization must be analyzed not as separate subfields but as integrated elements of coherent courses of action, allowing their combination: while CA has developed tools to analyze the basic units out of which turns are fashioned and the relations between turns in sequences of actions, interactional pragmatics has developed analytical tools to recognizes those units and those sequences as cues for the cultural

presuppositions of interaction from the perspective of participants' own reasoning and understanding about their circumstances and communication.

Based on the combination of CA and intercultural pragmatics, this article will discuss how linguistic and interactional features cooperate in constituting the *background* of interaction (Searle, 1992) in medical encounters mediated by an interpreter, establishing either the discrimination and the exclusion of the migrant patient or an emotional-sensitive healthcare, where the patient actively participates as a person, with his/her worries, doubts and concerns.

In the following sections two types of social situation will be discussed: those where mediation creates the conditions for the exclusion of patients' worries, doubts, concerns and emotions from the medical encounter and those where mediation succeeds in making patients' emotions relevant in the interaction. All conversations were transcribed according to Conversation Analysis (CA) conventions (see Figure 1 below).

[]	Brackets mark the start and end of overlapping speech
(.)	A micropause, hearable but too short to measure
Te:xt	Colons show degrees of elongation of the prior sound
Tex-	Hyphens mark a cut-off of the preceding sound
((comment))	Additional comments from the transcriber
"Text"	Italics between inverted commas is used for <i>English translations</i>

Figure 1: Transcription conventions. (from: Jefferson G. Glossary of transcript symbols with an introduction. In: Lerner G, ed. *Conversation Analysis: studies from the first generation* Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 2004; 13-23.

3. Interactions that exclude or inhibit patients: Non-renditions and zero-renditions

Data show that the situations where mediation creates the condition for the marginalization of patients' emotions, concerns and social worlds from the medical encounter are often characterized by the presence of two types of mediators' action: *non-renditions* and *zero renditions* of both patient's and doctor's turns of talk (both concepts derives from Wadensjö, 1998).

Non-renditions are "text which are analysable as an interpreter's initiative or response which does not correspond (as translation) to a prior 'original' utterance" (Wadensjö, 1998: 108). In zero-renditions originals are left untranslated, that is, "one or more element(s) produced by one of the primary participants lacks a correspondent in the production of the interpreter" (Wadjenso, 1998: 108).

In the first place, the discussion will focus on the form and consequences of *non-renditions* that, according to data gathered in the context of the research, occur when the mediator passes information from the patient to the doctor and vice versa.

Excerpt 1 has been recorder in an emergency room; the patient, who is a young Arab-speaking woman from Northern Africa, has suffered a leg injury at home. As the woman

shows limited skills in the Italian language, the doctor calls for the mediation service, which is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, in that hospital.

The crucial section of the excerpt consist in the dyadic sequence in Arabic, where the patient advances two questions (lines 6 and 8) to find out if the doctor is treating her leg in the office while the mediator, instead of translating the patient's questions, responds directly with non-renditions.

(1)

1D: *Allora signora (.) possiamo provare a dare (.) del*
So madame (.) can try to give (.) of

2 *Fastum gel in pomata (.) che però se lo deve comprare*
Fastum gel of ointment (.) that but it must buy

3 *perché non ce l'abbiamo (.) due volte al giorno*
because not it have (.) two times to day
"So madam (.) we can try (.) Fastum gel ointment(.) but she has to buy it herself because we don't have it (.) twice a day"

4M: *pomata Fastum gel, lma tshtriha mn alvarmajia*
ointment Fastum gel, what buy in pharmacy

5 *fhmtni*
she gives
"She gives you (.)the ointment you put it (.) buy it at the pharmacy"

6P: *fhl iatiha li?*
she give me it?
"does she give it to me?"

7M: *msh mojoda andhm hna fhmtni*
not here do not she gives
"It is not available here she's not giving it to you"

8P: *bdha tatiniha ma?*
not want give me?
"Doesn't she wants to give it to me?"

9M: *andhmsh, mandhmsh msh mshkl aih. kif lo andhm*
that that's not the problem. they it in them

10 £ *biatok hma bnfshim iani (.) msh ghali*
means don't have (.) not really

11 *homfihosh haja ghalia fhmti*
need you understand don't give
"£ That's not the problem they don't have it (.) really don't have it"

In lines 4-5, the mediator produces a *non-rendition* of the doctor's previous turn ("*she gives you the ointment*"), excluding the information that concern the unavailability of the ointment. The *non-rendition* is a cue for the cultural presuppositions of a doctor-centred

culture (Barry *et al.*, 2001), where the patient is expected to follow doctor's instructions, while the doctor is not expected to justify them. The sequential order of actions shows that the *non-rendition* is hindering mutual understanding: in the same turn the patient is told that the doctor is treating her leg with the ointment and that she needs to buy the ointment at the pharmacy; the interaction is entrapped in a paradox, which is a consequence of mediator's use of "give" as a substitute for "prescribe", so that the patient understands "gives you" as "put the ointment on your leg".

The patient is not able to give meaning to doctor's action, as they are reported by the mediator's non-renditions. She is not aware that the ointment is not available because the mediator cut out this piece of information in the non-rendition. Without knowing that the ointment is not available, the patient can still expect the doctor to treat her leg in the office. In order to overcome the uncertainty, the patient initiates a repair sequence in line 6: "Does she give it to me?". Instead of translating the question to the doctor, the interpreter completes the repair sequence, responding to the patient with a second non-rendition: "It is not available here she's not giving it to you" (line 7). Also that second non-rendition is a cue for the cultural presuppositions of a doctor-centred culture: as the doctor has already said that is not treating the patient at the office, the continuation of the topic prompted by the translation of the patient's question would unnecessary slowdown the encounter.

However, from the patient's perspective, the doctor didn't say anything about the unavailability of the ointment. If one applies the CA method, considering the sequential order of actions positioning herself as a participant in the interaction, what emerges is that the second non-rendition, that conveys the information of the unavailability of the ointment, comes only after a patient's question, whereas the first non-rendition didn't mention that unavailability. The sequential order of the interaction motivates the patient in understanding the second non-rendition as a strategy to deny the fact that the doctor does not want to treat her.

The patient's reiteration of the question (line 8) displays her dissatisfaction: the question has an interrogative-negative format, that CA research connects to questions designed to claim a knowledgeable position for the questioner (Heritage, 2001; Koshik, 2002; Stivers and Makoto 2010), seeking confirmation for information that is already in play.

For the patient, the order of mediator's non-renditions is a cue for the doctor's decision not to treat her leg in the office, a decision which the patient considers as a matter fact; the function of the interrogative-negative question is not to ask for information but to express dissatisfaction. The trajectory of the interaction suggests that such function is understood by the interpreter, who tries to mitigate the patient's dissatisfaction; however, she does so with a third non-rendition, without translating the patient's question to the doctor question but providing a direct response to the patient (lines 9-11).

In excerpt 1, the systematic use of non-renditions is a cue for the cultural presuppositions of a doctor-centred culture, in the first place for a hierarchy of differentiated social roles where the doubts and concerns of the patients are excluded if considered irrelevant for illness treatment. However, doubts about the functionality of a medical communication only concerned with physical symptoms have been raised, as a number of studies suggests that the treatment of emotions is important for the successful

outcome of medical treatment and care (Charles *et al.*, 1999; Mead and Bower, 2000; Barry *et al.*, 2001; Epstein *et al.*, 2005; Zandbelt *et al.*, 2006), and the doctors' affective involvement in the interaction is of primary importance in helping patients comply with treatment (Stivers, 2002; Kiesler and Auerbach, 2003; Mangione-Smith *et al.*, 2003; Heritage and Maynard, 2005; Robinson and Heritage, 2005). We can imagine the attitude of the patient towards medical prescriptions if she believes that the doctor is not interested in her health.

In excerpt 2 a dyadic sequence involving the interpreter and the patient is prompted by a non-rendition that offers a summarized translation of doctor's contributions. The patient is a Chinese man in his fifties, who has been living in Italy for the last two years, without developing adequate skills in the Italian language. The patient has been diagnosed with high blood pressure and put under medical control. The excerpt is taken from a programmed examination, with the presence of the mediator.

(2)

1D: *martedì è sette, vero?*

Tuesday is seven, true?

"next tuesday, is it the seventh, right?"

2M: *mmh, mmh*

3D: *allora gli dici di portare pazienza perché*

so to her tell f bring patience because

4 *per le prime due settimane ci vedremo spesso*

for the first two weeks us see often

"now tell him to be patient because in the first two weeks we'll meet very often"

5M: *ok, però l' orecchio -*

ok, but the ear -

"ok, but his ear -"

6D: *no, no, no. adesso ci occupiamo dell' orecchio,*

no, no,no. now we work of the ear

7 *intanto digli che deve portare pazienza.*

for now tell him that must bring patience.

"no, no, no. now we'll take care of his ear, for the moment, tell him that he has to be patient"

8M: *ok (.)ní zhèigè yuè jīnliàng duō,*

as much as possible this month

9 *xià gè xīngqī èr, Qī hào, Xiàwǔ liǎng*

next Tuesday, the 7th, at 2:30

10 *diǎn bàn lái zhèli,*

in the afternoon and come here

11 *wǒmen zài gěi nǐ zuò xuèyā jiǎnchá*
we give you to do blood pressure check

12 *xīnzàng jiǎnchá*
heart check

13 *chī zhège yào, zhōngyào bù yào chī le.*
eat this medicine, traditional Chinese medicine must not eat.
"This I recommend you, next Tuesday, the 7th, at 2:30
you come here so that we check your blood pressure, your heart. And take this medicine,
don't take the Chinese medicine any longer"

14P: *a:h zhōngyào bù yào chī le?*
a:h traditional chinese medicine, must not eat?
"ah, I don't have to take chinese medicine?"

15M: *zhōngyào yīgài bù yào chī le,*
traditional Chinese medicine must not eat

16 *bùyào wàng le, dào Yìdàlì lái bù yào chī le,* must not to forget, to Italy to come must not eat

17 *tīngdǒng le méiyǒu?*
to understand not to have?
"No, remember this, you have come to Italy so you
do not have to take those medicines more, do you understand?"

18P: *zhōngyào bù lún zhī liàn,*
traditional Chinese medicine not good,

19 *bù néng chī?*
not to eat?
"the Chinese medicine, is it not good so I can't take it?"

20M: *bù néng chīde, ok? qīngchu le? hái yǒu méiyǒu*
can't eat, ok? to understand? still to have or

21 *bù qīngchu de?*
not to have unclear?
"You can't, ok? Is it clear? Is it clear now or is it still unclear?"

22P: *zhè yào gěi W ōba. zhège yào.*
this medicine they give me. this medicine.
"they have given me this medicine"

23M: *zhège yào bù yào chīde, ok?*
this medicine not to eat it, ok?
"You do not have to take this medicine okay?"

24 ((to D in Italian)) *allora sto cercando di*
 ((to D in Italian)) so I am trying of
 ((to D in Italian)) "so I'm trying to"

25P: *bù shì yào zuò xuèyā dema?*
 not to be medicine to do blood pressure?

26 *bù yòng chī yào piàn?*
 need not to take medicine sheet?
 "aren't those medicines right for my blood pressure? Shouldn't I take the medicine sheet
 ((of the Chinese medicine))?"

27M: *bù yòng chī yào piàn*
 need not to take medicine sheet
 "no, I don't have to take it"

A dyadic sequence in Italian language between the doctor and the mediator (lines 1-7) is followed by a dyadic sequence in Chinese language involving the mediator and the patient (lines 8-13), which is prompted by a mediator's non-rendition.

In the non-rendition, the mediator adds a recommendation, to avoid traditional Chinese medicine, which was included in the doctor's contribution. By producing the non-rendition the mediator is performing the role of representative of the medical system, making relevant the distinction between scientific medicine and tradition, non-scientific, potentially harming medicine.

In turn 14, the patient responds to the recommendation with a question ("*ah, I don't have to take chinese medicine?*") where the initial token "*ah*", indicates of a change of state his understanding (Heritage, 1984), that is, that the recommendation to avoid traditional medicine makes a difference for the patient. The rest of the dyadic sequence provides negotiation of understanding of such change of state.

Two points need to be noticed. The first point is that mediator's confirmation of the referent of the change of state, that Chinese medicine must be avoided (lines 15-17) is not immediately accepted by the patient (lines 18-19), who insist on the possibility of re-establishing the validity of Chinese medicine (lines 22 and 25-26), while the mediator insists on the need to abandon it (lines 20-21, 23 and 27). The second point concerns the tension between what the development of the dyadic sequence in Chinese language and the inclusion of the third participant, the doctor, in the interaction. For instance, the mediator attempts to involve the doctor in the interaction (line 24), but is immediately re-engaged in the conversation with the patient by the lacking of patient's alignment to the recommendation to give up Chinese medicine.

In the course of the excerpt the patient makes four attempts to defend the use of traditional Chinese medicine; what is of the greatest importance for an analysis of the functions of mediation is that none of these attempts is translated to the doctor, because the mediator systematically drops the translation producing *zero renditions*. Instead of translating for the doctor, the mediator respond directly to the patient. Throughout the course of the interaction, mediator's zero renditions are cues for the presuppositions of a culture centred on the primacy of the expectations and the values of scientific medicine which are observed in opposition to traditional medicine, with the latter considered as a potential risk for the treatment, that must be abandoned.

By producing zero renditions, the mediator accesses the role of representative of the institution, substituting the doctor. It is the mediator, not the doctor, who manages the patient's reluctance to abandon Chinese medicine. Mediator's zero renditions are cues foregrounding: 1) trust in the western medicine, 2) distrust in traditional medicine, 3) expectations of the patient's resistance, that is, a set of cultural presuppositions feeding the idea of an unavoidable cultural conflict. In the context of the ongoing interaction, from the perspective of the mediator, who is concerned with the functionality of the medical encounter, that conflict must be solved in the shortest time, without involving the doctor, as it would be an unnecessary waste of the expert's time.

In all types of interactions, including mediated interactions, the participation framework is necessarily co-authored through interactional moves and activities between principal speakers and the mediator. In excerpt 2, the mediator doesn't cooperate in making patient's participation relevant in the medical encounter; her zero renditions prevent patient's concerns and social world, that includes the use of traditional Chinese medicine to treat blood pressure, to become relevant in the medical encounter.

By producing zero-renditions, the mediator substitutes the doctor in evaluating the relevance of patient's contributions, as the contributions that don't have corresponding translations are thus excluded from the medical encounter.

It is true that in excerpt 2, as in other excerpts, mediator's zero renditions make the medical encounter proceed faster, thus apparently supporting the functionality of the system. However, we may ask what kind of system's functionality is supported by those actions. Research by Leanza et al. (2010) and Schouten et al. (2007) confirm the efficacy of this type of mediators' action in keeping the interaction coherent, for instance, censoring a part of the medical discourse that might not be comprehensible or manageable by the patient, or a part of the patient's discourse which might be irrelevant to healthcare treatment. But the same research show that these types of mediator's action hinder the trust building process between patient and healthcare provider. Creating more distance between the principal participants, zero- and non-renditions pose risks to the therapeutic process and, paradoxically, compromise the same values (e.g., self-determinism and informed decision-making) of the Western medical system (Hsieh, 2010).

4. Interactions that promote an emotional-sensitive healthcare: formulations

4.1 Informative formulations

Data show that mediator's actions could also promote the development of an emotional-sensitive healthcare, where the patient participates actively, expressing his/her worries, concerns and social worlds. The analysis of the structure of the interactions where mediation succeeds in promoting patients' participation shows that patients' emotions are made relevant in the medical encounter through a movement between dyadic interactions (patient-mediator) and triadic interactions (patient-mediator-doctor).

Dyadic interaction is the context where the mediators may express interest and involvement in patients' contributions, including the expression of emotions and concerns. Most of the actions used to promote patients' emotional expression can be included under the CA category of *backchannelling* (Schiffirin, 1999). Backchannelling refers to the existence of two channels of conversation operating simultaneously: the channel of the speaker who directs primary speech flow and the backchannel of the listener which functions to define the listener's comprehension or interest.

In the conversation analyzed, some elements of backchannel are cues for the cultural presuppositions of a patient-centred culture that values the importance of patient's participation, also with regard to the expression of emotions. In dyadic sequences, the mediators promote patients' expression of emotions through backchannel elements such as *acknowledgment tokens* expressing that the stated information has been received (e.g. yeah, OK), *continuers* (e.g. hmmm, ah-ha) maintaining the flow of conversation and supporting the current speaker in continuing his turn and *echoing*, providing feedback that attention is paid to what is being uttered.

Data show that most of the dyadic sequences are generated when, instead of translating a contribution, the mediator respond to the patient with backchannelling, producing acknowledgment tokens, continuers, echoing (but also more substantive backchannel as requests for clarification or direct replies). By responding with backchannel elements mediators align to patients' expression of worries or doubts, embarrassment or want for reassurance as *responders* (Wadensjö, 1998), that is, as listeners who are responsible for responding to patients' contribution, going beyond the role of reporters of patients' contribution to the doctors. It is only by accessing the role of responder that the mediators have the opportunity to check and echo the patients' perceptions and emotions, providing positive feedback and expressing personal concern for them.

When the mediator performs the role of responder, the translation activity is suspended; a rendition of the whole dyadic sequence is then provided in summarized form, moving the interaction towards a *triadic* format where all participants, patient, mediator and doctor, are involved.

In the conversations analyzed, *formulations* are the main conversational resource used by mediators to involve doctors in the interaction. According to CA definition, formulations are turns of talk used to

advance the prior report by finding a point in the prior utterance and thus shifting its focus, redeveloping its gist, making something explicit that was previously implicit in the prior utterance, or by making inferences about its presuppositions or implications" (Heritage, 1985: 104)

Mediators' *formulations* follow patient-mediator dyadic sequences, with adaptations to accommodate the doctor. With *formulations*, mediators build, expand and recreate the meanings of prior dyadic sequences according to presuppositions and orientations for which they are responsible. *Formulations* are not word-for-word interpretations of contributions in prior dyadic sequences, but rely on mediator's discursive initiative and willingness to create a common ground between patients and doctors. Specifically, *formulations* are conversational resources available to the mediator in order to a) provide an interpretation which highlights content from prior sequences; b) make what is thought to be implicit or unclear, in prior turns of talk, explicit; c) propose inferences about presuppositions or implications of the participants' contributions (Baraldi & Gavioli, 2008). Data allows to make a distinction between two types of formulations, informational formulations and affective formulations. *Formulations* are *informational* when they elicit explanations from doctors, which patients are somehow inhibited from requesting and *affective* when they bring patients' emotions, doubts and concerns into the conversation.

Excerpt 3 includes *informational formulations*. The examination of a pregnant woman in her twenties, who is carrying her first pregnancy, shows that the foetus is not yet in the appropriate position.

(Excerpt 3)

1D: *£Ma dai che si gira!*

£come on, that himself turn!

"come on, he will turn by himself!"

2M: *thrki otmshi oan shaa allh*

move and walk and willing God

"Move, take walks and with the God's will"

3P: *oan thrkt omshit-*

and if move and I walk-

"So, if I move and take walks-"

4M: *bisaad*

help

"that would help"

5M: *dicevamo c'è qualche cosa particolare che (.)* we said is there something particular that (.)

6 *aiuta a girare? camminare (.) fare delle-*

helps to turn? walk (.) do some-

"Is there something that helps to turn (.)

walking (.) do some-"

7D: *no*
no

8M: *della ginnastica particolare (.) delle cose?*
some exercise particular (.) something?
"exercises of some kind, whatever?"

9D: *no (.) si gira da solo*
no (.) himself turns by alone
"no, he will turn by himself"

10M: *btqlk hai shghla ma fina nqol ank tamli (.)*
Says here can we no say it is useful(.)

11 *otmshi ao tthrki ao tlabi riadha hai tbiai*
walk or exercise or play sport in much

12 *hoa mn raso bdo idor bdor*
there is natural turn will turn
"He says that in this case we cannot say it is useful
(.) walking or exercising or making specific movements, it will happen spontaneously, he will turn by himself"

In line 1, the doctor reassures the patient about the foetus' position; the mediator's action in line 2 is a non-rendition, including a reference to physical exercise that was not included in doctor's quite generic reassurance. The mediator performs the role of medical expert first by producing the non-rendition, then by confirming her suggestion (line 4) in response to patient's echoing (line 3) that advanced a request for clarification.

The mediator involves the doctor in lines 5-6 through an informational formulation. If one focuses on their position in the sequential order of interaction, formulations are non-renditions; for instance, the informative formulation in lines 5-6 is a non-rendition as it advances a request to the doctor that was not included in the dyadic sequence, eliciting her opinion on the usefulness of physical exercise. After doctor's response in turn 9, the mediator produces an informational formulation to pass to the patient the gist of the previous dyadic sequence in Italian language, which object is obscure for the patient, as the dyadic sequences has been prompted by a mediator's initiative (line 10-12). The informational formulation adds some contents to doctor's generic and uninformative contribution. Those contents, without being relevant in strict medical terms, aim at offering a more effective psychological support to the patients.

Non-renditions (including formulations) may either exclude, as in excerpts 1-2, or give relevance to patients' personal expressions, as in excerpt 3. In the latter case, non-renditions are cues for the cultural presuppositions of a patient-centred culture, where patients' emotional status and the treatment of their concerns are considered as important.

4.2 Affective formulations

Affective formulations may be understood as discursive initiatives undertaken by the mediator to give voice to patients' emotions which, in most cases, manifest themselves implicitly. Patients rarely talk about their emotions directly and without prompting; instead, they provide clues about their feelings, thus providing health professionals and mediators with *potential emphatic opportunities* (Beach and Dixson, 2001: 39).

Affective formulations focus on the emotional gist of patients' contributions, giving the doctor the chance to share and get involved in the affective dimension of the interaction. In this way, doctors are made aware of patients' concerns, and patients assume an identity that goes beyond the generic social role of being sick.

In excerpt 4, the patient, who is a pregnant woman from the Middle East, complains about a pain in her belly that has forced her to go to the emergency room (line 1). Because of her limited skills in the Italian language, the doctor requests the help of a mediator.

(4)

1P: *rhuti almasha* (.) ((Arabic untranscribable))
 emergency went to (.) ((I had pain in my belly))
 "I went to the emergency room (.)((I had pain in my belly))"

2M: *ehm dolori forti crampi* (.)
 ehm pains strong cramps (.)
 "ehm, she had a lot of pain with cramps"

3 ((to P)) *igiaki iluagiaa?*
 ((to P))contractions did you have?
 "((to P)) did you have contractions?"

4P: *mhm uagiaa*
 "mhm yes"

5M: *mmh mmh ((to D)) è andata al pronto soccorso*
 mmh mmh ((to D)) is gone to the emergency room

6 *perché ha avuto del dolore*–
 because has had some pain-
 "Mmh mmh ((to D))she went to the emergency room because she had pain-"

7D: *ah un' altra volta?*
 ah one other time?
 "ah, again?"

8M: *si*
 "yes"

9D: ((to P)) *ti volevo chiedere* (.)
 ((to P)) to you wanted ask (.)

10 *come mai hai la faccia così sofferente?*

why have the face so suffering?

"((to P)) I wanted to ask you (.) why you look so suffering?"

11M: *lesh uigihik hek tabaan bain aleki*

why face your tired is much

"why is your face so tired?"

12P: *((Arabic untranscribable))*

((Partly for this pain))

13M: *fi hagia muaiana mdaiktk*

is there something wrong

14 *uiani mdaiik blbit mushkila?*

in your house that you worries?

"Is there anything wrong that worries you at home?"

15P: *lha (.) [khaifa*

No (.) [frightened

"No (.) [I'm frightened"

16D: *[no mi sembra a me che abbia*

[no to me seems to me that has

17 *la faccia sofferente*

the face suffering

"[No it seems to me that she has a suffering face"

18M: *hh un po' spaventata perché diciamo per*

hh a bit frightened because we say for

19 *la pancia*

the belly

"hh a bit frightened because let's say for her belly"

20D: *e:h ma è bellissima la tua pancia!*

e:h but is beautiful the your belly!

"e:h but your belly, it's beautiful!"

21M: *btul shitabii btiilik ma tilaii*

all normal everything you is fine

"she tells you that everything is normal, everything is fine"

After patient's complains in line 1, the mediator first translate this turn (line 2), then produces a non-mention to ask the patient about the type of pain she complains about ("*did you have contractions?*", line 3). The first component of line 5, "*mmh mmh*", is an acknowledgment token, expressing that the information has been received and understood. Both actions, the question in turn 3 and the acknowledgment token in line 5, are non-mentions in the context of a dyadic sequence, which is transformed in a triadic

sequence involving the doctor in line 5-6, with a translation of the patient's complaint that is acknowledged by the doctor with a news-receipt ("*ah again?*", line 7).

In lines 9-10, the doctor expresses concern for the patient ("*why you look so suffering?*"). This is followed by a dyadic sequence involving the mediator and the patient (lines 11-15), where the mediator first translates the doctor's question, albeit mitigating the original term "suffering" in "tired", then affiliates to the patient's expression of fear, checking her motives and consolidating affective expectations. Mediator's questions in the dyadic sequence are cues for the cultural presuppositions of a patient-centred culture, where patient's emotions and concerns are treated as relevant in the interaction.

The doctor interrupts the dyadic sequence to rebate her concerns, calling for the mediator's attention, in the spirit of a medicine sensitive to the emotional status of the patient (line 16-17). In the following turn, the mediator formulates her own understanding of the patient's concern, through a non-rendition which also introduces a projection of affective reassurance ("*a bit frightened because, let's say for her belly*", lines 18-19). The doctor affiliates with the mediator's initiative, providing an indirect reassurance (line 20) then, finally, the mediator translates the doctor's reassurance and provides support to the patient's emotional status (line 21).

In excerpt 5, the patient, who is a woman in her thirties from Northern Africa, reports a delay in her menstrual period in the course of a programmed gynaecological examination, but mitigates the relevance of this information by assuming she will get her period within the following few days.

(5)

1M: *bandma kan aakhr dora shhria lk?*

when was your last period?

"when you have your period for the last time?"

2P: *jni tlataash mn shhr ashra*

was thirteen in month ten

"It was the thirteen of october"

3M: *tlataash ashra?*

Thirteen ten?

"Thirteen of october?"

4P: *ai*

"yes"

5M: *l' ultima mestruazione è il tredici ottobre*

"the latest menstruation is the thirteen october"

6D: *mmh*

mmh

7M: *ora siamo al tredici novembre*

now we are to thirteen november

"now it's the thirteen of november"

8P: *kant thbt ali kl shhr nisha* (.)
arrive here each month exact (.)

9 *aldma hbt sar shhr lliom*
blood not felt month today
"It comes each month exactly (.) now it's a month today that it's not"

10M: *mhm*
"mmh"

11P: *astna tlat aiam oala arba aiam aiati rbma*
wait three days or four days, comes maybe
"I will wait three or four days, may it will come"

12M: ((to D)) *ah* (.) *può darsi che tra quattro o cinque*
((to D)) ah (.) can be that in four or five

13 *giorni al massimo* (.) *arriva* (.) *però* (.) *lei è un*
days at most (.) comes (.) but (.) she is a

14 *po' preoccupata*
bit worried
"£Ah (.) maybe in four or five days at latest (.)
it will come (.) however (.) she's a bit worried£"

In excerpt 5, the mediator uses *affective formulations* to bring patient's emotions to the fore, making them a topic in the medical encounter. The mediator's formulation, in line 13-14, ("but she's a bit worried") is affective because, while making current symptoms available to the doctor, highlights the patient's emotional situation which could otherwise have gone unnoticed in prior turns. The mediator's formulation of affective understanding involves the doctor in the affective exchange and promotes a shift from a dyadic to a triadic interaction.

The *affective formulation* offers the doctor the opportunity to tune in to the emotional status of the patient, reassuring her as needed. *Affective formulations* are inclusive because, while highlighting the emotions of the patient, they involve the doctor in the development of affective relations. By producing the *affective formulation*, the mediator develops and emphasizes an implicit emotional expression as a basis for subsequent interaction.

Affective formulations reveal the mediators not as neutral conduits, but as active participants, who provide a way to include patients' implicit, difficult, and embarrassed emotional expressions in the triadic sequence, to be treated in a patient-centred interaction involving the doctor (Farini & Barbieri, 2009).

5. Conclusion

The dual function of interpreter and mediator can make positive contributions to a patient-centred care and treatment. We focused on how these two functions are intertwined and how they affect doctor-patient communication. When mediators act effectively as mediators, otherwise hidden factors, such as patients' emotional expressions, can be relayed to the doctors thus creating opportunities for them to respond.

Analysis of emergency visits in two large paediatric departments in the USA (Flores *et al.* 2012) suggests an association between previous hours of interpreter training and error numbers, types, and potential consequences in English-Spanish mediated interactions. Well-trained, professional interpreters demonstrated a significantly lower likelihood of errors than ad hoc interpreters such as family members or other hospital staff. The study suggests that training for interpreters might have a major impact on reducing interpreter errors and their consequences in health care while improving quality of care and patient safety.

While we agree with the importance of professional training for interpreters, we also argue that the complexity of the interpreters' task, the fact that they cannot avoid the role of mediator between the principal participants, needs to be acknowledged. In triadic interactions the interpreters as mediators are the only participants who can effectively understand all the content and the intentions of the other participants; errors in translations are not the only issue: mediators necessarily co-ordinate the contingent and changeable management of sometimes diverging cultural presuppositions and the corresponding distribution of communicative resources, through their translation activity in intercultural contexts.

Data suggest that the dual role of interpreter and mediator is crucial to make patients' voices and their wishes heard in medical encounters. On the one hand, this article has discussed how non-renditions and zero renditions may exclude the patient or the doctor from the conversation. On the other hand, examples of a successful mediation have been discussed; in particular, the discussion has focused on a two-phases process where backchannelling promotes patient's participation in dyadic sequences then and a specific form of non-rendition, formulations, involve the doctor in the emotional situation of the patient, thus improving the emotional rapport between them and taking the medical encounter well beyond a mere exchange based on standardized roles.

When mediation succeeds in promoting an emotional-sensitive healthcare, mediators contribute to dialogue management in two ways: as *responders*, affiliating with the patient in dyadic interactions and as *coordinators*, translating patients' turns of talk including their interpretation of implicit contents (primarily emotions).

In particular, data suggest the effectiveness of *affective formulations* in capitalizing potential emphatic opportunities offered by the patients in the course of dyadic sequences. By producing affective formulations, mediators introduce patients' emotions, doubts and concerns to doctors, providing them with the possibility of accessing the many facets of the patient's situation at both a personal and cultural level.

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“ENERGY INDEPENDENCE”: PRESIDENT OBAMA’S RHETORIC OF A SUCCESS STORY

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Keywords: cognitive linguistics, rhetoric, climate change, clean energy, President Obama

1. Energy discourse from a rhetorical standpoint

At a time when the buzzword used by the White House to refer to energy policy is “energy independence” in the latest State of the Union Address, an expression that has clearly dethroned that of “energy dependence” recurrently referred to over President G.W. Bush’s terms, the aim of this paper is to investigate, from a cognitive linguistics standpoint, the rhetorical dimension of President Obama’s position towards energy and environmental policies. This piece of research is based on a series of past publications in the field of, very broadly put, “environmental discourse” in the U.S.A. (Cox 2013). Should the link between energy issues on the one hand and the environment on the other be clarified, let us underline that one of these two issues generally leads to the other, in what could be considered environmental discourse. These past years in American politics, energy discourse has always been, at some point and to variable extents, connected to environmental discourse and, more broadly, to “climate change”. As a matter of fact, in the following speeches, one would have a hard time disentangling one issue from the other, discourse wise.

Because their traditional format constitutes a case in point, the corpus is based on the past five State of the Union Addresses (S.O.T.U.A.), delivered by President Obama from 2009 to 2013. Only the parts dedicated to energy and environmental policies will be analyzed in this paper. The aim is to adopt (i) a chronological perspective on the data and take a closer look at the evolution and changes which occurred in the area of communications to reach the notion of “energy independence” and (ii) a synthetic one so as to sketch out the main recurrent rhetorical strategies called upon to make the Congress, but more so the American citizens, conceptualize energy and environmental policies. Prior to these two parts, we will briefly come back on a past investigation conducted on President G. W. Bush’s eight S.O.T.U.As as to how climate change and energy issues were represented (Bonnefille 2008). The goal of this paper is to focus on how a President (and his communications team) manages to shape a certain number of representations on the public’s mental screen via rhetorical tools and broader linguistic devices.


The power of rhetoric in day-to-day life, as well as the importance of the investigation about to be conducted, are nicely illustrated by Caillois in *Art Poétique* (1958) where he tells that once upon a time, there was a blind beggar on the Brooklyn Bridge. He wore a sign that read: “blind from birth”. One day, a passer by stopped and asked him how much money he usually received by the end of a day: “\$2” replied the beggar. The passer by took the sign, wrote a new message on the back and returned it to the beggar. One month later, the passer by came back and asked the beggar whether he had eventually collected more money. The beggar answered positively and did not know how to thank the passer by. “But what’s the sentence that you wrote?” he then asked. “Oh, it’s very simple”, said the passer by, “It says: ‘Springtime is coming and I won’t see it’”.

If we allow ourselves a rapid comparison of the two utterances, which was not operated by Caillois, “Blind from birth” states a fact in a highly informative and literal manner. The message goes straight to the point and therefore tries to be as efficient as possible in order to catch the passer-by’s attention. It may almost be perceived as blunt or even aggressive. Whereas the new message, “Springtime is coming and I won’t see it”, makes surface at least four parameters in the receiver’s mind: (i) context (springtime), (ii) identification process (what if I could no see springtime?) (iii) figurative language as springtime is personified (which potentially softens the message via a poetic image) and (iv) (related to (ii)) informative gaps to be filled which thus activate intersubjectivity and pathos.

2. Statistics

As was the case in President Bush’s S.O.T.U.As, there isn’t one part explicitly dedicated to climate change *per se*. The theme of energy constitutes the entrance door, so to say, to the climate change issue, and not the other way round i.e. from observations regarding climate change to energy policies. The main link which easily connects the two are the adjectives “clean” and “renewable”, which often qualify the noun “energy”. It should be emphasized that this type of corpus can only be obtained manually, and not via quantitative methods.

The following diagram takes into account the number of words pronounced in each S.O.T.U.A. within which a portion, in red, indicates the number of words dedicated to energy and environmental policies. To say that it is an exercise in style over substance is perhaps an overstatement, as it would suggest that there isn’t any substance. Yet, these passages are rather limited as they amount to 4 to 10 % of the total of words per speech. The day the 2013 S.O.T.U.A. was delivered, most media stated that Obama, this time, had centered an important portion of his speech on climate change. The figures clearly tell otherwise. Retrospectively, we may posit that this interpretation was created thanks to a selection of excerpts that were duplicated *ad infinitum* online, on TV, in the press, etc. It is worth underlining that the portions dedicated to these issues in G.W. Bush’s eight speeches oscillated from 0% in 2002 (where 70% of the S.O.T.U.A. was centered on the War on Terror program while the environmental issues at hand were solely referred to by the phrase “a cleaner environment”) to 4–5% in the other speeches, with an exception of 7.8% in 2007.



The diagram explicitly shows that in 2009, 5% of the total number of words was dedicated to energy and the environment, 4 % in 2010, 6.5 % in 2011, 10.3 % in 2012 and 9.3 % in 2013.

2012 corresponds to the S.O.T.U.A. of election year over which environmentalists and eco-friendly voters needed to be addressed. The amount of words for the first three speeches (2009–2011) varies little even though BP oil spill occurred in April 2010. For the sake of argumentation, I will come back on the context of 2013 at the end of the paper.

Energy and climate change are far from being at the heart of these five speeches. One major reason that accounts for this observation has, of course, to do with the economic crisis. New expressions such as “half homeless people”, “motel kids” or “unbanked” Americans” reflect the harsh reality the U.S.A. currently finds itself in although the recession is said to now be over.¹

3. Cognitive rhetoric

Since Bonnefille 2008, we have been using the expression “cognitive rhetoric” to refer to the blending of a sophistic definition of rhetoric – namely the speaker’s art of persuasion as defined by Aristotle – and cognitive linguistics as defined in the 1980s by, among other scholars, Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Sweetser (1990), Fillmore (1976, 1985), Gibbs (1994), Turner and Fauconnier (2002), Gentner (1983), Talmy (2000). Instead of looking at metaphors, metonymies, analogies and tropes in general as a taxonomy of rhetorical tools, we call upon the research conducted in cognitive linguistics so as to

¹ *The Economist*, Feb 2013. 1 in 12 American citizens has no bank account.

integrate the cognitive dimension triggered in the receiver's mind by the speaker's activation of such mechanisms. We also bridge the concept of storytelling (Poletta 2006; Salmon 2008) to that of rhetoric to demonstrate how central very simple templates of stories are projected onto a logos. By storytelling, we need to remember that it is not always a story in its more basic sense that is projected, but rather partial mechanisms of narratives which enable the hearer to get a sense of cohesiveness and logic, be the items explicitly or implicitly connected to each other. From Homer to Shakespeare (Salmon 2008: 16), stories were told to transmit universal myths, morals, traditions, knowledge, ways of behaving under given circumstances in order that wisdom could be reached. However, Salmon states that storytelling goes the opposite direction: artificial stories are brutally projected onto reality and thus firmly orient the audience's mind towards a controlled process of conceptualization. In return, the audience ends up identifying itself with this artificial highly basic narrative. As quoted by Poletta (2006: 7), according to Carville (the lead strategist who helped Clinton win), the Democrats lost the 2004 election because they did not have a good story:

They (Republicans) produce a narrative, we (Democrats) produce a litany. They say, 'I'm going to protect you from the terrorists in Tehran and the homos in Hollywood'. We say, 'we're for clean air, better schools, more health care'. And so there's a Republican narrative, a story, and there's a Democratic litany.²

The main ingredients are a cast of characters, a plot, a beginning, a middle, a potential ending (happy or not), potential episodes, most of the time a frame which governs a set of conceptual metaphors, metonymies, analogies, similes (war frame, illness frame, etc.). More generally, we therefore support Talmy's hypothesis regarding the existence of a narrative cognitive system (2000: 419):

We posit that the mental faculty for the generation and experiencing of broadly construed narrative constitutes a specific cognitive system in its own right. This narrative cognitive system would generally function to connect and integrate certain components of conscious content over time into a coherent ideational structure.

In the following piece of research, the speaker's intention of communication (in Grice's sense, Schiffrin 1994: 190–228), as well as a precise definition of who the receiver is will need to be defined. The extra verbal context against which the speech is delivered will be taken into account as much as possible. Likewise, the expectations on the part of the receiver, who is anchored within this specific context, will have to be investigated.

4. Energy, climate change, pollution and melodrama in President G.W. Bush's S.O.T.U.As and in some of Obama's speeches

In his essay "Environmental Melodrama", Schwarze (2006) states that most examples of environmental rhetoric that express public controversies, largely put, are often structured

² which isn't, by definition, a narrative.

by a melodramatic genre (or “frame”).³ He underlines (2006: 243–44) that melodrama should not be mistaken for tragedy, as tragedy “focuses on conflicts *within* the individuals whereas melodrama and comedy are staged around conflicts *between* individuals and some external opponent.” More simply put: “In tragedy the bad guy is *within*”, “in melodrama the bad guy is *external*”. Schwarze (2006: 255) also emphasizes the fact that melodrama is often used when there already exists a strong diversion in public opinion. And this is precisely then that it gains rhetorical power:

When bonds are strong, melodramatic rhetoric may do little more than reinforce existing identities and perspectives on a controversy; but when audiences are encouraged to empathize with unknown or far-flung victims, there is a much greater possibility for transformed perceptions of public problems.

In Bush’s S.O.T.U.As, energy crisis was conceptualized by what we defined as the dependence frame. Looking back at this piece of research through Schwarze’s article, we can now see how melodrama was called upon as a rhetorical tool in those passages. As will be discussed, this frame is no longer present in Obama’s Addresses. Yet, for the sake of contrast, we shall travel backward and summarize the main findings that were discussed in Bonnefille 2008.

4.1 On energy: Exit the dependence frame

One recurrent metaphor that was first activated in Bush’s S.O.T.U.As was that of dependence on foreign oil, especially after the 9/11 terrorist attacks which lead to the War on Terror program and where the Middle East became the main protagonist to keep at a distance. This notion of dependence was gradually replaced by the more telling “addiction to oil” metaphor. Based on the metaphorical expressions found in Bush’s S.O.T.U.As (Bonnefille 2008), the numerous conceptual cross-domain mappings of this metaphor, which made the narrative framing surface, were defined as follows:

OIL IS A DRUG
 ADDICTION TO OIL IS A SERIOUS ILLNESS
 THE U.S.A. IS A DRUG ADDICT
 THE U.S.A. IS A PATIENT/ THE VICTIM
 O.P.E.C. IS A DRUG DEALER/ THE VILLAIN
 AMERICA’S ECONOMY IS THE DRUG ADDICT’S HEALTH
 IMPORTING MORE OIL IS RISKING THE DRUG ADDICT’S LIFE
 COSUMING OIL IS DOING DRUGS
 THE U.S.A. IS WEAK/ LOST ITS FREE WILL
 THE OIL COMPANIES ARE THE MAFIA

³ The author wishes to thank Steve Schwarze for his kind help and advice at UMT, in June 2013 on this part of the argumentation. Schwarze uses the notion of « frame » in a way that will not be discussed here. It is however important to underline that we will use it as defined by Fillmore and Lakoff.

THE PRESIDENT AND HIS ADMINISTRATION ARE THE DOCTORS/THE SAVIOR
THE U.S.A. NEEDS TO GO TO REHABILITATION

Surprisingly, this narrative framing was reexploited by Obama over his first presidential campaign (Bonnefille, 2009). Candidate Mc Cain wanted to increase importation so as to reduce this state of dependence. Yet, the latter was never conceptualized as an addiction. However, Obama's speech aids decided to reactivate this rather brutal metaphor of addiction so that it would trigger a radical violent image of the situation that lay ahead in the citizens' minds. Here are some excerpts found in a series of Obama's selected speech delivered during the summer of 2008:

We become more addicted to oil; to beg Saudi Arabia for more oil; increase our oil addiction; reduce our dependence on foreign oil; begging dictators for more oil; we can't shake (our) addiction to oil; to free America from this dependence; breaking our oil addiction...

This choice of melodramatic frame appealed to the American citizens' pathos regarding the political danger of depending on foreign energy, especially when imported from the Middle East. The power of personification combined to a serious health condition allowed the hearers to compute on a much smaller scale, i.e. from countries to people and from global geostrategy to illness, and thus brought the complex problematic of energy in the U.S.A. closer to home while obliterating highly complex aspects of global economical strategies.

4.2 On climate change: From clean to cleanup

In Bush's eight speeches, the phrase "global warming" was not used once and "climate change" was only mentioned twice in 2007 and in 2008 (Bonnefille 2008). The word "environment" (which appears 13 times over the eight speeches, while "energy" surfaces 38 times), is often accompanied by the notions of protection and cleanliness:

2001 and 2002: *"a cleaner environment"*

2003: *"cleaner technology" "cleaner air"*

2005: *"safe, clean nuclear energy, clean coal"*

2006: *"cleaner, cheaper, and more reliable alternative energy sources"; "clean-energy research"*

2007: *"keep America's environment clean", "clean coal", "clean, safe nuclear power", "clean diesel"*

2008: *"clean technology", "clean energy sources", "cleaner technology"*

As said, the adjective "clean" activates a conceptual network of knowledge, which includes purity, freshness, hygiene and safety. As Lakoff (2004: 22–23) states:

People who support environmentalist positions like certain words. They like the words “healthy”, “clean”, and “safe” because these words fit frames that describe what the environment means to them.

Yet, clean coal, clean nuclear plant and clean diesel might be considered as misuse of language as these belong to the fossil type of energy which, by definition, cannot be considered as “green” and as harmless, and therefore as “clean”, for the environment. More to the point, we posited that this communication strategy is part of a greenwashing process.

President G.W. Bush’s eight speeches never pictured climate change as an enemy to be fought, probably because from 2002 onwards the war frame was already called upon so as to structure the War on Terror program. Neither did candidate Obama’s during his first presidential campaign. For him as well as for Mc Cain, environmental issues came after what, at the time (Summer 2008), was considered the number one priority: “energy crisis”.

But when President Obama delivered his speech at the U.N.’s Climate change summit in 2009 (Bonnefille 2012), the activation of an apocalyptic tale created a dramatic effect, which was almost immediately counterbalanced by the setting up of what we then called the rescue narrative. Mother Nature was presented as spiraling out of control. And the list of solutions presented in the next paragraphs operated a sharp contrast and created an immediate feeling of reassurance and safety. This process is close to what is known, in everyday language, as “emotional roller coaster”. When addressing climate change issues, Obama pronounced phrases such as: “a global fight against climate change”, “a combat”, “a challenge”, “a global commitment” “a threat”, etc.

Now it is interesting to note that when the 2010 BP oil spill occurred (Bonnefille 2013), the war frame – that had been lurking in the background until then, as shown with the selected aforementioned phrases – was explicitly activated throughout Obama’s oval office speech so as to make the citizens conceptualize what the task at hand, the “cleanup operation”, consisted of. The fact that this environmental catastrophe was directly human induced, as opposed to the fluctuating responsibility to be endorsed by human beings regarding climate change, gave the possibility to frame the situation from the war angle and therefore to convey a feeling of control and safety to be reached. The enemy was the spill and its side effects. And this is how Obama detailed, for 20 minutes on end, what the Administration’s “battle plan” would consist of. Not surprisingly, this framing process included an enemy, victims and a savior, and a strategy divided into three main clear-cut steps.

5. President Obama’s S.O.T.U.As: Conceptualization of climate change

In the five passages investigated, the mechanisms of melodrama are simply not activated, as there no longer seems to be any kind of controversy regarding either climate change, which is rarely referred to by Obama, or energy. The need to invest in the research and production of renewable and clean energies is recurrently emphasized in

these passages. However, the notion of energy crisis, which was structured by melodrama over Obama's first presidential campaign, is no longer topical as if it had never existed in the first place. In other words: exit energy crisis.

The expression "global warming" is not used once and seems to have been dropped for good in the American political arena. Obama refers to "climate change" once in 2009, 2010, 2012 and three times in 2013. It is not mentioned once in 2011. In 2010, he goes as far as implicitly referring to the Climategate⁴ and therefore chooses to address the skeptics:

I know there are those who disagree with the overwhelming scientific evidence on climate change.

Of course, one could argue that the expression "climate change" has a more general scope and thus can include tornadoes, tsunamis, etc. Nonetheless it still rings as an understatement, as a "change" in itself does not necessarily imply dramatic consequences, whereas "global warming" clearly refers to the danger implied by carbon emission for our planet. In Bonnefille 2012, we underlined that whereas Obama talked about "climate change", Sarkozy referred to the phenomenon via the more dramatic phrase "global warming". We posited that, quite obviously, "climate change" takes the heat out of the debate by presenting the issue as less catastrophic and by alleviating the guilt prompted by the expression "global warming", which often implies that the causes are predominantly human induced. Even though climate change and energy issues are intertwined, the passages under study predominantly deal with energy issue in the first place. And, once more, the connection between the two domains is obtained via the use of the notion of cleanliness. The main idea regarding "climate change" is that – when mentioned – it is conceptualized as a fight or a rescue plan:

2009: (...) save our planet from the ravages of climate change (...)

2012: (...) to pass a comprehensive plan to fight climate change (...)

2013: But for the sake of our children and our future, we must do more to combat climate change (...)

6. President Obama's S.O.T.U.As: Conceptualization of energy issues

This section gives a chronological overview of the passages extracted from the 5 S.O.T.U.As so as to "put the loose ends together" and get a more general picture of the mechanisms at work.

6.1. 2009

From 2009, renewable energy is presented as a contest that needs to be won. And President Obama reminds Congress and the American citizens that the U.S.A. has fallen behind China, Germany, Japan and Korea:

⁴ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2010/jul/07/climate-emails-question-answer>

We know the country that harnesses the power of clean, renewable energy will lead the 21st century. (...) Well I do not accept a future where the jobs and industries of tomorrow take root beyond our borders – and I know you don’t either. It is time for America to lead again.

The power of this energy is conceptualized as an animal that needs to be controlled by man, or rather as a horse harnessed by a cowboy. The vegetable metaphor induced by the verbal expression “take root” triggers the image of a plant that could grow bigger and expand if not uprooted rapidly. Hence, industries and jobs are plants, which need to be cultivated on the American soil. It is important to underline that clean and renewable energies correspond to two different categories. However, here, they seem to be one and the same. And this simplification can then mislead people in thinking that biomass and biofuel are renewable, when the latter may imply deforestation. The tone used in the passage is not that of encouragement but clearly that of emulation and authority:

I do not accept/ and I know you don’t either/it is time/So I ask this Congress to send me legislation/right here in America

Congress is openly asked to send a legislation that will increase the production of renewable energy via innovation. The conative function used to refer (i) to the Congress’s responsibility in that area and (ii) to the citizens’ will via the use of the pronoun “you” brings closer together the speaker and the addressees. They are then reunited in the personification “It is time for America to lead again”. The modal “will” expresses a sense of futurity as well as the will to act (*willan*), therefore activating the two meanings of the modal auxiliary: it is going to happen in the future and I want this to happen now. Very often, Obama associates the concepts of economy, security and climate change. Even if we may easily grasp how these notions are intertwined in the so-called extra-verbal world, the effect created by such a juxtaposition is that of a security discourse on the national political scene.

6.2. 2010

In 2010, innovation and creation are the key concepts used to refer to environmental and energy policies, henceforth conveniently bridging the two:

–And no area is more ripe for such innovation that energy. You can see the results of last year’s investments in clean energy.
 –But to create more of these clean energy jobs, we need more production, more efficiency, more incentives. And that means building a new generation of safe, clean nuclear plants in our country. It means (...) It means (...). And, yes, it means (...)

The comparative form of superiority, as repeated three times, again plays on the emulation string. The ternary rhythm is kept in the following statements so that it energizes the speech, the tempo is moving forward confidently, the way a steam engine would “it means, it means, and yes it means”. The expression “clean energy” changes parts of speech so that, from being a noun phrase, it becomes an adjective which defines a whole new category of jobs, rather loosely as it were: “clean energy jobs”. Again the

vegetable metaphor surfaces with the adjective “ripe” that turns the area of investment, energy, into a piece of fruit which should now be picked before it becomes overripe. In this passage, even climate change skeptics are addressed:

–I know there are those who disagree with the overwhelming scientific evidence on climate change. But here’s the thing – even if you doubt the evidence (...)– because the nation that leads the clean energy economy will be the nation that leads the global economy. And America must be that nation.

And, surprisingly, instead of trying to convince them of the reality of this “change”, President Obama finds them an incentive so that they too go with the clean energy flow i.e. money:

The nation that leads the clean energy economy will be the nation that leads the global economy.

Again, “clean energy” is used as an adjective to define a brand new kind of energy the way it defined a brand new kind of jobs. Nonetheless, specifics and quantity regarding those two are still a little foggy. The register used can sometimes catch the addressee off guard, as it can be downright casual: “But here’s the thing”. Generally speaking, the register used in these speeches is becoming less and less formal and get closer and closer to what is broadly referred to as “consultative” (although that would mean a two-way communication channel) and “casual” registers. In other words, this register rests on a “group” language shared by a certain group of members or, more appropriately, by buddies. This strategy naturally aims at establishing an intimate relationship with the people addressed to and to generate a feeling of connivance.

6.3. 2011

The notion of investment in clean energy technology, although we don’t know which types of energy are referred to, is also central in the 2011 passage. And Obama justifies the need to invest in that area as such:

(...) an investment that will strengthen our security, protect our planet, and create countless new jobs for our people.

Once more, the concepts of security of the nation and protection of the planet are juxtaposed and play on a double entendre: if the nation invests in clean energy, it reinforces its inland security and also plays a part in protecting the planet. One may wonder to what extent the 9/11 terrorist attacks are indirectly hinted at. As for the notion of protection, why connect it to the planet and not just to the environment? This implicit opposition between the U.S.A. and the planet makes the speech operate on a big scale, if not the biggest. Renewable energy is described as “a promise” with can be achieved if the Americans once more “reinvent (themselves)”:

(...) we’ve begun to reinvent our energy policy. We’re not just handing out money. We’re issuing a challenge.

The closeness in sound between “invest” and “invent” is worth underlining as it reinforces the dimension of creativity that Obama appeals to. The terms “Innovation”, “breakthroughs”, “setting a new goal” belong to the same semantic field of creation. To make the project even more attractive, it is described as a “challenge”. The tone of emulation, as well as a patriotic coloring, is therefore still part of the discourse strategy:

Maintaining our leadership is crucial to America’s success. But if we want to win the future (...)

6.4. 2012

Out of the five speeches, the 2012 S.O.T.U.A. contains the longest part dedicated to energy. This is precisely when Obama starts strengthening his position towards energy independence, even though the phrase is not pronounced as such:

And nowhere is the promise of innovation greater than in America-made energy. Right now—right now— American oil production is the highest that’s it’s been in eight years. That’s right – eight years. Not only that –last year, we relied less on foreign oil than in any of the past 16 years.

One important feature of this passage could be defined as a mixture of (i) what has already been done, concretely, regarding the field of energy and (ii) what is on the verge of being accomplished, in a to-do list format. In a down-to-earth approach, periods of time and quantities are frequently referred to, hence studding the passage with numerous figures:

- Over the last three years, we’ve opened millions of new acres for oil and gas exploration, and tonight I’m directing my administration to open more than 75 percent of our potential offshore oil and gas resources.
- We have a supply that can last America nearly 100 years. And my administration will take every possible action to safely develop this energy. Experts believe this will support more than 600, 000 jobs by the end of the decade.
- So far you (Congress) haven’t acted. Well, tonight, I will.

Another important aspect of the speech is, once more, the overuse of the notion of cleanliness as associated to the exploitation of energy, broadly put:

As strategy that’s cleaner; will create jobs and power trucks and factories that are cleaner; clean energy; clean energy industry; pass clean energy tax credits; a clean energy standard; development of clean energy; the largest commitments to clean energy in history

Cleanliness and safety often work hand in hand in the activated process of conceptualization i.e. not only is everything regarding energy “clean” but it also is “safe” for the citizens and for the country, whatever the scope of the notion of safety covers.

6.5. 2013

The 2013 passage, although much shorter, contains the exact same features: figures for periods of time and quantity (of money, of jobs, etc.), the semantic field of promise

(reinvention, challenge, etc.), the notion of safety (for the citizens, for “our” children). “Climate change” is pronounced three times, which actually is why so many people had the impression that, this time, Obama really had centered a part of his S.O.T.U.A. on environmental issues:

- We must do more to combat climate change (...)
- (...) market-based solution to climate change (...)
- (...) prepare our communities for the consequences of climate change (...)

Another way for Obama to make what he refers to as “new energies” attractive is their cost: they’re always described as being cheaper and as enabling the citizens to actually reduce their energy bills. It would only take a couple of engineers to demonstrate that renewable energies such as wind power, clean energies such as biomass and new technologies such as shale oil drilling systematically imply serious financial investment. Energy, by definition, can never be cheap. Out of the five S.O.T.U.As, 2013 is the year where the “energy independence” concept is referred to in an upbeat and confident style:

(...) the natural gas boom has led to cleaner power and greater energy independence. We need to encourage that. And that’s why my administration will keep cutting red tape and speeding up new oil and gas permits.

And, naturally, the adjective “clean” is overexploited and very often used in its comparative form of superiority, which implies that not only is the area of energy, very broadly put, “clean”, but it is even “cleaner”. Now, for the seasoned cognizer to reach a syntactic balance and a certain conceptual reality, he would actually need to have access to the other part of the syntactic and conceptual comparative form: cleaner than what? And in the same vein: safer than what?

7. The rhetorical power of analogical reasoning

“This is our generation’s Sputnik moment” is how the part on energy starts in 2011. This utterance corresponds to what Gardes Taminés (1996: 39) defines as “a universal memory image”, because it triggers specific shared knowledge regarding, in this case, the history of the country. Paradoxically, Sputnik refers to a missed golden opportunity as Sputnik was the first artificial earth satellite launched in 1957 by the Soviet Union. Hence, although “universal memory image” when connected to the history of the country generally develops patriotism –as a reference to Appollo 11 would– the adopted strategy is more subtle here. At first glance, we could define this utterance as metaphoric since it seems that a link of resemblance is established between A (the deictic in its cataphoric use) and B (“our generation’s Sputnik moment”) via the copula BE. Yet, we should remember that according to Gentner (1983), what is predominant in the working process of analogical reasoning is not the similarity between source and target but the relational structure that can be projected from source onto target. This is precisely the case here. More broadly, Vosniadou and Ortony state (1989: 7):

Analogical reasoning involves the transfer of relational information from a domain that already exists in memory (source domain) to the domain to be explained (target). Similarity is implicated in this process because a successful, useful analogy depends upon there being some sort of similarity between the source domain and the target domain because the perception of similarity is likely to play a major role in some of the key processes associated with analogical reasoning.

What is at stake, discourse wise, is a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity in the field of new energies that needs to be seized. And if –according to Obama– the U.S.A. achieves this goal, then the country will be in a analogous situation as the U.S.S.R. was when it launched the first satellite before anybody else, namely: the first, the best, the leader, the winner. The analogy, although a little cryptic for the younger generation, is yet another way to trigger a sense of emulation and patriotism. The President emphasizes that admittedly the U.S.A. missed the Sputnik golden opportunity but that, today, the country is ready to win this new global go–green race, i.e. end up first. And to strengthen the impact of the trope, the passage ends on another aspect of the analogy: “(...) we’ll fund the Apollo projects of our time.” Once again, analogy enables the President to make the citizens and Congress conceptualize the scientific innovation in the field of new energies in terms of the competition for supremacy in space exploration. In other words, that ship has not sailed yet. We may, however, ask ourselves what should be thought of the dormant aspect of the analogy: the now long buried Cold War context against which the Space Race took place.

8. Obama on energy: A success story in the making

Although there is an underlying structure common to the five parts under study, there isn’t any chronological evolution over the five excerpts but just a constant use of the same conceptual metaphors and scenario from 2009 to 2013. The scenario in question is not an elaborate narrative structure with episodes and a plot. Yet, a storytelling process can be highlighted. Obama actually spins energy policy in a way that we choose to call the model of a success story, for the purpose of this publication. As broadly defined, the notion of “success story” refers to the account of a person, usually poor, who succeeds in reaching a new level of social and economic way of life. The main character is a hard worker, often due to his social background that encourages him on the path of social revenge. With the help of personification and metonymic contiguity, the scenario is extended to the U.S.A., and hence generates a network of metaphorical entailments (activated or dormant). Energy issues, since the concern of an energy crisis is no longer resonating, are transformed into a challenge that will feed on invention, reinvention and creation. Many examples of technological research and advance are used to illustrate this key notion of creation. Hence the main following recurrent conceptual metaphors, combined to analogies such as the one we focused on, are used to frame the whole energy discourse this specific way and thus give those S.O.T.U.As a sense of cohesiveness and persuasion:

PRODUCING NEW ENERGY IS A RACE / A CHALLENGE
 THE U.S.A. WAS A WORLD LEADER & THE OTHER COUNTRIES WERE
 FOLLOWERS
 OTHER COUNTRIES ARE FIRST NOW
 THE U.S.A. HAS A PERSONALITY
 TO BE A WINNER AGAIN, THE U.S.A. NEEDS TO REINVENT ITSELF
 TIME IS AN OBJECT / THE FUTURE IS A GOLDEN MEDAL
 TO ACHIEVE SUFFICIENT ENERGY PRODUCTION IS TO WIN THE FUTURE
 PROMISE IS A LOCATION
 CLEAN ENERGY IS A PROMISE
 ENERGY SHORTAGE IS AN ILLNESS
 THE AVAILABLE AMOUNT OF ENERGY IS THE U.S.A.'S HEALTH
 THE U.S.A. COULD RISK ITS HEALTH
 TO DOUBLE THE NATION'S SUPPLY IS TO ESTABLISH A RECOVERY
 PLAN

As was the case in Bush's S.O.T.U.As, the adjective "clean" is used in Obama's S.O.T.U.As to define a brand new kind of energy as well as a brand new kind of jobs. Nonetheless, specifics and quantity regarding those clean energies and those clean jobs are still foggy as oil, natural gas and shale gas, coal and clean coal, wind and solar, nuclear power are all put on the same plane and subsumed under the generic term "energy". Hence, the adjectives "clean" and "new" create a greenwashed subcategory, which nicely bridges production of energy on the one hand with eco-friendly environmental policy on the other.

The emulation associated to this notion of discovery and conquest activates the old myth of the pioneers. The mid-19th century "Go West, young man" motto is nowadays replaced by "Go Green"⁵ and, to some extent, Obama's rhetoric of energy independence spun as a success story is similar to the rhetoric of Manifest Destiny which generated the largest acquisition of U.S. territory in the 19th century.

The Addiction to oil metaphor and the illness frame (that could definitely qualify for melodrama) used to refer to the American dependence on foreign oil –and originally coined by President Bush after 9/11 and reexploited by Obama during his first presidential campaign– are ancient history. One of the reasons they were given up has to do with the brutality these tropes convey and the metaphorical entailments they could trigger in the citizens' minds. Picturing a country as a drug addict when it is experiencing an economic crisis could be a very bad move communications wise.⁶ The domestic price of energy also plays an important role as connected to the background context. It dropped sharply these past years, alleviating the American citizens' pain at the pump. One should bear in mind that over President Bush's second term, the price of oil had increased to such a point that Obama decided to focus part of his campaign on the then so-called energy crisis. Now, do new perspectives in the area of energy exploitation in the United States equate with a vanishing energy crisis? Does the fact that fossil energies will remain dominant until 2035 equate with a "cleaner and safer"

⁵ We would like to thank our colleague Antoine Ertlé for this very helpful rephrasing.

⁶ <http://www.tv5.org/cms/chaine-francophone/info/Les-dossiers-de-la-redaction/Economie-Monde-2013/p-24007-Economie-en-2013-faut-il-etre-optimiste-ou-pessimiste-.htm>

environment⁷? And where does a potential rethinking of global energy consumption fit in, if at all?

9. Speaker and Receiver: Who’s talking to Whom?

In the Gricean view of communication, the speaker does not convey thoughts to the recipient, but intentions. And the recipient acts as a mirror–image of the speaker. The main goal is to achieve intersubjectivity. And to do so, not only the code (i.e. the lexicon and the grammar, to put it simply) is called for, but also what is referred to as “general principles of communication” (Schiffrin 1994: 393–405). We shall tentatively rephrase this expression by championing that the so–called code actually needs to be associated to rhetorical processes. For intersubjectivity to take place, the recipient needs to recognize the speaker’s intentions. As a matter of fact, three intentions are generally said to be involved in this inferential model of communication:

- a) S’s utterance of x produces a certain response r in a certain audience A
- b) A recognizes S’s intention a)
- c) A’s recognition of S’s intention a) functions as, at least, part of A’s reason for A’s response r.

The reponse “r” encompasses belief, hope, emulation, investment, etc. Although we posited that interpersonal solidarity and emulation are definitely “recognizable” in the corpus, reservations could be made as to whether the intention Obama wants to achieve can systematically be retrieved by the audience. If the targeted audience is the Congress, then Obama’s intention probably is retrievable.⁸ Yet if the audience that is addressed corresponds to the American citizens, then no intention beyond that of creating a sense of unity and emulation through common history, beliefs, myths can be perceived as most of the audience, quite logically, does not have any tangible notion regarding the complex reality of the energy context. Reality can thus easily be shaped according to misrepresentations and, oftentimes, according to lies by omission, as goes the expression in French.

This notion of expectation leads us to one final question: who is the President talking to? After several readings of the five passages, a feeling of cacophony may be experienced. We therefore asked a scholar in cognitive poetics, Arnaud Schmitt, to examine more closely this juxtaposition of utterances. Our colleague almost right away detected that not one, not two but at least three different receivers could be identified: Congress, the American citizens and the American collective unconscious (as demonstrated in the section dedicated to analogical reasoning, for instance). And that definitely explains, from a linguistics standpoint, the constant change of register and the sense of chaos it can lead to. As in:

⁷ See *The New York Times*, April 24 2013, « By 2023, a changed world in energy » http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/25/business/energy-environment/by-2023-a-changed-world-in-energy.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

⁸ He shall from time to time give to the Congress information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their consideration such measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient (...) Constitution, Art. 2, section 3

(2011) We need to get behind this innovation. And to help pay for it, I'm asking Congress to eliminate the billions in taxpayer dollars we currently give to oil companies. I don't know if you've noticed, but they're doing just fine on their own. So instead subsidizing energy, let's invest in tomorrow's.

The cohesiveness of these parts is not obtained via a complex underlying narrative structure but by a technique of cut and paste. Obama is talking to Congress, as a president always is supposed to during a S.O.T.U.A.. But he is also, and more predominantly, addressing the citizens (and investors) to reassure them:

(2009) But to truly transform our economy, protect our security, and save our planet from the ravages of climate change, we need to ultimately make clean, renewable energy the profitable kind of energy. So I ask this Congress to send me legislation that places a market-based cap on carbon pollution and drives the production of more renewable energy in America.

As seen in section 6.2., the register can get very close to that of a “group” language i.e. highly casual. As in:

(2012) When Bryan Ritterby was laid off from his job making furniture, he said he worried that at 55, no one would give him a second chance. But he found work at Energetx, a wind turbine manufacturer in Michigan (...) Today (the factory) is hiring workers like Bryan, who said, “I'm proud to be working in the industry of the future. (...) But I will not walk away from the promise of clean energy. I will not walk away from workers like Bryan.

This strategy of reduction of scale (from clean energy, to workers, to Bryan) and the instrumental use of an individual's name, enables the citizens to empathize with this character's job experience. This part, among others, is clearly not directed at the Congress. More generally, this strategy naturally aims at establishing an intimate relationship with the people addressed to and to generate a feeling of connivance. As a matter of fact, for this last S.O.T.U.A., the White House enabled the public to participate via the use of numerous government-created online and mobile tools, which corresponds, in the aforementioned diagram, to A's “r” possible response. These communication techniques, which are used to address several types of audiences at the same time in a speech, are also known as “dog whistlers” in the field of journalism. Hence this feeling of cacophony is not perceived as such if the bigger picture is not taken into account. In terms of communication, these speeches clearly are multi-layered and appeal to this or that type of audience every now and then, while not being of interest or even fully intelligible at other times. It is when one wants to get the full picture, so to speak, that a sense of disconnection close to that of cognitive dissonance may surface.

10. Concluding remarks

By using this multi-faceted message in the S.O.T.U.A. passages dedicated to energy and environmental communication in order to reach at least three distinct targets, Obama manages to address the collective unconscious via collective representations underlain

by the pioneer myth. We saw that, among other tropes, analogical reasoning is key tool to rhetoric and takes part in the framing process. As a matter of fact, the Space Race, the Cold War, 9/11 are never far off.

Over the past years in the U.S.A., the discovery of shale gas and oil has lead to a significant alteration regarding the issue of energy⁹. The gloomy energy crisis perspective got gradually replaced by a regained sense of hope, with a climax that surfaced in 2013 S.O.T.U.A.: “We’re finally poised to control our energy future”, claimed the President.

Yet, many official sources state that (i) the estimation of resources is being seriously overestimated and that (ii) the exploitation of such energy is much more expensive than expected. Gas prices have fallen sharply these past years due to the increase of domestic production. Yet, a year ago, Mr Tillerson, Exxon Mobil CEO (the largest producer of natural gas in the U.S.A. since 2010) stated before the Council on Foreign Relations in June 2012 and while, at the same time, lying to the investors: “We are losing our shirts. We’re making no money. It’s all in the red.”¹⁰

We hinted at Greenwash processes several times in our article, underlining that the notion of cleanliness was used to bridge energy exploitation with eco-friendly position. Hence, if issuing offshore permits is encouraged, the BP oil spill, which occurred in 2010, is not mentioned once. Neither is the Gulf Coast “cleanup operation”, nor its limitations, that has been going on since then (Bonnefille 2013). Events such as the controversy regarding the XL keystone pipeline route¹¹, as well as the serious spill which occurred on the Yellowstone pipeline in 2011¹², are totally obliterated. And this comes as no surprise as the aim of such a speech is to be persuasive, not to display the potential dangers the U.S.A. is exposing itself to.

Studying those speeches from the angle of rhetoric and cognitive linguistics enabled us to investigate the conceptualization mechanisms at work which have shaped one single consistent political position over five years, at least in the five S.O.T.U.A.s. We posited that this success story turns out to be a revamped version of the myth of the pioneer. It is partially based on inaccurate assumptions, incorrect scientific data and costs, which lead to wrong figures and overstated expectations regarding potential exploitation and, therefore, regarding also the reality of what Obama presents as a clean and safe energy independence. The discrepancy that exists between rhetoric and reality is nothing new under the sun. However, as a linguist, we deem it necessary to focus on this ever-growing type of energy and environmental communication so as to unveil the recurrent denominators that make people conceptualize the issue the way they do. Or as Sperber (1975) would put it:

“It is the job of rhetoric to explain how, on the basis of a fragment of a conceptual representation, the hearer manages to reconstruct the complete representation, and how the speaker can feel certain that the hearer will do so.”

⁹ <http://www.doi.gov/news/pressreleases/usgs-releases-new-oil-and-gas-assessment-for-bakken-and-three-forks-formations.cfm>

¹⁰ <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303561504577492501026260464.html>

¹¹ <http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/27/business/energy-environment/in-canada-pipeline-remarks-stir-analysis.html>

¹² http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/03/us/03oilspill.html?_r=0

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Appendix

Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address – 2009

It begins with energy.

We know the country that harnesses the power of clean, renewable energy will lead the 21st century. And yet, it is China that has launched the largest effort in history to make their economy energy efficient. We invented solar technology, but we’ve fallen behind countries like Germany and Japan in producing it. New plug-in hybrids roll off our assembly lines, but they will run on batteries made in Korea.

Well I do not accept a future where the jobs and industries of tomorrow take root beyond our borders – and I know you don’t either. It is time for America to lead again.

Thanks to our recovery plan, we will double this nation’s supply of renewable energy in the next three years. We have also made the largest investment in basic research funding in American history – an investment that will spur not only new discoveries in energy, but breakthroughs in medicine, science, and technology.

We will soon lay down thousands of miles of power lines that can carry new energy to cities and towns across this country. And we will put Americans to work making our homes and buildings more efficient so that we can save billions of dollars on our energy bills.

But to truly transform our economy, protect our security, and save our planet from the ravages of climate change, we need to ultimately make clean, renewable energy the profitable kind of energy. So I ask this Congress to send me legislation that places a market-based cap on carbon pollution and drives the production of more renewable energy in America. And to support that innovation, we will invest fifteen billion dollars a year to develop technologies like wind power and solar power; advanced biofuels, clean coal, and more fuel-efficient cars and trucks built here in America.

Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address – 2010

And no area is more ripe for such innovation than energy. You can see the results of last year’s investments in clean energy — in the North Carolina company that will create 1,200 jobs nationwide helping to make advanced batteries; or in the California business that will put a thousand people to work making solar panels.

But to create more of these clean energy jobs, we need more production, more efficiency, more incentives. And that means building a new generation of safe, clean nuclear power plants in this country. (Applause.) It means making tough decisions about opening new offshore areas for oil and gas development. (Applause.) It means continued investment in advanced biofuels and clean coal technologies. (Applause.) And, yes, it means passing a comprehensive energy and climate bill with incentives that will finally make clean energy the profitable kind of energy in America. (Applause.)

I am grateful to the House for passing such a bill last year. (Applause.) And this year I’m eager to help advance the bipartisan effort in the Senate. (Applause.)

I know there have been questions about whether we can afford such changes in a tough economy. I know that there are those who disagree with the overwhelming scientific evidence on climate change. But here’s the thing — even if you doubt the evidence, providing incentives for energy-efficiency and clean energy are the right thing to do for our future — because the nation that leads the clean energy economy will be the nation that leads the global economy. And America must be that nation. (Applause.)

Remarks by the President in State of Union Address – 2011

This is our generation’s Sputnik moment. Two years ago, I said that we needed to reach a level of research and development we haven’t seen since the height of the Space Race. And in a few weeks, I will be sending a budget to Congress that helps us meet that goal. We’ll invest in

biomedical research, information technology, and especially clean energy technology — (applause) — an investment that will strengthen our security, protect our planet, and create countless new jobs for our people.

Already, we're seeing the promise of renewable energy. Robert and Gary Allen are brothers who run a small Michigan roofing company. After September 11th, they volunteered their best roofers to help repair the Pentagon. But half of their factory went unused, and the recession hit them hard. Today, with the help of a government loan, that empty space is being used to manufacture solar shingles that are being sold all across the country. In Robert's words, "We reinvented ourselves."

That's what Americans have done for over 200 years: reinvented ourselves. And to spur on more success stories like the Allen Brothers, we've begun to reinvent our energy policy. We're not just handing out money. We're issuing a challenge. We're telling America's scientists and engineers that if they assemble teams of the best minds in their fields, and focus on the hardest problems in clean energy, we'll fund the Apollo projects of our time.

At the California Institute of Technology, they're developing a way to turn sunlight and water into fuel for our cars. At Oak Ridge National Laboratory, they're using supercomputers to get a lot more power out of our nuclear facilities. With more research and incentives, we can break our dependence on oil with biofuels, and become the first country to have a million electric vehicles on the road by 2015. (Applause.)

We need to get behind this innovation. And to help pay for it, I'm asking Congress to eliminate the billions in taxpayer dollars we currently give to oil companies. (Applause.) I don't know if — I don't know if you've noticed, but they're doing just fine on their own. (Laughter.) So instead of subsidizing yesterday's energy, let's invest in tomorrow's.

Now, clean energy breakthroughs will only translate into clean energy jobs if businesses know there will be a market for what they're selling. So tonight, I challenge you to join me in setting a new goal: By 2035, 80 percent of America's electricity will come from clean energy sources. (Applause.)

Some folks want wind and solar. Others want nuclear, clean coal and natural gas. To meet this goal, we will need them all — and I urge Democrats and Republicans to work together to make it happen. (Applause.)

Remarks by the President in State of the Union Address – 2012

And nowhere is the promise of innovation greater than in American-made energy. Over the last three years, we've opened millions of new acres for oil and gas exploration, and tonight, I'm directing my administration to open more than 75 percent of our potential offshore oil and gas resources. (Applause.) Right now — right now — American oil production is the highest that it's been in eight years. That's right — eight years. Not only that — last year, we relied less on foreign oil than in any of the past 16 years. (Applause.)

But with only 2 percent of the world's oil reserves, oil isn't enough. This country needs an all-out, all-of-the-above strategy that develops every available source of American energy. (Applause.) A strategy that's cleaner, cheaper, and full of new jobs.

We have a supply of natural gas that can last America nearly 100 years. (Applause.) And my administration will take every possible action to safely develop this energy. Experts believe this will support more than 600,000 jobs by the end of the decade. And I'm requiring all companies that drill for gas on public lands to disclose the chemicals they use. (Applause.) Because America will develop this resource without putting the health and safety of our citizens at risk.

The development of natural gas will create jobs and power trucks and factories that are cleaner and cheaper, proving that we don't have to choose between our environment and our economy. (Applause.) And by the way, it was public research dollars, over the course of 30 years, that helped develop the technologies to extract all this natural gas out of shale rock — reminding us that government support is critical in helping businesses get new energy ideas off the ground. (Applause.)

Now, what’s true for natural gas is just as true for clean energy. In three years, our partnership with the private sector has already positioned America to be the world’s leading manufacturer of high-tech batteries. Because of federal investments, renewable energy use has nearly doubled, and thousands of Americans have jobs because of it.

When Bryan Ritterby was laid off from his job making furniture, he said he worried that at 55, no one would give him a second chance. But he found work at Energetx, a wind turbine manufacturer in Michigan. Before the recession, the factory only made luxury yachts. Today, it’s hiring workers like Bryan, who said, “I’m proud to be working in the industry of the future.”

Our experience with shale gas, our experience with natural gas, shows us that the payoffs on these public investments don’t always come right away. Some technologies don’t pan out; some companies fail. But I will not walk away from the promise of clean energy. I will not walk away from workers like Bryan. (Applause.) I will not cede the wind or solar or battery industry to China or Germany because we refuse to make the same commitment here.

We’ve subsidized oil companies for a century. That’s long enough. (Applause.) It’s time to end the taxpayer giveaways to an industry that rarely has been more profitable, and double-down on a clean energy industry that never has been more promising. Pass clean energy tax credits. Create these jobs. (Applause.)

We can also spur energy innovation with new incentives. The differences in this chamber may be too deep right now to pass a comprehensive plan to fight climate change. But there’s no reason why Congress shouldn’t at least set a clean energy standard that creates a market for innovation. So far, you haven’t acted. Well, tonight, I will. I’m directing my administration to allow the development of clean energy on enough public land to power 3 million homes. And I’m proud to announce that the Department of Defense, working with us, the world’s largest consumer of energy, will make one of the largest commitments to clean energy in history — with the Navy purchasing enough capacity to power a quarter of a million homes a year. (Applause.)

Of course, the easiest way to save money is to waste less energy. So here’s a proposal: Help manufacturers eliminate energy waste in their factories and give businesses incentives to upgrade their buildings. Their energy bills will be \$100 billion lower over the next decade, and America will have less pollution, more manufacturing, more jobs for construction workers who need them. Send me a bill that creates these jobs. (Applause.)

Remarks by the President in the State of the Union Address – 2013

Today, no area holds more promise than our investments in American energy. After years of talking about it, we’re finally poised to control our own energy future. We produce more oil at home than we have in 15 years.

(Applause.) We have doubled the distance our cars will go on a gallon of gas, and the amount of renewable energy we generate from sources like wind and solar — with tens of thousands of good American jobs to show for it.

We produce more natural gas than ever before — and nearly everyone’s energy bill is lower because of it. And over the last four years, our emissions of the dangerous carbon pollution that threatens our planet have actually fallen.

But for the sake of our children and our future, we must do more to combat climate change. (Applause.) Now, it’s true that no single event makes a trend. But the fact is the 12 hottest years on record have all come in the last 15. Heat waves, droughts, wildfires, floods — all are now more frequent and more intense. We can choose to believe that Superstorm Sandy, and the most severe drought in decades, and the worst wildfires some states have ever seen were all just a freak coincidence. Or we can choose to believe in the overwhelming judgment of science — and act before it’s too late. (Applause.)

Now, the good news is we can make meaningful progress on this issue while driving strong economic growth. I urge this Congress to get together, pursue a bipartisan, market-based solution to climate change, like the one John McCain and Joe Lieberman worked on together a few years ago. But if Congress won’t act soon to protect future generations, I will. (Applause.) I will direct

my Cabinet to come up with executive actions we can take, now and in the future, to reduce pollution, prepare our communities for the consequences of climate change, and speed the transition to more sustainable sources of energy.

Four years ago, other countries dominated the clean energy market and the jobs that came with it. And we've begun to change that. Last year, wind energy added nearly half of all new power capacity in America. So let's generate even more. Solar energy gets cheaper by the year — let's drive down costs even further. As long as countries like China keep going all in on clean energy, so must we.

Now, in the meantime, the natural gas boom has led to cleaner power and greater energy independence. We need to encourage that. And that's why my administration will keep cutting red tape and speeding up new oil and gas permits. (Applause.) That's got to be part of an all-of-the-above plan. But I also want to work with this Congress to encourage the research and technology that helps natural gas burn even cleaner and protects our air and our water.

In fact, much of our new-found energy is drawn from lands and waters that we, the public, own together. So tonight, I propose we use some of our oil and gas revenues to fund an Energy Security Trust that will drive new research and technology to shift our cars and trucks off oil for good. If a nonpartisan coalition of CEOs and retired generals and admirals can get behind this idea, then so can we. Let's take their advice and free our families and businesses from the painful spikes in gas prices we've put up with for far too long.

I'm also issuing a new goal for America: Let's cut in half the energy wasted by our homes and businesses over the next 20 years. (Applause.) We'll work with the states to do it. Those states with the best ideas to create jobs and lower energy bills by constructing more efficient buildings will receive federal support to help make that happen.

VERBAL WARFARE IN THE POLISH MEDIA: AN ANALYSIS OF CONCEPTUAL METAPHORS IN POLITICAL DISCOURSE

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“The use and abuse of language
cannot be separated from each other.”
Paul de Man (1978: 21)

Abstract

Cognitive semanticists, especially George Lakoff and the Rockridge Institute, joined the analysts of political discourse in the 1990s. Much has been said about the metaphorical language of the US leaders, Bush and Obama, especially during the time of the War on Terror, and a range of conceptual metaphors have been pinpointed, such as THE STATE AS A PERSON, THE STATE AS THE FAMILY, THE USA AS A MORAL LEADER/DEFENDER OF THE JUST CAUSE, WAR AS MEDICINE, ARGUMENT IS WAR. Polish political discourse is, in contrast, largely focused on internal issues and debates. The resulting image of the nation and its aims, as found in official and unofficial statements made by the Polish government and parliamentarians portrays a pervading simplistic and dualistic picture of the nation and – more importantly – suggests that all aspects of politics evoke the imagery of war waged against all other parties involved.

This study traces conceptual metaphors in a large corpus of material. The primary sources include interviews with politicians as well as texts written by journalists commenting on the Polish political scene and the latest developments. Another source is daily news on popular portals and online services of selected Polish dailies and magazines. All the materials cover a period between September 2011 and mid-January 2012.

The outcome of the analyses of spoken and written data reveals that political, social and economic antagonisms are well fed by language which highlights dichotomies and depicts ‘the others’ as the source of all evil. The metaphorical language largely follows the patterns investigated and described by Lakoff, providing a wealth of material to support the claim that ARGUMENT IS WAR. In the light of the collected data, multiple ‘wars’ are in progress successfully generating language of conflict.

1. Introduction

This article concentrates on the verbal interactions and commentaries by the representatives of two opposing parties on the Polish political scene: the ruling Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska) and the main opposition party called Law and Justice

(Prawo i Sprawiedliwość). Descended from one common original post-communist rightist movement, both parties have been engaged in fierce debates revealing explicit and implicit hostile attitudes towards each other for the last several years.

This project focuses on metaphors understood as conceptual mappings structuring human thought and its product, language (Lakoff & Johnson 1980, Lakoff 1987, Taylor 2003, Barcelona 2003). The material for the study exemplifies current Polish political discourse on the basis of interviews, news items and commentaries collected from popular Polish portals, online magazines and political blogs in the period between September 2011 (the final stage of the parliamentary election) and mid-January 2012.

The purpose of the study is to identify (1) the most popular metaphors which structure Polish political discourse currently, and (2) the preferred range of lexical exponents in respective source domains. The analysis has been inspired by repeatedly voiced concerns about the brutalisation of the Polish language of politics which perpetuates hostilities within the nation. The Media Ethics Council (Rada Etyki Mediów) keep guard over the standards of public debate to prevent and condemn abuse, manipulation and discrimination, yet to little effect so far. Nevertheless, conceptual metaphors are less easy to detect and react against, and these - superficially ‘innocent’ and harmless – are often the basis for the construction of negative models and the encouragement of enmity.

2. Have principles disappeared?

Instead of being a means of reaching a consensus or searching for solutions to problems, political discourse in Poland explicitly violates ethical canons and the cooperative principle alike.

Paweł Śpiewak, a sociologist, notes in *Panel dyskusyjny "Język polskiej polityki po 1989 roku"* (2009) that the language used on the Polish political scene is becoming “a tool for a merciless fight, for humiliating the opponent, for hurting him/her” [translation mine]. In the same discussion held by the Senate of the Polish Republic, Michał Głowiński, an expert on communist newspeak, claims that totalitarian discourse dominates Polish political debates just as it did 30 years ago, and the dichotomy “us vs. them” is its one notable feature. Ideological divisions between PO and PiS, the two largest Polish parties engaged in a perpetual war, are clearly-set, constantly highlighted, and strengthened by politicians and journalists. In the light of the hypothesis that language does – to a certain extent – shape the way we think such verbal conflict may be regarded as an alarming phenomenon: creating hostility and giving rise to further abuse.

2.1 Vernacularisation of the language of the media in Poland

One relevant factor with reference to the language and style represented by politicians and the media in Poland nowadays is “the modelling of public discourse upon the discursive practices of ordinary life, ‘conversational’ practices in a broad sense” (Fairclough, 1994: 253). Since 1989, which marked the onset of the post-communist era, the language of Polish politics has undergone significant changes in many respects. As

Duszak (2006) aptly notes “(t)he desired direction of change was to make the language of politics more dialogic, direct, expressive and open.” As a result, politicians go to any lengths to convince the electorate they are one of the people; this might be achieved by appearing in informal contexts and, most commonly, with the use of colloquial speech, clichés and new popular coinages, frequently buzz words. Utterances produced by politicians, however, tend to verge on insult, or might be interpreted as a veiled attack. The language is rich in traditional metaphors represented by a set of conventionalised phrases, as well as in less evident, yet effective language based on conceptual structures which shape political discourse in terms of a conflict rather than a constructive verbal exchange. The authors of *Słownik polszczyzny politycznej po 1989 roku*, Rafał Żimny and Paweł Nowak (2009) stress the importance of conceptual metaphors. Their recipients, mostly subconsciously, acquire and accept the view of reality they construct (ibid.: 326). As such, conceptual metaphors and the images and scripts they imply are potentially more dangerous than decorative rhetorical figures which direct attention to the form of the utterance rather than its content.

2.2 Verbal directness of Poles

Apart from political factors, one reason for this predilection for the vernacular in speech could be part of the cultural script. Wierzbicka (1991: 121) observes that “Polish culture values (...) uninhibited emotional expression.” Pragmalinguistic analyses do confirm that Poles rarely apply hedging techniques, and this also refers to the ways in which opinions are voiced. Goddard & Wierzbicka (1997) believe that in most contexts Polish culture is likely “to actively encourage ‘directness’ of expression” rather than to advocate means of toning messages down. Boski et al. (1999: 8) refer to previous cross-cultural research and their own studies by claiming that “Polish scripts of interpersonal communication encourage spontaneity of affective expression, including negative moods and feelings.”

2.3 Mediatisation of politics

According to Fetzer and Weizman (2006: 146) “politics has undergone dramatic changes and has become a media endeavor.” The media are no longer subservient to politicians – they have themselves begun to participate in politics by shaping public opinion (Oniszczyk 2011), or – more radically – can be seen as an autonomous and competitive source of power (Street, 2006: 197). In these circumstances, as Bralczyk (2009) notes, “(a) politician exists through language. Once he/she stops talking, he/she ceases to exist as a politician” [translation mine]. “The language of politics has been subjected to the media” (ibid.) and, consequently, ‘new orality’ (Duszak 2006) based on simple talk prevails in political discourse. In order to reach, and ‘seduce’ wide audiences of voters, politicians apply indiscriminate, vivid language, colloquial lexicon, analogies and clichés. One cannot help thinking that politicians are expected to cater for lower tastes and appeal to the masses in the same way that celebrities do.

Kamińska-Szmaj (2008: 263) sees another factor, apart from the involvement of politics in the mass media, as a source of competitiveness found in language. Following Magdoń (1995), she believes that Polish political propaganda is full of the ‘spirit of play/of a game’ (‘*duch zabawy*’) marked by its density of metaphors, as well as verbal and non-verbal forms of dramatisation.

More convincingly, Kloch (2010: 115) attributes the verbal aggression to the globalisation and Americanisation of the media under the guise of freedom of speech and effective journalism.

3. Political discourse as a transfer of values

Language is never neutral (Bakhtin 1981, 1984; Fairclough 1995) and political discourse is no exception:

(a) metaphorical utterance often conveys or instigates a mental or emotional attitude or a value judgment about the target subject matter. This is perhaps especially prevalent in metaphor used in political discourse. (Barnden 2008: 333)

The value of the Conceptual Metaphor Theory for the study of political discourse was stressed by Lakoff and Johnson (1980), its founding fathers, who saw a significant role of metaphorical mappings “in the construction of social and political reality” (ibid.: 156). More recently, Zinken, Hellsten and Nerlich (2008: 364), in their sociocultural study, stress the importance of the study of metaphor, with its ideological bias, in discourse. The axiological weight of metaphors cannot be overestimated: Gibbs (1994) distinguishes between linguistic metaphor as a product, and conceptual metaphor as a mental process; the former has the power of activating representations in the mind. These form complex structures which regulate categorization and normative thinking. With ideological discourse resting on binary oppositions, e.g. good vs. evil, moral vs. immoral, the bodily basis of conceptual mappings play an essential role in shaping and instilling values.


4. Conceptual metaphors in the language of politicians and political commentators: material and theoretical constructs

The analysis undertaken here is based on a corpus of 53 written texts (44 news items and political commentaries, and 9 entries in blogs run by politicians) and 55 transcripts of radio interviews. In the total of 108 texts, a significant number of 735 conceptual metaphors was attested. This should be considered to be a rough estimate as metaphor identification is to a large extent subject to individual interpretation, and as such is always vulnerable to criticism. Another weak point is the delimitation of domains (Langacker 1987) as noted in Feyaerts (1999). Nevertheless, this study might be considered as an overview of the phenomenon in question, an impulse for further investigation of conceptual phenomena in discourse analysis.

The analysis of linguistic representations – with the application of the tenets of cognitive semantics – in search of conceptual representations which shape cultural discourse in Poland, might contribute to research on political manipulation. This is achieved through the influencing of conceptualization and cognition as a result of the repeated application of certain – more or less hidden – metaphors. In this respect, cognitive semantics is one research territory which complements pragmalinguistic discourse analysis of political language.

4.1 Image schemas and conceptual structure

The main tenet of cognitive linguistics is a close correlation between the concepts human beings form and the nature of our physical bodies. This correlation is better known as *embodiment*. According to this hypothesis, linguistic output (or lexical exponents) constitute the peak of the cognitive iceberg, the final product of the mind which is structured by more basic general representations. These include image schemas which derive from sensory and perceptual experience as we interact with the physical world. Graphically, the connection between language and its conceptual underpinnings can be represented as:



Embodied experience of space, force, containment etc. determines other concepts, including abstractions. All of these reflect the physicality of the human body and the positive or negative associations which result from its functioning in the environment.

Conceptual mapping is, in simple terms, understood as a mapping, or transfer, between diverse domains of experience. In order to convey an abstract meaning, a natural tendency is to draw from another area of experience (SOURCE DOMAIN), a concrete one. In political discourse, such a mental process – i.e. a mapping between a source and a target domain, can, for instance, be found in language which represents a political party as a person, e.g. *SLD potrzebuje czasu* (SLD needs time), *Platforma nie jest bez grzechu* (Platform is not without a sin), or “*GPC*” *pokazuje prawdziwą twarz PiS-u*” (GPC shows the true face of PiS). Ontological correspondences are retained: since a party is a person, its members are organs, important members are the heart, a party in trouble suffers etc.: *Myśmy byli samym sercem PiS* (We were the very heart of PiS), *Sojusz ciągle ma traumę* (The Alliance still suffers from trauma), *SLD nie jest zdrową partią* (SLD is not a healthy party).

4.2 Evaluative metaphors

Association evoked by certain patterns of experience account for the presence of selected image schemas in evaluative contexts. These underlie three types of metaphors which are pervasive in speech: orientational, sensorimotor and visual metaphors.

Oriental metaphors in the material culled for the present study (accompanied with literal, word for word translations, which are intended to retain the original Polish elements of the respective source domains) include: GOOD IS UP; BAD IS DOWN; SUCCESS IS UP; FAILURE IS DOWN; HIGH STATUS IS UP; LOW STATUS IS DOWN. Further elaborations include:

- MORAL IS UP/IMMORAL IS DOWN:
 - (1) Kurski **sięgnął bruku** ... [25]
(lit.) Kurski has **hit the pavement** ...
- POWER IS UP:
 - (2) ... jak Polska mogłaby wyglądać **pod** dobrymi (...) rządami. [31]
... what Poland might look like **under** good (...) leadership.
 - (3) Musimy schodzić bezpośrednio do ludzi. [59]
We have to get **down** directly to people.
 - (4) Jak pan czyta te ruchy: Kopacz **w górę**, Schetyna **w dół**. [103]
How do you read (=interpret) these moves: Kopacz **up**, Schetyna **down**.
- FAILURE IS DOWN:
 - (5) dziś jesteśmy **na samym dnie**. [102]
... today we are **at the very bottom**.
 - (6) ... nas już na samym początku próbuje się **wdeptać w ziemię**. [6]
... from the very beginning there have been attempts, to **tread us into the ground**.

Sensorimotor image-schematic metaphors attested in the corpus comprise: POSITIVE DEVELOPMENT IS STABILITY; STABILITY IS PHYSICAL BALANCE; STABILITY IS COMPLETENESS/INTEGRITY; STABILITY IS SOLIDITY:

- A POLITICAL PARTY IS A STRUCTURE
 - (7) Lewica to nie spójna partia, ale dramatycznie **pęknięta formacja**. [4]
The Left is not a coherent party, but a dramatically **fractured formation**.
 - (8) to jest dużo większe **pęknięcie** niż po odejściu Kluzik-Rostkowskiej. [62]
this is a much bigger **fracture** than the one following Kluzik Rostkowska's leaving.
- POLITICAL STABILITY IS BALANCE:
 - (9) **zachwianie** pozycji Jarosława Kaczyńskiego w tym ugrupowaniu. [7]
the **imbalance** of Jaroslaw Kaczynski's position in this grouping.
 - (10) Nieco podniósł się z **upadku** Palikot ... [68]
Palikot has slightly risen from his **collapse** ...

- (11) Obóz IV RP jest **mocno zakorzeniony**. [7]
The camp of the 4th Republic is **firmly rooted**.

Visual aspects of human interactions with the physical world result in the following assessment metaphors: GOOD IS BRIGHT; BAD IS DARK; ORIENTATION IS VISION. Further entailments include:

- DIRT IS BAD/DIRTY IS IMMORAL:
- (12) MSW **czyszczone** z ludzi Schetyny. [41]
The Ministry of Home Affairs has been **cleared** of Schetyna's people.
- KNOWLEDGE IS LIGHT/IGNORANCE IS DARKNESS:
- (13) muszę (...) zachować się wyjątkowo fair i wyjątkowo przejrzysto. Nie może być żadnego **ściemniania**, żadnych gier ... [83]
I have to act in an exceptionally fair and transparent way.
There must be no dirty tricks/smears (*lit. making something dark*).
- (14) Żenujące kłamstwa ministra Boniego, który **wcisnął ludziom ciemnotę** ... [79]
The embarrassing lies of minister Boni, who shoved **ignorance** (≈ Pol. 'darkness') down people's throats.
- INTELLIGENCE IS A LIGHT SOURCE:
- (15) Ludzie często powtarzają: nikt pana nie zna. A ja pytam: kiedy miałem **zabłysnąć**? [16]
People keep saying: nobody knows you. And I ask: when was I to **shine** (*lit. flash*)?

4.3 Ontological metaphors: containers

The imagery of containers is pervasive in thought and language and structures various aspects of experience. In the context of political discourse, politics itself as well as its elements, e.g. parties, are understood in terms of containers, boxes, buildings and other structures:

- PARTIES ARE CONTAINERS (STRUCTURES/BUILDINGS etc.)
- (16) Partie stają się takimi **pojemnikami**, które muszą pomieścić różne wizje państwa. [94]
Parties are becoming such **containers**, which have to accommodate diverse visions of the state.
- (17) Młodzi bili głowami o **szklany sufit**, partia promowała wówczas starych działaczy. [16]
The young beat their heads against the **glass ceiling**, while the party was promoting the old activists.
- (18) ... tylko wtedy można **budować** silną partię. [87]
... only then can you **construct** a strong party.

- STABILITY IS COMPLETENESS/INTEGRITY
- (19) To [= odejście posłów] już nie jest **obkruszanie narożników**, ale głębokie **tapnięcie**. [62]
This [= MPs' leaving] is more than the **edges/corners crumbling**; it's a **rockburst**.
- POLITICS IS A CONTAINER/BOUNDED AREA
- (20) ... ci, którzy żyją w **świecie pozapolitycznym**. [54]
... those who live in **the extra-political world**.

4.4 Ontological metaphors: forces

Politics is action and interaction, and – inevitably - requires force. This perception leads to modelling political activities in terms of physical forces (wind, vapour pressure, crushing, attracting). Consequently:

- INTENSITY OF ACTIVITY IS AMOUNT OF PHYSICAL ENERGY
- (21) nawet Marta Kaczyńska już nie **walczy tak ostro** jak zaczynała [78]
even Marta Kaczyńska is no longer **fighting as fiercely** as she did at first
- (22) ... gdyby **twardo wszedł** do politycznej gry [4]
... if he had **entered** the political game **keenly** (*lit.* 'hard')
- (23) Moi dawni koledzy są rozczarowani i czekają. **Pod pokrywką kipi**. [12]
My former colleagues are waiting disappointed. The situation **is boiling up/seething under the lid**.
- (24) Gwiazda PO **miażdży** byłego szefa. [32]
The PO star **crushes** his former boss.
- (25) Prezes jest teraz **wyciszony**. [17]
- (26) The chairman has now been subdued (*lit.* **quietened**).
- A PROBLEM IS A FORCE, i.e. OBSTRUCTION, NATURAL FORCE, PHYSICAL OPPRESSION
- (27) Mam wrażenie, że stoję ciągle **przed murem zbudowanym z tych samych spraw**. [81]
I have the impression I am up against **a brick wall constructed of the same issues?**
- (28) Jeżeli przebijemy próg powyżej 5 proc, to wszystko jest w porządku. [77]
If we can get past (*lit.* **cut through**) the **threshold** of 5 percent everything will be OK?

5. Conceptual model of competition

The model of competition, like any other purposeful activity, is conceptually structured as movement from one location (source) towards another (goal) along a path. Hence, any advancement, progress is expressed linguistically as:

- PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY IS TRAVELLING (ALONG A PATH TOWARD A DESTINATION)
- (29) ... **drogi** polityków dawno **się rozeszły**. [78]
... those politicians **parted their ways** a long time ago.
- (30) Mówił pan, że **idzie do Sejmu** po władzę. [103]
You said you were **going** (lit. walking) **to the Sejm to take power**.
- (31) Tak jakby **rząd się gdzieś zagubił**. [68]
- (32) As if the government has **got lost somewhere**.
- (33) Ruch Palikota z pewnością go nie poprze, bo "**nie tędy droga**". [42]
Palikot's Movement will certainly not support him, because "**this is not the way**."

Consistent application of the PATH imagery, frequent in political discourse in numerous languages (Kövecses 2002), can be found in longer stretches of texts, as in:

- (34) My **posuwamy się** w tempie, które uważamy za bezpieczne. Wprawdzie nie satysfakcjonuje ono tych, którzy chcą **pędzić** jak najszybciej, ale jednak **kierunek** jest ten sam. Prawdziwa polityczna alternatywa w Polsce jest dziś taka: albo **krok po kroku** będziemy spokojnie budować Europę w Polsce (...) albo **utkniemy** w okopach wzniesionych przez Jarosława Kaczyńskiego i jego partię. [83]
We **are inching** at a speed that we consider safe. Admittedly, this does not satisfy those who want to **rush** as fast as possible, yet the **direction** is the same. A true political alternative for Poland today is as follows: we will either build Europe in Poland **step by step** (...) or we will **get stuck** in the trenches dug (lit. 'built') by Jaroslaw Kaczyński and his party.

Any problem encountered on the PATH is an obstacle, as in (26) and (27) above.

- A PURPOSEFUL ACTIVITY IS A COMPETITIVE ACTIVITY (INDIVIDUAL or in TEAMS)

Political activity is commonly presented as endeavour requiring special skills, and, not infrequently, putting 'the player' at risk. Most commonly, scenarios and elements of a race, boxing match, card game, hunting, gymnastics or ball game are utilized:

- (35) Prawdą jednak jest, że przy wielkich ambicjach Napieralskiego i lewicy pojawiały się pomysły, że to oni będą **rozdawać karty**. [56]
It's true, however, that with the great ambitions of Napieralski and the left, there were hopes that they **would be dealing the cards**.
- (36) Dowgielewicz: **Karty mieliśmy słabe**, ale udało się osiągnąć cel. [52]
Dowgielewicz: **We had weak cards** but we did manage to achieve the goal.
- (37) Wiem, że to jest **gra**. Oni w taki sposób się ustawiają, żeby wygrać a potem robić swoje. [105]
I know it's a **game**: They position themselves so they can win and do their own thing later.

- (38) Jeśli premier wypadnie dobrze, **wejdzie do europejskiej superligi**. [94]
If the Prime Minister is successful, he'll **enter the European Super League**.
- (39) Palikot, mistrz **wolt**. [70]
Palikot, a master of **vaulting**.
- (40) Jeżeli [Kaczyński] po raz kolejny zostanie **wypunktowany** przez Tuska i odesłany do **narożnika** [43]
If [Kaczyński] is once again **counted off** by Tusk and sent to **the corner** ...
- (41) Donald Tusk na politycznym ringu **boksuje** całkiem niezle. [43]
Donald Tusk throws a fairly decent **punch** in the political ring.
- (42) A kto wygra **wyścig** Palikot–Miller? [56]
And who's going to win the Palikot vs. Miller **race**?
- (43) **Kibicował** Schetynie? [102]
Did he **cheer** Schetyna **on**?
- (44) [o Tusku] Lekcję zapamiętał i **biega głównie po tej prawej stronie boiska**, tylko z rzadka zapędzając się do środka. [94]
[of Tusk] He remembers the lesson and **runs mainly on the right side of the pitch**, only rarely rushing towards the centre.
- (45) Ale w drugiej połowie dekady obaj wylądowali **poza głównym ringiem**. [43]
But in the second half of the decade they both landed **outside the main ring**.

The imagery of a boxing match, a brutal one-on-one fight, appears to reflect the top political 'duels' best:

- (46) Wieloletnia **walka** Tuska z braćmi Kaczyńskimi była prawdziwą próbą charakteru, twardości i to jak na razie – po pierwszych **rundach** przegranych – walką wygraną. Stał się **zawodnikiem** bezsprzecznie w pełni zawodowym, który może nie dysponuje jakimś potężnym **ciosem**, ale za to sam jest nań odporny, może pochwalić się wysoką **techniką**, **szybkością** i **pracą nóg**. Umie też **faulować**, zwłaszcza gdy sędzia nie widzi. Jest elegancki, ale też potrafi zacwaniaczyć. Nie da się bezkarnie **opukać**, zwłaszcza że pracuje nad **kondycją** i nie wydaje się zmęczony. Wie, że Kaczyński czyha na jeden cios, chce zwyciężyć przez **nokaut** albo liczy na to, że pod rywalem zapadnie się **ring**. Dlatego Tusk musi uważać na przeciwnika, **ring** i **sekundantów** jednocześnie. [43]
Tusk's perennial **fight** against the Kaczyński brothers was a true test of character, and stamina, which so far – after the first lost **rounds** -has been won. He has undisputably become a fully professional **contestant**, who might not have a powerful **blow** (at his disposal), yet is resistant to ones himself, can boast about his **technique**, **speed** and **footwork**. He also knows how to **foul**, especially when the judge can't see. He's elegant, but also able to **play things smart**. He can't be '**knocked**' with impunity; with all his hard work to keep **in shape**, he doesn't seem to be tired. Kaczyński lies in wait for a single blow, wanting to win with a **knockout** punch, or hopes the **ring** will collapse beneath his rival. That's why Tusk has to watch out for his opponent, the **ring** and the **seconds** all at the same time.

- POLITICAL PARTIES ARE TEAMS:
 - (47) Wdarł się do Sejmu, mimo że w jego drużynie nie było politycznych gwiazd. [70]
He got into the Parliament even though there were **no political stars on his team?**
 - (48) Startując od zera, można wejść do parlamentu ze sporą reprezentacją. [88]
Starting from nothing, one might get into parliament with **a decent team.**
- INDIVIDUAL POLITICIANS ARE (professional) PLAYERS
 - (49) **Transfery**[polityków] z prawa, a zwłaszcza z lewa, miały umacniać to wrażenie [7]
Those **transfers** [of politicians] from the right, and even more so from the left, were to reinforce the impression ...
- ... or WEAPONS/TOOLS:
 - (50) Donald Tusk **gra Millerem**, by dusić Waldemara Pawlaka [12]
Donald Tusk is playing with Miller (*instr.*) = **uses** Miller to strangle Waldemar Pawlak ...

Citation (48) represents an instance of a complex mapping: the Prime Minister uses one of the government's staunch opponents (as a tool) in order to intimidate, literally 'strangle' the coalition party leader. A proper interpretation requires reference to several underlying domains involved in a conceptual integration process.

5.1 A one-on-one physical aggression

As implied above, a purposeful activity can take the form of a combat, e.g. a boxing fight. The following citations illustrate this aspect of political competition vividly:

- (51) Poreęba bije w Tuska. Premier odpowiada, a Barroso się śmieje. [20]
Poreęba **hits** Tusk. The Prime Minister responds, and Barroso laughs.
- (52) Donald Tusk, Jarosław Kaczyński. Ostatni taki **pojedynek**. [43]
Donald Tusk, Jarosław Kaczyński. The last such **duel**.
- (53) W Poznaniu **starli się** Waldy Dzikowski z PO (...) oraz Tadeusz Dziuba z PiS. [32]
In Poznan Waldy Dzikowski (PO) **clashed with** Tadeusz Dziuba (PiS).
- (54) Kandydat Platformy **rozłożył na łopatki** kontrkandydatów. [32]
Platform's candidate **knocked** his counter candidates **into a cocked hat** (*lit.* 'laid them on their shoulder blades')

5.2 POLITICS IS WAR (plus entailments)

The target domain of POLITICAL COMPETITION is understood in terms of the source domain, WAR. As the corpus material clearly suggests, ubiquitous lexical exponents in

Polish political discourse include nouns and nominal phrases better suited for military contexts, such as: *armia* (army), *kapitulacja* (surrender), *bitwa* (battle), *front* (front), *defensywa* (defensive), *okopy* (trenches), *broń* (weapon), *pobojowisko* (battlefield), *pojedynek* (duel), *kłeska* (defeat), *strategia* (strategy), *nalot* (air raid, swoop), *pole manewru* (room for manoeuvre), and *tykająca bomba* (time bomb). Most frequently attested verbs comprise: *atakować* (to attack), *walczyć* (to fight), *pacyfikować* (to suppress), and *ścierać się* (to clash). A range of collocational phrases, such as: *toczyć wojnę/wojenkę* (to wage war/war + diminutive suffix), *walka na śmierć i życie* (mortal combat), *przelewać krew* (to shed blood), *zwierać szeregi* (to draw up in battle array), and *wytrącić komuś z ręki broń* (to cut the ground from under sb's feet) add to the mercilessness of the activities on the political scene.

Selected citations illustrate the ferocity of political competition as presented in the Polish media today:

- (55) **zaatakował** nas Leszek Balcerowicz i zostaliśmy zepchnięci do **defensywy**. [82]
Leszek Balcerowicz **attacked** us and – as a result – we were forced back onto the **defensive**.
- (56) Jeżeli ktoś myśli o **kapitulacji** i o tym, żeby związać sztandar, to ja myślę o tym, żeby trwać przy **sztandarze**. [103]
If anyone is thinking of a **surrender** and of taking down the **banner**, then I am thinking of how to stand by this banner.
- (57) Tusk **rozklada siły, pozycjonuje armię**. [104]
Tusk is **setting out his forces, positioning the army**.
- (58) utkniemy w **okopach** wzniesionych przez Jarosława Kaczyńskiego i jego partię. [83]
we'll get stuck in the **trenches** constructed by J. Kaczynski and his party.
- (59) lewicę najbardziej interesuje **walka** - Millera z Kaliszem, Millera z Palikotem. [102]
The Left is mostly interested in **fighting** – Miller vs. Kalisz, Miller vs. Palikot.
- (60) No z tej walki może wyjść wielkie **pobojowisko i zgliszcza**.
Well, this fight might end up with a vast **wreck and charred remains**.
- (61) obie armie politycznego sporu w Polsce mają podobne **siły**. I nikt nie ma szans wygrać **tej wojny**, co najwyżej **bitwę** albo dwie. [54]
both **armies** in this political dispute have similar **forces**. And neither stands a chance of winning **this war**; a **battle** or two at the most.
- (62) SLD **zwarła szeregi** i ruszyła do **ofensywy**. [4]
SLD have **closed ranks** and **gone onto the offensive**.
- (63) Palikot **obstawia flankę** lewicowo-liberalną, a Gowin – konserwatywną. [11]
Palikot **guards** the left-liberal **flank**, while Gowin – the conservative one.
- (64) Państwo zaczęło **przegrywać** z Kościołem w drugiej połowie lat 80. XX w. [84]
The state started to **lose** against the Church in the second half of the 1980s.
- (65) Kaczyński (...) już tylko **broni swojego terytorium** ... [56]
Kaczynski (...) is only **defending his territory** now ...

- (66) Jestem człowiekiem, który **przelał najwięcej krwi** dla tej partii. [101]
He is the man who has **spilled the most blood** for his party.
- (67) Polityka (...) to już tylko **pole walki**. Nie do pierwszej **krwi**, lecz do ostatniej. [54]
Politics (...) is solely a **battlefield**. Not till the first (sight of) **blood** but to the last ('until the bitter end').

By analogy, PARTIES ARE MILITARY ORGANISATIONS:

- (68) PiS i PO to dwie **armie, które się okopały** [108]
PiS and PO are two armies which have **dug in (the trenches)**...
- (69) Tusk **mobilizuje** partię. [71]
Tusk is **mobilising** his party.
- (70) Kaczyński może tylko raz w miesiącu pojawiać się w tym miejscu, by **zagrzewać swych żołnierzy do walki** [78]
Kaczyński can turn up in this place once a month only to **rouse** (lit. **warm**) his soldiers to fight
- (71) prezesa będzie otaczał coraz mniejszy krąg **pretorianów**. [43]
the chairman will be surrounded by a dwindling **Praetorian Guard**.
- (72) wszystkie **hufce** Kaczyńskiego ... [78]
all Kaczynski's **regiments** ...
- (73) Słysząc doniesienia, że liczy **szable** i sam może opuścić PiS ... [3]
There are rumours that he is counting **sabres** and might leave PiS himself ...
- (74) **robimy** (...) nowy zaciąg w elektoracie. [11]
We are having a new **enlistment** of the electorate.

WORDS ARE WEAPONS in the dog-eat-dog world of politics:

- (75) Janusz Palikot w **bardzo ostrych słowach** ocenia zachowanie rzecznika rządu [44]
Palikot judges the behaviour of the government spokesperson with **very sharp words**
- (76) To nie są żadne debaty, ale **walki na słowa, przepychanki**. [2]
These are no debates but **word fights, jostling**.
- (77) Dyskusja zmienia się w **wymianę chwytów** retorycznych. [2]
The discussion turns into **an exchange of rhetorical figures** (*lit. ploys; grabs*).

Worse still, OFFENSIVE WORDS ARE EXCREMENT which can be use as a weapon by political opponents:

- (78) chłopaka, który na stronie "antykomor" zabawiał się **rzucaniem gównem w prezydenta**. [17]
a boy who amused himself on the 'anti-Komor' page by **throwing shit at the President**.

Attributing features of certain animals to party leaders and members highlights either positive or negative features. Source domains abound in a range of species, such as: moles, dinosaurs, young wolves, thus suggesting that POLITICIANS ARE ANIMALS:

- (79) Przed podjęciem każdej decyzji będzie musiał pielgrzymować do lewicowych **dinozaurów**. [4]
Before he makes any decision, he'll have to go on a pilgrimage to the left-wing **dinosaurs**.
- (80) SLD ze swoim młodym szefem i grupą **wilczków** o nieznanym nazwiskach [4]
SLD with its new boss and a group of **young wolves** with unknown surnames
- (81) To (...) wyrzucenie "**gada**" i dwóch "**plazów**" jak prezes mówi o Ziobrze, Kurskim i Cymańskim ... [98]
This (...) expulsion of the 'reptile' and two 'amphibians' – as the chairman refers to Ziobro, Kurski and Cymanski ...
- (82) Dzisiejsza lewica jest formacją wielkich **samców alfa**. [4]
Today's Left is a formation of big **alfa males**.

This mapping is less explicit with lexical exponents like: *stado* (herd), *gniazdo* (nest), *matecznik* (den/lair; backwoods) or *hodować* (to breed):

- (83) pomysł, żeby **wyhodować** sobie Palikota. [31]
the idea to **breed** Palikot for himself.
- (84) Tusk **mości sobie wygodne gniazdo** do rządzenia [103]
Tusk **is getting his comfortable nest (ready)** for his rule.

War requires physical strength, hence the success of the (STRONG) PEOPLE ARE MACHINES metaphor:

- (85) **Starcia "lokomotyw"**. W stolicy doszło do starcia liderów największych partii. [32]
The clashes of the "(**railway**) **engines**." In the capital the leaders of the biggest parties have clashed.

The imagery of war resembling medieval battles which pervades political discourse is further extended onto politicians. POLITICAL LEADERS ARE RULERS/KINGS metaphors add to this wider picture:

- (86) ... ktoś musiałby powiedzieć szefowi [tzn. Kaczyńskiemu], że się myli. Ale każdy, kto tak mówi, podważa **majestat władcy**. [62]
Someone would have to tell the boss (i.e. Kaczynski) that he is wrong. But anyone who says so, calls **the ruler's authority** into question.

Endowed with authority and special powers politicians are (demi-)gods:

- (87) ... dla **wyznawców** Kaczyńskiego ... [93]
... for the **believers** in Kaczyński ...

- (88) obaj właśnie **się nawrócili na milleryzm**. [19]
they have both just **converted to Millerism**.

Citations (53)-(85) exemplify a mere fraction of war metaphors and their entailments found in the corpus of texts analysed here. Yet, a coherent picture of consistent patterns in mappings between the source domain (WAR) and the target domain (POLITICS) is evident. For Polish readers and listeners this language is by no means unfamiliar. The selection of citations above comes from popular sources and the choice of words is characteristic of the regular register. Politics as a brutal activity is part of formal and informal registers alike; the distinction is, nevertheless, blurred in the mediatisation of politics.

5.3 'Star Wars' in Polish politics?

A more complex mental process, in fact, a blend of mappings transfers political conflicts onto space:

- (89) Zachowujecie się, jakbyście przylecieli z planety PiS. [20]
You behave as if you have come from the PiS planet.
(90) Minister powrócił jak kometa. Odgrzanym kotлетem. [30]
The minister has come back like a comet. On a reheated cutlet.

Citations (86) and (87) reflect the IMPORTANCE IS CENTRALITY metaphor, also found in:

- (91) włączyć Polskę do **jądra** decyzyjnego Unii Europejskiej [73]
to build Poland into the decision-making **nucleus** of the EU
(92) spychając na **marginie**s ludzi, (którzy dobrze czuli się w PRL) [7]
pushing the people (who felt good in communist Poland) off onto the **margins**?
(93) **trzon** wyborców, a zwłaszcza aktywistów [7]
the **hard core** of constituents, especially the activists
(94) Polska może być **peryferią, zmarginalizowana** [73]
Poland might become a **periphery, become marginalised**,

as well as the mapping: SHARING BELIEFS IS PROXIMITY, also attested in:

- (95) Najważniejsze jest to, że jesteśmy z premierem w dalszym ciągu **blisko** [56]
The most important thing is that we are still **close** to the Prime Minister
(96) **Na drugim biegunie** znajduje się PiS [26]
PiS is situated **on the opposite pole**.

From the anthropocentric perspective, objects in space are remote, of little importance, and so are the people conceived of as aliens: weird, maladjusted to the reality of the human world, potentially dangerous. Citation (87) adds the IDEAS ARE FOOD mapping to this extraterrestrial scenario: a reheated cutlet stands for an idea which is no

longer fresh and appealing, yet in this context is used a sort of ‘vehicle’ for political purposes.

5.4 All’s fair in love and war

Analogies between war and love have been drawn for ages and pervade today’s political discourse in Poland. POLITICAL ACTIVITY IS SEXUAL ACTIVITY/MARITAL RELATIONSHIP mappings - with *honeymoons*, *flirts*, and *break-offs* on the level of semantics - are fairly common and recurrent:

- (97) Janusz Palikot nie jest **dziewicą** polityczną [6]
Janusz Palikot isn’t a political **virgin**
- (98) Radio Maryja i "Gazeta Polska" **dopieszczają** twardych zwolenników PiS-u [17]
Radio Maryja and Gazeta Polska **are fondling** the staunch (lit. ‘hard’, ‘tough’) followers of PiS.
- (99) jak bardzo PO chce **podbić serca** zamiastowych [46]
how much PO wants to win (*lit. to conquer!*) **the hearts** of the country folk
- (100) Donald Tusk i Grzegorz Schetyna - **związek**, który ostatnio przechodzi ostry kryzys. [71]
Donald Tusk and Grzegorz Schetyna – a **relationship** which is undergoing a rough crisis.
- (101) Przestrzegalbym SLD przed **padaniem w ramiona** Palikota [96]
I would warn SLD against **falling into** Palikot’s **arms**.
- (102) Czyli **romanse** z Palikotem i SLD będziecie traktowali jak **zdradę**, a **zdrada** oznacza koniec **małżeństwa**? [104]
Will you then consider the **affairs** between Palikot and SLD as **infidelity**, and **infidelity** as the end of the **marriage**?

As was the case with a range of other metaphors, the complexity of (94) – (99) involves a cultural component. The script for POLITICAL ACTIVITY IS SEXUAL ACTIVITY/MARITAL RELATIONSHIP requires a knowledge of the values attributed to human relationships shared by Polish speakers.

5.5 Other metaphorical mappings

Apart from the conceptual metaphors and their elaborations described in section 5.1 – 5.4 a wide range of other common mappings has been exhibited in the material under analysis. The most typical ones (illustrated with the most frequent lexical exponents in brackets) include:

- A POLITICAL PARTY/ORGANISATION IS A PERSON
(body, illness, death)
- A POLITICAL PARTY IS A MACHINERY
(machine, apparatus, wear out, failure)

THE STATE IS A PERSON

(this sick state, failing an exam, protecting its citizens)

POLITICIANS ARE ACTORS

(political scene, an interrupted performance, electorate = extras)

POLITICIANS ARE MUSICIANS

(playing 3 pianos: PSL, SLD and Palikot)

POLITICAL PARTIES ARE VEHICLES/SHIPS

(drowning the party, pushed out, to take the helm)

POWER IS A (DESIRED) OBJECT

(to trust somebody with leadership)

POLITICAL OPPONENTS ARE ROGUES

(Platform heisted the media)

IMPORTANCE IS CENTRALITY

(on the margins, the hard core, gather around the leader)

POLITICS IS FLOWING WATER

(the currents of political life)

CHANGES ARE MOVEMENTS

(a creeping totalitarian state)

ACTIVE IS ALIVE/INACTIVE IS DEAD

(political cemeteries, shiftless opposition)

POLITICAL ACTIVITY IS A COMMERCIAL ACTIVITY

(demand for radical policy, buying ideas, the Polish government as an ‘advertising agency’)

ANGER IS HEAT/STORM/ELECTRIC CHARGE

(suspense= Pol. voltage; sparking between A and B).

These and others beyond the scope of this study also deserve the attention of linguists, discourse analysts, and anyone who is aware of the fact that “cognitive semantics and axiology are closely related” (Cortés de los Ríos, 2002: 39).

5. Conclusions

The corpus of 108 texts which has been investigated with the aim of identifying the conceptual metaphors which structure political discourse in Poland would suggest a number of conclusions:

- a. metaphorical conceptual mappings are ubiquitous, and along with metonymies (intra-domain mappings) result in a range of concepts which vary in their degree of complexity (frequently understood and interpreted against a domain matrix which involves the awareness of cultural scripts);
- b. metonymy is as significant as metaphor and in many cases these two processes work together to activate a meaning of high specificity;
- c. metaphors of war definitely constitute an overwhelming majority in the sample of data, frequently building on primary metaphors which exhibit evaluative functions;
- d. less common concepts of politics draw upon the domains of ARTS, COMMERCE/BUSINESS, and JOURNEY/VOYAGE;

- e. unlike American discourse in the realm of politics, Polish hardly ever resorts to FAMILY metaphors; the LEADER IS A FATHER metaphor appears merely once, and even this single instance is highly controversial as the implication of cannibalism might be taken into consideration if the polysemy of the verb ‘consume’ is taken into consideration:

(103) [Tusk] stał się **ojcem** zwycięstwa i **skonsumował** je [56]
Tusk became the **father** of this victory and **ate** (!) it.

Occasionally, voters might be treated like children, as in (101), yet it is the aspect of innocence or naivety that is highlighted in the context, rather than family ties:

(104) Kaczyński nuci kołysankę wyborcy PO [17]
Kaczyński hums a lullaby to the PO voter.

- f. The implications which have arisen in the current study would seem to situate Polish political discourse within what Tannen (1998) calls the Argument Culture (1998). The conceptual and linguistic “tendency to approach every problem as if it were a fight between two sides” is undoubtedly richly illustrated in political discourse in the Polish media. “We see it in headlines that are always using metaphors for war. It’s a general atmosphere of animosity and contention that has taken over our public discourse” (ibid.).

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