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EDITORIAL TO RIL 11:3

The present issue of Research in Language includes papers focused on the interface of semantics and pragmatics, which have been inspired by the discussions during the annual international conference "Meaning, Context & Cognition" (MCC), held in University of Lodz, Poland.

The opening paper, "A concept of general meaning and selected theories in comparison to selected semantic and pragmatic theories", by **Roman Kalisz**, discusses the concept of general meaning indicating some developments of the account. The discussion of the theoretical stance of general meaning includes rich references to semantic and pragmatic theories whose tenets are in some respects compatible with the concept. These include, *inter alia*, axiological semantics and classical pragmatic theories such as speech act theory, Gricean theory of conversational implicature, and relevance theory.

The next paper, **Jonathan R. White**'s "Ellipsis as a marker of interaction in spoken discourse", presents a discussion of strategies for interaction in spoken discourse, focusing on ellipsis phenomena in English. The data, which comes from the VOICE corpus of English as a Lingua Franca, includes records of seminar and workshop discussions, working group meetings, interviews and conversations. It is claimed that the main functions that ellipsis performs in the analysed corpus include Intersubjectivity, where participants develop and maintain an understanding in discourse; Continuers, which are examples of back channel support; Correction, both self- and other-initiated; Repetition; and Comments, which are similar to Continuers but do not have a back channel support function. It is indicated in the conclusions that the use of ellipsis is a strong marker of interaction in spoken discourse, as evidenced in the study.

"The role of syntactic stylistic means in expressing the emotion term *love*", authored by **Nataliya Panasenko**, is a cognitive-linguistic analysis of the concept "love" and, especially, its nature in Czech and Slovak as evidenced in the corpus inspired by the GRID project, which involved analysis of 24 emotion terms in 35 languages. As indicated in the title, the author's focus is lexical and syntactic means through which "love" is expressed in Czech and Slovak vis-à-vis English.

In the next text, "Biracial – black? A survey of language use and language attitudes in Poland and Germany", **Hanna Pułaczewska** analyses the construction of race from the perspective of cognitive sociolinguistics. Her focus is on the perception of mixed-race people of black and white heritage in Poland and Germany compared to that of the USA. The analysis puts emphasis on how perception finds its reflection in language. The study clarifies in how far a socially-marked perception of biracial people applies in the countries with relatively small population of black ancestry. As an illustration, the data from the first presidential campaign of Barack Obama is used to investigate the occurrence in both countries of mental colouring of biracial people. The paper also makes references to the issues of political correctness sparked off by Obama's

presidential campaign and its media coverage, trying to expose both the arguments posed by proponents of various solutions with regard to referring to biracial people, and the race issue-related paradoxes revealed in contexts where language use meets ideological positions.

Ewa Wałaszewska's paper, *"Like* in similes – a relevance-theoretic view", reopens a relevance–theoretic perspective to examine the meaning of *like* as used in similes. Acknowledging the fact that similes are close to metaphors, the author suggests that *like* in similes is different from *like* employed in literal comparisons. In particular, it is claimed that, contrary to the current relevance-theoretic position on the issue, *like* in similes introduces an *ad hoc* concept. *Like* conceived of in this way is seen as both conceptual and procedural and, as such, as distinct from both the conceptual *like* used in literal comparisons and the procedural *like* functioning as a pragmatic marker. It is further claimed that the proposed model allows to efficiently account for the similarities and differences between similes, metaphors and literal comparisons.

The last paper in the present issue, "Performing anaphora in Modern Greek: a neo-Gricean pragmatic analysis" by **Michael Chiou**, addresses the problem of interpreting anaphoric NPs in Modern Greek. It includes a proposal of analysis based on the systematic interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles of communication, which should result in a neat and elegant approach to NP-anaphora resolution. The author suggests that the study provides evidence for an account of NP-anaphora in terms of the division of labour between syntax and pragmatics and with reference to the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles.

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A Concept of General Meaning:
Selected Theories in Comparison to Selected Semantic and Pragmatic Theories

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Abstract
The paper discusses a concept of general meaning with reference to various relevant semantic and pragmatic theories. It includes references to Slavic axiological semantics (e.g. Krzeszowski (1997); Puzynina (1992)), Wierzbicka's (e.g. 1980, 1987) atomic expressions and classical pragmatics theories, such as speech acts, Gricean theory of conversational implicature, politeness theory and and relevance theory.

Keywords: general meaning, semantics, pragmatics

1. The rudiments of the concept of general meaning

In this section I would like to introduce a concept of general meaning which I claim is a valid notion in comparing cultural and linguistic phenomena across various language communities. I claim that at this level of semantic investigations similarities and differences among various cultural phenomena are most salient.

Let us start with exposition of the concept of general meaning which I have been developing for the last two years.

The concept of general meaning is connected with degree of schematicity of semantic description and perception. I claim here that it is possible to distinguish a level for basic values in a given culture. Let us present the following example which is an extract of an interview of a journalist with Muhammad Ali:

(1)   A. A journalist: You are extremely truculent!

        B. Ali: If it's good! I'm that!

Ali was not interested in the detailed meaning of the word *truculent* but was interested in what we call here **general meaning**. Here the aspect of general meaning is connected with evaluation of a situation, more precisely, with description of Ali in terms of 'good' or 'bad'. I n fact the term *truculent* may in itself be rather neutral idiosyncratic for its interpretation in the above terms. However, this aspect of understanding of the word *truculent* interested Muhammad Ali most. I claim that understanding and producing convictions in terms of a scale ranging from 'good' or 'positive' evaluation of an event

or a situation, through less enthusiastic evaluation in terms of positive indication, through neutral stance toward judgment in weaker and later stronger negative terms. The positive-negative or good-bad scale is one of the most fundamental parameters in human cognition through which humans assess observations of the world. Krzeszowski (1997) claims that every linguistic expression is charged axiologically. In other words every expression is confronted with good-bad parameter. The remaining two parameters are truth-falsehood spectrum and beautiful-ugly continuum. The location of a given expression on one or more continua presents general meaning of this expression. The general meaning is, then instantiated as a detailed meaning of the expression.

The utterance: *This soup is not good* represents prototypically a general meaning connected with location of the expression on the scale close to *bad* pole of the spectrum, whereas particular instantiations which contain obviously their general meaning too, may be as follows:

(2)   a. This soup is not tasty.

           b. This soup is contaminated.

           c. This soup is too salty.

           d. The consumption date for this soup is expired.

I propose three spectra which accommodate general meaning. An expression can be related to more than one spectrum:

(3)   Peter claims that Mary likes impressionists.

In the above utterance Peter is convinced that what he maintains (proposition) is true. The proposition contains the verb *like* which signals positive attitude toward the object of the utterance which is connected with art. Therefore, the scale beautiful-ugly enters the picture.

After some examinations connected with questionnaires too, these scales seem to be the most significant for human perception in Western culture. Obviously, some other scales are possible such as strong-weak, wide-narrow, high-low etc. However, they seem to be secondary and reducible to the three major scales. In some contexts other scales may be in focus and may be more important than others. In formula 1 stable fast-slow scale is probably the most important of all scales and all other are subordinate to this one. In other than Western cultures some other scales than our three presented may be more salient. Nevertheless, the cultural differences would be related to different assessment of various phenomena on various scales. To be consistent with the culinary subject, *pork* is not i.e. acceptable in Jewish culture, *beef* is not acceptable in Hinduism although for different reasons than *pork* in Jewish culture. At this level, major cultural differences can be noted stemming from different views of the world. Liberalism is viewed as bad socialist, let alone communist tradition. However, it is highly praised in other circles e.g. those represented in the journal *Najwyższy Czas* (The High Time). What is true? What is false? What is wrong? What is right? What is good? What is bad?

What is nice? What is ugly? Are questions often differently answered by many cultures, circles, political parties, unions, religious sects, convents and other organizations?

Systems of values can be studied starting with general meaning determining what is true, good and nice versus what is false, bad and ugly. The concept of general meaning would be less significant if it did not have anything to say about conversion of general meaning into detailed meaning and pragmatics. However, before we consider this issue I want to turn into the next step of our concept. Having established the first step i.e. identifying a scale or scales which is proper for a given utterance we want to resort to the placement of the utterance on a scale or scales. Location on scale or scales is an important part of semantic description of an utterance.

We do not have a hard and fast way of placing an utterance on a definite place on the scale or scales. It would rather be impossible to find such principle and moreover it would not reflect perceptual nature of the phenomenon. Assessment on the scale is necessarily fuzzy, since individual and contextual factors are indeterminate in numerical or digital fashion. However, what is possible is presentation of tendencies of alignment of a given utterance at a given place on the scale. A proposal for checking location on a scale is connected with a parenthetical test. Negative and positive parentheticals are added to a given utterance. The results can show tendencies concerning location on a given scale or scales. The area on the spectrum can be tentatively established. The examples of parentheticals for three scales include: *but it may be the case, but it may not be the case, and it may be the true, and it may not be true* for truth-falsehood scale; *but I like it, but I don't like it, and I like it, and I don't like it, and it is good, and it isn't good, but it is good, it isn't good* for positive-negative scale: finally *and it is beautiful, and it is not beautiful, but it is ugly, but it is not ugly* for the beautiful-ugly scale.

The basic results of adding parentheticals like the above show when we have to do with utterances located near the poles of a scale. A positive parenthetical causes tautology with utterances close to a positive pole of a scale and a negative parenthetical causes contradiction with such utterances.

(4)			a. *I'm sure that Mary left, but it may be true – taut ology

			b. *I'm sure that Mary left, but it may not be true – contradiction

(5)			a. *It is impossible that Mary left, but it may not be true – tautology

			b. *It is impossible that Mary left, but it may be true – contradiction

In the second couple of utterances the situation is reversed i.e. a negative parenthetical leads to tautology and positive contradiction. This behavior shows that we have to do with an utterance representing strong conviction of the author of the message concerning falsehood of the proposition i.e. close to the negative pole of the scale. In utterances which are closer to the middle of the scale, the situation is different:

(6)			a. *I think that Mary left, but it may be the case – tautology

			b. I think that Mary left, but it may not be the case – O.K.

In the first case of the above couple a positive parenthetical causes tautology showing that an utterance should be located on the positive end of the scale. However, the second case, where the sentence is grammatical with negative parenthetical, shows that the utterance should rather be located on the positive half of the scale. However, the second case, where the sentence is grammatical with negative parenthetical, shows that the utterances should rather be located closer to the middle of the scale than closer to the positive pole, since the conviction concerning the truth of the proposition is not very strong, allowing challenging of the statement. We have a reversed situation in the cases below:

(7)   a. I doubt whether Mary left, but it may be the case – O.K.

           b. *I doubt whether Mary left, but it may not be the case – tautology

The utterance with *doubt* should be located on the negative half of the scale, however, closer to the middle than to the negative pole, since positive parenthetical does not yield ungrammaticality.
    A similar situation is met in other scales:

(8)   a. *I'm happy that I work in Gda ńsk, but I like it – tautology

           b. *I am happy that I work in Gdańsk, but I don't like it – contradiction

There is also a different relation of an utterance toward placement on the positive – negative sca1e:

(9)   a. It is bad that you failed your exam

           b. It's not that awful that you failed your exam

Having determined a proper scale or scales for a given utterance and locating it on a certain area of such scale or scales, it is time to show how such general meaning is converted into concrete lexical meaning. The directionality of analysis, i.e. from general to detailed meaning, does not seem to be important here; however, in this paper we will employ a deductive method. In other words, we will start with general meaning and we will translate it into or instantiate it as a detailed lexical meaning. Summing up what we have maintained so far: we identify a scale or scales, present a tentative placement of the expression on one or more scales and convert general meaning already partly determined into a detailed meaning at best to the level of a morpheme. It is the starting stage of this account, so the analysis is neither conclusive nor complete. It only presents a suggestion toward a different way of semantic analysis. The essence of the ana1ysis is finding an exponent or exponents of particular scale or scales and building a semantic skeleton for the utterance involving construction meaning (cf. Goldberg 1995), lexical and morphological meaning. A type of sentence construction contributes to a sentence meaning.

A simple sentence consisting of one clause does not constitute a great problem for our analysis. Such a sentence immediately imposes a very high conviction of the author of the utterance concerning the truth of the analyzed sentence. For instance,

(10)   The train arrived at six

The above sentence shows very high conviction that an object (here train) came to a given location at some time (here six). Nevertheless, although a simple sentence without modification triggers inevitably truth – falsehood scale where the truth of the proposition is highly stressed, still other scales are not blocked e.g.

(11)   Christine loves sushi.

In the above sentence the truth of Christine's love for sushi is highly claimed, but it does not exhaust perceptual scales of general meaning. *Love* is a strong indication for semantic skeleton to the effect that Christine has a very strong, positive feeling toward eating a famous Japanese dish.

(12)   This is a very beautiful Monet.

The above sentence also contains an aesthetic scale. Thus it can be seen from the above examples that a simple sentence consisting of one clause imposes truth – falsehood scale pointing at a very high deg ree of conviction concerning the truth of the proposition contained in the clause, but it does not block other scales and admits variety of assessment on other scales, e.g.

(13)   This soup is awful.

Other syntactic constructions bring in their construction meaning connected with triggering of scales and placement of the utterances on particular areas of the scales.
      Simple sentences with modal expressions as the term itself suggests, modify a statement contained in the expression in terms of truth – falsehood, positive – negative, beauty – ugliness. In the scal e expressing truth – falsehood it often weakens the strength of conviction(however it does not always have to be so since we have such expressions as *certainly, surely,* etc.).

(14)   Maybe the train has arrived.

(15)   It's likely that Mary bought this dress.

Other modal expressions such as Polish *wspaniale, świetnie, cudownie* or English *wonderfully, greatly, it's beautiful* which are connected with other scales are separated from the simple sentence in an iconic manner by intervention of conjunction *that* in English or *że* in Polish between a modal expression (most often an adverb or a modal phrase containing *be*) and the clause without modification.

(16)   Wspaniale, że ugotowałaś obiad.
          'Wonderfully that you cooked-fem dinner.'

          It is wonderful that you cooked dinner.

More complex constructions are also susceptible to the above analysis. See below a sentence with adverbial clauses:

(17)   If I got well, I would visit you.

The analysis is as follows: If a given condition is fulfilled, i.e. if something good happened – if the speaker got well, then something would happen in the world – the speaker would visit the addressee. Here we have to do with two scales i.e. truth – falsehood and positive – negative.

The inventories of constructions presented in various grammars are analyzable according with the above directions.

2. The concept of general meaning with respect to selected linguistic theories

2.1 General meaning and axiological semantics

It may be claimed that our concept of general meaning is a variant of axiological semantics. This may be partly true because we deal with values and their role in language. Nevertheless, the role and the number of values in the concept of general meaning differs significantly from Krzeszowski's (1997) and Puzynina' s (1992) account.

Krzeszowski (1997) maintains that there are two basic values, i.e. good and bad, and that every expression in every language is axiologically charged,namely having good - bad values. I agree with Krzeszowski however only in the contention that any expression in every language **may** be axiologically loaded (in Krzeszowski's (1997) account bearing good or bad value), since it is always possible to provide a context that would trigger good – bad evaluation. Thus *good leaf* may be a mysterious construction, however, in a cigar factory, it is an obvious and natural expression.

It would be difficult to give a good – bad interpre tation to such expressionsas *A triangle has three angles* or *Venus is the second plannet of the solar system* without special contextual conditions. Hence, we contend that it is not always that good – bad relation is present in i nterpretation of utterances. However, it is the case that every linguistic expression possesses general meaning connected with true – false, positive – negative, beautiful – ugly parameters.

It may be argued that some scales may be reduced to a good - bad scale. It is possible for the scale beautiful – ugly where a beautiful object is positive and ugly is purportedly negative. However, there is nothing inherently good in Mary in the utterace like *Mary is beautiful and cruel* or bad in ugliness: *Poor, ugly Jane has a good heart.*

There is nothing good in *Oil flows on water*, although the sentence is true. Obviously it is possible to find context where flowing of oil on water is beneficial but it is not possible to claim that truth is always reducible to good or false to bad. Therefore we claim that account based on general meaning is more encompassing than Krzeszowski's (1997) axiological principle.

2.2 Wierzbicka's atomic expressions and the concept of general meaning

In her monumental work Wierzbicka (1969,1980,1987 and many, many other) develops Leibnitz's idea of atomic expressions which are also called indefinibilia, alphabet of human thought, primes and universals etc. The idea Wierzbicka entertains is that any expression in any language can be translated into a language consisting exclusively of terms which are not analyzable any further. This enterprise is not possible (see Kalisz 2001) with thirty two atomic expressions. The analyses conducted by Wierzbicka almost always involve intermediate expressions taking for granted that they can be split into atomic expressions with ease. This is not true. Attempts to get to ultimate atomic expressions almost in every case are doomed to failure because of such phenomena as Gestalt, impossibility to finish explication, awkwardness or unreadibility. The present author has not examined most recent Wierzbicka's inventory which at present consists of more than sixty atomic expressions (the smallest number was thirteen in Wierzbicka 1980).

Leaving the plausibility of Wierzbicka's analyses aside we may contend that her attempt is directed toward lower semantic units than lexical items. In other words, it is going beyond the meaning a of lexical item. Our account is headed in the opposite direction. We try to determine a general meaning above a detailed meaning of a lexical item. Our attempt is not contradictory with respect to Wierzbicka's research. An analysis of a lexical item, phrase or a sentence may start with general meaning reaching lexical meaning level ending with atomic expressions (or the other way around). This is theoretically possible and may be fruitful for a profound semantic analysis of a linguistic expression.

2.3 General meaning and meaning in classical pragmatics

2.3.1 Speech act theory and the concept of general meaning

Linguistic pragmatics deals with general meaning but in a slightly different sense than CGM (concept of general meaning). In a pragmatic concept of language we analyze types of speech acts (speech act theory), indirect meaning (theory of conversational implicature or theory of indirect speech acts) which are not exclusively determined by lexical meanings of words in an utterance. It is written here 'exclusively' because some semantic relation has to be present between lexical meaning and indirect speech act or a type of a speech act.

The following expressions may serve the speaker to make the addressee close the window in the room:

(18)   a. Could you close the window?

          b. It's cold in here!

          c. Syberia!

          d. My radicles!

However the utterances below cannot serve such purpose, unless they constitute a special code between the speaker and the addressee:

(19)   a. Tomorrow I'm going to watch a controversial movie.

          b. Cristine really likes Peter

It is difficult (in fact impossible) to derive meaning connected with closing the window since lexical items and in fact their meanings do not lead to understanding of discomfort of the author of the statement connected with cold arising from air flow through the open window.

However in pragmatics such as in CGM we note both general meaning (promise, reprimand, request for closing the window) and detailed meaning. *Do you have to make such noise* represents a reprimand or *It's cold in here* which represents a pragmatic request for closing the window. The existing semantic relation between lexical meaning and general pragmatic meaning is important here. The attempts of analysis of such relations were conducted although from a different perspective. For example, Verschueren (1977) presents what he calls speech act verbs. He wants to unify acts with existing verbs in English e.g. V – act of V – ing. i.e. act of doubt – ing for the verb *doubt* or act of judging for the verb *judge*. The problems here are created by indirect speech acts and expressions which are close in meaning. E.g. act of claiming (that p) and stating (that p). It is an attempt to connect general pragmatic meaning with lexical meaning with lexical meanings i. e. verb meaning = meaning type of a speech act. The Verschueren's ideas to differentiate the largest number of speech acts reminding astronomical number of spiders and beetles distinguished by biologists.

In our account we draw consciously a border between a general meaning of an utterance and detailed lexical meaning contending that general meaning can be transferred into detailed lexical meaning. The transfer works in both directions i. e it is possible to generalize a detailed meaning as in *I greeted her* (saying 'Good morning ' to her) or *Good morning Christine* represents a detailed form of greeting. In our analysis we start from general meaning and by creation of semantic skeleton we arrive at detailed lexical meaning. Wierzbicka (e.g. 1969, 1980, 1987 and others) takes a reversed road.

Searle (1969, 1977) classification of speech acts and classifications of other scholars show series of verbal behaviors of people. Although Wierzbicka (1987) characterizes speech act theory as anglocentric, still in the majority of languages one can distinguish promises or directives as identified by Searle (1969, 1977). They constitute general

meanings of utterances. Obviously, it is possible to distinguish various levels of pragmatics as attempted in Verschueren (1977) and in his postulate to distinguish many speech acts e.g. promise and unsolicited promise (see Kalisz 1993). Those meanings are not identical with general meanings postulated in CGM. However, they have many properties in common. A similar phenomenon is a level of abstraction of a speech acts and spectrum positive – negative or true – false. Searle's (1977) assertion is connected with conviction of the speaker concerning the truth contained in the proposition (in varying degrees). Reprimand or accusation would represent positive – negative scale, close to the negative pole, whereas congratulations would have a different orientation on this scale i. e. drifting toward positive pole. Expressives such as *What a wonderful view* represent the beautiful – ugly scale.

Thus, it can be seen that relation between a speech act type and CGM scale(s) is possible to establish. They represent a similar level of generality in analysis of meaning. **Pragmatic meaning of an utterance is its general meaning** representing a certain type of a speech act.

2.3.2 CGM and theory of conversational implicature

Conversational implicature theory (Grice 1975 and others) is aimed at discovery of meaning often hidden behind lexical meanings of utterances. Original Grice's example involves one professor asking another professor who had been Jones's philosophical teacher about Jones' s philosophical knowledge. The teacher's answer Grice's conversational maxims stating that Jones's handwriting was excellent and his attendance to tutorials had been regular. Jones's teacher in spite of that he breaks maxims (here maxims of Quantity and Relation), still preserves the cooperative principle. At least the professor who is to employ Jones understands it the way which allows him to derive implicature ' Jones is not good in philosophy'. This message suffices the professor who is to employ Jones at least for some time which is decisive for Jones's fate.

It has to be noted that the calculated meaning is very close to general meaning concerning the conviction toward the truth of the proposition and its negative impact.

Another Gricean example may be provided: *How is Peter? Oh, he likes his colleagues and he hasn't been to prison yet!* Conversational implicature is as follows: 'Peter is in a dangerous company'.

Not only the positive – negative spectrum is evoked by conversational implicature, e.g. *Andrew and Adalbert are excellent friends* used in the situation where both men behaved awfully with respect to the speaker. This case represents irony which is representative of the truth – falsehood scale, obviously apart from shameful behavior of Andrew and Adalbert. Conversational implicature triggers the scales which are provided by CGM.

2.3.3 Theory of relevance and CGM

Sperber and Wilson (1986, 1995 and others) select one of Gricean (1975) maxims of conversation, namely relevance (originally maxim of relation) and build around it the

whole theory of pragmatics which is later translated into truth conditional semantics and its anchoring in context. An assumption is more relevant if its contribution to conversation is very significant and its understanding/processing does not require much effort. Therefore, with high values of both parameters the assumption is highly relevant and of little relevance when the two values are low. The aim of pragmatics is a description of the speaker's meaning and filling the gap between linguistic meaning and intentions which are hidden behind this meaning (Mioduszewska 2006: 169).

Pragmatics of relevance operates with explicature and implicature. The first conclusions stem from lexical meanings of utterances and implicature, as in Grice, deals with indirect meaning. Thus, implicature is an ultimate goal searched by a language user. Explicature is the means of understanding implicature, in spite of that it has the meaning of its own in looking for relevance. It is possible here to equate general meaning with implicature where explicature may be treated as exposition of detailed lexical meaning.

Analyzing expressions such as:

(20)   a. Shall we go to the movies tonight ?

           b. I have an exam tomorrow!

it is possible to show the way of A's reasoning leading to the discovery of B's intention. On the basis of explicature, A expects an answer to his/her question from B. B says that he/she has an exam the next day. A's reasoning is roughly as follows: studying for an exam takes a lot of time, therefore it is not possible for B to do both i.e. to go to the movies and to study for the exam. Hence, B's intention is refusal to go to the movies. The reasoning of A is so far very similar to calculation of conversational implicature. The difference here is the notion of explicature which denotes parallel reasoning with derivation of implicature. Explicature may contain larger context connected with honesty of B i.e. whether B really has an exam the next day or B simply does not want to go to the movies with that person and the exam is only a purported argument. As in the case of conversational implicature, an indirect meaning is more general than lexical meaning

Epilogue

The above section deals with comparison of concept of general meaning (CGM) with linguistic theories which are closest to our account. We selected two semantic and three pragmatic theories. The pragmatic theories considered here are classical i.e. speech act theory, conversational implicature and relevance theory. We chose classical theories in their form because recent pragmatic research is more connected with sociolinguistic phenomena and other fields like discourse or specialized language. Even Verschueren (2003), formerly a noted speech act theoretician writes recently papers on such topics as erasion of group – based social inequality. We want to go to the roots of the above pragmatic theories because it is more useful in comparing the accounts.

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ELLIPSIS AS A MARKER OF INTERACTION IN SPOKEN DISCOURSE

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Abstract

In this article, we discuss strategies for interaction in spoken discourse, focusing on ellipsis phenomena in English. The data comes from the VOICE corpus of English as a Lingua Franca, and we analyse education data in the form of seminar and workshop discussions, working group meetings, interviews and conversations. The functions ellipsis carries in the data are Intersubjectivity, where participants develop and maintain an understanding in discourse; Continuers, which are examples of back channel support; Correction, both self- and other-initiated; Repetition; and Comments, which are similar to Continuers but do not have a back channel support function. We see that the first of these, Intersubjectivity, is by far the most popular, followed by Repetitions and Comments. These results are explained as consequences of the nature of the texts themselves, as some are discussions of presentations and so can be expected to contain many Repetitions, for example. The speech event is also an important factor, as events with asymmetrical power relations like interviews do not contain so many Continuers. Our clear conclusion is that the use of ellipsis is a strong marker of interaction in spoken discourse.

Keywords: interaction, ellipsis, oral language, corpus

1. Introduction

The focus in this article is on the role of ellipsis in oral discourse. Specifically, we wish to demonstrate that ellipsis is a marker of oral interaction, and is an effective economy strategy in pragmatic communication. The focus is on learner data, as this study is part of a larger one to compare learner with native speaker data regarding language economy strategies. In an earlier study, White (2013) has argued that many of the markers of interaction discussed in the literature can be found in ellipsis contexts in his own corpus of learner data in text chatlogs.

The article reports our analysis of transcripts from the VOICE corpus of English as a Lingua Franca (VOICE, 2011). This is a corpus of learner English, as discussed in more detail in the Methodology section below. The most common strategy we find in the VOICE data is Intersubjectivity, where speakers develop understandings on a particular strand of discourse. The repetition of previous material and comments also frequently occur, along with back channel support markers.

The presentation of the results begins by discussing ellipsis and interaction, and the pragmatic role of ellipsis. White's work on ellipsis in text chatlogs rounds off this first

part. Then, we present the data we will analyse in more detail. Different types of spoken data have been analysed, and the results of the analysis will be presented in successive sections, divided according to discourse type, and finally compared.

2. Interaction and ellipsis

2.1 Ellipsis

Ellipsis in the generative syntax literature (for example, Lobeck, 1995; Merchant, 2001, 2004; van Craenenbroeck, 2010) standardly means ellipsis with a syntactic context of the kind illustrated in (1):

(1)   a.   The cat chased the dog, and the rabbit did too.
       b.   Q: Where did you see him?
             A: Over there.

The ellipsis here is considered syntactic because the Verb Phrase from the first conjunct in (1a), *chased the dog*, lets us recover the meaning of the second as *the rabbit chased the dog too*; and for (1b), the full question allows us to interpret the answer as *I saw him over there*. Merchant (2001, 2004) even proposes a syntactic derivation of (2) below, uttered on seeing a friend:

(2)   Hi there, nice to see you.

There is no similar syntactic context in (2), since it is the start of a conversation, but we easily understand it to be the equivalent of *hi there, it is nice to see you*.

The derivation of the answer in (1b) proceeds as follows for Merchant (2001). We first generate a full sentential answer, *I saw him over there*, and the part that is to remain after ellipsis, *over there*, is moved to the front of the sentence:

(3)   [I saw him over there] => [over there [I saw him]]

Then, we delete *I saw him*, leaving the bare phrase behind[1].

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[1] Some evidence for this movement analysis comes from the fact that ellipsis is sensitive to movement islands – islands are structures that do not allow us to question material internal to them. Thus, we cannot leave a phrase behind after ellipsis that starts off within a syntactic island, for example a Noun Phrase island (Merchant, 2004: 688):

(i)   Q: Did Abby vote for a *Green Party* candidate?
       A1: *No, *Reform Party*
       A2: No, she voted for a *Reform Party* candidate

To allow an answer like A1, we would need to move the modifier of a noun. So we would have to start from *Abby voted for a Reform Party candidate*, and move the noun modifier

Stainton (2006) points out examples where it is not reasonable to argue for a syntactic input to ellipsis. For example, he describes the situation where a father is worried that his daughter will spill her drink (Stainton, 2006: 5). In that situation, he may utter the phrase *both hands*, meaning that she should use both hands to hold the cup. Stainton argues that there is no obvious suitable full sentential input to ellipsis which could be generated here. Instead, he proposes that the surface structure contains just the simple phrase, and that for the hearer the pragmatic component of grammar then supplies what is needed to decode a proposition. Merchant (2007) accepts Stainton's arguments, and proposes as a result that we can identify two types of ellipsis, syntactic and semantic. *Semantic* here really refers to ellipsis with a pragmatic context. Thus, in the father-daughter example, the daughter probably remembers that he has warned her before, and therefore can pragmatically interpret the bare phrase as *you must use both hands to hold the cup*.

After this very brief introduction to the phenomenon of ellipsis, let us move on now to interaction in spoken language.

2.2 Interaction in spoken language

What exactly spoken language is has been the subject of much debate. Beginning with classic work by Biber (1986, 1988) on the differences between spoken and written language, the debate has extended to include differences between oral and literate language (Holly, 1995). There is no simple divide between spoken and written language, as both can be more or less oral or literate. Thus, a conversation between friends differs markedly from a lecture or speech, but both are spoken; while textchat often differs from a novel even though both are written. As Scollon and Scollon (1995) remark, this is complicated still further by the multi-modality and multi-sensory nature of communication. Thus, textchat is on the face of it written, but is very oral in nature, and printed advertisements are multi-modal. Holly (1995: 346-347) summarizes features that can mark an oral language, and notes that ellipsis is one of those markers.

Interaction has received much attention in literature on second language acquisition and language learning, particularly computer-mediated language learning, over recent years. Discussing the speech acts that demonstrate a competence to interact, Chun (1994) takes up the following, based on work by Kramsch (1983): opening and closing conversations; constructing and expanding on topics; taking turns; capturing attention;

(ii)   [Abby voted for a Reform party candidate] =>
          *[Reform Party [Abby voted for a candidate]]

There is simple evidence that this sort of process is not possible in English from the following:

(iii)   *Which did you read book?

In (iii), we are trying to move just the *wh*-word *which*, leaving the noun *book* behind, which is ungrammatical (see Ross, 1967 and Corver, 1990). So, Merchant argues that, for the same reason why we cannot question a modifier of a noun in a *wh*-question, we also cannot leave a modifier behind after ellipsis.

steering or avoiding topics; elaborating on ideas; requesting confirmation or clarification; apologizing; giving feedback; and creating, expressing, interpreting and negotiating meaning.

Darhower (2002) also suggests greetings/leave-taking, plus intersubjectivity, humor, sarcasm/insults and the use of the L1 as markers of interaction. Intersubjectivity here refers to sharing or negotiating an understanding on a strand of interaction. Thus, clearly understanding and developing a discussion on a particular topic constitutes an example of intersubjectivity, which covers many of the functions of Chun's and Kramsch's above like expanding on topics, steering topics, elaborating on ideas and the final one on creating, etc. meaning. Negotiating intersubjectivity is an important feature for Darhower, and so seeking clarification is one such strategy that can be used when understanding is threatened. Like Darhower, Fernández-García and Martínez Arbelaiz (2003) also mention the use of an L1, particularly for echoing or asking for an explanation of a term.

Peterson (2009) presents evidence that Japanese learners of English are engaged in collaborative interaction in textchats. The strategies they used were: requests for assistance, provision of assistance, continuers, off-task discussion, self-correction and other-initiated correction (Peterson, 2009: 305). Assistance is described as having a positive effect on interaction; and therefore the asking for and receiving of assistance is important. Continuers refer to back-channel support which encourages others to continue their interaction (Cogo and Dewey, 2012: 139-142 also discuss back channel support in non-native speaker discourse). Off-task discussions create a social framework for the group, and reduce any anxiety at being required to interact in a foreign language. Finally, corrections initiated by a user are also positive strategies for learning. As Peterson notes, such interactive strategies create a sense of social cohesion and help establish discourse communities. Cogo and Dewey (2012: 139) also argue that they have a rapport-building function.

Repetition is a strategy mentioned by a number of authors in the literature. For example, Cogo (2009: 260), Suvimiitty (2012: chapter 7) and Mauranen (2012: chapter 7) all discuss the role of repetition as a communicative strategy for non-native speakers in ELF contexts.

The strategies we focus on for our analysis will be presented and justified at the start of the Data analysis section. We will now turn to the pragmatic function of ellipsis.

2.3 The pragmatic function of ellipsis

Oh (2005, 2006) discusses what she calls zero anaphora, or situational ellipsis. By this, she means the omission of personal pronouns (mostly subjects) from contexts in which the omitted material may be recovered by the hearer. She argues that, far from being a deviant and random linguistic device, ellipsis has a clear interactional function. Oh (2005) notes two contexts in which such ellipsis is commonly used in her corpus. One is the situation where an elliptical turn is marked as the second instance of a particular proposition. Consider the following extract from Oh (2005: 274) which has been reduced to take away all information about pauses (the predicate that has had its subject deleted is marked in bold type):

(4)   Ruth: [I h've one] *due* Thu:rsday
             Mark: [(   )]
             Ruth: **Have** one due tihm<u>o</u>rrow.to<u>o</u>:.=

In the extract, which is preceded by another speaker saying that she had a paper due in on Wednesday, Ruth comments that she has one due in on Thursday. She then makes a new statement saying that she has a paper due tomorrow as well, but omitting the subject *I*. Because of the repetition of the same type of linguistic material, the interpretation of the subject is recoverable here.

The other type of ellipsis for Oh (2005) concerns examples where new comments are made. Take the following from Oh (2005: 288), again reduced from the original example:

(5)   Curt:Didju know that guy up there et-oh. What th'hell is's name
             usetuh work up't (Steeldinner) garage
             did their body work for'em.

Here, Curt tries to remember the name of a man he is talking about, and provides two additional pieces of information about him, both using ellipsis of the subject. The listeners understand that these two comments have to refer to the man Curt is trying to describe – that is the most easily recoverable interpretation of these comments.

Oh (2006) adds additional categories to this classification. For example, there are examples of ellipsis coming after a parenthetical insert (Oh, 2006: 824):

(6)   M: I//I'll just I'll just start keeping track, start writing now
             W: yeah
             W: yeah
             M: s'I have't really gotten I've <u>do</u>ne reading
             M: **haven't** really°hh gotten down to it quite yet

The extract involves M and W talking about an assignment M is writing. M starts saying he has not gotten down to writing it, but interrupts the utterance with the parenthetical *I've done reading*. He then restarts the original utterance, but leaving the subject unsaid. The original utterance is close enough that W interprets M's last utterance as a restart of it.

Another strategy is to use ellipsis for marking topic cohesion (Oh, 2006: 830-831):

(7)   C: And it's a good forte to wear down there
             J: Right
             C: I bought a pair of Patty Woodards
             J: Yea::h
             C: An be very frank with you. **Paid** twenty-six dollars for them
             J: Yea:h=
             C: =**Took** them ho:me. **Wore** them <u>one</u> <u>evening</u> (.5) <u>here</u>

In this extract, C is talking about a bad quality pair of jeans she bought. She marks continuity in the discourse by subject ellipsis. Since J only interjects very minimal supportive utterances, C is virtually talking unopposed, and so the same subject can be supplied for all bold predicates.

The final strategy is for speakers to employ ellipsis to avoid making a referential choice (Oh, 2006: 835):

(8)   A: 'hhh so I w'z out 'n I ed sat in the car en reached over int'the
         glove compartment, en he came up tuh the door, en he said uhm 'hhh
         "Beatrice?" he said "Wouldju uh, mind if I would give you a <u>call</u>"
         B: Mm hm
         A: A:n I(hh) was <u>so::</u> du(h)mb<u>foun</u>ded yih(hh)kno(hhh)w
         //hhheh 'huhh! hhhhh
         B: Oh::: **Don' know** what tuh SA:Y
         A: I was so dumfoundid I really didn' know what tuh sa:y

Here A is telling B about meeting a prospective boyfriend. B's use of *don' know* could be interpreted as *I don't know*, or as a recasting of A's stating that she was dumbfounded. This referential choice can be hedged by the use of ellipsis, according to Oh.

Scott (2013) discusses the function of null arguments from a Relevance Theory perspective in diary entry discourse. She argues for three types of nulls (mostly subjects, but also objects). One is the informal use, where the null argument marks that the discourse is informal, and therefore that the speaker feels it is ok to relax the formal rules of English syntax and use null subjects/objects (White, 2011 makes the same point about the use of reduced and informal spellings in text chatlogs). The second type are null subjects/objects due to the limits of time and space in communication. Very often electronically-mediated communication is limited in this way. Thus, text messages are reduced linguistically to speed up writing, and similarly for textchat contributions; tweets are limited in size, etc. It is these restrictions that make null subjects/objects licit. Finally, we have ostensively vague arguments (like Oh's final category illustrated in (8)). In Scott's (2013: 78) example (46) from an ATM, *OK. Got that*, the programmer of the ATM does not want the machine to appear too human, and so the vague *got that* is a compromise from the too impersonal *the machine got that*.

We see that ellipsis carries many functions with it, and we would agree with Oh's and Scott's arguments that ellipsis is a valid and deliberate discourse strategy. Finally in this background section, let us consider the author's own evidence that ellipsis shares some of the above-mentioned features of interaction.

2.4 Ellipsis as a marker of interaction

White (2013) analyses textchat data from learners of English on an MA programme in English Linguistics. The data was divided into different functions, with the relevant part of each example marked in bold type. The data is taken from White (2013: 80-84).

We have different types of examples that have been analysed as comments. Consider the first case below:

(9)   [8:49:10 PM] Student 4 says: In some coferences, seminars , meetings..
          men tend to contribute more information and opinion,
          while women contribute more agreeing
          Do u think so
          [8:49:27 PM] Student 1 says: **Absolutely right**

Here we have a student asking a question about men's and women's language, and another student agreeing with the statement using the bare adjective phrase, *absolutely right*. We have as a part of our pragmatic knowledge the strategy that we comment on an utterance by using a bare phrase, and that comment relates to the previous discourse. Thus, (9) is really short for *your contribution is absolutely right*. This is an example of a Continuer in Peterson's (2009) classification since Student 1 is providing back channel support for Student 4.
    Consider now a comment that is intended to develop another student's contribution:

(10)   [8:46:48 PM] Student 2 says: Women tend to speak faster than Man
          [8:46:59 PM] Student 1 says: **Because women 's lang is rather different from men's**. They use hedge, polite forms such as perhaps, maybe....

The example can be analysed as an example of Darhower's Intersubjectivity, in that one student is supplying additional information that adds to a previous student's point.
    In the following example, we have a single case where students repeat a phrase to confirm that a previous contribution was on the right lines:

(11)   [9:55:06 PM] Student 4 says: men always base on the reality and women base on the ....
          ...
          [9:55:22 PM] Student 6 says: **feeling**
          [9:55:25 PM] Student 6 says: Student 4
          [9:55:30 PM] Student 4 says: thanks Student 6
          [9:55:41 PM] Student 7 says: **on their own feelinng s** . It is right? Student 4/
          [9:55:45 PM] Student 6 says: **her own feeling abr life**
          [9:56:06 PM] Student 1 says: Yes, **her own feelings**

The phrase *her own feelings* is repeated by Students 7, 6 and 1, after Student 6 mentioned it before. This can be considered another example of Darhower's Intersubjectivity function, as details in the discourse are being confirmed. It is not real repetition as the phrase is not being repeated exactly, but being developed.
    Next, we have a common category where students repeat specific words or phrases only in order to repair or correct previous contributions. Consider one representative example:

(12)   [9:35:40 PM] Student 5 says: gender refer to social catagory
              ...
              [9:36:03 PM] Student 1 says: Yes, Student 5
              ...
              [9:36:18 PM] Student 5 says: some cases **that's tue**
              ...
              [9:36:21 PM] Student 5 says: **true**

In this case, Student 5 repairs her own mistyping of *true*. This is clearly an example of the final category that is mentioned in Peterson's list, namely Repairs and Corrections. We see that students correct themselves and others, and this is seen as a positive strategy for learning.

We can see that a large variety of strategies have been proposed that establish and confirm interaction. Now, we present the data we are going to analyse for this article.

3. Data and methodology

As stated in the introduction, the analysis in the rest of the article involves data from the VOICE corpus, the Vienna-Oxford International Corpus of English (VOICE, 2011), a one million-word corpus of spoken English as a Lingua Franca. This data was chosen for a larger project of the author's which is a comparison of economy strategies in spoken and written oral language. The author's own corpus of data consisted of text chatlogs involving learners of English, so the VOICE corpus provides a natural spoken counterpart. ELF data is suitable for analysis of interaction, as much work recently by Cogo and Mauranen and others cited above has shown.

The VOICE corpus is divided into data from the following areas: education, leisure, professional business, professional organization, and professional research and science. There are a variety of speech event types within these areas, such as conversations, interviews and workshop discussions. We have concentrated on the speech events within the educational area, again to be closest in type to the author's own corpus. Academic discourse is interesting for study in itself, as learners negotiate different roles within the local community and in the academic community at large (Morita, 2004: 577). Local communities are vital for determining local interaction norms (as Mauranen, 2006: 127 and Pölzl and Seidlhofer, 2006 note for ELF communities; and Lave and Wenger, 1991 and Wenger, 1998 note for learning communities in general, their so-called *communities of practice*).

The speech events available within the education data are: conversations, interviews, seminar discussions, working group discussions and workshop discussions; and all of these have been analysed. The instances of ellipsis and their functions have been identified, and these will be presented and compared across speech event type in the following sections. Texts are given a code for the general area and speech event plus a number for the text. Thus, a seminar discussion in education will have a code starting EDsed. The markup conventions used in the corpus are described in the following link: http://www.univie.ac.at/voice/documents/VOICE_mark-up_conventions_v2-1.pdf.   The

number of examples of each function has been calculated, and will be presented in the form of tables.

4. Data analysis

Out of the strategies we noted above from Darhower (2002) and Peterson (2009), two were not found in the data. They are: Requests for Assistance, which have been analysed as Intersubjective; and Off-task Discussion (they do exist, but not in elliptical form). The Use of L1 strategy has been discounted, as we are specifically looking for data in English, and the speakers all have L1s other than English. There are cases of translation into English, and these have been analysed as examples of Intersubjectivity, as understanding is being promoted.

There were instances of the Greeting/Leave-taking and Apology strategies mentioned by Darhower (2002) and Chun (2004), respectively. However, these have been removed from the results, as we have chosen to focus on language that has been generated directly by users rather than applied as a formula. Thus, we are concentrating on the following functions: Intersubjectivity, Continuers and Correction. We also recognise Repetition as a function, following the work by Cogo (2009), Suvimiitty (2012) and Mauranen (2012) mentioned in the background. Repetition cannot be included under Intersubjectivity, in that the discourse is not being developed; rather something is being confirmed. Then, we are adding one of our own: Comment. We take Comments to be different from Continuers, in that Comments do not play the role of back channel support. We have chosen not to recognise as ellipsis examples where a speaker restarts a phrase s/he started in an earlier contribution.

We will now look at examples of each function, beginning with examples of Intersubjectivity.

4.1 Intersubjectivity

We will start the presentation of the Intersubjectivity function with examples of answers to questions. The first comes from the conversation marked EDcon4, and the second from EDcon496, and the parts with ellipsis we are focusing on are marked in bold type:

(13)   796S2: do you think so
            797S1: <soft> yeah </soft> (.)
            798S2: are you sure
            799S1: **not SURE** but (.) i think so (.)

(14)   2S2: why are you STRESSing
            3S3: <soft> yeah </soft>
            4S1: **cos cos i don't wanna be saying you know stupidities in front of a class**

In the first example, Speaker 2 has asked the *yes-no* question, *are you sure*, and Speaker 1 replies *not sure*. The syntactic context of the question clearly allows Speaker 1 to use this elliptical answer. In (14), we have an answer to a *wh*-question, and here it is a reason clause starting with *cos* which is the new information that needs to be given only. These are clear examples of Intersubjectivity, as answering a question develops the discourse, and negotiates an understanding between the participants.

There are also many examples of elliptical questions, starting with a repeated question from EDcon496:

(15)   128S1: <9><slow> to address </slow></9>{S1 takes notes on the laptop while speaking} (3) a new (2) customer (2) segment (2) customer segment (2) <fast>
            and what is it that you just said a minute ago </fast> **what**?

Here Speaker 1 asks what another speaker has said, and repeats just the *wh*-word, *what*. Next, we have a request for clarification from EDcon4:

(16)   23S1: <3> i </3> don't know because i skipped few questions. (.) i didn't participate actively @ (.)
            24S2: okay (2) so erm [first name3] was not upset (.) [first name3] (.)
            25S1: **about what** (.)

This time, Speaker 1 does not understand Speaker 2's comment about an individual not being upset, and uses the elliptical *about what*. These are also Intersubjective, because they are negotiating understanding. The questioners are unclear about something, and are asking for clarification. Such negotiations are the core of Intersubjectivity, for Darhower.

We also find similar examples of elliptical questions and answers in other speech events like interviews. (17) and (18) are from the same interview, EDint330, while (19) comes from EDint328:

(17)   451S1: you're very scholarly answers
            452SS: @@@@@
            453S2: **ready**? @@

(18)   531S1: so which language do you like better. (.)
            532S2: <soft> english </soft>
            533S1: english. and why @@
            534S2: **because i can express myself better in ENGlish**.

(19)   363S1: and did you teach them english (.) er at home? (1) two two of you did you speak to them english?
            364S2: yes <6> we did </6>
            365S1: <6> to your </6> children
            366S3: <7> when they </7> were young at school? (.) we used to help them.
            367S2: <7><soft> **yes we did** </soft></7>

These are very similar to the examples from conversations given above. We have the single-word question *ready* in (17); and the subordinate clause answer in (18) and the answer to a *yes-no* question involving complement ellipsis in (19). A follow-on question is exemplified below, from EDint331:

(20)   298S2: = i'm i'm also interested in the fact HOW er the maltese see THEIR language today? (1) hh er whether they became more aware of of its importance of of their as a part of their identity? hh whether has something change (.) changed (1)
            299S1: **today**? (.)
            300S2: yes (3)

The temporal adverbial *today* is used to question when something has changed in Maltese society regarding their language. The following examples of answers can be found in workshop discussions. The first comes from EDwgd5, and the second from EDwgd305:

(21)   159S7: <1> do you have an <un> xx </un> with what we did </1> friday? (.) last friday? (.)
            160S4: <2> **n:ot with me** </2>

(22)   404S2: <8> would you give us </8> (.) s:ome (.) kind of hint (.) when it's like (.) fifteen minutes to to <un> x <1> xx </1></un>
            405S7: <1> yes </1> (.) yeah **i will i will** (.) yeah? (.) okay (.) no further questions? (2) no questions on how? (2) {S7 leaves again}

We have an answer that gives additional information for the question in (21), and the complement ellipsis answer in (22). Again, the discourse is being developed or negotiated.

We also find a number of examples with translations coming in elliptical contexts, such as the following from the conversation, EDcon4:

(23)   328S1: <3> what's </3> the name for this <LNger> gebratene {roasted} </LNger> stuff. (1)
            329S2: **grilled**? (1)
            330S1: <LNger> gebratene {roasted} </LNger> not it's not grilled it's <LNger> ge<4>braten </4> {roasted} </LNger> (.)
            331S2: <4> **fried**?</4> (.)

Here, Speaker 2 offers two translations of the German term *gebratene*. S/he does not use a full sentence, but just the appropriate lexical item. As mentioned above, we treat translations as Intersubjective, since they are supplying extra information to develop the discourse, and, in the case above, answer a direct question. We find examples of translations like the following from the seminar discussion, EDsed31:

(24)   417S6: a:nd then i have a german word this is called <L1ger> eitel {vain}
              </L1ger> (.) <7> i don't </7> know the (.)
              418S1: <7><soft> mhm </soft></7>
              419S6: english word
              420S1: e:rm (.)
              421S18: **vain**
              422S1: **VAIN** yeah that's right <@> thanks.</@> @ <8> @ </8>

Speaker 6 asks for the translation of *eitel*, and Speaker 18 gives *vain*, which Speaker 1
confirms. These translations clearly promote understanding of discourse, therefore we
analyse them as Intersubjective.

    Moving on, we have extra information given below in elliptical form from the
interview, EDint331:

(25)   405S1: <4> now.</4> (.) people NORmally (.) er:: say that standards in
              english have go- (.) have gone down
              406S2: yes
              407S1: all right?
              408S2: **especially english teachers** @@

Speaker 1 is making a comment about standards in English, and Speaker 2 gives the
extra information that this is especially the case among English teachers. There are
examples of completion of information from working group discussions, like EDwgd5:

(26)   3S1: and there are enlargement issues?
              4SS: mhm (.)
              5S1: well actually it is also er =
              6S3: = **for common (.) foreign (.) <2> security policy**.</2>

Speaker 3 completes Speaker's 1 point about enlargement issues in the European Union.
This additional information adds to understanding of an issue, which is why we analyse
them as Intersubjective.

    Finally in this section, we have a rare example of gapping from the interview,
EDint328:

(27)   228S3: with arabic i'm i'm a bit confident as well hh <2> but </2> (.)
              229S1: <2> yes </2>
              230S3: <3> **when it comes </3> to: er you know other languages (2)
              <4>
              ho</4>peless**

The gapping comes when Speaker 3 comments on her ability in speaking Arabic, and
contrasts it with other languages. She means that she is hopeless with other languages,
but the context of her comment on Arabic means that she does not need to give the full
sentential utterance. This is similar to the previous cases, with additional information
being added to promote better understanding.

As we can see, there are a variety of structures from all the speech events that carry the Intersubjectivity function. Let us now move onto examples with the Continuer function.

4.2 Continuers

Firstly, we have a comment from the conversation, EDcon4:

(28)   290S1: what are you doing your presentation =
            291S4: = my hometown <1> @@@ </1>
            292S2: <1> ok- i am doing it </1> on the festival of <L1rum> sighisora </L1rum> (.)
            293S4: oh AH <2> **NICE** </2>

There are many examples of this type, with a simple adjectival comment like *nice*. A similar example of a comment involving a bare adjective is the following from the interview, EDint330:

(29)   4S1: i have one er questionnaire in english s- and i will <2> just </2> compare (.) you know (.)
            5S3: <2> **(good) for you** </2>
            6S2: okay (1)

Then, we have the comment from the seminar discussion, EDsed31:

(30)   95S9: (and i'm) twenty-six and i've been to austria many times before (1) and erm (1) i came to austria because i (.) <soft> er </soft> i've (.) very g- (.) good experiences and i've met (.) many nice (.) people (.) in austria before (.) and er (.) one (.) big reason is because i like the mountains a lot. (.) and i just wanted to be closer (.) to <3> the alps. @@ </3>
            96SS: <3> @@@ </3> @@ (.)
            97S1: <@> **good reason** </@> @@@@ hh

In this case, there is a nominal phrase *good reason*. They are all clear examples of Continuers, as they are functioning as back channel support. Such socially cohesive strategies are very important for promoting group unity, and therefore we might expect them to be very popular strategies (the actual situation will be made clear when we look at the frequencies in section 4.6). We will now move in to Corrections.

4.3 Correction

The next example is of a speaker correcting and completing information from the conversation, EDcon521:

(31)   364S2: we we're at WE ARE at a (.)
              365S3: we're at a crucial point?
              366S2: we are at <4> a yah </4>
              367S3: <4> in time </4>
              368S4: time (.)
              369S2: **in history** (.)
              370S3: **history or in <5> time**?</5>
              371S2: <5> we are at </5> a <un> xx </un> (.) <6> hi- er **history** </6> (.)
              372S5: <6> **in history** </6>

Speaker 3 starts with the utterance *we're at a crucial point*, and adds *in time*. Speaker 2
disagrees and corrects this with the elliptical *in history*, and Speaker 5 confirms this. As
only the relevant information is necessary, only the prepositional phrases are required.

Corrected information is given in the following from the working group discussion,
EDwgd5:

(32)   444S5: no <7> but it's </7> not the topic i mean it it <8> will take </8> (.)
              445S4: <7><soft><un> xx </un></soft></7>
              446S8: <8> and that's the problem </8><1> because </1> the
              447S5: <1> five minutes </1>
              448S6: <1> **TWO is better** </1>
              449S6: **two** =

Speaker 5 suggests that their presentation will take five minutes, but Speaker 6 corrects
that to two. S/he does not need to give a complete sentential utterance, but can simply
correct the appropriate part.

Another example of correction comes from the workshop discussion, EDwsd242:

(33)   12S2: so (.) please try to think (1) pragmatic- er (.)
              13S8: **pragmatically**.
              14S2: yeah pragmatically s:o (2)

Speaker 2 uses the adjective *pragmatic* instead of the adverb *pragmatically*, and Speaker
8 corrects her. There were no examples of self-correction in this corpus (although many
were found in Author's textchat corpus). Now, we will consider Repetitions.

4.4 Repetition

We have an example of repetition from the interview, EDint328:

(34)   262S1: = so its something very specific (.) er about which you can speak
              in english (.) for example movies (.) and the <6> books </6> (1)
              63S2: <6> the books </6>
              264S2: so (.) so (.) shall we shall i write books?

265S1: yes **books and movies** (1) it's more general than (.) than this one (15) {S2
and S3 are filling out the questionnaire (15)}

Speaker 2 asks whether she should write that she uses English most when reading books, and Speaker 1 repeats and expands that with the co-ordinated *books and movies*.

Next comes an example of repetition in (35) from the working group discussion, EDwgd5:

(35)   282S6: <5> yeah d- let's do it </5> this on (.) on wednesday yeah?
              283S4: yeah =
              284S3: = <soft> **wednesday** </soft>

The repetition of *Wednesday* acts as a confirmation that something will happen then.

In seminar discussions, we see examples of repetitions like the following from EDsed31:

(36)   59S1: okay <4> so swedish is </4> your (.)
              60S3: <4> yeah what else </4>
              61S1: is your mother tongue (.)
              62S3: <5> **swedish** yeah </5>
              63SX-f: <soft><5><un> xxx </un></5> **swedish**.</soft> (.)

Speaker 1 asks Speaker 3 if Swedish is her mother tongue, and she confirms this, and another unknown female speaker also repeats the phrase *Swedish*.

There is an example of repetition and clarification from EDsed362:

(37)   264S8: how would you why would you advise your (.) government er <clears throat> to do something about guantanamo bay or some of the (.) <spel> c i a </spel> bases in europe because that's <un> xxxxx (.) x </un> (.) that you have now (3)
              265S17: why did (you) NOT choose to advise (any more) membership? (.) erm it (wanted to rise) our discussion erm (1)
              266S16: what was the question please i couldn't hear you
              267SS: @ @ @ @ (.)
              268SX-8: **gua<2>ntanamo bay**?</2>
              269SX-17: <2> **guantanamo bay** </2> (.)
              270S16: what?
              271S17: **the prisoners at guantanamo bay** (.)

Speaker 8 asks a question about what to do about places like Guantanamo Bay, and Speaker 16 does not hear and asks for the question to be repeated. Speaker 8 repeats just the phrase *Guantanamo Bay*, as does Speaker 17.

There is the following example of repetition from the workshop discussion, EDwsd306:

(38)   995SX-7: this is democratic then.
               996SX-f: <soft> mhm </soft>
               997SX-7: **very democra<8>tic** </8>

Speaker 7 comments that something is democratic, and repeats and expands on that with *very democratic*. The common theme for Repetitions is that they are used to confirm but crucially clarify discourse elements. Thus, they provide extra understanding on discourse. They are quite similar to the examples of Intersubjectivity in section 4.1 in this respect, but the repetitive aspect makes them different, and therefore we have chosen to give them their own label. The last set of examples comes from Comments.

4.5 Comment

There is a comment from the working group discussion, EDwgd241:

(39)   274S1: it's actually a bit dangerous i <3> think </3><4> if there <un> xxxx </un></4>
               275S4: <3> yeah </3><4> it's a kind of </4> nationalism or something like <5> that </5> (if it is) <6> yeah (total) imperialism </6>
               276S5: <4> **very dangerous** </4>

Speaker 5 comments on imperialism, expanding on Speaker 1's comment earlier by saying *very dangerous*. This cannot be analysed as a Continuer, as the comment is not designed to be back channel support for Speaker 1 in his/her point, just to comment on the point being made. We find a similar comment from the workshop discussion, EDwsd9:

(40)   121S5: <1> you have </1> scenario number two
               122S7: no.
               123S5: number <2> three </2>
               124SS: <2> @ @ </2><3> @ @ @ @ @ </3>
               125S7: <3> no. (.) n-n n-n n-n n-n </3><@> **impossible** </@>

This is the standard type of comment with the bare adjective *impossible*.
     Finally, we have the following example of complement ellipsis from EDwsd242:

(41)   123S19: = o:h yeah s- sure <fast> you want me (to) say something </fast> about the computers?
               124S8: yeah about the facili<9>ties </9>
               125SS: <9> @ @ </9> @ @ @
               126S19: so(rry) **i didn't understand**.

The complement of *understand* has been subject to ellipsis.

These all comment on the discourse topic, but are different from Continuers. Finally, we will look at the frequencies at which these functions appear in the data, and comment on the tendencies that emerge.

4.6 Frequencies in speech events

We have seen that ellipsis carries many functions in the data. In the tables below, we summarise this information and present how many instances of each function there were in each speech event as a whole. The left-hand column in each table contains the reference numbers for the texts. We start with the functions appearing in conversations:

Text#	InterSubj	Continuers	Correction	Repetition	Comment
4	79	4	0	6	7
250	42	7	0	8	12
496	53	4	1	3	9
521	53	14	0	15	18
Total (/335)	**227 (67.76%)**	**29 (8.66%)**	**1 (0.30%)**	**32 (9.55%)**	**46 (13.73%)**

Table 1: Ellipsis in conversations

A trend we see in all speech events is that Intersubjectivity is by far the most common strategy. Comments come in ahead of Repetition and Continuers in conversations, while there is only one instance of Correction. This can be due to the fast nature of oral communication in conversations, as there is very little time to repair mistakes by oneself or others. Even in an education context, speakers do not repair mistakes they and others make so often.

Conversations have been described in the literature in different terms from more typical academic discourse like seminar discussions (Pölzl and Seidlhofer, 2006: 969). Academic discourse in general is seen as institutional in nature (Heritage, 2005) in that discourse behaviour of individuals can be explained as a consequence of the constraints of the academic genre, for example the power relationships between teachers and students. As Mauranen (2006: 128) notes, the primary goal of casual conversations is to socialise, which is very different from the goal of an academic seminar. In this regard, the lower percentage of Continuers can be considered surprising – plus that almost half of the instances come in the final text, EDcon521. That particular text is surprising, in that nearly half of the Repetitions come there too. In that text, the speakers were working on a presentation, and so there was much repetition of individual points, such as the following:

(42) 360S5: <3> yeah </3> le- let's write it down
361S2: you have a much better handwriting
362S3: @ @ @ @ hh okay (3) e:rm
363SX-f: nowadays (.)
364S2: we we're at WE ARE at a (.)

365S3: we're at a crucial point?
366S2: we are at <4> a yah </4>
367S3: <4> in time </4>
368S4: time (.)
369S2: **in history** (.)
370S3: **history** or in <5> time?</5>
371S2: <5> we are at </5> a <un> xx </un> (.) <6> hi- er **history** </6> (.)
372S5: <6> **in history** </6>
373S2: **history** is good (2)
374S4: what we're at a crucial time **in history** or
375S2: <soft> at a crucial POINT **in <7> history** </7></soft>
376SX-f: <7><soft><un> xxx </un></soft></7>
377S4: point **in history** (6)
378S3: <slow><reading_aloud> **point in
history**?</reading_aloud></slow> (.)
<8> or </8> in time =

There are many examples of ellipsis here with a particular point being discussed. The phrase *in history* is repeated many times. Also, there were many Continuers in this text, as speakers commented on each other's suggestions. Speaker 2's contribution in line 372 is an example of support for a particular wording, *history is good*.

Let us move on now to the interview data:

Text#	InterSubj	Continuers	Correction	Repetition	Comment
328	44	5	0	16	8
330	48	5	0	9	9
331	33	3	0	4	4
604	10	3	0	2	1
605	13	1	2	4	4
Total (/228)	**148 (64.91%)**	**17 (7.46%)**	**2 (0.88%)**	**35 (15.35%)**	**26 (11.40%)**

Table 2: Ellipsis in interviews

Once again, Intersubjectivity is the most common strategy. This can also be considered an institutional genre, as there are expectations for how participants interact, i.e. the interviewer is in charge of directing the discourse. For interviews, though, Repetition comes in second place before Comments. There are many examples of Repetition in EDint328, as this is an interview where a couple are filling in a form about language attitudes in Malta. Therefore, there is a lot of repetition about details in the form, such as the following:

(43)   23S1: and it would be useful to know what you did (.) e:r
              24S3: okay =
              25S1: = when you worked (1)

26S3: hh okay e:rm (3)
27S1: e:r **self-employed**?<8> you have </8> self- **self-employed** (1)
28S3: <8> **self-employed** yes </8>

In this example, one of the couple's profession before retirement is identified, and Speaker 3 repeats *self-employed*. In the last two interviews, EDint604 and EDint605, there is an unusually low amount of Intersubjectivity. This can be simply explained by the fact that the texts are very short, at 229 and 276 lines, respectively. EDint330 is the longest at over 1000 lines, but the other have around 750 each.

Now, we turn to working group discussions:

Text#	InterSubj	Continuers	Correction	Repetition	Comment
5	29	4	0	14	8
6	21	0	0	7	3
241	31	13	0	9	5
305	38	18	0	15	8
497	34	12	1	3	7
Total (/280)	**153 (54.64%)**	**47 (16.79%)**	**1 (0.36%)**	**48 (17.14%)**	**31 (11.07%)**

Table 3: Ellipsis in working group discussions

Intersubjectivity is still the most common strategy, but the percentage is decreasing. This is another institutional genre, where particular tasks for the group govern the discourse. Repetition and Continuers are almost equally common. There are very few Continuers in texts EDwgd5 and EDwgd6, most likely because they are the shortest discussions, at just over 700 lines each compared to over 1000 for the other three. The number of Repetitions varies much. There are many in EDwgd5 and EDwgd305 as speakers here are organising a presentation, and so many details are repeated, such as when the presentation will be. The example comes from EDwgd5:

(44)   244S3: <5> when IS </5> our presentation?
            245S6: <6> i think?</6> **on friday**.
            246S5: <6> **on friday**.</6>
            247S3: **on friday**?
            248S5: <7> yeah.</7>
            249SX-1: <7><soft> **on friday**?</soft></7>

Next, we consider seminar discussion data:

Text#	InterSubj	Continuers	Correction	Repetition	Comment
31	83	10	2	36	11
251	16	14	0	12	7
301	12	12	0	11	0
362	16	3	1	5	4

Text#	InterSubj	Continuers	Correction	Repetition	Comment
363	18	19	4	10	1
364	10	17	2	1	2
Total (/339)	155 (45.72%)	75 (22.12%)	9 (2.65%)	75 (22.12%)	25 (7.37%)

Table 4: Ellipsis in seminar discussions

Just as with the previous data, in seminar discussions Intersubjectivity is most common, with Repetition and Continuers coming behind. Text EDsed31 stands out with the most Intersubjectives, Repetitions and Comments. It is more than twice the length of the other texts, at 1700 lines compared to at most 700 for EDsed251. There is a lot of Repetition in the text, as students are introducing themselves, and details are repeated by the students, and also students are supposed to give their ideas about stereotypes of Austrians, and these are also repeated:

(45)   59S1: okay <4> so **swedish** is </4> your (.)
          60S3: <4> yeah what else </4>
          61S1: is your mother tongue (.)
          62S3: <5> **swedish** yeah </5>
          63SX-f: <soft><5><un> xxx </un></5> **swedish**.</soft> (.)

(46)   255S3: i have (.) a lot of (.) very generous friends (1) that('ve) (.) they ALways invite me and (1) yes
          256S1: okay
          257S3: and they're austrians (.)
          258S1: <reading_aloud> **sporty**?</reading_aloud>{S1 reads from S3's notes}
          259S3: **sporty**

So in (45), the native language of Speaker 3 is confirmed through Repetition by her; and in (46), one stereotype that Austrians are sporty is confirmed. There is a lot of Intersubjectivity, also because of the discussion of stereotypes:

(47)   438S1: erm (.) in what respect (.) beautiful? (.) like to be beautiful like to be: austrian:? like to be
          439S6: yeah er i- **in terms of outer appearance**.<4> especially </4>
          440S1: <4> outer appea</4>rance? =
          441S6: = espec<5>ially </5>
          442S1: <5> **cloth</5>ing** (you mean)
          443S6: yeah <8> **especially </8> in vienna**.

The appearance of Austrians is discussed here, and speakers add information to specify what this refers to.

Next, we have service encounter data:

Text#	InterSubj	Continuers	Correction	Repetition	Comment
421	26	0	1	3	8
422	26	0	0	6	3
423	27	0	0	13	5
451	9	0	0	1	3
452	44	0	1	8	1
Total (/183)	130 (71.04%)	0 (0%)	2 (1.09%)	31 (16.94%)	20 (10.93%)

Table 5: Ellipsis in service encounters

Intersubjectivity is by far the most common, and there are no examples of Continuers. This is not unexpected as service encounters are very asymmetrical in their power relationships, and so encouragement is not to be expected, except on behalf on the person with greater power. As Garcia (2004) notes, service encounters are characterised by many questions, particularly from the students in these texts, which all contain advice sessions for new exchange students. Mauranen (2006) argues similarly that such encounters are transactional in nature, as people go in with the goal of obtaining information/services. Thus, they are similar to retail encounters. Repetition is particularly frequent in EDsve423. Details are repeated, and misunderstandings are corrected by repetition:

(48)   136S1: e:r (.) that's on the SECond sheet i gave you? (1) the: university of vienna is organizing an orientation for all erasmus students? (.) and there you get some general information about university? hh a:nd (.) the next free date for the orientation would be **THIS friday? (.) from two to four** <spel> p m?</spel> (.) e:r (.) do you have time? (.)
137S4: yes (.) <soft> (it's) <6><un> xx </un></6></soft>
138S1: <6> is it okay?</6> (2) erm =
139S2: = <soft> what is it?</soft>
140S1: for the orientat<7>ion </7>
141S2: <7> o:h </7> i see =
142S4: = er fri- er **THIS (.) <8> friday**?</8> this <9> fri</9>day (4)
143S1: <8> **this FRIday** </8>
144S1: <9> mhm?</9>
145S2: <1> and what time?</1>
146S4: <1> it's from </1> **two to four** <spel> p m </spel> it's on the sheet i: gave you
147SX-5: <soft> on this sheet?</soft> (4)
148SX-2: **two to FOUR** . (.)

(49)   174S4: <to S2> **where can we buy this ticket** (.) in a station (.) (okay) </to S2>

175S2: <to S4> (.) pardon?</to S4>
176S4: <to S2> **this TIcket**. (1) when (.) **WHERE can we buy it**?</to S2>

The date and time of an orientation session is repeated in (48), while the question is (49) is repeated.

Finally, we turn to workshop discussion data:

Text#	InterSubj	Continuers	Correction	Repetition	Comment
9	17	2	1	4	3
15	37	8	3	11	6
242	28	3	4	12	5
302	164	22	0	49	13
303	27	9	0	11	5
304	49	8	5	15	7
306	32	18	1	9	2
464	24	5	0	18	6
499	37	14	1	11	6
590	22	0	1	0	0
Total (/739)	**441 (59.68%)**	**89 (12.04%)**	**16 (2.17%)**	**140 (18.94%)**	**53 (7.17%)**

Table 6: Ellipsis in workshop discussions

After Intersubjectivity, Repetition comes somewhat ahead of Continuers. In EDwsd302, there are the most instances of all functions except Continuers. This is most likely due to the size of the text at 2400 lines, compared to the 1900 in EDwsd304 and 1600 in EDwsd306. Repetition is a big feature of EDwsd302 as students are explaining their core values for human life, and these are repeated by the instructor, and are commented on in the form of Continuers:

(50)   153S20: a:nd <fast> money </fast> and the most important <1> er freedom </1>
                154S18: <1> what was </1> that =
                155S20: = <fast> **money** </fast> (1)
                156S18: many?
                157S20: yeah
                158S18: or **money**
                159S20: **MONEY** (.)
                160S18: **money** all right. =
                161S20: = **money** (.)
                162S18: **money**?
                163S20: yeah. no- <un> x </un> not for me but e:r for e:r (1) for i think about er
                rich rich people not e:r not e:r (2) e:r yeah. **money**. yes

(51)   190S4: well <1> i (.) i i i don't </1> say that this value is better than <2> another one so </2>
              191S18: <1><un> xx </un> more general ones or </1>
              192S18: <2> no definitely </2> not.<8> but </8>
              193S4: <8> so </8> just if if you have very different values yeah (.) somehow you have to find a solution so take t- two of yours and two of yours and negotiate about another one =
              194S18: = @@@ <9> all right </9>
              195S20: <9> okay </9><3> okay </3>
              196S4: <3> something </3> like that =
              197S18: = (**great**) =
              198S20: = okay =

In (50), money as one value is introduced and repeated, and in (51) Speaker 4's contribution is commented on. There are also many Continuers in EDwsd306 because students are presenting scenarios for what will happen to languages in Europe:

(52)   46S8: but then <8> again the extreme </8> (.)
              47SS: <8> @@@@@ </8>
              48S8: of number (.) three: (.) is also (.) just as bad because that would be total chaos and nobody will understand each other (.)
              49S6: okay (.) {S6 starts writing on blackboard}
              50S8: erm (1) (so it's) <un> xx </un> (too) @@ (.) <9> er (it's it's) <un> xxx </un></9>
              51S6: <9><un> x x x x </un> TWO </9> worst case (.)
              52S8: yeah because (.) <un> x x x x </un> two extremes
              53S6: okay
              54S8: so =
              55S6: = **perfect** (1)

Here, the contribution of Speaker 8 is commented on.
      Now, we will compare the data in all speech event types:

Speech Ev	InterSubj	Continuers	Correction	Repetition	Comment
Conversation	227	29	1	32	46
Interview	148	17	2	35	26
Working group discussion	153	47	1	48	31
Seminar discussion	155	75	9	75	25
Service encounter	130	0	2	31	20
Workshop discussion	441	89	16	140	53
Total (/2104)	**1254 (59.60%)**	**257 (12.21%)**	**31 (1.47%)**	**361 (17.16%)**	**201 (9.55%)**

Table 7: Ellipsis in all speech events

The combined results show that just under 60% of examples of ellipsis carry the Intersubjectivity function. Then, a further 30% of cases carry either the Repetition or Continuer functions. Repetitions come so high because of the contribution from workshop discussions (140 out of 361 instances). We can expect the other results, as Intersubjectives develop discourse, while Continuers and Comments provide feedback. Thus, we can conclude our analysis by saying that participants are clearly being interactive in many different ways in this data.

5. Conclusions

Our study of the VOICE corpus has demonstrated that ellipsis is a strong marker of interaction in oral discourse. Many different instances of each function were found, particularly Intersubjectivity. There were many variations in what was found, but they were argued to be consequences of the particular features of the relevant texts. For example, the amount of Repetitions was argued to be related to the text dealing with a questionnaire or a discussion of a presentation, and so certain points were likely to be repeated by speakers. The speech event was important too, since we saw that there were very few Continuers in events with asymmetrical power relationships like interviews. Further work on different sources of oral discourse is naturally needed to support or modify these conclusions, and a comparison between this and written data would also be valuable to see if the trends found in VOICE are particular to the texts themselves, or to oral discourse in general.

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THE ROLE OF SYNTACTIC STYLISTIC MEANS IN EXPRESSING THE EMOTION TERM *LOVE*

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Abstract
Love as one of important feelings in human emotional, cognitive and social life has always attracted attention of the researchers: psychologists, linguists, philosophers, ethnologists, etc. We may speak about extralinguistic and linguistic ways of love manifestation. To linguistic ones belong, of course, stylistic means, which include lexical, syntactic, phonetic, and semasiological level. The author focuses on lexical-syntactical means of expressing love in two Slavic languages, Czech and Slovak, using linguo-cognitive and cultural approach. This research is inspired by the GRID project, which aimed at study of 24 emotion terms in 35 languages.

Keywords: emotion term *LOVE*, linguistic and extralinguistic means of love manifestation, expressive syntax, fiction.

1. Introduction

There are different approaches to love as an emotion term, which have already been described in details by scholars representing different languages and cultures (Components of Emotional Meaning 2013). In this article I want to focus on linguistic means of expressing love in prosaic texts, namely means of expressive syntax, which itself has not been investigated yet, especially in connection with different cultures. I guess that people of different nationalities, even speaking languages of the same group, Slavic in our case, express their feelings in different ways. As far as we are going to discuss love, my hypothesis is that these scripts depend on many factors: (1) types of love (happy/shared vs. unhappy/unshared, romantic, tragic, common, homosexual, adultery, etc.; (2) number of participants (happy love – only two people + children in future; unhappy love – ménage à trois; adultery – three or more people); (3) other feelings and emotions which accompany love according to its type and participants; (4) stages of love (acquaintance, courting, dating, temporal separation, meetings, wedding or separation) and some others.

Another important aspect is love manifestation, with the help of extralinguistic (facial and vocal expression, bodily movements, shedding tears, smiling, laughing, giving gifts, etc.) and linguistic means (phonetic, lexical, morphological, syntactic and others) (Panasenko 2009). Let us consider the psycholinguistic approach to love.

2. Emotions and feelings from psycholinguistic point of view

Psychologists and linguists have a common object of investigation: feelings and emotions, but approaches to its study may be different (Frijda 1986; Nakonečný 2000; Ortoni et al. 1988; Panasenko, Démuthová et al. 2012; Rozhkova 1974). Psychologists take into account different features accompanying emotions, such as *features describing the person's evaluation or appraisal of the event*, *features describing the bodily symptoms* that tend to occur during the emotional state (felt shivers in the neck or chest, got pale, felt his/her heartbeat slowing down, felt his/her heartbeat getting faster, felt his/her breathing getting faster, perspired, or had moist hands); *features describing facial and vocal expressions*, that accompany the emotion (blushed, smiled, felt his/her jaw drop, pressed his/her lips together, felt his/her eyebrows go up, frowned, closed his/her eyes, had tears in his/her eyes; changes in the loudness of voice, of speech melody, speech tempo, speech disturbances, etc.). All these symptoms are included into GRID project (Components of Emotional Meaning 2013), results of which I partially use in my research. These extralinguistic means, which have universal character, include bodily symptoms, facial and vocal expression, and some others (see figure 1).

Figure 1: Extralinguistic means of expressing feelings and emotions in any language

Among all the linguistic ways of emotions/feeling manifestation I give the priority to syntax, because its role has been obviously underestimated and the number of its studies is limited (Kiseluik 2007; Panasenko 2012). Sometimes the study of grammatical means in expressing emotions and feelings is combined with the intonational (Panasenko, Krivonoska 1983) and lexical ones (Likharieva 1982).

We have done thorough analysis of linguistic and extralinguistic means (Panasenko, Trnka et al. 2013), which express love and hatred, but here I will concentrate on syntactic means of expressing emotional term *LOVE*.

3. Language material; emotion term *LOVE* in literary texts

As a language material I have chosen works by modern Czech and Slovak authors (17 novels), mainly bestsellers translated into many languages. Using the method of complete selection I have found numerous examples in the texts connected with emotion term *LOVE*: different stages of relations, different types of love in combination with other emotions and feelings, different types of speech – the first person narrative, the author's description, meditation, inner monologue, dialogue, etc. The analysis of these texts shows that description of this or that emotional manifestation is very often being dispersed on several pages. In these texts I have come across different types of love, but now I will only highlight love between a man and a woman taking into account such positive and negative aspects as: declaration of love; happy, shared love; disillusionment in love; non-shared, unhappy love, and some others.

Traditionally shared love is defined as a complex feeling including such feelings as sympathy, tenderness, liking, etc. in combinations with such emotions as joy, happiness, admiration, passion, delight, etc. But there is also unhappy, non-shared love. In connection with this, I would like to mention a very interesting research conducted by Nikonova (2008) who analyzed concept *LOVE* in tragedies by William Shakespeare and presented it in the form of a frame (Figure 2), some parts of which I use in my research.


Figure 2: Frame of subject-sensual layer of literary concept *LOVE* (a fragment) (after Nikonova 2008)

A question arises: what makes love unhappy? As far as prose texts are concerned, we will find an answer to this question a bit later, but much depends on the genre of a story. In modern fiction, we may single out several types of love development with different number of people involved into it (Panasenko 2012). We'll start with common love which can be shared and non-shared. Let us reconstruct its stages in the way they are reflected in fiction with accompanying them emotions and present in the form of a scenario (see Figure 3).

marriage (joy, happiness)

beginning → dating → temporal separation → declaration

separation (disillusionment,

doubt   jealousy, joy   regret, sadness   joy, happiness   hatred)

Figure 3: Scenario of love stages

The paradox is that in life everybody dreams of happy love, but in fiction it is not the main line of plot development. Some heroes are mentioned as the example of an ideal family: they love each other, have many children, enjoy love, but the reader waits for collisions, tragedies, tears, scandals – this is the main line of the plot structure for protagonists. If it is a novel, there are many characters in it and sometimes the reader must be very attentive to understand relations between all of them. Thus – two people – happy love; the symbol for this will be an **oval**, which may be treated as an egg, that is symbol of future life and development (see Figure 4).

Figure 4: Oval – a model of happy love with two people involved

Happy love used to be associated with family relations. Our research (Panasenko 2013) shows that in the course of time Czech and Slovak family patterns and family values are changing; factors which made love happy/unhappy some time ago and nowadays do not coincide. If love is non-shared, there may be a rival – a man or a woman: a woman loves a man, but he loves another woman or a man; variety – adultery – a man is married and has a mistress whom he promises to marry in future; mistress definitely hates her rival; classical *ménage à trois*. Its symbol is a **triangle** (see Figure 5).

Figure 5: Triangle – a model of unhappy love with three people involved

These relations may have a variety: a wife in revenge may find a lover, thus four people are involved. It's symbol is a **square** (Figure 6). As far as feelings of a man are described in different books in a different way here and above we omit them.


Figure 6: Square – a model of unhappy love with four people involved

4. Manifestation of love in Czech fiction

Czech examples form several groups with accompanying emotions, representing all three models mentioned above. I will present some samples. Let's start with happy love, the model of which is an **oval**. Here and below some comments are added to make the situation in the text clearer.

temporal separation: love + loneliness + regret

The girl felt great <u>loneliness</u> seeing off her boyfriend Honza and asked him to come back as soon as possible:

(1) *Najednou jsem se <u>cítila strašně opuštěná</u>, chtěla jsem mu říct ještě tisíc věcí. Bez naděje jsem se podívala nahoru k oknům vlaku, Honza se nikdy nevykláněl, ale zrovna dneska tam byl. "Přijeď brzo!" zakníkala jsem žalostně* (Hercíková "Jízda šikmo svahem", p. 141). (Czech)

Being alone, I felt <u>horribly alone</u>; I wanted to tell him a thousand more things. Without any hope I looked up at the train window, Honza never leaned out, but exactly today was there. "Come quick!" whimpered I in a plaintive voice.

meeting: love + joy

(2) Feeling of <u>joy</u>:

<u>*Pocit radosti*</u> *ze setkání tentokrát nedokázal překonat všechny obtíže, kteté jsme mu házeli do cesty* (Hercíková "Jízda šikmo svahem", p. 143-144). (Czech)

<u>Feeling of joy</u> from meeting this time didn't overcome all the hardships which he faced during his trip.

Model **triangle:** feelings of Anděla towards her lover's wife (Sharon) are described in the following way:

love + jealousy

(3) Direct mentioning of desire to kill her rival:

Necítila jsem k Sharon zášt, snad nechuť. <u>Ale zabít bych se mohla</u>, aby byl pokoj, <u>a zabila bych</u> se, kdybych měla revolver. Prostřelit si hlavu mi připadalo jako ucházejíci smrt. (Hercíková "Vášeň", p. 181). (Czech)

I didnt feel hatred for Sharon, perhaps reluctance<u>. But I could kill</u>, to keep peace, <u>and I would have killed her, if I had a revolver</u>. To shoot through my head seemed as seeking death.

Now a few words about adultery, a model for which is a square, including four people. Again, the situation may be specific. Lovers meet secretly, find explanations for their spouses, and lie to them and to their children. These and other factors add sensuality to their relations. E.g., Anděla, the heroine of one of novels, is a Czech woman married to an American, in her love to Jozef, who is also a Czech, she passes several stages: from blind passion to regret and disillusionment. No happy end. Perhaps an important factor of their love was common language, nationality, and culture. At the beginning of their relations they were very happy; they flew from the USA to Prague, where they spoke their native language. During their secret meetings they walked together holding hands, kissed in the street, smiled, laughed, and enjoyed every moment of being together:

love + joy of being together

(4) *Ještě nikdy jsme se spolu neprocházeli, nanejvýš spěchali společně na letiště nebo se najíst. ...<u>Procházet se bylo sladké</u>. Navíc v městě, kde jsme sa oba narodili. <u>Josef mě držel křečovitě za ruku</u>, jako kdyby se bál, že se mu mohu na pražské podvečerní ulici, plné stínů, ztratit. Uletět. Zmizet* (Hercíková "Vášeň", p. 26). (Czech)

Never before we have walked together, we mainly hurried together to the airport or to have meals. ...<u>To walk was so sweet</u>. Moreover, in the city where both of us have been born. <u>Josef held my hand tightly</u>, as if he were afraid that I could be lost in the evening Prague streets, full of shadows. To fly away. To disappear.

When their love collapses, Anděla takes antidepressants which have no effect on her:

unhappy love + disillusionment

(5) *Prášky neúčinkovaly, <u>třeštila jsem oči do tmy a bylo mi hůř a hůř, beznaděj se na mě valila jak lavina kamenů, jak hlína hrobu</u>* (Hercíková "Vášeň", p. 181). (Czech)

Pills did not work<u>, my eyes stared into the darkness and I felt worse and worse, despair rolled on me like an avalanche of stones, as clay on the grave</u>.

Analysis of all the samples of love display in Czech fiction gives an opportunity to describe them in the following ways (see Figure 7).

In literary texts I have found a lot of examples of direct description of love in combination with other feelings. But the skillfulness of the author is being displayed by the richness of his language, namely, means of stylistic syntax which we will discuss further on.

The results of my research show that in Czech prose, the means of stylistic syntax based on informational compression prevail and the rhetoric questions appear to be a

powerful means of rendering psycho-emotional state of people who are in love. Before presenting illustrations of syntactic devices, I would like to make some comments.


Figure 7: Display of common love in Czech fiction

As well as above all the Czech and Slovak examples are accompanied by translation, but the means of expressive syntax are underlined only in Slavic languages. The peculiarities of Czech and Slovak consist in the omission of the subject, free word order (unlike English), thus types and position of syntactic expressive means in a sentence are different. As far as it is impossible to give in details the content of the novel, in some cases some comments in brackets are added for better understanding of the context.

(6) The model **oval** – <u>happy love</u> – anaphora:

Hra se mi líbila. <u>Přerosla</u> mi přes hlavu. <u>Přerosla</u> nám oběma přes hlavu. Zamilovali jsme se (Řemínek "Chlapi nepláčou", p. 14). (Czech)

I liked the game. It grew over my head. It grew both of us over the head. We fell in love.

(7) The model **triangle**, <u>non-shared, unhappy love</u> – epiphora + anaphora + aposiopesis:

Zdálo se mi, že je mi sedmdesát pět let, že jsem stále v té samé posteli a stále sama. Možná muž, se kterým bych byla schopna existovat, na světě <u>není</u>. Prostě <u>není</u>. <u>Nebo</u> žije v Číně. <u>Nebo</u> je už dávno ženatý a má tři děti. <u>Nebo, nebo...</u> (Nesvadbová "Bestiář", p. 59). (Czech)

It seemed to me that I was seventy-five, that I was still in the same bed and all alone. Perhaps the man with whom I would be able to exist does not exist in the

world. Simply doesn't. Or lives in China. Or has been married for a long time and has three children. Or, or...

(8) Model **square**, adultery, <u>love + jealosy</u> – antithesis:
*<u>Byl tam s jinou. A já včera s jiným.</u> Celé <u>naše štěstí je vypůjčené, poslepované z ukradených chvil. Možna to ani <u>není štěstí, jen obyčejná nevěra, cizoložství, smilstvo a jaká hnusná slova pro to ještě existují.</u> **Adultery*** (Hercíková "Vášeň", p. 48). (Czech)

He was there with another woman. And I was yesterday with another man. All our happiness is borrowed, a patchwork of stolen moments. Maybe this is not happiness, just an ordinary infidelity, adultery, fornication, and such ugly words for that exist. Adultery.

(9) <u>love + regret, sadness</u> – rhetoric questions + parallel constructions:
Zdrceně jsem se vrátila domů. <u>Budu schopná ukázat Josefovi lahvičku s jeho parfémem? Co mi řekne? Že je Vůně milenců tím zázračným trikem, kterým se osvobodí od rodiny? Co se mnou bude?</u> <u>Ztratila jsem rodinu, ztratila jsem děti a teď ztratím Jozefa</u> (Hercíková "Vášeň", p. 179-180). (Czech)

In dismay I returned home. Will I be able to show Joseph a small bottle of his perfume? What will he say to me? That "The Smell of Lovers" (the name of the new perfume) is a miraculous trick which will make him free from his family? What will become of me? I've lost my family, I've lost my kids and I will lose Joseph.

Stylistic means of different levels are very important in expressing any modal meaning. In Figure 8 I want to stress how important is their combinations in Czech literary texts, which reflect common love in general and its varieties: non-shared, unhappy vs. happy, shared.

Figure 8: Stylistic means of Common love display in Czech literary texts

As far as I am interested in expressive syntax, below I present detailed data of its role in Czech fiction (see Table 1).

1. Syntactic stylistic means based on focusing		5
by pausation: parcellation	100	
2. Syntactic stylistic means based on expansion:		27.6
a) repetitions	74.5	
ordinary	6.45	
anaphora	**48**	
epiphora	6.45	
anadiplosis	16.25	
framing	16.25	
parallel constructions	16.25	
Total	100	
b) expansions proper	25.5	
enumeration	50	
antithesis	50	
Total	100	
Total		100

3. Syntactic stylistic means based on informational compression			61.7
a) Syntactic stylistic means based on *syntagmatic* compression of information	68		
aposiopesis	12		
nominative sentence	**35**		
one-member sentence	**45**		
antithesis	8		
Total	100		
b) Syntactic stylistic means based on *paradygmatic* compression of information	32		
rhetoric questions	**100**		
		100	
4. others (exclamatory sentences)			5.7
Total			100

Table 1: Syntactic means of expressing emotion term *LOVE* in Czech fiction in %

5. Manifestation of love in Slovak fiction

Discussing the ways of love manifestation in Slovak texts I will try to highlight differences of happy and unhappy love of people belonging to different social groups, of different age.

The model is an **oval**. The situation is as follows. A grown-up girl complains of her parents who are hanging on each other after many years of happy marriage, which makes her sad.

happy, shared love

(10) *"Vy tomu nerozumiete, lebo ste to nezažili. <u>Visia jeden na druhom. Ja som pre nich druhoradá. Tešia sa, keď sú spolu, mňa nepotrebujú.</u> Také manželstvo som ešte nevidela. Iní sa po toľkých rokoch rozvádzajú, <u>oni sa ľúbia ako na začiatku..."</u>* (Gillerová "Láska si nevyberá", p. 48). (Slovak)

"You do not understand, because you have never experienced it. <u>They are hanging on each other.</u> I am of second-class to them. <u>They rejoice being together</u>, they do not need me. I have never seen such a marriage yet. Others divorce after so many years together, <u>they love each other as at the beginning.</u>"

One of the critical problems in Slovakia is the woman's desire to work or to come back to work after the maternity leave (in details see Panasenko 2013). This situation is the keystone in the novel "Cukor a soľ" ("Sugar and Salt") by Keleová-Vasilková. Everything is fine in Nora's family:

(11) *Nora roky žila ako vo vatičke… obalená teplom, pohodlím a láskou* (Keleová-Vasilková "Cukor a soľ", p. 16). (Slovak)

Nora has been living for years like in a cotton ball (in diminituve form) ... wrapped in warmth, comfort and love.

Her husband and she have two daughters, a large house, enough money, but Nora wants to come back to work, to earn her own money. This irritates her husband, their family collapses, but after many collisions the story has a happy end.

Now let us try to answer the question what makes love unhappy and how it ir reflected in our texts. We will start with the examples of unhappy love in fiction.

unhappy love, disillusionment in love

At the early days of their marriage, Tereza, the protagonist of the novel "Za to mi zaplatíš!" ("You will pay me for this!") by Nagyová-Džerengová, got up early, prepared breakfast for her husband and they were sitting in silence. She followed his movements with loving sight. But then she realized that he kept silence because found her silly and not equal to him – he was a doctor and she was only a nurse without higher education. Tereza is tired of her husband's jealousy and scorn and leaves him.

Irma, another character in this book, is crazy about order in her flat; she polishes the floor, kitchen utensils, but forgets to cook something and to take care of her husband. As far as she can't forgive her husband's betrayal, she does not sleep well, she smokes too much, takes alcohol, threatens and curses him, and hides their daughter from him. Her love turns into hatred. They divorce and her former husband marries another woman (Nagyová-Džerengová "Za to mi zaplatíš!").

There were usually many children in a Slovak family (Panasenko 2013). Though their number is not very large nowadays, men do want to have heirs, and a women's refusal to bear children leads to a divorce or separation (Lukáš and his mistress Renáta in a book "Vôňa karameliek" – "The smell of caramel" by Hamzová):

(12) *Poznal ju až príliš dobre. Ona si to o ňom zrejme myslela tiež. Bola krásna, takmer dokonalá. Jej telo mohlo súťažiť s európskymi modelkami. Dokonalé miery, dokonalé pohyby, dokonalý úmysel... dokonalý chlad. Toto telo ho už dávno nevzrušovalo. Bolo síce krásne, ale studené ako ľad. <u>Príliš dokonalé na to, aby sa nechalo dobrovoľne zničiť. Napríklad tehotenstvom. Presne tak ako kedysi Silvia. Ani Renáta nikdy nechcela mať deti</u>* (Hámzova "Vôňa karameliek", p. 103). (Slovak)

He knew her too well. She probably also thought about him. She was beautiful, almost perfect. Her body could compete with European models. Perfect sizes, perfect movements, perfect intention ... perfect chill. <u>This body</u> has not inspired him with passion any more. Although it was beautiful, it was as cold as ice. <u>Too perfect to be voluntarily destroyed. For example, by pregnancy. Just as once Silvia did. Renáta never wanted to have children.</u>

In these three cases we may state that the reason of unhappy love and marriage lies in the characters' mistakes in their behaviour. There are only two people involved (the model **oval**), but the family is on the verge of wreck.

In other books, examples from which are not included into our sources for this article, I have come across other cases of unhappy love / marriage: alcoholism, sponging, vagrancy, different religion communities, creation of image, an ideal which is very difficult to find in real life and love to it, etc., but these cases will be considered in further publications.

Some examples with the model **triangle.**

non-shared, unhappy love

(13) Dominika, a teenager, is very thin, lost her appetite:

Bola pravda, že som v poslednom čase schudla. Vôbec mi nechutilo, cítila som ako v mrákotách. Zadúšala som v sebe zúfalú lásku, zúfalú túžbu po niekom, kto mi nikdy nebude patriť. *A nevedela som, čo s tým dělať* (Gillerová "Láska si nevyberá", p. 54). (Slovak)

It was true that recently I have lost weight. Nothing attracted me, I felt like in darkness. I was strangling in myself desperate love, desperate desire for someone who will never belong to me. And I did not know what to do with this.

5.1 Syntactic expressive means of love manifestation in Slovak fiction

Having analyzed prosaic texts from stylistic point of view, we may speak about the following combinations of them in different models:

(1) the model **oval** – happy love: aposiopesis, exclamatory sentences, rhetoric questions, nominative sentences, enumeration; declaration of love: aposiopesis, enumeration, anaphora, nominative sentences, exclamatory sentences, rhetoric questions, parcellation; temporal separation and meeting: interrogative exclamatory sentences, aposiopesis, exclamatory sentences; love + fear to lose the partner: exclamatory sentences, aposiopesis, interrogative exclamatory sentences, parallel constructions (complete and partial), framing;

(2) the model **triangle** – non-shared, unhappy love, disillusionment in love: aposiopesis, enumeration, antithesis, parcellation; non-shared, unhappy love, disillusionment in love + jelousy: exclamatory sentence, interrogative-exclamatory sentences, aposiopesis, rhetoric questions, epiphora;

(3) the model **square**, adultery – non-shared, unhappy love, disillusionment in love + hatred + jelousy: exclamatory sentences, rhetoric questions.

Let us illustrate these three models with some examples. The model **oval** – happy love – rhetoric questions:

(14) *Je to naozaj láska? Alebo len očarene?* (Keleová-Vasilková "Cukor a soľ", p. 123). (Slovak)

Is it really love? Or just enchantment?

(15) exclamatory sentence, nominative sentence:

ON! (Gillerova "Záhada zadnej izby", p. 14). (Slovak) HE!

(16) one-member sentence:

"Ľúbim ťa. Vieš o tom?" ... "Aj ja teba. Veľmi." (Keleová-Vasilková "Cukor a soľ", p. 182). (Slovak)

"I love you. Do you know about it?"..."I love you, too. Much."

(17) love + fear to lose the partner – aposiopesis + interrogative exclamatory sentence:

Vďaka nemu mala prestížne postavenie vo firme, dobrý plat, všade ho sprevádzala, kamarátky jej závideli pekného a úspešného muža, ktorý rešpektoval jej nezávislosť a slobodu... a teraz by ho mala stratiť?! (Hámzova "Vôňa karameliek", p. 102) (Slovak)

Thanks to him, she had a prestigious position in the company, good salary, accompanying him everywhere, her friends envied her handsome and successful man who respected her independence and freedom ... and now she should lose him?

(18) framing + exclamatory sentence:

Musí ho získať späť, musí! (Hámzova "Vôňa karameliek" p. 103). (Slovak)

She must get him back, she must!

Model **triangle** – non-shared, unhappy love, disillusionment in love:

(19) parcellation:

Zrejme sa ťažko zmieruješ s tým, že Deniska už patrí do iných sfér. Tých dospeláckych. A chýba ti (Gillerová "Láska si nevyberá", p. 87). (Slovak)

Obviously, it is difficult for you to accept the fact that Deniska (diminutive/familiar name of Denisa) already belongs to other spheres. To the adults. And (you are) missing her.

Model **square**, adultery – non-shared, unhappy love, disillusionment in love + jelousy + hatred:

(20) rhetoric questions:

Objíma teraz tú Milku? Takisto ako mňa? Ľúbi ju rovnako? (Keleová-Vasilková "Cukor a soľ", p. 142). (Slovak)

Is he hugging Milka (diminutive/familiar name of Ľudmila or Emília) now? In the same way like me? Does he love her like me?

(21) antithesis:

Postupne zisťovala, že láska a priateľstvo, ktoré k Ľubošovi celé roky cítila, sa mení na tichú, vždy prítomnú a spaľujúcu nenávisť (Keleová-Vasilková "Cukor a soľ", p. 7). (Slovak)

Step by step, she was considering that love and friendship, which she felt to Ľuboš for many years, has been changing to silent, always present and burning hate.

Linguistic and extralinguistic means of expressing emotion term love in Slovak are reflected in figure 9.

Figure 9: Linguistic and extralinguistic means of expressing feelings and emotions in Slovak fiction

Frequency of different stylistic means is presented in Table 2. We see that means based on syntagmatic compression of information prevail as well as exclamatory sentences.

1. Syntactic stylistic means based on focusing			2
by pausation:			
parcellation	70		
detachment	30		
Total	100		
2. Syntactic stylistic means based on expansion:			10
a) repetitions		29	
ordinary	20		
anaphora	20		
epiphora	20		
framing	20		
parallel constructions	20		
Total	100		

b) expansions proper		71	
enumeration	75		
antithesis	25		
Total	100		
Total		100	
3. Syntactic stylistic means based on informational compression			65
a) Syntactic stylistic means based on *syntagmatic* compression of information		94	
aposiopesis	**76**		
nominative sentence	4		
one-member sentence	4		
antithesis	**16**		
Total	100		
b) Syntactic stylistic means based on *paradygmatic* compression of information		16	
rhetoric questions	100		
Total		100	
4. others		40	23
exclamatory sentences	**70**		
interrogative exclamatory sentences	**30**		
Total	100		
Total			100

Table 2: Syntactic means of expressing emotion term *LOVE* in Slovak fiction in %

6. Discussion and conclusions

I have made only the first step in the direction of contrastive analysis of emotional concepts of different cultures: Czech and Slovak. The results obtained from literary texts analysis show that there are some differences in the ways of perceiving love, its understanding, evaluation in relation to a partner, etc.

Of all stylistic ways of expressing emotion term *LOVE* syntactic ones prevail, namely in Czech fiction these are stylistic means based on informational compression (61.7%) and based on expansion of information (27.7 %). In Slovak fiction, stylistic means based on informational compression prevail (65%) as well as exclamatory sentences (23%).

Syntactic means are connected with different types of model relations, which we name oval, triangle and square according to the number of participants involved into the situation (two, three and four correspondently). In Czech prose rhetoric questions rank one, followed by one member sentences, nominative sentences, anaphora and exclamatory sentences. In Slovak texts the list of top five starts with aposiopesis, followed by exclamatory sentences, one member sentence, interrogative exclamatory sentences and enumeration. What does it mean? How is it connected with cultural identity? Each device has its own function in the literary text. Rhetoric questions need no answer; they accompany doubt, regret, and disillusionment. They also need no

interlocutor, are typical of inner monologue. Exclamatory sentences as well as interrogative exclamatory ones, on the contrary, imply the addressee. They are also connected with intonational component of speech: level of loudness, peculiar melodic contour, emphatic word stress. All these factors testify to the high emotionality of the speaker, whereas rhetoric questions imply solitude and silence. One member sentences, nominative sentences are connected with laconic brevity, and self-restraint. Aposiopesis, a sudden break in speech, has another function – to express great emotional tension, stress, and unwillingness to speak; it is used to render the speech of a person who cannot find words to express one's feelings. Thus, the analysis of linguistic, namely stylistic syntactic means, shows considerable differences between their representation in Czech and Slovak prose.

Extralinguistic ways of expressing happy love are: Czech fiction: bodily symptoms and movements (to kiss, to hold hands) and facial expression (to smile); Slovak fiction: bodily symptoms and movements (kisses, to draw into embrace, to hold the hand /to bind hands; felt her or his heartbeat getting faster), facial expressions (laughter, smile), vocal expression (whisper), etc.

Our next step will be contrastive analysis of other emotion terms in languages with different structure.

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BIRACIAL – BLACK? A SURVEY OF LANGUAGE USE AND LANGUAGE ATTITUDES IN POLAND AND GERMANY

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Abstract
The paper deals with the construction of race from the perspective of cognitive sociolinguistics. The focus is upon the perception of mixed-race people of black and white heritage in Poland and Germany compared to the USA, and its reflection in language use. The study clarifies in how far a socially marked perception of biracial people applies in these countries with very small population of black ancestry. Among other things, the first presidential campaign of Barack Obama is used to investigate the occurrence in both countries of mental colouring of biracial people. The paper also reflects the language debate on political correctness of the press language, sparked off by the presidential campaign and its media coverage. It presents claims and arguments by proponents of various solutions regarding referring to biracial people, and paradoxes showing up in the relationship between language use and ideological positions when the race issue is at stake.

1. Introduction

The perception of race and ethnicity is a vast topic approachable from many angles. The following text deals selectively with a single piece of the mosaic – the perception of mixed-race people in Poland and Germany compared to the United States (while taking into account the influence of the latter on the former two), and the reflection of this perception in language use. It should make a contribution to the general picture of the social and discursive construction of race and ethnicity, emerging from efforts and pursuits in many different areas, such as social and cognitive psychology, sociology, cultural and historical studies, linguistics, and critical discourse analysis.

As the populations of Poland and Germany have different degrees of historical experience with biracial issues, and both differ very strongly again from the United States in this respect, the study may help indicate in how far history and histories influence the present-day cognitive constructs pertaining to mixed-race issues. I would like to analyse the degree to which a socially marked perception of biracial people applies in countries with very small or close to zero population of black ancestry, such as Germany and Poland, respectively. As a preliminary step, it will be clarified in how far the younger generation's concept of race in these two countries is still based on the

tripartite Cuvier-Comtean[1] division of biblical origin (black, white, and yellow) accepted as a matter of fact in both Germany and Poland in the early 20th century, and treated as a point of reference in defining human races in widely distributed encyclopaedic reference works and books on human geography.

In 2008, a unique opportunity presented itself for an investigation based on a topical story – the successful presidential campaign of Barack Obama, a candidate of black and white descent, that was reported broadly by the press worldwide, including Poland and Germany. The widespread basic knowledge about the new President made it possible to investigate the social perception of biracial people in both countries by means of a survey that was meaningful to the respondents. At the same time, the campaign and its media coverage prompted a minor debate on political correctness of the press language applied in referring to people of simultaneously black and white descent. Local debates took place both in the United States and abroad, where the coverage of the campaign was based on translations from original U.S. news sources and, by necessity, reflected both their wording and the social reality they construed.

An essential aspect of the perception of biracial people in the two countries under study is the question in how far it is shaped by the phenomenon of mental colouring, which is an outstanding aspect of such perception in the United States. Among the issues involved is the arguments and ideological claims by the proponents and opponents of various linguistic solutions to the sensitive issue of referring to biracial people, and the paradoxes showing up in the relationship between linguistic judgements and ideological claims when the value-laden issue of race is at stake.

2. Social marking and mental colouring

To define the cognitive process of mental colouring, an explication is needed of the more general notion of social markedness, on which the former is based. The concept of social marking has been discussed in considerable detail by Brekhus (1996: 497), who defined it as "*a classification process that accents one side of the contrast as unnatural, thus tacitly naturalising the unmarked side*". The notion of "naturalness" is itself value-laden: "*Social markedness highlights a contrast between marked phenomena that are explicitly given a social value as either positive or negative and the unmarked phenomena that are tacitly regarded as neutral or generic*" (ibid.).

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[1] Georges Cuvier, 1817; Auguste Comte, 1841. German Latinate terminology appears in Egon von Eickstedt, 1934. Egon von Eickstedt was the maker of the basis for the Nazi racist ideology and professor of anthropology in Mainz, Germany, until he retired in 1961. The tripartite division took upper hand over the alternative division into five races proposed by Johann Friedrich Blumenbach, 1804, whose term "caucasian" survived well into the 20th century in the United States where it was popularised by C.S. Coon. In Poland, the theory of three "pure races" was propagated between the world wars and up to the 1960s by Jan Czekanowski. It should be mentioned that while von Eickstedt used his scientific authority in support of opressing the "lower races" during the Second World War, Czekanowski is reported to have used his to save lives of many Jews;
cf. Agnieszka Juzwa-Ogińska, http://www.promemoria.pl/arch/2003_7/kara/kara.html

The concept of markedness plays a significant role in linguistics, in the description of language structure and usage in a number of areas, such as phonology, syntax, semantics, and conversation analysis. It is originally a linguistic concept; in 1930, Roman Jakobson introduced it into phonology, from which it has spread by analogy and probing to other areas. In a letter to N. Trubetzskoy, Jakobson declared '*a constant mutual connection between a marked and unmarked type*' to be '*one of your [Trubetzkoy's] most remarkable and fruitful ideas*'. He continued: '*It seems to me that it has a significance not only for linguists but also for ethnology and the history of culture, and that such historico-cultural correlations as life-death, liberty-non-liberty, sin-virtue, holidays-working days, etc., are always confined to relations a and ~ a, and that it is important to find out for any epoch, group, nation, etc., what the marked element is*' (Trubetzskoy 1975: 162).

In the area of social categorisation of people, an example of markedness is the contrast set 'man/woman', with 'man' being the unmarked element of the pair. The lexeme 'man' is described as polysemous (man: male human, and man: human) in classical analytical approaches to semantics and as showing prototype effects (meaning a graded structure distinguishing centrality vs. marginality) in cognitive semantics. For categories with just two contrasting elements (subsets), prototype effects melt down to markedness.

The marked categories can be expressed by adding modifiers to category names that designate the unmarked end of the contrast set, as e.g. 'male nurse' – a marked category that contrasts with 'nurse' which is used as a generic term but strongly connotes females. In linguistics, the markedness manifests itself as a bundle of the following associated features:

- the unmarked occurs with higher frequency,
- the marked appears to represent a specialized subset of the whole,
- the marked conveys a more heavily articulated concept than the unmarked,
- distinctions that are critical within the unmarked item are ignored or neutralized when they occur within the marked item.

The last point describes mental colouring, a process that applies to the category to which markedness has been assigned, and which consists in "*intensifying the rigid contrast by figuratively painting all members of the marked category under a single stereotyped image*" (Brekhus 1996: 497), that is, all category members perceived as "looking the same", or not distinguishable from each other in a way relevant to categorization.

Brekhus' (1996) illustrative example of mental colouring in social categorisation of people is the concept of virginity. Virginity is a type of sexual identity based on creating a binary opposition between the positively connoted absence of sexual intercourse and having any amount, however slight, of such experience. In this binary scheme, the difference between having had one, and having had no sexual intercourse is categorial and the difference between having had one and three hundred cases of intercourse is not categorial and, consequently, not lexicalised.

3. Social colouring of blackness in America

The concepts of social markedness and mental colouring are essential for the comprehension of the perception and categorisation of biracial people of black and white descent in the United States. This categorisation is based on an ideal-type convention for assigning marked identities and thus preventing categories from overlapping, known in its most rigid form as the one-drop rule. The conceptual exclusion of overlapping between the categories of black and white is made possible by applying the 'rule of the excluded middle' – introducing the pair x– ~x as the classification criterion, where x is having a black ancestor and ~x is its opposite, that is, having no black ancestor (rather than having a white one).

While holding a lecture about this and associated topics for a mixed U.S. and European audience, I became acutely aware of the impossibility of producing a text on racial perceptions in the United States that would be adequate to the very different background knowledge and experience of these two different groups at the same time. The differences became very evident in that things new and exotic to the latter group were self-evidential truisms to the former one. The following two sections summarise the history and the current practice of categorisation by the one-drop-rule (as the extreme form of the rule of the excluded middle) for the sake of those (mainly non-American) readers for whom it is news.

4. A concise history of one-drop rule

In a nutshell, over the duration of the 19th and the first half of the 20th century, several different but similar classificatory criteria of blackness for judicial and administrative purposes co-existed, with legal blacks defined variedly as those who had one or more black African among eight, sixteen, or thirty-two ancestors (in one generation) in different states, with a brief episode of counting Mulattoes as a category separate from 'pure black' by the Census Bureau between 1900 and 1920. Alternatively, and this definition became wide-spread, a person was registered as being black if she or he had any known black African ancestors within the recorded history. This is the most encompassing definition of the one-drop-rule, with one in thirty two coming close to it for practical purposes, given that it covers the genealogical tree for six generations, i.e. approximately 150 years. The last widely known case of judicial confirmation of the principle was the case *Phipps vs. Louisiana* in 1985, where the applicant, applying for reclassification as white in her passport, lost the case in the state and federal courts on the grounds of having three black ancestors among thirty-two. The U.S. Supreme Court rejected to deal with the issue as it was judged insubstantial for federal affairs. To put this into perspective, it should be mentioned that among many categories of race and ethnicity in the United States, the category of blacks is the only one to which the one-drop-rule has been applied.

According to Davis (2001: 5), "*this definition emerged from the American South to become the nation's definition, generally accepted by Blacks and whites alike*". Although the practice of self-definition (to be more precise, the definition by the head of the family for its members) began in 1960, this does not seem to have introduced any

significant fluctuation in the membership of the black category, thus indicating that those on whom the rule was enforced before generally apply it in their self-identification (ibid: 12). Confusing as it may be, in spite of the policy of self-definition, U.S courts have taken 'a judicial notice' of the application of the one-drop rule as being a matter of common knowledge (ibid.).

5. "Pass as white"

The historical roots of the application of the one-drop-rule, including the prominent role it played in the institution of slavery, have been analysed in the last few decades in a number of books and are well known to those who care – for the wide public, though, the principle has acquired the status of nothing less than common sense. This is reflected in language use in ways that may seem paradoxical for people not acquainted with the rule, living in countries where the race of a newly-born is not registered in birth certificates[2] (as is the case in at least some U.S. states[3]), being black or white is not granted an administrative status, and different classificatory criteria, such as physical appearance, are applied for the practical purposes of communication about racial issues. In still other countries, administrative classification persists but is based on a different mix of criteria (cf. Davis 2001).

The linguistic paradoxes produced by the application of the rule include the set phrase 'pass as white', applied to those whom the rule excludes from the category of whiteness while they do not manifest physical traits typical for the black population, and the notion of "discovering" that someone is black (or, seldom, white) – the discoverer and the discovered being sometimes the same person. (For people not accustomed with the rule, the question poses itself how someone could possibly pass as white or black other than by actually *being* white or black.) A quick search on the Internet reveals the wide circulation of both linguistic phenomena:

pass/ed/ing as white 604400	*pass/ed/ing as black* 16070
discovered that he was black 1120	*discovered that she was black* 24
discovered that he was white 8	*discovered that she was white*[4] 2

In accordance with the direction of mental colouring of biracial people, the phrase *pass/ed/ing as black* was applied to people who could not actually claim any black ancestry. The current widespread use of the expression and its general comprehensibility in the United States testify to the perseverance of mental colouring in the local mental model of race.

With the one-drop-rule predominating in the recent past and still enjoying recognition and verbal display (in phrases such as the above), it goes without saying that people having one black parent or grandparent are definitely perceived and referred to as being black. The gradation in traits of appearance and the diversity of heritages are not reflected in verbal references.

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[2] This is news for many U.S. citizens.
[3] And this is news for many European citizens.
[4] Retrieved on August 22, 2010, http://www.google.com/.

6. Nominal categories and adjectival predicates

According to Brekhus (1996: 508), "*the difference between adjectives and nouns is nontrivial. Adjectives merely imply a minor identity characteristic among many, but nouns connote a specific 'type of person'*". In other words, talking for example of the white, the black, and the rich reflects and (re)produces more stable, distinct, clearly delineated, and socially significant categories of membership than talking of white, black or rich people. Thus, social colouring, dichotomising, and preventing categories from overlapping are led conceptually a step further if these processes result in social categories expressed by nominal expressions (cf. also strategies of nomination and predication in Discourse-Historical Approach within Critical Discourse Analysis, Reisigl/Wodak 2001).

7. Categorisation of biracial people in Poland and Germany: a survey

Testing conceptual categorisation of people of black and white descent in Poland and Germany, as well as the associated questions regarding the concepts of race and ethnicity in these two societies was undertaken by means of four surveys conducted in Germany and Poland. The respondents were students of English Philology[5], who may not be representative of the whole population but can be expected to be relatively well-informed on current political issues. This was helpful in obtaining a high ratio of qualified responses for some items.

The first survey testing the general categorisation of the human race into human 'races' was distributed among 49 students in Poland and 27 in Germany. The second survey tackled the issue of mental colouring by investigating the perception of the racial categorisation of Barack Obama. It was conducted with 86 students in Poland and 54 in Germany but provided only 60 qualified responses for Polish and 22 for German because only so many Polish and German respondents had the relevant knowledge about the President's parents.[6] The respondents in these two surveys partly overlapped, which made it possible to calculate correlations between some responses.

The third survey was conducted among 44 German students, and tested the views on the appropriateness of applying the labels *schwarz* and *Schwarzer* (adj. 'black', noun 'Black') in referring to Barack Obama (it could not be conducted with Polish students because of a language difference).

The fourth survey, conducted with 22 Polish and 21 German students, was a translation task and tested the comprehension of the one-drop rule as a principle of racial categorisation.

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[5] The students came from the state Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń and the private Academy of International Studies in Łódź in Poland, and the University of Regensburg in Germany.

[6] There was a considerable difference, though, between German graduate students and freshmen who were the majority of the sample. Another survey, conducted among German graduate students only, showed that the prevailing majority knew Barack Obama's descent.

## 7.1 The number of race categories

The goal of Survey 1 was to demonstrate in how far the tripartite division into white, black, and yellow race, itself of biblical origin but developed to a scientific concept in the 19th century, persists in the younger generations' conceptualisation of race. The respondents were provided with a series of pictures showing diverse people from different countries and continents and asked them to name their respective races.[7]

In addition to the traditional categories of white, black, and yellow, the responses included, to name but a few, African, Asian, European, Mulatto, Latin-American, Afro-American, South-European, Slavic-European, South-American, negroid, caucasian, Chinese, Portuguese, and Russian. The list shows that the concept of race intermingles very strongly with notions pertaining to region and nationality. Significant differences, though, could be observed between the German and the Polish respondents.

The responses were quantified by dividing them into

1) those with *black, white*, and *yellow* (or *Asian, European*, *African* and *mongoloid, negroid, europeid*) as the only labels used to classify the people in the photos (BYW);
2) those with the additional category *Mulatto, mixed*, or *white/black* (BYW+1);
3) those with a greater number of categories (5 or more), including B or W (B/W/3+);
4) those with a greater number of categories, including neither B nor Y nor W (no BYW).

To form a binary contrast for some calculations, the second, third, and fourth groups were combined into the category 'other than BYW'.

Diagram 1. Survey one: the number and kind of race categories applied to people on pictures. BYW- tripartite division black-yellow-white, BYW+mixed – as BYW plus an extra category of mixed white/black, B/W/3+ - more than four categories including white or black, no BYW – no use of the labels black, yellow, and white.

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[7] The pictures could not be reprinted here because most of them are copyrighted. Those of particular relevance were: item 3 - http://photobucket.com/images/andremug-blog/; item 6 - http://www.sammyboy.com/showthread.php?t=21857 Ilham Anas, retrieved on January 22, 2010.

A comparison of the responses showed that relatively many Poles opted for the classical tripartite division into three races, while they frequently added some other categories such as mixed and others (Latino, Eskimo, Hindu, Arabic, Mediterranean ...). The German respondents generally abhorred any mention of white, black, and yellow in their answers. About one-third of the Poles, and just one German respondent used the pure 'black-yellow-white' scheme. At the same time, only two Polish respondents and 67% of the Germans did not use any of the labels 'yellow', 'white' (alternatively, 'Arian' in two cases), or 'black'. *Gelb* ('yellow') did not occur at all in the German answers; the label *Asiatisch/Asiat/in* was used along with *Mongolisch*, *Vietnamesisch*, *Chinesisch*, and *Inuit* to refer to people with the so-called Mongolian fold. *Weiß/Weiße/white* and *schwarz/Schwarzer* ('black') were used sporadically (in 9 out of 27 responses, i.e. 33 per cent) but in all responses except one they were accompanied by several terms pertaining to region or nationality, including 3 cases in which they were modified to White/Black American. 'Black' and 'white' were used together (i.e., by the same respondents) in just 4 out of 27 answers. In contrast, 82 per cent of the Polish ones included labels *biała* 'white', and an additional 4% (2 persons) the label *aryjska* ('Arian', a term introduced by the Nazi ideologists to refer to the race of the supposedly highest virtues); 57% used the label 'black', 8% 'Negro' and 8% 'negroid' *(czarna*, *Murzyn*, and *negroidalna*, respectively). The label 'caucasian', introduced in the United States by Coon (1962) and roughly co-referential with 'white', was used by 5 Polish respondents (3 times together with 'white': *biała kaukaska*), and none of the German respondents.

One German respondent noted they she felt uneasy categorising people according to race. Even more significantly, a German colleague whom I asked to distribute the questionnaire among his students refused for the fear of being perceived as having racist inclinations by merely addressing the topic of race, and asked me to distribute it myself. He thought that being a foreigner with a non-native accent, I would not be subject to the same kind of associations and pejorative evaluation because the students were unlikely to apply the same criteria of judgement to someone not involved with the German history. As I announced the survey as a part of a cross-European study on labelling different types of people, the respondents may have made a conscious effort to avoid confirming the notoriety of the Germans in relation to the cultivation of racist ideas. In other words, they may have avoided anything even remotely reminiscent of racist categorisation, compromised by the Fascist ideology and counteracted by the education system after the Second World War. After the results had been analysed, the students were asked by their German teacher to comment on their responses and the questions asked. The following discussion confirmed that the careful avoidance of the "colour" labels was motivated by political correctness in general and the anxiety of suggesting a racist attitude in particular. The Polish students, on the other hand, displayed a rather high degree of acceptance for the tripartite division of the human race, although it is no longer included in the school curricula; they freely used the traditional labels.

7.2 Categorising biracial-looking people

Survey 1 also tested the occurrence of mental colouring. Among the pictures to be labelled, there was one showing a decidedly black-looking Afro-American, and Ilham

Anas[8], an Indonesian regarded as resembling Barack Obama (he was casted as Obama's double for a television ad). It is unlikely that prior to the resemblance being "discovered" by his family, Ilham Anas was regarded to be any more African-looking than any other Indonesian (Indonesians are either 'Caucasian' or 'mongoloid' in classical classifications).[9] The following diagram shows how many respondents placed both pictures in the same category.

Diagram 2. The proportion of respondents who placed the photos "XX" and "Ilham Anas" in the same category in Germany and Poland. Below: same category, above: different category.

The difference between Polish and German respondents was significant.[10] By necessity, the tendency to use WYB classification correlates strongly with the identical labelling of both pictures (Pearson's correlation coefficient =0.65); all WYB-respondents classified both of them as showing black persons (*czarna*, *negroidalna*, or *Murzyn*).[11]

For non-WYB respondents, the cross-cultural difference between the ratios of respondents who placed both photos in the same category was insignificant (22% for German vs. 33% for Polish). Obviously, opting for WYB strongly reinforces the racial mental colouring on which it is based; this tendency proved much stronger for the Polish students.

The second survey was concerned with the categorisation of Barack Obama, who is exceptional in being a highly known person of an exactly equal mix of the European (more recently, white American) and African descent. Asked to name Obama's race, 37% of those 60 Polish respondents who realised that the President was biracial used the

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[8] http://www.sammyboy.com/showthread.php?t=21857 Ilham Anas; retrieved on January 22, 2010.

[9] *Webster's Revised Unabridged Dictionary,* 1913.

[10] df=1; x^2=5.0; p<0.025.

[11] Other labels for Polish were: *mulat* "Mulato*"* (10), *Afroamerykanin* (12), *mieszana* or *czarna/biala* "mixed-race", "black/white*"* (3), *Hawajczyk* "Hawaian" (2), *Hindus* "Indian", *Indoeuropejczyk* "Indoeuropean", *Hiszpan* "Spaniard*"*, and *zambezi*. For the Germans, the labels included, next to schwarz, *Afro-Amerikaner, Mischling, Amerikaner, Südamerikaner, Afrikaner, Mexikaner, Mitteleuropäer, Indisch, Jamaikanisch, Latino*, und *Asiatisch*.

label *czarna* 'black' or *Murzyn* 'Negro', 45% thought he was mixed-race (*Mulat*, *biała/czarna*, *mieszana*), 17% used the label 'Afro-American', and the remaining respondent thought that he belonged to the human race. The 22 German respondents who knew about Barack Obama's biracial descent gave the following responses: 50% Afro-American, 9% Black/African-American, 27% African and European, African and North European or African and North American (9% each), 9% mixed-race (*Mischling*), and the remaining respondent (5%) thought he was of American race.

Diagram 3. Racial categorisation of Barack Obama by German and Polish respondents.

Again, the German respondents showed no inclination to use "colored" labels in referring to race and favoured the neutral terms 'Afro-American', pertaining to ethnicity, or 'African', 'American', and 'European' pertaining to geography rather than "*Rassenlehre*" ('science of race', a term coined by the Nazis). It should be mentioned that although the label 'Afro-American' was rarely used among Polish respondents in answering the question on race, it was familiar to them. This was tested by asking them to name Barack Obama's ethnicity – 65% of the respondents said 'Afro-American'. All those who answered '*I do not know'* (13%) named Afro-American in the response to the question on his race. The remaining 22% responded that he was of American or African ethnicity. The results confirm the differences in the approach to questions on race, with the tendency of the Germans to speak of categories in ethnic rather than racial terms. At the same time, the Polish respondents differentiated strongly between race and ethnicity. In order to clarify the results, a group of 44 German students were asked whether they found the label *schwarz/Schwarzer* (adjectival and nominal form of 'black/Black')

appropriate in referring to Barack Obama. The question was worded: "*Würdest Du Barack Obama als schwarz, bzw. einen Schwarzen bezeichnen?*" ('Would you call Barack Obama black *adj*, Black *noun*?') It elicited 37 positive and 7 negative responses. One respondent differentiated between the adjectival form *schwarz* as acceptable, and the nominal form as not acceptable because the latter created a category of people rather than just describing an attribute of an individual. This fits in with the claim by Davis (2001) quoted before, pertaining to the different force of nominal and adjectival references in the processes of the formation of categories and mental colouring. The justifications given by the respondents of their respective choices included factors listed in the table below. Diagram 6 shows the frequencies of the particular types of justifications.

YES – JUSTIFICATIONS

Explanation refers to language use – politically correct, no negative connotations

Explanation refers to language use – there are few alternatives in German

Explanation refers to language function – short and clear

Explanation refers to language use – prevailing usage for dark complexion even if not quite black
Explanation refers to the usage in the media campaign and/or symbolic function (hope, representative of the Black)

Explanation refers to complexion, physical appearance

Explanation refers to African descent

complexion and descent

NO – JUSTIFICATIONS

Racist connotations

Incorrect

Afro-American would be correct

skin colour is gradable

social experience different from the majority of the Blacks

Diagram 4. German respondents' answers to the question whether Obama should be called *schwarz/Schwarzer* ('black', adj./noun) and their justifications: NO – 1 social experience, 2 politically incorrect/racist (noun), 3 politically incorrect, YES – 4 prevailing usage, 5 media focus/symbolic function, 6 descent/appearance, 7 politically correct

Only 37% of all respondents gave answers pertaining to the appearance and descent, and the most gave justifications pertaining to socio-political factors, which is in accord with the German students' evaluation of "race" as being a socio-political category (see next section) as much as a biological one and little differentiation between race and ethnicity for the U.S. context.

It should be noted that this question could hardly be asked of Polish students without changing its sense because of some nuances of expression.[12]

7.3 Race as biological vs. socio-political category

The respondents in Survey 1 were asked whether they thought of race as a biological or socio-political category, with possible answers ranging from 1 (biological), through 2 and 3 (rather biological/rather socio-political), to 4 (socio-political). The average score of the Polish students was 1.5 (between 'biological' and 'rather biological'); for the German students, 2.4 (between 'rather biological' and 'rather socio-political'). This amounts to a considerable difference in attitudes. For the Polish students, the tendency to view race as a purely biological category correlated with the tendency to restrict their categorisation of people on the photos to WYB (Pearson's correlation coefficient =0.41 – medium positive). In other words, numerous respondents thought that their classification was "biological" while overriding pronounced differences in appearance between people in the photos.

7.4 Survey results summarised

The surveys showed that the German and Polish students differ strongly in their attitudes towards labelling races and their approach to the concept of race. The Poles opted for the "biology" view; the German students were more conscious of the social dimension of race, its sensitive character, and the issues of political correctness. The tendency towards the formation of a minimal number of non-overlapping categories and dichotomised categorisation of biracial people occurred in both populations but was much stronger in Poland.

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[12] In Polish, the adjective most widely used in this context to name the attribute of a person is *czarnoskóry*, "black-skinned" rather than "black". A pilot test showed that most Polish respondents understood the survey question, translated from German into Polish, as a matter of choice between "czarny" and the usual form "czarnoskóry". This interpretation is, of course, quite distant from what the question means in German. On the other hand, translating *black* as *czarnóskory* would produce a question pertaining strongly to the physical appearance. In other words, this relatively simple question could not be translated from German to Polish without a change of meaning, connotation, the suggested response and its justification.

7.5 Knowledge and comprehension of the one-drop rule

As stated above, the most extreme form of markedness assignment and mental colouring of the racial category 'black' is the one-drop rule, defining 'white' as non-presence of 'black' and 'black' as any mixture of white and black descent. The following mini-survey consisted of just one target item and aimed at testing whether the one-drop rule had any presence in the actual or potential conceptualisations of race by German and Polish students. Such presence could be constituted either by the awareness of the existence of the rule in the United States, or by the ability to reconstruct it from the premises in cases of its implicit (presuppositional) verbalisations, which would suggest that the same conceptualisation is ready at hand.

The students were asked to translate into their respective languages a short text containing the phrase "*pass as white*". Taking their level of proficiency into account, it could be expected that they would not have any trouble translating the expression "pass as + NOUN"; the remaining text was also easy to translate.

I applied the test in Poland in two versions differing in the strength of the contextual clues guiding the interpretation; each version had 11 respondents. Both are given below.
(1) He worked in a car factory. At work, he passed as white for five years.
(2) He worked in a car factory. At work, he passed as white for five years but he revealed his identity to a friend.

In fact, even the addition of more context did not result in any correct responses. 3 Polish respondents failed to offer any response; the remaining 19 produced most surprising guesses, including e.g. (the following is a back-translation from Polish):
'He worked illegally (Polish: literally "in black") *for five years.'*
'He worked honestly for five years.'
'He worked well for five years.'
'He worked for five years as a white-collar worker.'
'At work, he kept isolating himself for five years …'
'At work, he was not known for five years …'
'Although he was white, he managed to stay there for five years.'
The exercise must have been mind-boggling if just four people translated the phrase *pass as* correctly in the sense of 'be regarded as', using one of the Polish equivalents (*był uważany/był uznawany/uchodził za*). The four subject complements (translations of 'white') were: 'clean', 'an honest person', 'an example', and 'a common man'.

It was obvious that the students possessed no knowledge of the one-drop rule; neither were they able to reconstruct the premises (i.e. that being white, or black, is not merely a matter of appearance). When I explained the issue after the test, there was a general murmur of surprise in the class.

In the first run of the experiment, 14 German students correctly translated the phrase, which they received in version (2). Only one of them knew the one-drop-rule from the film "The Human Stain". One person left the phrase *passed as white* not translated, five translated it diffusely without a reference to whiteness[13] and one got it wrong (*white → höher qualifiziert*, 'higher qualified').

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[13] E.g. *blieb unerkannt*, "was not recognized".

Because the difference between the Poles and the Germans was puzzling, a further survey was conducted in which 24 German students were asked to translate the passage and invent a story where it might appear, in order to find out whether they are actually able to infer the said premises.[14] After the translation task, they were asked whether they had heard of the one-drop rule.

All students translated *white* as 'weiß/Weißer' (8/16). One person did not give any useful outline of the story, and four people outlined it in very general terms while indicating that it involved racist or migrant discrimination issues. From the remaining nineteen who gave more detailed responses, twelve persons identified the passage clearly as referring to a person of a light complexion and some African or otherwise non-European ancestors, and six realised that racism was at stake but thought either that the referent actually changed his physical appearance by using make-up or bleaching (four people), or that he was an albino coming from a black or Mexican family (two people). One student thought the referent was a blue-collar worker. Fifteen students located the story in the USA, and one in Germany at the time of national socialism. Only two students had heard of the one-drop rule.

As a whole, the German students showed a much greater ability to re-construe the principle of mental colouring, that is, a greater awareness that being classified as white or not is not just a matter of looks but also of family heritage independent of physical appearance, notwithstanding that it was not shared by all students alike. This general tendency comports with viewing the concept of race as not being mainly an issue of biology, demonstrated by the German students as discussed before (section 7.3).

8. References to Barack Obama's race and ethnicity in the Polish and German media

Table 1 below shows the wording of references to Barack Obama's race and/or ethnicity in two German and two Polish widely-circulated publications: the tabloids *Bild* (German) and *Super Express* (Polish), the broadsheet *Frankfurter Rundschau* (German) and the weekly *Polityka* (Polish). The figures pertain to the online versions of the publications in the period from February through December 2008 for *Frankfurter Rundschau*, *Polityka*, and *Super Express*, and the December 2008 through March 2009 for *Bild*. The selection was based on the availablity of the articles from the respective periods in the online archives.

The interlingual comparison between *Frankfurter Rundschau* and *Bild* shows that 85% and 80%, respectively, of relevant references involved a "colour" or ethnic term. At the same time, the nominal form of reference, *Schwarzer*, was much more frequent in the tabloid – which is known for its right-wing approach to the social issues such as migration and minorities. This fits in with Brekhus' (1996: 508) contention that there is a "non-trivial" difference between adjectives and nouns, and that nominal references are

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[14] One motivation for repeating the test was a comment of the translation teacher in the German course where it was conducted, who spoke of the students' tendency to "translate just as it stands there, no matter whether it makes sense, which, in this case, may have produced correct results just by chance".

more strongly affiliated with emphasizing difference, as well as with reinforcing pejorative connotations if there are any to start from. A further interlingual difference was observed in the more frequent use of 'Afro-American' (as an adjective or a noun) in *Frankfurter Rundschau*, and much lesser use of the adjective and the noun *farbig/Farbiger*. The use of *farbig*, both as an adjective and a noun, is regarded as pejorative by some (but not all) speakers of German; resented by the Blacks in Germany and acknowledged as being discriminatory by researchers on racism (cf. Noah Sow in an interview given to *Franfurter Rundschau*).[15]

In Polish, the broadsheet used the adjectives *czarny* and *czarnoskóry* ("black-skinned") with roughly similar frequency, while *Super Express* opted for *czarnoskóry* with just 2 exceptions (*czarny* and *Afroamerykanin*) among 50 references. No conclusions, though, can be drawn about the ideological value of these preferences because none of the two sources shows a distinguished profile as far as the racial or minority issues are concerned. The usage of the noun *Afroamerykanin* and the corresponding adjective was very low in both sources.

	GERMAN			POLISH	
	Frankfurter Rundschau	Bild		Polityka	Super Expres
	[951]	[1312]		[87]	[233]
schwarz (adjective, black)	74%	51%	czarny	33%	2%
Schwarzer (noun, Black)	10%	19%			
"schwarzer Kennedy", JFK	1%	13%	„czarny Kennedy", JFK	12%	4%
schwarzhäutiger Kennedy, JFK	0%	0%	czarnoskóry Kennedy, JFK	16%	0%
halb schwarz	0%	0%	na wpół czarny	2%	0%
Afro-amerikanisch, afroamerikanisch	5%	2%	afroamerykański	0%	0%

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[15] Published online on October 17, 2008,
http://www.fr-online.de/in_und_ausland/politik/aktuell/?em_cnt= 1614568&; retrieved on January 22, 2010.

	GERMAN			POLISH	
	Frankfurter Rundschau	Bild		Polityka	Super Expres
	[951]	[1312]		[87]	[233]
Afro-Amerikaner, Afroamerikaner	7%	3%	Afroamerykanin	2%	2%
farbig (adjective, coloured)	1%	8%	kolorowy	0%	0%
Farbiger (noun, coloured)	1%	3%			
dunkelhäutig (dark-skinned)	0%	1%	ciemnoskóry	0%	0%
schwarzhäutig (black-skinned)	0%	0%	czarnoskóry	31%	92%
mit dunkler Hautfarbe	0%	2%	o ciemnej skórze	0%	0%
Mulate (mulatto)	0%		Mulat	2%	0%
Total	224	240		49	52

Table 1. Language use in references to Barack Obama's race/ethnicity in selected Polish and German dailies and periodicals (online versions). The figures in square brackets refer to the number of articles in which Barack Obama is mentioned.

The table shows that referring to the President as 'black' in German and either 'black' or 'black-skinned' in Polish was the prevailing practice in both countries, especially in Poland. The terms *mulat*, *Mischling*, or expressions meaning 'black and white' were hardly used or not used at all, although they were applied to him in the earlier quoted surveys. This was to be expected because the news in both countries were based on U.S. media sources, from which they were translated, and reproduced the linguistic practice as well as categorisations and attributions represented in the latter.

However, this seemingly unproblematic practice became a debated issue, even if the debate was never at the centre of public attention. It was led with engagement in the shadow of the news reports on the presidential campaign by people similarly opposing racial discrimination but representing contrary attitudes towards the linguistic or classificatory issue.

The controversy and the argumentation for and against the continued mentally-coloured language use (in which people of white-and-black descent are, simply, black) has an old history. This does not imply that this history is known to the ever-changing participants in the discussion, who may be re-inventing the relevant argumentation for themselves when they become interested in the problem.

The following recapitulation clarifies the basic nature of the contention. Then, examples are given from the discussion ignited by Barack Obama's campaign. Proponents of non-racist language use in the United States or other countries basically draw their frameworks from the two approaches outlined below.

9. Discussions on the dichotomising language use in the media

In a nutshell, the antiracist attitudes towards dichotomising language use boil down to the following two options. The first group thinks it should be opposed as it is unjust. The other group believes that it is wrong to oppose it because this only severs discrimination. Both supporters and opponents of the dichotomizing language use are similarly concerned about discrimination, and frequently view the practices different from their own as being discriminatory.

Those who think that the rule should be opposed have one principal argument – they argue that the asymmetry in the criteria used for distributing blackness and whiteness clearly implies their unequal status, and any asymmetry is discriminatory in itself.

The following is a summary of arguments used by those who think that the dichotomy should be continually used, extracted from Davis (2001):

- Opposing it amounts to the degree of discrimination becoming dependent on the degree of a person's visible or hereditary blackness[16].
- A graded re-classification (more/less black) ignores the historical continuity of the experience of discrimination and opposition against it.
- Opposing the rule would undermine the solidarity of the oppressed.
- Re-classification would exclude many historical personalities, symbols of "black pride", from the very category they fought (or have been fighting) for.
- The classification reflects self-identification of racially mixed people with the Black community and is a matter of personal freedom.

The following quotations from the electronic and electronically re-produced printed media illustrate some of the above-listed arguments, and show the paradox of basically the same intention producing contrary guidelines regarding the ethically right language use. The quotations show how the same motives and arguments cut through various countries, as well as simple-minded and more sophisticated levels of reflection.

iii. Obama is not black
BETTINA STEINER (Die Presse)
Well, in the first place here is a correction: There will be no black President in the White House! I mean, not in the following few years, this I happen to know from the horse's

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[16] Cf. also „colorism", Walker 1983.

mouth. It is not the case that I have received a secret report from the new James Bond. I also do not worry about an armed coup. It is just that Barack Obama is not exactly black! Or, to be exact, if we claim that he is black, we could as well call him white. He has a white mother and black father. But we do not care about the white part. White, as it seems, means – pure white.
Does this already mean racism?
No idea. I have no answer.[17]

While Bettina Steiner notes the asymmetry, but is inconclusive about its interpretation as an expression of tainted perception and discriminatory attitude, the following quotation comes from a Polish online discussion forum on current political affairs and represents a firm stand on the issue:

> **iv. Obama – the first black U.S. President**
> *Obama is not black. Obama is black white. He is a mulatto 50/50. [18]*

> **v. Re: To be precise**
> *Which Negro? What black? He has a white mother and a black father. Which means that he is half white. [19]*

These quotations from German and Polish may arouse the impression that what is at stake here is mixing up the meaning of the German word *schwarz/Schwarzer* and, even more so, the Polish words *czarny/czarnoskóry,* which refer to physical appearance, with *Black* as it is used in the American media – as a reference to ethnicity and a political group of interest. The latter reference is connected to the referent's self-identification as much as his or her life experience, as indicated by the famous headline "*Is he Black enough?*"[20] in a article considering his being worthy of Black support, with a view to

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[17] ***iii. Obama ist nicht schwarz***
Also zunächst einmal eine Korrektur: Es wird auch weiterhin keinen schwarzen Präsidenten im Weißen Haus geben! Jedenfalls nicht in den nächsten Jahren, das weiß ich zufällig aus erster Hand. Nicht, dass mir der neue James Bond geheime Informationen zugetragen hätte. Ich befürchte auch keinen bewaffneten Putsch. Es ist nur so: Barack Obama ist eigentlich gar nicht schwarz! Oder besser: Wenn wir behaupten, er sei schwarz, dann können wir ihn mit dem gleichen Recht einen Weißen nennen. Er hat eine weiße Mutter und einen schwarzen Vater. Aber der weiße Anteil ist uns wurscht. Weiß, das bedeutet offenbar reinweiß. Ob das schon rassistisch ist?Keine Ahnung. Kann ich nicht beantworten.

[18] 05.11.08, 06:33 http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/w,902,86819882,86820051, Obama_pierwszy_czarny_prezydent_USA.html
iv. Obama - pierwszy czarny prezydent USA
Obama nie jest czarny. Obama jest czarny biały.Obama jest mulatem 50/50.
05.11.08, 06:33 http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/w,902,86819882,86820051, Obama_pierwszy_czarny_prezydent_USA.html

[19] 05.11.08, 08:25 http://forum.gazeta.pl/forum/w,902,86819882, Obama_pierwszy _czarny_prezydent_USA.html?v=2v.
Re: W kwestii formalnej
Jaki murzyn? Jaki czarnoskóry? Przecież on ma białą matkę i czarnego ojca. Czyli jest w połowie biały.

[20] Michael Fauntroy in *The Huffington Post*, January 30, 2007, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/michael-fauntroy-phd/is-he-black-enough_b_40048.html

these both aspects of the presidential candidate during the campaign. (The article was definitely not concerned with Barack Obama's looks, and it would have been most shocking if this had been the case, regarding, among other things, that many prominent activists of the Black movement are of black and white heritage.) In this interpretation, the doubts and dislikes regarding the correctness of the attribution would melt down to cultural-linguistic ignorance, i.e. not knowing the intension of the words *black/Black* in American English, which actually mean "Afro-American", and which *schwarz* and *czarny* are merely literal translations of. (See e.g. quotation X below in which *black* and *Afro-American* are treated as strictly synonymous in AE).

Viewed from this perspective, the controversy stems from the lack of a suitable German and Polish translation equivalent as a result of the non-existence of the phenomenon itself, i.e., an ethnic group of people of African origin, who share a common historical experience spanning several generations and have worked out their own distinguished culture, including lifestyle, institutions, and varieties of language. In contrast, Afro-Germans are first- or second-generation immigrants, come from many different parts of Africa, identify themselves mainly with particular African ethnic groups, speak different languages at home and have no common historical heritage apart from the post-colonial experience, which is culturally and linguistically diversified, plus the very recent individual experience of migration. This, obviously, is not enough to form an ethnicity.[21] In Poland, black and biracial people are few in number and, like in Germany, do not form an ethnic group.

However, such a rendering of the issue as a linguistic misunderstanding is largely invalidated by the occurrence of the same sentiments and interpretations based on the asymmetry argument in the United States, illustrated by the following quotations coming, respectively, from a non-expert and a writer on racial issues:

> '*vi. Yahoo!answers*
> *If someone is half white/half black, what race do they belong to?*
> *Barrack Hussein Obama is listed as "the Black Senator" from Illinois, but his mother was white. He is just as much white as he is black.......are the people who call him black being racist, because they see the color of his skin first?*
> *Best answer – chosen by Asker*
> *It is a throwback to the bad, old days when they used to claim that if someone has so much as a drop of black blood, they were black. Yes, I think it's racist, but it's become so widely accepted that I think people have forgotten about that - until someone like you poses the question.*
> *Wouldn't it be nice if we didn't think in those terms at all?* '[22]

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[21] It is worth noting that first- and second-generation Afro-German teenagers have already started to vigorously produce an ethnicity based on their shared African roots. A cultural practice unique to them is, in the year 2010, the so-called jerk dance, performed in the streets and public buildings and initiated by Black teenagers in Los Angeles. Jerk dance groups in Germany, publishing their dance videos on Youtube, consist exclusively of youth of some African heritage. I observed that other wanna-bes are excluded from participation even if there are family ties at stake, in patchwork families such as my own.

[22] http://ca.answers.yahoo.com/question/index?qid=20061109182215AALPv4E. Both comments came from people writing in the U.S..

While reasoning from the "asymmetry" argument is rather tentative here, the U.S. writer Marie Arana takes a clear stance. The author is a Peruvian-born U.S. citizen and the author of the autobiographical book *America Chica: Two Worlds, One Childhood.*

> *'vii. He's Not Black*
> *By Marie Arana, The Washington Post[23]*
> *He is also half white.*
> *Unless the one-drop rule still applies, our president-elect is not black.*
> *We call him that -- he calls himself that -- because we use dated language and logic. After more than 300 years and much difficult history, we hew to the old racist rule: Part-black is all black. Fifty percent equals a hundred. There's no in-between.*
> *That was my reaction when I read these words on the front page of this newspaper the day after the election: "Obama Makes History: U.S. Decisively Elects First Black President."*
> *The phrase was repeated in much the same form by one media organization after another. It's as if we have one foot in the future and another still mired in the Old South. We are racially sophisticated enough to elect a non-white president, and we are so racially backward that we insist on calling him black. Progress has outpaced vocabulary.*
> *To me, as to increasing numbers of mixed-race people, Barack Obama is not our first black president. He is our first biracial, bicultural president. He is more than the personification of African American achievement. He is a bridge between races, a living symbol of tolerance, a signal that strict racial categories must go.'*

Marie Arana sees the use of dichotomising "colour" labels as rooted in ways of perception formed by the tradition of racist oppression, "racially backward" and "mired in the Old South". The language used is strongly evaluative and does not leave any doubts about whom she sides with. Her stance has been opposed by direct responses to this contribution, illustrating two of the above-listed counter-arguments to symmetry: experience (*viii, ix*) and choice (*ix, x*).

> *'viii. (...) Yes, Barack Obama is our first African American president. Why, because he identifies himself as such. His experiences and details have been much what many blacks have endured in regards to racism and bigotry. If he was pulled over by the police (before running for president) I am sure he was profiled just like any other black male. I'm sure the police could give beans about his fifty-percent white heritage. Is it right, absolutely not but again this is the real world. I understand what your article was trying to say but I disagree with how you say it. President-elect Obama is definitely black, because that is how he has lived his life. (...)[24]*

> *ix. Well, if Barack isn't Black, since I am brown skinned, since my both parents have grandparents of white descent, I too should be considered biracial. Along with many black people in the Western hemisphere. The problem with accepting that bi-racial thing is figuring out where do you draw the line. The fact is many people of African descent have non-black ancestry and believe me no one stops to ask us what we are mixed with. Mixing is not a new phenomenon and I might add that as a West Indian, my great-grandfather (a man of mixed descent) married a white woman. I'm sorry but I am a mixed*

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heritage woman that have no qualms calling myself a Black woman. No one should be imposing their views on what I consider myself and the same should be done for Obama. (...)[25]

x. He's Black, Get Over It
I know, it's hard to believe, but some people are still having trouble with it. (...)
If identifying biracial people as black "validates the separation of the races" then there is perhaps no one contributing more to the cause of these neo-segregationists than Barack Obama himself. "My view has always been that I'm African-American," Obama told Chicago Tribune *reporter Dawn Turner Trice back in 2004. "African Americans by definition, we're a hybrid people." In seeking a validation of her own ideas about race and racial identity, and by casting Obama as the victim of a reductive racial vocabulary, Arenas simply ignores the will of her subject. But racial categories are only unjust insofar as they prevent people from identifying how they wish. Arenas is doing exactly what she is attempting to prevent, forcing Obama into the racial category of her, rather than his own, choosing.* [26]

The ironic formulation "*get over it*" in (*x*) does not only sound strongly adversary and accusatory of those to whom the directive is addressed but also implies a shock and regret on their part. The people who disclaim Barack Obama as being "simply" black are rendered rather contemptuously as "*still having trouble with it*", and thus represented as being on the wrong side of the barricade – fighting for a lost and erroneous cause.

In Germany, an even stronger polemic supportive of the term 'Schwarz/er' in references to Barack Obama and other biracial people has been offered by a renowned expert on the racial issue, Noah Sow, in an interview for *Frankfurter Rundschau*. However, it needs to be emphasized that this happened as a criticism of the alternative term *Farbig* ('coloured'), and that Sow denies any reality to the notion of race apart from political reality. The argument from choice is accompanied by pointing out the semantic-political dimension of the term *Schwarzer* (taken to be an equivalent of *Black*), i.e. defining it as referring simply to a political group of interest rather than some biological attribute (the term is to be spelled with a capital letter in English to distinguish it from references to complexion). Besides, racism and the proximity to Nazi ideology are attributed to adherents of different linguistic practices:

'*xi. FR: How would you explain the fact that some people are reluctant to use the politically correct term "Schwarzer"?*
NS: Because they still have some of the Rassenlehre in their heads. And because they do not know that "Schwarz" is a political concept. Or they think that they do not need to respect the right of the black people to name themselves. [27]

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[25] ibid.

[26] http://www.jackandjillpolitics.com/2008/12/hes-black-get-over-it/

[27] Frankfurter Rundschau, 17 October 2008, http://www.fr-online.de/in_und_ausland/politik/ aktuell/?em_cnt= 1614568&, retrieved on January 22, 2010.
FR: Wie erklären Sie sich, dass manche Leute sich scheuen, die korrekte Bezeichnung "Schwarzer" zu benutzen?
NS: Weil sie wohl noch nicht ganz die Rassenlehre aus ihrem Kopf haben. Und nicht wissen, dass "Schwarz" ein politischer Begriff ist. Oder finden, dass sie das Selbstbenennungsrecht Schwarzer Menschen nicht beachten müssen.

Yet, the most widely circulated German discussion on this issue took place in the printed edition of the tabloid *BILD am SONNTAG* with a readership estimated at 10.5 million, and reprinted in the online edition of *Bild*. It consisted of a reader's letter to the editor in chief, Claus Strunz, and the editor's answer.

> **'xii. Why do you call Barack Obama "black", Mister Strunz?**
> **Dear Mr. Strunz,**
> *Barack Obama has been repeatedly referred to in the German newspapers as a black candidate for presidency. Obama is, however, not black but coloured. His mother is a White from Kansas, his father is a Black from Kenya.*
> *Maybe you should, Mr. Strunz, make your journalists aware of this difference, even though it may be difficult for some of them to distance themselves from stereotypical pictures of America, such as racism, because a black U.S. President suits polemic argumentation better than a (merely) coloured president, which Obama – if he becomes one – is going to be.*
> *With best wishes*
> *Jürgen Rosenfeld, California (USA)[28]*
> **xiii. Dear Jürgen Rosenfeld,**
> *Thank you for your letter to me about how to correctly refer to Barack Obama. Is he, as repeatedly written in BILD am SONNTAG, a "black presidential candidate", a "coloured" or an "Afro-American"?*
> *Correct ethnic references change. As recently as several decades ago one did not hesitate to use the word "Neger" (Lain niger=black) for people of dark skin colour.*
> *Hans J. Massaquoi, who grew up in the Third Reich – his mother came from Hamburg, his father from Liberia – gave his highly-recommended memoirs published in 1999 the title "Neger, Neger, Schornsteinfeger", because he frequently had to hear this children's rhyme.*
> *Today, the word "Neger" is regarded as being taboo, probably because it sounds too much like the discriminating word "Nigger". Therefore, the Berlin CDU-polititian Frank Steffel was rightly condemned for insensitive language use after he used the word in 2001.*
> *Politically correct, but also inconvenient for everyday use, is the word "Afro-American to refer to a U.S. citizen whose parents or parent stem from Africa. The analogical word "Afrogerman" has not gained currency. I find it clumsy.*
> *The word you prefer, Coloured, is certainly not false but, to be precise, it also includes other parts of the population, such as the Indians or Hindu, therefore it lacks precision.*

(Author's comment:)"Rassenlehre" - "race science", the Nazi teachings of the hierarchy of the races

[28] Bild am Sonntag, 5. 7. 2008.

xii. Der Chefredakteur antwortet Warum nennen Sie Obama „schwarz", Herr Strunz?
Lieber Herr Strunz,
*Barack Obama wird in den deutschen Zeitungen wiederholt als **schwarzer Präsidentschaftskandidat** bezeichnet. Obama ist aber kein Schwarzer, sondern ein Farbiger. Seine Mutter, eine Weiße aus Kansas, sein Vater, ein Schwarzer aus Kenia.*
Vielleicht sollten Sie, Herr Strunz, Ihre Redakteure einmal auf diesen Unterschied hinweisen, wenngleich es manchem Redakteur auch schwerfallen mag, sich von allgemeinen Klischees über Amerika, wie etwa dem des Rassismus, zu trennen, weil eben ein schwarzer US-Präsident besser zum polemischen Argumentieren passt als (nur) ein farbiger Präsident, der Obama – wenn er es werden würde – nun einmal ist.
Mit freundlichen Grüßen
Jürgen Rosenfeld, California (USA)

A short time ago the son of the U.S. civil rights leader Martin Luther King Jr. was asked by a journalist from "Stern": "Why is someone who has a white mother and a black father authomatically black?" Martin Luther King III's response was: "This goes back to a definition developed once by the Europeans. When you have just a drop of black blood, you are black. I think that people look at Obama and believe that he looks black. Even if he looked somewhat whiter than he does, he would still be regarded as Black." Have I convinced you?

BILD am SONNTAG sticks to the expression "Black" (noun) in references to the presidential candidate of the Democrats also because "black" is what he calls himself, as with many other Afroamericans.

You certainly do not want to claim that Mr. Obama discriminates against himself, dear Jürgen Rosenfeld.

BILD am SONNTAG' [29]

The reader, Jürgen Rosenfeld, proposes that Barack Obama be called *farbig* or *Farbiger* ('coloured' *adj.*, 'Coloured' *noun*) because he isn't black. The arguments named by the editor in chief, Claus Strunz, defending the label *Schwarzer* ('Black') for Barack Obama are:

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[29] ibid.

xiii. Lieber Jürgen Rosenfeld,

herzlichen Dank für Ihr Schreiben an mich, wie man Barack Obama korrekt bezeichnet. Ist er, wie wir in BILD am SONNTAG es mehrfach geschrieben haben, ein „schwarzer Präsidentschaftskandidat", ein „farbiger" oder „Afroamerikanischer"?

Die korrekten ethnischen Bezeichnungen wandeln sich. Noch vor einigen Jahrzehnten wurde ganz ohne Arg der aus dem 17. Jahrhundert stammende Begriff „Neger" (lateinisch niger = schwarz für einen dunkelhäutigen Menschen verwendet.

Der im Dritten Reich aufgewachsene Hans J. Massaquoi – Mutter Hamburgerin, Vater Liberianer – gab seinen 1999 erschienenen lesenswerten Memoiren den Titel „Neger, Neger, Schornsteinfeger", weil er als kleiner Junge diesen Kinderreim oft zu hören bekam.

Heute gilt das Wort Neger als tabu, weil es wohl zu sehr an das diskriminierende Wort „Nigger" erinnert. Zu Recht wurde dem Berliner CDU-Politiker Frank Steffel unsensibler Sprachgebrauch vorgeworfen, als er 2001 das Wort „Neger" verwendete.

Politisch korrekt aber auch umständlich für den Alltagsgebrauch ist die Bezeichnung „Afroamerikaner" für einen US-Bürger, dessen Eltern bzw. ein Elternteil aus Afrika stammt. Der analoge Begriff Afrodeutscher hat sich bisher nicht durchgesetzt. Ich empfinde ihn als verkrampft.

Die von Ihnen favorisierte Bezeichnung „Farbiger" ist sicherlich nicht falsch, doch umfasst er streng genommen weitere Bevölkerungsgruppen wie zum Beispiel die Indianer oder Inder, ist also unpräzise.

Kürzlich wurde der Sohn des vor 40 Jahren ermordeten US-Bürgerrechtlers Martin Luther King von einem „Stern"-Reporter gefragt: „Warum ist einer, der eine weiße Mutter und einen schwarzen Vater hat, automatisch black?" Die Antwort von Martin Luther King III.: „Das geht zurück auf eine Definition, die die Europäer mal entwickelten. Wenn du nur einen Tropfen schwarzen Bluts in dir hast, bist du Schwarzer. Ich glaube, Leute schauen sich Obama an und halten sein Aussehen für das eines Schwarzen. Selbst wenn er noch etwas weißer wäre, würde er als Schwarzer gelten" Überzeugt?

BILD am SONNTAG bleibt auch deshalb bei dem Ausdruck „Schwarzer" für den Präsidentschaftskandidaten der Demokraten, weil Barack Obama sich wie viele Afroamerikaner selbst als „black" bezeichnet.

Dass Mr. Obama sich selbst diskriminiert, wollen Sie, lieber Jürgen Rosenfeld, doch sicher nicht unterstellen.

- the label 'coloured' is not bad, but it is imprecise, as it also includes other minorities such as American Indians,
- the label 'black' corresponds to the current language use,
- the current use of this language has been confirmed recently in a published interview with the son of Martin Luther King Jr. (Martin Luther King III is quoted as saying that this categorisation was developed once by Europeans),
- Barack Obama refers to himself as being Black – and he would certainly not want to discriminate against himself. [30]

Whatever Jürgen Rosenfeld's motivation was in writing his letter to the editor (his use of *farbig*, regarded as derogatory by Sow and African migrants in Germany, may arouse doubts regarding the cause he represents), what is of interest here is the editor's answer, voicing the view that self-reference conforming to the one-drop-rule is based on choice.

The argument from choice, represented also in the earlier-quoted responses to the contribution by Marie Arana in (*viii*), (*ix*), and (*x*), is rejected e.g. by Davis (2001: 5), who states laconically: "*Blacks had no other choice.*" Similarly, Brekhus (1996) points out the lack of real choice in self-identification because for members of the marked category self-identification is guided by definition they received from others; any self-categorisation must be socially legitimised in order to become capable of being effectively used in communication ("*Communication requires that speakers should base their interactions on validity claims that are acceptable to their fellows*", Agozino 2003: 104). However, as illustrated above, the argument reappears in the public debate in both Germany and the United States.

Another group of arguments in favour of the "biracial-black" are arguments from black pride, as illustrated by the following exchange on a Polish discussion forum on African affairs:

'xiv. Afraid?! (=pun "Obama"<>"Obawa" , Polish: fear)
Obama, that is to say President Obama, is a historical personage now. But ... everybody calls him "black", "black-skinned" or (a word I detest) "Negro". Why? He is as black as he is white. As far as the membership in the unjust racial division, he is a Mulatto. That is, every White can say he represents us. Every Black can feel represented by him. At this point, we should ask ourselves whether the artificially imposed division into races makes any sense at all. (...) For many people "black" is a synonym of "worse". Fortunately, this website shows that there is only one word – "human", without division into "colors". (...) Ifunanya [31]

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[30] Claus Strunz's response is actually based on at least one false premise (causal explanation by a celebrity being equalled with rationalisation and justification); this issue cannot be pursued here.

[31] 06-11-2008, http://afryka.org/?showNewsPlus=3352
xiv. Obawa?!
Obama, a raczej prezydent Obama, jest w tym momencie osoba historyczna. Ale... Kazdy mowi o nim "czarny", "czarnoskory" czy (tak nie lubiane przeze mnie slowo) "Murzyn". Dlaczego? Jest tak samo czarny, jak bialy. Pod wzgledem "przynaleznosci" do niesprawiedliwego podzialu na rasy: jest mulatem. Czyli kazdy bialy moze powiedziec, ze to nas reprezentuje. Kazdy czarny, ze jest ich przedstawicielem. W tym momencie nalezaloby sie zastanowic czy sztucznie narzucony "podzial" na rasy ma jakikolwiek sens? (...) Dla wielu ludzi "czarny" jest synonimem slowa "gorszy". Na szczescie ten portal pokazuje, ze istnieje tylko slowo "czlowiek", nie dzielac na "kolory" (...) Ifunanya

xv. Obama is a black man

I regret to say this Inunanya, but in this case most of my black friends would accuse you of typically "whitey" thinking, because of your attempt to take away the achievements of the black U.S. President by denying his "blackness". They would say you regarded him to be "black" as a candidate, but now as president you want him "white", or at least "not black". I know this is not what you meant, and probably I also should not comment on this for my friends (because this is also an indiscretion of sorts), but the relations between the races are as they are. I would refrain from saying that Obama is not (only) a black man. He is a pride (and well deserved for sure) of all black people in the world. It's like claiming after the election of JPII for the Pope that he was not quite Polish (but, rather, a Mountaineer, or more of a Catholic – it is harder to find a reason, but let's imagine there is one). The Poles would tear your head off ☺. Maybe JPII is not the best example – possibly Maria Sklodowska-Curie and the contention about her being Polish would be better – but only this example arouses comparable emotions.

It is interesting how sensitive and deceptive any discussion becomes when skin colour is in any way concerned. This always makes the topic heavy, because it touches upon a sensibility and loyalty to the group which is closer, in one way or another, to one's own ego. In a way, it seems that we are all "fanclub members" by nature, to a greater or lesser degree.

Marcin_emi [32]

These two texts illustrate again how both the supporters and opponents of dichotomising language use are similarly concerned about discrimination and view the advocates of practices different from their own as supporters of unfair treatment. In (*xv*), the apparent "injustice" inherent in the asymmetrical treatment is rendered fully irrelevant in view of the factual social inequality of the races, which is to some extent outbalanced by the categorisation of a prominent personage as a member of the "weaker" party. At the same

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[32] 07-11-2008, http://afryka.org/?showNewsPlus=3352, retrieved on January 22, 2010.

xv. Obama jest czarnym człowiekiem

Przykro mi Ifunanya, ale w tym przypadku większość moich czarnoskórych znajomych zarzuciła by Ci typowo 'białaskie' myślenie. Za próbę odbierania zasług i osiągnięć czarnoskórego prezydenta USA przez negowanie jego 'czarności'. Powiedzieli by, że, wg Ciebie, to jako kandydat on był 'czarnoskóry', a teraz chcesz, by jako prezydent był 'biały', albo przynajmniej 'nie czarny'. Wiem, że nie o to Ci chodziło, i wiem, że pewnie nie powinienem nawet tego komentować za moich znajomych (bo to też jest w sumie pewnego rodzaju nietakt), ale specyfika relacji między rasami jest taka, a nie inna. Dlatego wystrzegałbym się stwierdzania (teraz), że Barack Obama nie jest przecież tylko czarnym człowiekiem. On jest dumą (zasłużoną w każdym calu) czarnoskórych na całym świecie. To jest tak, jakbyś stwierdził po wyborze papieża JPII, że nie jest on całkiem Polakiem (tylko np Góralem, albo bardziej katolikiem, niż Polakiem - w tym przypadku ciężej znaleźć powód, ale wyobraźmy sobie, że taki istnieje). Polacy by Ci chyba głowę urwali :). Może JPII nie jest tutaj dobrym przykładem (np. lepszym byłby Maria Skłodowska-Curie i spór o jej polskość) ale jedynie ten przykład wiąże ze sobą porównywalny poziom emocji.

Swoją drogą to interesującym jest to, jak bardzo delikatna i obfitująca w zasadzki staje się dyskusja na temat czegokolwiek co dotyczy koloru skóry człowieka. To zawsze czyni temat ciężkim, bo dotyka wrażliwości i wrodzonego poczucia przynależności i lojalności wobec grupy bardziej zbliżonej (na różne sposoby) do własnego 'ja' każdego z nas. Wychodzi na to, że z natury jesteśmy w mniejszym lub większym stopniu 'kibolami'. (:)

Marcin_emi

time, similarly as in (*x*), insisting on the "statistical" 50/50 view is interpreted as an act of envy and unwillingness to admit any bit of success to the under-privileged minority. The argument in (*xv*) takes its force from emphasizing the right of the oppressed minority to claim an achievement, and can only be convincingly opposed by someone claiming the same from a different angle. Such a claim occurs in (*xvi*) which is a response to (*xv*):

> **'*xvi*.** *Show your friends Obama's photos from his childhood – a white mom and an absent dad. Blackness vanishes somehow, doesn't it?*
> *Marcin_emi – your friends may feel annoyed because calling Obama a Mulatto is disclaiming the Black achievement and negating his origins, but calling him black negates all the hard work which his mother put into his upbringing – it is like claiming she had never been there. As a black man's woman I refuse to cooperate on that. My children will be just as white as they will be black, and just as Polish as Zimbabweish ... [33]*

10. Conclusion

The surveys testing the language use and social perception of people of white and black descent among the German and Polish youths revealed a tendency towards mental colouring in which 'black' is the marked part of the spectrum in both communities. This tendency was stronger in the Poles due to their relatively strong adherence to the classical categorisation of races into a few categories, which many respondents treated as non-overlapping. At the same time, the surveys proved that the German youths were much more conscious of the sensitive socio-political nature of racial classification and understood race as being a socio-political and biological category to equal degree. They distanced themselves from the historical classifications of the human race into "races" in favour of attributions emphasizing geographic diversity of human appearance. The Poles treated race prevailingly as a biological notion carrying only a slight socio-political aspect. This was consistent with the respondents' inability to reconstruct the one-drop rule (the premise that being white is not merely a matter of looks) in a translation task, as well as with the prevailing tendency to translate *black* as *czarnoskóry* ('black-skinned'), referring unanimously to appearance, in the Polish press.

The most interesting conclusion that could be drawn from the observation of the public debate about "biracial=black" led in the press and online media in the United States, Germany, and Poland showed that, paradoxically, the proponents and opponents of applying mentally-coloured language when referring to people of black and white descent regard linguistic choices different from their own as symptomatic of explicit or hidden racism. This demonstrates that whichever solution is chosen in speaking about

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[33] 07-11-2008, http://afryka.org/?showNewsPlus=3352, retrieved on January 22, 2010

xvi. Pokaż swoim znajomym zdjęcie Obamy z okresu dorastania - biała mama i nieobecny tatuś. Jakoś ta czarność chyba zanika?

Marcin_emi - może i Twoi znajomi się burzą, ze nazywając Obamę Mulatem odbiera się osiągnięcia Murzynów i neguje jego pochodzenie, ale nazywając go czarnym neguje się całą ciężką pracę, jaką włożyła jego matka w jego wychowanie - to tak, jakby powiedzieć, że jej nigdy nie było. Jako kobieta czarnego faceta odmawiam współpracy. Moje dzieci będą tak samo białe jak i czarne i tak samo polskie jak i zimbabweńskie...

them, in particular by those who are unlikely victims of racial discrimination, it will have a considerable potential for sparking accusations of racism. In other words, a tendency to produce controversies and moral evaluations pertaining to any sort of language use is inherent in the subject matter, and no way of speaking is considered free of suspicion when value-laden issues such as racial categorisation and discrimination are at stake.

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LIKE IN SIMILES – A RELEVANCE-THEORETIC VIEW

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Abstract
The paper examines the meaning of *like* as used in similes in the light of relevance theory. Similes, even though superficially indistinguishable from literal comparisons, are found to be closer to metaphors. Therefore, it is proposed that *like* in similes is different from *like* employed in literal comparisons. In particular, it is claimed that, contrary to the current relevance-theoretic position on this issue, *like* in similes introduces an ad hoc concept. This *like* is seen as both conceptual and procedural and, as such, it is distinct from both the conceptual *like* used in literal comparisons and the procedural *like* functioning as a pragmatic marker. Such a solution accounts for the similarities and differences between similes, metaphors and literal comparisons.

1. Introduction

Similes would be metaphors were it not for the word *like*. The paper is an attempt to throw some light on the meaning of *like* as used in similes. Even though they bear a superficial resemblance to literal comparisons, similes are actually closer to metaphors. Unlike literal comparisons, they are irreversible and they can give rise to similar effects as corresponding metaphors. Consequently, similes are assumed to be related to metaphors. To account for this relation, after examining previous approaches to the problem, it is proposed that *like* in similes involves both conceptual meaning following from the original concept of similarity and a procedural instruction to create an ad hoc concept.

2. Simile and literal comparison

Most definitions of simile describe it as involving "an explicit comparison between two things or actions" signalled, in the majority of cases, by the presence of *like* (Cruse 2006: 165). In comparison, one examines the things being compared in order to find out whether they are similar or different, and in what respects these things are similar or not (Bredin 1998: 69). From this it follows that there are two types of comparison: open, which do not mention properties with respect to which the two compared things are alike or different, and closed, which are comparisons that explicitly point to such properties (Bredin 1998: 70, 72; see also Beardsley 1981). Consequently, there are two corresponding types of simile: open, e.g. *Her heart is like stone* and closed, e.g. *Her*

heart is hard like stone (Bredin 1998; Margolis 1957: 187; see also Beardsley 1981). On the basis of the above examples, it is possible to say that open similes have the form *X is like Y*, and closed similes state "that X is like Y in such and such a respect" (Beardsley 1981: 137). Closed similes specify "the respects in which the comparison is intended", and hence neutralize – though do not eliminate – the figurativeness of the simile (Margolis 1957: 187). For Beardsley (1981: 138), open similes are "empty and uncontrolled" out of context; it is the context that is needed to show in what respects X is like Y. This paper will focus on open similes of the *X is like Y* form.

However, not all comparison statements of the form *X is like Y* are regarded as similes; many authors agree that there are two kinds of such statements, dependent on the type of similarity exhibited. Two much discussed examples originally given by Ortony (1993: 346-347) illustrate the difference between literal and non-literal similarity:

(1) Encyclopaedias are like dictionaries.
(2) Encyclopaedias are like gold mines.

Example (1) involves literal similarity, since the comparison emphasises some properties shared by encyclopaedias and dictionaries which are salient for both types of books, such as being used for reference and being organised in alphabetical order. On the other hand, example (2) involves non-literal similarity because the properties shared by the two types of entities seem hardly salient and more abstract, e.g. 'being profitable' (Ortony 1993: 347; see also Levinson 1983: 155). Consequently, statements involving literal similarity may be referred to as 'literal comparisons' (Levinson 1983; Ortony 1993) or 'statements of similarity' (Croft and Cruse 2004). Statements involving non-literal similarity can be called 'similes' (Croft and Cruse 2004) or 'non-literal comparisons' (Ortony 1993).

It is also possible to show the difference between literal comparisons and similes by resorting to the distinction between symmetrical comparisons and predicative comparisons (Bredin 1998: 74). A symmetrical comparison is defined as asserting or denying "a likeness between two things in such a way that *each identifies the other*" (Bredin 1998: 74, italics in the original); in other words, in a symmetrical comparison, the subject and the predicate are referentially independent of each other. In (1), the denotation of the term *encyclopaedias* is distinct from the denotation of the term *dictionaries* so this example involves a symmetrical comparison. This also implies that statements involving a symmetrical comparison are reversible without (much) change in meaning, which agrees with the observation that literal comparisons are generally reversible (see Glucksberg & Keysar 1993: 414). On the other hand, "[a] predicative comparison asserts or denies a likeness between two things in such a way that *one of them describes the other*" (Bredin 1998: 74, italics in the original) – the subject refers to something which is then described by the predicate. Therefore, an interchange of the subject and its predicate will bring about a major change in meaning. In (2), the expression *gold mines* serves as a description of encyclopaedias. Interchanging the subject with its predicate will result in a major change in meaning, for example *Gold mines are like encyclopaedias* may be interpreted as 'gold mines are so organised that you can easily find what you are looking for', etc.

Croft and Cruse (2004: 211) suggest a different diagnostic test with which it is possible to check whether a given statement of comparison is a literal comparison or a simile. The test consists in transforming a comparison statement of the form *X is like Y* into the corresponding nominal metaphor of the form *X is Y*. While, in the case of literal comparisons, such a transformation results in unacceptability or in a major change in meaning, similes undergo this process without a great difference in meaning. Consequently, the meaning of the simile in (2) is close to that of the corresponding metaphor in (3), whereas the meaning of the literal comparison in (1) is not preserved in the corresponding *X is Y* form in (4).

3) Encyclopaedias are gold mines.
4) Encyclopaedias are dictionaries.

3. Simile and metaphor

With respect to form, similes are identical to literal comparison statements; with respect to meaning, they are close to corresponding nominal metaphors, as shown by the simile in (2) and the metaphor in (3). If similes and their corresponding metaphors can give rise to similar, or even the same, interpretations, then the question is whether they are related (for discussion, see e.g. Israel, Riddle Harding & Tobin 2004). One possible answer comes from the so called comparison theory of metaphor, the tradition extending from Cicero or Quintilian to Miller (1993), according to which metaphors are implicit similes (elliptical similes). This means that in order to understand a metaphor of the form *X is Y*, which is false on a literal interpretation, one has to transform it into the corresponding simile, *X is like Y*, which will always be true when taken literally.

Another possible answer was already hinted at by Aristotle, whose observation that "[similes] *are* metaphors, differing in the form of expression" (*Rhetoric* 3.4.2, italics in the original) boils down to a bold statement that both metaphors and similes involve non-literal (metaphorical) meaning, with the difference being the presence of *like* in similes. Very much in the tradition of Aristotle, Ricoeur (2003: 293) views simile as not fundamentally different from metaphor: he claims that it is only a weakened version of metaphor. Lakoff and Turner (1989: 133) likewise claim that metaphor and simile are essentially versions of the same phenomenon in that both metaphorical statements and simile statements "can employ conceptual metaphor". Following their argument, we may assume that examples (2) and (3) use basically the same conceptual metaphor, the only difference being that the simile makes a weaker claim. Thus in both cases, one concept (ENCYCLOPAEDIAS) is being understood in terms of another (GOLD MINES), and the form of an utterance has very little bearing on whether metaphor is involved in the comprehension process. The fact that it is the conceptual nature of metaphor that is emphasised, not its linguistic realizations, shows that, for Lakoff and Turner, there is no essential difference between metaphor and simile.

Still another possibility, though related to the previous one, is that similes are implicit metaphors (e.g. Glucksberg 2001).[1] On this approach, all statements of the form *X is Y*, literal or metaphorical, are understood as class-inclusion statements. For example, a literal statement like *A louse is an insect* is a class-inclusion statement in that it

ascribes to any louse the membership in the category of insects. In the nominal metaphor *John is a louse*, John belongs to the (more abstract) superordinate category of which the louse is a perfect exemplar, that is, the category of contemptible beings capable of odious low conduct. In Glucksberg's terms, via the mechanism of dual reference, the metaphor simultaneously refers to the literal louse as the perfect representative of the extended category and classifies John as a member of this category, with the resulting meaning that John is a contemptible being capable of odious low conduct. On this view, the corresponding simile *John is like a louse* involves the literal louse and can only be understood when transformed into the metaphor form. This transformation will allow for constructing the superordinate category whose features will be ascribed to John.

It is also possible to claim that metaphors and similes are distinct. This position has been assumed in cognitive linguistics by Croft and Cruse (2004: 212), who claim: "The first and most obvious difference is in propositional structure. An expression of the form *A is like B* asserts that there is a resemblance between A and B in some respect. An expression of the form *A is B*, on the other hand, predicates certain properties directly of A". The position that metaphors and similes are distinct seems to have also been adopted by relevance theorists such as Carston (2002) and O'Donoghue (2009). That standard relevance-theoretic approach to simile and metaphor, and some of the criticism it has received will be presented in Section 4.1.

4. *Like* in similes

The above discussion shows that, on a number of approaches, similes and metaphors are regarded as related. On the other hand, the nature of relatedness is understood in several different ways: metaphors are conceived of as implicit similes, or similes are conceived of as implicit metaphors or metaphors and similes are two versions of the same (conceptual) phenomenon with similes being weaker, less obscure realizations. This shows that the role of *like*, the only formal item which makes simile statements different from their metaphorical equivalents, is far from clear. Either *like* is added in the comprehension process of metaphors or it is deleted in the comprehension process of similes, or its presence/absence brings about the weakening/strengthening of the impact of a given simile/metaphor.

Even though there has not been much discussion about the role of *like* in similes, several more or less explicit mentions of *like* can be found in the literature. For example, Ricoeur (2003: 293) argues that *to be like* "must be treated as a metaphorical modality of the copula itself" and that the *like* "is not just the comparative term among all the terms, but is included in the verb *to be,* whose force it alters". Feder Kittay (1987: 143, n. 1) also notices that *like* in simile should be understood metaphorically for it signals "comparisons which cross the bounds of our usual categories and concepts" (p. 19). In his interpretation of Aristotle's claims about metaphor and simile, Leezenberg (2001: 42) conjectures that the explicit term of comparison *like* is only a hedge weakening the assertive power of a statement. Thus, by saying *Achilles is like a lion*, "the speaker can avoid a commitment to the assertion that Achilles *actually* is a member of the class of lions, although both are species of the genus of brave animals" (Leezenberg 2001: 42). The hedging role of *like* is also suggested by Glucksberg (2001); on his account *like* is

treated as a hedge reducing the perceived metaphoricity of non-literal comparison statements (Glucksberg 2001: 44). On the empirical side, the presence or the absence of the word *like* affects the number of features assumed by people to be shared by the topic/subject and the vehicle/predicate in nominal metaphors and similes. It has turned out that, in the case of metaphors, subjects are more likely to think that there are more common features between the two concepts involved than in the case of similes (Xu 2010: 1633).

5. *Like* in relevance theory

5.1 Simile and metaphor in relevance theory

To the best of my knowledge, there exists no exhaustive account of the preposition *like* used in similes from a perspective of relevance theory. However, it is possible to learn how this theory views *like* from the way it treats similes and metaphors. On the standard relevance-theoretic account (Carston 2002; see also O'Donoghue 2009), the interpretation of metaphors involves ad hoc concept formation, whereas the interpretation of similes does not. An ad hoc concept is an unlexicalised concept communicated by the speaker by means of a word encoding a related concept; such an unlexicalised concept has to be pragmatically constructed by the hearer in the process of utterance interpretation. An ad hoc concept may be narrower or broader than the lexically-encoded concept used for its communication, as illustrated by the use of *bird* in (5) and *square* in (6) below.

(5) The bird escaped its cage and flew out the window.
(6) His jaw is a square.

In (5), the concept BIRD is used to convey a more specific ad hoc concept BIRD* which denotes only birds kept in cages as pets. Such an ad hoc concept is the result of the lexical pragmatic process of narrowing, which involves "the use of a word to convey a more specific sense than the encoded one, with a more restricted denotation ..." (Wilson & Carston 2007: 232). In (6), the geometric term *square* is used loosely to convey the sense of 'approximately a square': the broadened ad hoc concept SQUARE* is based on the lexically-encoded concept SQUARE 'a shape with four sides that are all the same length and four corners that are all right angles'. It shows that in the lexical pragmatic process of broadening, a word is used "to convey a more general sense than the encoded one, with a consequent expansion of the linguistically-specified denotation" (Wilson & Carston 2007: 232).

In order to make sense of the metaphor in (7), one has to form an ad hoc concept based on the concept encoded by the word *bulldozer*.

(7) Mary is a bulldozer.
(8) Mary is like a bulldozer.

The constructed ad hoc concept BULLDOZER* is both broader and narrower than the lexically-encoded concept BULLDOZER, whose denotation has been expanded to include obstinate and insensitive people and, at the same time, narrowed to exclude heavy machines. This shows that there is no overlap between the denotations of the lexically-encoded concept BULLDOZER 'a piece of heavy machinery' and the derived ad hoc concept BULLDOZER* 'an obstinate and insensitive person' (Vega Moreno 2007: 97). By being described as *a bulldozer*, Mary is classified into the category of BULLDOZERS* 'obstinate and insensitive people'. In the simile in (8), however, as Carston (2002: 357-358) argues, no ad hoc concept BULLDOZER* is communicated and the word *bulldozer* is understood as conveying the concept it encodes. If the lexically-encoded concept is preserved in similes, while it is not in metaphors, then there is no difference between similes and literal comparisons. Hence, we may assume that, on the standard relevance-theoretic approach, the *like* used in similes is the same as the one used in literal comparisons.

Such a diverse treatment of metaphors and similes is unacceptable for Hernández Iglesias (2010: 175-176), who puts forward the idea that similes, like metaphors, do involve ad hoc concept formation. He claims that Carston's account of similes is counterintuitive as it "draws too radical a difference between metaphors and similes and fails to account for what they have in common" (Hernández Iglesias 2010: 174). Carston (2002: 357) admits that the implicatures triggered by the metaphor and the corresponding simile (examples 7 and 8) "are probably the same" and ascribes the difference in their overall impact to the fact that metaphor is commonly felt "as somehow more direct and forceful." For Hernández Iglesias, it is implausible that such a difference would bring about the difference in what is explicitly communicated – the difference which seems to be a pivotal element in Carston's analysis. On her view, the metaphor in (7), which involves the ad hoc concept BULLDOZER*, would explicitly communicate that Mary is obstinate and insensitive, since ad hoc concepts are claimed to be part of what is explicitly communicated (explicature). In the case of the simile in (8), where no ad hoc concept is constructed, Mary's obstinacy and insensitiveness are implicated via the analysis of what Mary and literal bulldozers have in common. A related difficulty for Carston's account is that, in the right circumstances, a simile may be more powerful than the corresponding metaphor (see O'Donoghue 2009: 132).

Based on Carston's (2002: 359) observation that "longer stretches of the encoded conceptual structure" can be used metaphorically in order to create complex ad hoc concepts, Hernández Iglesias (2010: 175-176) puts forward the idea that to understand a simile of the form *X is like Y*, it is necessary to construct the complex ad hoc concept [LIKE Y]*. This means that to understand a simile such as *Mary is like a bulldozer*, it is necessary to construct the complex ad hoc concept [LIKE A BULLDOZER]*, which means 'obstinate', 'single-minded', 'insensitive to other people's feelings', etc. He also claims that the process of constructing this complex ad hoc concept would be essentially the same as the construction of the ad hoc concept BULLDOZER* in the metaphor *Mary is a bulldozer*.

As noticed by Carston (2010: 255), Hernández Iglesias's proposal is problematic for a number of reasons. It does not follow from his cursory suggestion whether the ad hoc concept is broader or narrower than the string [LIKE A BULLDOZER]. Apparently, it has to be narrower since, from a literal point of view, everything is like everything else, and as

Carston points out, it is hard to construct an ad hoc concept broader than the string [LIKE A BULLDOZER].

Although Hernández Iglesias's proposal is far from flawless, I think that he is correct to suggest an analysis of simile in terms of ad hoc concept formation (for an alternative proposal, see Wałaszewska 2010). Even Carston (2010: 255) is not fully opposed to the ad hoc concept treatment of simile, as can be seen from her comment on Hernández Iglesias's suggestion: "[It] is not that the key concept in the simile is never in any way pragmatically modulated ... but just that it does not undergo the radical broadening that the corresponding metaphorically used concept does..." However, what I find problematic in Hernández Iglesias's proposal is the function of LIKE in the ad hoc concept, which he does not examine in any way, though apparently he assumes that *like* in similes enters an ad hoc concept.

5.2. 'Like' as a pragmatic marker

Neither Carston's nor Hernández Iglesias's account of simile seems to provide a basis for a satisfactory explanation of the functioning of *like* in similes. There is, however, a detailed relevance-theoretic analysis of *like* as a pragmatic marker, to which I will now turn since it may prove insightful for an analysis of *like* as used in similes. Andersen (2001: 53) notes that the pragmatic marker *like* must have originated in a preposition with the meaning of 'similar to' and that the lexical predecessor of this pragmatic marker is still present in English as a preposition/(conjunction). It is worth mentioning that the pragmatic marker usage and the non-marker (preposition or conjunction) usage of *like* may be confused since the borderline between the two is fuzzy (Andersen 2001: 54). This could be illustrated with an exchange from Russo's (1997) *Straight Man* in which the sarcastic professor deliberately misinterprets the student's use of the pragmatic marker *like* as an attempt to produce a simile.

Student: 'I like the clouds … They're, like, a metaphor.'
Professor: 'They *are* a metaphor ... If they were *like* a metaphor, they'd be, like, a simile'
(Russo 1997, in Glucksberg & Haught 2006: 360)

In his analysis of *like* as a pragmatic marker, Andersen (2001: 210) observes that it "is notorious for its functional complexity and distributional versatility" – it can be used as a quotative marker (ex. 9), approximator (ex. 10), marker of exemplification (ex. 11), discourse link (ex. 12) or hesitational device (ex. 13). *Like* may also accompany metaphors (ex. 14) and hyperboles (ex. 15).

(9) and then, and then Kevin came up to me and said erm ... if you if you go and see Mark this afternoon erm he would like to speak to you, I was like, he should come and speak to me. (Andersen 2001: 250)
(10) My lowest ever [score] was like forty. (Andersen 2001: 50)
(11) I know but it wouldn't be any point if someone wanted to be, like, a doctor and they got into a nursery place. (Andersen 2001: 236)

(12) I know and like … on Friday yeah I mean we're gonna be there for about an hour and a half probably yeah, and I wanna. (Andersen 2001: 255)

(13) Alright. Erm, well like, I usually take the train about … twenty past. (Andersen 2001: 270)

(14) She's like tearing the wall down. (Andersen 2001: 236)

(15) We can like endlessly swear on it. (Andersen 2001: 236)

Andersen shows that *like* can affect utterance meaning in a number of ways, for example, by indicating the need for the broadening or narrowing of lexically-encoded concepts (Andersen 2001: 230). For example, in (10) *like* signals that the lexically-encoded concept FORTY is used loosely as a crude approximation of the speaker's test score (p. 233). In (11), *like* triggers the process of ad hoc concept formation which results in the broadening of the lexicalised concept DOCTOR. *Like* before *a doctor* instructs the hearer to construct the ad hoc concept DOCTOR* which is broader than its lexically-encoded counterpart in that it denotes not only doctors but also other health care professionals. In this case, *doctor* is used to denote a broader category of professions related to health care of which this profession is the most salient member (pp. 236-237).

Andersen (2001: 210-211) claims that, despite the multitude of contexts in which it is used, *like* can be described in general terms as having the function of a marker which encodes a procedural constraint on utterance interpretation. In Andersen's (2001: 264) words, "[*l*]*ike* contributes to utterance interpretation and to the overall relevance of utterances as a procedural constraint on the process of identifying the intended explicatures of utterances", and it may, or may not, be truth-conditional.

At this point, it is worth clarifying the notion of a procedural constraint which follows from the relevance-theoretic distinction between conceptual meaning (concepts) and procedural meaning (procedures) (Blakemore 1987, 2002). Procedures are generally viewed as constraints on pragmatic inferencing which is involved in the interpretation of an utterance (Carston 2002: 57). A classic case of procedural encoding is the conjunction *but*, whose meaning guides the hearer through the comprehension process of the utterance in which it is present, by signalling the concept of contrast between the coordinated elements (Blakemore 2002: 90-91). Each of these two types of meaning may, or may not, be truth-conditional, in that each of them may, or may not, contribute to the proposition expressed (Bordería 2008: 1414). For example, discourse connectives such as *so* and *after all* are regarded as procedural and non-truth-conditional, since "they encode procedural constraints on implicatures" (Wilson & Sperber 1993: 19) and they do not affect the truth-conditions for an utterance. On the other hand, illocutionary adverbs like *seriously* are seen as conceptual and procedural since they encode concepts but do not contribute to the truth-conditional content; they contribute to so-called higher-order explicatures, which carry information about the speaker's attitude to the speech act the speaker intends to perform. Mood indicators, interjections and intonation are also claimed to contribute to the construction of higher-order explicatures, but they encode procedures. Finally, pronouns such *I* and *you* or indexicals such as *now* or *here* are both procedural and truth-conditional in that they impose constraints on explicatures (see Wilson & Sperber 1993; Bordería 2008).

The idea of the conceptual/procedural dichotomy has been revisited on a number of occasions by various relevance theorists (see Bordería 2008: 1415-1416). Some of them suggest that the clear-cut binary distinction between conceptual and procedural meaning is hard to uphold; Moeschler (2002), for example, suggests that this distinction is gradual, which is reflected in the lexicon. A related view is presented by Takeuchi (1997), who shows, on the example of two Japanese causal connectives, that some words may encode both a concept and a procedure.

6. Towards a new relevance-theoretic account of *like* in similes

I agree with Andersen (2001: 53), that there exist two types of *like*: conceptual and procedural. Conceptual *like* is used in literal comparisons and is taken to mean 'similar to'. Procedural *like* is present in, for example, approximations and exemplifications and it instructs the hearer to construct an ad hoc concept by broadening or narrowing the concept(s) encoded by the linguistic material following *like*. What is more, Andersen (2001: 228) admits the possibility that *like* encodes both conceptual and procedural meaning; he assumes that *like* as a procedural marker "carries traces of an original lexical meaning, 'similar to'" and suggests that "the notion of similarity is faintly present ... when *like* is used as a marker of loose use, approximation, exemplification".

I would like to claim that *like* in similes of the form *X is like Y* is both conceptual and procedural. It encodes the concept of similarity and a procedure which instructs the hearer to construct an ad hoc concept by broadening the concept encoded by (part of) the linguistic material after *like*. The broadened concept will help the hearer identify relevant properties attributable to the subject. As such *like* in similes is similar both to the conceptual *like* in literal comparisons, and to the procedural *like* functioning as a pragmatic marker.

Let me illustrate this suggestion by analysing the following oft-quoted example:

(16) My lawyer is like a shark.

The simile is likely to be interpreted along the following lines: 'My lawyer is a violent, cruel and rapacious person'. In order to arrive at this interpretation, it is necessary to construct an ad hoc concept based on the lexically-encoded concept SHARK. The concept SHARK will be, as indicated by *like*, broadened to include people – lawyers; however, there will be no narrowing. The broadened concept will be a kind of ad hoc superordinate category in which both literal sharks and lawyers can be found, allowing for a comparison of the two. What is more, the literal shark will be understood as the most salient, prototypical, member of the created category, in a sense, serving as a point of reference or comparison. The comparison of sharks and lawyers within the broadened category will show which properties are to be ascribed to the speaker's lawyer.

The above analysis shows how similes work and why they are intuitively felt to be intimately related to metaphors, on the one hand, and literal comparisons, on the other, as well as clearly distinct from both of them. What similes have in common with metaphors is that they likewise involve the process of ad hoc concept formation. And if they actually involve ad hoc concepts, this may explain why it is so easy to transform

similes into metaphors by omitting *like*. However, the ad hoc concepts resulting from the use of a simile are different from those arising from the use of a metaphor; the former exploit broadening and the latter both broadening and narrowing. This hypothesis captures the intuition that metaphors are more abstract than similes. On the other hand, it is not too difficult to see what similes have in common with literal comparisons, namely the presence of *like*. However, it is argued that *like* operates differently in those two cases. In literal comparisons, *like* seems to encode the concept of similarity, whereas in similes the word appears to be both conceptual and procedural in nature; it encodes the concept of similarity and procedure to construct an ad hoc concept.

7. Conclusion

Assuming that similes are more related to metaphors than to literal comparisons, it makes sense to claim that *like* in similes introduces an ad hoc concept. Moreover, in similes, *like* is both conceptual and procedural, with the procedure it encodes instructing the hearer to construct an ad hoc concept by broadening the concept encoded by the expression following *like*. Such an account shows how similes are similar to and different from metaphors and literal comparisons. Namely, unlike literal comparisons, both metaphors and similes involve ad hoc concepts, even though the concepts are constructed differently. It also shows how the *like* used in similes is both similar to and different from the conceptual *like* used in literal comparisons and the procedural *like* functioning as a pragmatic marker.

Notes

1 It should be noted that Glucksberg (2008) has abandoned the view that similes should be interpreted as implicit metaphors.

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PERFORMING ANAPHORA IN MODERN GREEK: A NEO-GRICEAN PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS

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Abstract
The paper addresses the problem of interpreting anaphoric NPs in Modern Greek. It includes a proposal of a novel analysis based on the systematic interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles of communication, which provides a neat and elegant approach to NP-anaphora resolution.

   The findings of this study provide evidence for an account of NP-anaphora in terms of the division of labour between syntax and pragmatics and more accurately in terms of the systematic interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles.

Keywords: anaphora, pragmatics, syntax, Grice

1. Setting the scene

The interpretation of anaphoric expressions is one of the core issues in linguistics. Understanding and explaining the phenomenon of anaphora, as it is termed, which refers to the relation between two noun phrases (henceforth NPs), wherein the interpretation of the one (the anaphoric expression) is fixed upon the interpretation of the other (the antecedent), constitutes one of the most intriguing and controversial topics in linguistic research.

Anaphora is a cross-linguistic phenomenon and it is realised differently across languages. To borrow two terms from biology, we can say that on the one hand, there is a certain genotype of anaphora, which is common to all natural languages and on the other hand, there are various phenotypes, i.e. observable variations in the realisation of the phenomenon.

In this paper I will mainly focus on NP-anaphora in Modern Greek and I will show that the established syntactic accounts of the phenomenon cannot adequately describe and explain the whole range of anaphoric patterns. I shall present evidence according to which NP-anaphora patterns in Modern Greek are inherently pragmatic in nature and anaphora resolution involves preferred interpretations following from conversational inferences. Given this, a way forward is to propose that NP-anaphora in Modern Greek can be explained more elegantly in terms of the division of labour between syntax and pragmatics and more precisely, in terms of the systematic interaction of pragmatic principles of communication such as the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles in the spirit of Levinson (1991, 2000) and Huang (1994, 2000).

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 offers an overview of the basic distributional facts of NP-anaphora in Modern Greek. In section 3, we present an up-to-date review of the generative approaches to Modern Greek NP-anaphora. The proposed partial neo-Gricean pragmatic analysis is presented in section 4.

2. Some basic facts

In this section, I shall present the basic distributional facts of Modern Greek NP-anaphora, focusing mainly on the classification and the syntactic distribution of anaphors and pronominals (overt and zero).

2.1 Typology

For our purposes we are going to follow the typology of NPs as introduced in Chomsky (1982, 1986). According to this typology, anaphoric NPs are described and classified in terms of two polarized abstract features namely [+/-anaphor] and [+/-pronominal] thus giving us four different types of NPs.
In the case of Modern Greek, NPs can be classified as follows:

	overt	empty
[+anaphor, -pronominal]	o eaftos mu	NP-trace
[-anaphor, +pronominal]	aftos/i/o, ton,tin,to	*Pro*
[+anaphor, +pronominal]	------	?PRO
[-anaphor, -pronominal]	r-expressions	wh-trace/variable

Table 1: Classification of NPs in Modern Greek

In this paper I will mainly focus on the reflexive *o eaftos mu* which fills the overt anaphor position, the personal pronouns (overt and empty) which are described as pronominals and finally, the r-expressions which fill the overt [-anaphor, -pronominal] position. Note however that there is an anaphoric expression missing from the table, namely *o iδjos*. This is an anaphor of a special type that does not fit neatly into this classification; we shall return to the case *o iδjos* of in our discussion. Finally, PRO[1] will not be discussed since it is not within the scope of this paper.

2.2 The reflexive *o eaftos mu*

One way of expressing reflexivity is by the reflexive pronoun *o eaftos mu* (myself). It is formed by the definite article *o* (the) in masculine gender, the noun *eafto*s (self) and the possessive pronoun *mu* (my) in the appropriate person, number and gender in agreement

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[1] For details on PRO see Iatridou (1993), Karanasios (1989), Philippaki-Warburton (1987), Philippaki-Warburton & Catsimali (1999), Terzi (1991, 1993) and Varlokosta (1993, 1994).

with its antecedent. The possessive pronoun appears only in genitive case. Moreover, the agreement in number between the noun and the possessive is not necessary, for instance, (*ton eafto*-sg *tu*-sg) and (*ton eafto*-sg *tus*-pl).

As Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton (1987: 79) note, *o eaftos mu* can occur in various positions in the clause, "more specifically in whatever position a noun phrase bearing the same syntactic relation can occur". The reflexive pronoun *o eaftos mu* can function as an object, subject, object of an adjective, passive agent and object of prepositions[2] as it is illustrated in examples (1) - (5) respectively (for more examples see Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton 1987, Holton et al 1997 and Chiou 2010).

1)   O   Janis aɣapai ton eafto   tu
        the John loves   the self-acc his
        'John loves himself.'

2)   O eaftos   mu ftei   ja ola
        the self-nom my is responsible for everything
        'Myself is responsible for everything.'

3)   Jati δen ise   kalos me ton eafto   su?
        why not are-2sg good with the self-acc your
        'Why are you not good with yourself?'

4)   O   Janis pliɣonete apo ton eafto   tu
        the John is hurt   by the self-acc his
        '**John hurts himself.'

5)   O   Janis milai   panda ja ton eafto   tu
        the John speaks always for the self-acc his
        'John speaks always for himself.'

2.3 Ο iδjos

O iδjos is formed by the definite article and the adjective *iδjos* (same) and it forms all three genders in both numbers. It can be found mainly in two positions, namely, in a subject or in an object position (direct or indirect). Consider examples (6) and (7) respectively.

6)   O Janis$_i$ δjavase to vivlio pu o iδjos$_i$ ixe aɣorasi
        the John   read   the book that the same-nom had bought
        'John read the book that he himself had bought.'

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[2] Holton et al. (1997) as well as Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton (1987: 80) note that the reflexive *o eaftos mu* does not occur with other locatival complex prepositions, for instance, **dhipla ston eafto mu* (next to myself), **piso apo ton eafto mu* (behind myself) etc. However, expressions such as *enantia ston eafto mu* (against myself), *gyro/ekso apo ton eafto mu* (round/outside myself) may occur.

7)   O Janis_i θeli   o Kostas_j na voiθisi ton iδjo_i
        the John wants the Kostas to help   the same-acc
        'John wants Kostas to help him.'

When in object position, *o iδjos* cannot appear in relative clauses and cannot have a quantifier as its antecedent, see (8) and (9). By contrast, subject *o iδjos* allows for the above distributions, see for instance example (6).

8)   *O Janis_i aγapai tin kopela pu filise   ton iδjo_i
        the John loves   the girl   who kissed the same-acc
        'John loves the girl who kissed himself.'

9)   *Kaθenas_i nomizi oti   o   Janis aγapai ton iδjo_i
        everyone thinks that the John loves   the same-acc
        'Everyone thinks that John loves him.'

2.4 Personal pronouns

Personal pronouns occur in both numbers (singular and plural), in all three persons, namely, *eγo*, *esi*, *aftos/afti*, *emis*, *esis*, *afti/aftes* (I, you, he/she, we, you, they) and form all cases. As Mackridge (1985: 145) notes, "personal pronouns are divided into emphatic and non-emphatic (clitic) pronouns" There is a difference between emphatic and non-emphatic pronouns both in their function and form. More precisely, "the emphatic forms are typically disyllabic or trisyllabic and are stressed on the second syllable whereas the clitics are unstressed monosyllables" (Mackridge 1985: 145). Clitic forms function as direct or indirect objects and they normally precede the verb forms, except for imperatives and the present participles where they follow the verb (Mackridge 1985).
What is more, given that Modern Greek is a typical pro-drop language, it normally drops the overt subject personal pronouns. As a result, the class of pronominals can also appear as an empty category. By way of illustration consider the example:

10)   Ø   ipe oti Ø   θa δjavazi perisotero
        (She/he) said that (she/he) will study   more
        'She/he said that she/he will study more.'

As Joseph & Philippaki-Warburton (1987) state, full pronouns are optional in their occurrence. Their presence is usually associated with emphasis or contrast and they are considered more marked choice when use instead of a zero pronoun (Holton et al. 1997). The referential properties of zero pronouns are similar to the overt ones. In addition, null subject languages like Modern Greek also exhibit two other properties: a) they have free subject inversion, and b) they can extract the subject long-distance over a lexically filled complementizer (Huang 2000).

11)   Sto   sxolio piγe o Janis
        to the school   went the John
        'John went to school.'

12)   Pjos nomizis   oti irθe simera spiti?
        who think-2sg   that came today home
        'Who do you think that came home today?'

In this paper, we are more interested in third person pronouns, either in their full form *aftos, afti, afto* (he, she, it), their non-emphatic or clitic form *tu, tis, to* or in the zero form.

3. The syntax of NP-anaphora

The most influential theory which has offered a systematic and principled approach to NP-anaphora in Modern Greek has been Chomsky's binding theory within the framework of the principles-and-parameters theory.

3.1 Binding principles

Following Chomsky (1982, 1986) the interpretation of lexical anaphors, pronominals (overt and zero) and r-expressions is regulated by the three binding principles or conditions in (13).

13)   Chomsky's binding principles (Chomsky 1995: 96).
        Principle A: An anaphor must be bound in a local domain.
        Principle B: A pronominal must be free in a local domain.
        Principle C: An r-expression must be free.

The definition of binding is given in (14) below:

14) α binds β iff:
        i) α is in an A-position
        ii) α c-commands β, and
        iii) α and β are coindexed

Note that given (14i), the binding conditions are relevant to NPs occupying θ-marked positions which are in principle A(rgument)-positions. Consequently, A-binding is distinguished from A'-binding, with the latter being relevant to binding of variables which occupy A'-positions. Finally c-command is defined in (15).

15)   α c-commands β iff:
         i)   α does not dominate β,
         ii) β does not dominate α,
         iii) the first branching node dominating α also dominates β

C-command distinguishes syntactic binding from co-reference, which is a semantic notion.

    Following the above rules and principles, the paradigmatic patterns for binding in Modern Greek can be described along the following lines: The reflexive *o eaftos mu*[3] appears to be a typical example of a [+anaphor] [-pronominal] NP and thus it should be bound by a local antecedent.

16)   I   Maria$_i$ θavmazi ton eafto tis$_i$
         the Mary admires the self   hers
         'Mary admires herself.'

17)   *I   Maria$_i$ ipe oti   o eaftos tis$_i$ ine kalos sto   piano
         the Mary said that the self   her is   good at the piano
         'Mary said that herself is good at playing the piano.'

In (16) *o eaftos mu* is co-indexed with a local antecedent, which is grammatically acceptable whereas in (17) we have an ungrammatical sentence since the reflexive appears to receive a non-local antecedent violating thus binding condition A. Therefore, the distribution of the Modern Greek reflexive *o eaftos mu* in examples (16) and (17) follows straightforwardly from binding principle A. Moreover, according to principle B, a pronominal is free in its local domain. This is borne out in Modern Greek for the personal pronouns either overt or zero as it is illustrated in the examples (18) and (19).

18)   O   Janis$_i$ ipe oti   Ø$_i$ tha δiavazi perisotero
         the John said that (he) will study   more
         'John said that he will study more.'

19)   *O Janis$_i$ ton$_i$ kseri   poli kala
         the John him knows very well
         'John knows him very well.'

The ungrammaticality of (19) follows from the violation of binding principle B since the clinic pronoun *ton* is co-indexed locally. Finally, in an unmarked context examples like (20) are also ungrammatical since they violate binding principle C.

20)   *O Janis$_i$ θavmazi ton Jani$_i$
         the John admires the John
         'John admires John.'

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[3] For the reflexive *o eaftos mu* see also Iatridou (1988); see also Anagnostopoulou & Everaert (1999) for an analysis within the semantic/argument structure approach.

3.2 Problematic issues

3.2.1 Problems with principles A and B

Cross linguistic evidence has shown that the binding principles run into great difficulties in particular with languages that allow the long-distance binding of reflexives/anaphors (e.g. the majority of Asian languages, some Scandinavian, Germanic and Romance languages), but also with languages that lack reflexives altogether using thus pronominals for encoding co-reference locally (e.g. Astronesian and Papuan languages), (see Huang 2000 for more).

In Modern Greek too, there are certain cases which are problematic for the classical binding theory. To begin with, the reflexive *o eaftos mu* is not an exception to long-distance binding effects. Consider the following example:

21) $\emptyset_i$ mu ipe   na fero mia efimeriδa ja ton Jani$_j$ ke
         (He) me said-3sg to bring one newspaper for the John and
         mia ja ton eafto tu$_i$
         one for the self his
         'He told me to bring one newspaper for John and one for himself.'

In addition, there is the well know case 'picture' NPs.

22)   O Nikos$_i$ ipe oti o Kostas$_j$ iδe mia fotoγrafia tu eaftu tu$_j$ stin
         the Nick   said that the Kostas saw a   picture   the self his in the
         efimeriδa
         newspaper
         'John said that Kostas saw a picture of himself/him in the newspaper.'

Examples like (21) and (22) challenge a purely local account of reflexive *o eaftos mu*. In example (21), even if there isn't a strict violation of binding condition A, since there is no c-command relationship, there is an issue for a purely local account of the reflexive as it should be accepted that there is another version of *o eaftos mu* which does not fall under binding condition A. Also in (22), the alleged complementarity in reference between reflexives and pronominals, arising from the mirror effect of binding conditions A and B, breaks down.

Coming to pronouns, despite the fact that both overt and zero pronouns are subject to binding condition B, it has been shown that they are not in free variation. As example (23) illustrates, there are cases in which the use of an overt pronoun instead of a zero one can change reference, which is not predicted by binding condition B.

23)   Kapjos$_i$ ipe oti aftos$_z$ /$\emptyset_i$ iδe ti Maria$_j$ sto   party
         somebody said that he   (he) saw the Mary at the party
         'Somebody said that he saw Mary at the party.'

3.2.2 The anaphor o iδjos

Particularly worrisome appears to be the case of the anaphoric expression *o iδjos*[4]. *O iδjos* does not fit into the binding principles as defined in (13) since it appears to be free in its local domain but bound within the sentence, combining therefore properties of both anaphors and pronominals. In addition, it systematically overlaps in reference with personal pronouns. In the current literature there are two major studies which attempt to address the problem, namely, Iatridou (1986) and Varlokosta & Hornstein (1993) (henceforth V&H).

Iatridou (1986) notes that there is not a principle to cover the option bound in the whole sentence but free in the governing category and hence she puts forward a new binding principle, namely Principle D, as a complement principle of Principle C.

24)   Principle D
O iδjos should be bound in the whole sentence but free in the governing category.

Moreover, Iatridou (1986) distinguishes between anaphoric and adjectival uses of *o iδjos* in order to account for cases where Principle D appears to be violated.

Coming next to Varlokosta & Hornstein (1993), they note that *o iδjos* is or behaves like a pronominal since it has to be free in its local domain. Nevertheless, *o iδjos*, unlike the other pronouns in Modern Greek, has to be bound within its own sentence. This leads V&H to conclude (as Iatridou 1986 does) that *o iδjos* does not fit neatly into the standard binding principles. More specifically, they suggest that when in object position *o iδjos* is an A'-bound pronoun (see also Enç 1989 for a similar approach). Their analysis is based on Koopman & Sportiche's (1989) work of on logophoric pronouns. By generalizing Koopman & Sportiche's analysis, V&H propose that in the [Spec, CP] there is a null operator (Ø) which A'-binds *o iδjos*. As for *o iδjos* in subject positions they suggest that syntactically "it has none of the properties of object *o iδjos* since it functions like a standard pronominal expression and it has a focused reading" (V&H 1993: 188). Therefore, they propose that the "pronoun found in subject position is *IΔJOS* rather than *iδjos*…".

However, these two approaches are not without problems. To begin with Iatridou (1986), Principle D appears to receive support from the case of *o iδjos* in Modern Greek and from a class of long-distance reflexives, which do not take a local, like in Marathi and Dravidian languages. Yet, it cannot be maintained as a cross-language principle. This is due to the fact that in most of the cases, long-distance anaphors like *o iδjos* allow local binding as well (like Chinese *zijii*, see Huang (1994, 2000). What is more, even the prediction that *o iδjos* should be bound in its sentence is falsified by examples like the following:

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[4] Zribi-Hertz (1995) and Kiparsky (2002) also discuss, rather briefly though, *o iδjos* in their works. There are also two studies within the framework of Lexical Functional Grammar (LFG) by Kordoni (1995) and Lapata (1998), which will be not considered here.

25)   O Janis$_i$ ipe oti piγe   me ti Maria
         the John   said that went-3sin with the Mary-acc
         exθes   sto   aeroδromio. Otan eftasan   ston elenxo
         yesterday at the airport.   When arrived-3pl to the control
         o   ipalilos rotise an θa taksiδepsi ke o iδjos$_i$
         the officer asked if will travel-3sin and the same
         'John said that he went to the airport with Mary yesterday. When
         they reached the control the employee at the desk asked if he himself
         is going to travel.'

In V&H (1993), the basic distributional and configurational facts of *o iδjos* follow from the properties of bound pronouns. The major advantage of this approach is that it describes more accurately the pronominal features of *o iδjos*. On the one hand, this approach partly explains the distributional overlap between *o iδjos* and the clitic pronoun *ton*, which supports further the pronominal aspect of the former. On the other hand, their difference in dependency is given by the Ø-operator binding of *o iδjos*. However, it is not always unacceptable to find *o iδjos* bound where the presence of an Ø-operator is not possible. Embedded questions like the one in (26) can falsify the prediction proposed in this analysis. Consider the following example which is judged acceptable by native speakers.

26)   O ipurγos$_i$ δen ipe pjos ixe katiγorisi tote ton iδjo$_i$
         the minister not told who had accused   then the same self
         'The minister didn't tell who had accused him then.'

In this case, *o iδjos* seems to be bound directly by its antecedent without the need of an Ø-operator. According to V&H (1993) sentence (26) is ungrammatical as the SpecCP position is occupied by the *wh*-word *pjos* and consequently there is no position for the Ø-operator.

3.3.3 Discussion

From the discussion so far it follows that syntactic factors play a central role in Modern Greek NP-anaphora. Nevertheless, a closer examination also reveals a number of cases which reinforce the view that the interpretation of Modern Greek NP-anaphora has been 'over-grammaticized', to borrow Levinson's (1987) phrasing. In other words, there are several cases that cannot be adequately described and explained within a purely syntactic account. In a nutshell, classical binding theory cannot account for the long-distance uses of the reflexive *o eaftos mu* and it cannot provide an explanation for the differences in interpretation between an overt and a zero pronoun. Furthermore, there have been attempts to come up with better formulations for *o iδjos*, nevertheless, purely syntactic accounts remain problematic when it comes to the interpretation as well as to the systematic overlap in reference of *o iδjos* with personal pronouns.

4. The neo-Gricean pragmatic theory

As shown, there is enough evidence against a purely syntactic account of NP-anaphora in Modern Greek (as well as across languages for that matter). Many considerations have been put forward, even within syntactic literature, suggesting that anaphora is a multi-dimensional phenomenon, integrating semantic, pragmatic (see Reinhart 1983[5]) and discourse aspects (see Fox 1987, Frey 2005). Earlier attempts to provide a partially pragmatic account of anaphora phenomena has also been pursued in the works of Dowty (1980), Mittwoch (1983), Kempson (1984, 1988a, 1988b, 1988c), Kuno (1987) and Grodzinsky & Reinhart (1993).

4.1 Neo-Gricean pragmatic principles of communication

The Gricean construal of meaning and communication is founded upon two basic theories, namely the theory of meaning$_{nn}$ (non-natural meaning) and the theory of conversational implicatures (see Grice 1975, 1989). In both theories, Grice attempts to show the importance of non-conventional means in communication but also he draws the line between what is said and what is actually communicated in a communicative event.

4.1.1 Levinson's inferential principles

A recent development of the original Gricean theory on communication is the neo-Gricean pragmatic theory introduced and developed by Levinson (1987, 1991, 1998, 2000). Levinson suggests that the classical Gricean maxims of conversation be reduced to three pragmatic principles, namely, the Q- (Quantity), I- (Informativeness), and M- (Manner) principles which are defined as follows:

27)   The Q-Principle
Speaker's Maxim:
Do not provide a statement that is informationally weaker than your knowledge of the world allows, unless providing a stronger statement would contravene the I-principle.
Recipient's corollary:
Take it that the speaker made the strongest statement consistent with what he knows, and therefore that:
   a)   If the speaker asserted A(W), and <S, W> form a Horn scale (such that A(S) – A(W)), then one can infer K ~ (A(S)), i.e. that the speaker knows that the strongest statement will be false;

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[5] Reinhart (1983) argues for the distinction between co-reference, which is semantically or pragmatically determined and bound anaphora which is grammatically conditioned and constrained by c-command. For cases that don't fall under the bound variable constructions, Reinhart (1983: 167) puts forward the following maxim of Manner: "Be as explicit as conditions permit" i.e. by avoiding a bound variable interpretation the speaker intends non-co-reference between the relevant expressions.

b)   If the speaker asserted A(W) and A(W) fails to entail an embedded sentence Q, which a stronger statement A(S) would entail, and {S, W} form a contrast set, then one can infer ~K(Q), i.e. the speaker does not know whether Q obtains or not.

The basic idea of the Q-principle is that the use of an expression (especially a semantically weaker one) in a set of contrastive semantic alternates (such as a Horn-scale) Q-implicates the negation of the interpretation associated with the use of another expression (especially a semantically stronger one) in the same set. Seen the other way round, from the absence of an informationally stronger expression, we infer that the interpretation associated with the use of that expression does not hold. Hence, the Q-principle is essentially negative in nature. The operation of the Q-principle is illustrated in (28).

28)   Some of John's students are hard-working.
    +> Not all of John's students are hard-working

29)   The I-Principle
Speaker's Maxim: The Maxim of Minimization.
'Say as little as necessary', i.e. produce the minimal linguistic information sufficient to achieve your communicational ends (bearing the Q-principle in mind).
Recipient's corollary: The enrichment rule.
Amplify the informational content of the speaker's utterance, by finding the most specific interpretation, up to what you judge to be the speaker's m-intended point.
Specifically:
    a)   Assume that stereotypical relations obtain between referents or events, unless (i) this is inconsistent with what is taken for granted; (ii) the speaker has broken the Maxim of Minimization by choosing a prolix expression.
    b)   Assume the existence of actuality of what a sentence is 'about' if that is consistent with what is taken for granted.
    c)   Avoid interpretations that multiply entities referred to (assume referential parsimony); specifically, prefer co-referential readings of reduced NP's (pronouns or zero).

Mirroring the effects of the Q-principle, the central tenet of the I-principle is that the use of a semantically general expression I-implicates a semantically specific interpretation. More accurately, the implicature engendered by the I-principle is one that accords best with the most stereotypical and explanatory expectation given our knowledge about the world. By way of illustration, take (30).

30)   Paul was waiting for the nurse to give him his medicine
    +> Paul was waiting for the *female* nurse to give him his medicine

In this case an I-implicature is triggered by the stereotypically held expectation that a nurse is most of the times a female.

31)   M-Principle
Speaker's Maxim:
Don't use a prolix, obscure or marked expression without reason.
Recipient's Corollary:
If the speaker used a prolix or marked expression M, he or she did not mean the same as he or she would have had he or she used the unmarked expression U-specifically he or she was trying to avoid the stereotypical associations and I-implicatures of U.

      Unlike the Q- and I-principles, which operate primarily in terms of semantic informativeness, the metalinguistic M-principle[6] is operative primarily in terms of a set of alternates that contrast in form. The fundamental axiom upon which this principle rests is that the use of a marked or prolix[7] expression M-implicates the negation of the interpretation associated with the use of an alternative, unmarked expression in the same set.

32)   The new manager is friendly.
         I +> The new manager is friendly in the stereotypical sense
         The new manager is not unfriendly
         M +> The new manager is less friendly than the previous utterance suggests

Given the above tripartite classification of neo-Gricean pragmatic principles, the question that arises next is how inconsistencies arising from these potentially conflicting implicatures can be resolved. According to Levinson (2000), they can be resolved by an ordered set of precedence.

33)   Levinson's resolution schema for the interaction
         of the Q-, I-, and M-principles
             a) Level of genus: $Q > M > I$
             b) Level of species: e.g. $Q_{\text{-clausal}} > Q_{\text{-scalar}}$

Genuine Q-implicatures (where $Q_{\text{-clausal}}$ cancels rival $Q_{\text{-scalar}}$) precede inconsistent I-implicatures, but otherwise I-implicatures take precedence until the use of a marked linguistic expression triggers a complementary M-implicature to the negation of the applicability of the pertinent I-implicature (see e.g. Huang 2007 for further discussion).

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[6] The Levinsonian Manner principle is directly related to the Gricean maxim of Manner and more precisely to the submaxims 'avoid obscurity of expression' and 'avoid prolixity' (see Grice 1989).

[7] The notion of markedness employed for the M-principle is in the spirit of Horn (1989) and Levinson (1987, 2000). In terms of formal characteristics, marked forms, in comparison to corresponding unmarked forms, are more morphologically complex and less lexicalized, more prolix and periphrastic, less frequent or usual, and less neutral in register. (Levinson 2000: 137). For a discussion on the different senses of 'markedness' and the possibility of doing away with it see Haspelmath (2006).

4.1.2 A revised neo-Gricean pragmatic apparatus

Based on the theoretical framework above, Levinson (1987, 1991) puts forward the hypothesis that the three Binding Conditions of generative grammar can be reduced to a single grammatical condition with the effects of the other two being secured by default pragmatic inferences following from the systematic interaction of the I-, Q- and M-pragmatic principles. This idea is further pursued in Huang (2000, 2007) and a revised neo-Gricean pragmatic apparatus for the interpretation of anaphora is fleshed out.

A revised neo-Gricean pragmatic apparatus for anaphora:
  a)   Interpretation principles
      i)   The use of an anaphoric expression x will I-implicate a co-referential interpretation unless (ii) or (iii).
      ii)   There is an anaphoric Q-scale $<x, y>$, in which case, the use of y will Q-implicate the complement of the I-implicature associated with the use of x in terms of either reference.
      iii) There is an anaphoric M-scale $\{x, y\}$, in which case, the use of y M-implicates the complement of the I-implicature associated with the use of x, in terms of either reference or expectedness i.e. (contrastiveness/emphaticness or logophoricity).
  b)   Consistency constraints
Any interpretation implicated by (i) above is subject to the requirement of consistency with:
      i)   Information saliency, so that
          a)   implicatures due to matrix constructions may take precedence over implicatures due to subordinate constructions, and
          b)   implicatures to co-reference may be preferred according to the saliency of antecedent in line with the hierarchy: topic> subject> object, etc.; and
      ii)   General implicature constraints, namely,
          c)   background assumptions,
          d)   contextual factors
          e)   meaning-nn, and
          f)   semantic entailments.

35)   Referential content hierarchy
       Anaphors < pronominals < r-expressions

Given (35), a choice to the left tends to reinforce co-referential readings, while a choice to the right tends to reinforce disjoint reference.

5. A partial neo-Gricean pragmatic analysis for Modern Greek

In the remaining of this paper I shall present a partial neo-Gricean pragmatic analysis of NP-anaphora in Modern Greek, seeking evidence for Levinson's and Huang's revised

neo-Gricean pragmatic theory of anaphora as presented in the previous section[8]. More precisely, I shall argue for a partial pragmatic reduction of the interpretation of Modern Greek NP-anaphora based on the systematic interaction of the Q- I- and M-neo-Gricean pragmatic principles. The proposed pragmatic model is not a wholesale replacement of syntactic accounts. By contrast, it presupposes the existence of distinct syntactic, semantic and pragmatic levels of explanation. For this matter, the account proposed points in the direction of a division of labour between syntax and pragmatics.

5.1 The reflexive *o eaftos mu*

As we have seen so far, the reflexive *o eaftos mu* may be used as: a) a locally bound reflexive or b) a long-distance anaphor. Let us examine these two cases separately.

In typical reflexive constructions like the one in (36) below, *o eaftos mu* is bound by a local antecedent and it behaves as its English equivalent, namely, *himself*.

36)   I   Maria$_i$ θavmazi ton eafto tis$_i$
          the Mary admires the self   hers
          'Mary admires herself.'

In these distributions, reflexive *o eaftos mu* behaves like a typical [+anaphor, -pronominal] NP in the sense of Chomsky (1982, 1986). Its interpretation is syntactically and semantically conditioned and it does not depend on contextual factors. For that matter we accept that local co-referential relationships are grammatically conditioned in Modern Greek and are interpreted by the syntactically defined binding principle A.

Given the formulation above, wherever a pronoun (semantically weak) is used instead of the reflexive *o eaftos mu* (semantically strong) the interpretation of the pronoun would be pragmatically inferred as follows:

37)   I   Maria$_i$ tin$_z$ θavmazi
          the Mary her admires
          'Mary admires her.'

The reflexive *o eaftos mu* and the pronoun will form a Q-scale <*o eaftos mu*, *tin*>. In (36) reflexivity is overtly marked in the syntax by the use of the reflexive *o eaftos mu*, hence according to binding condition A, the use of the reflexive will give rise to a local co-referential interpretation. When the speaker alters to a clitic pronoun, as in (37), she/he invites the hearer to infer that she/he intends to avoid the local co-referential interpretation. Given that *o eaftos mu* is semantically stronger than the pronoun, the choice of the semantically weaker clitic pronoun will Q-implicate the complement of the

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[8] See also Valiouli (1994) for a more discourse oriented pragmatic analysis of the phenomenon of anaphora, Miltsakaki (2002) and Karamanis & Miltsakaki (2006) for an anaphora model that combines the mechanisms of topic continuity and focusing. For a pragmatic approach to Spanish NP-anaphora see Blackwell (1994, 2000, 2001, 2003).

interpretation associated with the use of the reflexive, i.e. disjoint reference. Therefore, binding principle B effect is pragmatically reduced by the operation of the Q-principle.

So far so good then for cases where reflexives and pronouns contrast in reference. What happens though in cases where this apparent complementarity breaks down like in (21) or (38)?

38)   O   Janis$_i$ iδe mia fotoγrafia tu$_{i/z}$ / tu eaftu tu$_i$ sto   perioδiko
        the John saw a picture   him / the self his in the magazine
        'John saw a picture of him/himself in the magazine.'

These distributions embarrass a purely syntactic account that predicts strict complementarity of pronouns and anaphors. Nevertheless, a pragmatic analysis is not defeated in such a way since it appears that the use of a reflexive in such environments is clearly pragmatic and it is different from its local reflexive use. More precisely, it has been proposed (see Runner, Sussman & Tanenhaus 2003) that reflexives in 'picture NPs', appear to behave as logophors (we will return to logophoricity in a while). Furthermore, Levinson (2000: 327) notes that "pragmatic contrasts can be on various dimensions, and where an anaphor encodes perspectival information as well as referential dependency, the contrast with a pronoun can as well be in terms of the logophoric dimension".

As a result, when the reflexive *o eaftos mu* is used in these long-distance environments, the use of a pronoun still generates a contrast yet because the reflexive is marked for other kinds of pragmatic meaning as well (e.g. logophoricity), the contrast is at a this very level of logophoricity. Therefore the account can be spelled out as follows: The use of the unmarked pronoun indicates that the speaker wants to go for a co-referential reading. Reversion to the more marked reflexive *o eaftos mu*, will generate an M-implicature in terms of logophoricity.

5.3 Overt and zero pronouns

Modern Greek is a typical pro-drop language and as a result, it normally drops the overt subject[9] of clauses (pro-drop parameter)[10]. Nevertheless, since pro-dropping is only a general tendency, it means that an overt phrase can equally occupy the relevant slot in the clause. Let us concentrate here in cases where the full pronoun *aftos* is used instead of a zero pronoun.

On this basis there is a rather clear question to be addressed to, namely, what is the reason for using the pronoun *aftos* where a non-morphologically expressed pronoun can be used. In other words, what motivates speakers to use a marked construction (*aftos*) over an unmarked one (zero)? There are good reasons to believe that the preference of the pronoun *aftos* over the zero pronoun is inherently pragmatic. In other words, it will be claimed that speakers generally tend to avoid using the full pronoun *aftos* or the anaphor *o iðjos* without any particular purpose. By contrast, when they opt for one of

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[9]   Modern Greek drops only subjects but not objects.

[10] The zero subject of finite clauses is known under the term *pro*, hence the pro-drop parameter.

these two marked anaphoric expressions they intend to convey readings which cannot be inferred by the use of a zero pronoun.

The distribution zero/*aftos* is a twofold case. On the one hand, there are contexts in which the use of the more marked *aftos*, where the zero could have occurred, results in the disjoint interpretation of the overt pronoun like in (39).

39)   Kapjos$_i$ ipe oti   Ø$_i$ /aftos$_y$ iðe ti Maria$_z$ sto parti
        somebody said that (he)/he   saw the Mary at the party
        'Somebody said that he saw Mary at the party.'

On the other hand, there are cases where there is an overlap in reference between the zero pronoun and *aftos*.

40)   O Janis$_i$ pistevi oti   Ø$_i$ /aftos$_i$ θa kerðisi stis ekloγes
        the John believs that (he)/he   will win   at the elections
        'John believes that he will win at the elections.'

As mentioned before, these cases are not problematic at all for the neo-Gricean pragmatic apparatus since the M-principle operate at various distinct levels of pragmatic meaning. As a result, examples like (39) and (40) are interpreted in the following way: When a zero pronoun is used co-reference is given by the I-principle. In the case of (39), reversion to a more marked full pronoun, will M-implicate a contrast in reference. By contrast, in (40) the use of *aftos* expresses a more emphatic/contrastive meaning. Therefore, in contexts like these, the use of the more marked full pronoun M-implicates emphaticness/contrastiveness in the following way. Given the set of alternates {Ø, *aftos*}, the choice of the more prolix pronoun instead of the zero will M-implicate the intention of the speaker to go for a more marked interpretation in terms of emphasis and contrast.

The observation that there is a general tendency to avoid marked forms, unless there is a reason to do so, is not novel in the literature. Chomsky (1981, 1982) has proposed the so called 'avoid pronoun principle' according to which, a null pronoun is preferred where co-reference is intended. In a different case, the use of an overt pronoun would be interpreted as disjoint in reference. This principle indeed describes and explains the rationale behind the preference of a zero where the option between a null versus a full pronoun in pro-drop languages like Modern Greek is open. Yet, this principle has a clear pragmatic content and it can follow directly from the interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles as described above.

5.4 On the interpretation of *o iðjos*

As already mentioned, *o iðjos* overlaps systematically in reference with personal pronouns. At the risk of redundancy, consider the following example:

41)   O Janis$_i$ nomizi oti   Ø$_i$ /o iδjos$_i$ ine kalos maθitis
        the John thinks that (he) the same is   good student
        'John thinks that he is a good student.'

In these contexts, there is some sort of unexpectedness (Edmondson & Plank 1978, Huang 2000, Levinson 2000) in the sense that the preferred interpretational pattern is not affected by the use of *o iδjos* instead of the pronominal form. As Huang (2000: 225) notes, "this   unexpectedness   may   turn   out   to   be   logophoricity, emphaticness/contrastiveness or something yet to be discovered".

5.4.1 Emphaticness/contrastiveness

Modern Greek does not codify emphasis and contrast with purpose-specific pronouns. Emphaticness/contrastiveness is mainly expressed by the use of the anaphor *o iδjos* and full pronouns. It is fairly clear from examples like (41) that *o iδjos* marks contrastive/emphatic content which is also accompanied by a natural negative gloss of the sort 'and not anyone else'.

This sensitivity of *o iδjos* in emphatic/contrastive interpretations may also be related to the semantics of the *iδjos* (same) part of the anaphoric expression. It could be argued that the use of *o iδjos* generates identity statements (see Alrenga 2006, 2007) and that its anaphoric occurances are rather conventionalised as such. This suggestion further supports the view that the interpretation of *o iδjos* is semantically and pragmatically motivated. What is more, in this way we can by-pass the problem raised in Iatridou (1988), where the syntactic Principle D could only account for the anaphoric uses of *o iδjos*.

5.4.2 Logophoricity

Logophoricity and the use of logophoric pronouns were initially observed in a number of African languages such as Ewe, Dogon, Tuburi, Aghem and so on (see Huang 2000 for a variety of examples). In these languages, there is a separate paradigm of logophoric pronouns, i.e. a class of pronouns dedicated to the encoding of logophoric interpretations. Nevertheless, apart from the purpose-specific logophoric pronouns, reflexives can be used logophorically under certain conditions (see Culy 1994, 1997, Huang 1991, 1994, 2000, Sells 1987, Zribi-Hertz 1989).

According to Culy (1997: 845), "logophoric pronouns are usually described as pronouns that are used to refer to the person whose speech, thoughts, or feelings are reported or reflected in a given linguistic context". This 'person' is also referred to as the 'internal protagonist' (Huang 2000) or the 'minimal subject of consciousness' (Zribi-Hertz 1989). In particular, Zribi-Hertz (1989) identifies the subject of consciousness with Kuno's (1987) sense of logophoricity as "a semantic property assigned to a referent whose thoughts or feelings, optionally expressed in speech, are conveyed by a portion of the discourse" (Zribi-Hertz 1989: 711). Logophoricity is also related with the notion of 'point of view', yet Culy (1997) claims that logophoricity proper is rather distinct form

point of view. More precisely, Culy points out that "morphologically distinct logophoric pronouns are grammatically licensed in indirect discourse…and only secondarily indicate point of view" (Culy 1997: 846). In a similar fashion, 'indirect reflexives' (reflexives which can be used logophorically) "can express point of view if they do not have grammatically determined antecedents" (Culy 1997: 856).

As Kuno (1987) and Kuno & Kaburaki (1977) note, the contrast between a pronoun and an anaphor, where there is a free choice, is semantic/pragmatic in nature and it is associated with the notion of 'point of view'. This seems to be the case with Modern Greek *o iðjos* when it occurs in embedded subject positions instead of a zero pronoun (see again example 41). A way forward is to suggest that *o iðjos*, apart from emphasis and contrast, also encodes logophoricity in the sense of Kuno (1987) and Kuno & Kaburaki (1977). The logophoric interpretation of the sentence can be analyzed as follows: When the null pronoun is used, the belief that *John* is a good student is expressed by the speaker. In other words, the speaker states his own view about the protagonist of the sentence who is *John*. By contrast, when *o iðjos* is used, the sentence conveys a more logophoric interpretation in the sense that the internal protagonist's point of view is also expressed. As we understand it, the use of the anaphor *o iðjos* is logophoric.

The logophoric interpretation of *o iðjos* can be accounted for by the systematic interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles. When there is an option between a zero pronoun and *o iðjos*, the speaker will tend to use the unmarked zero if a marked message is not intended. By contrast, if a logophoric interpretation is intended, the more marked *o iðjos* will be used. This is explained in terms of the interaction of the M- and I-principles. Given the M-scale <Ø, *o iðjos*>, the use of the more prolix anaphor, instead of the unmarked zero, will M-implicate the intention of the speaker to go for a logophoric interpretation.

5.5 Parameters constraining anaphora

As it is already mentioned, various syntactic, pragmatic, semantic and cognitive parameters appear to interact systematically in the case of anaphora resolution. It has been shown (Huang 1991, 1994, 2000, Blackwell 1994, 2000, 2001, 2003) that the predictions made by the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles are constrained inconsistent with certain factors such as world knowledge, semantic entailments or information saliency/aboutness.

Interpretations that follow from the systematic interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles do not survive when inconsistent with our knowledge of the world. By way of illustration, consider the examples.

42)   O kaθighitis$_i$ ipe oti o Janis$_j$ kseri   oti Ø$_j$ /o iðjos$_j$ perase
          the professor said that the John knows that (he) /the same passed
          to δiaγonisma
          the exam
          'The professor said that John knows that he passed the exam.

The M-implicature which should have been generated by the use of the more prolix anaphoric expression *o iδjos* is ruled out since our knowledge about the world is that students participate in and pass/fail exams. World knowledge in these cases equals to certain stereotypical relations about the world.

In a study on Spanish NP anaphora Blackwell (1994, 2000) also observes that semantic entailments can override inconsistent M-implicatures of non-co-reference. In her example (Blackwell 2001: 929) the use of a more prolix NP, where a zero could have occurred, does not trigger an M-inference of non-co-reference. This is also borne out in Modern Greek.

43)   I   Maria_i niazete mono ji'   aftin_i ke panda kani to δiko tis
         the Mary cares   only about her and always does the own hers
         'Mary cares only about her and always she does whatever she wants.'

44)   I   Maria_i niazete mono ja   ti Maria_i ke panda kani to δiko tis the Mary
         cares   only   about the Mary and always does the own hers
         'Mary cares only about Mary and always she does whatever she
         wants.'

As the M-principle predicts, the use of the more prolix NP *ti Maria* where the less prolix pronoun could have used, should M-implicate a non-co-referential interpretation. However, there is a preference for the co-referential reading of the r-expression which can be attributed to semantic entailment. In that case, as Blackwell explains, the M-implicature is cancelled since the NP *ti Maria* "is interpreted as a reiterated NP", that is, semantically entailed by the subject NP (Blackwell 2001: 930).

The theory of antecedent saliency can be proved to be an important factor in Modern Greek anaphoric patterns. One can claim that the interpretation of the null pronouns is also regulated by 'aboutness' factors since it is usually the case that a null pronoun is co-referential with the most prominent entity in the sentence. Consider the example.

45)   O   Janis_i xorise me ti Maria_j. Kanis   δen kseri   Ø_i
         the John split   with the Mary. Nobody not knows (he)
         ti   kani meta apo afto
         what does after   this
         'John split with Mary. Nobody knows how he is coping after that.'

In (45) the null pronoun can potentially be co-referential with either of NPs in the first sentence. However, the most preferred reading is the one shown in the example above. In that case *John* is the topic in discourse, hence more salient than *Mary*; as a result the hearer I-infers that the speaker gives him/her information about the topic of the discourse which is *John*. Note here that any change in the topic would be marked by the use of the more prolix full pronoun as (46) illustrates.

46)   O Janis$_i$ xorise me ti Maria$_j$. Kanis   δen kseri   afti$_j$
          the John split   with the Mary. Nobody not knows she
          ti   kani meta apo afto
          what does after   this
          'John split with Mary. Nobody knows how she is coping after that.'

6. Conclusion

In this paper, I addressed the issue of interpreting anaphoric NPs in Modern Greek and I
proposed an alternative analysis based on the systematic interaction of the neo-Gricean
pragmatic principles of communication, which provides a neat and more elegant
approach to NP-anaphora resolution. Summarising our main findings, it was claimed that
the interpretation of the anaphor *o eaftos mu* remains grammatically specified and it is
subject to binding condition A. Yet, in those contexts in which *o eaftos mu* can receive a
long distance antecedent a co-referential reading is given by the I-principle. Moreover,
the use of *o idhios* instead of a null pronoun will give a preferred contrastive/emphatic
and/or logophoric interpretation given the M-principle. Also, in the distributions zero vs.
overt pronoun, preferred interpretations are given by the M-principle. In these cases M-
inferences can give either a disjoint or a contrastive/emphatic reading depending on the
context. Finally it was shown that interpretations that follow from the systematic
interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles do not survive when inconsistent
with our knowledge of the world.

     The findings of this study provide evidence for an account of NP-anaphora in terms
of the division of labour between syntax and pragmatics and more accurately in terms of
the systematic interaction of the neo-Gricean pragmatic principles. Despite the fact that
syntax and pragmatics operate on distinct levels of linguistic explanation they appear to
interact systematically in the case of anaphora resolution. On the one hand, syntax sets
certain restrictions on distributions and regulates the part of interpretations, which are
related to grammatical structure. On the other hand, the choice of anaphoric expressions
by the speakers and their interpretation by addressees is heavily dependent on
preference, which is regulated by principles of language use and communication.

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