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Creating, Sustaining And Contesting Definitions Of Reality: Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE) As A Pragmatist Theorist And Analytic Ethnographer

Abstract

Although widely recognized for his oratorical prowess, the collection of intellectual works that Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE) has generated on persuasive interchange is almost unknown to those in the human sciences.

Building on six texts on rhetoric attributed to Cicero (*Rhetorica ad Herennium, De Inventione*, *Topica, Brutus, De Oratore*, and *Orator*), I claim not only that Cicero may be recognized as a pragmatist philosopher and analytic ethnographer but also that his texts have an enduring relevance to the study of human knowing and acting.

More specifically, thus, Cicero's texts are pertinent to more viable conceptualizations of an array of consequential pragmatist matters. These include influence work and resistance, impression management and deception, agency and culpability, identity and emotionality, categorizations and definitions of the situation, and emergence and process.

Keywords
Cicero; Pragmatism; Ethnography; Reality; Activity; Persuasion; Symbolic interaction; Oratory; Rhetoric; Aristotle; Roman; Kenneth Burke

There is a scientific system which includes many important departments. One of these departments -- a large and important one -- is eloquence based on the rules of art, which they call rhetoric. For I do not agree with those who think that political science has no need of eloquence, and I violently disagree with those who think that it is wholly comprehended in the power and skill of the rhetorician. Therefore we will classify oratorical ability as part of political science. The function of eloquence seems to be to speak in a manner suited to persuade an audience, and the end is to persuade by speech. (Cicero, De Inventione, I, V: 6)...

Aristotle . . . who did much to improve and adorn this art, thought that the function of the orator was concerned with three classes of subjects, the epideictic, the deliberative, and the judicial. The epideictic is devoted to the praise or censure of a particular individual; the deliberative is at home in a political debate and involves the expression of opinion; and the judicial is at home in a court of law and involves accusation and defense or a claim and counter-plea. According to my opinion, at least, the art and faculty of

the orator must be thought of as concerned with this threefold material. (Cicero, De Inventione, I, V: 7[trans. Hubbell])

When Plutarch (46-125CE), a Greek scholar of the Roman era developed *Lives* [*Plutarch's Lives*], a series of texts that juxtaposed outstanding pairs of Greek and Roman characters in particular fields of endeavor, Plutarch selected Demosthenes (384-322BCE) as the Greek rhetorician of record and Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43BCE) as his Roman counterpart. From all accounts, it is these two speakers, Demosthenes and Cicero, who are most renowned for their exceptionally compelling modes of presentation and, relatedly, for their abilities to win favorable judgments for any positions they represented.

Still, to stop here, to focus more exclusively on their prominence as orators, is to miss the broader pragmatist philosophic and historical analysis of rhetoric that Cicero provides as well as the extended importance of his scholarship for Western social thought.[1]

Several of Demosthenes and Cicero's speeches have been preserved and although we cannot be certain of other things Demosthenes may have written, it appears that Demosthenes concentrated more exclusively on his prowess as a practitioner of the art. Thus, whereas Cicero openly and directly models himself after Demosthenes in developing his style of oratory, Cicero also has left an incredible intellectual legacy to those in the human sciences. Accordingly, I will use this occasion to help establish Cicero's relevance as a pragmatist philosopher as well as an analytic ethnographer.[2]

Looking Back, Looking Ahead

This paper emerged as part of a much larger study of the development of pragmatist thought from the classical Greek era (circa 700-300BCE) to the present time. In the quest to locate text that dealt with human knowing and acting in more explicit, detailed, and sustained terms, this venture has taken me across the realms of rhetoric, poetics, education, love and friendship, ethnohistory, politics, philosophy, and religious studies.

Still, whereas so much interim and contemporary scholarship in these and other fields of the humanities and social sciences have been developed from texts developed by Plato and Aristotle, I have found that of all Roman scholars, it was Marcus Tullius Cicero who has provided the most continuity in Western social

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[1] The terms rhetorician (Greek) and orator (Latin) are used interchangeably to refer to those who assume roles as speakers in persuasive endeavors.

[2] Without going into these matters in detail, I have used the term "pragmatist philosopher" here to refer to someone who addresses the nature of human knowing and acting in conceptually abstract ways -- with particular attention to human capacities for speech and intersubjectivity, reflective thought, minded (i.e., purposive, deliberative, adjustive) activity and collective interchange. Although often associated with the works of John Dewey, George Herbert Mead, and Herbert Blumer, pragmatism (as a philosophic approach to human knowing and acting) can be traced back to the classical Greek era and particularly the works of Aristotle (Prus 2003, 2004, 2007a).

I have used the term "analytic ethnographer" to refer not only to someone who studies the way of life of a group of people, relying extensively on participant observation and/or open-ended inquiry, but also to someone who attempts to develop more conceptually informed (i.e., more generic or abstract) understandings of the people whose life-worlds are being examined. Analytic vs. more purely descriptive ethnography is more pronounced yet when the scholars involved develop more extended comparisons (similarities, differences, and inferences) of people's activities across two or more contexts on a contemporary plane and/or historical basis.

thought. Thus, whereas his work on rhetoric is truly exceptional in its scope, depth, and analytic rigor, Cicero also provides some highly consequential statements on philosophy and religious studies.

I have approached this project as a symbolic interactionist (Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Strauss 1993; Prus 1996, 1997). Although attentive to human group life more generally (Prus 1996, 1997), much of my work has focused on persuasive endeavor and associated interchanges (Prus and Sharper 1977; Prus and Irini 1980; Prus, 1989 a, b; Prus 1999; Prus and Grills 2003).

Accordingly, I will be asking to what extent and in what ways Cicero attends to matters such as intersubjectivity, multiple perspectives, reflectivity, activity, negotiation, relationships, linguistic fluency, emotionality, ambiguity and knowing, objects, process, and other aspects of human group life that are more central to an interactionist analysis of the human condition.

Moreover, although Cicero does not explicitly approach his texts as a "participant-observer" or "ethnographer," he very much adopts a role of this sort in developing his materials on rhetoric. Not only has Cicero engaged rhetoric intensively as a student and, seemingly even more so, as a long-term practitioner of rhetoric, but Cicero also examines and writes about the practices that people invoke as rhetoricians in highly sustained, situated, prototypic, historical and comparative analytic terms.

Indeed, it would be difficult to find anyone on a contemporary plane who, in any instance of ethnographic research, matches the expertise or the analytic depth and historical detail that Cicero provides in his texts on rhetoric. Cicero speaks more directly as an instructor or advocate of virtuous rhetoric at times, but this does not invalidate the more central features of Cicero's texts for the broader, long-term study of human knowing and acting.

Given the immensity of the materials on rhetoric attributed to Cicero and the general lack of familiarity of contemporary scholars in the humanities and social sciences with the contents of these texts as well as the wide range of materials of relevance to the pragmatist study of human knowing and acting to be found within Cicero's works on rhetoric, I faced a dilemma about whether to focus on particular texts or parts thereof and address these in more sustained pragmatist/interactionist terms or to present a more comprehensive statement of Cicero's work on rhetoric that could more effectively establish Cicero's broader relevance as a pragmatist philosopher and analytic ethnographer.

Despite the appeal and value of the former, I chose the latter since comparatively decontextualized statements of the former sort would likely invite skepticism regarding Cicero's broader relevance as a pragmatist scholar and analytic ethnographer. Engaging the fuller set of Cicero's texts on rhetoric not only helps establish a more comprehensive foundation on which subsequent, more detailed analyses of Cicero's works could be developed, but these texts also identify particular resources for comparative analyses.

Still, to better contextualize the more immediate project, it is important to briefly consider (1) the development of rhetoric in the classical Greek era, (2) Roman continuities and practices, and (3) the broader set of Cicero's works to which we have access. Following (4) a synoptic, chapter and verse, depiction of six texts on rhetoric have been attributed to Cicero — *Rhetorica ad Herennium, De Inventione, Topica, Brutus, De Oratore*, and *Orator*, the paper (5) concludes with a discussion of Cicero's relevance for those in the human sciences.

Greek Roots

> [W]hen it was recognized what power lay in speech carefully prepared and elaborated as a work of art, then suddenly a whole host of teachers of oratory arose: Gorgias of Leontini, Thrasymachus of Calchedon, Protagoras of Abdera, Prodicus of Ceos, Hippias of Elis, all of whom enjoyed great honour in their day. They and many others of the same time professed, not without arrogance to be sure, to teach how by the force of eloquence the worse (as they called it) could be made the better cause. Opposed to them was Socrates, who with characteristic adroitness of argumentation made it a practice to refute their doctrines. Out of the wealth of his discourses there emerged a group of men of great learning, and to them is attributed the first discovery of the philosophy which deals with good and evil, with human life and society, as distinguished from the philosophy of nature, which belonged to an earlier time... In the old age of those whom I have just mentioned Isocrates came forward, whose house became a veritable training-school or studio of eloquence open to all Greece. He was a great orator and an ideal teacher, but he shrank from the broad daylight of the forum, and within the walls of his school brought to fullness a renown such as no one after him has in my judgement attained. (Cicero, Brutus, VIII: 30-33 [Hendrickson, trans.])

The preceding quotation from Cicero's *Brutus* provides a particularly succinct account of the genesis of rhetoric as a field of activity and realm of study as well as the subsequent division of philosophy and rhetoric promoted by Socrates and Plato. Whereas the term *rhetoric* (from the Greek, *rhetoreia*) often is used to refer to people's skills in public speaking, it has been used more broadly (see Plato's *Phaedrus* and Aristotle's *Rhetoric*), to encompass all modes and arenas of persuasive endeavor. Thus, although political speeches, legal cases, and eulogies have been especially prominent focal points, rhetoric may be invoked in any instance of human interchange.

Protagoras, Gorgias, and Demosthenes are among the most widely acknowledged Greek rhetoricians but rhetoric also was given considerable attention by the poets Homer and Aristophanes, for instance, as well as the historians (Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon) and those who assume roles as moralists and/or educators of whom Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle are most prominent. Relatedly, the most astute analyses of rhetoric to which we have access are those provided by Plato (see *Gorgias*, *Sophist*, and *Phaedrus*) and Aristotle (*Rhetoric* and *Rhetoric to Alexander*).

As the two extracts following from Aristotle's *Rhetoric* suggest, Aristotle provides one of the most compelling analysis of persuasive endeavor on record (a point openly acknowledged in Cicero, *De Inventione*, II ii: 6-7): [3]

> Rhetoric is the counterpart of dialectic. Both alike are concerned with such things as come, more or less, within the general ken of all men and belong to no definite science. Accordingly all men make use, more or less, of both; for to a certain extent all men attempt to discuss statements and to maintain them, to defend themselves and to attack others. (Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I 1354a [Roberts trans.])

> Of the modes of persuasion furnished by the spoken word there are three kinds. The first kind depends on the personal character of the

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[3] For a more extended consideration of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, see Prus (2008).

speaker; the second on putting the audience into a certain frame of mind; the third on the proof, or apparent proof, provided by the words of the speech itself. Persuasion is achieved by the speaker's personal character when the speech is so spoken as to make us think him credible... Secondly, persuasion may come through the hearers, when the speech stirs their emotions... Thirdly, persuasion is effected through the speech itself when we have proved a truth or an apparent truth by means of the persuasive arguments suitable to the case in question. (Aristotle, Rhetoric, Book I 1356a [Roberts trans.])

Still, before turning to rhetoric as practiced by the Romans and Cicero's texts more specifically, it should be noted that Aristotle's analysis of rhetoric not only has a more distinctive philosophic quality than that of those rhetoricians who would follow but also that Aristotle's work on rhetoric is best comprehended amidst his analyses of ethics, poetics, and politics. Cicero does not achieve the remarkable philosophical depth that Aristotle generates, but unlike most academics who (following Socrates and Plato on this matter) separate philosophy and rhetoric, Cicero (more like Aristotle) insists that rhetoric and philosophy are best comprehended mindfully of the other.

Moreover, writing nearly three centuries after Aristotle, Cicero not only provides a remarkable analysis of the practice of rhetoric in Rome in his own time but also generates some of the most valuable historical and comparative analyses of rhetoric on record.

Roman Continuities and Practices

While an analysis of Roman rhetoric (as Cicero observes in *Brutus*) rather inevitably entails a comparative analysis of Greek and Roman rhetoric, the more immediate objective is to briefly consider the ways in which the Romans approached this activity in more general terms.

Judging from the surviving literature, rhetoric or oratory represents a prominent theme in Roman politics, courts, and education during the emergence and duration of what would become known as the Roman (and later the West Roman) empire (c200BCE-500CE).[4]

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[4] Readers might appreciate that following the division of the Roman Empire into Western and Eastern sectors (395CE) in an attempt to facilitate matters of administration, the two Roman empires became notably distinct in a more enduring historical sense. West Rome would disintegrate by 500CE, amidst (a) a series of hostile raids by the Vandals, the Vikings, and others, (b) an assortment of rebellions within various territories that the Romans had occupied, and (c) ongoing internal political struggles. Somewhat concurrently, as well, (d) the Roman Catholic Church began to emerge as the central integrating force (i.e., as a transnational organizational empire) across what is now Western Europe.

Scholarship in Western Europe during the ensuing centuries (c500-1000CE) is often characterized as "the Dark Ages." Academic arenas, interests, and competencies greatly deteriorated during this era and were sustained primarily by small pockets of Christian scholars. Given the general state of intellectual decay during this era, these people not only worked with fragmentary versions of earlier Latin texts (most Greek and Roman texts having been destroyed or lost), but with notably lessened levels of education and associated conceptual abilities.

Although an increasingly distant intellectual relative, East Rome would fare much better (until 1453CE, when Byzantine fell to the Ottoman Empire). In a fashion somewhat paralleling the Roman Catholic Church, its Greek Orthodox offshoot would dominate East Rome and extend its religious empire through proselytizing activity (conversion, theological education) in the neighboring northern states. Greek scholarship retained greater continuity in Byzantine than in Western Europe (during the dark

During the earlier years (c200-01 BCE) of Roman dominance in the Mediterranean and West European theaters, Roman education represented partialized, "carbon copies" of early Greek thought. The Romans had taken control of Greece by 145BCE, but Greek influences on Roman culture (and scholarship) were evident somewhat earlier.

Roman interests were notably different than those of the Greeks, but Roman intrigues with (the more sophisticated) Greek culture were substantial. Academically, the Romans were ill prepared to comprehend various features of Greek thought. Still, as a collectivity, the Romans appear to have appreciated (in ways that many other peoples have not) "the value of a classical Greek education." In these years then (c200BCE-100CE), well-educated Romans would be expected to be highly conversant in (spoken and written) Greek.

As well, there was great unevenness with respect to the specific Greek emphases that were pursued (and lost) in the Roman Empire. Hence, for instance, the Romans appear to have attended with great interest to Greek art and entertainment, courtroom practices (and rhetoric), and military technology.

Likewise, one finds considerable interest on the part of the Romans in some realms of Greek philosophy. Mostly notably, however, these were focused on Stoicism and Epicureanism. The dominant Roman philosophic emphases, thus, reflected a mixture of concerns with theology, morality, idealism, fatalism, determinism, and divination.

By contrast, Roman interests in the more extended and rigorous features of Platonic thought and Aristotelian scholarship (philosophy and science) appear to have been comparatively ignored. Thus, whereas Plato's Academy persisted for some centuries it appears to have been focused more on dialectics than fuller considerations of human knowing and acting. By Cicero's time, Aristotle's school receded yet further into the intellectual background of the Roman era (Prus 2006).
However, it might be noted that following the death of Aristotle (c384-322BCE) and the eventual disintegration of the Greek empire that had been established by Alexander the Great (356-323BCE), Greek scholarship also became more theological, idealist, and determinist in emphasis. In these respects, Roman philosophy reasonably imitated the already weakened Greek intellectual tradition in vogue at the time.[5]

Somewhat ironically, too, as Roman education prospered and began to assume a more distinctive character, one witnesses a further loss of intellectual competence. In part, this seems attributable to the (not uncommon) nationalist concern that written materials and instruction be developed in one's own language.

While a great deal of the early Roman literature represented overt (but less adequate) variants of the Greek originals and some Greek originals had been directly translated into Latin, the subsequent emphasis on producing *Latin* texts and honoring *Roman* celebrities, events, and authors meant an increasing disregard of classic Greek scholarship.

This is not to deny some instances of highly competent scholarship on the part of the Romans but, rather, to observe that one effect of the Roman quest for *national pride* and *individual persona* was the disregard of a great deal of highly enabling Greek thought.

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ages), but Greek philosophy and science stagnated in the East, where it was not further suppressed, under the theological agendas of the Eastern or Greek Orthodox Church.

[5] A similar observation on the overall deterioration of Greek philosophy is made by Cicero (*De Oratore*, BIII, xxxii: 132). More than any Roman scholar of record, Cicero addresses the conceptual transitions in *both* rhetoric and philosophy from the Greek era to his own time.

When we turn more directly to rhetoric, the loss is much less apparent than in some other areas (most notably philosophy and science) of scholarship. Still, despite the extended attention given to rhetoric by a vast assortment of Roman practitioners and scholars (see Cicero's *Brutus*), Roman rhetoric would become viewed more exclusively as a productive or enabling art or technology.

Even Cicero (106-43BCE) who clearly emerges as the outstanding scholar of Roman rhetoric *and* who explicitly endorses the study of philosophy on the part of orators can, on his own, only contribute so much to the broader study of community life in a setting intellectually dominated by Stoic philosophy.

Cicero's Written Works

While a great many Greek and Latin texts have been lost, Cicero's preserved writings still are quite extensive. These include several treatises on rhetoric and philosophy, a series of texts of his orations, and a collection of his letters. Although his texts are only marginally known in the broader contemporary academic world, Marcus Tullius Cicero emerges as one of the most competent scholars of record from the Roman Empire, particularly in the areas of rhetoric, philosophy, and religious studies. Moreover, Cicero's texts also have been invaluable for a historical reconstruction of Roman society.[6]

Although building extensively on the Greek literature that he encountered as a student of rhetoric and his broader, longer-term attentiveness to Greek and Latin philosophy, it is during the last few years of his life (45-43 BCE) that Cicero developed much of his work on philosophy (MacKendrick 1989).[7]

Although Cicero makes few claims to the originality of content, it is in his attempts to generate a greater awareness of philosophic thought of the part of Roman readers and the ways that he (dialogically) presents and compares a series of viewpoints of rhetoric, philosophy, and religion, that his scholarship is so valuable.

In addition to Cicero's works on rhetoric (especially *Rhetorica Ad C. Herennium*, *De Inventione*, *Topica*, *Brutus*, *De Oratore*, *Orator*) and their implications for a fuller pragmatist approach to the study of human knowing and acting, readers also are referred to Cicero's more distinctive philosophic works. These include *Academica*, *On the Nature of the Gods*, *On Fate*, *On Divination*, *On Ends*, *Topics*, and *Tusculan Disputations*. Also see Cicero's *On Friendship*, *On Old A*ge, and *On Office* as well as *On the Republic* and *On the Laws*.[8]

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[6] Whereas most of those generating translations of Cicero's texts also provide valuable background information of the materials they address more directly, Paul MacKendrick (1989) has provided an invaluable service by reviewing in some detail the entire corpus of Cicero's texts on rhetoric and philosophy. Still, as with so much of the scholarship of classic Greek and Roman eras, Cicero's materials typically have been discussed as segmented parts of the broader historical flow rather than in more sustained comparative analytic terms.

[7] Cicero's decision to develop a series of texts on philosophy was his way of dealing with the inactivity resulting from a closure of the court system in Rome. Still, Cicero likely would have contributed yet more had he not been killed at the order of Mark Anthony. Having extensively criticized Mark Antony (Marcus Antonius, one of the three Roman Governors), in a series of orations (copies have been preserved), Cicero was defined as threat to the state.

[8] Because of the longer-term diffusion of classical Greek and Latin thought, as well as the disjunctures and constrictions characterizing the flows of Western intellectual thought, it is not possible to fully and directly trace the influences of Cicero's work on Western scholarship. However, as MacKendrick (1989) indicates in some detail, Cicero's impact is likely much greater than is commonly acknowledged.

Cicero's Latinization of Rhetoric[9]

In one of his later volumes, *Brutus* (xci: 313- xcii: 317),[10] Cicero describes himself as initially poorly prepared (physically and mentally) to assume an active role as an orator. However, pursuing what he describes as an intense fascination with oratorical fame, Cicero spent two years studying rhetoric and philosophy with a number of Greek-educated instructors in Greece and Asia Minor.

Following his return to Rome, Cicero would become an exceptionally prominent judicial orator and political figure.

Still, in very general terms, one might observe that Cicero, who had traveled across Greece and Asia Minor in pursuit of a strong education in rhetoric, invokes a mixed set of conceptual frames in his writings.

Thus, while Cicero's rhetoric (a) very much reflects the general analytical features associated with Aristotle (384-322BCE), Cicero's writings also appear to have been (b) moderated by an attentiveness to Hermagoras' (c150CE) concerns about more direct technological applications and (c) developed in ways that are explicitly mindful of Isocrates' (436-338BCE) emphasis on pursuing rhetoric that is morally virtuous and stylistically elegant. At the same time, Cicero has particular regard for (d) the courage and style of the Greek rhetorician Demosthenes (384-322BCE) whom Cicero frequently references as exemplary in his depictions of the ideal orator.

As well, while we know little about Hermagoras,[11] Cicero clearly was much more centrally involved in the practice of judicial and political rhetoric than were Aristotle or Isocrates. Hence, Cicero's (detailed) expositions on rhetoric also reflect his extensive experiences as a *participant* in a wide variety of forensic and deliberative arenas.

Of all Roman scholars too, it is Cicero who appears most desirous of fostering a closer linkage of philosophy and rhetoric. Cicero clearly distances himself from the censorial posture on rhetoric that Plato and Socrates promote. Cicero also is vigorously opposed to the artificial and anti-intellectual separation of rhetoric and philosophy he associates with Socrates and Plato.
Nevertheless, whereas Cicero (like Isocrates) defends rhetoric as a realm of activity and scholarship, he still emphasizes the desirability of *virtuous rhetoric*.

For Cicero, thus, *the ideal orator* would be someone who: is exceedingly accomplished at a technical and performance level; is well schooled in procedures, style, and philosophical insight; is compellingly eloquent in linguistic and physical expressivity; is able to effectively address audiences and convince them of the viability of any claims (or challenges) made; does not avoid the challenges of the day; and rigorously champions the moral integrity of the community.

Expressed in other terms, Cicero's ideal orator would achieve the analytical insights of Plato, the conceptual rigor of Aristotle, the eloquence of Isocrates, the

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[9] In developing this material on Cicero, I will be building primarily on the Loeb Classical Library series of translations of Cicero's works on rhetoric. Individual translators will be acknowledged as particular texts are introduced.

[10] As Hubbell (1962: 299) notes in his introduction to *Orator*, the more complete versions of *Orator* and *De Oratore*, along with the theretofore unknown *Brutus* were only rediscovered by Western academics in the 1400s.

[11] For more information on Hermagoras' works on rhetoric, see Kennedy (1963: 303-321).

oratorical depth and courage of Demosthenes, and the moral virtues of those who respect the well being of the community.

Cicero's analyses of rhetoric are conceptually astute as well as thoroughly substantively informed. Moreover, he also develops (especially see *Brutus*) his analyses of rhetoric in *comparative-analytic* terms. Thus, he draws extensively on *historical* and *cross-cultural* materials as well as practices in his own more situated, contemporary context.

Envisioning rhetoric as much more than (informed and noble) talk, Cicero *takes the practice of rhetoric apart piece by piece* and examines these matters in comparative analytical terms. Even when questing for ideals of sorts, Cicero is a remarkably insightful and conceptually articulate analyst of rhetoric as a *realm of humanly contrived and negotiated human interchange*. It is for this reason that his writings are so informative for social scientists.

By examining *Cicero's texts on rhetoric*,[12] readers may be able to track Cicero's thoughts more directly as these pertain to the ways that realities are constructed, presented, and resisted in oratorical arenas.

Readers are cautioned that it is impossible to represent, in any adequate sense, the depth of analysis or the eloquence of Cicero's writings within the confines of the present statement. In dealing with his works, the emphasis has been on maintaining an overall sequential flow within each volume while acknowledging particular sections of these texts that address more consequential features of persuasive endeavor.

Whereas these texts are considered in some detail so that readers might appreciate that Cicero's relevance as a pragmatist philosopher and an analytic ethnographer as well as an exceptional orator, readers are cautioned that this material is densely compacted. Because Cicero's texts are conceptually detailed as well as exceptionally informed in both comparative procedural and historical terms, readers are encouraged to exercise patience in examining and absorbing the material presented here. The references provided within enable readers to more directly consult Cicero's texts for more complete, more precise indications of the material presented here.

Before proceeding further, it may be noted that this treatment of Cicero's work begins with a statement on *Rhetorica Ad C. Herennium* [*RH*]. *Rhetorica Ad C. Herennium* traditionally has been attributed to Cicero, but some have questioned whether Cicero wrote *RH*. However, this uncertainty neither diminishes the overall importance of this text for comprehending rhetoric more generally nor, given the contents of the other five volumes (*De Inventione*, *Topica, Brutus, De Oratore*, and *Orator*) considered here, does this ambiguity notably detract from Cicero's immense contributions as a scholar (and practitioner) of oratory.

Still, because most of Cicero's works appear to have been recovered only in the 1300's, *RH* appears to have represented the major or best known work in rhetoric available to European scholars during the intervening centuries. Thus, regardless of its authorship, *RH* is to be recognized not only for the insights it provides into *humanly negotiated reality* but also as a highly consequential intellectual linchpin for students of rhetoric over the millennia. Thus, whereas we may be highly indebted to

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[12] Those more familiar with Cicero's works will recognize that I have disattended to Cicero's *Paradoxa Stoicism* (Stoic Paradoxes; apparently modeled after Aristotle's *Sophistical Refutations*, wherein Aristotle addresses a series of problematic or misleading arguments commonly made by some sophists of his day). *Paradoxa Stoicism* is an important volume but would unduly extend the parameters of this statement.

an unknown author if *RH* was written by another or even more grateful to Cicero if this text also was one that he had written.

As with Cicero's *De Inventione* (discussed later), the indebtedness of *RH* to Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (or variants thereof) is strikingly apparent. Although *RH* lacks some of the analytical features of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (particularly in reference to Aristotle's broader explanations of human activity and Aristotle's more extended consideration of emotionality as a humanly experienced essence), *RH* merits recognition as a solid, direct, and highly articulate treatment of influence work.

Rhetorica Ad Herennium[13]

Like Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, *RH* is concerned with three modes of oratory: (a) judicial or forensic, (b) deliberative or political, and (c) epideictic or demonstrative (also evaluative). However, whereas Aristotle attends to human behavior more broadly, *RH* is intended more exclusively as a theory of public speaking (BI, i: 1).
Still, *RH* (especially Books I-III) provides considerable insight into the humanly engaged world, particularly into matters that are contested in courtroom interchanges. *RH* also maintains an instructive or prescriptive (versus a more distinct analytical) thrust but, because of its more precise focus and systematic presentation, *RH* provides a valuable *transhistorical comparison* point for contemporary analysts interested in the linkages of language and action.

Although the material in *RH* is intended to enable speakers to pitch messages to audiences as a generalized other (Mead 1934) of sorts, the author of *RH* recognizes a considerable range of interests, competencies, and interpretations on the part of judges or audiences. As well, *RH* explicitly shares with Aristotle the expectation that speakers would *attend to* their audiences on an ongoing basis and *make adjustments* along the way.

Nevertheless, as with virtually all classical rhetoric, the emphasis is primarily on the activities of speakers. Speakers are explicitly encouraged to "take the role" (Mead, 1934) of judges, but one obtains comparatively little insight into the ways in which judges actually deal materials presented to them by speakers (even though the authors of these works seem likely to have served as judges or auditors on many occasions).

RH is organized around five features of oratory: (1) *invention* or the matter of devising credible arguments; (2) *arrangement* or the ordering of the material to be presented; (3) *style* or the selection of appropriate words and phrases; (4) *memory* or speakers' capacities for retaining and recalling materials pertinent to the matter at hand; and (5) *delivery* or the actual presentation signified by voice, appearance, and gesture (BI, ii: 3).

While acknowledging some natural abilities on the part of speakers, *RH* emphasizes theory, imitation and practice as essential to speakers' overall success (BI, ii: 3).

Invention

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[13] In developing this statement on *Rhetorica Ad C. Herennium* I am very much indebted to Harry Caplan (1954) for his translation of *Rhetorica Ad Herennium*.

Referring primarily to the development or building of cases for presentation, the term *invention* encompasses a great many features of forensic, deliberative and demonstrative oratory.

In the ensuing text, *RH* provides an extended treatment of invention in forensic or judicial oratory, followed by much briefer considerations of deliberative and demonstrative oratory before turning to the other four features of oratory (i.e., arrangement, style, memory, and delivery).

Judicial Oratory

The first two parts (Books I and II) of *RH* deal predominantly with *invention* or the task of developing viable cases in forensic settings. Although *RH* gives primary attention to speakers who make claims against others, it is expected that those involved in defending cases would also attend directly to these matters. Notably, too, speakers are expected to develop their own cases in ways that anticipate and adjustively neutralize, if not more effectively destroy, their opponents' cases.

All speakers, thus, may introduce and pursue matters in ways that they deem appropriate to the case and all claims of relevancy and significance are open to dispute. However, all presentations and counterclaims are pursued with the understanding that it is some third party judge(s) who, in the end, will decide the case on whatever grounds that third party considers appropriate.

RH (BI, ii: 5) classifies the cases (or causes to be undertaken) as honorable, discreditable, doubtful (both honorable and discreditable in some way), and petty, providing some suggestions for the ways that these differing types of cases might be approached. More generally, however, explicit concerns are expressed about speakers (a) achieving *attentive audiences* (BI, iv); (b) establishing *credibility* vis-à-vis judges, (c) *discrediting* their adversaries, and (d) *extolling the virtues* of the judges in the case (BI, iv: 7 -v: 8).

Mindful of the task of inventing or generating cases for auditors, *RH* then addresses the central components or *stages of forensic oratory*. These are the (1) *introduction*, (2) *narration*, (3) *division*, (4) *proof*, (5) *refutation*, and (6) *conclusion*. After briefly distinguishing subtler from more overt *introductions* to the case (BI, vi: 9 - vii: 11), *RH* focuses on the matter of *developing narratives* or "stating the facts" (BI, viii: 12 -ix: 16) in ways that favor one's case.

In Aristotelian fashion, *RH* also stresses the importance of developing accounts that are direct, clear, and plausible. In pursuing definitions of narrative plausibility, *RH* particularly emphasizes the importance of achieving a coherence of people, place, and activity in the case.

In the *division* (*RH* BI, x: 17), speakers typically indicate both (a) points of agreement between themselves and their opponents and (b) issues that remain contested. Here, speakers are advised to enumerate the points of contention and prepare the auditors for the materials that they will be developing in greater depth.

Next, *RH* (BI, x: 18 -xxxix: 47) considers *proof* and *refutation*, viewing these as the basis on which cases are won and lost. Confirmations and challenges are seen to revolve around three *types of issues*: (a) conjectural, (b) legal, and (c) juridical.

Conjectural issues (*RH* BI, xi: 18) deal with questions of the facts in the case. *Legal* issues (BI, xi: 19 -xiii: 23) pertain to interpretations and applications of laws (as in disputes between the spirit and letter the law, conflicting laws, or disputes regarding the applicability of particular laws to specific instances).

Issues are viewed as *juridical* matters (BI, xiv: 24 -xv: 25) when people agree on the act in question, but contest the culpability or accountability of the focal actor(s).

Normally, this involves considerations such as the denial of responsibility, the shift of responsibility to others, or justifications based on unavoidable choices between undesirable activities.

Once the type of issue is defined, the next aspect of proof and refutation revolves around *motives* for the acts in question. While *justifying motives* are not central to conjectural cases (in which the commission of the act is the first or primarily issue), actor justifications are seen as vital to building strong defenses in legal and juridical cases (and become points of adjudication). Notably, (all or any) *motives* (*RH* BI, xvi: 26-27) represent devices that defenders and prosecutors may invoke more generally as they build and challenge cases.

In Book II, *RH* deals with conjectural, legal, and juridical cases in greater detail. In conjectural issues, it is *facts of the case* that are subject to challenge or dispute. Accordingly, *RH* addresses six themes (BII, ii: 3 -viii: 12) that prosecutors may pursue in *generating definitions* favorable to their positions (as well as ways that defenders may try to invalidate these themes). "Facts" revolve around (a) probabilities, (b) comparisons, (c) signs, (d) presumptive proofs, (e) subsequent behaviors, and (f) confirmatory proofs.

Rather than treat facts as objective entities, *RH* focuses on speakers convincing audiences by establishing more compelling *probabilities* (BII, ii: 3 -iii: 5). Thus, some attempts to achieve proof rests on claims that defendants were *motivated* (via possible gains or losses) to engage in the act in question and that the activities in question are consistent with aspects of the defendants' *life-style*.
Comparisons (*RH* BII, iv: 6) may be invoked to exclude others (as in lacking motives or opportunities to commit the acts in question) from responsibility for the event. A variety of *signs* (BII, iv: 6-7) or supplementary indicators also may be introduced by prosecutors to show that accused persons maximized conditions favorable to success. This would include things such as: selecting specific places, times, and occasions; assuming confidence of success; and taking precautions to minimize detection.

Likewise, guilt in conjectural cases may be demonstrated through *presumptive proofs* (*RH*, BII, v: 8) wherein some sense-based evidence (materials, indicators) is submitted that allegedly fits (before, during, and after) with the event at issue. References to people's *subsequent behaviors* (*RH*, BII, v: 8) also may be made to establish consistency of those behaviors with the claims being made. As well, *confirmatory proof* (BII, vi: 9 -viii: 12) in the form of witnesses and rumors may also be introduced. As the author of *RH* observes throughout, however, any or all claims along these lines made by those attempting to prosecute cases may be challenged by those endeavoring to defend accused persons.

When engaging *legal* issues (BII, ix: 13 -xii: 18), *RH* provides an instructive commentary on the ways that speakers might develop (and oppose) viewpoints on matters of interpretation regarding (a) the intention vs. the letter of written text; (b) the conflict of two or more laws; (c) ambiguous text; (d) the definition of terms of reference; and (e) the appropriateness of the present legal setting for dealing with the case at hand.

In *juridical issues* (*RH*, BII, xiii: 19 -xvii: 26), wherein it is acknowledged that specific people did things, the issue revolves more directly around the culpability of actors. Accordingly, *RH* embarks on considerations of (a) the context in which the act and actors are to viewed (as in statutory law vs. customary arrangements; concerns with previous decisions or equality); (b) comparison (choosing between two or more undesirable activities); (c) shifting blame to other people; (d) denial of responsibility through necessity, accident, or ignorance; and (e) pleas for mercy.

Having dealt with these three types of issues (conjectural, legal and juridical), *RH* subsequently introduces an assortment of *defective reasonings* (e.g., questionable inferences, weak analogies, problematic comparisons) that speakers may invoke as they move through the various stages of their arguments (BII, xviii: 27 -xxix: 47).

RH (BII, xxx: 47 -xxxi: 50) then addresses *conclusions*, drawing attention to the objectives of summarizing cases, focusing attention on desired matters, and generating emotional sensations on the part of judges. Following a synopsis, in which audiences are reminded of the key issues of contention and are specifically refreshed of the compelling features of the speaker's argument, speakers are then in a position to generate hostility toward the accused (or, conversely, arouse sympathy for the accused) on the part of their audiences.

As part of the conclusion, *RH* (BII, xxx: 48-49) identifies ten points on which speakers may attempt to *generate animosity* toward those they are trying to prosecute. Thus, particular efforts may be directed to show that (a) recognized authorities (as gods, rulers, or states) have been violated; (b) certain undeserving parties (whether superiors, equals, or subordinates) have been negatively affected; (c) such acts should not go unpunished, lest they lead to more dangerous, wide-spread practices of this sort; (d) if this person is tolerated, others will be encouraged to commit similar offenses; and (e) an error of leniency would be irreversible in this case.

Likewise, animosity may be intensified when speakers claim that (f) the act was premeditated and is not to be excused; (g) the crime is exceedingly distasteful, cruel, or sacrilegious, (h) the offense is unusual and needs to be avenged; and (i) compared to other crimes, this act is truly reprehensible. As well, (j) speakers are encouraged to present all distasteful features of the act as fully and intensely as possible so that auditors might more fully participate in this experience.

The *treatment of pity* (*RH*, BII, xxxi: 50) is dealt with more abruptly, but those defending cases may appeal to audiences by emphasizing (a) human vulnerabilities to chance; (b) the perpetrator's current difficult circumstances; (c) the great losses that the perpetrator is likely to experience if found guilty; (d) the generalized sympathies of judges toward people; (e) the kindness that the perpetrator has shown toward others; (f) the long-standing difficulties the perpetrator has experienced; and (g) the "human understanding" of the auditors. Defenders also may (h) directly plead for mercy on behalf of their clients.

The material presented in *RH* does not inform us of the ways that judges might actually sort out the materials (and challenges thereof) with which they may be presented. However, *RH* clearly alerts readers to the relativistic, tactically enterprising and negotiable nature of courtroom definitions. Moreover, invention is not limited to forensic oratory.

Deliberative Oratory

Focusing on orators who attempt to shape the choices that auditors make between two or more lines of action, deliberative or political speeches are seen to revolve around the advantages that speakers associate with (a) security and (b) honor.

Attending to audience concerns about avoiding and managing threats or dangers (*RH*, BIII, ii: 3), speakers invoking images of *security* more typically address

people's predicaments or opportunities with respect to physical resources (e.g., equipment, supplies, money) and/or political craftiness.

By contrast, speakers attending to *honor* (BIII, iii: 3 -iv: 7) tend to emphasize people's concerns with wisdom, justice, courage and self-restraint. Further, while acknowledging that deliberative rhetoric could address or invoke audience concerns with both security and honor in the same speech, it is made apparent that the two realms of emphases also may be presented as sharply competing justifications or motivations for action in other instances (BIII, v: 8-9).

Demonstrative Oratory

RH (BIII, vi: 10 -vii: 15) also gives some attention to *epideictic rhetoric* wherein particular targets (specific people, participants in certain events, gods, or communities) become the focal points of praise or censure. Those developing demonstrative or evaluative speeches may draw on (a) the circumstances in which their targets find themselves, as well as (b) any physical attributes or (c) qualities of character that speakers might associate with these targets. In addition to selectively *amplifying* (emphasizing) or diminishing various features of the situation at hand, speakers are explicitly counseled to attend to *audience viewpoints* in developing, presenting, and adjusting the statements that they present to these audiences.

On Arrangement

Having focused predominantly on invention or the development of arguments in judicial, deliberative, and demonstrative contexts, *RH* (BIII, ix: 16 -x: 18) briefly considers *arrangement* or the ordering of the major components of the speech. Thus, attention is given to the typical sequencing of judicial oratory, including the introduction, statement of the facts, division (points of agree and contention), proof, refutation, and conclusion.

On Delivery

The discussion then shifts to the delivery or presentation of the speech. While stressing the importance of delivery, the author of *RH* clearly intends not to minimize the importance of any of the other four facilities (invention, arrangement, memory, style) outlined at the outset (BIII, xi: 19). The ensuing portrayal of delivery very much focuses on *voice quality* (volume, control, flexibility; BIII, ix: 20 -xiv: 25) and *physical movement* (gestures, posturing, facial expressions, BIII, xv: 26-27). Notably, the detail directed toward delivery (as enacted eloquence) in this section appears to approximate the rhetorical style of Isocrates rather than Aristotle.

On Memory

The author of *RH* (Book III, xvi: 28 -xxiv: 40) also provides a valuable consideration of memory or deliberative recollection (*mnemonics*, from the Greek) as this facility enters into people's abilities to effectively present speeches to others. While some speeches may be delivered directly from written text, *RH* encourages speakers to develop the ability to organize their thoughts around *sequences of*

images that they might memorize and then recollectively invoke these images as they work their way through their presentations.[14]

On Style

Although of less immediate interest for our purposes, Book IV of *RH* (about one-third of the overall text) deals with an extended assortment of embellishments of *linguistic style*. Noting that these elements cut across all aspects of invention and delivery, the author deals with the selection of words and phrases as this pertains to contemporary tastes of speech, variants of diction, and figures of thought. This material indicates just how intricately orators may attend to various grammatical features of speeches. The inference is that each of these stylistic devices may enable speakers to develop more persuasive messages and, thus, contribute to the overall likelihood of influencing other in desired manners (also see Murphy, 2003).

Cicero's *De Inventione*[15]

When *De Inventione* (*INV*) is read mindfully of *Rhetorica Ad C. Herennium* (*RH*), the parallels in the materials are striking. Indeed, it is commonly argued (variously) that both were written by the same author, that one author copied the other, or that both works reflect common sources (also see Hubbell's [1949: xi-xviii] introduction to *De Inventione*).[16] However, some notable differences in emphases in these texts are evident and *De Inventione* provides us with yet further insights into human interchange.

In his later years Cicero (*De Oratore*, I, ii: 5) describes *De Inventione* as a less polished product of his youth. He also notes at the conclusion of *INV*, that he has not developed his statement on oratory as fully as he had intended (i.e., to cover all the parts of rhetoric; invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery). Still, *De Inventione* provides an exceptionally valuable account of the processes by which speakers *envision, develop, and arrange materials* in ways designed to influence audience definitions of situations.

While maintaining the essential flow of this volume, the following headings are used to highlight various features of Cicero's *De Inventione*: (1) defense of rhetoric; (2) the stages of oratory; (3) intensifying affective viewpoints; (4) conjecture, definition, and resolution; (5) assessing documents; and (6) deliberative and epideictic rhetorical continuities.

In Defense of Rhetoric

Like Aristotle and the author of *RH*, Cicero deals with forensic, deliberative and epideictic rhetoric. However, in contrast to *RH*, *De Inventione* is begun with an

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[14] Taking issue with more conventional Greek oratorical practices, here, the author of *RH* encourages the learning and recollection of images over the memorization of extended sequences of text (words).

[15] *De Inventione* (*On Invention*) was translated by H. M Hubbell (1949). I am most grateful for his contributions to the present statement.

[16] Later, in introducing Book II (i: 1 -iii: 11) of *De Inventione*, Cicero notes that he has used a number of sources (citing Aristotle, Isocrates, and Hermagoras) in developing his statement.

explicit *defense of rhetoric*. Thus, while observing that some people have used their abilities to speak in self-serving or divisive and destructive manners. Cicero intends to alert readers to the value of eloquence, particularly that informed by philosophic wisdom:

> I have often seriously debated with myself whether men and communities have received more good or evil from oratory and a consuming devotion to eloquence. For when I ponder the troubles in our commonwealth, and run over in my mind the ancient misfortunes of mighty cities, I see that no little part of the disasters was brought about by men of eloquence. When, on the other hand, I begin to search in the records of literature for events which occurred before the period which our generation can remember, I find that many cities have been founded, that the flames of a multitude of wars have been extinguished, and that the strongest alliances and most sacred friendships have been formed not only by the use of the reason but also more easily by the help of eloquence.
> For my part, after long thought, I have been led by reason itself to this opinion first and foremost, that wisdom without eloquence does too little for the good of states, but that eloquence without wisdom is generally highly disadvantageous and is never helpful. (Cicero, De Inventione BI, i: 1)

In more general terms, Cicero also argues for the *centrality of language* for the human condition. Not only does speech provide the basis of reasoned community life among humans (*INV*, BI, ii: 2 -iii: 5), but it is also an element that uniquely distinguishes people from other animals. As well, Cicero observes, if oratory is something that can be achieved through instruction, then it warrants closer study:

> For from eloquence the state receives many benefits, provided only it is accompanied by wisdom, the guide of all human affairs. From eloquence those who have acquired it obtain glory and honour and high esteem. From eloquence comes the surest and safest protection for one's friends. Furthermore, I think that men, although lower and weaker than animals in many respects, excel them most by having the power of speech...
> And if, as it happens, this is not brought about by nature alone nor by practice, but is also acquired from some systematic instruction, it is not out of place to see what those say who have left us some directions for the study of oratory. (Cicero, De Invention, BI, iv: 5)

Relatedly, like Gorgias and Aristotle whom he explicitly cites, Cicero views rhetoric as applicable to *any* subject matter (BI, v: 6-8).

Acknowledging five components of rhetoric (i.e., invention, arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery; *INV*, BI, vii: 9), Cicero focuses most directly on *invention* or the matter of developing the issue or case at hand in judicial cases.

In ways that somewhat parallel *RH*, Cicero (*INV*, BI, viii-xi) distinguishes cases with respect to *issues* of (1) fact (conjecture or inference), (2) definitions (establishing legal terms of reference), and (3) the qualifying matters of actor responsibility and accountability. Cicero also recognizes those judicial cases that introduce (4) a transitional dimension (when it is argued that the case should be transferred to another court or handled in other ways).

Following summary statements on each of these matters, Cicero also briefly considers simple vs. complex cases (BI, xii: 17) and those involving written documents (BI, xiii). Cicero then deals with the overall framing or arranging of the case (BI, xiii: 18 -xiv: 19).

The Stages of Judicial Oratory

Envisioning rhetoric as entailing a series of deliberatively engaged processes, Cicero delineates *six stages of oratory*: (1) exordium or introduction; (2) narrative or account; (3) partition or points of contention; (4) confirmation or proof; (5) refutation or challenge; (6) and peroration or conclusion.

Mindful of the task of inventing or generating cases, Cicero deals with each of these matters in considerable detail. In the process, he addresses a number of consequential features of human known and enacted realities.

Providing a preliminary introduction to the case, the **exordium** (*INV*, BI: xv: 20 - xviii: 26) is intended to encourage judges to be more favorably disposed to the speaker at hand. Thus, while urging speakers to attend to audience viewpoints, Cicero distinguishes cases as honorable (wherein judges are already receptive to the viewpoints to be proposed), difficult (wherein judges are hostile to the case), petty (where the issues are thought inconsequential), ambiguous (involving a mixture of honorable and discreditable elements), and obscure (where the issues are not readily comprehensible to the judges).

Cicero (*INV*, BI, xv: 22 -xvi: 23) also observes that those intending to achieve the *good will of their auditors* in the introduction may (a) comment (presumably modestly) on their own person, (b) draw attention to noteworthy failings of their opponents, (c) discuss the merits of their case, and (d) acknowledge the wisdom and virtues of the auditors.

Where auditors are thought more hostile to the case, Cicero instructs speakers to (e) attend to the basis of this resistance (and adjust accordingly). More generally, Cicero also encourages speakers who anticipate difficult audiences to (f) shorten their introductions and (g) use these as places in which to develop insinuations or otherwise cast some doubt on the integrity of their opponents (BI, xvi: 21).[17]
Relatedly, those desiring greater *auditor receptivity* (BI, xvii: 23) also may claim to (h) address matters that are novel, incredible, or derive importance by their relevance to the auditors or others in the community, or pertain to matters of state or theology. Likewise, Cicero notes, (i) speakers promising to be brief are also apt to be better received.

The second stage, the **narrative** refers to an account of the events that are supposed to have transpired in the case at hand. Here, Cicero (*INV*, BI, xix: 27) distinguishes (a) clearly fictionalized narratives from (b) historical accounts of actual events and (c) more plausible fictionalizations prior to focusing on (d) legal narratives. Legal accounts, Cicero (BI, xx: 28 -xxi: 30) emphasizes, should be brief, clear, and plausible.

In pursuing *plausibility* in judicial settings, Cicero (*INV*, BI, xxi: 29-30) instructs speakers to strive for narratives that fit with people's general understandings of real life. For Cicero, this means (a) articulating selectively favorable accounts of one's cases in ways that are (b) mindful of reasonable ranges of people's (as actors) characters, acts, rationales, abilities, opportunities, places, and encounters with other participants, and (c) attentive to the viewpoints of the auditors.

The **partition** or division (BI, xxii: 31 -xviii: 43) is intended to *clarify the issues* at hand; to provide auditors with direction for the ensuing arguments. Thus, speakers are advised to identify consequential areas of (agreement and) disagreement with

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[17] Cicero (*INV*, BI, xviii: 23-25) later discusses the matter of handling insinuations made by others.

their opponents and to *outline the agendas* that they will pursue in making their cases.

Confirmation or proof, along with refutation, constitutes the essence of case to be contested. Referring to attempts to establish the viability of one's positions by argumentation, Cicero (*INV*, BI, xxiv: 34-xli: 77) develops confirmation around three themes: (a) *features of the people* involved; (b) relevant *components of the activities* in question; and (c) realistic *probabilities*.[18]

Cicero recognizes the inseparability of people and activities in actual instances but points to the importance of distinguishing people from activities and inferential probabilities in developing cases (proofs and refutations). Although Cicero's efforts are directed primarily toward forensic cases, social scientists may well appreciate the highly astute analytical distinctions that Cicero introduces in his considerations of people, activities, and probabilities.

Accordingly, Cicero (*INV*, BI, xxiv: 34 -xxviii: 43) identifies a number of *features of the people* involved that may be used as departure points for building a case for (or against someone). After acknowledging target names as convenient reference points, Cicero identifies a broad series of background characteristics (e.g., gender, citizenship, age, ancestry, appearance, and physical and mental abilities) that speakers may invoke in developing proofs. Cicero also indicates ways in which people's life-styles, fortune and circumstances, habits and skills, emotional states, plans and purposes, and achievements may be used to support whatever case one intends to make.

While cases invariably involve connections between particular people and specific activities, Cicero (*INV*, BI, xxvi: 37 -xxviii: 43) delineates several *components of the activities* in question. Here, Cicero is explicitly mindful of (a) naming or designating the particular acts involved as well as (b) identifying the specific instances (performances) of acts under consideration. Cicero further discusses acts with respect to (c) place, (d) time, (e) occasion, (f) manner, (g) facilities (resources and limitations), and (h) the consequences attributed to these instances.

Observing that all judicial argumentation is developed around people and acts, Cicero (*INV*, BI, xxix: 44 -xxx: 50) observes that the task becomes one of defining (and combining) people and acts in ways that *appear probable*, if not also irrefutable, *to the auditors*.

Envisioning all arguments to be developed through inductive or deductive reasoning, Cicero (BI, xxxi: 51 -xli: 77) deals with these matters at some length. When speakers use inductive reasoning, they ask people to draw conclusions based on comparisons, analogies, and apparent similarities and differences. Deductive or syllogistic reasoning requires that speakers establish premises that appear to capture the essences of the phenomena at hand and show (through logical inclusion or exclusion) that certain conclusions are unavoidable.

As Cicero (*INV*, BI, xlvii: 78 -li: 96) notes, **refutations** build on the same basic materials as confirmations. In general terms, then, any argument may be invalidated by (a) challenging one or more of its assumptions (BI, xliii: 79 -xlviii: 86), (b) showing the form of argument to be erroneous in some way (BI, xlvii: 87 -l: 95), or (c) introducing arguments that are equally or more compelling (BI, li: 96).

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[18] Interestingly, despite Aristotle's genuinely sustained attention to activity in *Rhetoric* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, Cicero (*De Inventione* Book I xxiv-xxviii; Book II iv–xvi) more adequately focuses analysis on what actually happens in particular instances (i.e., as in rigorously attending to the situated flows of the events under consideration). This may reflect Cicero's greater involvements in prosecuting and defending (versus observing) actual cases.

While serving (a) to draw speeches to a conclusion, the **peroration**, as Cicero (BI, lii: 98 -lvi: 109) observes, also provides speakers with valuable opportunities to (b) selectively summarize cases for auditors. Further, (c) although judicial speeches are organized around attempts discredit (or exonerate) certain persons and speakers may attempt to invoke appropriate affectations throughout, Cicero envisions the peroration as a particularly opportune place in which to (c) *intensify emotionality* on the part of the auditors. Notably, this means (d) generating indignation directed toward one's opponent and (e) arousing sympathy for one's own position. Because of the attention given to the (social) production of emotionality (especially the matters of anger and pity), Cicero's analysis of these topics merit more detailed consideration on the part of social scientists.

Intensifying Affective Viewpoints

In a manner reminiscent of Aristotle (*Rhetoric*) and *RH*, Cicero focuses explicitly on people's abilities to shape (potentially at least) the emotional viewpoints that others adopt. Thus, while primarily discussing the peroration, Cicero (*INV*, BI, liii: 100 -liv: 105) delineates fifteen themes that speakers may employ to *generate indignation* or hostility toward some person (or action).

To this end, speakers may (1) point out authorities (gods, rulers, law makers, or people of the state) that have been violated; (2) indicate the disapproval of large segments of the community (including superiors, equals or inferiors); (3) argue that tolerance of this situation and the subsequent widespread practices of this sort would be devastating for the community; (4) posit that others are eagerly anticipating a licensing of this activity so that they too may engage in these undesirable activities; and (5) claim that making a mistake (of leniency) in this case would be unalterable. Similarly, hostility may be generated when speakers (6) stipulate that the deed was done purposively and not to be excused like those acts that people might do inadvertently; (7) stress that the evil deed was accomplished by force, violence, wealth, or other unfair advantage; (8) contend that the crime is exceptional in nature and/or highly despicable because it was perpetrated against those who were least able to defend themselves; (9) compare the incident with other crimes to show how horrible it is, even in that notably immoral context; (10) present the act in highly vivid terms, with violent denunciations of each aspect of the act as it developed, evoking as much disgust and shame as possible for the auditor to experience.

Speakers intent on inciting hostility also may (11) argue that the perpetrator was in a position to have known better and would be expected to prevent such an act were it done by others; (12) express indignation that those present uniquely have to deal with a case of this sort; (13) contend that the target has exhibited disregard and arrogance with respect to the act; (14) urge the auditors to personalize the offense, to put themselves and their family members in the place of those harmed by the target; and (15) state that even one's enemies do not deserve to be treated in the fashion the perpetrator has treated the target.

Cicero (*INV*, BI, lv: 106 -lvi: 109) then turns matters around as he indicates sixteen ways that speakers may attempt to *evoke audience pity* or sympathy for the defendant (perpetrator). Cicero defines his overarching strategy for inducing more gentle or merciful sentiments for the defendant as one of encouraging auditors to attend to commonplace human experiences and the overall weakness and limitations of humans. Cicero also suggests that this material be presented in a more somber fashion, with the intention of neutralizing more intense emotional spirits.

Operating within this general framework, then, Cicero observes that speakers who intend to invoke sympathy or pity on the part of audiences may: (1) depict losses that the defendant has experienced and the basis of these troubles; (2) indicate the difficulties the defendant has had over time and tell how these have persisted; (3) show how the defendant experienced intense grief with various personal losses and indicate the concern the defendant had shown for others; (4) alert auditors to the negative treatments that the defendant has experienced at the hands of others; (5) present the defendant's misfortunes in more vivid terms so that auditors may experience these more directly; (6) stress the disappointments that the defendant has experienced and the great state of distress that befell the defendant; (7) ask the auditors to consider their own relatives or other loved ones when looking at the speaker; and (8) indicate that there are uncertainties surrounding troublesome acts or omissions that will remain unknown.

In their attempts to encourage sympathy on the part of judges, speakers also may (9) remind audiences of their capacities to achieve deep affections for other objects, such as animals, houses, and other possessions; (10) address the sense of helplessness, weakness, and loneliness that all people generally experience; (11) acknowledge the necessity of auditors assigning to the defendant's loved ones the eventual task of burying them; (12) observe the great sense of loss that people experience when some loved one is torn away from them; (13) remind auditors of the anger that people experience when they are treated badly by those very people whom they have treated most kindly and from whom they would least expect such treatment; (14) ask the audience to take mercy on the defendant; (15) observe that auditors are people who care more about their loved ones than themselves; and (16) indicate that the auditors are not only understanding and merciful in their viewpoints but also virtuous and patient in dealing with human limits and misfortune.

Conjecture, Definition, and Resolution in Judicial Cases

Following a brief overview of Book I and his own approach to rhetoric, Cicero develops most of Book II around the three issues that form *the nucleus of forensic rhetoric*. It is here that Cicero deals at greater length with (1) *conjecture* or the matter establishing the facts (and causes) of the case; (2) the *definition* of the act or the legal terms of reference; and (3) the *resolution* or quality (accountability, as in responsibilities and sanctions) of the case.

While these matters may take us more directly into considerations of law than some might prefer, the material that Cicero introduces here is particularly important. Not only does *De Invention* provide valuable insight into the ways in which *law may be negotiated* in practice but this statement also considers the ways in which *human agency* is represented (and assessed) more generally.

Viewed in these latter terms, Book II contributes yet further to a pragmatist approach to the study of human community life or the sociology of knowing and acting. As with Book I, however, it will be necessary to present this material in highly compacted terms. This means glossing over a great many subthemes in Cicero's statement that those who wish to develop a fuller appreciation of influence work, identity claims, or the social construction of reality would find beneficial.

Because *conjecture* (*INV*, BII, iv: 13 -xvi: 51) deals with "issues of fact," it is here that speakers attempt to provide audiences with their views of the things that have not been acknowledged by earlier agreement (in the partition or division). Conjecture, thus, revolves around claims, indications, and inferences. Relatedly, as

Cicero stipulates (BII, iv: 16), all inferences are contingent on considerations of causes or arguments about *the ways that particular people accomplished specific activities*.

When dealing with *causality* in the human theater of operations, Cicero (*INV*, BII, iv: 17 -vi: 22) begins by contrasting impulsive and premeditated acts. Cicero defines impulsive acts as things that are done without usual care and deliberation. In forensic instances, these are often signified by intense emotional states wherein one acts passionately rather than reflectively.

Premeditated activity is characterized by deliberation and a careful consideration of alternatives. These acts imply clear objectives, assessments of options, and voluntary, intentioned behaviors.

In discussing causality, Cicero also makes distinctions between intended and unanticipated outcomes of intentional acts (*INV*, BII, vii: 23). He also notes the importance of showing that the act was perpetrated exclusively by the accused (that others lacked motive, opportunity, capacity; BII, viii: 24).

For Cicero (*INV*, BII, viii: 25-27), causes become formulated in the courtroom as speakers define the acts in question with respect to those presumably involved. Thus, speakers may work with images of impulse and premeditation in their considerations of human agency with respect to both the immediate case at hand *and* any more general reference points that speakers may invoke in developing particular aspects of their cases.

Although Cicero earlier (*INV*, BI, xxiv: 34 -xxv: 36) had considered imputations based on target characters, with respect to confirmation, Cicero (BII, ix: 28 -xi: 37) makes further reference to these background matters in discussing the ways in which *people's characters* may be more directly incorporated into speakers' conceptions of causality (via notions of motives, life-style, past deeds, circumstances, and passions). Cicero also observes that the very same target materials may be used in radically different manners, depending on whether speakers are endeavoring to prosecute or exonerate particular targets.

Likewise, while Cicero earlier (*INV*, BI, xxvi: 37 -xxviii: 43) had discussed the performance of the act in reference to confirmation, Cicero now (BII, xii: 38 -xiii: 45) points to the *constituents of the act* as another consequential matter that speakers may address when defining causality (as impulsive or premeditated; voluntary or forced).

Thus, Cicero takes the reader from suspicions of the act to a more vigorous *deconstruction of the act* from all feasible angles. This encompasses notions of sequencing and coherence, as well as considerations of settings, opportunities, timing, strategies, consequences, ensuing perpetrator reactions, moral indignation (and amplification), and so forth. It is important to acknowledge Cicero's explicit attention to the fuller sets of subprocesses entailed in people developing "acts." Notably, this includes the things that people do *prior to* the focal act, the ways they *physically engage* (the various components of) the act, and anything they might *do afterwards*.

For Cicero (*INV*, BII, xiv: 45 -xvi: 51), invention (i.e., the discovery and development of particular cases) requires the careful study of causes (via circumstances, participants, and acts). Thus, Cicero encourages rhetoricians to give concerted attention to the ways that people, acts, and circumstances fit together, both at the level of particular instances and in more abstracted, comparative types of cases.

Having examined notions of causation in forensic cases, Cicero proceeds to the matter of *definition* (*INV*, BII: xvii: 52 -xx: 61). Because the meanings and

applications of specific words serve to establish the essential terms of reference for all participants in the setting, these may become the focal points of contention. As Cicero indicates, definitional matters in judicial settings more commonly revolve around (a) the nature of the charge, (b) the status of the people involved, and (c) the terms (and significations) of other things (e.g., acts, duty, rights, possessions) that are deemed consequential to the case.

Attempting to convince audiences of the greater viability of their *terms of reference* for dealing with the cases at hand, each of the speakers involved may propose specific definitions of things, as well as challenge the definitions proposed by their opponents. Although all sorts of reference points may be taken for granted, Cicero is acutely aware that speakers' choices and definitions of words, terms of reference, and other significations may consequentially transform the relevancies of any aspect of the case at hand.

Cicero (*INV*, BII, xxi: 62) next considers the way in which the case is to be *resolved* or (what he terms) the *qualitative features* of the act. Having discussed a number of aspects of the act earlier (BI, xxvi: 37 -xxviii: 43; BII, xii: 38 -xiii: 45) in some detail, Cicero intends to concentrate on accountability and sanctions.

In developing this discussion, Cicero (*INV*, BII, xxii: 65-69) distinguishes between natural law, customary law, and statutory law. *Natural law* (or justice), Cicero alleges, is somehow implanted in people through their general exposure to religion, truth and such. *Customary law* relies on consensus between the people involved; it reflects people's prevailing understandings regarding contacts, notions of equity, and the like. *Statutory law* is that which is formally recorded as state law. Cicero observes that speakers strategically may appeal to any or all of these three divisions of law in developing and defending their cases.

Attending more directly to matters of justice (or equity) and ensuing auditor actions (rewards or punishments), Cicero (*INV*, BII; xxiv: 72 -xxxvi: 109) subsequently embarks on a consideration of arguments intended to *offset* (and re-establish) *culpability* on the part of defendants who admit performing the acts in question. Here, the defenders do not attempt to define the act in desirable terms, nor do they contest their involvements (as accused persons) in the act. Instead, they try to absolve defendants of responsibility for the act or its consequences.

Focusing on speaker attempts to minimize defendant (agent) accountability for the act, Cicero delineates four common tactical themes. The first two involve (a) comparison, wherein it is argued that defendants picked the lesser of two or more undesirable options (*INV*, BII, xxiv: 72 -xxvi: 77) and (b) retort, in which the speaker alleges that the defendant was provoked to act in this particular manner by another (the claimant) who had acted improperly (BII, xxvi: 78 -xxviii: 86).

Speakers also may attempt to minimize culpability by (c) shifting the charge, wherein the act is acknowledged but it is claimed to be the fault (and responsibility) of another (BII, xxix: 86 -xxx: 94) and (d) seek concessions, wherein the defendant acknowledges the act, but asks to be pardoned as a consequence of ignorance, chance, or other matters beyond the defendant's fuller control (BII, xxxi: 94 -xxxvi: 109).

In building justifications of this sort, Cicero anticipates that speakers representing defendants also would stress various desirable qualities (including the deeds and associations) of those they represent while their opponents would set out to destroy the integrity of their arguments in these same regards.

Cicero also approaches *rewards (and punishments)* as socially contested or negotiated judicial outcomes (*INV*, BII, xxxvii: 110 -xxxix: 115). Thus, rewards, settlements, or payments to some party may be encouraged (and resisted) with

respect to (a) any services rendered (regarding conditions, extent, sacrifices, intent, timing of assistance); (b) the person to be rewarded (e.g., merits, intentions while acting, subsequent motives); (c) the kind of reward (as in type of award, quantity, concerns about establishing precedents), and (d) the abilities of defendants or others (individuals or communities) to make awards to claimants or meritorious parties.

Assessing Documents

While only some forensic cases involve *documentary evidence*, Cicero (*INV*, BII, xl: 116 -lii: 154) concludes his treatment of judicial oratory with an insightful analysis of the ambiguities that revolve around written documents and the problematics of invoking (interpreting and contesting) these in courtroom settings.

To this end, Cicero develops discussions around: (a) the ambiguous use of terms (BII, xl: 116 -xli: 121); (b) distinctions between "the letter" and "the intent" of the law (BII, xlii: 122 -xlviii: 143); (c) instances in which two or more laws pertinent to the case appear to be in conflict (BII, xlix: 144-147); (4) reasoning by analogy (BII, l: 148-153) where no law seems directly appropriate for handling the case in question; and (5) invoking specific definitions of aspects of the broader situation in which the case is contested (BII, li: 153-154).

Indicating parallels in the ways in which written documents and other courtroom materials may be interpreted and contested in forensic cases, Cicero provides a great deal of insight into the ways that people define, propose, contest and adjust the meanings of things.

Deliberative and Epideictic Rhetoric

In contrast to his extended treatment of forensic rhetoric, Cicero gives much less attention to deliberation (political, managerial) and epideictic (ceremonial, evaluative) oratory. Still, he addresses these matters in noteworthy fashions.

In discussing **deliberative oratory** (*INV*, BII, li: 155 -lviii: 176), Cicero acknowledges the importance of stressing *advantage* (as in possessions, resources, glory, rank, influence and friendship) of encouraging action in political arenas. However, Cicero intends to emphasize *honor* (as in virtue, knowledge and truth) even more prominently than advantage.

In dealing with advantage, Cicero considers speakers attentiveness to both personal and group related interests with respect to auditors concerns with safety and security on the one hand and auditor influence over other people and things on the other. Still, while encouraging speakers also to be mindful of things in the situation that are possible and necessary in developing deliberative oratory, Cicero adopts the viewpoint that honor is the greatest necessity (followed in order by security and then other advantages).

Observing that the topics of praise and censure (as these pertain to people) have been discussed at length in his earlier considerations of people in forensic rhetoric (especially *INV*, BI, xxiv: 34-xxv: 36; BII, ix: 28-xi: 39), Cicero dispenses with **epideictic rhetoric** rather abruptly (BII, lix: 177-178).

Noting that speakers might distinguish their oratory objects (targets) with respect to qualities of (a) mind (as in honor, virtue, knowledge, wisdom), (b) body (health, beauty, strength), and (c) external circumstances (office, wealth, social

connections), Cicero contends that the more compelling demonstrative speeches generally focus on matters of the mind (both in praise and censure).

Rhetorical Continuities

Cicero concludes *De Inventione* with the recognition that this volume has assumed a more expansive quality than he expected. Cicero anticipates, vaguely, that he will deal with other aspects of rhetoric in later writings. Although twenty or so years would pass before Cicero developed the other texts on oratory considered here, Cicero much more than fulfils his promise. Even so, *De Inventione* is to be appreciated as a remarkable treatise on the social construction of reality.

In what follows, particular attention is given to *Topica*, *Brutus, De Oratore*, and O*rator*.[19] Addressing the generic, instructional, historical comparative, and idealized

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[19] Readers may note that I have passed over two of Cicero's other works on rhetoric, *De Partitione Oratoria* and *De Optimo Genere Oratorum*.

De Partitione Oratoria (*PDO*) takes the form of a manual of instruction written by Cicero for his son (who participates in this dialogue with his father), and provides an overview of the art of rhetoric. However, despite its very adequate quality as an analytic resource, this volume lacks the more remarkable conceptual detail that Cicero achieves in other statements.

Thus, in very direct terms (*DPO* i: 3-4), we are informed of the centrality of (a) the speaker, the (b) speech, and (c) the question for rhetoric. The *speaker's* task (ii: 5 -vii: 26) is to convince an audience (as in forensic, deliberative, or demonstrative cases) of a certain viewpoint; to develop speeches that are verbally, cognitively, and emotionally compelling; and to deliver these in ways that appeal to, and impact on, audiences.

Next, consideration is given to the parts of the *speech*. This includes: (a) the introduction, which is designed to generate a receptive and attentive audience (*DPO* viii: 27-30); (b) the division and narration, wherein speakers briefly outline the major features of the case in direct, comprehensible terms and provide an account of the events in question in ways that are favorable to the speaker's position (ix: 31-32); (c) the confirmation or lines of proof (ix: 33 -xii: 43), wherein mutually acknowledged facts, evidence of various sorts, and inferences regarding people, places, and actions are used to establish reasonable probabilities and convincing certainties; (d) refutations (xii: 44), wherein specific claims, instances of evidence, witnesses, inferences, and conclusions are challenged; and (e) the peroration (xv: 52-xvii: 60), in which speakers recapitulate the aspects of the case they intend to be most central for auditors and redefine (magnify or diminish) the significance of some particular matters at hand as well as attempt to intensify whatever emotional themes they deem most consequential for invoking desired audience responses.

The third part of oratory as defined in this volume is *the question* (xviii: 61 -xix: 67). Here Cicero focuses on (a) the particular features and development of the case at hand and (b) related theoretical matters pertaining to human knowing, justice, and action as well as (c) issues of duty and the role of rhetoric in shaping emotion.

The volume concludes with summary discussions of speeches developed around (a) oratorical displays of praise and blame (xxi: 70 -xxii: 82), (b) deliberative or advisory stances (xxiv: 83 -xxvii: 97), and judicial cases (xxviii: 98 -xl: 140).

Cicero's **De Optimo Genere Oratorum** (*OGO*) appears to be an introduction to an unfinished manuscript. Focusing on *The Best Kind of Orator* (Hubbell 1949), the materials to be used were Greek records of speeches pitting Demosthenes against Aeschines. Cicero's plan was to consider the interchanges of two of the most accomplished of all Greek orators, focusing on challenges that were highly charged at a personal level. Demosthenes had accused Aeschines of malfeasance on an embassy, while Aeschines sought vengeance on Demosthenes' career and reputation by subjecting these to judicial review under the guise of another case (Cicero, *OGO*, vii: 19-22).

Even in the process of outlining this statement, Cicero is compelling insightful, as suggested in his delineation of the three-fold objectives of the orator:
The supreme orator, then, is the one whose speech instructs, delights and moves the minds of his audience. The orator is duty bound to instruct; giving pleasure is a free gift to the audience...to move them is indispensable. (Cicero, *De Optimo Genere Oratorum* I: 3-4).

features of influence work, these four pieces of work yet further attest to Cicero's remarkable scholarship as a rhetorician and analyst.

Topica[20]

While Cicero's *Topica* appears to have been modeled after Aristotle's *Topics*, wherein Aristotle presents a statement on how to argue effectively on any position without contradicting oneself), *Topica* establishes the more *generic relevance* of Cicero's writings on influence work. Although considerably more compact and abstract in its development than *De Inventione* (which Cicero uses as an extended set of reference points), *Topica* identifies and examines a series of topics around which argumentation of all sorts may be developed and assessed.

Defining *topics* as realms or regions of argument in which speakers attempt to resolve doubts about specific situations (ii: 8), Cicero's *Topica* is intended to provide readers with the means of efficiently and effectively coming to terms with *all* modes of argumentation. Relatedly, Cicero observes (ii: 6-7) that an adequate consideration of argumentation encompasses both the *development of arguments* and the *judgment of their validity*.

Providing an instructive account of the *linkages of language*, *objects, and activities* as these are viewed and negotiated in the human community, *Topica*, thus, rather directly takes us into the philosophy and sociology of knowledge.

Positing that argumentation typically is developed (a) around *the nature of things* (*Topica*, ii: 8 -iv: 23) or (b) by means of *external testimony* (iv: 24), Cicero subsequently embarks on an analysis of these contested realms of knowing prior to attending to (c) some distinctions between particulars and abstractions.

Addressing the Nature of Things

Focusing first on *the nature of things*, Cicero intends to examine the arguments that speakers develop (and contest) concerning the definitions of things and the ways that these particular matters are to be viewed, acknowledged, acted toward, and the like.

Cicero organizes the ensuing consideration of topics or controversies pertaining to things around (1) the definition of things, (2) etymology, (3) conjugation, (4) genus (and subdivisions within), (5) comparisons of similarities, differences and contraries, (6) adjuncts, (7) logical connections, (8) causes and effects, and (9) quantity and quality. He later will discuss the knowing of things through (10) external sources, and (11) inquiry as this pertains to abstractions and particulars.[21] These topics overlap in various ways, but each may draw attention to different aspects of the cases under consideration.

The first point of contention revolves around the *definition of things* (*Topica*, iv: 26 -viii: 34). This includes notions of what exists (and exists not), the substance of the things under consideration (e.g., as physical entities or more exclusively in people's minds), the species or genus to which things belong and any subdivisions within, and the subcomponents of things and how things are constituted.

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[20] This consideration of Cicero's *Topica* (Topics) is based on the translation of H. M. Hubbell (1949).
[21] Readers may note various conceptual parallels between Cicero's discussion of "the nature of things" and Aristotle's *Categories*.

A second realm of controversy pertains to the *etymology* or the rootedness of words and the traditional meanings of things (*Topica*, viii: 35-37).[22]

In some other cases, arguments may be developed in reference to what Cicero labels *conjugation*. Here, speakers consider the use of the common roots of two or more terms to establish their affinity (ix: 38).

As with words, when speakers focus on other objects more directly, they may address (and challenge) classifications of things in more *generic* terms or with respect to the *subdivisions within*; should either be thought to be to their advantage (*Topica,* ix: 39-40).

Another consequential set of arguments revolves around *object comparisons* as these might be developed around *similarities* (*Topica*, x: 41-45), *differences* (xi: 46) and *contraries* (xi: 47-49).

Cicero also introduces a processual flow (*Topica*, x: 51-52) to arguments by reference to *adjuncts*. Criticizing philosophers for disattending to the sequencing of particular things, Cicero observes that orators normally consider, as consequential, the things that happen before (e.g., preparations, conversations), during (as in people shouting, moving), and after (trembling, agitation) particular events.

Cicero (*Topica*, xii: 53 -xiv: 57) then focuses on logical deductions, most centrally as this pertains to the establishment of necessary *consequences*, *antecedents*, and *contradictions*.

Next, Cicero considers *causes* and *effects* (*Topica*, xiv: 58 -xvii: 66). Cicero's considerations of humanly engaged causes and effects are not as fully articulated in *Topica* as in some of his other works (e.g., *De Inventione*, *De Fato*). Nevertheless, Cicero differentiates between causes affecting other things *and* causes involving people (wherein matters of impulse, deliberation, and intention are pivotal).

Cicero (*Topica*, xviii: 68-71) also makes reference to comparisons of *quantity* and *quality* as consequential to some instances of argumentation. These comparisons generally rely on inferences of desirable states (such as possessing more, rather than less, of valued items; equity as an objective to be pursued; achieving honor).

Considering External Testimony

Defining the preceding topics as matters that are intrinsic to particular cases, Cicero (*Topica*, xix: 2 -xx: 78) also deals with *external sources* or things from the outside that may become the focal point of some instances of argumentation. Envisioning these external materials to be dependant on testimony, Cicero identifies those sources (human witnesses and other indicators) that are likely to be assigned *greater credence* by judges.

In particular, Cicero (*Topica*, xix: 73 –xx: 75) identifies witnesses who are more generally thought believable to include those who: (a) have long-standing reputations as honorable persons, Cicero makes reference to witnesses who (b) are more skilled in or knowledgeable about the matters they discuss; (c) are opportune witnesses to pertinent matters; or (d) achieve greater effect by their multitude of numbers.

Cicero (*Topica*, xx: 76-77) also notes that speakers sometimes introduce other forms of external testimony (such as oracles, visions, or unusual worldly

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[22] Observing that words are tokens (*notae*) of things, Cicero traces the notion of representation back to the Greeks, observing that Aristotle uses the term *symbolon* (*Topica* viii: 35).

occurrences) as connoting "messages from the gods" in attempts to make their cases. Readers familiar with *De Divination* and *De Fato* will recognize that Cicero, personally, is highly skeptical of these modes of evidence. As an orator, however, Cicero recognizes that these may be consequential elements insofar as the judges in these cases adopt viewpoints of these sorts.

On Generals and Particulars

Cicero next deals with the matter of *inquiry* (*Topica*, xxi: 79 -xxvi: 100). Acknowledging a clear indebtedness to Greek scholarship, Cicero differentiates between a *hypothesis* (which attends to the features of a particular case) and a *thesis* (which involves a more abstract proposition about the nature of things of a certain type).

While envisioning speakers as necessarily developing hypotheses and pursuing practical lines of investigation in order to deal with the specifics of the case at hand, Cicero also encourages orators to strive for the wisdom that can be achieved only by attending to propositions and envisioning cases in more comparative, conceptual terms.

In developing this discussion of inquiry, Cicero reviews his earlier consideration of the preceding modes of argumentation mindfully of the orator's duty *to win cases*. Cicero (xxiv: 91 -xxvi: 100) concludes *Topica* by briefly outlining the three realms of oratory (judicial, deliberative, and epideictic) and the stages of oratory, while emphasizing the importance of establishing proof and achieving emotional appeal throughout.

Whereas *De Inventione* and *Topica* deal with the matters of developing arguments in specific cases and at more generic levels, respectively, the three volumes following (*Brutus*, *De Oratore*, and *Orator*) provide highly instructive *historical*, *cross-contextual* and *situated* comparative dimensions to Cicero's overall analysis of rhetoric. While all of Cicero's writings add transhistorical features to Greek rhetoric (especially Aristotle), these three volumes offer later-day scholars a compelling set of resources on which to develop a more comprehensive understanding of influence work.

Brutus[23]

In *Brutus*, Cicero provides another instructive body of insights into *rhetoric as a community phenomenon*. More than Cicero's other writings though, *Brutus* provides an exceptionally valuable *ethnohistorical* account of rhetoric. At the same time, though, it is another opportunity for Cicero to pursue his conceptualization of for the ideal orator and this comparative theme runs through this historical review.

As Cicero (*Brutus*, iii: 14-17) directly acknowledges, this volume was centrally enabled by the information contained in *Liber Annolis* (now lost). Written by Cicero's long-term friend, Titus Pomponius Atticus (c109-32BCE), the *Liber Annolis* apparently represented an extended compendium of major people, their associates, and their interlinkages with important events in Greek and (especially) Roman history

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[23] I am very grateful to G. L. Hendrickson (1962), on whose translation of *Brutus* this discussion is based.

to that point in time. In turn, Cicero represents Atticus along with Marcus Junius Brutus and himself in the dialogue.

Brutus is begun as Cicero laments the death of Hortensius (c114-50BCE), an exceptionally accomplished orator and colleague. Cicero earlier had envisioned Hortensius as an oratorical role model and then as an intense competitor. As Cicero's career developed, however, Cicero came to view Hortensius not only as a source of personal support, but also as a noble, prominent, and competent proponent of a civilized, law abiding state (i: 1 -ii: 9).

Faced with Hortensius' death, Cicero (Brutus, iii: 14-16) found Atticus' historical chronology of Greek and Roman life particularly timely, inspiring, and helpful in developing this remarkable historical account of rhetoric. In *Brutus*, readers become cognizant not only of the emergent shifts of emphases (and de-emphases) of oratory over time, but also of the variable contexts, talents, styles, and limitations of those who have spoken in political, legal, educational and other forums over the centuries to which Cicero has access through preserved text of sorts.

Framing his analysis around various eras or periods of time, Cicero considers and compares orators in ways that are mindful of the practices of speakers' predecessors, their contemporaries, and those who follow them.

Approached in these terms, it become evident that matters of oratorical practice, instruction, theory, and text are highly contingent on *human enterprise* and *community interchange* for whatever direction and continuity that rhetoric may attain (also see *Brutus* xcvi: 330 -xcviii: 333).

As a prelude to a more sustained analysis of Roman oratory, Cicero (*Brutus*, vi: 26 -xiv: 51) provides a compact but valuable account of Greek rhetoric. Here, Cicero directly comments on the vital developmental linkages of preSocratic oratory with vast array of Greek life-world activities (politics, poetics, history, and philosophy).

While noting concerted attempts on the part of Socrates and his followers (vii: 31) to separate rhetoric from philosophy, Cicero deals with a series of prominent Greeks who adopted more engaged notions of oratory (including Protagoras, Gorgias, Thucydides, Pericles, Demosthenes, Isocrates, Lysias, Theodorus, Aristotle and Theophrastus).

Although identifying various early Romans whom he believes likely were capable orators, Cicero recognizes Marcus Cornelius Cethegus (c200BCE) as the first Roman orator of written record, followed by Cato (Marcus Porcius Cato; c234-149BCE) whose extensive written works Cicero clearly admires (*Brutus*, xv: 60 -xviii: 69) and whom Cicero subsequently uses as a reference point for assessing others in Cato's broader era.

As Cicero moves through a series of Roman orators, he takes particular issue with the Stoic orators (and philosophers; *Brutus*, xxx: 115 -xxxi: 120) whom Cicero claims lack style. Whereas Cicero is skeptical of the value of any existing school of philosophy for producing the ideal orator, he argues that philosophy (particularly of the Peripatetic or Aristotelian tradition) is essential for developing an effective orator. Cicero then briefly acknowledges the broader philosophical contributions of Plato (richness), Aristotle (vigor), and Theophrastus (charm). By contrast, whereas Demosthenes may seem excessively bold in philosophic contexts, he brings a desirable emotional intensity of application to rhetoric.

Following a more extended consideration of interim and contemporary orators, Cicero later (*Brutus*, xci: 313 -xcvii: 330 documents his own preparations and experiences as an orator. Notably, too, this includes an account of the intersection of his own life with that of Hortensius. Cicero concludes *Brutus* with the observation that

with the loss of Hortensius, it is contingent on the few competent practitioners who remain to serve as *guardians* of a genuine, enlightened rhetoric.

De Oratore[24]

In contrast to *De Inventione* and *Topica*, both of which are developed in more direct analytical manners, Cicero's *De Oratore* (*DO*) assumes a conversational format that is somewhat reminiscent of Plato's dialogues but more pointedly instructional. While presuming familiarity with *De Inventione*, *De Oratore* provides a broader philosophical and academic context in which to view Roman rhetoric and some of the divisions of emphasis and styles within.

In discussing Roman oratory and its links to academic enterprise more generally, Cicero introduces readers to two very different viewpoints on the importance of a broader, formalized education for oratory. In addition to the analytical contrasts signified by these two "ideal types," Cicero provides some instructive commentary on shaping audience emotions and an insightful analysis of humor. Still, Cicero also wants to emphasize the importance of connecting philosophical insight and oratorical (especially judicial and political) activity.

Accordingly, *DO* is organized around (1) academic vs. populist oratorical emphases; (2) engaging audiences; (3) using humor for advantage; (4) acknowledging memory; and (5) the matters of style, philosophy, and delivery.

Academic vs. Populist Oratorical Emphases

Allegedly writing *De Oratore* for his brother, Cicero organizes this text primarily around two successful, highly esteemed orators (Licinius Crassus and Marcus Antonius) but also includes others (notably Julius Caesar Strabo Vopiscus).
Notably, whereas the more scholarly, sophisticated Licinius Crassus (c140-87BCE) appears to adopt positions that Cicero, himself, would prefer, Cicero still very much appreciates the less disciplined oratorical prowess of Marcus Antonius (c143-87BCE).[25]

In providing a general introduction to rhetoric, Cicero particularly stresses the importance of orators acquiring a broad philosophical, poetical, and historically informed *education* (*DO*, BI, ii: 6-iii: 12). Subsequently, his speakers debate about the *importance of oratory* for the community at large (BI, viii: 30 -xiii: 54), extending this into an exchange about *rhetoric as a science* (encompassing the study of oratorical procedures, laws, philosophy, political science, and cases at hand; BI, xiii: 55 -xxiv: 113). The speakers then focus on the *requirements of an orator* (BI, xxv: 113- xxvi: 122), followed by a consideration of *how orators are judged* (BI, xxvii: 122 - xxx: 136).

The dialogue then shifts to *the school course in rhetoric* (*DO*, BI, xxxi: 137 -xxii: 146) and the importance of practice and preparation (BI, xxxii: 147 -xxxv: 164), including legal knowledge (BI, xxxvi: 165 -xxxvii: 171), to rhetoric. Subsequently, the participants debate about the necessity of formal study for oratory (xxxvii: 172 -xl:

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[24] This discussion is derived from E. W. Sutton's (1949) translation of *De Oratore* (On the Orator); not to be confused with Cicero's *Orator* (The Orator), considered later.
[25] For another, comparative assessment of the oratorical approaches of Antonius and Crassus on Cicero's part, see *Brutus*, xxxvi: 138 -xliv: 163).

184). They then consider whether rhetoric constitutes a unique and effective specialization (BI, xli: 185 -lxii: 264).

While Crassus affirms the importance of systematic, broad, and intensive scholarship for orators, this position is directly challenged by Antonius who argues, instead, that speakers require a more practical knowledge of the world and an ability to relate people in ways that people more generally find persuasive.

From Antonius' viewpoint, a moralist, virtuous philosophy of the sort associated with Plato and Socrates is seen as inconsistent with, if not detrimental to, successful oratory (*DO*, BI, li: 219 -liv: 233). Likewise, Antonius claims that eloquence and practice are much more consequential than a specialized knowledge of the law in shaping actual forensic decisions (BI, lv: 235 -lxi: 262).

Book II of *De Oratore* finds the orators re-engaging one another, with Antonius restating his views regarding the limited value of an extended formal education for oratorical success. In doing so, however, Antonius develops an insightful commentary on some early Greek historians (Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon) noting that their works inform speakers in ways that philosophy does not (BII, xii: 51 -xv: 61).

Differentiating rhetoric from history (*DO*, BII, xv: 62-64) and philosophy (BII, xv: 65-66) in terms of emphases and style, Antonius further observes that rhetoricians have concentrated rather exclusively on matters of persuasion (BII, xv: 62 -xvi: 70) and have contributed little to history or philosophy. The debate is extended across a range of topics (and technicalities) in rhetoric (BII, xvii: 71 -xxviii: 123) before Antonius is asked to explain his own method of oratory (xxviii: 124).

In responding, Antonius first emphasizes the necessity of an orator being a clear, astute thinker and someone who can readily converse with others. He also insists that most instances of oratorical engagements can be reduced to a few subtypes or prototypical cases. Once orators recognize that they are reworking a small number of what should become increasingly more familiar terrains, Antonius contends, speakers will be able to proceed with specific cases much more readily and effectively.

Still, more is required and Antonius next emphasizes the necessity of speakers attending with great intensity both to the details of their own cases and, albeit as unobtrusively as possible, to all aspects of the opponents' case. In addition, Antonius insists on the importance of memory and energy (as in a more dynamic delivery). From his viewpoint, philosophy offers little viable instruction but, instead, has much capacity for diversion. Antonius then (*DO*, BII, xxxviii: 157-159) describes Roman philosophy (notably Stoicism) as comparatively inconsequential to successful orators.

Engaging Audiences

Shifting frames somewhat, Antonius next addresses the task of engaging audiences or securing favor with one's audience through appropriate modes of influence work (*DO*, BII, xlii: 178 -liv: 216). One important consideration, thus, revolves around attempts to establish the worth, achievements and reputation *of the person* represented by the speaker:

> And so to paint their characters in words, as being upright, stainless, conscientious, modest and long-suffering under injustice, has a really wonderful effect; and this topic, whether in opening, or in stating the case, or in winding-up, is so compelling, when agreeably and feelingly handled,

as often to be worth more than the merits of the case. (Cicero, De Oratore BII, xliii: 184)

Likewise, Antonius specifically encourages speakers to *focus on the audience* (to "take the role of the other," Mead, 1934) as a means of informing speakers' about the subsequent lines of action to be pursued in presenting the case at hand:

> This indeed is the reason why, when setting about a hazardous and important case, in order to explore the feelings of the tribunal, I engage wholeheartedly in a consideration so careful, that I scent out with all possible keenness their thought, judgements, anticipations and wishes, and the direction in which they seem likely to be led away most easily by eloquence... If however an arbitrator is neutral and free from predisposition, my task is harder, since everything has to be called forth by my speech, with no help from the listener's character. (Cicero, De Oratore BII, xliv: 186-187)

Notably, too, it is anticipated that the *sharing of meanings*, particularly emotional sensations, will be greater when speakers more explicitly convey their viewpoints to their auditors:

> Moreover it is impossible for the listener to feel indignation, hatred or ill-will, to be terrified of anything, or reduced to tears of compassion, unless all those emotions, which the advocate would inspire in the arbitrator, are visibly stamped or rather branded on the advocate himself. (Cicero, De Oratore BII, and xliv: 189)

Further, despite the clearly contrived nature of the orator's presentation, Antonius also observes that speakers (even in defending strangers) may also succumb to the very emotional states that the speakers have attempted to generate on the part of others:

> ...for the very quality of the diction, employed to stir the feelings of others, stirs the speaker himself even more deeply than any of his hearers. (Cicero, De Oratore BII, xlvi: 191)

From there, Antonius moves to a broader consideration of poetics (and theater) observing that more effective performers in these fictionalizations also are apt to become caught up in the emotionality they try to convey to others. Subsequently, Antonius proceeds to establish a set of guidelines for developing emotive oratory (*DO*, BII, li: 204 -liii: 216).

After stating that emotionally-charged rhetoric should not be invoked in petty cases or in instances in which audiences are judged unreceptive to emotional appeals, Antonius then identifies love, hate, wrath, jealousy, compassion, hope, joy and fear as particularly viable emotional themes. Antonius briefly outlines the basis of each of these emotional motifs and indicates ways in which they may be approached.

Antonius concludes his analysis by observing that any arguments developed along any of these lines may be neutralized or replaced by speakers invoking opposite viewpoints. Thus, as speakers take their turns, they may strive to replace notions of hate with images of good will or vice-versa.

Using Humor for Advantage

Observing that speakers also may profitably use *wit* or humor to their advantage in shaping auditors' (emotional) receptivities to their cases, Antonius then asks Caesar (Vopiscus) to share his expertise on forensic humor with the others.

After Caesar makes some vague references to earlier Greek texts on courtroom laughter (*DO*, BII, liv: 217) and distinguishes wit that runs through specific orations with that intended for more certain effects within speeches, the participants consider whether wit is a talent that can be learned (or taught).

Caesar then engages in a highly insightful analysis (*DO*, BII, lvii: 231 -lxxi: 290) of things that audiences are apt to find humorous and how speakers might achieve these amusements. Defining humor primarily by reference to the unseemly and/or ugly (in ways that are envisioned as nonthreatening to auditors), Caesar acknowledges a variety of purposes for which judicial humor may be employed.

Most centrally, this includes repelling attacks, dispelling distasteful matters, and relieving boredom. Caesar also consider some limits of the use of humor (especially regarding serious events, beloved targets), suggesting that the things that are most effectively ridiculed fall more moderately between those things generating strong disgust and intense sympathy. He also remarks on the dangers of speakers who intend to be witty being seen as acting in bad taste or as fools.

Caesar further distinguishes wit that is associated with the facts of the case with humor that builds on particular words, phrases or expressions. Recognizing that attempts at humor are problematic in effect, Caesar (*DO*, BII lxi: 248 -lxxi: 290) nevertheless tries to specify some of the more *generic ways in which humor may be developed*.

These include (a) heightening ambiguity (as with mimicry of expressions or mannerisms; equivocation); (b) making unexpected comments; (c) developing plays on words; (d) injecting verses or proverbs (that convey humor by their application) into the presentation; (e) taking words literally (as opposed to contextual or more casual uses); (f) using irony or the inversion of meanings; (g) employing oppositionary meanings or intentions; (h) alerting others to incongruent matters of the case; (i) making unusual comparisons; (j) presenting caricatures; (k) making deliberate understatements; (l) invoking farcical absurdities; (m) expressing undue simplifications; (n) generating hints of (undeveloped) ridicule; and (o) engaging in personal retorts.

Because humor (like magic; Prus and Sharper, 1991; Stebbins, 1994) is always contingent on *audience reactions* for its realization, the difficulties that the participants in *De Oratore* encounter when the analyzing humor from the viewpoint of the speaker are typical of contemporary analysis as well.
As with much of Cicero's work on rhetoric more generally though, his analysis of humor provides contemporary scholars with some uniquely valuable cross-cultural materials on which to build in developing more viable conceptual understandings of this humanly constructed and experienced phenomenon.

Following this astute subtreatise on humor, the participants discuss some other aspects of developing forensic cases, including some cautions about damaging one's own case (*DO*, BII, lxxiv: 301-lxxv: 306). The dialogue then shifts to matters of arrangement and presentation (BII, lxxvi: 307 -lxxxv: 350), before focusing on memory as a practical feature of oratory.

Acknowledging Memory

Although *memory* is often overlooked as an element of contemporary pragmatist thought,[26] Cicero's participants place great value on human recollective capacities. Here, Antonius (*DO*, BII, lxxxvi: 351 -lxxxviii: 360) explicitly acknowledges the importance of Greek mnemonics (or memory-enabling devices) to aid people's existing capacities for recollection. While clearly appreciating the practice of ordering things for later recall, Antonius claims that the practice of people developing particular, sense-related *images* of things is especially helpful for oratory.

Thus, in contrast to Greek orators who focus on the memorization of highly sustained text, Antonius puts primary emphasis on the practice of speakers generating, mastering, and recalling an orderly set of images as they prepare for, and present particular cases to, their audiences.

Style, Philosophy, and Delivery

As the participants resurrect their dialogue in Book III,[27] Crassus (BIII, v: 19) launches on an *exposition of style*. For Crassus (like Cicero), oratorical style is an exceedingly broad phenomenon. It ranges from the philosophic thoughts (following Socrates and Plato) about the unity of all knowing to the deployment of particular words and gestures in shaping the images of things that speakers convey to auditors.

Acknowledging that successful speakers may adopt styles that vary greatly with respect to boldness, intensity, vigor, preparation, precision, intimidation, and the like (*DO*, BIII, ix: 32), Crassus plans to consider *four requirements of oratory style*: (a) correct diction, (b) lucidity, (c) ornamentation or enhancement, and (d) propriety.

Following some preliminary thoughts on diction and clarity (BIII, x: 38 -xiii: 51), Crassus (BIII, xiv: 52 -xx: 77) argues that the genuine orator is one who has studied and debates the entire matter of human life. Crassus, thus, embarks on a consideration of the *interconnectedness of philosophy and rhetoric* in early (preSocratic) Greek society.

Observing that Greek rhetoric can readily be traced back to Homer's *Iliad*, Crassus stresses the point that pre-Socratic rhetoricians also were politicians, philosophers and scientists. Crassus then pointedly identifies Socrates (and Plato) as the people most directly responsible for the ensuing and *counterproductive separation* of rhetoric and philosophy: [28]

> [T]he genius and varied discourses of Socrates have been immortally
> enshrined in the compositions of Plato, Socrates himself not having left
> a single scrap of writing. This is the source from which has sprung the
> undoubtedly absurd and unprofitable and reprehensible severance between

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[26] Building notably on conceptual materials from Aristotle and Emile Durkheim on memory, Prus (2007b) provides a more sustained interactionist analysis of memory as a socially accomplished process.

[27] Before resuming the dialogues more directly in *De Oratore*, Book III, Cicero (1, i-iv: 16) embarks on a side-discussion of the fates that had befallen the various participants he portrays in *De Oratore*. As a general observation, Cicero notes that those who enter into the competition of public (and political) life rather inevitably place themselves in states of jeopardy.

[28] Cicero (via Crassus) makes a similar, but also informative observation on Socrates' divisive approach to philosophy and rhetoric later in *De Oratore* (BIII, xix: 72-73). See also Cicero's *Brutus*, (vii: 31).

the tongue and the brain, leading to our having one set of professors to teach us to think and another to teach us to speak. (Cicero, De Oratore, BIII, xvi: 61)

While acknowledging the impact of this divide on the plurality of schools that are linked in one or more ways to the philosophic emphases of Socrates, Crassus (*DO*, BIII, xviii: 65-66) then more specifically distinguishes rhetoricians from (a) Stoic philosophers (who make inappropriate claims on wisdom, whose discourse is abrupt and obscure, and whose notions of morality are at variance from people more generally) and (b) those idealist or skeptic philosophers who adopt the dialectic viewpoint that nothing, but disbelief in human knowing, is viable.

The dialogue then shifts somewhat to the earlier debate about the overall training of orators with respect to broader, more rigorous educations (*DO*, BIII, xx: 74 -xxiii: 85), before Crassus more specifically discusses *ornamentation* or embellishment in rhetoric (BIII, xxiv: 90 -xxvii: 108).

Approached thusly, embellishment includes not only (a) specific words and phrases intended to engage the senses of the auditors but also (b) various philosophic insights and (c) advantageously construed amplifications (and diminishments) of aspects of the case.

After discussing some applications of embellishments to cases, the dialogue again turns to early Greek rhetoric (*DO*, BIII, xxxii: 126 -xxxv: 143). This is accompanied by a more direct acknowledgment of the more general *deterioration of scholarship* on the part of post-Aristotelian Greeks (BIII, xxxii: 132) and a consideration of the importance of orators becoming cultured in the ways of the classic Greek speakers (BIII, xxxiii: 132 -xxxv: 142)

Then, after observing that philosophers also could benefit from style if they are to communicate more effectively (*DO*, BIII, xxxv: 142), the ensuing dialogue refocuses on *ornate style* wherein Crassus gives direct consideration to (a) vocabulary and enhancement (BIII, xxxvii: 148 -li: 198; as in coining new words, invoking metaphors, structuring sentences harmoniously with rhythm and balance); (b) artistic styles (BIII, lii: 199-201; elegant, plain, and moderated); (c) ways of embellishing lines of argument (BIII, liii: 202-205);[29] (d) the use of figures of speech (BIII, liv: 206-208); and (e) adapting style to the cases (objectives, audiences) at hand (BIII, lv: 210-212).

De Oratore concludes (BIII, LVI: 213 -LXI: 227) with an insistence (following the renowned Greek orator Demosthenes) that *delivery* or the enacted presentation of the case is critical to successful oratory. Particular attention, thus, is directed toward (a) the use of one's voice as an evocative musical instrument and (b) the artful deployment of gesture as an element of impression management that can achieve much greater breadth and depth than that afforded by words alone.

Focusing more specifically on the use of one's eyes in engaging the audience, the extract following provides a sampling of Cicero's (via Crassus) deep regard for delivery:

> For delivery is wholly the concern of the feelings, and these are mirrored by the face and expressed by the eyes; for this is the only part of the body capable of producing as many indications and variations as there are emotions, and there is nobody who can produce the same effect with

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[29] Cicero provides a similar, but also extended review of embellishments (such as tactical amplification, mockery, digressions, reiteration, and fictionalization) in *Orator* (xl: 137-139)

the eyes shut... it is the eyes that should be used to indicate the emotions by now assuming an earnest look, now a merry glance, in correspondence with the actual nature of the speech. For by action the body talks, so it is all the more necessary to make it agree with the thought... for words influence nobody but the person allied to the speaker by sharing the same language, and clever ideas frequently outfly the understanding of people who are not clever, whereas delivery, which gives the emotion of the mind expression, influences everybody... (Cicero, De Oratore, BIII, lix: 220-223)

In the *Orator*, the last of Cicero's works on rhetoric considered here, one finds a further extension of a number of themes developed in *De Oratore*. However, in the next volume, it is Cicero who speaks more directly as he situates, depicts, and defends his own style of engaging rhetoric in comparison with the views and practices of his contemporaries.

Orator[30]

Taking the form of an extended letter written to Marcus Junius Brutus (c85-42BCE), who has asked Cicero for his depiction of the ideal orator, *Orator* (c46BCE) affords Cicero an opportunity to defend his own, more embellished, eloquent, and emotionally-engaged style against the criticisms that Cicero has encountered from some contemporary rhetoricians (including Brutus) who had adopted an *Attic* (Athenian) or plain style of rhetoric (wherein the emphasis is on a clear, articulate, logical, and compact presentation of cases).

More importantly for our purposes, however, *Orator* extends some of the cross-contextual themes that Cicero introduces in *Brutus* and *De Oratore*. Delving further into the realm of rhetorical (and literary) criticism in *Orator*, Cicero develops some ideal-type comparisons that further enable us to appreciate the ways in which his contemporaries approached influence work and how these efforts were received by those in the settings at hand.

In developing *Orator*, Cicero sets out to portray *the ideal orator*, acknowledging that this person likely has never existed (ii: 7). Mindful of this objective, Cicero distinguishes three oratorical styles. Most centrally, Cicero contrasts (1) a *grand* or magnificent style, wherein speakers effectively combine diction and thought, emotional appeals, and forceful delivery with (2) an *Attic* or plain style of speaking wherein Roman orators (imitating some Athenians) deal with cases in ways that are exceptionally clear, precise, analytical and direct. Cicero also references (3) a *tempered* or moderate, style.

Speakers adopting this third style are somewhat less distinct. They fall somewhat between the first two, often mixing more subdued features of grand and Attic styles, albeit in different and uneven manners. Relatedly, while lacking the more sustained, intense or rigorous aspects of either magnificent or plain styles, speakers using a tempered style tend to place greater emphasis on pleasantry or charm.

While Cicero envisions this third, moderated style as somewhat more commonplace, the ensuing discussion primarily hinges on contrasts of magnificent and plain styles, with Cicero holding both of these more disciplined styles (or ideal types) of rhetoric in high regard.

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[30] *Orator* (*The Orator*), which has been translated by H.M. Hubbell (1962), represents the primary source for this statement.

At the same time, though, Cicero recognizes that the objective of all rhetoric is *to win* cases. He is fully aware that it is the speakers' *audiences* who ultimately define the effectiveness (and appropriateness) *of any style* of rhetoric:

The eloquence of orators has always been controlled by the good sense of the audience, since all who desire to win approval have regard to the goodwill of their auditors, and shape and adapt themselves completely according to this and to their opinion and approval. (Cicero, *Orator*, viii: 24)[31]

Further, as suggested in the following depiction of Demosthenes (c384-322BCE; a Greek rhetorician who was philosophically schooled in Plato's Academy), Cicero's ideal orators would engage their audiences as comprehensively as the situation merits:

> Demosthenes, who, I said, excels all others, in his masterpiece, the famous oration In Defence of Ctesiphon, began calmly, then in his discussion of the laws he continued without adornment; after that he gradually aroused the jury, and when he saw them on fire, throughout the rest of the oration he boldly overleaped all bounds; yet, careful as he was to weigh every word. (Cicero, Orator, viii: 26)

Noting that rhetoric is only one important realm of speech within the human community, Cicero (*Orator*, xi: 62 -xx: 68) also differentiates the objectives and styles of rhetoricians from those of philosophers, sophists, historians, and poets.

After acknowledging the eloquence of various philosophers (including Plato, Aristotle, and Theophrastus) and some overlap of areas of interest with orators, Cicero observes that *philosophers* engage wide ranges of topics for the purpose of analysis, insight, and instruction rather than attempting to captivate (and win) audiences through emotional intensity, shrewdness, or stylistic modes of delivery.

Cicero envisions the *sophists* as more akin to orators since the sophists use a great many of the modes of influence that rhetoricians might employ in forensic cases. However, Cicero depicts the sophists as somewhat more playful or entertaining in emphasis while the rhetoricians concentrate their efforts on winning cases.

Although Cicero expresses great regard for the scholarship of Thucydides, Cicero also pointedly contrasts the typically smooth-flowing, descriptive narrative of *historians* (even when their texts are extensively and effectively punctuated with speeches) with the more particularistic, vested interests and vigorous styles of orators.

After acknowledging some similarities between *poets* and rhetoricians (via expressive messages and the choice and arrangements of words), Cicero is also mindful of their differing intentions and the greater restrictions (winning cases) with which orators work.

Re-emphasizing the task of orators as one of obtaining favorable judgments (particularly in forensic and deliberative cases) through the use of proof, charm, and persuasion, Cicero subsequently argues for the importance of wisdom and propriety (decorum) in all that one does as an orator.

This is followed by more detailed considerations of the three styles of oratory: Attic (*Orator*, xiii: 76 -xxvi: 90), temperate (xxvi: 91 -xxviii: 96), and magnificent (xxviii: 97-99). While Cicero has a clear preference for the magnificent style, he is careful to

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[31] Cicero makes somewhat related observations about winning the favor of the audience later in *Orator* (xxxiv: 122 -xxxvi: 125). Also see Cicero's *Brutus*, vii: 31).

point out the demanding and meticulous features of the Attic style as well as the preparations and attentiveness that a competent tempered style requires.

With this frame in mind, Cicero more explicitly resumes his task of defining the ideal orator. In a minor shift of emphasis, though, Cicero (*Orator*, xxxix: 101) suggests that instead of searching for the ideal orator as a person, it is more fitting to consider the ideal as a *quality* to which people may aspire (or be judged).

As well, because speakers are expected to deal with a wide variety of issues, Cicero declares that the *ideal orator* would be able to discuss trivial matters in a plain style, things of more moderate importance in a tempered manner, and important matters in a grand style. Having, *in this contextual turn of phrase*, established his preferences among the three styles, Cicero next proceeds to illustrate oratorical flexibility in these matters on the part of speakers by referencing some cases in which he has been involved (*Orator*, xxix: 102 -xxxi: 111).

Cicero then turns to an insistence on the importance of rhetoricians attending to the *study* of philosophy, civil law, and history (*Orator*, xxxi: 112 -xxxiv: 120). Cicero intends that speakers would benefit from, and make use of, these background materials in seeking favorable judgments from audiences. From Cicero's viewpoint, as well, orators are to *adapt themselves* to the occasions on which they speak and the audiences whom they address (xxxv: 123 -xxxvi: 125).

From here, Cicero considers a wide assortment of capacities that *help define the ideal orator*. More centrally, these include abilities to: (a) deal with cases on both more particular and more abstract levels (*Orator*, xxxvi: 125-126); (b) achieve emotionality at will (xxxvi: 127 -xxxviii: 133); and (c) invoke a wide range of embellishments and figures of thought in dealing with audiences (xxxix: 134 -xli: 140).

In this latter regard, Cicero identifies an array of over thirty *tactics* (*Orator*, xl: 137-139) that speakers may use in attempts *to focus* (and/or divert) audience attention on particular aspects of the case at hand.[32]

These include strategies such as: dealing with the same subject in several ways; speaking casually about or denigrating something; repeating things; asking questions and then providing answers; appearing to consult with one's audience or opponent; invoking humor; introducing comparisons and citing precedents; providing cautions; speaking boldly or presumptively at times; assuming intimate stances toward audiences; condensing or elaborating on things; acting insulted; invoking metaphors or examples; and pleading with audiences.

The remaining text is devoted to the quest for verbal (literary) elegance (*Orator*, xlii: 145 -xlviii: 162) and rhythm (xlviii: 162 -lxxi: 236) of presentation. *Orator* then ends rather abruptly. Cicero acknowledges that Brutus (or other critics) may still differ in their conceptions of the ideal orator but observes that he (Cicero) has pursued this somewhat elusive topic as far as he has been able.

Cicero's Contributions

In introducing this paper, I made the claim that Marcus Tullius Cicero not only has provided a remarkable set of texts on rhetoric as a realm of influence work (and

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[32] One of Cicero's speakers, Crassus, in *De Oratore* (BIII, xxxv: 142 -lv: 212) addresses a related set of topics under the notion of ornate style. The sections, BIII, liii: 202 -liv: 208, of *De Oratore* deal more directly with embellishments.

resistance) but that Cicero also should be acknowledged as a pragmatist philosopher and an analytic ethnographer.

In developing this claim, I provided chapter and verse synoptic statements of six texts on rhetoric that have been attributed to Cicero. Because translations of Cicero's works are widely available, readers can readily consult the fuller set of texts for themselves. Still, it may be helpful to highlight some of the themes from this set of texts as a means of summarizing Cicero's works on rhetoric as well as establishing the viability of the claims I have made.

When we begin with **Rhetorica ad Herennium**, we encounter a text that not only addresses rhetoric in judicial, political, and honorific contexts but also provides a particularly astute consideration of five features of oratory: invention, arrangement, style, memory, and delivery. Whereas *Rhetorica ad Herennium* (a) builds on Greek rhetoric, particularly that developed by Aristotle and (b) is primarily oriented towards forensic or judicial contexts, the analysis is comprehensive, systematic, and highly detailed. Thus, considerable attention is given to matters of speaker preparations, anticipations, presentations, and adjustments. *Rhetorica ad Herennium* not only provides extended insight into the problematics and processes of court case deliberations and negotiations as this pertains to crime and culpability, but it also represents a highly sophisticated account of human agency and people's participation in collectively achieved definitions of reality.

Because some scholars have questioned whether *Rhetorica ad Herennium* was written by Cicero (or an unknown author), some readers may prefer to put this text aside in assessing the claims I have made for Cicero. I do not find the evidence of those who question Cicero's authorship particularly compelling, but even if we exclude this text for now, Cicero still gives us so much in the other five texts considered here that the claims I have made are substantiated in this latter set of materials.

Like *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, **De Inventione** is a remarkably astute, systematic, and highly detailed depiction of rhetoric as a field of activity. Both statements build on Aristotle's analysis of rhetoric and both have a pronounced instructive dimension. As well, as with *Rhetorica ad Herennium*, *De Inventione* is very much an account of influence work as a realm of negotiated interchange and centrally focuses on human agency and collectively achieved definitions of situations with respect to the speakers and those attending to these matters as auditors or judges.[33]

Although Cicero would later refer to *De Inventione* as a less sophisticated product of his youth, *De Inventione* has a great deal to offer students of community life. In developing this text, Cicero focuses on forensic much more than political or honorific rhetoric. He also attends more centrally to invention than to arrangement, expression, memory, and delivery (as other consequential features of rhetoric). Nevertheless, Cicero's analytic contributions in *De Inventione* are extensive.
Notably, thus, *De Inventione* (a) provides an instructive defense of rhetoric as a field of endeavor, (b) outlines the stages of forensic rhetoric (i.e., exordium or introduction,

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[33] It might be observed that, virtually all who have written about rhetoric following Plato and Aristotle have focused primarily on those assuming roles as speakers. Little direct attention has been given to those employing their services (or the interchanges between clients and their representatives). Whereas more attention has been given to those assuming roles as judges in these affairs, we also have little direct consideration of the ways in which auditors actually engage their roles. Still, in all fairness to these authors, it can be acknowledged that one finds comparatively few ethnographic studies on a contemporary plane that attend to the roles and activities of the broader set of participants in the setting. For two exceptions, see Wiseman (1970), Prus and Irini (1980).

narration or account of the case, partition or clarification of position, confirmation or proof, and peroration or conclusion), (c) considers the ways that speakers might generate, intensify, neutralize, and redirect the emotional sensations and associated conceptual frameworks that audiences associate with aspects of the case at hand, (d) addresses the problematic features of establishing proof, (d) attends in notably pragmatist philosophic terms to the matters of causality and the qualitative features of acts, (f) deals with issues of culpability and assessments of sanctions in judicial cases, and (g) considers the problematics of assessing documentary evidence.

Whereas *Rhetorica ad Herennium* and *De Inventione* focus on the intricacies of judicial rhetoric, perhaps in more extensive detail than many modern readers can quickly comprehend, **Topica** represents a yet more abstract consideration of influence work and one that even more consequently establishes Cicero as a pragmatist philosopher.[34]

While utilizing *De Inventione* as a convenience source of more concrete reference points, Cicero has written *Topica* as a means of analyzing argumentation in more generic terms.[35] Moreover, in addressing the basic features of argumentation -- as in making claims about the nature of things, judging or assessing the validity of people's claims about particular matters, and challenging definitions of things -- Cicero provides an exceedingly thoughtful consideration of what, centuries later, will be termed "the philosophy of knowledge" and "the sociology of knowing."

Focusing specifically on (a) the ways that people approach particular matters (as in existence, substance), (b) the terms and categories they employ, (c) the linkages they develop, (d) the comparisons they invoke, (e) the sequences or flows of events they consider, (f) the assignment of connections, causes, and consequences, and (g) inferences of quality and quantity, Cicero not only is mindful of *the ways that people make sense of particular matters* but also attends to (h) distinctions between other phenomena and humans as this pertains to causation (and matters of agency — as in reflectivity, intention, deliberation, and meaningful activity combined with interchange and purposive adjustment).

In addition to the preceding aspects of knowing, Cicero also discusses (i) external testimony as another element of the claims-making process and (j) stresses the importance of speakers attending to both generals (or abstractions) and specifics (or the particular cases at hand) in arriving at more adequate understandings of both levels of phenomena. Rather notably, and in direct criticism of philosophic practices, Cicero also (k) emphasizes the importance of considering not only the things that people do in more situated instances (as in the particular activities, thoughts, and consequences) but also the things that people did prior to embarking on those activities and the things that they may have done following some particular activity and observing it's outcomes.[36] For social scientists interested in the nature of human group life, especially as group life is accomplished in actual instances, there is much in Cicero's *Topica* to be appreciated relative to the study of human knowing and acting.

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[34] Amongst other of his works, readers may also refer to the pragmatist analysis of human knowing and acting found in Cicero's *Academica* (Prus 2006).

[35] Those familiar with Aristotle's works (especially *Categories* and *Topics*) will recognize that Cicero has built on aspects of these texts. Still, Cicero's *Topica* also is highly instructive in its own right.

[36] Because these temporal anterior and posterior elements of activities and outcomes are so widely neglected in the analysis of group life and associated explanations of people's behaviors, readers may recognize the very central relevance of Cicero's criticism for much contemporary theorizing and research within the human sciences

Whereas Plato and Aristotle provide valuable reviews of rhetorical practices to their own time, Cicero's **Brutus** offers a highly instructive, historically informed comparative analysis of rhetoric in both the classical Greek and Roman eras. Building on a (now lost) text developed by his friend Titus Pomponius Atticus, Cicero frames his analysis of rhetoric in ways that are not only attentive to the historical flows of people's educations, emphases, and practices as rhetoricians but also develops his materials mindfully of people's modes of argumentation (and presentation) as well as their relative involvements in more scholarly or populist approaches to rhetoric.

Brutus has been uniquely valuable to those striving to comprehend the life-worlds and practices of the classical Greek and Roman eras. It is also a testimony to the importance of social scientists attending more directly to the flows, developments, disjunctures, continuities, variations, and adjustments to the ways in which people may pursue parallel sets of activities over time and across, as well as within, particular settings. [37]

The next text considered here, **De Oratore**, is focused more exclusively on Roman orators. Here, Cicero more specifically distinguishes "academic" and "populist" approaches to the practice of rhetoric. In presenting these as ideal types, Cicero more specifically considers the ways that rhetoric as a field of endeavor differs from history and philosophy. He also addresses the ways that speakers engage their audiences, including their attentiveness to audience viewpoints and their more immediate interests. In addition to acknowledging speaker attempts to attend to and more directly shape the emotional states of their auditors, Cicero also considers speakers' own experiences with emotionality as they develop their performances. Relatedly, Cicero provides a thoughtful analysis of the ways that humor may be used in oratorical contexts as well as a depiction of the more specific ways humor may be invoked. Still, *De Oratore* has more to offer. In addition to a discussion of the ways that memory might be heightened in oratorical contexts, Cicero also encourages speakers to be mindful of oratorical styles, the linkages of philosophy and rhetoric, and the elements of delivery that more directly enable speakers to connect with their audiences.

Whereas Cicero defends his own style of practicing rhetoric against some critics (i.e., an instance of literary criticism with Cicero as a participant-observer) in **Orator**, he also uses this text to elaborate on some of the cross-cultural themes he introduces in *Brutus* and *De Oratore.* Still, in *Orator*, Cicero even more pointedly focuses on the qualities of the ideal orator. Stressing the orators' central task of obtaining favorable judgments, he discusses three different styles of persuasive endeavor (magnificent, plain, and moderate) and indicates how each may be invoked in seeking favorable commitments from their audiences.

Notably, too, instead of searching for the ideal orator in some particular person, Cicero concentrates on defining the ideal as a *quality* to which people may aspire (or be assessed). Albeit with the acknowledgement that people are apt to disagree on the particular qualities they assign to the ideal orator, Cicero stipulates the qualities he deems most appropriate. He also indicates in some detail the ways in which these qualities may be pursued.

In addition to (a) developing an extended fluency with and competency within wide ranges of rhetorical styles and (b) and associated ability to adopt themselves

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[37] Readers interested in the developmental flows of Western social thought from the classical Greek era to the 20th century, as seen from a sociological perspective, may like to examine Durkheim (1904-1905) and Prus (2004).

and their styles of rhetoric to particular contexts and audiences, Cicero stresses the importance of rhetoricians (c) achieving more sustained familiarity with history, law, and philosophy. He also places great value on (d) orators' abilities to shift back and forth between conceptions of, and references to, generals and particulars. The ideal orator also would have (e) the potential to shape auditor experiences of emotionality at will as well as (f) the ability to invoke wide ranges of embellishments and figures of thought in more effectively focusing and sustaining audience receptivities.

It should be understood from Cicero as well, that the ideal orator would also (g) possess great courage in facing adversity, (h) assume extended resourcefulness in developing cases, and (i) have the integrity to pursue noble causes with particular intensity and yet represent all cases accepted in the most effective manner possible while still respecting the parameters of the judicial system (ultimately, it is the auditors who are responsible for making viable judgments regarding the case at hand).[38]

Some readers were likely puzzled at the outset by the linkages I had drawn between Cicero's works on rhetoric and 20th and 21st century pragmatist scholarship. Indeed, there is no evidence of the direct influence of Cicero's works on the thought of any of the major American pragmatists (Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, or George Herbert Mead). Still, it should be acknowledged that Aristotle and Cicero, amongst others, articulated a field of activity that continues to inform Western social thought in a great many other sectors of community life (as in law, politics, philosophy, education, entertainment, religion, and interpersonal relations). Although formulated anew and very much envisioned as a discovery-making process (which it was, in terms of various disjunctures and re-emphases of scholarship over the millennia) by its principle architects, American pragmatism nevertheless is rooted in aspects of Western social thought that can be traced back to the classical Greek era (Peirce 1934: 5-11 [1906]; James 1907) and particularly the works of Aristotle (Prus 2003, 2004, 2007a, 2008).

Moreover, whereas Cicero's works clearly predate American pragmatism, Cicero's analysis of rhetoric very much parallels American pragmatism with regards to matters such as people's collectively achieved definitions of situations, the relativity of people's viewpoints and interests, and the human capacity for agency and interchange (especially reflectivity, deliberation, purposive activity, and anticipating and mindfully adjusting to the other) amidst the emergence and challenges of ongoing community life.

Still, Cicero's relevance as a pragmatist philosopher is yet more encompassing. Thus, whereas Cicero's work may be better appreciated when scholars invoke the conceptual emphases on human knowing and acting found in American pragmatist philosophy (and especially the extensions thereof in Blumerian symbolic interactionism), we also can appreciate Cicero's particular attentiveness to (a) the pragmatist conceptualization of activity (terms of reference, connections, causes, and understandings) developed from instruction, study, and actual sustained involvements with actual cases, (b) his explicit emphasis on attending to the more generic features of human knowing (*Topica*), (c) the importance he places on history and comparative analysis (*Brutus*), and (d) his more extended elaborations of the negotiation process (influence and resistance) as this takes place within the established parameters of community life (as in political, judicial, and honorific

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[38] Whereas Cicero's texts may be seen to constitute a highly instructive course in the history and practice of law (forensic rhetoric) in themselves, our emphasis has been on the relevance of these materials for the study of the ways in which human group life is accomplished on a day-to-day basis.

settings). Thus, whereas his work centers on the elaborations of influence work and the negotiation process, Cicero merits recognition as a pragmatist philosopher of considerable relevance.

Cicero's ethnography may rely heavily on participant-observation but it is participant-observation of a particularly intense, involved, and extended sort. Moreover, it is an especially rigorous analytic ethnography. Not only are Cicero's materials on rhetoric remarkably comprehensive, systematic, and detailed but they also display an extraordinary level of conceptual clarity, historical attentiveness, and comparative analysis of an extended realm of activity at both enacted and more abstracted levels.

Cicero does not explicitly make reference to extended open-ended interviews as some interactionists (e.g., Prus, 1997) explicitly encourage, but it is apparent that Marcus Tullius Cicero has examined the life-world he discusses at great length. Thus, (based on commentary in his texts), we may acknowledge: years of intense involvement, public practice, and observation in rhetorical arenas; wide ranges of instruction received and given; an ongoing attentiveness to the literature in this area; endless discussions about influence work and resistance in extremely wide range of contexts; and wide ranges of commentary (and criticism) pertaining to his own involvements in rhetoric (*Orator*). On these bases and more especially the several highly detailed and analytic texts he has developed on rhetoric as a realm of activity, Marcus Tullius Cicero not only deserves to be included in the ethnographic circle of scholars but also may be recognized as an exemplar within the ethnographic community.[39]

The third claim I made in introducing this paper was that Cicero's texts have an enduring relevance to the study of human knowing and acting. Whereas Cicero's accomplishments as a pragmatist philosopher and analytic ethnographer would establish this third claim, Cicero's more specific analysis of rhetoric (as indicated in the preceding set of texts) is one of the most remarkable scholarly accomplishments on record.

Although it is often assumed that contemporary analyses of interpersonal relations and associated interchange would be vastly superior to those developed 2000 years ago, this simply is not the case if we take the analyses of rhetoric developed by Aristotle and Cicero as our reference points.

Readers may find James Kinneavy's (1990) review of the 20th century literature helpful for situating rhetoric on a more contemporary plane. Although there has been a revival of interest in rhetoric more generally, much of the 20th century literature may be characterized by a range of conceptually diffuse (as in applied, artistic, journalistic, casual, moralistic) emphases. Thus, Kinneavy also indicates that the term "rhetoric" has lost much of its connectedness with classical scholarship. In contrast to the exceedingly rich analysis of rhetoric as activity that Aristotle and Cicero provide, most contemporary authors have failed to approach rhetoric as "the study of the activities entailed in instances of persuasive interchange."

Of those more commonly envisioned as 20th century rhetoricians, it is Kenneth Burke (1945, 1950) who most consequentially has connected rhetoric with the human sciences. Building on the works of Aristotle and Cicero, as well as aspects of American pragmatist philosophy, Burke does this through a pragmatist (Burke uses

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[39] Although some of Cicero's work on rhetoric has a more distinctive instructive or prescriptive versus a more purely descriptive and analytic quality, it may be acknowledged that Cicero's analysis of rhetoric is so comprehensive, sustained, and detailed that the relevance of his prescriptive elements fades by comparison.

the term "dramatist") attentiveness to the "philosophy of the act." Thus, he dialogues with a broad assortment of materials from the classical Greek and Roman eras as well as more contemporary materials in the humanities and social sciences that pertain to the study of human knowing and acting.

Some sociologists, more particularly those working in the symbolic interactionist tradition – notably including Erving Goffman (1959, 1963), Orrin Klapp (1962, 1964, 1971), Joseph Gusfield (1963, 1981, 1989, 1996), and Stanford Lyman and Marvin Scott (1970) – have derived considerable inspiration from Kenneth Burke in developing their own variants of "dramaturgical sociology".

Following Burke, they (along with many others working within the Chicago tradition of symbolic interaction - Prus 1996, 1997; Prus and Grills 2003), have further synthesized materials that Kenneth Burke had developed with aspects of American pragmatist thought. This is particularly evident with respect to the theatrical metaphor Burke represents and the matters of symbolism, impression management, reputations, and the shaping of images and definitions of situations in symbolic interactionist analyses of human group life.

Still, despite the considerable proportion of symbolic interactionists who knowingly or unwittingly have taken aspects of Burke's scholarship as departure points for their own work, there has been little in the way of a more extended engagement of the classical Greek and Latin literatures on rhetoric on the part of those in the interactionist community.

This, in part, may reflect Burke's more casual mode of citing his sources. Thus, even though he frequently references Aristotle and Cicero in discussing his dramatistic approach, Burke's citations are notably vague. Those not familiar with Aristotle's and Cicero's texts would not realize how partial Burke's utilization of these materials is. Indeed, unless they had examined the fuller texts that Aristotle and Cicero developed, readers relying on Burke's citations would be unable to appreciate just how thoroughly and precisely Aristotle and Cicero had developed their texts in both substantive and conceptual terms.[40]

I say this *not* as a condemnation of Burke's work on rhetoric and dramatism because Burke towers above other 20th century rhetoricians in his philosophic attentiveness to the nature of human knowing and acting. Moreover, Burke not only has been highly instrumental in reintroducing classical rhetoric to the social sciences, but he also synthesizes rhetoric with American pragmatist thought in ways that Peirce, James, Dewey, and Mead had not even begun to do. Relatedly, Burke also notably extends some of the topics about which Aristotle and Cicero wrote.

Nevertheless, when one more directly compares Kenneth Burke's materials on persuasive endeavor with Cicero's analysis of rhetoric, it becomes apparent that there is yet so much more in Cicero's texts on which students of the human condition could build.

Given the remarkably little attention directed toward to the study of influence work as a realm of meaningful, adjustive interchange in the contemporary human sciences, Cicero's work on rhetoric represents an extremely valuable transhistorical

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[40] Some other 20th century authors who have incorporated aspects of classical rhetoric into the human sciences include C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards (1923), Ernesto Grassi (1980), Chaim Perelman (1982), Martha Cooper and William Nothstine (1992), Thomas Farrell (1993), Michael Billig (1996), Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (1996), Robert Prus (1999, 2008), Bryan Garsten (2006), and Robert Danisch (2007). Still, Cicero's analyses of rhetoric has been much neglected, even these texts. Whereas many people seem prepared to acknowledge Cicero as an outstanding orator, along with Demosthenes (384-322BCE), few seem aware of Cicero's exceptional contributions to scholarship (MacKendrick 1989; Prus 2006).

and transcultural reference point for comparative analysis. Cicero provides a wide array of concepts and insights into the influence (and resistance) process that could productively inform contemporary understandings of community life as realms of social accomplishment as well as provide a great many departure points for subsequent inquiry into the analysis of human interchange. These include influence work and resistance, impression management and deception, reflectivity and activity, agency and culpability, identity and emotionality, categorizations and definitions of the situation, and emergence and strategic adjustment.

Somewhat ironically, the challenges for modern day scholars are apt to revolve around the tasks of coming to terms with (a) the vast array of topics that Cicero addresses with respect to human acts, definitions, and persuasive interchange; (b) the highly detailed quality of the materials that Cicero presents; and (c) the extended historical and contextual comparisons he introduces.

Although some conceptual flexibility will be required if contemporary scholars are to achieve transcontextual affinities with Cicero's work, it is by adopting a pragmatist or interactionist vantage point and attending to the more generic or transsituational features of human association (Prus 2007c) that we may be better able to realize the remarkable potency of Cicero's work on rhetoric for considering the ways that people create, sustain, contest, and readjust definitions of reality.

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Citation

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Social Introspection of I. A. Bláha and Wittgenstein's' Argument Counter to Private Language. Anniversary Study on Introspection Approach in Social Sciences.

Abstract

The following text discusses the method of social introspection of the Czech philosopher and sociologist I.A. Bláha. It focuses both on presenting the method and exploring its potentials and limits in order to understand social reality. The application of the Wittgenstein´s argument against the private language as a critique of the introspective perspective and a brief analysis of the phenomenological approach in sociology will help to assess the boundaries of this approach. Theoretical conclusions of application of the introspection method in sociology are drawn at the end of the text and thus allow to assess applicability of the Blaha´s own method.

The anniversary of Wittgenstein and Bláha serves as an opportunity to emphasize an approach in the research of social reality that, as it seems through the vast overflow of specialized methodological literature, almost vanishes from sight. And it happens in spite of, or more accordingly, due to the fact that it is constantly seen. Social introspection as a way of questioning one's own "common" social experience of the researcher is a source of knowledge that sociological literature often remarks, but does not systematically discuss on a regular basis.

Social introspection as an instrument of sociological research can be also considered the most compelling contribution towards sociological methodology by I. A. Bláha (1879-1960)[1], the Czech sociologist and the founder of Brno sociological

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[1] Inocenc Arnošt Bláha (1879-1960) is one of the greatest Czech sociology classics and founders of sociology in Czechoslovakia. He contributed to its development through discourse by presenting new topics that were rare in sociology: in Czech sociology it was for example studying the city as a social phenomenon; in the context of world sociology he presented a topic of intelligence – and also authentic and revelatory elaboration of standard topics (issues of blue collars, rural province, family, and socialization). In his sociological work he was able to combine various intellectual influences (aside from the domestic influences, primarily from French and German sociology) and formulate own general sociological theory – federate functionalism. Indisputable is his contemplation and construction of sociological method (for example his peculiar method of social introspection, but also his pioneer use of questionnaires for sociological inquiry etc.). As a co-founder and initiator he also

department. Systematic analysis and evaluation of his significance from the perception of (not only) contemporary sociology is still awaiting presentation. Bláha is not the only, nor the first to research use of the introspective method. In the following study, the focus will be Bláha and first and foremost his theoretical possibilities of application of introspective approach, rather than the analysis of applications. L. Wittgenstein (1889-1951), more famous world-wide than Bláha, is one of the key sources of postmodern "turn to language" which characterizes a great fraction of contemporary social science and philosophy. His argument against the private language can be used as a critical lens to view the introspective method from the position familiar to the contemporary approaches. He establishes a general critique of the introspective method and enables us to formulate particular conclusions on Bláha's method. Due to paradigmatical relevance of phenomenology for the introspective approach in sociological research, inevitable attention will be paid to discussion of core arguments.

Reasons that arise in favor of interpreting Bláha's method in the context of Wittgenstein's arguments do not lie eminently in Wittgenstein paradigmatical significance for social sciences. Aside from being co-temporaries, both thinkers were also culturally interconnected. As a resident of Habsburg monarchy, at the turn of the century, Bláha attended Vienna University and absorbed the atmosphere, which also had had an impact on Wittgensteins' development.[2] The key factor for both thinkers however, is their gradual diversion from positivism that led them towards their heterogenic positions on the issue of utilizing individual experience.

Social introspection of I. A. Bláha

Surprisingly, no passage of Bláha's work describes the method of social introspection in depth. The fact that it is not only a chimerical perception, is indicated both in primary and secondary literature. In the paramount study, *The Sociology of Intelligence,* Bláha remarks that social introspection is *"… necessary, according to my opinion to give preference due to the fact that it is by far, more reliable and scientific than methods of intuition, or 'einfühlen des Verstehen' which are too burdened by subjectivism…"*. He describes it as an endeavor to examine one's own self in various situations, such as a performance in the role of a member of intelligence (Bláha 1937: 7).

In an extensive study, *Sociology*, published post mortem Bláha (1968) on social introspection remarks:

> Furthermore we presume that it can be beneficial, however only as a supplemental method, a method of social introspection. (…) Family, nation, party are not entities that objectively exist only aside from us, but they exist also within us, they are part of our living structure. We know justice, morality, religion not only because we were instructed about these phenomena, but also because we, ourselves, act according to justice,

contributed to building Czech sociology through institutional and organizational aspect. He founded the second sociological academic institution in CSR (1921); initiated creation of the first Czech sociological association (1924); was a key actor in founding the first field periodical in Czechoslovakia – *Sociological review* (1923), that he helped to lead it to world accepted standards; led research groups and organized research.

[2] On the relationship of the period cultural atmosphere in Vienna and philosophical thinking see Schorske (2000), Kampits (1995). In particular, on cultural impact of Vienna on Wittgenstein's thinking see Toulmin and Janick (1984).

morality and live religiously. Therefore we understand them. Nature is only exterior to us. A group is more than exterior to us, it is also interior. We can observe it both outside of the self and within the self. We know it, because we live it. In fact, we would say we know it better because of that. (p. 63)

This is essentially the only remark on social introspection in Bláha's text. While Bláha used the method, he didn't explicitly write about it.[3] Besides, Durkheim also first wrote *The division of Labor in Society*, and consecutively portrayed the used method in *The Rules of Sociological Method*. When examining Bláha's social introspection it is necessary to reconstruct from his texts concentrating on methodological topics which are dispersed sporadically throughout his work. From the argumentation point of view, I consider Bláha's texts dated from the beginning of the twenties of the 20th century to be key sources on this matter. It is here we can find a turn from critical commentary on sociological approaches to one's own positive compact sociological approach.

Genesis of Bláha's noetic position.

Bláha was a student of Durkheim and an admirer of Masaryk and therefore his own position regarding sociological theory can be perceived as a synthesis of their positions. He preserves critical distance from Durkheim's objectivism which, in a sociological point of view, deprives individual of his own independence with regard to societal forces. Similarly, he is reserved towards Masaryk's psychologism, which emphasizes the role of grand individuals – charismatic leaders – in history and social life. Bláha's position is being denominated by his interpreters and himself as a critical realism. He perceives society as a structure exceeding the individual with inherent laws, which always rely on concrete individuals, who may influence a character of society by using his/her own initiative.

This stance is already enunciated in Bláha's early sociological work from the first and second decade of the 20th century and contextually his position does not significantly change in the following years. His arguments on a relation between individual and society can be divided into two segments: (1) Findings counter subjectivism, i.e. "atomistic reduction of social phenomena to individual movement", show that (A) it is not always in preference to individual mentality that we find either precise cause or conditions of why a certain idea is not just an individual force, but becomes also collective. (B) There are a number of ideas that are significant to the individual, but not to society (at least analytically we are capable of the distinction between individual and collective concept). (C) Both psychologism and subjectivism tend to reduce social phenomena to exceedingly elementary causes. Therefore they deprive social phenomena of their social aspect and sociology of its argument in favor of scientific existence. Here he uses Durkheim's argument, that such reductionist aspirations resemble aspirations to reduce biology into a chapter from physics that describes life processes through power, gravity, speed, weight, etc. (D) Phenomena that emerge through interactions are usually ranked as new and therefore can not be predicted beforehand. Hence, it is essential to take them into account as phenomena sui generis, even if it is possible to retroactively trace the genesis into qualitatively different levels of existence.

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[3] Probably the most systematically in *Sociology of intelligence* (Bláha 1973).

(2) It can be objected counter to sociological objectivism that (A) no empirical evidence exists to prove that individual's consciousness could not come into existence without psychosociological interaction, at least in its primitive form. (B) No empirical evidence exists to prove that interaction existed before emergence of individual consciousness.[4]

Bláha presupposes that in the extreme versions of both theories, there is something that opposes empirical evidence, or could not be sufficiently evincible. Subjectivism deprives social phenomena of specific character; objectivism on the other hand contradicts mental initiative. Deficiency lies in one-sidedness which is caused by favoring logical priority of one domain of social existence over the other.

In an essay that discuses scientific approach of sociology, Bláha acknowledges Durkheim's approach as the first to be scientific, due to the fact that not until then was sociology based on inductive method as opposed to ad hoc, where facts serve only as illustrations for speculations (Bláha 1912a (3rd part): 6). Durkheim's sociology positively relates to reality the way the natural sciences do. The requirement to study social phenomena as facts contains his methodological naturalism which uses the scientific empirical method similar to the way natural sciences do. In the first half of his sociological carrier, Bláha fully identifies with this position and is considered a Durkheimian objectivist. In an article on sociological methods he states, "*the highest point of scientific exactness is offered by a number, statistics*" (Bláha 1912d: 75). In his enumeration of sociological methods he lists alongside with observation where "*observer must be completely neutral*" (Bláha 1912d: 75), also questionnaire, experiment, historical and comparative analysis leading to induction of principles. These formulations show the spirit of methodological naturalism, even though he grants induced social principles with rather presumptive character.

During the twenties, Bláha cautiously adds to Durkheim's theory a statement that, in order to fully understand social phenomena, is not possible to use only objective observation, because society exists solely through us, through individuals it thinks, feels, composes (Bláha 1921a).

> "Perhaps aspect of objectivity is of such significance that without it, establishing sociology as a science appears to be unthinkable, still it is not enough. Due to the fact, that the world and social life is not only exterior to us, but also within us, (…) it is inefficient to use only observational intelligence in order to understand it, but also apprehended forcibility, as Dilthey already mentioned (…) there exists a complete human being."
> (p. 178)

Hence, Bláha makes his way to a new noetic position which corresponds with his critical realism of the general theory of society and is represented by social-introspective method.

Transformation in Bláha's noetic position

One may legitimately question why Bláha qualifies objectivist perspective as insufficient, considering the effect of Durkheim's tradition on him. What is the intent and why is there a need to supplement it – among other things by introspective method? In fact, Bláha was not a Durkheimist.

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[4] Compare Bláha 1912b.

In addition, the reason that Bláha became aware of the limits and boundaries of Durkheim's objectivist sociology evolved from several factors. On one hand it was caused by the fact that he got suspended in 1897 after two years of study at theology seminar due to his involvement in activities of Catholic modern art. Continuous interest in "higher spiritual values" that are difficult to measure can be seen in Bláha's various sociological works. He often crosses from "value-free" analysis to morality – which can be frequently seen among various Czech sociology classics, including Masaryk – followed by social criticism, based on the spiritual values of the collective.

Additionally, during this time of creating studies interconnected with introspection, he finished and published his second major treatise *Philosophy of Morality* (1922) where he faced a problem of phenomena difficult to grasp explicitly by using the objectivistic approach. For example, according to Bláha (1922), conscience defined as an important demonstration of a broader social aspect of morality is impossible to embrace without analysis of one's own subjective experience and practice.

> A knowledge of conscience cannot be acquired through any [outside – authors note] specification, but only through its possession by using it and analyzing it as own status. External moral act does not itself offer anything reliable concerning internal morality. It could have clearly resulted from rather different motifs than moral motifs. (p. 85)

Conscience is an example of sociologically relevant phenomena, where Durkheim's objectivistic sociology with certain methodological naturalism becomes cumbersome and according to Bláha, it is possible and suitable to add a dimension of subjective experience analysis, i.e. introspection. The fact, that pressure and contents of conscience can also be perceived through contents of "collective fantasies", serves a different purpose.

His critique of Durkheim's approach in favor of the subjectivistic method is based on the work of contemporary French scholar M. Bernés. However, more influential towards to his argument was W. Dilthey, who is explicitly referred to in the context of correction of objectivism, and neo-kantians Widelband and Rickert. Neo-kantianism itself was a powerful inspirational source for a newly rising social science in Brno. Theoretically, a neo-kantianism normative theory of Fr. Weyra was constructed (Bláha was closely acquainted with his work and on various occasions led discussion with it – see Bláha 1928). Also Rickert's publications were more available and more popular in Brno as oppose to for example Hegel's. These were added to the library in the faculty of arts after World War 2 as a result of a Marx teacher's work.

Limited by the extent of the text, it is possible to mention only basic points in Dilthey's arguments that were essential to Bláha's correction of Durkheim objectivism. The main connecting point between Bláha and Dilthey lies in their similar positivistic intention (never naturalistic) to develop social science and their interest in spiritual world of human being. Bláha's argument also includes clear attributes of Dilthey's *subjet* concept of social practice and appearance of value component into the mere act of understanding the social reality.

In the *Introduction to the Human Sciences (Enleitung in die Geisteswissenschaft)* Dilthey (1967) writes:

> Nature is alien to us. (…) Our world is society. (…) We are obliged to control the image of its status in always agile value judgments and at least in our imagination with effort always remodel it. All this imprints certain

basic features to the study of society that distinctly differentiate it from the study of nature…

I alone, experiencing and realizing myself from within, am part of this social unit…

Apprehending unit, that has effect in human sciences is a complete human being: high performances in addition to the power of intelligence result also from greatness of personal life. …in addition to apprehension it (i.e. cognitive activity – author's note) is connected also with practical tendency of evaluation, ideal, regulation. (p. 586-587)

In a similar direction, Bláha carries his debate about social phenomenon as an experience. When Bláha sees "the spiritual" as essentially human in a human being and argues that in order to recognize a rock, no experience is needed, however, there is a need to experience love, religion, art (Bláha 1921: 177 a n.), he follows Dilthey's reasoning. Dilthey's inspiration is clear in Bláha's concept of indivisible part of a free element in the process of understanding and the role of quality of personal life. Both will be discussed in the text to follow. (see especially Obligation of introspective understanding for practice). At some point Bláha appears to be more radical than Dilthey, especially in the question of sociological competencies to affect social events. Aside from establishing facts and pronouncing theorems, Dilthey also grants social science with the possibility to state social objectives and assign regulations as a legitimate component of their aspirations (Dilthey 1967: 578). Bláha (1939) even pronounces, though cautiously, that sociologist has a duty to "formulate scientifically fortified value judgments about social events".

…sociologist due to the fact that he can see better, deeper and more accurate into the processes of social events and as a result to that he can more reliably extrapolate references between what actually exists and what should exist, is above all obliged (…), to formulate, (…), respective scientifically fortified value judgments about social events for the need of practitioners. Not only is he obliged to do so, but also it is his social and moral responsibility. (p. 145-146)

It seems that Bláha's interest in "higher spiritual value" goes against Durkheim's attempt, formed in *The Rules of Sociological method* (1926), to cleanse sociology of "all metaphysical". And the demand for value competence and subjective experience seem to go against Durkheim's pursuit of objectivity in sociological research, inquiring "social phenomena as social facts". It is not a negation however, but supplementation. He expresses critique of Durkheim for one-sidedness, but not for inaccurate conclusions, or method. Coercion of social phenomena is according to Bláha, only one side of an issue. Another side, the internal side, is conscious individual activism. Their interconnection creates an attribute of the approach which Bláha endorses and which he denotes as "critical realism" (Bláha 1929: 407 – 410). It can be agreed upon that the proposition that Bláha, in his application of introspection, wanted to explore (from within) is represented today by Bourdieu's term "habitus" – bridging the objective and subjective aspect of social phenomena.

Social introspection

The fact that understanding society relies on the need to live in a society, or experience society, according to Bláha, created a distinction between natural science and human sciences and the possibility to apply the introspective method between them. However, it does not necessarily mean that psychological and social world cannot be allocated with the rest of the nature, as something more complex that includes new characteristics (Bláha 1921a: 178).

In the broad perception of society, Bláha appears to be strongly connected to Durkheim, who views society above all as a psychological reality originated in interaction (compare for ex. Durkheim 1998: 17-48 and Bláha 1968: 9-43). Bláha talks about the birth of qualitatively new "We"-psyche which naturally results from a simple necessity of aggregated people to organize themselves and enter social relations. Durkheim also develops another argument inspired by Dilthey. In this, psychological matters are not measurable, but they are rather experienced and therefore he adopts this knowledge in the concept of social phenomena.

> Social phenomenon, as quite rational, emotional and attemptive **experience** of the part of rationality, emotionality and desiderativeness which is common to all, becomes a newly organized and socialized psyche, a constructive architect of social bonds and systems (law, science, etc.). (Bláha 1921a: 179)

A sociologist's experience in exploring social reality is different from the common experience of a human being. A human being does not capture existence in its general validity, because the knowledge was not de-subjectivited into a scientific term. Conversely, individuals who were scholarly trained in critical thinking and working with scientific terminology can better overcome this subjective point of view. As Bláha (1921a) notes,

> … ascend over the existence, survey it from the distance as a legitimate order, see its universal purpose. He was able to come to scientific, objective understanding. In addition he realizes that his understanding is not complete, that he has to descend down to the existence and re-live it again, however not in a sense general public does, but in a sense of existence, in its **objective** character and validity. (p. 180)

It is possible to see two matters in Bláha's conclusion. First we find **experience** embraced as an instrument of **objective understanding** and secondly, this experience **obliges to further action,** which completes the process of understanding. Now I'm going to look at the issue of objectivity of understanding that results from experience.

Objectivity of introspective understanding

Bláha acquires his understanding of objectivity through conceptual analysis with the help of opposition towards subjectivity. He understands objectivity in the first place as super-individual and never as independent from the human being itself. Though, it is not clear whether individual intelligence would occur without society (see arguments against sociological objectivism), it is certain that where individual intelligence reaches the highest point of understanding towards general ideas of truth, good and beauty, is developed through the continual battle with nature and society. This battle, which guarantees objectivity, includes continual balancing,

adjusting and compiling and composing of individual consciousness' all together (Bláha 1921a: 176-177).

Bláha considers scientific truth objective because it consists of overlapping partial attitude towards the super-individual. Perhaps we can find in Bláha's work rather naïve formulations and requirements, such as the necessity to get rid of all own prejudices and more; however theoretical merit in his conception of objectivity is in accordance with contemporary processes and dialogic understanding the way it is elaborated by several scholars who study epistemological issues of social sciences. For example, multi-culturally oriented philosophy of social sciences represented by B. Fay (Fay 2002: 237-263), or a critique of social constructivism by I. Hacking (Hacking 1999) who stands the ground of philosophical realism with a addition of pragmatic corrective, or as continually defended in the major aspects by Rorty (Rorty 2000: 281-320; Putnam, Rorty 1997) in his relativistic critique of objectivism (as a reflection of reality from the standpoint of uninvolved "god's eye"). Bláha is connected with the given positions through tendencies of "approaching understanding as participation on reality" (Rorty). I think that even Quine, for instance, bases his concept of objectivity on understanding of similar principles – i.e. opposition to individual subjectivity when the first step towards objectivity is perceived through expression of private stimulations via public language (compare for. ex. Quine 1994: 12). Of course, Bláha's goals were in major part different from the goals of temporary post-analytical or post-positivistic scholars. It is even possible that he would consider Rorty to be an eccentric and that Rorty would perceive Bláha to be a prisoner of positivism. In spite of that I think it is valuable to be familiar with and discuss Bláha's arguments today.

It would be a misrepresentation to state that Bláha repulsed the correspondent theory of truth leaning towards the consensual approach. Also, it would be a misrepresentation to assume that the objective truth is assigned as an attribute of sentences correspondence and from subject independent reality, with which they represent. In Bláha's case, it is rather a realization of the limits that occur in perceiving the understanding as an identity (full correspondence) with object and at the same time insisting on positive fundamentals of knowledge. This balance results in shifting the accent from substantial criteria of objectivity to procedural criteria. In this sense we should interpret the following argument, as objective truth resulting from the dialogue among various opinions. Furthermore the more the parties engage in the discussion, the more objective the understanding becomes. (compare for. ex. Bláha 1914: 7-8).

The established approach is also present in Bláha's (1921a) concept of the origins of general terminology as a result of social life:

> Due to the fact that truth, beauty, goodness exist, we know that society exists. Therein everyone longs for the ideal, (…) therein society talks in us, society lives in us. If the individual would have always lived only for own self, he would have never developed his idea into the endless generality, eternal truth, boundless good (…). (p. 177)

If the society did not exist, beauty as a term would probably not surpass an opaque sensational dichotomy, such as like/dislike, pleasant/unpleasant. In other words, totality as a perspective of intelligence is not a biological attribute of a human being, but is a *social* attribute. It was not born in the heads of philosophers, but was created spontaneously through the genesis of general terminology via social life.

Leaving the existence Bláha describes as a scientific experiment containing the characteristics of the scientific, methodic experience (Bláha 1921a: 180). By using his own approach, which attempts to deprive the experience of all the categorical attributes, Bláha strongly encourages procedure intentions of phenomenological reduction (without any explicit reference to Husserl); however no basic requirement such as Husserl's eschewal of the general thesis of the world can be found.

Assuming the experience to become a source of objective understanding in a sense of objectivity as described above, the researcher, who tries to apply scientific orderliness, faces the necessity to somehow always participate in inter-subjectively acquired by scientific terminology. In the first place, it is because he/she tries to apply to experience the term of principle, i.e. aspiration to find constancy and perseverance in the flow of experiences.

This implicit conclusion is indicated in Bláha's studies both from the beginning of his sociological activity, as well as later references to development of sociology as a science. Only subordination of social phenomena to legitimacy in Durkheim's point of view, i.e. inductive, provides sociology with the status of objective positive science. In contrast, Saint-Simon's or Compte's application of the term of principle was according to Bláha (1912a (3rd part): 6, 1921a: 175) considered a more speculative approach. Bláha's assurance of a correct application on the subjective level is not any more specific than schooling in scientific thinking and/or (in a Dilthey's perception) a greatness of personal life, which is eminent for practical dimension of understanding. Masaryk is as an example of both, according to Bláha.

This much is presented towards the understanding of Bláha's objectivity in the context of understanding resulting from experience. The issue concerning the necessity to understand the actions of the cognizant subject forms one of Bláha's characteristic conclusions; and from the perspective of the theoretical sustainability of the introspective method, it plays an important role in Bláha's system (see Potentials and boundaries of Bláha's introspection). Therefore I will briefly analyze it.[5]

Obligation of introspective understanding for practice

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[5]A more precise idea about a possible form of participation based on inter-subjectively acquired scientific terminology in the case of introspection is offered by P. Bourdieu. Bourdieu's focus on the issue of objectivity of understanding acquired from the individual experience is similar to Bláhas'and represents a valuable parallel, showing the potential of Bláha's approach. Bourdieu as well, thinks that "social experience tested by the sociological critique" is an irreplaceable source. (Bourdieu 2003: 11) According to both scholars, individual experience should be seized and depicted by the de-personalized scientific tools and therefore objectified. Besides the critical thinking, or as Bláha states "schooled scientific thinking", Bourdieu also offers concrete methodic. Its purpose lies in capturing conditionality of researchers own experience, which gives him/her understanding. It happens through analysis of civil and academic environment of the researcher, or a position which he/she takes interest in, as well as necessary dispositions that result from it (for. ex. Preference of the question, basis and principles of explanation, etc.). Bourdieu puts emphasis on statistical analysis to be one of the tools of objectification of social experience that can be considered as "one of the most brutal tool of objectivism". (Bourdieu 2003: 7). The result of objectification is double shift. On one hand, the primary social experience varies scientific practice by becoming its source; on the other hand, reinterpretation of primary experience takes place after applying objectified scientific techniques. Although, neither did Bourdieu stay away from the need to somehow deal with practical level of personal experience due to its interconnection with evaluation and willingness. Reinterpretation of primary experience leads to some sort of "conciliation of the researcher with him/herself, with his/her social characteristics which bears the liberating anamnesis" (Bourdieu 2003: 14) and with adopting a new attitude towards "the world of origin".

Bláha (1921a) describes his specific methodic approach of penetration to the lived social reality as entrance into the laws of existence that can be further constructed and developed by a human being.

> With own life in the existence, is own scientific countenance above it. (p. 180)

Through the step of specific introspection, an individual dissociates from the lived existence in order to say something positive about it from the outside and again on the level of lived practice returns to bring harmony between the theory and practice. The result of theoretical reflection is a practical act. This conclusion is brought by Bláha's (1921b) resolution of an issue in which social scientist becomes part of inquired social process.

> … the social world is of a strange nature. It is not only a world of our understanding, but also a world of our practice. (…) it is necessary to connect own understanding and conscience with objectively acquired moral development, to maintain it alive with subjective authorization, which means nothing more than using correct evaluation to choose good means for good ends. Therefore at social existence, the practice is equally important to the theory. (p. 742-743)

According to Bláha, a sociologist lives socially and morally when his/her objective theoretical understanding changes his or her own emotion and will to action. Based on that, it can be assumed that sociology as a science can be distinguished from sociology as a practice only artificially, because both are integrated in a sociologist who both explores the social world through intelligence and lives it through emotion. Such interpretation can be confirmed by Bláha's previous citation about competence or even obligation of a sociologist to provide scientifically fortified value judgments. Value judgments as followed by practical acts develop from the synthesis based theory of "overall living activity of an individual". The voluntary and emotional components of an individual's personal structure become an epistemological category, a tool of understanding.

According to Bláha, a subjective understanding of the objective disposition of social reality results in adequate social practice which is rather a postulate than reality; a postulate that only such great historical figures as Masaryk and schooled scientists (of the future) can manage to saturate. Based on that, Bláha's method can be called a **social introspection**, because it results from questioning the social experience. Such subjective understanding of the objective disposition of social reality is according to Bláha the only way how to get out of the materialized social life. At the same time from romanticism, moodiness and mythicality of thought about social life and also from dangerous experimenting with the social world with reference to a priory projects like Russia (Bláha 1921a: 181). Thus Bláha clearly states that he wants to find an objective societal ideal (transcending "materialized" world) without violating its objectivity during the search (avoiding romanticism, experimenting etc.).

Potentials and boundaries of introspective method

I. Shutz's and Patočka's discussion on phenomenology method

In order to review Bláha's social introspection method and its effect on sociological research it is necessary to go beyond its mere description, it is important to set its boundaries for understanding the social reality. E. Husserl, the par excellence representative of introspective method, faced a rudimental issue, on how to constitute sociality (intersubjectivity) on the platform of pure subjectivity, a dialogic social relation. According to several authors he was unable to resolve it satisfactorily (compare for ex. Nohejl 2001: 26). Husserl's attempt can be found in the fifth meditation of his *Cartesian meditations* (Husserl 1993: 87-145) named "Uncovering the sphere of transcendental being as monadological intersubjectivity". Here, in order to explain intersubjectivity, Husserl uncovers, at times in a difficult fashion, the human ability of pairing, apresentation and apperception of the other, empathy, reciprocity of subjectivities and similarly difficult sounding approaches that constitute, according to him, an intersubjective world based on the performance of the subject that relates to the other outside of the self.[6]

Husserl's student and one of the most remarkable Czech sociologists Jan Patočka, asserted that critique of Husserl's concept of intersubjectivity was *"presented in the vastest and most diverse form by A. Schutz"* (Patočka 1993: 184), who was the first scholar to apply phenomenology onto the grounds of pure sociology. Fundamentals of Schutz's critique can briefly be summoned as follows: If we reach, using phenomenological reduction, a kind of *"out-of-profane"* observable position towards intentional consciousness that includes phenomena, than we cannot trace within these phenomena distinction between the own self and extraneous self. This situation can be described by Wittgenstein's metaphor; in the eye's range of sight, there exists nothing that would indicate a possibility to be seen by some other eye.

> If I'm reduced to the sphere of what I have inhered, according to Schutz, than Husserl's means of how to come to the other, extraneous self, are unclear and inadequate. (…) Schutz intends to say the following: body of the other self can be a subject of coherent experience the way any other physical object is, where the experience does not go beyond the broad synthesis of its aspects; once there is intention of objective subjectivity, it is assumed, that I have noematically[7] in front of me the self as extraneous, to construct extraneousness of this self from own self is a problem that is irresolvable – entirely new element of an intent, obviously can not by transferred to something different. (Patočka 1993: 184)

Localization in the other (body) by empathy can bring verification of the world that is experienced by the extraneous, as a mutual world (shared, social) through subjective opinion (in a sense of vision and observation) cannot be successful for two reasons. First because, no such input into "you" is known and secondly, by adding

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[6] It is not possible to talk about Husserl on a wider scale than necessary. His concept is sociologically analyzed in Czech context by M. Nohejl (Nohejl 2001: 17-34). Value of *Cartesian meditations* in the context of Husserl's philosophy is introduced in a book by I. Blecha (Blecha 1996).

[7] Noema for Husserl always constitutes unity of the purpose of certain object or its aspect in a stream of consciousness even after phenomenological reduction Noema is a part of stream of consciousness, however, by its existence it is transcendent to this, it is a structure allowing for exampe, to retain the identity of a specific object in a various forms of existence (past x present x future, possibility x reality etc.) – for example, my cup on the table and my cup in the sink, or my cup yesterday and today is still the one and only cup, even though it appears to be different.

the subjectivity "I" to the locality of "you", the "you" disappears as such and becomes "I". The difference between "you" – "I" would be erased.

Patočka's conclusion of Husserl's analysis on the intersubjective world constitution reads that all the experiences that Husserl describes in his fifth meditation, all the coherences and links of the meaning which he develops (apperception, apresentation, reciprocity of subjectivities etc.), *"are true experiences that define meaning of the other being in its concrete appearance."* However, these experiences and links of the meaning are not elements that would themselves create a structure of the meaning of "societal world", but instead they would **presuppose** and **explicate** it (Patočka 1993: 186-187).

As mentioned by M. Nohejl (2001), a similar conclusion was made by A. Schutz, who starts sociological application of phenomenology; his analysis however, harbors a postulate of "mundane intersubjectivity":

> This mundane approach of intersubjectivitiy stands on an assumption that sphere "we" precedes the individual and the clarification of the issue has to arise from commonly shared reality. It is different from Husserl's approach where subject additionally forms intersubjective sociality by realizing bodily resemblance with other people. In contrary, Schutz understands intersubjectivity as one of the basic constitutive elements of society and states that "my life world is not my private world, but a world that is intersubjective from the very beginning". (p. 54)

Schutz starts grounding the introspective method of social analysis on a postulate of mundane intersubjectivity by a point, around which Husserl only tip toed, and to which he got as close as his analysis of physicality and experience of the other in the process of interaction.

II. Wittgenstein's argument against private language

One of the most eminent critiques of the introspective methods was presented in Wittgenstein's argument against private language.[8] Even though this discussion was led in the field of philosophy, it is possible to effectively transfer it to the field of sociology, because Wittgenstein's later works were created in confrontation with the behaviorist movement and his arguments focused on philosophical coping with positivism. Coping with positivism played an important role while forming foundations of interpretative sociological paradigm.[9] Wittgenstein is more than an important figure of analytical philosophy; he is also one of the key figures in the postmodern turn to language (Hubík 1994) and one of the first representatives of social constructivist paradigm.[10] It is not an exaggeration to say that in the current social science theory

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[8] Some essential essays on Wittgenstain´s *Philosophical Investigations* are collected in Georg Pitchers´s reader (Pitcher (ed.) 1966), especially on private language argument see Ayer´s (1966), Rhees´s (1966), Cook´s (1966) and Kenny´s (1966) articles. Although my interpretation of Wittgenstein´s private language argument is generally in accordance with these texts the aim of this study is different and more subtle.

[9] One of the first applications of Wittgenstein´s conception in social sciences is P. Winch´s essay which is still more philosophical (Winch 1958) and generally H. Garfinkel´s ethnometodology, which is more closely to empirical research.

[10] Although „social construction" is a label, which lived through certain inflation and became fashionable, in Wittgenstein´s case it has a foundation as we will see in the following text. For reasonable critique of the label „social construction" see Hacking (1999).

prevails the constructivist perception about society and pragmatic, rather than a visual idea about language. Thus, Wittgenstein's ideas are still applicable and his argument seems as an acceptable tool that can help to unveil the limits of introspective method as well as help to evaluate Bláha's aspiration.

This application enables focus of Wittgenstein's argument towards possible recounts about private sensations or phenomena that can be captured in dimensions of pure subjectivity, these are basically intentions of the introspective method (immersion into own experiences and their questioning).

Wittgenstein's argument against the private language can be found in his *Philosophical investigations* (Wittgenstein 1972). His argumentation is built as follows; first he shows how every language is controlled by certain regulations and then discuses whether the private language as a language about private sensations meets the criteria of action according to the regulation. The part on following the regulation is presented in the argument against the private language and in contemplation about a possibility of discourse on sensations.[11]

For description and analysis of language, Wittgenstein uses term language-games. This term allows him to express his belief that language is always interconnected with specific practical actions (PI: §7 and following.) and also plurality of types of regulations that actors use during their language action, as well as the fact that every language is a game, has certain regulations. To portray plurality of language games Wittgenstein uses examples such as giving orders and acting according to orders, describing objects based on its look or based on survey, making an object according to the description or design, reporting on a certain event, making a joke, translation from one language to another, expressing appreciation, praying, etc (PI: §23 and following)

Due to the fact that every game and every language has its own regulations, the regulations and order must be present even in the vaguest sentence (PI: §98). What Wittgenstein understands under regulation is explained through regularity (PI: §§205-209). For example, if I am trying to understand foreign language for which I have no dictionary, I would try to track regularities among situations and sounds that occur there, I am trying to look at them as symbols. I assume this regularity; otherwise it is impossible to talk about symbols.

An important aspect of Wittgenstein's argumentation in our context lies in the distinction between acting according to regulation and knowing that I am acting according to regulation. I suppose I am acting according to the regulation. If I am acting according to regulation, I do not make a choice, I act based on the regulation without any question (PI: §219), without realizing the fact that I am acting according to regulation or should act according to regulation. This can be seen for example when we automatically say hello to a friend on the street, or when we ask for a menu in a restaurant in stead of going straight to the kitchen to place an order. Regulations, according to Wittgenstein, are condensed forms of human practice, abstractly expressed routines, habits, and institutions. A hypothesis that I act according to

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[11] Philosophical investigations do not consist of a compact text that is structured into chapters, but several hundred short paragraphs (693 paragraphs plus cca 70 more pages of subparagraph that are not numbered, which construct the second part of the book). Schematically said, part on following the regulations consists primary of §§ 189-242, part on private language and discourse about sensations of §§ 243-421. Considering the formal structure of Philosophical investigations, I will refer to this book only with abbreviation PI and listed numbers of respective paragraph. For quotations I used G. E. M. Anscombe´s translation from 1953 reprinted in 1972.

regulation does not necessarily have to correspond with the fact that I actually act according to regulation. Regulation is an issue of practice, not assumption.

> To obey a rule, to make a report, to give an order, to play a game of chess, are **customs** (uses, institutions). To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a technique. (PI: §199)

Regulation is therefore a pure form of certain practice; however practice is primary to regulation. Even so called "commentary" to the regulation is according to Wittgenstein, only a substitution of one regulation form by some other (PI: §201).

> And hence also ´obeying a rule´is a practice. And to **think** one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule ´privately´: otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it. (PI: §202)

To act by regulation is possible only publicly or "as if publicly." The subjective aspect of acting by regulation relies on the fact that regulation as a pure form can and must be executed and substituted in practice in various ways.[12] For private language, that serves to express opinion on private phenomena that are available only to the narrator, Wittgenstein concludes that it is not possible to consider it as an action by regulation. In §258 he introduces an example of situation where someone wants to keep a diary about recurrence of emotion, and concludes that the only criteria of correctness that my emotion had arrived is my feeling of correctness. Also, same thing would occur if we would not insist on the identity of emotion, but only on similarity. The only reason to make a note in a diary would be that it appeals to me as a good idea to make a note. To talk about correctness (confirmation that I'm acting according to a regulation) in a common sense is unacceptable, because "*(…) justification consist in appealing to something independent.*" (PI: §265) Independent instance in a subject cannot be, according to Wittgenstein, represented by another concept, because it would mean the same as accepting a concept of an outcome of a certain experiment is an outcome of such experiment, or that a concept of a railway guide is verification that I correctly remembered train departures.

And there lie all the difficulties of the introspective method. There is no objective warranty that my descriptions, classification of the stream of experiences was correct, i.e. that they would be actions according to regulations. The only criteria and warranty of accuracy is personal feeling of correctness. There is missing an objective super-personal instance as a corrective that determines if the action meets the regulation. An anomalous situation arises here due to the fact that any action (any identification, description of emotion, etc.) can be initiated in accord with regulation and „*if everything can be made out to accord with the rule, then it can also be made out to conflict with it*" (PI: §201) Thus discussion on regulation is invalid.

Speculations about the potential of the subject to record his or her own subjective sensations objectively can be illustrated as a situation when we measure our temperature on a thermometer when we feel we have a fever. The thermometer is a corrective of the basically random feeling of correctness about having or not having a fever. Whether we understood what we see on a thermometer correctly according to the regulation is in line with Wittgenstien's theory indeterminable. The

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[12] If we would like to prevent it, it would have to be supplemented by another regulation that would determine interpretation and this regulation would have to be supplemented by another and so on ad infinitum.

thermometer represents for us in the given moment the other in a dialogic situation of a language game and it is not possible to apply the term of correctness on a language game as a whole. The problem of self-destruction of Wittgenstein's argument when applying it to societal unit is not significant for us and therefore we will not pay further attention to it.[13]

If we approach Wittgenstein's *Philosophical investigations* from the standpoint of the specific theory of language and society, than it is important to realize assumptions on which it is built. Ontological connection of regulation with its application and thesis on possibility to act according to regulation only in a dialogic situation, i.e. in social or quasi-social context, is based on an assumption of principal consonance in social situation. Existence of an intersubjective relation is a primitive fact, which cannot be trespassed. Acted language game is given matter, stream of life, 'proto-phenomenon' which cannot be violated (PI: §§654-656).

P. Koťátko raised an eligible objection asking why someone else can not request to accept transparency and accuracy of own impressions and unity of internal life of individual, as a primitive fact. (Koťátko 1992: 450). Such a basis for their philosophy was accepted by Descartes, or Husserl.

This position leads, at least in a sphere of subjective phenomena, to a visual theory of language, which was denied by Wittgenstein in his later works as unsustainable. According to this conception, the sentences represent visualization (of possible or real) of facts and their veracity is given through correspondence with the real status of the world. This theory is remodeled by Wittgenstein in his early work – *Tractate* (Wittgenstein 1961), however, later he abandons it completely. In *Philosophical Investigations he* offers a different one, one of the pragmatic conception of language.[14] Visual theory relates a meaning of a sentence to objects, pragmatic theory for the use of certain situations.

One of the important theoretical reasons for Wittgenstein's shift lies in the impossibility of the analysis of language, to reach elementary sentences that would correspond with elementary facts. While also maintaining the thesis that all sentences of our language have a meaning and „are in perfect logical order" (Wittgenstein 1961: 113, sentence no. 5.5563); this thesis Wittgenstein, as oppose to Vienna neo-positivists, supported from the very beginning.

The premise of elementary sentences and elementary facts allow thinking of real the potential of accurate language and also about clear decidability whether the statements are true or false. The premise of basic world elements is essential because they guarantee that the world has a solid structure. The collapse of visual theory in Wittgenstein's thought led to a failure in the approval of the solid structure of the world and to social-constructivist solution of the relation between the language and the world which he applies as an indication of subjective experiences. In §293 he gives the following example.

> Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a „beetle". No one can look into anyone else´s box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at **his** beetle. – Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing. – But suppose the word „beetle" had a use in these people´s language? – If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-game at

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[13] This aspect was partially analyzed by P. Koťátko (Koťatko 1992) and myself (Janák 2004).

[14] Continuity and differences of Tractate and Philosophical investigations were analyzed by J. Pechar (Pechar 1993).

all; not even as a **something**: for the box might even be empty. (...) That is to say: if we construe the grammar of the expression of sensation on the model of ´object and designation´ the object drops out of consideration as irrelevant. (PI: §293)

Using this and other examples, Wittgenstein tries to disqualify a possibility to talk about private emotions with intention of the visual theory of language. Wittgenstein's arguments are aimed against the concept of self-consciousness of Cartesian type, a sphere of total transparence and pellucidity, or absolute evidence. In a contrast, pure self-assurance appears to be, based on his perception, a sphere of fatal uncertainty and arbitrariness. An important question arises for the presented text, what are the conditions to maintain introspective method as an instrument of description and understanding of social reality? What are the conditions under which we can question or own self to be considered as an action based on regulations? Or is it necessary to fully accept and bring to an effect Wittgenstein's argument and therefore reject the introspective approach as a method that is totally inconclusive and speculative?

Theoretical implications

Even if we accept P. Koťatko's objections and acknowledge that it is possible to create a private dictionary, the applicability for understanding, or description of social relations remains problematic. It would require changing Bláha's (and Wittgenstein's) concept of objectivity. Also, based on Schutz's and Patočka's conclusions, in order to construct sociality on the platform of subjectivity, it is necessary to implement a new postulate of intersubjectivity. The term "pure subject" has to be cleared of predicate pure.

Therefore, private language itself needs to be rejected in social research. Does it also mean disqualification of the introspective method? I assume not. More likely, it changes the angle of the questions. The question now is not based on whether the introspection method is approved or not, but what should introspection look like, if not as a private language? The introspective method, in the field of understanding and description of social reality, must include a postulate of intersubjectivity. However, that does not mean that it is necessary to disqualify the subjectivistic introspective method in sociology as inapplicable. It is not possible to construct it in a sphere of pure subject investigating intentional stream of consciousness from 'out of profane' position.

A subject of investigation must somehow always include the moment of intersubjectivity. That means that either the phenomenological reduction in Husserl's radicalism which leads to out of profane attitude (and private language in Wittgenstein's sense) can not be accepted and investigated subject must participate on intersubjective social relations, even after reductive phenomenological steps; or we must change concept examining subjectivities, i.e. we must not see the subject as a unity, but as a fatally divaricated sphere leading to open dialogue (communicating) within itself. Can Bláha's approach meet such criteria?

Potentials and boundaries of Bláha's introspection

The main goal of this study does not lie in determining the conditions and developing the concept of the introspective method based on presented theoretical conclusions, but in assessing within these relations Bláha's introspective approach. Even though Bláha did not pay as much attention to the theoretical grounding of a possible introspective method as the other authors did, it is possible at least to reconstruct his view based on the mentioned conclusions and determine sustainability of his social introspection from a context of his work.

Some development can be seen in Bláha's first approach, such as the participation on intersubjective relations, as well as during the introspective observation of existence. The connection with society does not disappear even if taking an introspective step towards detachment from existence. Let's go back to the one of the former Bláha's propositions on the methodic intersection into lived reality based on the introspective approach: *"With own life in the existence, is own scientific countenance above it."* (Bláha 1921a: 180) and *"… the social world is of a strange nature. (…) … at social existence, the practice is equally important to the theory"* (Bláha 1921b: 743). I think that Bláha's position can be well characterized when the order of the sentences in the first citation is inverted: With own scientific countenance above it, is own life in the existence.

If we want to follow the analogy with phenomenological tradition, we can philosophically qualify Bláha's solution as similar to Heidegger's, in which he approaches the analysis of human understanding in its existential intra-profane situation of carrying for one's own being. Accordingly, Bláha recognizes social life as a sphere in which the cognizant always participates both by rational understanding, i.e. theoretically, and by evaluation, will and action i.e. practically. That is the reason why Bláha makes the conclusion obligation of sociological knowledge towards social practice. Also, that is why the introspective analysis of one's own self always means analysis of me-as-wanting-and-acting in a certain social situation. It is not an analysis of the pure contents of conscience, pure phenomena.[15]

How should we understand *"… ascend over the existence, survey it from the distance as a legitimate order, see its universal purpose. … was able to come to scientific, objective understanding"* (Bláha 1921a: 180)?

In order to hold Bláha's position sustainable, an understanding of ascendency over the existence and surveying the purpose cannot be perceived as taking an out-of-profane (transcendental) position. In the long run, this interpretation is held back by the second sentence of the citation which imports from this ascendancy, the scientific, objective understanding which, according to Bláha, is possible only based on an intersubjective relation (see part on Objectivity of introspective understanding). Therefore Bláha's isolation from existence is not radical in Husserl's point of view. How is it then? How does it function? It is more of an experiment of the reflexive grasp of one's own acting, wanting and feeling (eventually also knowing) in a most objective way, i.e. depersonalization. Sufficiency of such perception is either a matter of exceptional figures, such as Masaryk, or it can be acquired by schooling and practice in scientific thinking (Bláha 1921a: 181) which works with most objective acquired terminology. It is a perception from an objective position, i.e. a super-individual observer.

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[15] It is interesting to remark that contemporary representative of phenomenological sociology L. Embree is trying on a similar grounded basis of phenomenological analysis of willing and evaluating, to unveil the structure of natural world as a cultural world in the concept of "basic culture". He tries to describe, by using phenomenological analysis, such phenomena as social class etc., that the traditional phenomenology, according to its critics, cannot embrace. (Ebree 2003)

Indeed, it is not a perception from the position of out-of-the world "god's eye", or "out-of-nowhere perception". It is a perception of an observer who stands with both feet on the ground ("is own life in existence"), but pursues objectivity. By permanent relation with the world shared with others, in addition to the objective scientific method (in Bláha's sense) he/she also provides practical context of social-scientific understanding.

Same as Dilthey's endeavor to analyze human cognitional potencies from analysis of free impulse and aversion (compare Dilthey 1980), Bláha places "maintaining of life and escalating vitalities" beyond the principle of the individual and social life (compare for. ex. Bláha 1921b: 659-665). Value and evaluation is according to him, a result of experiencing reality (Bláha 1921b: 660) and also a finalization of the process of the subjective understanding of social reality (Bláha 1921a: 180). Evaluation is always connected with understanding. Evaluation and will is in Bláha's work existentially connected with practical action, it is its fore-step and conclusion. Pure understanding is an abstract. The observer is an actor at the same time. To some degree, in which evaluation is an epistemological attribute of understanding sociality, it is also an intersubjective relation and practice standing in behind, part of the cognition act. Thanks to an indivisible evaluative part of understanding, the link to the intersubjective world is continually sustained.[16]

Inquiring the possibility of grounding such a super-personal (perhaps even collective) observer in the subject of a researcher, we are approaching the field of a concept of subjectivity, which was stated as a second possibility to maintain an intersubjective relation with introspective approach. Bláha does not elaborate a possibility of the dialogic understanding of subjectivity even though he acknowledges the plurality of constituents of individual spirituality. This, according to Bláha, aside from the entirely individual part, contains also a societal part with certain groups in which it participates. Finally, a part that it has in common with all human individuals is in being a human being (Bláha 1968: 38). Otherwise his analysis of subjectivity focuses a determination of the environment effect on forming a child's morally free qualities, feelings, fantasies, etc., although more from the perspective of practical upbringing. In *The Sociology of Childhood* Bláha describes family as an environment where child *"matures to myself- feeling, to distinction of I-feeling from un-I-feeling, which causes the primary chaos of the most primitive organization"* (Bláha 1927: 124). However, it is more an enunciation rather than a result of analyzing the process in weary detail, known by G.H. Mead.[17]

As shown through Bláha's argumentation on the issue of sociological subjectivism and objectivism (see part Genesis of Bláha's noetic perspective, especially arguments 5. and 6. counter the objectivism), Bláha is still conflicted over whether the communication precedes individual understanding or in contrary

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[16] Similar principle to "escalating vitality" is a principle of "intra-profane desires" proposed by contemporary French phenomenologist R. Barbaras. "Desire" is a basic instinctive epistemological motion and is (as oppose to need) basically unsatisfiable and beforehand undeterminable, same as "escalating vitality". "Desire and questioning, regardless of intermission between spatial and spiritual, represent one and identical motion." (Barbaras 2005: 181). Therefore, Barbaras concludes his reflection on a similar basis to Bláha's, that there is no alternative between philosophy (theory, questioning) and life (practice).

[17] Mead is one of the first to develop dialogic concept of subjectivity denominated as Self. Self is dialogic unity consisting of parts I (unaware, instinct, biological I) and Me (social, anticipated attitudes of others, adopted situation contexts). *"I, is a response of the organism towards the attitudes of others, Me, is organized collection of attitudes of others, that the individual anticipates."* (Mead 1967: 175). Self-confidence appears only with Self. I is impermissible to direct reflection, it is accessible only as a historical figure after it answered to Me.

understanding precedes communication. However, if the introspective method should resist Wittgenstein's constructivist objections and implications of Shutz's conclusions and it should also meet Bláha's criterion of objectivity. Then it cannot be concerned with only that part of the human psyche that Bláha determines as purely individual.

If we would like to answer an implicit question stated in the title of the text and decide whether to deny Bláha's social introspection under the pressure of Wittgenstein's (and Schutz) argumentation as inconclusive or conversely retain and use it in social research, the answer would be rather ambiguous.

Bláha's introspection as a system meets the demands expected by the postulate of intersubjectivity. Therefore we can retain it, metaphorically, in a sociological "stock of knowledge at hand".

If we ask whether to accept it and use it with everything included, than the answer would not be so definite. In the first place, there is a technical problem of application. No specific instruction aside from "schooling and practice in scientific thinking and method", or "magnitude of personal life" is recommended by Bláha. It means that Bláha's reminder towards supplementing Durkheim's approach by dimension of internal experience of social phenomena is irrelevant. It is solely because his avoidance of *Scylle* of objectivism does not end at *Charybdy* of relativism. Thus it is important to understand it only as an ingenious reminder of the limits in Durkheim's naturalistic objectivism.

The second substantial problem lies in full acceptance of Bláha's conclusion of practical accomplishments and application (not only introspective) of sociological knowledge. In this instant though, more questions than answers arise and their solving is beyond the frame of this text devoted above all to Bláha's theory of social introspection.

Conclusion and discussion

I have tried to present the method of social introspection of Brno sociologist I. A. Bláha and reconstruct the theoretical foundations that this method relies upon. Also, I have summarized theoretical arguments of its applicability from the perspective of contemporary sociology (or the one that deals with analysis of knowledge and culture in a narrower point of view) characterized in general by the social constructivist approach that emphasizes a linguistic form of human behavior.

The main requirement for applicability of the introspective method is its intersubjective grounding. This evolved from the analysis of Wittgenstein's arguments and discussion of the phenomenological method created by Schutz and Patočka in the realm of knowledge of social relation. Bláha's work provides us with a lot of footage for such grounding of the introspective method and thus makes it theoretically vital even for today's social research. On the other hand, Bláha's inconsistent methodic elaboration of this method turns out to be a limiting factor for its practical application.

On particular objective of Bláha's theory, would be good for further elaboration. This is the issue of obligation of theoretical conclusion for practice, which is a characteristic of Bláha's conclusion. If intersubjective communication is needed for verification of theoretical knowledge (insisting on given objective proof, on communicable meaningful argument), than it is necessary to ask for a method in order to deduce obligation for moral societal practice. Does this question provide us with "verification principle"? If yes, than must it comply with a criterion of intersubjectivity?

All these questions are certainly important and interesting for people and scientists to consider, however finding answers to them goes beyond the theme of this text. This text should provide some guidance for finding the answers to the posed questions.

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Reconceptualizing Dreamwork (With Apologies To Lewis Carroll's *Alice*) As A Facet Of Motherwork

Abstract

While acknowledging some of the myriad ways in which the term "dreamwork" has been used by scholars over the past century, this article directs especial attention to dreamwork as both a facet of motherwork and form of anticipatory socialization. This particular conception views dreamwork as an interpersonal accomplishment and emphasizes its collaborative character. In arguing for its utility, we note how this conception of dreamwork complements insights found in other works and suggest how these ideas might be related, and future research on parental involvement in the lives of children strengthened, by gathering them together under the concept of dreamwork.

Keywords
Dreamwork; Parenting; Motherwork, Mothering, Socialization

Reconceptualizing dreamwork (with apologies to Lewis Carroll's Alice) as a facet of motherwork

In Lewis Carroll's classic children's tale, *Through the Looking Glass* (1871/2001: 113), Humpty Dumpty, that most imperious anthropomorphized egg, haughtily harrumphs to Alice that "When I use a word, it means just what I choose it to mean - neither more nor less." When Alice protests, observing that "The question is whether you *can* make words mean so many different things," Humpty retorts dismissively: "The question is which is to be master - that's all." This fantastical conversation seems to anticipate the challenge that awaits any earnest writer who would attempt to define "dreamwork," given that scholars in a wide array of disciplines have used this word in very different ways.

While Blass (2002: 103) has categorically insisted that "dream work is, and can be nothing but, the various rules that Freud devised and used as he applied his technique of dream interpretation," it appears likely that Freud, himself, might have been startled by what his tropology of dreamwork has inspired and by how it has been adopted, adapted and deployed by scholars in a wide variety of fields including

aesthetics, cultural studies, hermeneutics, linguistics, and poetics and rhetoric (Civitarese 2006; Ferro 2006; Gane 2006; Hoeveler 2006; Mahon 2007). Moreover, while many in the caring professions do continue to pay explicit homage to Freud in their writings on dreamwork, at least some would seem more obviously inspired by the theories of Carl Jung or Alfred Adler or Fritz Perls or Aaron Beck (Amendt-Lyons 2004; Bird 2005; Davis and Hill 2005; Jones 2007; Litowitz 2007). In other disciplines, even greater eclecticism may be evinced in charting a genealogy of dreamwork, with new lines of descent proposed that would, for example, give greater prominence to the historical Weber rather than the ahistorical Freud (Gerona 2004) or direct pointed attention to Plato's *Republic* and his characterization therein of science's work as dreamwork (Franchi 2005: 99). However, given the voluminous literature that exists on night dreams, "social dreams" and "daydreams," as well as the widespread use of the dream-as-metaphor, it is, perhaps, predictable enough that definitions of dreamwork will only occasionally mesh.

Dreamwork has been described as a research method and assessment tool in work with specific clinical populations (Levin and Nielsen 2007), studied as a grassroots social movement (Edgar 1995) and identified as a facet of "ethnicity work" (Adams 2005). It has been exalted as a spiritual practice that allows the dreamer to harken to "the voice of the soul" (Savary 1990: 12), heralded as a secular consciousness-raising method which contains the potential to challenge structural oppressions (Burch and Moss 2003) and touted as a management technique that can be deployed prosaically to cultivate "corporate creativity" (Maxwell 2002). It has been narrowly used to describe an inchoate image that guided the refashioning of a doctoral program (Fetterly 1999: 710) and broadly presented as if synonymous with the entire process of artistic creation (Sonenberg 2003). Dreamwork is said to demand skills that are only possessed by a specialized elite after a long and arduous training (Pesant and Zadra 2004) and proclaimed by others, who champion its democratization, to involve techniques that are easily mastered by laypersons; the subtitle of one popular book promises that dreamwork can be mastered in "One Minute or Less!" (Chetwynd 1980) while another identifies its target audience as "complete idiots" (Pliskin, Romaine and Just 2004).

Rather than decry this lack of unison as an "obvious" failing or presume to rank the disparate ways in which "dreamwork" has been defined, the aim of this article will be far more modest. It simply attempts, with anticipatory apologies to Alices everywhere, to argue for the utility of one particular construction of dreamwork - specifically, that which defines it as an interpersonal accomplishment, developed, negotiated, sustained, or discarded in interactions among parents, their children and interested others; (2) note how this conception of dreamwork complements insights found in other works that do not use the concept explicitly; and (3) suggest how these ideas might be related and further research strengthened, by gathering them together under the concept of dreamwork.

Dreamwork as interpersonal accomplishment

In an earlier article that focused on mothers whose children, twelve years and under, studied ballet, we extended Levinson et al.'s (1978) construct of the "dream" as a career anchor to suggest how, through "dreamwork," dreams may be constructed by mothers on behalf of their children. In chronicling the socialization of "stage mothers," the term *dreamwork* was employed in an attempt to distinguish between the idle daydreams of one's child in a future occupational role and dreams

which inspire and embody parental agency and action. Parental dreams, it was argued, can have a narrative quality in spite of their fuzziness and sometimes fantastical nature. Dreamwork, as used therein, referred to forms of purposive behaviour that allow dreams to be worked out in an exploratory way as a series of short- or long-term projects. The concept frames a variety of forms of parental behavior undertaken on behalf of children and suggests how parents come to invest potentially great amounts of time, money, energy, and themselves in the activities of their children. Moreover, while both mothers and fathers may engage in dreamwork on behalf of their children, it was suggested that mothers may be particularly encouraged to do so by the dramaturgy of motherwork.

In stark contrast to media depictions of "stage mothers" (Giroux 1998; Tennant 2005), "hockey fathers" (Bergin and Habusta 2004; Firmbach 2000; Haney 2002) or other putative examples of "extreme parenting," the term "dreamwork" is employed to emphasize the social, collaborative character of activities that are undertaken on behalf of children. Rather than view child-centred dreamwork as the unique creation of a single author, it is envisaged as a multi-authored work that is built up crescively and elaborated upon by interested parties. Thus, while a journalist writing on the "casting crib" has described herself as "one of the bottom feeders of Hollywood lore: a stage mother" whose twin boys "had work permits before they were 3 months old" and numbered among the roughly "4,500 infants and toddlers in the Los Angeles area between the ages of 15 days and 6 years [who] had entertainment work permits, according to state labor statistics" (Levander 2004), it would seem premature to suppose that this situation is best reduced to a series of expostulations that denounce "[t]he narcissistic, overly demanding, and destructive antics of stage mothers" and the "negative consequences of [a] loss of perspective in adults" (Weinstein 1995:21). Even though the term "stage mother" may imply a linear form of self-aggrandizement, the etiology of the role may follow a more serpentine path.

To the extent that women, but not men, are encouraged to conflate issues of identity and intimacy, the role of the "stage mother" implies that some women fashion a "career" out of the mothering role and construct dreams in relation to a child as part of the "extended self" (Belk 1988; James 1890). However, a dream need not operate solely or primarily at the intrapsychic level as an internally directed conversation within the self; rather, it may exist as an intersubjective state that is constructed and assessed in the company of others. This vantage point, it may be noted, complements Fine and Leighton's (1993) suggestion that even nocturnal dreams can be profitably studied as: "1) external to the individual (that is, socially produced and mediated by the self); 2) reflective of cultural/societal content; 3) shared socially with others; and, 4) connected to social organization" (Vann and Alperstein 2000: 112). Moreover, while parental dreams, like nocturnal dreams, may remain private and solitary, unrealized or quickly forgotten, it is also possible that they may be imbued or freighted with meaning and accorded profound significance.

Admittedly, it is difficult to disentangle the origins of dreams that are shared by very young children and their mothers. For example, our earlier research with mothers whose children studied ballet noted that only a minority of women expressed, from the very onset of their child's dance training, a well-articulated dream of their child as a future professional dancer and that those who did almost invariably attributed the genesis of this dream to the child rather than to themselves. For example, a mother could maintain that her child "has always wanted to be a ballerina. She's been begging me for lessons ever since she learned how to talk" or report that, "Since the age of three, my daughter has had one dream and that dream is to be on Broadway." A cynic might well suspect that such assertions contain at

least some level of apocrypha; that is, while many three-year-olds might know of Sesame Street, Broadway would seem a more uncommon destination in the childhood atlas. It is also possible that some mothers perceived that certain accounts are conventionally approved of more than others and retrospectively appropriated the past and changed it. Nevertheless, while the genesis of a dream may initially reside with a parent and/or in the parent's response to cues from a child, its articulation invites the participation of others. Over time, dreams may become interpersonal projects that are developed, negotiated, sustained or discarded in interaction with a variety of "brokering agents" including, but not limited to, status coaches such as instructors who have a vested interest in their own version of the dream.

While initial forays into dreamwork may be incorporeal and without significant consequence, the tessellation of events can create a social organization which then folds back and coaxes further investments to be made. For example, our research noted that enrolling a child of nursery and kindergarten school age in dance lessons generally occurred as part of a tentative parental search for extracurricular activities that might amuse, occupy, or stimulate a child. However, in pointing to the ways in which the interior decor of dance studios might promote parental awareness of dance lessons as a possible pathway to a professional and "glamourous" career, or how the routine staging of end-of-the-year dance recitals could serve as a powerful visualization of the "career ladder" that children could climb with continued training, it was suggested that involvement with dance studios, at even the most general level, could have an impact upon the perceived meaning, implications and functions of dance lessons.

For example, in outlining how studio personnel acted as brokering agents for dreamwork and offered up a variety of inducements for continued or heightened involvement, it was argued that "altercasting" (Weinstein and Deutschberger 1963) children as "students" rather than as "customers" invited children and their mothers to assume certain obligations towards staff members and respond to them as "experts," and affirmed their authoritative role to prescribe the content of dreamwork. This lexicon encourages mothers to disattend to the fact that a "school of ballet" is, simultaneously, a business enterprise, and to view the pronouncements and recommendations of studio staff as disinterested assessments of a child's potential as a future dancer rather than as self-interested "sales pitches" that seek to bolster the studio's profitability. While elite dance schools which enjoy the luxury of having far more applicants to their programs than available spaces can afford to be exacting in their evaluations of a child's suitability for dance training, the same is rarely true of non-elite studios. To the extent that non-elite studios must compete with other non-elite studios in the vicinity for students, nurturing the dream may occur as a routine form of sales behaviour.

In addition, teachers and other status coaches may furnish mothers with a variety of exculpatory statements that minimize the significance of events that potentially challenge the viability of the dream. For example, when children fail examinations that are judged by examiners external to the studio, teachers may encourage parents to view the external examiner, and not the dream or the student, as problematic, with claims made that the examiner is "well known" to be "the hardest examiner of all the examiners" or examiners depicted as troll-like individuals who jealously guard their professional turf, begrudging passage to even "the most talented" of children. Mothers of overweight children studying ballet may also be told that professional companies are "moving away from anorexic girls with stick legs" and towards "healthy looking girls," with praise directed upon a child's "beautiful feet" and extreme musicality. However, akin to the workings of a cybernetic system with

faulty feedback loops, a parent may be urged into further dreamwork on the assumption that the information they receive is professionally prognostic.

In emphasizing that the setting in which dreams are made serviceable can provide dreamwork with a vitality and momentum which might otherwise be lost, our research explored how the meaning of dance lessons could be reshaped from an activity of fleeting importance to a project that was thought to warrant attention and significance. Moreover, recognizing that dreamwork follows different trajectories that cannot always be predicted, it was proposed that analyzes of parental dreamwork be organized around four constituent social processes: exploring dreams, articulating dreams, living dreams and - anticipating that, as children age, guardianship of dreams will increasingly shift from parents to children themselves - letting go.

In addition, while the term "stage mother" is commonly used as a pejorative, which identifies a "type" of mother as "deviant" or atypical, it was argued that this role may be more accurately viewed as a caricature of what society has, by convention, deemed admirable behavior for mothers. As Collett (2005: 329) observed in her study of the role of children's appearances in the maintenance of identities and management of impressions for their mothers, "the identity of mother is distinctive. Being someone's mother is not enough. A mother's success is measured by her child's life and achievement. As the tangible results of her endeavors, a woman's children *are on stage*. . . ." (emphasis added). Insofar as the ultimate goal of "motherwork" demands the production of a "marketable product . . . an adjusted and achieving child" (Epstein 1988: 197), the most fulsome execution of its dramaturgy may *require* that mothers engage in dreamwork on behalf of their children. As such, dreamwork may be profitably conceptualized as another strand in women's traditionally invisible and unpaid work within the family.

"My son the doctor" and the extended self

Several decades ago, Slater (1969) memorably entitled her examination of upward social mobility among American Jews as "My son the doctor." Although Dundes (1971: 194) would later direct attention to this phrase as a putative exemplar of an "ethnic slur" that is constructed on multiple-trait folk stereotypes, including that of the overly involved "Jewish mother," others would construe its significance quite differently. Thus, for Rabbi Joseph Telushkin (1992: 34), the common appearance of this phrase within Jewish humor is inoffensive and believed to attest to "the hopes and fears that haunt Jewish parents," including, most especially, the "desire for *nakhas* from children. Nakhas, meaning pleasure or contentment, is both a Hebrew and Yiddish word. . . .[that] [o]ver time . . . has come to connote the particular pride parents derived from their children's accomplishments."

The phrase "my son the doctor," and Telushkin's commentary upon it, would seem relevant to a discussion of dreamwork for at least two reasons. First, although the word "nakhas" is distinctively Hebrew/Yiddish, there is no reason to suppose that the admixture of parental attachment, identification and ambitiousness it synthesizes and encapsulates - as well as the activities, undertaken on behalf of children, that such potentially intense feelings may inspire - are exclusive to parents who speak either of those languages. One might consider, for example, the broader implications of Smith's (1974: 195) observation that the Japanese language distinguishes between "many kinds of mothers" including, among others, "*kyooiku* MAMA" or "education mothers" who "pay attention to their children's education" and "*suteeji* MAMA" or "stage mothers." Similarly, it would seem presumptuous to suppose that

the phrase "my son the doctor" only enjoys currency among "overly involved" Jewish mothers. Indeed, Silverman's observation that "we are all Jewish mothers now" (cited in Slate, 2007) would certainly seem apt in the United States where (1) in 1997, choral conductor Don Campbell's *The Mozart Effect*, which proposed that exposing infants to classical music could enhance children's thinking and performance, became an "instant best seller" and fueled a "stampede of Mozart-related children's products" (Jensen 2002); (2) by 2002, *Baby Einstein* (slogan: "Great Minds Start Little") had become a "$1-billion-a-year toy category" (della Cava 2002) and "32 percent of our nation's infants owned at least one Baby Einstein video"; (3) between 2003 and 2004, overall sales of educational toys increased by 19 percent; and, (4) in 2004 alone, developmental videos and DVDSs reaped profits of $100 million (Quart 2006: 24). As della Cava remarks, "Trek to the toy store these days and, with a blizzard of names such as Baby Genius, IQ Baby and other cerebrum-inspired monikers, you'll think you've stumbled into a mini-Mensa convention."

Quart's (2006) examination of what she dubbed "the Baby Genius Edutainment Complex" identified a vast range of "child enrichment" products and services in the United States including those that provide for the tutoring of prenates (e.g., BabyPlus Womb Song) and package giftedness as either digestible through baby formulas (e.g., Similac Advance, Nestle Good Start, Bright Beginnings) or transmittable through instructional DVDs (e.g., the *Brainy Baby Left and Right Brain; Athletic Baby Golf; Athletic Baby All-Star*). Affluent American parents may also elect to enrol their prodigy-in-training in programs such as the Baby-Genius Art & Languages School in west Los Angeles (aka "UCLA for babies") (Quart 2006: 40) (cost in 2003: up to $12,000 annually [Darmiento 2003]) or, on the opposite coast, the Diller-Quaile program in New York where, for $1980 for a 30-week term, 4 to 8 month-old "Music Babies" and an accompanying adult may partake of 45 minutes weekly in "enriched musical experiences in a school setting" (Diller-Quaile 2009) and, in doing so, simultaneously demonstrate both "conspicuous consumption" (Veblen 1899) and "conspicuous leisure" (Grenfell and Rinehart 2003: 91). To like effect, the website for Broadway Babies & Applause Theatrical Workshops, also in New York, outlines how a child, beginning as young as four months of age, may progress sequentially from a 45-minute "mommy & me" "Broadway Babies" class (cost for the 14-week winter 2009 term: U.S. $695) through a "separation class" designed for "Broadway Little Stars" (ages 3-4) ($695) into a "drop-off" classes for "Broadway Stars" (ages 4-5) ($715) and, upon "graduation" from one-hour classes for "Broadway Superstars" ($1095) when s/he is in kindergarten, be ready to tackle postgraduate work in a 2-hour class for "Broadway All Stars" ($1360) (Applause 2009). However, all of these marketed products and services, regardless of their cost and specific focus, would seem: predicated on an assumption that a desire for "nakhas" is widespread; invite parents to envisage even a very young child in a future occupational role; and may serve to encourage and sustain parental dreamwork.

Second, the phrase "My son the doctor", as well as the concept of nakhas, would seem to invite consideration of the subtle differences that inhere between parental conceptions of children as "property" and as "possessions" that form part of the "extended self" (Belk 1988) and become the focus of dreamwork. Although various scholars have commented upon parenthood as an extension of ownership and property rights and/or examined how this ideology is displayed within the language and metaphors that are employed, by parents and others, when talking about parents and their children (Delphy and Leonard 1992; Smith 1983), far less attention has been focused on parental understandings of children as an extension of the self. Thus, while various academics have investigated the use of intimates as an

indirect form of "impression management" (Goffman 1959), their analyses have most typically directed attention to the strategic use of others as "status symbols" and to how, by association, one may attempt to claim self-flattering attributes (Cialdini, Finch and Nicholas, 1990; Gillespie 1980; Salamon 1984). Yet, a distinction can assuredly be drawn between parental deployment of children for the cynical purposes of impression management (e.g., adorning children in designer togs as a way of extending personal space and indirectly advertising social class and *savoir-faire*) and conceptualizing of one's child as a defining attribute of the self.

Cohen (1989: 126) observes that Belk's (1988) definition of the "extended self" encompasses not only those material possessions and kinds of behaviors that contribute to personal identity but, as well, "those in which we have invested 'psychic energy,' those useful in achieving personal goals and symbolic self-expression, those having affect attached to them, and those that occupy a central place in our thoughts or memories." Although the "extended self" has been criticized as a "transcendent concept . . . which given no apparent boundaries is at once metaphor and scientific construct" (Cohen 1989: 125), Belk's much-cited article continues to invigorate research on not simply the somewhat predictable topics of consumption norms and shopping behavior (Fennis and Pruyn 2007), but, as well, on the identification and attachment that individuals forge with sports teams (Bristow and Sebastian 2001), advertising memorabilia (Motley, Henderson and Menzel 2003); pets (El-Alayli et al. 2006) and even pet rocks (Kiesler and Kiesler 2004). His concept of the extended self may also have even broader utility inasmuch as it seems to capture some of the more elusive aspects of the parent-child relationship that are not easily addressed within the children-as-property literature.

Admittedly, some might seize upon the fact that Belk's concept of the "extended self" was originally coined in an attempt to explain consumer behavior, and proceed, in Eureka fashion, to argue that the terms "property" or "possessions" are interchangeable in their semantics. Nevertheless, there would seem to be a meaningful divide between viewing children as property versus as possessions that form part of the extended self. Moreover, when coupled with the concept of "dreamwork," Belk's concept may assist in conceptualizing parental, and especially maternal, involvement in the lives of children in ways that are left largely unexplored within the allied literature on both the "hurried child" (Elkind 1981, 1984, 1987; Lynott and Logue 1993) and "hot house children" (Quart 2006).

For example, Grenfell and Rinehart's (2003) ethnography of American youth figure-skating subculture and aspiring national-class female skaters emphasized that "parental involvement and support is necessary for viable participation of children in figure skating," positioned parents as "co-actors in this figure skating subculture," directed attention to the interaction between the child skater and multiple adult figures (coaches, trainers, choreographers) and focused particular attention on the potential for children's rights abuses when "[t]he parent/child/coach coalition becomes so focused on the shared idea that the child *has the talent* and has *made the commitment* that this seems to justify any amount of work and sacrifice to attain a competitive-related goal" (emphasis in original). In contrast to the construct of dreamwork, however, they posit a continuum of parental involvement within youth figure skating that "bridges the gap between the stereotypical 'stage mom' (the entertainment/beauty content genre) and the competitive 'sport mom' (the competitive youth sport genre)" (Grenfell and Rinehart's 2003: 87) and suggest that "[t]his parental involvement may also range within a continuum, which, on the positive end, might be 'supportive parenting' and on the negative end, what we term 'conspicuous parenting'." According to these authors, "conspicuous parenting" occurs

when "the parent pushes the child as in the role of the stage mom but also pushes his/her own image as the idealized, self-sacrificing parent - i.e., the 'conspicuous display' of ideal parenting." However, they insist emphatically that "[c]onspicuous parenting is decidedly *not* altruistic - in fact, the intent of the parent, whether conscious or unconscious, is to display one's own prowess" (ibidem: 87, emphasis in original). Thus, they cast a suspicious eye on "Soccer Moms" "who pride themselves not only in the participation and achievements of their child but in the highly visible way in which they can display their role as involved, concerned parents. Bringing team snacks, hosting team pizza parties, setting out chairs for spectators, coaching the team, volunteering to referee" - and pose as rhetorical questions, "at what point do these activities go beyond the function of supporting the youth sport organization and become self-aggrandizing behaviors? At what point do the parents *become* the competition?" (ibidem: 91, emphasis in original).

Although Grenfell and Rinehart acknowledge the significant financial costs that the parents of these young athletes confront (i.e., "A base estimate of annual costs for one skater ranges between U.S. $30,000 and 40,000" (ibidem: 88)), and the enormous investments of time that parents themselves may be required to spend, "attending five skating sessions Monday through Fridays in the summer, or taking children to ballet and strength-training lessons, or merely shopping for the proper sequins for a $500-600 outfit" (ibidem: 87), they suggest that these behaviors are best understood as "utilitarian" (ibidem: 90). They propose that "in the post-modern age,. . . children have become to parents covert opportunities to demonstrate prowess, status, symbolic capital, and power," "subtly. . . returned to a type of commodity, where their use is indicative of status, standing, and mostly, power for adult coaches, teachers, and parent," and now simply provide their parents with the opportunity to demonstrate their power in a way that is qualitatively akin to "the display of the 'trophy wife' for aging men of power" (ibidem: 90).

It is Grenfell and Rinehart's contention that achieving children serve as "a means for displaying parenting skills" - specifically, as "markers of status for parents" - and they conclude that this signifies that children are viewed by their parents "as objects which may be utilized instrumentally" and "are only seen for their use-value" (ibidem: 87). An assuredly kinder interpretation, however, is the parable of the talents, and the fear that some parents may experience that they are not allowing their child to come into his/her own. Moreover, the parental activities that Grenfell and Rinehart (2003) would cast as solely self-aggrandizing may be more charitably envisaged as indicative of parental involvement in the construction of a social and sociable world for one's children - the creation of a ready-made friendship network, so that children will be liked, happy and popular.

Grenfell and Rinehart's continuum of parental involvement would seem to implicitly presume that (1) the motives that underwrite parental involvement are easily distinguished; (2) these motives remain constant over time; and (3) ideal parents will not only be utterly altruistic in their support of a child but, as well, will scrupulously refrain from any conduct that might suggest a "conspicuous display" of altruism. The concept of dreamwork, however, contains no such presumptions. Rather, it is suggested that, whether or not dreamwork stems from purely altruistic motives, its dramaturgy makes motivation at least somewhat irrelevant; as Shakespeare wrote in *Hamlet*: "For here lies the point: if I drown myself wittingly, it argues an act; and an act hath three branches - it is to act, to do, to perform" (act 5, scene 1). Moreover, rather than view claims of self-sacrificial behavior as *prima facie* evidence of "conspicuous parenting," these types of claims may be seen as the logical outgrowth

of social constructions that actively encourage women to assume the role of the "selfless mother" who exists only to nurture her child.

The "good mother" and dreamwork

Various authors have noted how the promotion of motherhood since the 1800s has been accomplished both by exhortation and by prescription. Thus, in an analysis of advice offered to mothers from the time of Rousseau onwards, Badinter (1981) observed how practical advice (e.g., do not swaddle your baby, do breastfeed your baby) has been interspersed with an inculcation of the creed that motherhood should generate deep and powerful feelings in a woman. Similarly, Ehrenreich and English (1979: 4) remarked upon how the advent of "scientific motherhood" saw the proffering of advice by various "experts" who used their authority "to define women's domestic activities down to the smallest details of housework and child raising." In recent times, these types of directives have not abated; rather, they would seem to have increased. Thus, expectant and/or breastfeeding mothers may find themselves exhorted to "support your baby's brain and eye development" (Enfamil 2007) by consuming Expecta LIPIL DHA supplement; informed that they may "strengthen" a child's "earliest capabilities" and "ensure" that their infant is born "more alert and responsive, nurse better, sleep better and later in life, enjoy improved school readiness" by strapping onto their abdomen a "Baby Plus Educational System"; and cajoled to purchase a Bebe Sounds Prenatal Gift Set that "includes all you need to listen, talk and play music to your unborn baby" (Toys R Us 2007). However, as the "good mother" has evolved from supplier of a child's physical needs to creator of an (ill-defined and ever-changing) "optimal" physical, social and emotional environment for her child, the likelihood has increased that mothers will be found wanting in some way and held accountable in the production of a less than-perfect child. As Epstein (1988: 197) has remarked, "Idealization and blame of the mother are two sides of the same belief in an all-powerful figure" (see also Antler 1984, 2007; Douglas and Michaels 2004; Gorman and Fritzsche 2002).

Collett's (2005: 342-343) investigation of the role of children's appearances in the maintenance of identities and management of impressions for their mothers reported that, by tending to children's dress, grooming, and behaviors, her sample of women attempted to "show themselves and others that they are good, capable mothers who care about their children." Moreover, while acknowledging that "[i]n all likelihood, most of the people these mothers encounter throughout the day are not paying as close attention to the way these children look as the mothers assume they are," she maintained that "the woman who believes that she successfully manages her children's appearances gains confidence in her abilities and affirms her most salient identity." Collett's remarks point to the centrality that women may assign to their mothering role even though her assertion that *all* of the mothers within her sample viewed motherhood as their "most salient identity" would certainly seem overly bold, given that the contents of her list of interview questions (which appear as "Appendix A: Interview Questions" pp. 343-344 of her article) suggest that she did not ask her respondents to identify which, of the multiple statuses they presumably occupied, they defined as their "master status," nor directly address the issue of self-identity.

To the extent that a child can be viewed as an extension of self, dreamwork may represent a socially organized attempt on the part of mothers to create, enhance and preserve their identities as "good mothers." For example, in our research on

mothers whose children studied dance, attention was directed to the ways in which women attempted to present their behavior as laudable and it was noted that dreamwork was both brokered and justified with reference to the construct of the "good mother." Thus, the impression management of mothers seemed designed to present themselves as initiating action in the "best interests of the child" and as willingly making "sacrifices" towards that end. However, it was also emphasized that, unlike those social settings in which a child is cast as an appendage of a parent ("Dr. Brown's daughter"), this symbolic ordering of importance is reworked within the subculture of the dance studio; there, a woman encounters considerable encouragement to anchor her identity in the "Mother of" role, regardless of whatever unique accomplishments or other statuses she may possess; view her child as part of her extended self; and evaluate herself as a "good mother" through both the child's accomplishments as a dancer and her own efforts towards that end. It was additionally noted that if the invisible tasks of motherwork are most likely recognized in their breach (Graham 1984), those who engage in dreamwork may be particularly prone to exploitation by professional status coaches who, in forwarding particularized definitions of the "good mother", are pursuing self-interested ends. Moreover, even though status as a "good mother" within the dance studio subculture was most readily achieved by those who were full-time, at-home middle or upper-class mothers, providing unwaged labour on behalf of children and the dance studio itself (holding fund raisers, contributing items to be sold at raffles or bake sales), their doing so did not immunize these women against potential labeling as "stage mothers." Indeed, the fact that these women sought to neutralize possible labeling as a "stage mother" suggests how elusive the status of a good mother could be.

The construct of the "good mother" may function as an ever-available invitation to shame or guilt in child-rearing and the activities that accompany it, inviting a mother to endlessly ask herself, "Am I being a good mother? Am I squandering my child's precious talents? What might become of my children if I gave them their head? If my child does not turn out to be accomplished - a dancer, a musician, an artist - will I be responsible?"

Conclusion

While our original research focused upon a single social setting and on how dreamwork may be particularly encouraged by the "good mother mandate," the concepts of the dream and dreamwork may have greater currency and a broader constituency that includes fathers. Indeed, fashioning dreams in which children are made central and energizing dreamwork on their behalf may be more routine parts of parenting than formerly acknowledged.

One might consider in this context that a recent poll of college students, for example, reported that 25 percent of these students felt their parents "were overly involved" in their postsecondary school lives "to the point that their involvement was either annoying or embarrassing" (HealthyPlace.com 2009). In complementary fashion, it would seem telling that the website for the University of Calgary currently provides graduating students with instructions for "Landing your helicopter parents." This site reports laconically, "There are a few different models. There is the basic Helicopter parent who hovers close to you and swoops down to solve any problem that may come up. There are also Lawnmower parents (who mow down any obstacle) or Curling parents (who sweep every problem away), and the most extreme cases are often called Black Hawk parents (named for an American military

helicopter)" (University of Calgary 2009). In like fashion, the British Columbia Ministry of Education has ostensibly seen the need to identify a list of the "do's" and "don'ts" that should guide the parental actions of university-level-age students. Among the *Do's*: "offering advice on how to approach an instructor or professor concerning a specific issue" and "helping to proofread"; among the *Don'ts*: "contacting instructors or professors directly to discuss an issue" or "Writing parts of or their entire essay") (Government of British Columbia 2009).

One might also contemplate Kivisto's (2003) comments on the naming practices of the parents of the renowned late sociologist Stanford Lyman:

> [w]ith brothers named Harvard, Yale and Princeton, Stanford's parents were far from subtle in conveying the significance they attached to higher education for their children (or at least their male children, since his twin sister Sylvia didn't receive a Seven Sisters moniker).

Kivisto's remarks also invite consideration of how gender-role beliefs systems may impact the content of parental dreamwork and affect parental inferences about a child's nature and capabilities, their expectations about the child's future roles and occupations, and the types of opportunities they provide with the aim of developing children's skills in various domains.

In suggesting that the concepts of the dream and dreamwork may tie together disparate strands in parents' thinking, actions and interactions which would otherwise remain disconnected, it is acknowledged that parental efforts may represent, in part, a projection of the parent (i.e., "if only I had been able to have dance lessons myself, how different things might have been!"). However, unlike the term "extreme parenting," which conjures up readily-familiar images of "hockey fathers" who furiously attack referees and/or the fevered antics of mothers on *Toddler & Tiaras,* the concept of dreamwork may provide for understanding even the most intense forms of parental involvement in ways that do not presume, in *a prioi* fashion, that such involvement is pathological or predatory. Moreover, if terms such as "stage mother" and "hockey father" direct attention to parental actions that are enacted in relation to distinctive public settings, the concepts of the "dream" and "dreamwork" are broad enough to encompass those which may be more private and mundane. For example, for a parent of a child with a profound language delay, the dream of one's entirely silent child being able to express the simplest of thoughts may serve to inspire dreamwork and energize future battles with naysayers. The concept of parental dreamwork may also encourage researchers to contemplate the alternative: what happens when there is a lack of parental visions of this sort and/or a readiness to act in tandem with others and dedicate energies towards the accomplishment of dreams. Finally, it can be noted that approaching potentially intense parental involvement in the lives of children in this way would seem consistent with what Plummer (2009: 174-175) recommended in arguing against the "hunt" of High Sociology "for the questing beast. A snark" and for the practice of an "understated" sociology which tends to the "knowledge of those on the scene/The telling and retelling of narratives/At once personal and communal,/Original and conventional."

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Citation

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The Loves Of Others: Autoethnography And Reflexivity In Researching Distance Relationships

Abstract

Reflexive accounts of research are important, but they should include attention to a wider range of relations than those between researcher and participant. The researcher's position in relation to the participants does merit discussion, especially when there is an element of autoethnography involved. However, assistants in the research such as transcribers, can play a role in accounting for the research. The relationships participants have with loved ones also shape how they reflexively account for themselves and their experiences, in this case – of being in a distance relationship.

Keywords

Reflexivity; Autoethnography; Relationality; Distance relationships; Interviewing; Transcribing

This is a story of investigating an under-researched and personal area. It examines autoethnography and reflexivity in the research process and is about the often difficult business of investigating and analyzing people's lives. The story has some characters not usually met in descriptions of method. Along with the interviewer and participants, this is about an imaginary cat and a cheeky transcriber.

These methodological reflections relate to a project funded by the Economic and Social Research Council on UK couples in distance relationships. A distance relationship is defined as a committed relationship where partners spend most of their time living in different towns, each have their own house, flat or apartment and reunite as often as possible. The couples studied are different from traditional couples with an often absent husband, like sailors. These are dual-career couples with professional women who live apart to pursue their careers, being unable or unwilling to find a suitable job in the same town as their partner (cf. Gerstel and Gross 1984; Holmes 2006). Usually these couples travel a few hours to see each other at the weekends, although some live further away and are apart and together for longer periods.

This project was intended as an in-depth qualitative study to explore the joys and sorrows of distance relating, thus numbers were kept small in a focus on gathering detailed and rich quality data (Minichiello, Aroni and Hays 2008). Questionnaire data was obtained for twenty-four couples. This gives information on forty seven individuals, as one person's partner did not participate. From this sample,

fourteen interviews, including two with lesbian couples, were conducted between 2002 and early 2005. Twelve couples were interviewed jointly and two of the women partners were interviewed on their own, their partners declining. The interviews lasted around one to two hours each and were audio-recorded and transcribed. The semi-structured interview guide began with asking participants to talk about how they met, something couples liked doing and so a good ice-breaker. It also provided some context for the relationship and an idea of its length and character. The couples' experiences of distance relating were then explored by asking them what they liked, and then what they didn't like about it. From preliminary conversations, my own experience and the literature review, I observed a tendency to see these relationships as problematic ("it'll never last"). I tried to go beyond this by first asking couples to focus on the positive aspects, before detailing the problems. A range of other themes were noted on which to prompt distance relaters, but often these themes emerged in their own detailing of the pros and cons. These themes included discussing where they lived, their accommodation, whether it was 'home', and practical arrangements around children, travel and staying in touch. They were also asked about how they organized their possessions and finances and caring for each other and how other people reacted to them being in a distance relationship. The focus on getting the couples to tell me what they did and didn't like about distance relating helped make their own understandings of their experiences central (cf. Roseneil 2006).

Researching the experiences of people in distance relationships entailed both an element of autoethnography and attention to reflexivity. The first section of the paper deals with debates around these issues before turning to a specific discussion of the autoethnography involved in this project. Then the story turns to how a cheeky transcriber helped shape the research accounts, before investigating how the participants' selves and stories are produced and presented through their relations to others. It is important to think less about how research makes the researcher feel and more about reflexivity in research as a process that involves researcher, participants and a wider variety of others.

Reflexivity and Autoethnography

Reflexivity is a capacity via which individual and social lives are produced and changed as people react to their circumstances in ways no longer governed by tradition (Giddens 1990). The complex theoretical debates within sociology about the meaning and importance of reflexivity are evaluated elsewhere (Holmes 2010), but a brief summary may be helpful. Theories of reflexivity have focused around detraditionalization and risk (Beck 1992; Giddens 1990, 1992) as people try to respond to the difficulties of making calculated choices within the uncertainty of contemporary life. Uncertainty and the speed of change throws doubt on Bourdieu's (e.g. 1987) claims that habitus determines our ways of being in the world, but reflexive practices continue to connect most individuals to each other (Archer 2003; Mason 2004). Symbolic interactionism helps recognize these connections by providing ways of thinking about how our selves and social worlds are formed via the meanings we give to them and to the actions of others. In identifying the importance of the generalized other Mead (1962) highlights the relational production of social selves. This can help explain the way in which people incorporate notions of what others say, think, do and feel into their judgements (Holmes 2010: 147; Holdsworth and Morgan 2007).

Methodological literature has usually employed a more relational understanding of 'reflexivity' than in much theory. Although the concept is applied rather differently in different methodological traditions from grounded theory to public sociology, there are commonalities. Researchers try to locate themselves in relation to those they study, but some also try and understand how those they study employ implicit assumptions and taken for granted practices in their social interactions. There is arguably some amnesia in contemporary work about the previous importance twentieth century Chicago school sociologists and ethnomethodologists gave to reflexivity as something that 'enjoins the analyst to displace the discourse and practices that ground and constitute his/her endeavors in order to explore the very work of grounding and constituting' (Pollner 1991: 370; Denzin 2006). There appears to be more forgetfulness around the way these traditions dealt with reflexivity as it refers to how social settings are constituted by 'the discourse, reasoning, and interaction of participants' (Pollner 1991: 371). New gurus have emerged. Bourdieu is now often the touchstone, for not only theoretical but methodological invocations of a reflexive sociology. This means asking why do we like to do the things that we do as sociologists? In essence he advocates 'the sociology of sociology … as the necessary prerequisite of any rigorous sociological practice'. However, he argues that not just sociologists, but everyone struggles against the temptation 'of taking up the absolute point of view upon the object of study' (Bourdieu cited in Waquant 1989: 33). The habitus is ultimately thought to explain how that reflexive struggle occurs for various kinds of people and its likely outcomes. As already noted, there are problems with relying on habitual action to explain reflexivity within a world that has at least partly become divorced from tradition (Gross 2005) and subject to complexity and rapid change. However his attention to everyone's reflexivity does demarcate his work from most sociological methodology since the 1990s in which reflexivity is discussed as a 'problem' of how researchers are related to those they study (Denzin 1994; Mauthner and Doucet 2003).

In some cases researchers include themselves in their research and this is what constitutes autoethnography. Definitions of autoethnography and understandings of its purpose are rather varied. There are disagreements about whether autoethnography should be emotive or analytic, and if so who should emote or be analysed. Although autoethnography involves emotional reflexivity, that is not a process interior to the individual, and more attention is needed to how it is played out in interacting with others (Holmes 2010). There are also debates about whether autoethnography is something that occurs 'in the field' or in the analysis and how new it is (Anderson 2006; Denzin 2006; Ellis and Bochner 2006). The kinds of autoethnography that apply to this research are researching a group in which the author is an 'insider' (Roseneil 1993) and the researcher sharing his or her own stories with other participants (Berger 2001). This then includes thinking about how to analyse these experiences and stories in final research accounts. It involves self-reflexivity about the author's relationship to her participants and to the research that she produces.

Reflexivity is about how the social is reproduced through people interacting, yet much methodology oversimplifies, over-rationalizes and over-personalises the social relations it involves. Instead it foregrounds researcher-participant power relations within the interview or ethnographic encounter; and typically ignores the relations of analysis (Mauthner and Doucet 2003). Analysis could be given more attention, but many methodological accounts may now focus too much on how the researcher's experience and his or her institutional and interpersonal contexts inform the research.

Much more could be said about the reflexivity of the participants. However it is important to say something of how and why the researcher came to the research.

My project and I

This research on distance relationships is partly, reluctantly, about me. For many years I lived at a distance from my partner and I frequently encountered other academic couples in distance relationships. Although this seemed interesting, I feared the emotional impact of muddling my personal life up with work. I decided to wait until I was no longer in a distance relationship. The relationship continued at a distance and I continued to meet others doing the same. Finally I thought I would see what research had been done on distance relationships and was rather annoyed to discover that there was very little[1]. What was a Sociologist to do? Here was an interesting and under-researched social phenomenon. The major book length study on the topic, dealing with what they called 'commuter marriage' in the USA, had a sample half-composed of academics (Gerstel and Gross 1984; Ferber and Loeb 1997) and my encounters with academics 'doing distance' in Britain convinced me to begin within academia and later extend to other professions[2]. Less privileged couples may be apart, but under different conditions (Roseneil 2006) and often in ways similar to traditional absent husband patterns, but sometimes with women as the absent workers (Hoschchild and Ehrenreich 2003; Schvaneveldt, Young, and Schvaneveldt 2001). In addition it was theoretically sensible to begin with elites as this was where we might expect to see most actively at work the processes of individualization much talked of in social theory about shifts in intimacy (Beck and Beck-Gernsheim 2003; Giddens 1992). Distant lovers willing to share their experiences needed to be found.

In finding participants, my own networks were central. Mediators were used to gather a broad sample of couples in distance relationships where at least one partner was an academic. I contacted colleagues, friends and acquaintances in as many different universities across Britain as possible. Each of these mediators was asked if they knew any couples relating at a distance who would fill in a questionnaire and indicate whether willing to be interviewed. Names were passed on to me once the mediator had checked with the couple, or the prospective participants were asked to contact me directly. Confidentiality was enhanced via this process because, unlike in standard snowballing (Noy 2008), only one or two of the participants were known to each other. Contacting a diverse range of mediators helped me gather questionnaires from 24 couples, 14 of whom were interviewed. The sample was diverse in age, spread well between newer/older and more and less elite universities,

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[1] Statistics are vague about people doing distance relationships and qualitative findings are limited. Haskey (2005) gives the best recent estimate: that around two million people in Britain are in committed and long-term living apart relationships, but this does not include the over sixties, of whom quite a number might be LATs according to other studies (Borell and Ghazanfareeon 2003; Levin 2004). How many of these LATs are in distance relationships rather than near neighbors remains unclear (Author reference 2006; Roseneil 2006; Guldner, 2003 for some American information). The little qualitative work done usually includes all LATs and focuses on work family balance (Beets and Van Nimwegen 2000; Binstock and Thornton 2003; Borell and Ghazanfareeon Karlsson 2003; Caradec 1996, Gerstel and Gross 1984; Kim 2001; Levin 2004; Milan and Peters 2003; Rindfuss and Stephen 1990; Roseneil 2006; Schvaneveldt et al. 2001). My interest is in what distance relationships can reveal about intimacy, equality, emotions, and care.

[2] Phase two, which planned interviews with British non-academics in distance relationships, was not executed because of my relocation to Australia.

included people resident across Britain and who had been relating at a distance for anything from a few months to around fifteen years. Some couples commuted a couple of hours between neighboring cities, one or two crossed the Atlantic, or Europe. The vast majority of couples travelled a few hours to meet and saw each other every weekend, or at least fortnightly. The mediated approach provided not only a breadth of sample but participants willing to be interviewed. Mediators were known to participants and able to recommend me, thus helping ensure trust, which is crucial when investigating intimate life (Edwards, Ribbens and Gillies 1999). A trusting rapport was also encouraged by telling participants that I was in a distance relationship.

Telling participants that I too was distance relating made the project at least partly an exercise in autoethnography. Removing interviewer affect was neither realistic nor desirable in this research, but I wanted to acknowledge and analyze the possible affects of my input on the interview data (Oakley 1981). As I have said, my own distance relationship made me reluctant to research the topic. The principal aim of the interviews was to hear about the experiences of others, but giving some information about my own relationship allowed me to develop rapport and to build trust (Berger 2001). Thus one couple were discussing how they regarded distance relating as a provisional arrangement but were finding it hard to get jobs and be together, when one of them asked:

> *Participant H1*: Is our situation any that different from yours, I mean, do you not view your situation as provisional? Are you more accepting? (Interview 5).

My answer in this instance was rather garbled[3], but showed that I had similar doubts and struggles. It seemed important to somehow include these in the research.

I asked my partner if he and I could became participants in the research in order to more systematically include the comparisons I would make with my own relationship, have some input from my partner, and make my 'data' more comparable to what would be learnt about others. He agreed and I promised anonymity (where that is not offered in this paper it is with his consent). Like the other couples we each filled out a questionnaire and I recorded our conversation as we went through the interview schedule together. This helped put our experiences into the same timeframe and context as the other participants, but was not without problems.

Where the research is about my relationship it can be difficult to create some distance and to get the information I want on record. My partner initially uses humour to deal with the awkwardness of being interviewed by me about our relationship.

> *Interviewer*: What is it like, I mean, being apart. How do you feel about it?
> *Partner*: [jokingly] It's great!
> *Interviewer*: No seriously, are there good things about it? Do you like it?
> *Partner*: Umm, well, yeah you don't mess up the house so much, because you're not here. And I suppose you get lots of work done, but that's about it.

A little later when I ask him to describe what kind of house he lives in, he says "it's got walls and a roof". There are various other facetious answers given to questions that I clearly know the answer to, but want him to talk about for the record. I try to create some distance from the data when analyzing our transcript, and help maintain our anonymity, by turning myself into two people. I choose pseudonyms for myself

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[3] I do not give the quote here because I do not wish to reveal these details about my relationship.

and my partner, as I do for everyone else. In our interview, I use the pseudonym (here replaced with 'Interviewer as partner') for any comments I make in response to what my partner is saying about our relationship. So after my partner's comment on getting lots of work done above, my version of the transcript continues:

> *Interviewer as Partner*: Yeah, Yeah, you do get lots of work done, I get lots more work done when I'm not hanging around with you. That's true. Do you think that's been quite a good thing at the start of our careers?

As you can see, this example shows that the distinction is not always maintained, as the final sentence here surely should be given to the interviewer with the 'our' changed to 'your'. However, in the other interviews one partner did sometimes check that the version of their life being advanced was agreed upon. For example, participants might say: "is this correct so far?" (Interview 7), or make a statement such as "we were living in each other's pocket", and then ask "weren't we?" (Interview 8). They might also invite their partner's version of something by saying "she always tells it better than I do" (Interview 20). Participants all ask questions and, in joint interviews, check what they are saying with their partners (cf. Seymour, Dix and Eardley 1995). This is important in shaping the accounts.

Checking with partners is part of the emotion work of interaction (Hochschild 1984) and I involve myself in such work as interviewer. As participants generously share their emotional ups and downs with me, I want to affirm those emotions, where I can (Berger 2001; Corbin and Morse 2003). Usually what happens is that in exchange for a story that has evoked some recognition I tell a story of my similar experience. This occurs, for example, when one couple (as all did) tell me about the shortcomings of communicating by telephone. My partner recommended I include this story here, which I tell in response to a participant who is trying to explain how interacting over the telephone can be awkward if you have run out of chat:

> *Participant E1*: And then we could talk about something else but since we have email or we send emails we have talked about everything else. We don't really have anything to talk about else and so it becomes the issue of not talking to each other which is not true but we kind of figure this out, right?
>
> *Interviewer*: I felt like I would get phone calls and [my partner] would go "hello" which was my cue to sort of chat, you see and I got sick of this after a while so I said look I'm, I'm not doing this today and I'll talk to you later, which was very unusual for me because we just don't y'know do that and he was like "Oh no I'm in big trouble" so anyway about 10 minutes later he phones back and I hear the opening of a book and he goes "did you know that Russia produces 87% of the worlds molybdenum?" (Laughs) And he'd thought it through, we've known each other a long time, and he knew what the problem was so now whenever we get into a lull, he's like: "shall I go and get the atlas?"

A similar exchange occurs in another interview, where a couple respond to my question about what they talk about on the telephone by discussing how arguments on the telephone are a problem:

> *Participant F2*: … if you have an argument when you're with somebody in the same room you can sort things out quickly but if its over a telephone its, its impossible to do that so nip this in the bud
> *Participant F1*: Yes
> *Interviewer*: I think that is a tricky thing isn't dealing with y'know conflicts or potential conflicts when you're not together a lot because it is, yeah, really difficult to deal with them on the phone and I remember once hanging up on my partner, and that's not me I'm not a drama queen at all y'know, we've been together even slightly longer than you guys and I was quite surprised with myself
> *Participant F2*: Its like wow
> *Interviewer*: I know, Yeah exactly its almost like y'know I'm getting really annoyed and actually its better if I hang up than start saying things I maybe don't want to say when, over the telephone y'know and I feared
> *Participant F2*: I think that's why I, I feel myself getting angrier and angrier, right I'll just speak to you tomorrow night , when you're in a better frame of mind. (Interview 20)

It would be nice to think that it is reassuring for couples to hear that they are not alone in these difficulties. The reassurance benefits me as much as the participants.

Comparing experiences builds a good relationship with the particpants and often has the effect of spurring quite self-critical reflection in their accounts. For example, in the conversation above expressing my unpleasant surprise at my 'drama queen' behavior is followed by Participant F2 admitting that he was not communicating well on that occasion, saying: "no I was appalling I was just like nurrr I think I've, for some reason, I found it harder this year with [her] being away, than last year…". He goes on to set out why he thinks this might be so, focusing on the disappointment of hopes that they would be together before his partner was offered her present job in a distant location. Further examples could be given to indicate that sharing my own experiences not only helped build rapport with the couple, but could encourage more critical self-examination (Berger 2001; Edwards et al. 1999; Oakley 1981) and allow couples to perhaps occasionally relax attempts to present their relationship in the best light (Seymour et al. 1995). My stories of things not going so well could make couples more inclined to give me a frank account of the bad as well as the good. It also enabled me to treat the interview less as a sociological version of the Petri dish and more as a conversation (Oakley 1981), albeit not inevitably harmonius (van Enk 2009: 1270) in which sometimes I am moved to respond to what I am being told. I am not the only one who feels moved to comment on the lives being shared. To my surprise, an important character in how the stories get told is the transcriber.

The more the merrier: the cheeky transcriber joins in

The transcriber helps shape the research accounts. Whilst looking through the transcripts I would find gems such as:

> *Interviewer*: Fabulous (evil laugh) (Interview 7).

A less cheeky transcriber is unlikely to have used 'evil' as the descriptor.

The interjections often express the transcriber's own boredom with the tedious nature of verbatim transcription, but can help draw a line between what is relevant and what is not. There is a good humored rebuke in another interview where the

transcriber feels I have been engaging in too much idle chatter. The following is inserted in the transcript (in capitals):

> TALK ABOUT COFFEE FOR A BIT. COULD TRANSCRIBE IF YOU WANT [INTERVIEWER] BUT THE PAIR OF YOU CHATTER BOXES ARE HAVE TESTED MY PATIENCE WITH THIS CATS TALK SO FOR NOW I'VE (sic) SKIPPING OVER COFFEE TALK (Cheeky Transcriber, Interview 6).[4]

The transcriber's patience is further tried because this interview went on rather long, so that my partner arrives while we are still talking. Here is his radically shortened version of the exchange that occurs:

> [INTERVIEWER'S PARTNER] COMES HOME. HE LOOKS SEXY IN HIS BIKE HELMET (Cheeky Transcriber, Interview 6)

My partner is sent away again, but I remember experiencing some embarrassment about this 'intrusion' of my personal life into my professional performance as researcher. It looks like I have not planned as well as I could and boundaries between work and intimate life have been breached. When my partner appears there is also some sense of guilt on my part that this interview is eating into some of our time together.

The transcriber also reminds me (and us all) of the embodied aspects of interviewing, which is helpful in keeping a sense of the participants' humanity while performing the analysis. When reading the transcripts I am vividly transported, for instance, to one cold winter's day creeping to darkness when the transcriber writes: 'PARTICIPANT GOES TO PUT THE HEATING ON' (Interview 14). In the same interview some cheeriness was restored by a well-timed break, as I recall because the transcriber writes: 'INTERVIEWER PAUSES THE INTERVIEW FOR A MINUTE . TEA CUPS ARE REFILLED' (Interview 14). The sometimes less well-timed pauses are indicated when he notes that 'AT THIS POINT INTERVIEWER SWITCHES MINI DISKS' (Interview 15). But in one case there is an explosion of self-conscious awareness of the interviewing process, which involves food:

> INTERVIEWER COMMENTS ON THE COMMESTIBLES PRESENT. REPORTEDLY THEY ARE OF RELATIVELY HIGH QUALITY. [PARTICIPANT] SAYS THIS IS MENTIONED FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE TRANSCRIBER. FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE READER I WOULD LIKE TO SAY I AM EATING A BIG COCHOATE [sic] CAKE WHILE TRANSCRIBING (Cheeky transcriber, Interview 7).

Bodily gestures and emotions are also captured, which are not just reminders of embodiment, but offer interpretations. Where a bit of text is unclear it is noted that STRANGE SOUND MICROPHONE PROBLEMS. MAY BE DUE TO [PARTICIPANT C1's] CRAZY LAUGHTER (Interview 10). When I ask participant G2 'what [their] plans for the future are?' the transcriber really helps bring alive the response, although not without a perhaps unfounded interpretation of the participant's feelings:

> [HE] BLOWS OUT SO HIS LIPS FLAP, INDICATING AN OPEN ENDED , FLEXIBLE APPROACH WITH A STRONG ELEMENT OF ABDICATION TOWARDS THEIR FUTURE (Interview 7)

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[4] We were chatting about the importance of her real cats in where was 'home'.

The transcriber is a sociologist who offers his own interpretation (via email) of the overall data as revealing the joys of relationships as 'comparable to the joy people experience when consuming commodities'. This is not used to bolster inter-coder reliability, and my analysis remains different, but that email also contains an account of what it felt like for him to transcribe the interviews. I am interested in the reflexivity (his and mine) that this prompts:

> Often I have felt sad transcribing these interviews, either because as a single person I have felt jealous of the couples closeness to each other and wonder if I could ever be so close to someone or because things they are talking about have led me to mentally replay painful incidents in my own prior relationships. This of course is another reason why these transcriptions take so long as I have to continually wipe the tears away from my eyes every two seconds and wipe the keyboard dry so that my fingers do not slip on the wet and soaked keys (Email from the transcriber, July 2005).

I don't know if there is humour intended in the portrait of him soaking the keyboard with his tears (he's excusing a delay in getting the transcribing done after all), but he seems genuine about the sadness he feels in comparing his single self to the 'closeness' of the couples. He is moved to reflect on his own life by the accounts he has been typing. This challenges the idea of the unemotional male and makes us think about the role of the (usually female) transcriber, so often invisible in the research process. I am not suggesting that we offer transcribers counselling in the event that they may be upset by what they transcribe (Corbin and Morse 2003), but that like much in the transcripts, his input highlights the relational nature of these accounts.

Who is the research about?

I am suggesting that it is participants' relations to others, not so much to the researcher, that inform their accounts. As Jennifer Mason (2004: 167) argues: '[i]t is possible to identify a range of relational styles in people's narratives, which reflect in distinctive ways upon their experiences of kinship with others, as well as their sense of self'. I am concerned not so much with the range of relational styles but with how they express their selves through relations not just to kin, but to friends and to a 'generalized other' (Mead 1962). This departs from much sociological methodology which predominantly discusses reflexivity in terms of consideration by the researcher of her or his relationship with the participants (Denzin 1994; Mauthner and Doucet 2003; van Enk 2009: 1266). It can do so partly because the participants here are relatively privileged academics and their partners, and therefore power and other differences between the researcher and participants are relatively minimal. I produce this research account but I construct it from the participants' renderings of themselves as in relationships with their partner, friends and family.

Changes affecting intimacy (Bauman 2003; Giddens 1992; Seidman 1991) can make it hard to maintain connections to others and these distance relaters do seem to think hard about which relationships are important and how to stay connected. Social networks have supposedly become more tenuous, or at least more difficult to maintain for many reasons including long work hours, lack of involvement in local communities, to geographical distance. Yet, contra Bawin-Legros and Gauthier (2001: 43) those in non-cohabiting relationships continue to have selves born in relation to others and the couples I spoke to were very aware of important others;

although they may not be satisfied with the conditions of relating that their distance imposes. One participant, for instance, said that what she did not like about distance relating was that:

> *Participant A1*: … structurally it [distance relating] makes it difficult to do anything with the weekend. Umm I mean I have a lot of friends around the country. Very few of my friends actually live near me in either of the places that I live. Ummm so there are situations where I'm quite likely to see people at weekends but it would mean going away and because of the structure of our lives there isn't really much, it isn't very easy to go away for the weekend; either together or separately actually. It's much easier to be at home, one of our homes at the weekend and not have that kind of y'know, so that means that a lot of my friendships are managed with less actually seeing. I mean I do still manage them and I still see them sometimes but we manage more by other forms of communication and that for me is a disadvantage (Interview 6)

The participants' accounts are about how human bonds can take on a certain fragility (Bauman 2003), but also how tight bonds can be restrictive. Where frequent mobility is involved, maintaining ties or making new ones is difficult, as appears the case for this couple in assessing what they don't like about distance relating:

> *Participant E1*: That's part of moving around so much that you never really have a local group of people really. I mean we have some friends here but its' ah y'know you learn, you meet them through university so you (inaudible words) just, we just do this thing I guess where you take a ceramics course outside or something like this y'know. I mean a) I, I just don't have the time to do that and then y'know, y'know if its something intimate that takes longer and then you just don't consider it because y'know you're not going to be there….

Towards the end of this conversation his partner confirms that moving can mean a lack of friends locally by asking: "why would I bother making friends here? I'm leaving in six months" (Interview 15[5]). As another participant proclaims: "it feels quite isolating as well because our weekends revolve around one another and occasionally we go and visit people and visit friends" (Interview 9, 2004). However, for one couple it was too much contact with family that was a problem. They quite frequently stayed with one partner's family who lived between their distant locations. The exclusivity of the couple relationship was threatened by the presence of family and their demands:

> *Participant B1*: But what became the problem was, because we were, when we were spending time at [my partner's] family's, is that they had other agendas, like, it was also about them seeing [my partner] or wasn't it? And, or not really getting the notion that that was our only [time together] … (Interview 14).

Sometimes she wanted to "just call it a day because its, just sometimes that can just be, you're negotiating a very difficult relationship anyway and having that on top of it y'know with that, all kinds of dynamics going on". For this person there were too many people in the relationship, too many emotional 'dynamics' to negotiate and not enough time to themselves. An account of their relationship means recognizing that

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[5] Interviews were numbered at the planning stage and to correspond to questionnaire numbers. This is why there are interview numbers of 15 and over when I conducted 14 interviews.

disconnection from each other was sometimes an issue because of relating closely to family.

The context in which these couples relate to each other and their friends and family has an impact on the doing of the research as well as the accounts of it. It is not easy to organise interviews given the busy circumlocutions of other distance relaters who are frequently on the move. With one couple it took me six months just to organize a time when we could meet for a joint interview, even though they were keen to be involved in the research. This email succinctly explains the difficulties involved in trying to plan ahead for many distance relaters, especially if in the process of trying to get closer.

> Hi [Interviewer],
> This email address will remain good until the end of September. Thanks for the holiday wishes, I'm sure it will be fun. I'll try to let you know when my partner and I are going to be in the same place and interview-able; we are both moving house (and job) over the course of the summer (twice in my case) so it is not straightforward; such complications for you are, I suppose, related to the population in which you are interested (Personal email from a participant, June 2004)

These couples appear to employ reflexivity in relational ways, and this can have imaginative aspects, as is illustrated by one couple's story about inventing an imaginary cat to help them sustain their relationship. This emerges when I ask what they 'talk' about on the phone or when emailing each other.

> *Participant E2*: Well a lot of our, a lot of our communication is quite playful. … Almost quite childish which is another of our, another outlet that I don't have anywhere else in my life, partly because I don't have, I don't have intimate friends around, other people whom I play with in that way anyway which is kind of verbal playing or y'know kind of fooling around in some sense
> *Participant E1*: And we should say that we have an imaginary cat
> *Participant E2*: Yes we do. We have, we have an imaginary cat
> *Interviewer*: Fantastic
> *Participant E2*: so its on that kind of, that kind of level
> *Participant E1*: And so we just from time to time we talk about this cat y'know
> *Participant E2*: But we have not really ever got closer to any real situation [where] we could have a cat, like … you need your own place.
> *Participant E1*: And, and these things then become, so from time to time they become like these issues that you have in a relationship, do you want a car together, do you want a car at all, or who's going to go and scoop it [cat poo] up at six in the morning right and this stuff. So that sort of really part of it but it has become this standing little reference we have
> *Interviewer*: That's great. Aww love it; it's a brilliant idea
> *Participant E2*: So, so things around that level are kind of part of, y'know, part of what we communicate especially when you're at work and you're bored or something.
> *Participant E1*: So when we talk about, y'know like, we talk about a friend who's got a kid or something new and then we say well wait until you play with Fraser, y'know our cat's name, so and things like this so its just y'know, this kind of stuff (Interview 15).

This account tells us about the couple as related to others. Fraser the imaginary cat helps them feel connected to each other and to their friends. They have made some choices about pursuing their chosen professions even though it entails their separation and, presently, regular moves. Nevertheless, they sometimes suffer because of their inability to plan or consider 'normally' taken-for-granted steps in being a couple like getting a cat or a car together. When others are doing 'normal' couple things, like having children or getting some new possession together to show off, how can they comment? They can talk about Fraser the imaginary cat, he can help make them feel they have some token of togetherness, some way to link to others, even if made-up.

The research is about the couple and how they reflexively make their relations to each other and to a wider group of others. This is done within social constraints, but reflexivity can have playful and pleasurable aspects, and can resist social norms as well as reproduce them. Imagining a cat may seem a sad illustration of the lengths distance relaters must go to in order to turn their 'togetherness' and 'apartness' into something emotionally bearable. This can be painful but the couple who invented Fraser describe one 'playful' response to their situation. Rather than ending their relationship because they are unable to meet traditional, or even contemporary expectations about co-habitation and co-operation in various joint ventures, they make fun of all that through Fraser. This casts doubt on whether the 'pure relationship' is now dominant within intimate life. In pure relationships individuals engage with each other not for economic or family reasons, but for the sake of the relationship alone. They remain together only as long as they find it satisfying (Giddens 1992). Yet Giddens overlooks the difficulties of deciding what makes a relationship satisfying. Rational calculation cannot suffice, so in entering a relationship people consider how it fits (or does not) with others and with relationship norms. Reflexivity is emotional and comparative (Holmes 2010).

Participants' accounts tell us a considerable amount about traditional or conventional relationships against which they compare themselves. Their distance is typically presented as "a problem to be resolved" (Interview 16) or "a bad state of affairs that [they] would change" (Interview 5). However, most participants felt it was not inevitably tragic. All were easily able to discuss positive aspects when asked, and often these were discussed in relation to the doubts that some couples had about traditional co-habitational and marital relationships. Those doubts were expressed by one couple when I asked them about their plans for the future. They said they knew they would probably have to spend some time apart, but the intention was for that to be short term. However they were a little unsure *how* they wanted to be together:

> *Participant F1*: I think its only actually because lots of ours friends have got, some of our friends have got married who have been going out, a lot shorter time I mean some, I mean we've never thought about marriage it's not something that we want, er although more recently erm we're thinking , well maybe I don't know we kind of talked a little bit about it but er I still haven't totally changed, got some
> *Participant F2*: I think I'm, we've both got the same sort of misgivings about it…

As this suggests a couple's sense of their own relationship is often achieved through comparison to a co-habiting/married other. This helped them reflect on what was bearable, but many wanted to compare themselves to other distance relaters and asked what I was finding in my research. I responded as best I could to these enquiries, usually late in the interview in order not to lead the participants towards

particular responses. The need participants felt to talk comparatively was evident, for instance in one interview where the participant was talking about the relatively short distance between herself and her partner:

> *Participant G1*: I mean I feel really bad talking about a distance relationship between Hertown and Histown [about ninety minutes drive apart] that was hard because y'know you're, comparatively it's actually nothing.
> *Interviewer*: Yeah but in some ways its not about how far it is, its about how it works and stuff for lots of different reasons and that's what I'm interested in so y'know its not y'know I live further away than you do therefore y'know, I'm tougher or whatever (Interview 7).

In fact this participant is comparing herself to me, because she knows that I was travelling much further to see my partner. It is back to being about me again.

Conclusion

Reflexive accounts of qualitative research are important in order to allow readers to gauge the extent to which the research has been driven by personal concerns and how they may have affected the 'results'. A personal connection to research can produce passionate and worthy work and knowledge of that connection can help assess the quality of the questions asked and the answers obtained. In all research, no matter how objective it claims to be, the quality of the questions and answers are significantly dependent on researchers' relationships with their subject and participants. Making those relationships more transparent is important for rigorous qualititative research and involves considering whether the researcher is an (equal?) insider or (powerful?) outsider. Here the answer has been that some forms of autoethnography include the researcher as a participant who also still has power in being able to analyze what other participants say. Autoethnography can enable researchers to more systematically include their experiences in a way more equivalent to the other participants. However, researchers are not the only ones who ask questions in research and most reflexive accounts could say less about researchers' experience and their relation to participants. The researcher produces the research account but not from thin air and both interviews and analysis are shaped by interactions with research personnel like transcribers, with participants and their family and friends (as represented by them), and real and imagined 'normal' others. These interactions all contribute to my account of what the research tells us about thinking, feeling human beings.

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Citation

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Stealing Peanuts and Coercing Energy Drinks: The Underground Economy Of A Middle School Summer Camp

Abstract

Economic activities are one important but understudied mechanism which kids use to recreate inequality within their peer cultures. Drawing on ethnographic data from a middle school summer camp, we used Goffman's typology of economic arrangements to analyze sequences of economic interactions within an underground economy. The middle school students drew on coercion, trading and sharing in order to address their own interests and concerns. When negotiating friendships, girls sometimes engaged in a series of interactions which converted previous social exchanges into unfulfilled economic exchanges. Girls also used inappropriate social exchanges to successfully resist boys' private coercion efforts, prompting boys to switch tactics and propose appropriate social exchanges and economic exchanges. Not only were these economic interactions patterned along gender, race, and class lines, but the repetitive, routine nature of these interactions helped to recreate inequality within the peer culture.

In contemporary US schools, many teachers craft lessons about tolerance, diversity, and multiculturalism. Yet even as their teachers preach the value of equality in the classroom, kids[1] often reproduce inequalities during their interactions with each other. As they build their peer cultures, kids appropriate information from adult social worlds and the peer cultures of older youth, creatively refashion this information to meet their own needs, and interpretively reproduce gender, race and class inequalities in the process (Corsaro 1992, 2005). Kids and youth use play, language routines, friendship, and media to recreate gender, race and class inequalities in their peer cultures (Adler and Adler 1998; Bettie 2003; Eder, Evans and Parker 1995; Evaldsson 2003; Ferguson 2000; Lewis 2003; Schofield 1989; Thorne 1993; van

Ausdale and Feagin 2001). However, less is known about the role kids' economic arrangements play in the reproduction of social inequality. We add to a nascent literature on kids' underground economies by examining how kids' food and monetary exchanges reproduce gender, race, and class inequalities in their peer culture.

At the summer camp we studied, the acquisition and consumption of food was a central concern in the peer culture. Each day at the start of camp, kids congregated in a central meeting room. As they greeted each other and played video games, the room would buzz with requests to share food and money, promises of future food gifts, and inquiries about economic resources. Throughout the day, kids continued to negotiate the purchase and distribution of food and drink. When adult staff were busy organizing activities or mediating disputes, kids furtively purchased and guzzled forbidden energy drinks, argued about food gifts and unpaid loans, and stole food from one another. Away from the watchful eyes of adult staff, kids organized a complicated and often coercive exchange of food, drink and money. This underground economy consisted of long sequences of economic transactions which included members of multiple friendship groups and sometimes spanned weeks. Drawing on Goffman's (1961) insights about the underlife of institutions, Corsaro's (1992; 2005) theoretical lens of interpretive reproduction, and intersectionality (Collins 1998), we analyze sequences of economic interactions in order to more fully reveal the ways that middle school kids reproduce inequalities in their underground economy.

The underlife and kids' underground economies

Underground economies are part of the underlife that residents of total institutions create. Total institutions are bureaucratic organizations in which individuals work, sleep and play apart from mainstream society. Goffman (1961) argued that individuals living in such institutions faced the challenge of complying with the organization's expectations while simultaneously maintaining a sense of self. When individuals in mental hospitals, prisons, and factories exhibited character traits and behaviors that matched the organization's expectations, they engaged in primary adjustments. Goffman observed that an individual who only demonstrated primary adjustments would experience a sense of selflessness because everything that individual was and did occurred at the direction of the organization. In order to maintain a sense of self, Goffman argued that individuals created secondary adjustments, or behavioral routines with means or ends not sanctioned by the institution. These may include make-dos, working the system, workable assignments, and free places (Gallacher 2005; Goffman 1961; Ingram 1982). Whether it be stealing food from the kitchen or lighting cigarettes by sparking electrical outlets, Goffman argued that these unsanctioned activities allowed an individual to develop a sense of "selfhood and personal autonomy beyond the grasp of the organization" (1961: 314). The collective set of secondary adjustments individuals made within a total institution constituted the underlife (Goffman 1961).

Although organizations such as nonresidential schools and camps do not fit Goffman's definition of a total institution, kids in schools and summer camps routinely create an underlife. Perhaps this is because schools and camps share some of the important characteristics of a total institution, including a bureaucratic structure which homogenizes people into groups for processing, a goal of transforming people (in this case into productive, educated adults), and a high degree of social control (Davies

1989). Because children are legally minors, their ability to voluntarily enter and exit schools and camps are severely curtailed (Davies 1989). High degrees of social control over children's movements and activities in these organizations generate a threat to kids' selfhood and autonomy that kids counter by developing an underlife.

The underlife in children's organizations includes a variety of secondary adjustments. Students have engaged in unauthorized means of avoiding unpleasant chores, such as pretending not to hear the teacher's directions or claiming one needs to go to the bathroom instead (Corsaro 2005). Despite teachers' instructions to share, be friends, and work things out, kids in preschools routinely achieved the unauthorized end of excluding other kids from their play (Corsaro 2005; van Ausdale and Feagin 2001). Students have used unsanctioned forms of word play, such as insulting phrases and bathroom humor, to undermine school goals such as demonstrating respect and obedience (Hadley 2003). At both the preschool and elementary school level, kids have resisted school edicts banning food and toys. Kids concealed toys in pockets, passed notes behind raised desktops and furtively shared food while the teacher's back was turned (Corsaro 2005; Thorne 1993). These practices were so well developed in elementary school that Thorne dubbed the flourishing trade in pencil toppers, potato chips and lip gloss "the underground economy of food and objects" (1993: 20). In both Goffman's (1961) *Asylums* and ethnographic investigations of schools, the underground economy of food and objects constituted a significant component of the underlife.

Within the underground economy, Goffman (1961) observed three important categories of economic arrangements. The first, *private coercion*, occurred when one patient expropriated another's resources without providing a rationale. For example, Goffman noted that a patient in a mental hospital used another patient as a seatkeeper, pushing that patient into the seat when he left and pushing the patient out when he returned without saying anything (1961: 264). Private coercion practices can include stealing, strong-arm techniques, and forced sexual submission. Although Goffman raised the question of how long such naked expropriation could continue without justification, he did not describe how residents of total institutions might resist private coercion. In the second category of economic arrangements, *economic exchanges*, two parties agree on terms before the transaction occurs and payment must be immediate. Should one party default on the transaction, the other can demand to be repaid. Economic exchanges include selling and trading (Goffman 1961). *Social exchanges*, such as gifting and sharing, are balanced transactions that demonstrate solidarity between the giver and the recipient. The giver provides food or an object in exchange for an unspecified payment, a future favor, or an affirmation of the relationship (Goffman 1961). Although Goffman (ibidem) presented these three forms of economic arrangements as discrete activities, he noted that economic interactions in the underlife could combine elements of all three.

Within the underground economies of schools, kids are active economic agents (Zelizer 2002) who produce, consume and distribute food, toys, clothing and money. Elementary school-aged kids (roughly ages six to eleven) circulate goods in the underground economy using two of the economic arrangements Goffman identified: social and economic exchanges (Chin 2001; Ferguson 2000; Katriel 1987; McGuffey and Rich 1999; Mishler 1979; Nukaga 2008; Thorne 2005). In elementary school lunchrooms and summer camps, kids engaged in social exchanges by freely gifting and sharing food (McGuffey and Rich 1999; Nukaga 2008; Thorne 1993, 2005). Gifting and sharing were more likely to occur between friends (Chin 2001; Thorne 2005), with gifting denoting stronger friendship ties and sharing marking weaker friendship ties (Nukaga 2008). Kids occasionally engaged in economic exchanges,

such as selling fruit for money on the playground or exchanging candy for the services of a "slave" (Ferguson 2000; Nukaga 2008). Trading is relatively rare within kids' underground economies and most often occurs between those who are not friends and who have unequal statuses within the peer culture (Chin 2001; Nukaga 2008; Thorne 2005). Examples of private coercion were not reported in these studies.

Because social exchanges like gifting and sharing were the most prevalent economic practices in lunchrooms, playgrounds and day camps, previous ethnographic work documented the ways that underground economies functioned to solidify relationships and affirm group membership. Kids marked the boundaries of their friendship groups by sharing food with some classmates and not others (Nukaga 2008; Thorne 1993, 2005). Through the proper execution of food sharing routines, Israeli kids communicated respect to and affirmed ties with their friends (Katriel 1987). By gifting food to friends who qualified for free school lunches, kids in a U.S. middle school demonstrated their concern for friends who might be embarrassed or stigmatized by their free lunch status (Kaplan 2000). Low-income kids have also used the underground economy in order to generate income (Ferguson 2000) which can be used to demonstrate affection and solidarity with family members (Chin 2001; Pugh 2004).

Previous research on kids' underground economies has four limitations which we attempt to address in this paper. First, the nascent literature on kids' underground economies has primarily examined the underlife in preschool and elementary school. We extend this literature by examining an underground economy at the middle school level. Second, investigations of the underground economy have not examined *sequences* of economic transactions. In part, this may be because investigations of kids' peer cultures have often mentioned, but rarely focused on, the underground economy. Some book-length works may mention the economic interactions between kids on just a few pages (Chin 2001; Ferguson 2000; Thorne 1993) while other research focuses on the wider context of the underground economy (Kaplan 2000; McGuffey and Rich 1999; Pugh 2004; Thorne 2005). The few articles which placed elementary school kids' food transactions at the center of the analysis (Katriel 1987; Mishler 1979; Nukaga 2008) have focused largely on documenting the structure of economic activities. Consequently, many of these transactions are analyzed as isolated events instead of interactions embedded within the evolving behavioral routines of kids' peer cultures. It remains to be seen how individuals within a peer culture employ multiple economic strategies, how kids resist unfavorable economic arrangements, and how the meanings of private coercion, social exchanges and economic exchanges may change over time.

Third, drawing on insights from interpretive reproduction (Corsaro 1992, 2005), we question whether kids' economic transactions primarily function to promote solidarity. In contrast to older, passive models of childhood socialization, interpretive reproduction stresses kids' active participation in society and their own socialization. As they build their own peer cultures, kids actively interpret information from adult cultures and reconfigure those norms, beliefs, ideas and behaviors to address their own values and concerns. In the process, Corsaro (ibidem) posits that children contribute to processes of cultural change and ultimately reproduce society. In line with interpretive reproduction (Corsarso ibidem), we view underground economies as one arena where kids could appropriate elements of adult social worlds and creatively refashion them to meet the needs of the peer culture. While previous research has documented the ways kids use the underground economy to establish

group membership and inclusion, it is possible that kids are using the underground economy to address other values and concerns as well.

Fourth, previous investigations of the underlife have examined how economic activities are fundamentally shaped either by gender, race or popularity, but few studies have considered how these statuses operate simultaneously in the underground economy. Within the underground economy of the mental hospital, Goffman observed that gender shaped income-generating activities: men engaged in car washing and waxing while women were rumored to engage in prostitution (1961: 267-269). In elementary school, gifting and sharing of objects stereotypically associated with one gender (e.g., toy trucks or lip gloss) were more likely to occur between kids of the same gender (Thorne 1993). Nukaga (2008) found that Korean American kids most often shared Korean foods such as udon noodles or Korean barbeque meat with other Korean American kids. At one summer camp, popular boys had first choice of other kids' lunch foods (McGuffey and Rich 1999). Analyses which focus primarily on one type of status are limited because they do not capture variation within groups. Indeed, intersectionality developed to address this limitation. Intersectional approaches stress understanding how multiple axes of power (gender, race, class, sexual orientation, age and so on) intersect to shape the social location of each group and its members (Collins 1998). Rather than examine economic actors within the summer camp as boys or girls, or as Latinos or whites, we use an intersectional approach to examine kids' gender, race, class, and popularity simultaneously.

Based on our observations of a summer camp, we contend that middle school kids who create secondary adjustments in order to maintain a sense of self separate from the one imposed by the formal organization are able to use multiple economic arrangements to address their own interests and concerns. The middle school students we studied creatively and flexibly drew on coercion, trading and sharing in order to solidify status hierarchies, threaten friendships and resist unfavorable arrangements. In contrast to Goffman's (1961) suggestion that social exchanges are used to demonstrate solidarity, we found that the meanings of economic arrangements varied according to their position within a sequence of economic interactions and the social context of the peer culture.

Researching the underground economy at camp

To investigate the underground economy in a middle school peer culture, we conducted ethnographic research at a summer day camp in a small Texas city. In June and early July 2008, the Program for After School Success (PASS) camp offered middle school students enrichment activities from noon to six pm four days a week. Each day of camp, kids congregated in a public school classroom where they chatted and played video games until everyone had arrived. Then, the camp director described the day's field trip and activities. The PASS field trips included outings to a community pool, an arcade, museums, a mall, a library, an ice skating rink, and the movie theater. If the field trip took less than six hours, the camp director and her staff took the kids back to the public school and either let the kids play in the computer lab or supervised activities designed to foster civic engagement. Because the PASS camp offered kids large amounts of unstructured time in the computer labs and on field trips, it was an ideal site for observing the dynamics of a middle school peer culture.

Twenty-seven students from three different middle schools attended the PASS camp. In this area, middle schools served students in the sixth, seventh and eighth grades. The kids at camp were primarily from the earlier grades. There were ten sixth graders, fourteen seventh graders, and just three eighth graders. Eleven of the campers were boys and sixteen were girls. Seven (26%) of the students at camp were Latino/a and the remainder were white. Fifty-two percent of the students at the camp were on free or reduced lunch status, which we use as a crude measure of social class.[2] During the 2005-2006 school year, 36% of the students in this school district were racial and ethnic minorities and 35% were economically disadvantaged students. Compared to the school district as a whole, the PASS camp enrolled a smaller percentage of racial and ethnic minorities and a higher percentage of economically disadvantaged students.

In order to observe how the kids organized their peer culture, two female ethnographers entered the field and attempted to become quiet and marginal members of the peer culture (Eder, Evans and Parker 1995). The first author was a 36-year-old white college professor and the second author was a 21-year-old Asian American undergraduate. On the first and second day of camp, the camp director asked the college professor to describe the research project to the kids. The first author stated that she and the second author were from the local university and planned to write a paper about what it was like to be a kid at PASS. Most kids were excited that we were going to write about their experiences. We obtained parental consent for twenty-three of the twenty-seven kids and all three of the high school students who volunteered as camp staff. We obtained consent from the adults at a pre-camp staff meeting.

Both ethnographers participated in camp activities with the kids. We avoided sitting at the "adults' table" with the camp director and her staff. By the end of the first week at camp, both ethnographers had been accepted into the peer culture at the camp as marginal members. The kids demonstrated their acceptance of us into the peer culture when they broke rules in front of us by cussing, switching seats while the bus was moving, and streaming explicit music videos in the computer lab (Corsaro 2005; Eder, Evans and Parker 1995). They also included us in their groups by saving bus seats for us, sharing food and stickers, and inviting us to join their conversations. Accepting their invitations to sit and talk allowed us to move between different friendship groups within the peer culture and observe all of the kids at the camp. The first author primarily observed the girls' groups and the second author spent much of her time with the boys' groups.

While it was impossible for either ethnographer to fully abandon her adult status within the camp, both ethnographers were able to construct field roles which minimized our adult power and authority (Best 2007; Mandell 1988). PASS campers clearly understood that we were not regular adults. Within the camp, we had very little authority and campers recognized that we did not discipline kids for rule infractions. For example, after Angelica cussed repeatedly in front of the second author, "Angelica turned around, looked in my direction, and then told Nathan that she cussed in front of me. Nathan said that everyone had already cussed in front of me all day and it was alright" (Second author's fieldnotes, 06/10/08). The only adult authority we had was the ability to escort the kids somewhere when the camp director instructed us to do so, though this authority did not transform us into full-fledged adults. Throughout the summer, kids referred to us as "friends" rather than "teachers." Minimizing our adult status helped us develop rapport with the kids and gain access to their peer culture.

While in the field, we tried to take jottings unobtrusively whenever possible. After exiting the field each day, we used our jottings to write full and detailed field notes. In addition, we used small digital recorders to record samples of kids' conversations. Although the quality of these recordings rarely allowed for full transcription, these recordings functioned as audio jottings which helped us to expand our field notes. Each week, we met to compare field notes and to discuss the salient features of the peer culture. Before data analysis began, we replaced names with pseudonyms and changed identifying information. Following the procedures outlined by Emerson, Fretz and Shaw (1995), we analyzed our data by identifying emergent themes, coding fieldnotes, and writing analytic memos. We identified food and money as two main concerns in the peer culture and focused our analyses on how the youth at camp structured their underground economy.

The quest for food and the underground economy

All of the kids at the camp shared a quest for food. At the start of each day, the kids had the option of eating a school lunch. As in Chin's (2001) study, few kids found the school lunches appetizing and most kids went to the lunchroom primarily to visit with friends. With the exception of a few special days when the camp had a cookout, the camp provided only a small snack sometime between 12:30 and 4:00 pm. This snack usually consisted of chips, cookies or a granola bar coupled with a juice box.[3] Because the school lunches were unappetizing and the snacks were fairly small, kids at the camp were often hungry. Campers spent a great deal of time seeking access to food or looking for money with which to purchase food. Because food and money were rare and valued within the peer culture, the kids generated an organized underground economy to govern their distribution.

Unlike previous studies of the underlife in elementary school, the most common economic arrangements in the middle school camp were private coercion and social exchanges. Economic exchanges were rare, although kids did discuss trades and loans to be repaid. In order to demonstrate how the meanings of these economic transactions shifted according to context, we present two series of economic interactions. The first sequence of economic interactions illuminated how one kid, Kate, simultaneously juggled three different economic interactions. The second was a series of economic interactions that occurred over the course of three weeks between Angelica and the highest-status group of boys. By analyzing these sequences, we reveal how kids manipulate, respond to and resist unfavorable economic arrangements as they address their own concerns and values.

Kate and the Peanuts

Throughout the summer the camp director, Mrs. Levinson, encouraged the kids to share their food and drink, to be kind to one another, and to respect each other. On several occasions, we observed Mrs. Levinson lecturing kids who had denigrated, hit or humiliated each other. We observed several episodes where kids shared food while insulting each other and engaging in power plays. Although the director encouraged sharing, she discouraged sharing that occurred within a context of insults and domination. Consequently, one set of secondary adjustments kids made was to exchange food and insults out of sight of the camp director. Such sharing episodes became a part of the underground economy.

Within the underground economy, we observed kids in group situations deftly handling multiple economic arrangements simultaneously. Not only were kids able to multitask by fending off coercion while negotiating the terms of a trade, kids were also able to convert one type of economic interaction into another after the fact. To illustrate the alacrity with which kids could switch between economic arrangements, we focus on a series of interactions centered around Kate. Within the space of thirty minutes, Kate deftly handled and converted multiple economic arrangements in order to address her own interests and concerns.

Kate (white, regular lunch) was one of the few kids at the camp who had money every day. Her money came from birthday gifts and an allowance. Toward the end of the summer, the camp took a field trip to a history museum. Because no one expected there to be opportunities to purchase food, few of the kids had brought money. Late in the afternoon, the kids congregated outside the snack bar at the museum. Several stated they were starving and bemoaned their lack of money. Kate had used her money to purchase a bag of peanuts, which she pulled out of her purse and began eating. Immediately, Mackenzie, Paige, Chase and Josh besieged Kate with requests to share her peanuts. In order to stave them off and maintain control over her peanuts, Kate employed and responded to a variety of economic arrangements.

Kate's relationships with Mackenzie, Paige, Chase and Josh set the stage for how Kate responded to their multiple requests for peanuts. Kate and Mackenzie were good friends during the school year and the two girls spent the first few weeks of camp hanging out together. During the third week of camp, Mackenzie left to go on a family vacation. Left alone, Kate started to spend time with Paige, whose friends had also recently stopped attending camp. Although Kate and Paige spent several days together, they did not become good friends. Kate also spent much of her time at camp arguing with her cousin Josh and fighting with Chase, a boy whom she had known since elementary school and with whom she had a sibling-like relationship.

On the day of the museum trip, Mackenzie returned to camp to find that Kate and Paige had started to spend time together. Mackenzie and Paige did not know each other, but both spent time with Kate that day. During free time at the museum, the three girls sat near each other on a bench. Mackenzie (white, free lunch) said she was hungry and started counting her change to see if she had the 92 cents needed to buy a candy bar. When Mackenzie announced that she had 46 cents, Kate suddenly decided to claim Mackenzie's money. Confused, Mackenzie pointed out that Kate had gifted her the money earlier that day.

Excerpt 1: 6/26/08, first author's recording and fieldnotes

Kate: Hey, you owe me the rest of my money.
Mackenzie: Okay, but I owe you a dime and two cents.
Kate: You owe me. You can keep the dime but I gave you a dollar.
Mackenzie: You said I didn't owe you back it.
Kate: No, I said that I didn't, that you didn't owe me back. You owe me back! Stop! (directed at Chase who was grabbing peanuts).
Mackenzie: (held out hand to Kate for peanuts)
Kate: NO. I don't feed poor people. (Mackenzie punched Kate and then Kate slapped Mackenzie).

It was no accident that this negotiation occurred on the first day Mackenzie returned to camp after several days absence. Kate refused Mackenzie's request to share by converting a previous gift into an economic transaction on which Mackenzie had

defaulted. Because economic exchanges usually occur between non-friends (Nukaga 2008), converting a previous gift into a trade is a method for both refusing the request and threatening to deny the friendship. It is possible that Kate lashed out because she was angry that Mackenzie had left her alone at camp the past few days. Mackenzie was dismayed by Kate's refusal and immediately protested the terms of Kate's economic arrangement. Mackenzie tried to reestablish the original terms of the exchange and the friendship by observing that the earlier transaction had been a gift because Kate did not specify the need for repayment. Although Kate agreed that she initially told Mackenzie there was no need for repayment, Kate tried to change the terms by stating that now "you owe me back". After Kate was distracted by Chase's successful attempt to steal her peanuts and throw them off a balcony, Mackenzie mutely asked again for peanuts and Kate responded with a vehement denial that she did not feed poor people. By pointing to the difference in their class statuses, Kate converted Mackenzie's request for a gift from a friend into a petition for a charitable handout. As she did so, Kate again made it clear that she did not consider Mackenzie a friend of equal status but instead that she was a person of lower status who could be treated without respect. Such interactions may contribute to the hidden injuries of class (Sennett and Cobb 1972) inflicted in childhood.

Stung by Kate's refusal, Mackenzie then tried to turn the tables on Kate and convert an earlier gift of her own into an economic exchange on which Kate had defaulted.

Excerpt 2: 6/26/08, first author's recording and fieldnotes

Mackenzie: Kate! You owe me. Kate! You owe me. Peanut. Two.
Kate: How do I owe you a peanut?
Mackenzie: You actually owe me two.
Kate: No, I don't.
Mackenzie: Because I gave you two candies this morning.
Kate: You just gave 'em to me. You didn't say I had to pay it back.
Mackenzie: You didn't say I had to pay you the money back.
Kate: Yeah I did. I said--
Mackenzie: Kate, you said, here you can have it, but don't, you don't have to pay me back.

When Mackenzie turned the tables on Kate, Kate reacted by using the same counter Mackenzie had. Kate asserted that Mackenzie did not insist on repayment at the time she gifted Kate the candy. Once Mackenzie realized her tactic had prompted Kate to feel dismay, Mackenzie returned to the earlier argument about the money Kate had lent her. Kate and Mackenzie began to revisit this argument, making the same points each had made earlier. Before they could renegotiate the terms of the transactions and their friendship, several kids returned to the benches and pulled Kate and Mackenzie into separate conversations.

Although Goffman's (1961) original definition of a social exchange suggested that gifting and sharing could demonstrate solidarity, the context of a social exchange in middle school can change that meaning. On this day, Kate distributed her peanuts in a way that threatened, rather than demonstrated, solidarity. First, Kate refused to share peanuts with Mackenzie by converting an earlier gift into a loan which needed repayment; by doing so, Kate threatened to treat Mackenzie like an unequal acquaintance rather than a friend. Then, Kate shared peanuts with Paige (white, free lunch) in a way that emphasized Paige's hunger, desperation and weight.

Excerpt 3: 6/26/08, first author's fieldnotes
Paige begged for a peanut and said she was starving. Kate said there were starving people in China and Africa, that Paige wasn't starving, and if she was she'd be like people in Africa. Paige asked again for a peanut. Kate threw a peanut toward Paige and it landed on the floor. Paige picked it up and ate it. Kate said 'You licked it off the floor, you pig.' Paige asked for another one. Kate said no. Kate said 'I swear you're just like kids.' Paige asked who. Kate said 'Alyssa, Mackenzie, everyone who was just over there buying candy, and YOU.' Paige said 'Why me?' Kate said 'You just took a peanut off the floor and ate it.' Paige laughed. Kate said 'Here, have a peanut' and threw another one. The peanut went on the floor at the other end of the bench. Paige laid down and asked 'Where'd it go?' Kate said it was the white speck on the floor. Paige reached for a wadded up straw wrapper. Kate said not that one, the other one. Paige said 'Oh.' Paige found the peanut and ate it.

Although this was not a social exchange, it was a gifting of sorts. Although Kate derived enjoyment from her "gifting" of the peanuts, there is little solidarity expressed by forcing Paige to eat food off the ground and crawl around under the benches. Nor is there a balanced exchange here. Kate clearly retains the upper hand, berating Paige for her use of the word starving, calling her childish and naming her a pig. Kate's actions are reminiscent of Goffman's description of interactions that combined elements of social exchanges, economic exchanges, and private coercion in which the recipient was humbled (1961: 297). In the context of the evolving friendships, Kate's actions take on additional meaning. Paige had been a convenient friend while Mackenzie was unavailable. Once Mackenzie returned, Kate tried to drive Paige away and return her to a non-friend status by throwing food on the floor for her to eat and calling her a pig.

After Kate taunted Mackenzie by converting a previous gift into an unpaid loan, and after Kate had mocked Paige by "gifting" in a demeaning way, Chase (white, regular lunch) and Josh (white, regular lunch) again asked for peanuts to eat.

Excerpt 4: 6/26/08, first author's fieldnotes
Chase and Josh asked for more peanuts. Kate said 'Ha, you don't get any, meanies.' Chase said he already got some. Josh said 'We don't need to get anything. We could just steal it from you.' Kate said 'Yeah right.' Kate said she would put the peanuts in her purse and the purse was going to be behind her on the bus.

When Kate refused the boys' request to share, they simply responded that they could use private coercion to get the peanuts away from Kate. Chase even pointed out that he had stolen some peanuts earlier. To some extent, this demonstrated a sense of entitlement and white male privilege. Chase and Josh were aware that coercion was an acceptable means for white boys to access girls' resources (see below). Kate responded by saying that she would hide the peanuts where the boys could not steal them. Kate did indeed hide her peanuts in her purse for the bus ride home and the boys did not have an opportunity to steal her peanuts. Chase and Josh continued to interact with Kate in friendly ways during the bus ride home.

Within this one sequence, Kate demonstrated an amazing ability to protect her resources and to use multiple economic arrangements to affirm and deny friendships. With a friend, Kate was able to convert a previous social exchange into an economic exchange; this allowed her to express her resentment at being abandoned as well as to conserve her resources. With a temporary friend of lower status, Kate was able to

"share" in a way that emphasized her distance from and superiority over Paige. With the boys, Kate was able to protest their threatened theft and then hide her food when the boys threatened private coercion.

Kate's use of multiple economic arrangements was not unusual within the camp. Throughout the summer, we saw white and Latina girls refusing requests to share by claiming that another girl had "jacked" or stolen her food earlier. The girl requesting to share almost always immediately protested that the earlier transaction had been a gift. It was also not unusual to see white girls "gifting" in ways that demonstrated hierarchical relationships rather than solidarity. Throughout the summer, white girls handed out cruel comments about each other's bodies, behaviors, and possessions alongside gifts of food and money. Latina girls also engaged in this behavior but did so less often than the white girls; in addition, Latinas were more likely to target white girls than other Latinas. Like Kate, other girls on regular lunch status were able to share food in ways that emphasized the poverty and hunger experienced by girls on free and reduced lunch status. Because girls alternated between gifting freely, refusing requests to share, and offering food with cruel comments attached, it was critical to examine their economic arrangements in the context of evolving friendships in order to understand why girls chose a particular strategy at any given moment. As they wielded and responded to a shifting array of economic arrangements, white middle-class, white working-class, and Latina working-class girls recreated inequalities within the camp's peer culture.

Angelica and the Energy drinks

Within the underground economy at the camp, some foods were valued more than others. Both girls and boys craved energy drinks. There are several different energy drinks, although kids at this camp preferred Energy drinks. When Paige (white, free lunch) told Alyssa (white, reduced lunch), "I would so DIE for a Energy drink" (first author's fieldnotes, 06/24/08), she illustrated the high value kids placed on energy drinks. Energy drinks contain high levels of sugar, caffeine and herbal stimulants such as ginseng and guarana (Griffith 2008). It is possible that kids valued the energy drinks because caffeine is a short-term appetite suppressant and consuming energy drinks helped them to quash their hunger. More importantly, the energy drinks were appealing because they were taboo items. Some kids stated that their parents had prohibited energy drinks. During the first two weeks of camp, the camp director made disparaging comments about the energy drinks to the kids. By the third week of camp, the camp director and the high school volunteers outright banned the energy drinks. During field trips, the high school volunteers sat just outside snack bars and vending machine areas monitoring campers' purchases to make sure that no one bought energy drinks. Purchasing and consuming the forbidden energy drinks were another set of secondary adjustments that kids made.

As a highly valued and taboo commodity, energy drinks occupied a central place in the camp's underlife. Both girls and boys yearned for the energy drinks, but it was primarily girls with free and reduced lunch status who brought cans of Energy drinks to camp and who purchased energy drinks while on field trips. The highest status boy, Connor, and his friends worked very hard to divest the girls of their Energy drinks and the cash which could be used to purchase the drinks. Connor's high status derived from his race, class, grade and physical appearance. Connor was white, lived in a middle-class neighborhood and paid full price for school lunches. In addition, the girls quickly deemed the seventh grader the most attractive boy in the

camp. Connor's best friend was Chase (white, regular lunch). Throughout the camp, Connor and Chase regularly interacted with a small group of boys including Max (Latino, free lunch) and a few other white boys on both free and regular lunch. Although Connor appeared to be middle-class, he never brought his own money or food to camp. Instead, Connor and his friends used private coercion to expropriate Energy drinks from Mackenzie (white, free lunch), Faith (white, reduced lunch) and Angelica (Latina, free lunch).

Week 1: The provision of Energy drinks. Although three girls provided Connor and his friends with food and money, Angelica proved to be the most reliable source of Energy drinks for the boys. Each day during the first week of camp, we observed Angelica enter the classroom, walk up to Connor, silently pull a can of Energy drink from her purse and hand it to him. Then Angelica walked over to her female friends to sit and talk. Angelica's silent offering might be construed as gifting, except that these economic interactions demonstrated little in the way of solidarity or balance. Angelica did not appear to gain access to the boys' group either as a friend or dating partner which suggests that this gifting did not affirm a relationship between Angelica and the boys. Also, Angelica did not verbally request a future favor in return.[4] Consequently, we argue that Connor's repeated demands for Energy drinks constituted a form of private coercion because Connor provided no rationale for his expropriation of Angelica's resources.

Week 2: The beginning of resistance. As Angelica's supply of Energy drink dwindled during the second week of camp, Angelica began to resist Connor's private coercion. Angelica used five resistance strategies: partially consuming the resources herself, pretending to forget her promises, placation, hiding her resources, and suggesting Connor share with his friends. These strategies had varying degrees of success. We consider a strategy unsuccessful when Angelica was forced to hand over the Energy drink. Sometimes Angelica was able to keep the drink, but only by enduring the boys' continued attempts to coerce the drink from her and/or by listening to the boys' critiques, insults, and verbal harassment; we consider this outcome partially successful. Angelica's resistance was completely successful when she was able to keep her Energy drink and did not experience any negative reactions from a boy.

When Angelica began to resist the boys' efforts to expropriate her Energy drinks, her first strategy was to make the Energy drink seem less appealing. Rather than entering the classroom with an unopened can and offering it to Connor, the second week of camp Angelica entered the classroom with an open and partially consumed can of Energy drink.

> **Excerpt 5: 6/18/08, second author's fieldnotes**
> Connor and Chase turned around while they were playing the game. Connor asked where his was. Angelica said, 'Whoops, my bad.' Angelica said that she would try to buy one for Connor at the library today. Chase asked if he could have the one in Angelica's hand. Connor got up from his seat and reached for the Energy drink. Angelica pulled it away and said that this one was hers.

Angelica's resistance strategies are partially successful. In general, once food is touched by another's hands or partially consumed, it is less appealing; the presence of another child's saliva can "contaminate" food or drink (Nukaga 2008; Turner 2003). However, as Nukaga (2008) observed, close friends sometimes find it acceptable to share drinks, food and utensils even when saliva may be present. By partially consuming the Energy drink, Angelica marked the drink with her saliva and

successfully made that particular can less appealing to Connor. Connor made it clear that he wanted a pristine, unopened Energy drink by asking where his was. Angelica employed additional strategies of forgetfulness and placation, claiming that she forgot Connor's Energy drink and offering to purchase him one on the field trip. Connor rejected this placation attempt by reinitiating private coercion: he tried to grab Angelica's drink out of her hand. Chase, who has less status than Connor, also attempted a form of private coercion in which he asked for Angelica's Energy drink without providing a rationale. Angelica simply ignored him. In the end, Angelica's resistance was partially successful because she was able to reserve her Energy drink for her own consumption, but only at the cost of continued coercion attempts.

In response to Angelica's new strategies of resistance, the boys increased their coercion efforts. Angelica, in turn, added to her repertoire of strategies for protecting her Energy drinks. The next day, Angelica again used the strategy of carrying a Energy drink which was open and partially consumed.

> **Excerpt 6: 6/19/08, second author's fieldnotes**
> Connor saw the Energy drink, walked up to Angelica and asked where his was. Angelica said oops. Chase said that Angelica had short term memory loss. Angelica laughed. Angelica said that the energy drink she had was nasty and asked Connor if he wanted it. Connor said sure. Max said that he wanted some too. Angelica told Connor that he should share the drink with Max. Connor said no and Connor went back to his seat in front of Guitar Hero. Angelica gave the drink to Max. Then Angelica then pulled out an unopened Energy drink from her purse and popped it open.

When Connor saw Angelica drinking "his" Energy drink, he immediately contested her ownership of the Energy drink. Angelica successfully fooled him into thinking that she had forgotten his Energy drink. She then prevented Connor from drinking any of the opened Energy drink by asking him to share it with Max. Max, a Latino sixth grader eligible for free lunch, was of lower status than Connor within the camp. The day before, the combination of partially consuming the Energy drink and pretending to forget resulted in Connor's attempt to physically swipe the Energy drink. Adding a suggestion to share with a lower-status boy made Angelica's resistance more potent. Rather than stealing her Energy drink, Connor walked away. In addition, Angelica resisted the boys' private coercion by hiding her resources. After she gave the partially consumed Energy drink to Max, Angelica revealed a second, unopened Energy drink in her purse. Because Chase and Max had proven willing to drink open Energy drinks before, Angelica drank this Energy drink when the boys could not see her. When the camp director told the kids to board the bus, Angelica frantically searched for a place to hide the open Energy drink.

> **Excerpt 7: 6/19/08, first author's fieldnotes**
> Angelica was the last one in the classroom. She ran up to me holding her Energy drink and asked me where to put it so the other kids wouldn't steal it. I suggested in a desk. Angelica put it in a desk and walked out.

When we returned from the field trip that day, Angelica immediately ran to the desk, pulled out her Energy drink and guzzled it triumphantly.

During this second week, Angelica brought four Energy drinks to camp. Of these four Energy drinks, Angelica managed to reserve two completely for herself and only gave away two partially consumed Energy drinks (one to Chase and one to Max). Angelica's strategies included partially consuming Energy drinks, pretending to forget her promises to bring Energy drinks, and offering to buy Energy drinks at

a later date. While these strategies prompted additional attempts at coercion, her most successful strategies were hiding Energy drinks and countering one economic arrangement by suggesting a second, inappropriate arrangement. Hiding was a successful strategy because the boys did not attempt to steal Energy drinks they did not know existed. Manipulating the rules of a social exchange also proved effective. When Angelica suggested Connor share with Max, she put Connor in an untenable position. Because Connor had no desire to demonstrate solidarity with a lower status boy, he simply walked away. Angelica's resistance strategies were so successful that Connor was unable to divest her of any Energy drinks during the second week of camp. He was, however, receiving Energy drinks from other girls on free and reduced lunch status that week.

Week 3: A tangle of economic arrangements. Angelica's successful resistance of Connor's private coercion was somewhat short-lived. On the fifth day that Angelica refused to provide Connor with Energy drinks, the boys increased their private coercion attempts. When Angelica walked into the meeting room with no Energy drink, Connor immediately approached her.

> **Excerpt 8: 6/23/08, first author's fieldnotes**
> Connor asked Angelica, 'Where's my Energy drink?' Angelica said she did not bring one for him, and that he needed to call and remind her on Sunday night. Connor walked back across the classroom.

Angelica drew on a strategy she had used the previous week and claimed that she had simply forgotten Connor's Energy drink. She elaborated on this strategy by suggesting that Connor had a responsibility to remind her. However, this week Angelica's resistance was not as successful. A few minutes later, Connor and his friends approached Angelica again to demand their Energy drinks. This time, the boys escalated their coercion efforts to include scrutiny, judgment and ridicule.

> **Excerpt 9: 6/23/08, second author's fieldnotes**
> Connor asked how much caffeine Angelica had today already. Angelica said not much and that she had a Energy drink and Mountain Dew. Chase said that was a lot of caffeine already and Angelica said, 'No, it's not.' Connor asked where his Energy drink was. Angelica said she forgot. Chase said that Angelica always forgot. Angelica said she really did this time because she was over at Kate's house this morning and did not have a chance to grab a Energy drink for Connor because she didn't get it before she left to go to Kate's house. Chase and Connor sarcastically said 'Sure.'

After Angelica resisted the boys' attempts at private coercion by claiming forgetfulness, the boys approached her in a group, scrutinized her caffeine intake, judged her for having too much caffeine, and insisted that she provide Energy drinks for them. When Angelica protested again that she had simply forgotten, the boys mocked her. Scrutiny, judgment and mockery augmented the boys' demand for more Energy drinks. The boys' strategies were successful because the next day Angelica walked into the meeting room holding another open, partially consumed Energy drink. Connor immediately grabbed the Energy drink out of Angelica's hand. While Angelica yelled at Connor and told him not to finish it, Connor gulped the remainder of the drink before handing the empty can back to Angelica (6/24/08, first author's fieldnotes).

Once Angelica had demonstrated that she would comply with Connor's coercion efforts, Connor and his friends began to use other economic arrangements. Initially, Connor responded to Angelica's newfound compliance by sharing with her.

Angelica came in and stood at the side of the room. Connor went up to Angelica. Angelica handed Connor an unopened Energy drink. Connor took it and went back to sit near the Guitar Hero game. Connor popped the tab of the drink and took a few gulps and then walked over back to Angelica and gave the drink back to her.

At first glance, it seemed as if Connor was willing to reward Angelica for her silent compliance by turning the event into a social exchange, demonstrating solidarity and perhaps even friendship with her. Indeed, were we to analyze this economic interaction as an isolated event, interpreting this as a social exchange would seem reasonable. Put in the context of subsequent interactions, this apparent social exchange fades into a facade of magnanimous generosity. After the camp had been called to order and kids boarded the bus for the day's field trip, Connor began to wish he had consumed a full Energy drink. On the bus, Connor sat up so that he could see over the seats and began to talk to the other boys.

Connor said that he wanted some more Energy drink. Angelica turned in her seat and told Connor that he had already drank half of her Energy drink. Connor said that the Energy drink that he got from Angelica earlier was warm and that was nasty. Connor asked a group of boys 'Hey guys, have you ever had a warm Energy drink?' No one responded. Connor said into the silence, 'That's right. You shouldn't because they're nasty.' Connor said that Energy drinks were his favorite. Angelica said that she was out of Energy drink and that she would have to go to the store and buy some more.

On this day, Connor initially used sharing to gain access to Angelica's resources. It is possible that Connor was dissatisfied with sharing part of a Energy drink because that was what the lower-status boys in his friendship circle did to gain access to Angelica's Energy drinks. After one brief sharing episode, Connor reverted to coercion to extract more Energy drink. Connor used public humiliation and shaming to extract Angelica's promise of future Energy drinks that would not have to be shared.

While Connor returned to private coercion after briefly using the social exchange of sharing, Connor's friends moved toward making trades in order to obtain the Energy drinks.

Chase was giving Angelica his hoodie. I walked by and asked what was going on and Chase said that he was giving Angelica his hoodie because she was going to buy him a Energy drink before we left the library.

Chase's hoodie had become a highly valued object within the peer culture the day the camp went ice skating. Most of the kids at the camp had worn shorts and shivered through the four hours at the ice rink. The warmth Chase's hoodie provided was highly sought after that day, and kids took turns wearing the hoodie. Since that day, even when the kids were outside in the Texas heat, kids vied to wear or carry Chase's hoodie. Consequently, Chase was able to make a trade with Angelica: he would lend her his hoodie and in exchange she would purchase an energy drink for him later.

It is important to point out that Angelica was not the only girl providing Connor and his friends with energy drinks. Nor was Angelica the only girl at camp to experience this mix of coercion, sharing and trading. Because of space limitations, we chose to describe the detailed series of interactions centering around Angelica in order to reveal how the economic arrangements unfolded over a period of time and in relation to previous interactions in the underground economy. Within this peer culture, only the highest status boy in this camp, Connor, was able to practice the purest form of coercion by simply taking unopened Energy drinks and demanding more. Connor's friends, who are not themselves of the highest status, are willing to settle for sharing opened and partially consumed Energy drinks and trading for other drinks. Asking the highest-status boy to use a strategy commonly employed by lower-status boys was an effective means of resistance because it led to a temporary cessation of coercion. When the highest-status boy briefly used sharing after a girl had renewed her compliance with his coercion efforts, he immediately returned to public mockery as a means of coercing more Energy drinks from her. These patterns add to the findings in the previous literature that sharing occurs among equal status friends and trading among non-friends of unequal status. We find that in this middle school camp, status is linked to the kinds of economic arrangements employed, with the highest status white boy primarily using private coercion to extract drinks from a lower status girl. Boys in the next status tier, however, were willing to use coercion, accept gifts and trade. Notably, although white boys in the camp would steal from the girls, Latino boys never resorted to stealing. Common behavioral routines in which high-status, middle-class white boys coerce food and money from white and Latina working-class girls widen economic disparities and recreate gender, race and class inequalities within the peer culture.

Discussion

At the summer camp we studied, middle school kids organized an underground economy governing the distribution of food and money which reflected and recreated status hierarchies. Examining race or gender in isolation could not explain which kids participated in specific economic interactions; for example, it would be inaccurate to say that boys practiced private coercion when it was *specific* boys who coerced energy drinks from *particular* girls. Using an intersectional approach (Collins 1998), we noted that middle-class white girls were able to distribute food in ways that emphasized the poverty and hunger experienced by white and Latina girls on free and reduced lunch status. Because there were no Latinas on regular lunch status in the camp, we were unable to observe whether middle-class Latinas also inflicted hidden injuries of class. Both white and Latina girls expressed dissatisfaction with their friends by converting previous sharing episodes into unpaid loans and sharing food in humiliating ways, although Latinas were more likely to do so with their white friends than their Latina friends. White, middle-class, popular boys often used private coercion to obtain food or energy drinks. The targets of their coercion attempts were white and Latina girls on free and reduced lunch status. Although white boys occasionally attempted to steal food and money from white girls on regular lunch status, middle-class white girls were more adept at preserving resources for their own use. Latino boys at the camp practiced coercion by asking girls for food and drink without providing a rationale, but we never once observed the Latino boys stealing. These routine economic transactions were patterned along gender, race, popularity

and class lines. As kids circulated food and money using these practices, they reinforced status distinctions within the peer culture.

This study makes four contributions to the nascent literature on children's underground economies and Goffman's (1961) analyses of economic exchanges. First, we extend previous research on underground economies in preschool and elementary school by examining economic transactions in a middle school peer culture. As in previous studies conducted in elementary schools, we found that middle school kids engaged in social exchanges like gifting and sharing with friends and that economic exchanges were rare. Consistent with previous research, the few trades we observed occurred between kids who were not friends and who occupied different statuses. In contrast to prior research, we found that private coercion played a much larger role in this middle school underground economy. Although we cannot be certain, we speculate that private coercion attempts may have been more prevalent because the disparity in monetary resources was greater in this middle school setting than in elementary school. Some middle school kids had access to larger sums of money than they did in elementary school because they had begun to work informally; some of the kids at the camp reported working paper routes, babysitting, and doing yard work for neighbors. The greater resources some kids brought to camp and the higher costs of food at field trip sites (often four or five dollars for a small snack) combined to create a situation of obvious inequality. Faced with conspicuous monetary disparities, a kid who is hungry for six hours may be more likely to view private coercion as a viable method for gaining access to food.

Second, because private coercion played such a large role in the peer culture, we were able to add to Goffman's (1961) analyses of the underground economy by analyzing how individuals resist unfavorable economic arrangements. Girls used several strategies to resist the boys' private coercion efforts including hiding their resources, making food less desirable by partially consuming it, pretending to forget food items at home, and placating boys by offering to bring food another day. These strategies proved to be only partially successful and boys continued to coerce girls into providing them with food, money and energy drinks. It was notable that working-class girls did not simply refuse boys' requests. Middle-class girls were more likely to issue clear refusals, but even they had to reinforce their refusals with other resistance strategies such as hiding their resources. Unfavorable arrangements in the underground economy of middle school provided an eerie preview of the sexual economy of high school. In high school, the compulsive heterosexuality boys enact emphasizes their ability to engage in sexual behavior with multiple girls and to overcome any resistance the girls may exhibit (Pascoe 2007). Working-class high school girls are more likely to find it difficult to resist boys' sexual advances while middle-class girls are more likely to develop a sense of control over their bodies and exert sexual agency (Martin 1996; Thompson 1994, 1995). As interpretive reproduction suggests (Corsaro 1992, 2005), kids bring knowledge and skills from one peer culture with them into the next; coercion and resistance dynamics practiced in the underground economy of middle school may pave the way for the sexual economy in the high school peer culture.

Third, we furthered Goffman's (1961) theorizing on the underground economy by highlighting the importance of analyzing *sequences* of economic transactions and individuals' responses instead of isolated transactions. Our analyses revealed that the most potent and intriguing forms of resistance occurred when kids countered one economic arrangement with another. For example, one of the most successful strategies for resisting private coercion attempts was to suggest an inappropriate social exchange. By manipulating the unwritten rules of a social exchange, girls were

able to counter unfavorable economic arrangements (such as the forced expropriation of an energy drink) with the suggestion that a high status boy then use the energy drink to demonstrate solidarity with a lower status boy. Between girls, when one friend wanted to deny a request to share food, she could simply convert a previous social exchange into an economic exchange on which her friend had defaulted. To protest this unfavorable denial of a request, girls would counter by converting a previous gift of their own into an unpaid loan.

Finally, we extend both Goffman's (1961) arguments about the functions of economic transactions and the literature on children's underground economies by examining economic interactions within the context of the peer culture. Although Goffman (ibidem) and ethnographers of children's peer cultures (Chin 2001; Nukaga 2008; Thorne 2005) suggested that social exchanges demonstrated solidarity between friends, we found that they could also function as forms of resistance, rewards for compliance with coercion efforts, threats to friendship, or a means of reinforcing hierarchy. Our results indicate that economic exchanges in the underground economy might have multiple functions and that the function of each exchange depends upon the current state of relationships in the peer culture. In sum, our analyses suggest that Goffman's (1961) typology of economic arrangements can provide greater insights into the recreation of inequality in kids' peer cultures if 1) economic interactions are examined as part of a sequence rather than as isolated events; 2) responses to economic arrangements are analyzed as part of the sequence; and 3) economic arrangements and resistance strategies are placed in the context of unfolding friendships and relationships.

Taken together, our results demonstrate that kids in one camp used the underground economy to interpretively reproduce and resist inequalities within their peer culture. However, the limitations of our study demand that our conclusions be approached with caution. Although we were present for the entire summer camp, the camp itself was of fairly short duration. It is entirely possible that common sequences of economic exchanges, their functions and effective forms of resistance would develop in new and unexpected ways had the peer culture lasted longer. In addition, only white and Latino kids attended the summer camp while the middle school population included white, Latino, Black, Middle Eastern, Asian and indigenous kids. The underground economy might change in significant ways within the context of a multi-racial peer culture. In order to better understand how underground economies recreate and disrupt status hierarchies, future research on children's underground economies needs to examine sequences of economic transactions in multi-racial peer cultures that are longer in duration. Such research might also identify the most common sequences of sharing, trading and coercion, facilitate comparisons with typical sequences in adults' underground economies, and further our understanding of how such sequences recreate inequalities across the lifespan.

Middle school kids created an underlife at camp which allowed them to develop a sense of self separate from the tolerant, egalitarian self espoused by the camp director. Consistent with interpretive reproduction (Corsaro 1992, 2005), we argue that kids used economic arrangements in the camp to address their own interests and concerns and to reproduce the wider social world. As kids addressed their own desire to obtain taboo food items, express displeasure about friends' abandonment, or end a temporary friendship, their economic transactions reproduced larger gender, race, and class dynamics in their own peer culture. By developing a greater understanding of how kids' economic practices recreate inequality, teachers, camp directors and concerned adults will be better prepared to whet kids' appetites for both food and equality.

Endnotes

1. We follow Thorne's (1993) practice of referring to middle schoolers by the term that they most often used themselves, kids, in order to maintain a side-by-side rather than a top-down approach to the summer camp.
2. In this school district, kids are eligible for free lunch if the family income is less than 130% of the federal poverty guidelines and reduced lunch if the family income is less than 185% of the federal poverty guidelines. In the 2007-2008 school year, a family of four would have had to earn less than US$26,845 to qualify for free lunch and less than US$38,203 to qualify for reduced lunch. Although kids at the camp explicitly discussed class differences, they used brand names of clothing and the quality of housing rather than lunch status to identify the class background of a subset of campers. We use lunch status as a crude measure of social class because we had access to all of the kids' lunch statuses.
3. The camp rarely provided milk to drink because many kids were lactose intolerant. We suspect that the camp avoided any kind of nut product in order to avoid triggering severe food allergies. Whatever the motivations, the consequence was that kids were provided with snacks consisting solely of carbohydrates.
4. Angelica's motivations for providing Connor and his friends with Energy drinks during the first week are unclear. We never observed her talking about her motivations. Despite her lack of success interacting with the boys, it is possible that she *hoped* the energy drinks would allow her access to their friendship group either as a friend or dating partner. As contextual evidence for this interpretation, we note that one of the other providers of energy drinks, Faith, did gain access to the group as Connor's girlfriend during the third week of camp.

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Narrative Approaches as A Supplementary Source of Knowledge On Marginalized Groups

Abstract

This article reflects upon two different research projects that involve narratives from youth in care and youth growing up in families with gay and lesbian parents. We argue that these narrative approaches may offer a supplementary source of knowledge on marginalized groups that often seem hard to reach. The first method involves the participant and researcher collaborating to convert an oral narrative into a written one. In the second, the participants write an autobiographical narrative by themselves, covering themes specified by a researcher. The article is structured so that we first look at the processes of co-creating narratives and collecting autobiographical testimonies. We then introduce the two different methodological approaches by referring to empirical examples. Finally we reflect on the methodological and ethical challenges that occurred during this research.

Keywords
Narrative approaches; Autobiographies; Youth in care; Youth in gay and lesbian families

According to Hine (2009), most understanding of the lives of young people is based on adults' perspectives and interpretations. Until relatively recently this has been taken for granted and seldom questioned (Hine 2009: 35). According to the UN Convention on the Right of the Child, children and youth have a legal right both to be heard and to express their opinions freely. The implementation of this convention has contributed to a change in the way children and youth are viewed in research, a change that demands a different understanding and an alternative perspective that actually involves children and young people (ibidem). A considerable body of literature now exists on children's and youth participation arguing for greater involvement of children and young people in decisions that affect them (Hill et al. 2004; Powell and Smith 2009). In spite of this, Powell and Smith (2009) claim that we still have a long way to go. It is not easy, they state, for children and youth to

participate in research when research agendas are set by an adult researcher (Kellett et al. 2004; Powell and Smith 2009). This issue represents an ongoing challenge within the field of research as well as for individual researchers. Our approach to the topic considers whether a narrative approach could offer children and youth greater possibilities to contribute in research in a way that they are comfortable with. Might a narrative approach also open a door to marginalized people often considered as "hard to reach"? Will the participants in our two research projects, which in many ways can be defined as investigations into marginality and stigmatisation, be better able to contribute their knowledge through a narrative approach?

Narratives and autobiographies

Along with the increasing body of literature concerning child and youth participation, the number of publications relating to narratives has increased massively over the last two decades. There is growing interest in the application of narratives in subjects such as anthropology and ethnography, sociology, psychology and medicine (Hydén 1997; Hydén 2008). As researchers, we are presented with new possibilities and challenges when gathering these many narratives. Narratives present and explain individual experiences by organising actions and events, creating a sense of fulfilment and a connection between the narrator and those listening or reading. Polkinghorne (1988) explains it this way:

> ….a form of 'meaning making'. /…/ Its particular subject matter is human actions and events that effect human beings, which it configures into wholes according to the roles these actions and events play in bringing about a conclusion. (p.36)

The narrative pulls the events together to create an understanding of cause and effect. But one action cannot simply be explained as the result of another according to some logical principle, and meanings cannot necessarily be explained through logic and rational language either. Bruner (1986) seeks to make this clear by drawing a distinction between the narrative, on the one hand, and the well-formulated logical argument on the other. There are two different types of knowledge, he claims - narrative knowledge and scientific paradigmatic knowledge. These are judged by different measures, and have their own unique demands in terms of formulation and accuracy. Both can be used to convince the listener or reader. But what they can actually convince someone of is different:

> …arguments convince one of their truth, stories of their lifelikeness. The one verifies by eventual appeal to procedures for establishing formal and empirical proof. The other establishes not truth, but verisimilitude. (p.11)

Narratives show meaning and their strength lies in their truthfulness and their verisimilitude. When we are listening to or read a good story, the narrator creates a "narrative truth." This is what we have in mind when we say that a story is good - that an explanation seems convincing.

When a narrative is interpreted in the context of research the immediate impression is no longer sufficient. Narratives are connected by language and subjectivity, and are contextualised by and consist of many threads and layers. They cannot be viewed simply as standalone events or as unconnected fragments, but relate to time, place, gender and class. Narratives can describe connections and

divides, surprising occurrences and everyday life. A narrative approach allows us to see a broader and more complex picture than one provided by asking limited questions or sticking firmly to specific themes. If the participant is allowed to express and explain what he or she thinks is meaningful, then one gets closer to what Bruner (1986) and Polkinghorne (1988) call *narrative comprehension*. Through narrative comprehension, a researcher seeks to understand and analyse the ways in which participants identify themselves and how they view their relationship with others.

One common factor between narratives is that the author looks back and reflects upon earlier experiences. He or she looks back at his or her history in the light of the present, and in this light, also at his or her expectations for the future. Narratives are, in that sense, an attempt to create order and continuity from looking back over life lived. Or, in the words of Laslett (1999), "... *they look back on and recount lives that are located in particular times and places*" (p.392). Narratives are not necessarily "windows of reality," but stories about the present and an anticipated future. Denzin (2000) expresses the constitutive function of narratives like this:

> Narratives do not establish the truth of…such events, nor does narrative reflect the truth of experience. Narratives create the very events they reflect upon. In this sense, narratives are reflections **on** – not **of** - the world as it is known. (p.xii/xiii)

Riessman (2008) maintains that narrative analysis consists of a series of methodological approaches. One of these is the *autobiography;* that is written accounts where researchers ask the participants to write down their life experiences and/or reflect on more specific themes.[1] Autobiographies are highly personalized texts in which the authors tell stories about their own lived experiences, relating the personal to the cultural (Richardson 2003). Through the writing process, the writer both creates and discovers who he or she is – or will become. But as we know, identity is fluid, and is always being shaped by the combined processes of being and becoming, belonging and wanting to belong. The written form allows, according to Hydén (2008: 50), "*a more elaborate and formal style and use of imagery, and a refined chronology of events.* " It distinguishes itself from the verbal form in that the researcher does not actively engage with the narrator. *The oral narratives* are constructed and produced through the process of interaction between narrator and researcher:

> The focus on story telling in various social contexts has led researchers to focus on both the performance of the story and its performative aspects. That is, both the way the story is told and performed in interaction jointly with the listeners, and what is done or accomplished through the telling of the story. (p. 51)

While Hydén (2008) highlights the importance of interaction between narrator and researcher, where what is being told is viewed in light of this, Richardson (2003) asserts that language is the most central factor for narratives. She shows how

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[1] Plummer (2005:86-87) splits or divides the term autobiography into three components, and describes the components as: "autos (what do we mean by the self?), bios (what do we mean by the life?) and graphe (what do we presume in the act of writing?). "Plummer further defines the purpose of writing autobiographies thus: "autobiographical writing aims to capture this self-reflexive process, to know it through consciousness, to ultimately understand the flow of this particular life. Part of the philosophy of autobiography, then, concerns this self-reflective debate and the streams of consciousness it provokes."

language does not reflect any social reality, but produces meaning and constructs social realities. Regarding language's importance for expressing one's self – our subjectivity – she writes the following:

> Language is not the result of one's individuality; rather, language constructs the individual's subjectivity in ways that are historically and locally specific. What something means to individuals is dependent on the discourses available to them. (p.508)

Narratives give us an insight into how the linguistic expressions used by the author affect the way in which the person concerned sees themselves and their subjectivity. The ways we construct our identities are therefore reflected in narratives. The author or narrator often finds that the patterns he or she now sees did not exist at the time when the events happened, but have arisen through the speaking or writing process. Reflecting in the present about events and experiences in the past, shows how lived life is situated in relation to factors such as time, place, relationships, culture and structure. With this in mind, we can interpret narratives as re-presentations - as the narrator or author's attempt to structure different events and motives in an effort to position the story within "*a discourse of truth and identity /…/ as an attempt to authorize the autobiography*" (Gilmore1994: 69).

Empirical examples

The data which forms the basis of this paper is drawn from two different studies. One of them was conducted with 10 youths aged between 18-27 years with experience of being in care (Follesø 2006). The other is based on 25 participants aged between 15-45 years who have grown up with gay and lesbian parents (Hanssen 2007). We will now present a brief description of the methodology involved and highlight some relevant examples.

Youth in the care system

The first research was conducted between 2004-05 and encompassed six girls and five boys. They had different backgrounds and came from different parts of Norway, but shared a common factor of having lived in a foster home or institution for long periods. Most of them had complex histories and had experienced regular moves between their family home, foster home and institutions. The youth were approached via Youth in Care, a non-governmental organisation established and run by youths that are or have been placed in the care of social services.

The narratives were arrived at in close collaboration with the individual concerned, and the time between the initial meeting and submission of a final, written narrative was around six months. The participants were introduced to the project via an initial conversation where they were given the chance to decide whether they wanted to proceed or decline. No-one chose to withdraw either at the outset or later in the process. Each youth was interviewed individually, starting with an open question about his or her's first memories about being in care. We followed up with questions related to what they chose to value within their narrative. In this way, themes gradually emerged that could be expanded upon. The interview was transcribed, then the researcher composed a draft narrative. This was achieved by charting events on a timeline, collating statements about each event and disregarding statements that did not belong to the dominant narrative. We took this

draft narrative back to the narrator to review and edit, discussed the text together, and adjusted it until the narrator approved the text as theirs.

The kind of themes that arose regularly involved stories of difficult family backgrounds and positive influences. The following examples come from Amalie (20) and Henning (21). Amalie explains:

> I started at school at the first place where we lived, just outside Oslo. Then we moved north, here I continued in first grade. I remember two different schools, and four different flats… I never knew when we were going to have dinner. Or who was home. Or if anyone was home at all. Or where we were gong to sleep. Sometimes we were woken up in the middle of the night to be driven somewhere. Social services had found us again … We hid – or she hid us. I can remember once I wasn't allowed to school. We had to pack everything and move to a camp site. (Follesø 2006: 72)

Positive influences could be a teacher, social worker or, as in Henning's' case, a sister:

> In many ways she was like my mother. She was responsible for me and helped me when I was a child. In many ways, I think we helped each other through the tough days. We could talk to each other about everything, even when words couldn't describe it. A look, a signal, just a movement was often enough. We had our own language, my sister and I. We weren't the kind of family that could talk around the kitchen table. We lived a kind of sign language type life, us two. Being a big sister is not always easy. Taking responsibility can sometimes mean doing things that sometimes not everyone appreciates. Like contacting social services when everything fell apart. She was the one who was blamed for everything that went wrong. Our parents blamed her for us having to move about, they didn't want to take the responsibility themselves. This is how it is to this day. (Follesø 2006: 46)

Youths growing up with gay and lesbian parents

The other study was conducted in 2004-06 and is based upon the participation of 25 people aged from 15 to 45 (most of whom were aged between 21-26), who have grown up in families with gay and lesbian parents. The participants come from Denmark and Norway. When the empirical work started out it was quite a challenge to attract participants. After sending a lot of emails and information about the study to different organisations, we began to receive replies from applicants who wanted to participate.

The participants were asked whether they preferred to be interviewed or write their life story themselves. Four of the participants preferred to write their own story, while the rest wanted to be interviewed. The participants who decided to write were asked to focus especially on three themes. One was "my family", where they were asked to explain who they considered family and what family meant to them. The second theme concerned the stigmatisation and difficulties they had experienced. The participants were asked to write whether they had experienced any kind of stigmatisation and whether they saw their families as included or excluded by society. The last theme concerned identity – "Who am I?" Here, they were asked to write about their everyday life, what kind of interests they had and about friends and

school or work. In addition, they were invited to introduce any theme, events or situations they deemed meaningful to their story.

Although no interviewer or collaborative partner participated during the writing process, some limitations were applied to their writing – mainly because they were asked to concentrate on specific themes. But once the participants had begun they were on their own - the researcher no longer had any influence on the process. What the participants wrote, the topics they chose to highlight and the way in which they wrote was left up to them.

Christine (31), chose a particular perspective when she wrote about her identity. She followed the themes that she had been asked to write about precisely, which meant that she started by writing about her family, then about stigmatisation and finally about identity. The section on identity was the longest part of Christine's autobiography and is where she reflected most. When writing about her identity, she chose to write about the experiences, thoughts and struggles related to her own sexual orientation. She begins her narrative like this:

> I have been married to a man for eight years and have two children by him.
> I see myself as bisexual but have only been with a woman twice.
>
> Until I was 18 years old, it didn't occur to me that I could be anything but heterosexual. Lesbianism belonged to a completely different generation – it was something my mother and women of her age were. It was not something that I associated with myself or other young women. But then I was (with my mother and stepmother) at a reunion party at Dannerhuset (which my mother had occupied in the past). And I saw some young women kissing each other. It was completely new to me, and I remember, it suddenly struck me: "I could definitely see myself there, kissing another woman!" Then I began to wonder whether I could be a lesbian too (Hanssen, work in progress)

It was entirely Christine's choice to place such an emphasis on her awakening to her sexual orientation. The topic itself opened up the possibility of writing about interests, friends, work and so on, but Christine only concentrated on the process that formed her sexual identity. This suggests that this process must have been very important to her and has occupied a sizeable proportion of her life and thoughts.

Oral and written stories: disparities, similarities and possibilities

Here are different ways in which a researcher can gather data – something these studies also illustrate. We have opted to collect data either by producing personal stories collaboratively between researcher and narrator or by asking participants to compose their narratives in relation to specific themes. Initially, these approaches might seem dissimilar, but, as we see it, there is more that unites than divides them. We will now discuss how these approaches can be an interesting supplement to other types of data collection.

The methods are similar partly because both involve the written form, even though the processes by which the written narrative is composed are quite dissimilar. When working with the texts produced by youth with experience of being in care, this process was complex because of the need to convert oral narratives into a written, coherent text. An interview transcription can make words appear odd and out of context even though they did not seem to be at the time of the interview itself. The

differing demands of written and oral forms account for some of this. The spoken form can be far from grammatically correct. We can repeat ourselves, interrupt ourselves and others, use half sentences or make unsupported assumptions. The speaker may have known what they are saying at the time and the listener may have understood, but, when the speech is transcribed, it can appear completely different. It can seem imprecise or hesitant or the person can, contrary to how they seemed within the conversation, appear to have a poor grasp of language (Fog 1994). This means that the narratives' oral nature, with their meandering, broken formulations and associations, has to be overcome through a rigorous consultation process between the narrator and researcher.

Narratives invite the narrators to highlight what they themselves consider important. For instance, when a participant is asked to write an autobiographical narrative and is given specific topics, it is up to the narrator whether he or she wishes to emphasise some topics over others. This allows them to write about issues that concern them, more so than if they were directed to answer specific questions. The fact that the narrator is not "disturbed" by the researcher during the writing process means that he or she can dip in and out of the written narrative and reflect upon whatever they choose. Autobiographical narratives can therefore give the researcher access to the practices and thoughts in the way in which the narrator chooses to present them. Where a participant is interviewed and works out a text afterwards in collaboration with the researcher, the focus will be on whatever information the participant wants to impart. In other words, it is the participant's own perspectives and choices that are dominant – the researcher does not control or start to steer the contextual direction. The researcher must be responsive and probing, and follow up the topics that the participant wishes to focus on.

When conducting this kind of research, one has to be prepared for surprises. Individual experience is systematised through the personal story in such a way as to create coherence and completeness both for the person that tells their story and the person who reads it. Inviting someone to discuss something that they themselves deem important can, if prepared for, create an opportunity to discuss issues that are not normally enquired about. Whereas set questions can close doors or guide answers in a particular direction, the narrative approach can open up and lead in completely unexpected directions. In the projects that we refer to here, the narrative did indeed provide an opportunity to highlight topics that we had not initially considered as central – and the narratives went in different directions to the ones we had expected. One example is Henning, who had once been able to speak with his sister about everything. Henning had lived in a foster home for many years and it had been assumed that the main issue he would focus on would be his feelings about life in a foster home. However, this turned out to be of secondary importance. What turned out to be the most important narrative to Henning was the painful separation that he had experienced when he was younger. After having relied on his sister as the only fixed focus in his life, he had gone through the trauma of their having been placed in separate homes. Brother and sister gradually lost touch with each other, something that is still painful for Henning. In his case, the narrative opened up into a further discussion of how sibling relationships can be maintained when children are placed outside the parental home. Another example is Christine, who strongly emphasised in her autobiography her experiences and reflections relating to sexuality and sexual identity. Instead of emphasising other narratives, this was – surprisingly enough – the only focus she had when she was writing about the make-up of her personal identity.

Hydén (2008) asserts, as mentioned earlier, that there is a division between oral and written texts. This divide he describes - with reference to Linell and Bauman - as the following:

> The norms for written stories are in many ways different from those of spoken language (Linell 2005). /…/ These norms and forms are rarely used in the telling of oral and conversational narratives, where those aspects having to do with the necessity and importance of engaging the audience through the whole story telling event and delivering a point are much more important (Bauman 1987). (Hydén, 2008: 50-51)

Hydén pinpoints the central difference between oral and written narratives. Autobiographies allow for the possibility of meandering backwards and forwards without being directly influenced by the researcher, whereas oral narratives are produced and shaped collaboratively with the researcher. On the other hand, we are critical of the assertion that "*engaging the audience*" and "*delivering a point*" should be more central to oral delivery than when it comes to written narratives. Our experience is that the narrators, whether they are recounting verbally or in written form, are equally concerned about both engaging the recipient of the narratives and portraying what are, to them, the most significant points.

Despite the differences between the oral and written narratives within our research project, it is the similarities that are most striking. There are two specific conditions that we wish to highlight in this regard. Firstly, both approaches give the narrator *time.* This means that the narrator is given a chance to work on their narrative over a longer timeframe than is common with qualitative interviews. Through a recurring process – either through the researcher and narrator continually returning to their narrative, or through the narrator writing, editing and working on their autobiography – greater possibilities arise for new and further reflections than would do with a narrative that is produced only once. Secondly, we believe that our mode of approach is appropriate for engaging with marginal groups that are otherwise difficult to reach. While the prospect of a traditional formal interview might appear threatening, the discussion of one's narrative – or writing it oneself – is a situation in which more people are comfortable. Here, researchers can ensure that it is the narrator's own experiences that are important – and not the researcher's own preconceived categories.

The researcher's influence

A narrator always has an audience, and within a research project the audience is generally the researcher. Through narratives, the researcher tries to understand events and meaning the way that a narrator portrays it. By speaking or writing down a cohesive narrative, the narrator is encouraged to share their own understanding and interpretation, and the space for cohesive thoughts is bigger than with other approaches within research. This doesn't necessarily mean that the researcher's influence disappears. What influence, then, does the researcher have when portraying a narrative?

In the two approaches that are presented here – ie oral narratives and autobiographies – the researcher's influence might at first seem different. The oral narratives were based on an introductory interview, as explained earlier. Despite the open form of questioning, the researcher is able to guide both the turnings and choices, and the researcher's interests will consciously or unconsciously be able to

steer the narrator in the desired direction. The next stage of the process, however, allows the participant to have a greater degree of involvement during which they can correct the researcher's influence. Through their amendments and additions, the participants become involved in the formation of the narrative so that everyone has responsibility for their own narrative. So, the narrator and researcher carry out a work of a performative and creational character. When it comes to the autobiographies, the process is somewhat different. Here, the researcher's participation – and therefore their influence – is marginal during to the author's writing process. The researcher's influence is there at the initial phase - that is, in the formulation of the invitation and the definition of the narrative's topic and scope. After that, the author is left on their own to decide for themselves what they want to put down on paper and pass on to others. The researcher's influence will again be strong when the narrative is interpreted and analysed.

Regardless of which approach is chosen, a researcher will have to reflect on their own role and understanding, as neither a researcher nor a narrator exists in a context-free, neutral environment. Everyone uses their prior understanding as a basis for seeing meaning and patterns in their surroundings. This understanding will be partly conscious, partly unconscious. The researcher's task is to try as much as possible to highlight this context and in doing so show which parameters the analysis falls within. This process of awareness Haraway (1991) describes *as situated knowledge*. Science and knowledge, she claims, must always be understood contextualised, localised or situated.

As researchers we have preconceptions of the people we meet. Marginalisation and vulnerability are terms that contain normative narratives, and which change in relation to historical, cultural and social conditions (Lundberg 2005). In our meetings with vulnerable or marginalised groups it is therefore highly important that we reflect on how we are localised and situated in time, place and culture. But it isn't just about how we as researchers from our own perspective perceive what we see and hear; it is just as important how participants or informants perceive us as researchers. They also view their lives from their own contexts and will often have preconceived views on who we are as researchers, where we come from and what we want from them. This also raises possible imbalances of power and position, differences which – if they are not addressed – can subconsciously steer what is being said and how it is being said.

The researchers therefore have a clear influence within narrative research. They initiate the narratives, choose the boundaries of the topics, and are also central in the way in which the narratives are shaped and constructed. Furthermore, the analysis of the narrative depends on what the researcher recognises as a pattern, their preferred theoretical perspectives and not least what they choose to omit. The researcher's situatedness is therefore of undoubted importance.

Conclusion

Our experience is that participants in research projects get a clearer voice through telling their narratives orally or in written form than when compared to other quantitative and qualitative research. The two methods that we have discussed in this article therefore represent key approaches that provide us with an opportunity to listen to voices that often go unheard. We can therefore see that both oral narratives and autobiographies can offer important supplementary knowledge when engaging with people who are not always easy to reach.

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Beyond Conceptual Ambiguity: Exemplifying The 'Resistance Pyramid' Through The Reflections Of (ex) Prisoners Agency

Abstract

Contemporary resistance scholarship increasingly positions individuals as agents operating within power relations and as such, this stimulating and diverse body of work illuminates the complexity of power-resistance. The richness of this academic engagement notwithstanding, there continues to be a paucity of work which offers a framework for conducting an analysis of resistance. In this article, we propose a general framework through which power-resistance can be coded, analyzed and theorized. Using data from an ethnomethodological study of 20 former long-term male prisoners in Canada, we demonstrate the usefulness of our 'resistance pyramid' to render visible the objectives, purposes, strategies, tactics and skills which characterize the processes, and not just the practices, of resistance. We argue that it is exactly these, often obscured, processes that allow us to appreciate the density of resistance-power, the multiple ways it operates and the significance of individuals' social, personal or political capital.

Keywords

Resistance, Prison, Parole, Ethnomethodology

Michel Foucault's work (1978, 1982) opened the door to think about power and resistance in new ways that transcend the binary understanding of resistance as the opposite of monolithic 'power' (Rose 1999: 279). Rather than "power with a capital P" (Foucault 1980: 185), a proper noun that can be imposed because it is possessed (by an individual, institution or the state), power is conceptualized as permeating all social interactions - both an effect and condition of other relations and processes. It follows that resistance is necessarily in a reciprocal and constitutive relationship to power (Foucault 1978: 95). Moreover we can use resistance "as a chemical catalyst so as to *bring to light* power relations" (Foucault 1982: 780) [*emphasis ours*] - or put another way, to render the invisible visible.

In real terms this conceptualization of power-resistance immediately opens up a space to untangle some of the contradictions evident in analyses of agency. We can acknowledge that resistance is always conditioned by the possibilities afforded

by social location, cultural and material resources, and the far-reaching ideological instruments of advanced capitalism (Scott 1985: 320). This does not mean that resistance is futile (Willis 1977) or that without an articulated political consciousness "groups are seldom able to develop a counter-ideology to legitimate their own oppositional activities [and thereby ensure] that they remain hidden even to themselves" (Thompson 1966: 174). Quite the opposite, marginal(ized) people are well aware of their oppression but they are also cognizant of the costs of open insubordination (Scott 1985). Scott (1990) sensitizes us to the complexity of everyday politics: we can appreciate that social actors may feign complacency and, rather than challenging the hierarchical relation of ruling, assert agency by employing the "public transcript" (Scott 1990: 152) to their advantage.

If resistance is hidden, subtle and diffused the question becomes, what analytic point of entry allows us, as researchers, to discern the complex (and sometimes contradictory) nature of power relations? How can we recognize the unequal distribution of personal, social and political capital and acknowledge the politics of everyday acts without defining "any sign of life at all as that mythical thing, resistance" (Pringle 1989: 150)? What rigorous analytic approach would illuminate not just *practices* but also *processes.*

In this article we tender a model that allows us to untangle the knotty threads of resistance so that the individual strands are once again recognizable. We begin with a brief consideration of the resistance literature in sociology, drawing out the key arguments and reflecting on how this body of work is simultaneously the source of our enthusiasm and our frustration. Next we present the 'resistance pyramid', which is simultaneously a conceptual framework and methodological tool that allows us to observe the complexity and nuances of resistance and to render visible its hidden components. The remainder of the article consists of an application based on our own research with long term prisoners.

The Literature

In the last fifteen years there has been an explosion of academic attention to the question of resistance. In our own field of criminology we see that, unlike earlier Marxian-influenced work that positioned resistance as oppositional to a monolithic power embodied by the State (c.f Hepburn 1985; Taylor, Walton and Young 1973; Garson 1972; Gramsci 1992) this contemporary literature builds on the insights of Foucault (1978, 1982) and speaks to power-resistance as productive. The result is a rich and varied body of literature that attends to the resistance of incarcerated men (Cohen & Taylor 1981; Crewe 2007; Gaucher 2002; Fox 1999; Godderis 2006) and women (Bosworth 1999; Bosworth and Carrabine 2001; Carlen 2001); heroin users (Friedman and Alicea 1995); IRA members (Buntman and Huang 2000; Aretxaga 1995; McEvoy, Shirlow and McElrath 2004); 'rave' promoters (Heir 2002); CCTV operators (Norris and McCahill 2006); erotic dancers and other sex workers (Jeffrey and Macdonald 2006; Bruckert 2002); aboriginal communities (O'Malley 1996) and 'subcultural' youth (Haenfler 2004) among others. This criminological interest echoes that of other social scientists who are 'discovering' and bringing to light the agency of populations historically constructed as unengaged victims of oppression.[1] We read this literature with growing enthusiasm; it illuminated the often obscured agency of

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[1] See for example the work on such diverse populations as waitresses (Tibbals 2007), nursing home staff (Jervas 2002), and steel workers (MacKenzie et al. 2002).

marginal social actors. From this literature we came to appreciate the significance of the "hidden transcript" (Scott 1990) and saw that resistant acts "... can be classified along the axis of individual/collective, passive/violent and everyday/exceptional" (Bruckert 2004: 844-845). It also drew attention to murky and contentious questions: Is intentionality a prerequisite for resistance?; Can one resist without an action?; Can compliance be read as resistance and if so, under what circumstances? In short, it broadened and deepened our understanding and forced us to contemplate resistance in new and exciting ways.

Introduction of the Model

Inspired by the literature and in the process of research with formerly imprisoned men, we started to reflect on the many forms of our participants' resistance. That these individuals resisted in multiple ways was immediately evident to us; in many studies; we could list the acts, offer up rich descriptions and provide ample evidence of agency, creativity and of the insights of the participants. Our initial delight was soon replaced with frustration as We were delighted but became frustrated when we, sought, as good social scientists, sought to *systematically* apply the concept in order to 'make sense' of the data. We realized that we were without the tools to shed light on the entire *ensemble* of practices which constitute resistance. We wanted to move beyond the action to tease out the goals, the processes and the skills. In other words, it was at this point that we confronted the malleability of the concept, the fuzzy edges and the lack of an analytic framework, and so we turned back to the literature. Cohen and Taylor's (1981) work, *Psychological Survival*, provided a model but one that was too limited to capture the diversity of resistance that was emerging from our data. In other scholarship we found multiple examples and fascinating discussions but no systematic, articulated methodology. We also tried to draw on other frameworks (feminist, geographic, etc.) but this led us into a piecemeal approach that seemed like trying to fit use a single bed sheet to cover a King size bed; no matter how we pulled at the edges, it never quite fit and something was left uncovered.

Unable to locate a systematic model, we began by operationalizing the terms frequently found in the literature. We often encountered the words, 'tactics' and 'strategies' but these were rarely defined or were simply used synonymously. Some scholars relied on De Certeau (1984: 37) who argued that strategies are tools of the powerful (institutionalized and supported by dominant discourses) whereas tactics are deliberate actions "determined by the absence of power". For us, this *absence* of power was impossible to reconcile with the Foucauldian model of power/resistance as mutually constitutive. We then turned to the Oxford English Dictionary which defined a strategy as "a plan for successful action based on the rationality and interdependence of the move of the opposing participants". This is distinct from a tactic which is the "mechanical movements of bodies" (OED 2008). This, admittedly militaristic model, provided a point of entry. As we worked with the data, we saw that particular strategies were linked with distinct tactics; however, we also came to appreciate the need for more nuance. It was clear that employing strategies and tactics required specific skill sets that worked in tandem with the broader objectives – things: "aimed at or sought; a target, goal, or end" (OED 2008).

The resistance process, as conceived under this model, has six tiers which we represent in Diagram 1. This image is conceived of as a pyramid rather than a triangle because a single (in)action may have several purposes and/or strategies;

therefore, a three dimensional image symbolically represents the multiple angles of approach that are integral to our orientation. The hierarchical image is not intended to speak to the nature of power or power relations; rather it is a model which obliges us to pull apart the pieces and reassemble them in order to see the process of resistance. Each component is a pre-condition of the one which falls 'below' it on the pyramid allowing an analytic point of entry at each tier.


Diagram 1. Resistance Pyramid

In order to systematically address each of the elements represented as a tier in the pyramid, we formulated six questions that could be posed to the data. Drawing on Bosworth's (1999) insight that, despite confinement "… prisoners are always in some manner engaged in the negotiation of power inside" (10), our first question[2] became 'within the context of power/resistance relations, was agency exerted?'; this allowed us to examine (in)action as resistance without becoming locked into the sometimes tautological arguments regarding intentionality. The second question ('If so, what manifestation(s) of power relations is/are being challenged?') sought to illuminate the particular purposes of the challenge(s) and puts us in line with Faith's (1994) argument that it is the strategies of power that are contested, not power itself. Based on our data and that of others, we identified four principle strategies and our third question ('Does their approach subvert, contest, or counter power relations?') was developed to explore these. We then asked, 'what specific procedure is employed to meet the strategy?' and this became the fourth question. In order to further texture our understanding of resistance we asked. "which skills, competencies and/or resources are drawn upon? Our final question, "what is the (in)action?" sought to ground the analysis materially and ultimately often proved to be our analytic point of entry.

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[2] The numbering of the questions given here is for simplicity rather than as applied sequencing. In many cases, the answer to the last question was answered first or we started with the third question.

These questions seemed like they could be applied to the studies we had read but without access to the raw data we were unable to test the framework. In order to move beyond abstract, hypothetical postulations, we turned to our own current research to exemplify the type of analysis which we thought was possible using the resistance pyramid. In the coming sections, we briefly describe the research project, apply the model to this data and consider how this approach might be of use to other scholars.

The Research

The broader research project from which this data was drawn was interested in the release, reentry and resettlement experiences of successful former long-term prisoners in Canada. Using the Correctional Services of Canada definitions of long term imprisonment and success all participants had been sentenced to 10 or more years of incarceration and had been released from prison at least 5 years prior to the interview and had incurred no new convictions during that time. In total, 20 semi-structured interviews lasting between one hour and two and a half hours were conducted.

The majority (16) of the men in this sample were serving Life sentences which, in Canada, means that an individual is given a minimum period of incarceration but no maximum. The amount of time served ranged between 10 years and more than 30 years with a median time of 17 years. The minimum time since release was 5 years but two of the men had been out of prison for over 20 years at the time of their interview. Given the amount of time served, it is not surprising that the men who participated in this research were predominantly middle aged: twelve of the men were between 40 and 55, seven of the men were over 56 and only one was under 40 years of age.

Each of the interviews was transcribed verbatim and marked for both "in vivo" codes (terms used by informants) and "constructed codes" (more abstract and drawn out by the researcher) (Jackson 2001: 202). This process allowed for a detailed read of each of the transcripts – a process referred to as reading the 'vertical axis' (Pettigrew 1990; Pires 1997) wherein the focus is on the depth of each story. In the end, we had 109 different passages which spoke to the men exerting agency within the context of power/resistance relations and we applied the framework to make sense of these diverse and often detailed examples.

Applying the Model to [Ex]prisoners

As already noted, the men's narratives immediately revealed them to be agents who actively resisted within the repressive relations of power that characterized the prison and post-carceral periods.[3] By applying our six resistance questions to the data, we were however able to transcend description, move beyond the surface level and engage with the thickness of the men's experiences in power-relations.

Evidently, we could answer our first question ('within the context of power/resistance relations, was agency exerted?') in the affirmative and this allowed

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[3] While all the men provided multiple examples of resistance, some also questioned the efficacy and need for resistance.

us to then consider which manifestations of power relations were being challenged; ultimately, we identified nine distinct purposes that are represented in Diagram 2.

*Diagram 2. Purposes of Resistance for Former Long-term Prisoners*

Diagram 2. Purposes of Resistance for Former Long-term Prisoners.

Most frequently, the men problematized correctional rules and regulations and the day-to-day actions of state representatives. Having endured many years of confinement and/or surveillance wherein their routine existence was monitored, timed and regulated (Bosworth 1999; Foucault1978; Goffman 1961) and subject to seemingly random acts by the state, it is not surprising that the (ex)prisoners pushed against the boundaries on a somewhat regular basis in effort to gain a measure of control.

Once the broad purposes were rendered visible to us, we were positioned to ask whether their approach subverted, contested, or countered power relations. We could also now consider the unique tactics adopted and the skills required to do so effectively. It is to these last four questions, represented in diagram 3, that we now turn.

Diagram 3. Strategies and Tactics of Resistance

Tactics of Contestation

The most efficacious strategy was contestation which we defined as an overt challenge based on negotiation, ability to reason and discursive strategies. Contestational tactics were relied upon when the men felt that 'common sense' or logic was being neglected. Frequently, the men would bring their rational arguments to a person who held a position of influence, who could understand their points and intervene on their behalf: we refer to this tactic as 'appealing to a higher authority'. Tangentially, the men who were knowledgeable about institutional directives would draw attention to the incongruities between the policies and the practices. Fred, spoke of challenging the correctional practice of checking with a parolee's employer:

> ... it's hard enough out for me as it is, to get a job out there ... my argument is, 'well, you can't be going around and calling my employers saying oh, this is so and so, and ... I'm calling to check on Fred just to make sure that everything's going good with him'. And I said 'no, no. That doesn't happen ...how am I supposed to have a normal life if you're going to be ... intruding

in it' ... she didn't really like it at first but I think she seen my point ... after I talked her a little more about it.

Other times, the men would negotiate with agents of the state to find compromise positions that acceptable to both parties. In a variation on this tactic ('open and honest engagement') the men would 'lay their cards on the table' and outline what they were and were not willing to do; this was not a negotiation but instead a clear statement of their position.

Drawing attention to the state's problematic reliance on documentary evidence was the final tactic of contestation we identified. As Foucault (1978) notes, a prisoner's file creates a 'truth' upon which further decisions are based: "in fact, power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of objects and rituals of truth. The individual and the knowledge that may be gained of him belong to this production" (Foucault 1978: 194). Not surprisingly, prisoners (who have little control over the contents of their dossier) contest the significance afforded to it by state agents. In one particularly poignant example, F.G. spoke of asking to see the parole board well before he was eligible in order to counter-balance the information in his file and the effect of this was, in his words, "... you cease to be a piece of paper and you become a person."

The efficacy of the contestational strategy was contingent on possessing various forms of capital. The men who used these accompanying tactics drew upon their ability to articulate a rational argument, their knowledge of correctional policy (and the less formal 'convict code'), their awareness of dominant discourses, their reputation and their leadership skills.

Tactics of Counterforce

As Carrabine (2005) suggests, when strategies of contestation fail, a more spectacular, direct and overt approach may be employed and borrowing from Faith (1994), we labelled these as counterforce. As we can see in Diagram 3, there were five tactics employed by the men who adopted counterforce. The first of these was 'political action' which we defined as intervention designed to realize wholesale change in either policy or practices and which often relied on a sense of collectively to accomplish a particular end (McEvoy, Shirlow and McElrath 2004; Buntman and Huang 2000). In our sample, this tactic was infrequently employed; this finding may speak to the fact that most of our respondents did not come to prison with an already developed political consciousness.

Others used 'dramatic symbolic acts' to draw attention to various issues such as abuse of power by the state's agents; participation in Prisoners' Justice Day, hunger strikes and escapes were examples given to illustrate this type of approach. Sometimes the symbolic act operated solely at the discursive level with individuals taking a public stand in order to register objections but ultimately, complying rather than facing disciplinary action. Other times, faced with complex power relations, an individual may oscillate between contestation and counterforce[4] is Bobby:

> It took a 32 day hunger strike to, you know, finally get their attention ... It took two years ... to finally get a parole board hearing where they started to acknowledge some of these letters and some of these actual factual

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[4] This example well illustrates the multiple angles of approach inherent in the pyramid.

documentations that I'd been submitting -- before that they refused to hear. Absolutely refused.

Unlike some studies that examine resistance as emerging out of occurrences like prison riots (Carrabine 2005), in our study, violence (and related acts of aggression) as a tactic of counterforce was mentioned only once[5]. However, the men did speak of using 'litigation', or more accurately, the threat of it, as a counterforce tactic. In one example, Ziggy, who had little cultural or convict capital to draw upon, spoke of bringing his lawyer to his parole hearing:

> They [parole board] had no reason not to let me go but I brought a lawyer ... the lawyer just went in and turned on the tape machine. His own. They said, 'you can't do that'. [lawyer says] 'Well, yes I can. You can shut your machine off as many times as you'd want but this machine will stay on.'

In reflecting back upon the strategy of counterforce our findings were incongruent with those of Scott (1990) who argued that social actors are most likely to feign complicity when power differentials are extreme. In our study, we found that in the carceral period, when control and domination were most oppressive, counterforce was frequently employed; force was met by force. However, as the men embark on the longer resettlement process, we see an interesting transformation - rather than being used for their own benefit, counterforce resistance is employed in the interests of the collectivity. The men speak of using the various tactics to break down stereotypes or to improve the life of those still incarcerated. In a sense, the solidarity that we did not see while the men were imprisoned emerged when they had re-established themselves in the community and achieved a level of success.

Tactics of Subversion

Covert challenges to power relations that undermined daily functioning of the correctional apparatus were categorized as 'subversive' strategies. The tactics, as shown in Diagram 3, took three main forms: 'working the system' (wherein the men would consciously manipulate the correctional process in their own interest), 'managing biographical data' to which the state had access and what we refer to as 'non-engagement' (which is a conscious but passive refusal to be a subject of the penal apparatus). This subtle and often hidden strategy was usually characterized by fatalistic undertones; the men saw themselves as a players in a 'rigged game' wherein the only way to exert some control (even if it was to their detriment) was to attempt to 'restack the deck' or remove themselves from the table. Invoking the metaphoric language of a contest, F.G. provided a story through which the tactic of 'working the system' is visible:

> they said, you've got to do the Phoenix Course ... and I said, I think I know what they're going to do. So, I went in, took the first test. I cook with butter ... I eat ice cream, I eat potatoes and I eat all this. I don't eat vegetables, and I got something like. ... a 25 or something. And after six weeks of the

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[5] This finding may speak to a methodological consideration. A prisoner whose file indicates that they are aggressive will be defined as 'high risk' by correctional authorities and therefore denied parole. Since we specifically interviewed only men who had been released and successfully reintegrated, such individuals not captured in our sample.

> course, I was eating whole wheat bread ... I went from like 20% up to 95% ... I played your game, I know how to play the rules.

The conscious non-engagement of individuals was an interesting strategy that was adopted exclusively while the men were in prison and which drew heavily upon the 'convict code' and their ability to 'do time'. In contrast to the counterforce tactic of non-compliance, non-engagement was not about actively resisting *elements* of the system, but rather, about passive refusal of it in *total*. Men spoke of gaining control by not subscribing to the goals of the state; they refused to accept the need to move through the penal system and eventually be released. Gowan provides an example:

> I just took life as it was ...I didn't push the envelopes. I didn't write; I didn't get involved in parole boards; I didn't try to meet with PO's. I didn't bother with anything. I didn't put in a transfer ... I just laid there. Until finally my wife and the POs were all working behind me.

As the last sentence of Gowan's quote alludes to, this tactic of non-engagement can have the effect of disrupting power relations so significantly that the penal system assumes the responsibilities that it formerly placed on the individual.

Discussion

Foucault's (1978, 1982) reflections on power inspired a generation of scholars to think about resistance as dynamic, omnipresent and inevitable. Earlier, we asserted that his work was the point of departure for rich and exciting scholarship that rendered visible the often obscured agency of social actors at the same time as it engaged with questions of power relations. That said, we (along with others) would argue that his musings are conceptually fascinating but empirically limited and methodologically ambiguous (see also Meadmore et al. 2000; Tamboukou 1999). Resistance scholars have certainly addressed the former limitation; however, the absence of careful attention to methodological issues[6] continues to characterize much of the literature. It is this matter that we sought to address in this paper by modelling the process of 'pulling apart' resistance and demonstrating how the asking specific questions of the data is essential. Not only does it bring to light the *ensemble* of resistance, it positions us to move beyond practices to the systematic analysis of process. It is exactly these, often obscured, processes that allow us to see the complexity of resistance-power, the multiple ways it operates and the significance of individuals' social, personal or political capital. Finally, but significantly, the 'resistance pyramid' is a template to realize analytic integrity and bring some much needed methodological transparency and rigour to resistance studies.

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[6] This methodological absence may have been intentional. Foucault (1994: 288) is on record as stating that he took "care not to dictate how things should be". Arguably then some scholars might be reticent to detail a method for fear of being dismissed as non-Foucauldian or proscriptive. In light of our commitment to methodological rigour this is not an argument that resonates with us.

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Secondary Adjustment In Prisons: Prisoners' Strategies Of influence

Abstract

This participant observation research explores and examines the strategies that prisoners use to influence prison officers in an Asian prison setting. Grounded theory meth{\bf y} is employed in the analysis process. From the study, eight strategies of influence are conceptualised: *repetition, distraction, finding excuses, feigning ignorance, false compliance, hearsay, direct hit* and *spontaneous protest*. They are further subsumed under three main categories of *Enhancers, Trouble Shooters* and *Resistors*. On the other hand, there are three categories of prison officers with respect to their responses to the eight strategies of influence – *Idealists, Pragmatists* and *Authoritarians*. In summary, this study serves three objectives. First, it provides a fresh perspective on how prisoners attempt to influence prison officers in their daily interactions. Second, it has demonstrated that data collection through covert participant observation can be done effectively without causing any harm to the stakeholders in a prison setting. Lastly, this study has implications for the development of theory, practice and future research in the area of penology.

Keywords
Secondary adjustment; Influencing Strategies; Covert Participant Observation; Grounded Theory.

As a prison officer, I was always intrigued by the mini-society that existed in the prison setting. I was constantly wondering how power dynamics played a part in such unique prison officers – prisoners' relationships. The exercise of power, status and influence by both parties in this relationship baffled but yet fascinated me. And I was particularly interested in understanding how prisoners at the supposedly disadvantaged end of this power imbalance deal with the prison officers in their daily interactions. Thus, my curiosity in these issues brought me to conduct this inquiry on the dynamics of the dealings between the prisoners and prison officers.

Prison is a place in which new norms are formed, due to the presence of unique institutional pressures such as the loss of personal freedom and rights, adjustment to new living conditions and social relationships, dealing with prison control mechanisms such as rules, regulations and punishment. (Sykes 1958). Prisoners

have to adjust their behaviours in accordance to these new norms that are totally different from those in the normal outside society. In the prison setting, power is exercised by the institutional staff extensively on the inmates in restricting and intervening in, their social behaviours (Goffman 1961). This is because the control of prisoners is usually perceived by the prison administrators as the ultimate goal in the efficient functioning of any prison (Scharf 1983). The control mechanisms such as withdrawal of privileges, loss of good time, lock down etc. are exercised to bring the prisoners back into compliance (Hamm, Cuopez, Hose and Weinstein 1994). The prisoners usually perceive such control mechanisms as a form of violation of their human rights but they have no means of removing them. Therefore, they have to cultivate a system of secondary adjustments that do not directly challenge the staff but still allow them to obtain certain forbidden satisfactions (material or emotional ones) or to get away from certain sanctions (Goffman 1961). Thus, the different forms of interactions between the prisoners and prison officers are strongly characterized by such secondary adjustments amidst the institutional rules, routines and other control mechanisms (Goffman 1961; Rosenhan 1973). Such institutional rules, routines and control mechanisms aim to restrict or thwart certain undesirable prisoners' behaviours or activities (as perceived by prison administrators). To contravene this, unique forms of influencing techniques (secondary adjustments) are created by the prisoners. These secondary adjustments serve to assist the prisoners in exerting indirect influence on the prisoner officers in order to achieve their own personal interests through a non-confrontational avenue (Goffman 1961). In this paper, such possible secondary adjustments by the prisoners would be explored and investigated in the context of this research.

Importance of This Study

This study aims to understand the strategies of influence employed by prisoners on the prison officers in achieving their personal aims. This area of study has been largely ignored in the local context. Thus, this study can help to fill up the relevant gaps in the current literature. On the other hand, this study also serves as an important source of information for any researcher who is planning to study the behaviours of prisoners. Third, by understanding the influencing behaviours of the prisoners, this study provides another important learning resource for aspiring prison officers. Lastly, this study showcases the effective use of covert participant observation method in the unique setting of prisons without causing any harm to the researched subjects.

Research Questions

This study arose mainly because of my professional experience as a prison officer and, my curiosity in understanding more about my work environment. It aims to understand the interactions between prisoners and prison officers in their daily dealings. In other words, it seeks to understand the prisoners' use of secondary adjustments that do not directly challenge staff but still allow them to obtain certain forbidden satisfactions or get away from certain sanctions (Goffman 1961). As such, the research question in this study is "What are the types of secondary adjustment that the prisoners used in achieving their personal aims?"

Research Methodology

Grounded Theory Methodology

Grounded theory is the methodology used in this study. Grounded theory is a form of inductive qualitative research, which is about conceptualising data and eventually resulting in the emergence of a theory or theories from the data itself (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Grounded theory method relies on the method of constant comparison where the analysis of data involves the data interacting with one another through comparison. In the constant comparative method, each piece of relevant data is continually compared with every other piece of relevant data to generate theoretical concepts that encompass as much behavioural variation as possible (Glaser and Strauss 1967). It involves four stages: a) comparing incidents applicable to each category; b) integrating categories and their properties; c) delimiting the theory and d) writing the theory (Glaser and Strauss 1967: 105). It is important to compare every incident and category with one another. This is done through asking questions of the information provided by each incident or category to ensure if any two are similar. Through this comparison process, the collection, coding and analysis phases work in tandem from the start to the end of the investigation. This allows the gradual development of the data from the lowest level of abstraction to a higher one of theoretical conception. At the same time, theoretical sensitivity, which is important in the data analysis stage, is fostered in the constant comparison phase. Theoretical sensitivity is the ability of the researcher to identify the important features of the collected data, perceive the concepts, categories, properties and their interrelationships that arise and finally give meanings to them (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Glaser 1992; Strauss and Corbin 1998). In the initial stage of data analysis, certain events may be overlooked, but as theoretical sensitivity increases, they can be recoded and reanalysed (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Glaser and Strauss (1967) suggested that the researcher's personal inclinations and experience are helpful in creating theoretical sensitivity to the ongoing research. In this study, I was able to draw on my experiences as a prison officer. This helped me to attain an acceptable level of theoretical sensitivity in dealing with the initial data collection and analysis. At the same time, the reading of literature also helps in enhancing the theoretical sensitivity of the researcher (Glaser 1978). Thus, the literature review conducted was very helpful in developing my theoretical sensitivity. As the study progressed, the data analysis phase became another source for increasing my theoretical sensitivity (Strauss and Corbin 1998).

This study is concerned with the behaviours of the prisoners in a prison setting. Thus, there is a need to discover and understand their actions as the research question has shown. This portends well for a grounded theory approach as it is a qualitative research paradigm that emphasizes on the discovery of the true meanings behind the actions of these social actors (in our case, the prisoners).

Methods of Data Collection

This research was conducted in a local prison where I, the researcher, was a senior prison officer tasked in supervising a number of junior prison officers and 300 over prisoners. In grounded theory, sampling is conducted according to the principle of theoretical sampling where sampling choices are dictated by the

categories of the emerging theory. I had focused my data collection on a number of prisoners' activities that I supervised. These activities include job therapy in workshop, free association and foot drill in the yard, life skills guidance sessions in the hall and free association in the dormitory. In theoretical sampling, the researcher jointly collects, codes and analyses his/her data. He/she then further decides what the data to be collected next are and where to find them, so as to develop the theory as it emerges (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Thus, the function of theoretical sampling is to aid in the selection of participants who will yield data that produce categories of a phenomenon until no new categories are found. At the same time, it also helps to develop, elaborate and refine existing categories through searching their other uncovered properties and dimensions, until none is found. In other words, the researcher is "sampling along the lines of properties and dimensions, varying the conditions." (Strauss and Corbin 1998: 202) The most important theoretical sampling criterion in grounded theory is that the data collected must be able to achieve the theoretical completeness of the whole phenomenon. This is achieved when theoretical saturation is attained and data collection stops. Theoretical saturation is where no additional data are found whereby the researcher can form new categories or develop new properties and dimensions of any present category (Strauss and Corbin 1998). Therefore, sample size in theoretical sampling is not an important issue as long as theoretical saturation is reached (Glaser and Strauss 1967). To achieve theoretical saturation, data were collected from a total of 29 prisoners, 3 Senior Prison Officers and 9 Junior Prison Officers. The whole data collection period took slightly over a year.

The main avenue of data collection was the use of covert participant observation. One of the reasons that I decided to use covert participant observation method was that the investigated prisoners were perceived as a marginalised group. Marginalised groups such as criminal groups, religious groups, deviant groups etc. are usually inaccessible for research if permission is sought from them. Therefore, covert participant observation would be the most useful and effective method in examining such marginalised subcultures so as to gather insightful and accurate data (Festinger et al. 1956; Parker 1974; Humphreys 1970). Besides, participant observation provides knowledge of the context in which events occur, and may enable the researcher to see things that participants themselves are not aware of, or that they are unwilling to discuss during an interview (Patton 1990). Another important reason that participant observation was used in the data collection was I (as a prison officer) was the one subjugating the researched subjects (the prisoners). Due to our obvious conflicting interests, overt forms of data collection such as interviews, focus groups or questionnaires can never be effective in eliciting true information from the researched subjects. Besides, the prison officers who were observed were my colleagues. This also meant that they would not like their professional livelihood to be researched on. Therefore, covert participant observation is the most suitable method of data collection due to this unique relation between researched subjects and me. Lastly, as it was a covert participant observation research, I had to rely mostly on his retrospective note taking. After every observation, I would take notes of the significant events that transpired whenever I was not in view of anyone.

Besides observing the prisoners and my colleagues, I was able to rely on two other important means of eliciting information. The first method of gathering information came from the informal interactions between my colleagues and me. I could confirm with them any prisoner's behaviour that I had observed. At the same time, I could seek their perspectives on the probable reasons behind such prisoners'

behaviours. However, in these interactions with my colleagues, I took care not to let them know that I was actually conducting a research.

The third method of gathering data comes from a special group of prisoners who were supposedly on better terms with the prison officers. These prisoners were assisting the prison officers in the operational and administrative chores of the dormitories and thus in constant contact with the prison officers. I would ask them about other prisoners' behaviours under the shield of catering to operational needs. Similarly, these prisoners did not know that I was conducting a research. However, I had to take care that these prisoners might not be divulging the correct information. At the same time, it had to be noted that these prisoners are cautious in their responses to my queries most of the time. Thus, only some significant data were elicited from them.

Data Analysis

Open and axial coding stages of grounded theory analysis procedure are used in the data analysis stage (Glaser 1978; Strauss and Corbin 1998). Open coding involves the labelling of phenomena as indicated by the data (Strauss and Corbin 1998). As such, these labels known as concepts which are the building blocks that will help build up the theory or theories, are formed in this stage. This is achieved through the comparative method that employs the procedures of asking questions and making comparisons of the data (Glaser 1978). By asking simple questions such as what, how, when and where, the data are broken down into different compartments. In axial coding, the data are compared and similar compartmentalized data expressing the same incidents are grouped together under the same conceptual label. These conceptual labels are then contrasted again and further clustered into a higher and more abstract level known as categories (Strauss and Corbin 1998). In this study, the data analysis process occurred concurrently with the data collection process. After each period of data collection, I would code and analyze them accordingly.

Credibility of the Research and Findings

The rigor of an interpretive study is examined by the notion of trustworthiness (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Trustworthiness is defined as the conceptual soundness of the research results and is influenced by the notions of credibility, transferability, dependability and confirmability (Lincoln and Guba 1985). This study aims to describe accurately the reality of a phenomenon it intends to represent within the research context (credibility) through the triangulation and maximum variation of data sources (prisoners and prison officers). By describing the influencing behaviours of the prisoners in width and depth, the transferability (the applicability of the research findings to other similar settings) can be sustained (Lincoln and Guba 1985). Dependability refers to the consistency between the data collected and the findings while confirmability refers to the degree the findings can be corroborated by other researchers (Lincoln and Guba 1985). An audit trail that consisted of a detailed documentation of the methods and the collection and analysis of data was maintained. Two ex-colleagues of mine were also asked to corroborate the findings. These measures ensured dependability and confirmability of this study.

Ethical Issues

The main controversial issue about this study is the covertness of data collection. In the spirit of most social research, this study may be considered unethical, as the permission of the researched subjects was not sought at all. However, for research on unwilling participants, the next best move would be a covert research stance that does not compromise the confidentiality of the researched subjects. This is because the conventional methods such as interviews, questionnaires etc. would not work well under such circumstances. The confidentiality of the researched subjects has been constantly kept in mind and achieved. I made sure that there is no avenue that the identities of the researched subjects would be revealed.

Limitations

There are several limitations in the implementation of this study. One of the limitations is related to the my significant reliance on his memory power. At times, I had to be around physically supervising the prisoners and it would be a substantial period amount of time that had passed before I could find a private period to pen down the significant events that I had taken note of. Besides, there were times where I had to handle unexpected administrative or operational events that had occurred. This meant that I could have missed certain significant events. This was also the main reason that this data collection stage took over a year before theoretical saturation of the data was achieved.

The next limitation is methodological. The replicability of the research findings can be an issue here. However, this study is exploratory in nature and does not aim to generalise its findings on the main population of prisoners in the local context. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the findings still have some useful but limited form of generalization. It can generalize its findings to any other population in similar contexts experiencing the same phenomenon. Thus, the results of this study may still be applicable to other prison settings that resemble the one in this research.

Lastly, my epistemological preferences, beliefs, values, theoretical orientations, bias, experiences may also affect the data collection and analysis. This limitation is reduced as much as possible through I being reflexive in the data collection and analysis processes. Reflexivity is a process of conscious self awareness where a researcher continually appraises the subjective responses and intersubjective relationships within the data in relation to his/her values, experiences, interests and beliefs (Finlay 2002).

Findings and Discussion

Types of Prisoners' Secondary Adjustments

The strategies of influence that are discovered and conceptualised in this study are the categories of *repetition, distraction, finding excuses, feigning ignorance, false compliance, hearsay, direct hit and spontaneous protest*. In this study, the following identifications are used in the data collection and analysis processes: SPO- Senior

Prison Officer, PO – Junior Prison Officer, P – Prisoner, Y-Yard, D-Dormitory, G-Guidance Room and W-Workshop. For example, the fifth observation that was conducted in the yard (Y5) involved one particular Junior Prison Officer (PO3) and 3 prisoners (P3, P5 and P24). In summary, data were collected from a total of 29 prisoners, 3 Senior Prison Officers and 9 Junior Prison Officers.

Repetition

Prisoners may use repetition as a form of influencing strategy on the prison officers. Their main mode of operation involves them taking turns individually or in groups, to request certain privileges from the prison officers. The first few requests are usually rejected by the prison officers. Thus, they employ a wave of such repetitive acts to pressurize the concerned prison officers in eventually acceding to their requests. These requests are usually not contravention of the rules and regulations of the prison. The approval of these requests is subjected to the individual decisions of the prison officers as they are not entitlements for the prisoners. To stop the waves of pestering by the prisoners, some prison officers may accede to their demands. One example of such tactics is shown in *Observation Scenario Y3*:

> Before the commencement of the foot drill, P3 asked PO2 to allow them to play sport games after the foot drill. It was then followed another similar request by a group of prisoners consisting of P3, P6 and P27 during the break. PO2 rejected their request both times. Eventually, they approached PO2 as another group (consisting of P3, P6, P11 and P13) and PO2 finally agreed to let them play games after the foot drill. This was not in PO2's agenda when he first took this group for foot drill as he told me before the session that he would end the foot drill and would proceed to handle some administrative matters. However, the prisoners managed to change PO2's initial plan and PO2 allowed them to have games after the foot drill. When I asked PO2 why he eventually let them to have games even though he told me that his original plan was not so, he hesitated and claimed that he could settle the administrative matters later.

Other examples of the employment of repetition as a strategy of influence are shown in *Y7, Y11, Y4, D10, D12, D15, W3, W4, G2* and *G3*. I managed to speak to some prison officers of at least 20 years' experience working in various prisons (SPO1, PO3 and PO4), regarding this phenomenon. According to them, prisoners like to ask repeatedly or pester the prison officers for the privileges they hope to attain. Some more, those requests they made are not against the rules and regulations. Therefore, inexperienced prison officers may fall into this trap as they feel that acceding to their requests does not constitute breaking the rules. It is further verified by P13 (one of the administrative prisoners) who claimed that P03 and his friends were experts in such influencing method and usually they got what they wanted.

Distraction

The prisoners employ the strategy of distraction to get fellow prisoners out from certain situations where they were caught by prison officers breaking the institutional rules and regulations. Its mode of operation involves creating a pressing situation to

divert the prison officer's attention from the situation when he is dealing with the prisoner's misdeed. The strategy of distraction is clearly illustrated in *Observation Scenario W18.*

> In W18, P23 was caught by PO8, for illegally passing some items to another production line. It was against the workshop's regulations and prisoners caught doing it would be subjected to punishment. While PO8 was deciding on the kind of action to take against P23, P3 cut his fingers. PO8 then quickly meted a stern verbal warning (instead of putting up a report against him) to P23 so that he can attend to the P3's injury. When I causally asked PO8 the reason why a formal report was not put up against P23, he told me that he felt that it was more important to handle the medical emergency.

It seemed to be a deliberate attempt by P3 to cut his fingers so that the attention from the wrong doer P23 would be diverted. Other examples are shown in *Y8, W3, D5* and *Y6.* These instances can be perceived as the strategy of distraction. However, it could not be confirmed with prisoners or prison officers. Notwithstanding that, here are two undeniable facts in each execution of distraction. First, it is always executed before a fellow prisoner gets in trouble with the prison officer and the consequence is always that that fellow prisoner always gets away with a lesser or no punishment. However, I also noticed that there were some instances where this strategy failed, especially with experienced prison officers.

Finding Excuses

Prisoners tend to find excuses whenever they do not want to do some tasks as assigned by the prison officers. P12 is an example. This is further ascertained by SPO2, PO3 and PO7. P12 was always finding excuses to get away from doing tasks assigned to him as shown in W2, G1, D1 and D10. In all these instances, he was trying to get away from counselling, work and foot drill by reporting that he was not feeling well due to different kinds of illnesses. This tactic is also used by other prisoners P21, P14, P3, P11 and P25 as shown in G2, D1, W1, W12 and W14 respectively.

Feigning Ignorance

The prisoners attempt to feign ignorance of any issue, which the prison officers question them about when they know that admitting it would get them into trouble. One of the examples is shown in *W16*:

> P15 was caught by PO7 for communicating with a passing civilian worker in the workshop. It should be noted all inmates in the workshop were briefed on the dos and don'ts there and thus knew that it was an offence for doing that. However, P15 kept saying that he did not know that is an offence.

In this instance, P15 tried to plead his innocence by feigning ignorance. He knew that if he admitted his mistake, he would be punished for it. Therefore, he decided to take a chance by employing this tactic of feigning ignorance. His gamble worked as PO7 gave him the benefit of the doubt and meted out a verbal warning to him. Other

instances of feigning ignorance are shown in W13, D17, Y1 and Y8. Most of the prisoners would use this strategy upon the first sign they are caught breaking rules and regulations by the prison officers. SPO2, SPO3, PO1, PO2 and PO5 agreed that prisoners use the strategy of feigning ignorance frequently.

False Compliance

The prisoners usually show compliance when the prison officers instruct them to do certain tasks. However, once the prison officers are not physically around to ensure that the orders are carried out, they usually do not complete the required tasks. Such behaviour would be termed as the strategy of false compliance.

Examples of such tactics can be found in D*6, D8* and *W7*. In *D8*, I arrived at the dormitory immediately after PO2 was intending to leave. I then began talking to some of the prisoners. After sometimes, PO2 returned and enquired the prisoners if they had cleaned up the bunk areas. The prisoners claimed that they had done it. However, when I checked with PO2 when this instruction was given, I understood that it was given just before I came to the dormitory. And during the period I was there, no prisoners were seen tidying up the bunk areas. Further inputs by PO2, PO3 and PO6 also unilaterally confirmed that this tactic is commonly being used by the prisoners. However, they said that they would remind the prisoners the second time to carry out their assigned tasked even though they knew that they deliberately did not carry out the tasks. These officers told me that these tasks are usually mundane ones, thus, they will give some leeway to the prisoners.

Hearsay

There is a number of incidents where the prisoners commented *"I heard (certain practice or procedures) are allowed in....Can we have/do it too?"* to the prison officers. This strategy is known as "hearsay". This strategy happened in many observation instances such W3, W12, D4, D5, G2, G12, Y6 etc. My experienced colleagues, SPO1, SPO2 and PO4 revealed that this strategy is often used as a tool to influence the decisions of new officers. According to them, this will make the prison officers question about the validity of the hearsay. Being new officers, they will not want the inmates to see them as indecisive. Thus, this will pressurize them into either believing or disbelieving it. If the prison officers believe the hearsay, the prisoners will gain. If the prison officers do not trust what they have said, the prisoners have nothing to lose too. The most important of all, according SPO2, the prisoners have no obligation to be responsible for their hearsay as they have stressed that they have heard about that certain procedures or practices are allowed but they have not seen it being implemented.

Direct Hit

Direct hit is a strategy of influence that is highly confrontational but at the same time, provides a high rate of success for the prisoners. This strategy demands the presence of two critical factors. The first one is the presence of an error made by the prisoner officer earlier. This error is committed in front of the prisoners without the prison officer realising the mistake made. The second factor is that there must be

another prison officer around if this strategy is to be executed. To provide a better perspective of the rationale of direct hit, the scenario below is provided.

> In D19, P3 asked for a carom board from PO7 after 6pm. This was not allowed by the institutional rules. Therefore, PO7 rejected it. However, the moment, the researcher arrived at the scene, he made a fuss out of the whole issue by stating that PO7 performed double standard by allowing the carom board to be in the dormitory after 6pm two nights ago. This scene was created in the presence of me, PO7 and the other prisoners. The other prisoners supported P3's claim and were waiting for the course of action by both the prison officers. The aim of P3 seemed to be getting the carom board and getting PO7 into trouble if he did not get it. Thus, it was a win-win situation for P3 even if he might not get the carom board. In this instance, P3 did not get the carom board, while I had to reprimand PO7 after ascertaining what P3 claimed was true.

This strategy of influence is seldom executed as the executor would be affecting the future relationship between him and the concerned prison officer. However, according to P15 (another administrative prisoner), there were a few instances where the concerned prisoners succeeded in getting their aims through the strategy of direct hit.

Spontaneous Protest

Spontaneous protest usually involves at least a group of prisoners. It usually occurs when the prison officer makes a highly unpopular decision. This act is spontaneous as it occurs without any instigation by any prisoner but just happens at the spur of the moment by groups of prisoners. It becomes a chain reaction where other groups of prisoners follow suit unprompted. It occurs in scenarios where the inmates feel short-changed by the prison officers especially in terms of privileges and rights. An illustration is shown in Y25 as below.

> PO3 had to call off the free association session at the court due to unforeseen circumstances only after 10 minutes. One group of prisoners could be seen protesting to PO3. This is followed by another two groups at the other end of the court, which started protesting while PO3 was still handling the first group. After some persuasion by both of us and another two other prison officers who were called upon to assist, we managed to get them back to dormitory but we compromised by giving them another 10 minutes of free association.

Although such spontaneous protests occur at times, they are usually harmless and do not compromise the security of the prison. It never results in real physical confrontation between the prisoners and prison officers. As the instances have shown, the aim of this strategy of influence is probably to delay the execution of the prison officer's decision or to negotiate for a better deal for the prisoners through spontaneous group behaviours. In this way, they can extend the enjoyment of their privileges or rights.

The research question in this study is "What are the types of secondary adjustments that the prisoners used in achieving their personal aims?" As the study has shown, the strategies of influence that are used by prisoners include the categories of *repetition, distraction, finding excuses, feigning ignorance, false*

compliance, hearsay, direct hit and *spontaneous protest.* These forms of secondary adjustment occur in this particular prison setting that is bounded by rules and regulations (Sykes 1958; Goffman 1961; Rosenhan 1973). These secondary adjustments are largely covert in their intentions (*repetition, distraction, finding excuses, feigning ignorance, false compliance and hearsay*). However, some of them are overt in their aims (*direct hit and spontaneous protest*). At the same time, they can be individual- and/or group-based. The categories of *distraction, finding excuses, feigning ignorance, direct hit* and *false compliance* can be both individual- and group-based to be effective. On the other hand, the categories of *repetition, hearsay* and *spontaneous protest* need the presence of group cooperation to be effective.

As this is a small scale study, these insights are not exhaustive. However, these insights can serve as future references for more large-scale studies in such areas which are largely unexplored in Asian context. In short, this study has implications for the development of theory, practice and future research in the area of penology.

Typology of Prisoners' Secondary Adjustments

Different strategies used by the prisoners serve different specific aims. The strategies of *repetition* and *hearsay* aim to help the prisoners get extra privileges such as games' times, TV times, exemption from chores they do not like etc. Such strategies of influence would be termed as *Enhancers* as they are executed to enhance their living and working conditions in the prison.

As for the strategies of *distraction, feigning ignorance, false compliance* and *finding excuses*, the prisoners utilise them to get themselves or their peers out of trouble when they are caught by prison officers contravening the rules, or not following official instructions. The strategies are termed as *Trouble Shooters* in this study. The non-confrontational nature of the both *Enhancers* and *Trouble Shooters* agrees with the characteristics of secondary adjustments suggested by the study of Goffman (1961).

However, the other two strategies discovered in this study can be confrontational to some extent. First, the strategy of *direct hit* aims to get prison officers in trouble with the prison higher authority. Second, the strategy of *spontaneous protest* is used by the prisoners to show passive protest against certain unpopular decisions made by the prison officers. Both strategies are seen as confrontational because they aim to oppose the prison officers. These strategies of influence are known as the *Resistors* in this study since they aim to demonstrate resistance against the prison officers.

In short, the prisoners' goals in engaging in such strategies always serve their own personal benefits in the prison setting that is bounded by control mechanisms that are presumably against them. These strategies can be grouped under the categories of *Enhancers, Trouble Shooters* and *Resistors.* At the same time, these secondary adjustments can be both cooperative and conflictive. They may be cooperative as they help the prisoners in reaping material or social benefits for themselves, while they can be conflictive in demonstrating passive resistance against the prison officers. Another notable finding is that these three categories are not mutually exclusive with respect to their execution by the prisoners, i.e. any prisoner may use all three categories, some of the categories or none of the categories. Therefore, this study did not succeed in discovering a typology of prisoners with respect to the execution of these secondary adjustments. On the contrary, from the

analysis process, a typology of prison officers with respect to their responses to such secondary adjustments, was discovered.

Typology of Prison Officers with Respect to Their Responses to Prisoners' Secondary Adjustments

Some prison officers may be persuaded by the prisoners' strategies while others may see through their ploys. In all, there are three different categories of prison officers with respect to their responses towards the prisoners' strategies of influence. The first group generally consists of prison officers who have no idea that they are manipulated by their prisoners through such persuading strategies. They genuinely believe that the prisoners are here to be rehabilitated and do not perceive such micro-political activities as being present. This group of prison officers are termed as the *Idealists*. This may create a pressing issue here as this group of prison officers may be compromising the security of the institution. More importantly, if these prison officers discover that they are being manipulated by their prisoners through such strategies, their working morale and confidence can be substantially affected. This is particularly detrimental to their professional growth as effective prison officers.

On the contrary, some of the prison officers may know about some of these strategies but they do not openly articulate or acknowledge them. These prison officers belong to the second category of prison officers in responding to such manipulative strategies and would be termed as the *Pragmatists*. At times, they may choose to ignore them or even accede to such persuasive moves as long as the acts of influence are discreet. This is because it is perceived to be a lose-lose situation for the prison officers if they are too keen in handling every single act of passive resistance or influence that they recognise. They have divulged that prisoners can afford 24 hours a day in planning such influencing ventures while prisoner officers can never invest an equal amount of time in counteracting them. They have to take care of other operational needs, administrative needs and their own external commitments. Thus, these prison officers believe in exercising flexibility ("give and take" mentality) in addressing such influencing acts from the prisoners. By doing this, certain elements of control can be ceded to the prisoners as long as there is no serious implication on the security of the institution. Thus, to the prison officers in this study, the control of the prisoners is not perceived by them as the most important function of theirs. This is in contradictory with Scharf (1983) and this may create problems as there may be a danger that the prisoners assume incremental control in the institution in the long run.

The last group of prison officers consists of those who know about their prisoners' persuading acts and adopt a rigid and strict stand towards them. They are termed as the *Authoritarians* in this study. They would tell straight in the face of the prisoners not to influence them and provide no room for further discussion or negotiation. The relationship between such prison officers and their prisoners is usually tense. And their prisoners would attempt to get such prison officers into trouble through the strategy of *direct hit*. Therefore, such prison officers have to be constantly on their highest operational alert.

In summary, this study discovered three categories of prison officers' responses to the prisoners' strategies of influence and it was believed that none of them had a clear edge in dealing with these strategies of influence effectively. If the prison officers are able to learn from the findings and deal with the prisoners more effectively, the process of the rehabilitation of prisoners can be conducted more effectively in the reduced presence of such unconstructive micro-politics. However,

this does not mean that prison officers would rigidly implement operational policies in consideration of the findings. This is because the power dynamics between prison officers and prisoners are very complex and intricate. Exercising either extreme ends of the continuum of responses [Rigidity (*Authoritarians*) vs. Flexibility (*Pragmatist*)] towards the prisoners' strategies of influence can be counter productive. On the other hand, being unaware of such strategies of influence (as of the *Idealists*) can put the prison officer in dire straits too. In order to manage this complex relationship well, there is a need to exercise an effective amount of flexibility, rigidity and awareness in the dealings between both the prison officers and prisoners. However, this is never an easy task.

Conclusion

This study has also provided some insights into the world of micro activities of influence used by the prisoners. From the study, eight strategies of influence are conceptualised: *repetition, distraction, finding excuses, feigning ignorance, false compliance, hearsay, direct hit* and *spontaneous protest*. They can further subsumed under three main categories of *Enhancers, Trouble Shooters* and *Resistors*. At the same time, there are also three categories of prison officers with respect to their responses to the eight strategies of influence – *Idealists, Pragmatists* and *Authoritarians*. In conclusion, I hope that this study would make some meaningful contributions in the area of penology. Eventually, these contributions can play their part in benefiting both the operational capability of the prison officers and rehabilitation of the prisoners, with no partial treatment to either prison officers or prisoners.

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Citation

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At Home In Blackness: How I Became Black

Abstract

I became and have remained Black in Canada by interacting with Blacks. Altercasting (the "push" from the larger society) moved me into interacting intentionally with Blacks, interacting with Blacks helped make me Black by immersing me in the Black experience, and studying Blacks helped anchor me within the Black community by giving me an understanding of what it means to be Black. In this paper, which is based on autoethnography, I offer a brief overview of the concept of Blackness in Canada and then I discuss the key ways in which my Black identity was developed and is sustained. The key mechanisms discussed are altercasting, interacting with Blacks, and studying the Black community.

Keywords

Altercasting; Autoethnography; Black; Blackness; Church; Community; Identity, and Interaction

I became Black in Canada by interacting with fellow Blacks.[1] I had never thought of myself as Black but within two years of 1978 when I moved from Nigeria to Canada I realized that to live in and successfully identify myself with Canada I had to identify myself with a race; specifically, I realized the importance of identifying myself as Black. In my birth country of Nigeria it is family connections that matter: one is identified in terms of the region, language, or religion of one's family. In Nigeria I am a Southerner, an Isoko man, and a Christian; my skin color is of no real social significance. While what we refer to as "black" in North America is the default skin color in Nigeria, those who do not have black skins are not seen as inferior. In sharp contrast to Nigeria, Canada's popular imagination considers Canada's default race to be White and considers true Canadians to be White and non-Whites to be inferior (Fleras and Elliott 1992: 234-243). The initial reason for my involvement in the Black community was not so much a pull from within the community as a push into it—an experience that is not unique to me since immigrants are ethnicized and raced in Canada (James 2003: 29). In any case, interacting with fellow Blacks was critical in my feeling at home in the 400-year old 783,000-plus strong Black community of Canada.[2]

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[1] A version of this paper was presented at the Qualitative Analysis Conference in Waterloo, Ontario in April 2009.

[2] Blacks have been present in Canada since at least 1605 (Williams, 1983:445) and Blacks comprise

I knew I was becoming Black when, beginning in spring 1980, I found myself becoming emotionally connected to fellow Blacks irrespective of their national, religious, and other ties. Ultimately, my immersion into the Canadian Black community was virtually guaranteed by my marriage, since August 1985, to a Canadian-born Black woman with whom I have two sons and one daughter. My wife Faridat was born in Winnipeg, Manitoba and spent her formative years at Pilgrim Baptist Church-- Winnipeg's oldest Black church--where her maternal grandparents and other members of her extended family attended. I am at home in Blackness because Blackness represents for me a "cognitive environment in which I can undertake the routines of daily life" and through which I find my identity well mediated (Rapport and Dawson 1998: 9).

Methods

This paper is based on autoethnography, a qualitative research technique in which researchers "use their own experiences in a culture reflexively to look more deeply at self-other interactions" (Holt 2003: 2). Autoethnographers place the self within a social context and focus on the connection between the self and the personal (Berg 2007: 180, Reed-Danahay 1997). Autoethnography involves the use of a variety of data sources to describe, understand, and explain aspects of social life with which the researcher has "deep familiarity" that is achieved through participation (Berg 2007: 172-179).

In addition to the use of archival materials, my study of the Black community was based on the six major approaches employed by Gans ([1962] 1982: 397-398) in his study of Italian immigrants in Boston's West End: use of community facilities; attendance at community events; informal visiting with community members; "formal and informal interviewing of community functionaries"; "use of informants"; and observation. I made efforts to ensure that both observations and interviews were representative of events and views existing in the Black community. To this end, I employed three types of sampling predominantly: quota, snowball, and deviant cases.[3] Most of the data for this paper come from fieldwork done in Hamilton, Ontario from 1989 to 1991 and participant observational studies in the cities of Edmonton, Calgary, Winnipeg, Hamilton, Toronto, and Montreal from 1992 to 2009.

Blackness

Blackness is ambiguous, partly because the Black population is not a monolith[4].

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about 2.5% of Canada's total population of about 31 million (Statistics Canada, 2009).

[3] McCall and Simmons (1969: 64-67) have discussed these three types of sampling, which they consider to be ideally suited to field research. Basically, quota sampling occurs when one consciously investigates events or persons representing the various categories that comprise one's unit of analysis. For its part, snowball sampling occurs when one solicits from those being studied others who are considered to be suited for the investigation at hand. Finally, deviant case sampling occurs when one makes conscious attempts to search for and study events or persons that do not fit into the ordinary pattern.

[4] A testament to the ambiguity of blackness can be seen in the "It's a Black Thing, You Wouldn't Understand" slogan printed on t-shirts worn by some Blacks. Very interesting personal accounts illustrating the ambiguities of blackness are posted on the internet by the Experience Project at http://www.experienceproject.com/stories/Must-Confess/623475. I witnessed an occasion in which a White man confronted a Black man about what, the White man reasoned, were the unnecessary divisions between Blacks and "progressive Whites" that result from a belief in that slogan. When the Black

For example, contrary to what one would expect based on popular depictions of Blacks, Nelson Mandela, a major cultural icon who is Black, admits that he has a "keen interest in European classical music—specifically, the music of Handel and Tchaikovsky (ANC.org.za/people/mandela.html). For his part, Louis Farrakhan, an American-based Black nationalist and leader of the Nation of Islam is a trained concert violinist who, after more than four decades of abstaining from publicly playing the violin, performed Jewish composer Felix Mendelssohn's violin concerto in E minor (http://www.experiencefestival.com/a/Louis_Farrakhan/id/517802). Furthermore, not all Blacks can or even like to dance, sing, or play basketball. What then is Blackness and how does one know that one is Black?

Most of Canada's 783,000 or so contemporary Blacks are of Caribbean origins and immigrated to Canada only after the introduction in 1967 of the "point system" immigration policy that allowed the non-sponsored immigration of skilled persons regardless of national origins (Brym and Lie 2009: 215; Macionis and Gerber, 2008: 361-362). Accordingly, issues such as Black identity are not yet fully crystallized in the experiences of many local Blacks. Indeed, there are no physical aspects of lifestyles ("material culture") that differentiate Blacks, as a group, from the larger society; in general, the manifestations of material culture among Canadian Blacks reflect national, social class, and religious cleavages. Thus, for example, old-line Black Canadians tend to be similar to members of the larger society in terms of their worldviews (Cryderman 1986: 131; Driedger 1989: 43). Nevertheless, as Brym and Lie (2009) note,

> black Canadians still tend to interact little with white Canadians of European descent, especially in their intimate relations….Like the aftermath of expulsion and conquest, the aftermath of slavery—prejudice, discrimination, disadvantage, and segregation—continues to act as a barrier to assimilation. (p. 217)

I contend that, at least in North America, the so-called racial group is often only a type of ethnic group which is itself a type of social group (Isajiw 1979). In these terms, blackness, like ethnicity, may be defined in terms of four major ideal-typical inter-related characteristics that are manifested at both the individual and group levels. Barth (1969:10-11) defines an ethnic group as a category of people that "(1) is largely biologically self-perpetuating, (2) shares fundamental cultural values, realized in overt unity in forms, (3) makes up a field of communication and interaction, (4) has a membership which identifies itself, and is identified by others, as constituting a category distinguishable from other categories of the same order." So-called racial groups can be included among Canadian ethnic groups due to "the fact that the physical marks are superficial, not necessarily borne by all members of the group, and modifiable by interbreeding, and that there is not complete consensus as to what groups are "non-white" or "visible" in Canadian society" (Burnet and Palmer 1988: 7).

The categorization of "racial" groups as ethnic groups is based on the fact that there are no biological, genetic, or other scientific bases for placing human populations into classificatory schemes, all so-called races being only socially created phenomena (Bolaria and Li 1988:13-25; Hughes and Kallen 1976: 80-84; Isajiw 1979; Satzewich

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man insisted that the slogan was a valid assessment of the issues, the White man asked what there was about the Black experience that White people could not understand. While walking away from the White man, the Black man responded as follows: "The fact that you ask that question shows that you don't understand."

1990: 253). Fleras and Elliott (2007: 34) note that "The completion of the Human Genome Project in 2000 revealed what many had expected: Human beings belong to a single biological species (*Homo sapiens*) within a larger grouping or genus (*Homo*). Humans as a species are 99.9 percent genetically identical with just 0.1 percent of genetic material accounting for human diversity."

Race is a crucial factor in understanding ethnicity at least partly because it is one of the central foci of ethnic identification (Weber 1978: 379-398). According to Weber (1978: 386), "Almost any kind of similarity or contrast of physical type and of habits can induce the belief that affinity or disaffinity exists between groups that attract or repel each other." Similarly, Isaacs (1975: 46) argued that "body" is the most important of the six components of ethnic identification--body, name, language, history and origins, religion, and nationality--which he examined. He notes that physical features are crucial because, in general, unlike the other components of ethnic identity, biological characteristics cannot be readily altered.

In addition to possessing the relevant phenotypes (that is, readily observable characteristics such as skin color and body build), to be Black in Canada one has to maintain interaction with fellow Blacks. It is significant that Blacks are protective of aspects of culture, such as music and style, which are important mechanisms of boundary maintenance among Blacks (Kelly 1998: 62). Phenotypical features can account for the matters of biological perpetuation and distinguishable membership while interaction not only raises the consciousness of group members but also helps in the transmission of subcultural values. It is interaction with fellow Blacks that account for curious subcultural traits such as the centrality of hair care and hair salons among North American Blacks (Talbot 1984). In short, since interaction tends to produce and sustain group identification (Shaffir 1974: 47), it is necessary to interact with Blacks in order to be Black.

Altercasting and my Journey into Blackness

The quest for Blackness was not something that I desired; indeed, like Austin Clarke in his book "Growing Up Stupid Under the Union Jack", I did not see myself as in any way connected or even connectable to the Black community. The initial trigger for my journey into Blackness was external to me and to the Black community; it was the result of altercasting—experiencing others act in ways that place constrains and limits on one's capacity to "make a role and preserve a valued conception of self" (Hewitt 2007: 167).

The altercasting or othering of Blacks occurs both on a regular basis and, every now and then, in major crises. W.E.B. Dubois' (1903/2004) notion of "double consciousness" vividly expresses the universal experience of all categories of Blacks in North America—a feeling of being under constant scrutiny (Kelly 1998). But most middle class Canadian Blacks rarely experience blatant racism; instead, the norm for middle class Blacks is persistent subtle forms of racism (Fleras and Elliott 2007). For me, a constant evidence of subtle, invidious altercasting presents itself in the question, "Where are you from?"

Altercasting: An Encounter in Halifax, Nova Scotia

The major crisis moment in my journey into becoming Black occurred in Halifax, Nova Scotia about twenty months after my arrival in Canada. Throughout my stay in

Halifax – August 1979 to April 1980 – I struggled with my love for both Canada and Nigeria. I could not see how my identifying with one nation would not undermine my identifying with the other. In my mind, the question of national identity was a zero-sum game: if one was a true Nigerian, one could not at the same time be a true Canadian. I enjoyed Canada's material comforts and it's "peace, order and good government" but I missed Nigeria's personal touch—Nigeria's "gemeinschaft." I was torn between Nigeria and Canada; I was a marginal man.

Although I felt at home in Halifax and, essentially, saw myself as a Haligonian, I did not feel connected to the local Black community. I felt comfortable with and connected to the few Black people at church and at Dalhousie University where I was an undergraduate, but I did not think of myself as a Black person. I saw myself as a Christian, a man, a Nigerian, a Dalhousie University student, and so on but I did not see myself as Black. Moreover, I did not think anybody could mistake me for a Black Nova Scotian. In my mind, it was obvious to everyone that I was an African university student.

Nothing happened to challenge the view I held of myself, until a few hours before I left Halifax for a return trip to Winnipeg at the end of the 1979/80 academic year. Although it was spring I wore my winter parka for three reasons: it was rather cold, I had a slight cold, and I did not have any other coat to wear.

After taking my two suitcases to the train station in downtown Halifax, I went to a shopping mall to buy a few souvenirs of Nova Scotia for my friends in Winnipeg. My aim was to purchase a few small items such as collectible silver spoons. I picked up a number of items and went to the front of the store to pay for my purchases. After collecting all the items from me, the cashier asked me what I considered a routine question: "Is that everything." My response to the cashier's question was also a routine one: "Yes." The cashier collected my payment, gave me some change, bagged my purchase, smiled at me and said "Thank you."

To my utter surprise as soon as I walked out of the store two mall security officers confronted me and informed me that they had been summoned by a cashier in the souvenir store and needed to search me in order to determine whether I had stolen any goods. I assured the officers that I had not stolen anything and yielded to their search. I stood in the very busy hallway of the mall and passersby watched as I removed my coat and as the officers frisked me, searched all my pockets.

When the security officers did not find any evidence of stolen goods, they apologized profusely and went with me to the cashier to explain what had happened. Once inside the store, I returned my purchases and asked the cashier why she thought I had shoplifted. Her response surprised me: "lots of young Black guys shoplift in this mall and I've never seen a Black guy buy souvenirs. " I explained to the cashier that I was an African student at Dalhousie and that I bought the souvenirs because I was moving out of the province. She apologized profusely and indicated that she too was a Dalhousie student and that had she had any inclination that I was a university student or an African she would not have activated a button behind her desk to summon the mall security guards.

The fact that a young university student mistook me for a native-born Black Canadian surprised me. I had assumed that it was obvious to everybody that I was an African; I thought it was obvious that I was not Black. The incidence at the Halifax mall sent me on a journey of identity transformation. The incidence made me realize that, in spite of my subjective feelings, I was objectively a Black man in Canada—that in spite of my feelings and wishes, my master status in Canada was "Black". I moved to Halifax in August, 1979 viewing myself essentially in terms of my religious and national identities and left the city in late April, 1980 seriously considering the

possibility that my physical features may be paramount in some people's assessments of my personhood. I realized that I could not be a Haligonian in an unqualified way; I certainly could not be a mainstream Canadian in any way. At the same time, I realized that I could readily become Black; that is, I could readily form the self-schema of "Black" by adopting the relevant social identity—because both my name and my skin color mark me out as "Black". According to Michener and DeLamater (2004: 87), "Whether a person identifies with a social category in which one can claim membership depends on how easily one can be identified as a member of that group, for example, by name or skin color."

Altercasting: An Encounter in Red Deer, Alberta

My experience in Halifax was a rather blatant case. Subsequent possible cases were so subtle that it's difficult to tell whether or not the behaviors were racially motivated. One possibly ambiguous case was the occasion on October 13, 2007 in which my wife, our 11 year old daughter and I were all asked to leave a volleyball tournament game at a Roman Catholic high school in Red Deer, Alberta by a woman named Sherry Schulzke who claimed to be the chief tournament organizer. My offer to pay the nominal admission fee at the end of the game, which was in less than two minutes, was rejected—in spite of the fact that my son's team was scheduled to play a second game after the lunch break.

My wife, daughter, and I left the stands and watched the rest of the game (whose outcome was not in doubt) from the foyer close to the gym entrance--joined by friends who were also visiting Red Deer from Edmonton. While chatting in the foyer Mrs. Schulzke, who had not even bothered to introduce herself, confronted us with the words, "I asked you to leave. What are you still doing here." I reminded her that we were outside the gym and then told her that, like the other parents around us, we were waiting to chat with an athlete—in our case, our 17 year-old son. After lunch my wife, daughter, and I returned to the gym, paid for the pass and watched the second game.

At the end of the second game, I approached the woman who had confronted me earlier that day. I first introduced myself as a professor from Edmonton and then asked her about her connection to the tournament. Perhaps she did not recognize me; in any case, she told me about her positions as teacher, volleyball coach, and tournament organizer and about how she recruits students and other volunteers to help her with the volleyball tournament. She then calmly wrote down her first and last names and her email address on a sheet of paper which she gave to me.

When I later asked both Mrs. Schulzke and the school principal, Mr. Greg Hall, in writing to explain to me why White people (including a White parent from my son's Edmonton-based team whose husband, a Black man, was absent) who did not pay the fee were not asked to leave both Mrs. Schulzke and Mr. Hall responded in writing that I was trying to dodge the issue. In one of the most ridiculous defenses I've ever read, Mrs. Schulzke wrote me a letter dated November 17, 2007 in which she told me about her volunteer activities at her local parish and about how she is "a teacher with over 20 year's experience." For his part, Mr. Hall acted in a rather schizophrenic manner. First, in response to a White friend of my wife's who had written to the principal to express her disgust at Mrs. Schulzke's behavior, Mr. Hall sent an email indicating that Mrs. Schulzke acted the way she did towards me because she assumed that I did not intend to pay the admission fee. A short time later, in response to my email asking why a White woman who did not pay the admission fee

was not even approached, Mr. Hall wrote me a letter dated November 17, 2007 acknowledging that "I understand that you may have walked into the gym and sat in the stands without realizing that payment was due" and then accusing me (without bothering to even hint at any evidence) of disruptive behavior. Mr. Hall also mentioned how his school had sponsored, supports and is very proud of the club "Students for International Friendship and Understanding (SIFI)." This club and founder, a student whose origin was India, has been acknowledged at the recent Harmony Award Banquet on October 24th, 2007 in Toronto.

The standard effect of encounters such as the ones I had in Halifax and in Red Deer is to remind Blacks such as me that no matter what our social status may be, there are Whites who see us only in terms of popular negative stereotypes. The written correspondences among Mrs. Schulzke, Mr. Hall, and me have been very useful tools in my classroom discussions and analyses of altercasting and of subtle forms racism. My students' conclusions about Mrs. Schulzke's behavior sometimes lead us to of discussions of the distinctions between ignorance and racism; in particular, some of my students argue that Mrs. Schulzke's actions may reveal that she is ignorant and not that she is a racist. But consequences of actions do not invariably depend on actors' motives. In short, from the my perspective, regardless of motives, the Red Deer school officials' actions had the effect of reminding me that I am an outsider. It is partly due to a desire to avoid being placed in a slot (and being asked ridiculous questions such as "When do you hope to return to your country?") that I enjoy the company of fellow Blacks.

Interaction: Black House Parties

Since social events offer opportunities for interaction and conversations, attending ethnic group functions is one of the major ways in which ethnic group identity is created and reinforced (Breton 1964: 193, Isajiw 1999: 194, and Driedger 2003: 125-126). Social interaction is an important vehicle through which both personal and group identities—"the categories people use to specify who they are and to locate themselves relative to other people" (Michener and DeLamater 1994: 88)—are socially created and sustained (Hewitt 2007: 182-184). In discussing the typical African-American experience, hooks (2004: 149) illustrates the importance of talk as follows:

> Through the "talk story" and the telling of aphorisms, Sarah Oldham, my mother's mother, communicated her philosophy of being and living….Often these lectures focused on the notion of "difference" and "otherness"….In her mind, to be safe one had to "keep a distance."

One of the major opportunities I have for interacting informally with fellow Blacks is in functions such as House Parties—social events held in private homes. I have discovered that attending Black house parties offers me crucial opportunities to encounter some important aspects of the heartbeat of the Black community. Like Toennies' (1887/1963) gemeinschaft, Black house parties are characterized by fluid social structures and informal face-to-face interactions. Black house parties remind me of my ancestral homeland of Nigeria and also create a home for me in Canada by confronting me with an environment with which I am well accustomed. These parties have been for me a throwback to the simplicity of the life that I knew as a young boy and as a young adult in 1970's Nigeria; they have been islands of gemeinschaft in a cultural sea of gesellschaft.

The Black house party is a large-scale replica of Black family life, especially in areas such as music, visual media, and food. Furthermore, like the case in families,. the socialization that occurs in house parties assumes the two major forms of active instruction and passive influence through music, food, and other aspects of the home environment. To be invited to a house party is to be invited to a private home: hosts typically display the newspapers and magazines they normally read, play "Black" music, and either play Black-oriented movies or tune their television sets to shows in which Blacks are shown in a favorable light.

Black house party conversations tend to be boisterous but good-natured. For instance, in 2008 many Black house party conversations included discussions about Barack Obama's run for the office of President of the United States. At a November 2008 house party in Edmonton held in honor of Obama's election the conversations were so heated that moderators and time-keepers were selected in order to give all in attendance the opportunity to speak their minds. At some point that evening, I mentioned in passing that, as important as Obama's victory was, it is likely that he was not the first US President of African heritage (DiversityInc 2007). The ensuing discussion was so heated that it continued via email over the next three days. The following in an excerpt from one of the emails I received:

> I believe the question one should ask is - did these US Presidents acknowledge their African Ancestry and would they have been elected if they had? Given the bigotry of those days and time I am sure white Americans would have lynched those presidents if they ever find out that they had Black blood in them. No wonder one of the Presidents had to destroy all documents that may be used to prove that he is black or had black blood in him. The most important thing is that we live in a different world now where being black may no longer be an obstacle to aspiring to the highest office in America and hopefully in any part of the world. Time will tell. I believe Obama is the first who did not only claim that he is black but everybody acknowledged his blackness and that of his family – his wife, children, mother –in-law, brother-in-law etc. In that sense he is the first Black person to be elected President of the United States. None of those other Presidents claim to be black and we cannot make it for them.

The nature of conversations that occur at Black house parties makes these events fertile grounds for the renewal, formation, and development of friendships and, ultimately, group identification among Blacks. One factor that sustains ethnic identity is personal ties such as friendship networks; for "ethnic homogeneity of friendship networks" is vital for ethnic identity formation and retention (Weinfeld 1985: 74). Such is the importance of ethnic group friendships that individuals--including those who are second, third, and fourth generation North Americans--are more likely to choose close or intimate friends from within their own ethnic group than randomly from the larger society (Breton et. al. 1990: 56). I met almost all my Black friends at either Black parties or at Black churches; the connection between some of best Black friends, such as Ronald and Deridor Collier, and me straddled house parties, Black churches, and university life.

As important as interaction in Black house parties was in my development of a Black identity, I found that one needs to be at least a bit entrenched in the Black community before one receives invitations to attend these parties. The key area of the Black community in which entry was very easy for me was the Black church.

Interaction: The Black Church

When I returned to Winnipeg from Halifax in 1980 I immediately got involved in the institutional structure of Winnipeg's Black community by intentionally patronizing Black-owned businesses such as barber shops and provisionary stores and by watching Black-oriented TV shows. Given the fact that the first group with which I associated within 24 hours of my arrival in Canada in August 1978 was a Black church where Reverend Raymond Cornish pastored, I naturally returned to that particular group. I was so entrenched in the life of the church that I lived with one of the church's key families, the Barretts, for a number of months in 1980.

The Black church helped to meet my spiritual needs while anchoring me to the Black experience in North America. It was shortly after I returned to Winnipeg that Reverends Cornish and Allen, the pastors of the first Black church I attended in Canada, parted ways. Rev. Raymond Cornish teamed up with Rev. Errol Campbell, a relatively new immigrant from Jamaica, and started conducting services in a new location in downtown Winnipeg.

Rev. Campbell was an excellent preacher, administrator, and musician. His administrative skills were especially needed given the chaotic situation of the church, particularly after the breakup. One of the main ways Rev. Campbell helped to introduce stability to the struggling church was by inviting to the new church for preaching/teaching sessions Rev. Murray Blair, the head of the Jamaican district of the New Testament Church of God denomination with which the new church was affiliated. Rev. Campbell also requested that each individual make an unambiguous decision regarding commitment and involvement in the new church; there was no room for pew warmers.

Although I did not wish to side with Rev. Cornish as opposed to Rev. Allen, I liked the Cornish-Campbell team so much that I committed to the new church, as did the majority of the members of the Cornish-Allen congregation. Such was the vision of the pastors that this church of fewer than fifty members got involved in presenting a monthly half hour program on Videon Cable TV. I had a repertoire of about five songs that I felt comfortable singing and playing on my acoustic guitar. The fact that I sang one of these songs in church virtually every week did not prevent me from singing them on the TV program.

My association with the Cornish-Campbell team continued, and my involvement with the church's TV program intensified, after I moved to an apartment around Grant Avenue, across from Videon Cable Television studios and offices. This was the first time I rented accommodation outside of downtown Winnipeg. On Grant Avenue, I shared a one-bedroom apartment with a Nigerian-born student named Timothy Dabo, an education student at the University of Manitoba (U of M). Tim was one of the students on a Nigerian Federal Government Technical Scholarship Programme-- the program under which many of my friends, such as Francis Achus-Got, Boniface Etuk, and Ohi Izirien, came to Canada in the late 1970s. Although Tim was from the predominantly Muslim area of northern Nigeria, he was a committed Christian who attended the local Christian Missionary Church. Tim was involved in an on-campus para-church organization known as The Navigators. I liked Tim's enthusiasm about attending Navigator Bible studies; I particularly liked the fact that Tim was always involved in systematic Bible studies with the Navigators. I was tempted to leave the Black church and attend mainstream churches like Tim and most of my other African-born friends. But I was convinced that the combination of InterVarsity and my Black church gave me enough spiritual nourishment.

To my amazement, the stability of the new Cornish-Campbell church lasted for only a few months; personal and other troubles in the lives of some of the church officers undermined the fragile unity of the new church. I decided to leave the New Testament Church of God and, indeed, Black churches in general. I decided I would visit Black churches but would not make any of them my home church. I visited two churches close to the University of Manitoba campus. I also investigated Calvary Temple (where some of my friends, such as Ohi Izirien and John Okosun, were regular attenders) and Elim Chapel (which is located across from the University of Winnipeg and had a significant population of university students).

Even after I stopped attending the Cornish-Campbell church on a regular basis I maintained my friendshp with the pastors and many of the congregants. It was only after I left the church that a crucial thing dawned on me: most of my friends at the New Testament Church of God were black in terms of physical appearance but they did not seem to see themselves as Black—as fundamentally similar to native-born Blacks of North American heritage. For instance, although the Barretts, the friends with whom I first lived when I moved from Halifax to Winnipeg, had lived in England before moving to Canada, they were unavowedly Jamaican. The Barrett's Jamaican outlook was reflected in things such as their accents, speech patterns, and foods. Their involvement in the Church of God seemed to play a large role in helping them maintain their Jamaican identity.

The Barrett's situation was quite representative of that of the other members of the New Testament Church of God. Mrs. Barrett's younger brother Daswell MacLeod and his wife Evita were clearly Jamaican—as were the Cornishes. But did these people think of themselves as Black in the North American sense? I wondered if any of them had been forced, as I was in Halifax, to see themselves as essentially the same as native-born Blacks? Since I was not sure that my Caribbean and African friends in Winnipeg thought of themselves as Black, I decided to search elsewhere for information on what it meant to be Black.

In my mind, the most logical place to find out about and experience Canadian Black culture in Winnipeg was at the oldest Black church in the city: Pilgrim Baptist Church, which was founded in 1924. Up till the late 1960s when the introduction of the Point System immigration policy led to an influx of Caribbean Blacks to Winnipeg and other Canadian cities, Pilgrim Baptist Church was the central institution for Blacks in Winnipeg. The original core membership of Pilgrim Baptist was native-born Canadian Blacks, many of whom were from Nova Scotia.

Pilgrim Baptist Church was one of the Black churches that I seriously considered joining in spring 1980 when I returned to Winnipeg from my nine-month sojourn in Halifax. But loyalty to Pastor Cornish and to my friends at the Church of God as well as the structural limitation of travelling by public transit from my apartment to Pilgrim Baptist Church prevented me from attending the latter church on a regular basis. Walter Dorrington, my Nova Scotian-born friend at Pilgrim Baptist, was always happy to see me at his church; however, Walter did not have access to an automobile so he could not offer me rides. Walter was in charge of the youth choir at Pilgrim Baptist and there was no doubt that whatever he lacked in musical knowledge and/or ability he made up for with his enthusiasm.

Two curious things stood out for me about Pilgrim Baptist. First, the music was quite different from that in any church I had attended in the past. Although the church had only a few musical instruments, the singing reminded me of the music of Andrae Crouch, especially the "Live in Carnegie Hall" recording, I enjoyed so much while in Nigeria. I generally took my acoustic guitar along with me to Pilgrim Baptist and would join the church's guitarist, making sure that I did not play loud enough to

interfere with the music. Another major thing I noticed at Pilgrim Baptist was that many of the congregants greeted one another and visitors in a rather formal manner: everybody was Mr., Mrs., or Miss so-and-so. On one memorable day, I went to Pilgrim with a Black female university professor, a feminist who detested the idea of the title "Miss" being applied to anyone. The professor was visibly baffled when she introduced herself as Dr. so-and-so only to be promptly referred to as Miss so-and-so. It was always fun for me to watch some of the older congregants struggle with my last name, give up, and simple call me "Efa".

My friend Walter Dorrington went to the United States more frequently than anyone I knew. Most of his trips to the U.S. seemed to be in connection with music conferences; his other trips to the U.S. were less structured casual visits. I joined Walter and some members of Pilgrim Baptist for one very memorable visit to the Dakotas in the U.S. and enjoyed myself tremendously. Our weekend visit essentially involved eating, staying in a hotel, shopping, and attending a dynamic Black church. It was during this trip that I first discovered how costly it can be to feed teenage boys. I made the mistake of promising a teenage boy that I would treat him to whatever he wanted to have for breakfast. To my utter surprise, the boy had two helpings of the most expensive item on the menu: a large breakfast that included steaks and eggs.

My experiences in Black churches, especially Pilgrim Baptist Church, were to be expected for the Black church has historically been the central institution within the North American Black community (Frazier 1968; Lincoln 1984; Shreve 1983; Taylor, Thornton and Chatters 1987: 125-126). It is generally acknowledged that not only is the Black church largely the direct product of social segregation imposed by forces outside the Black community, but the Black church is the oldest and most fundamental institution in the North American Black community (Frazier 1968; Lincoln 1984 and Williams 1974). Winks (1971: 338-339) contends that Black churches emerged in Canada as a result of both factors external and those internal to the Black community. An important external factor is the fact that many White churches encouraged separation in order to please segments of the White population whom they believed would not condone integration. On the other hand, an important internal factor seems to be the fact that some Blacks preferred separate churches where they could deal with preachers who spoke in a vernacular they understood well (Winks ibidem: 338-339). The crucial role of the Black church has been aptly summarized as follows:

> The Black man's pilgrimage in America was made less onerous because of his religion. His religion was the organizing principle around which his life was structured. His church was his school, his forum, his political arena, his social club, his art gallery, his conservatory of music. It was his lyceum and gymnasium as well as sanctorium. His religion was his fellowship with man, his audience with God. It was the peculiar sustaining force that gave him strength to endure when endurance gave no promise, and the courage to be creative in the face of his own dehumanization (Lincoln 1984).

During the first two years after returning to Winnipeg from Halifax, I sought an environment that would meet both my spiritual needs and my intellectual needs within the context of Blackness. I wanted to experience an unadulterated Black-centered subculture. The local Black churches were quite helpful in satisfying my quest. But I desired more.

Studying the Black Community

As soon as I settled into my life as a graduate student at the University of Manitoba, I returned to a somewhat vigorous search for blackness. My office mate, Mike, was an American—a Vietnam War draft-dodger who held a B.A. degree from the University of Winnipeg. Mike and I got along very well. Mike informed me that he was very pleased to have a Black office mate since he grew up in a small town in the American mid-west where he did not have the opportunity of knowing any Black person.

Mike was unorthodox in many ways; he was certainly not average or typical. For example, since he did not like the idea of wearing seatbelts while driving, he bought an antique car that had no seatbelts and then obtained a special permit to drive his antique car without a seatbelt. He also once applied for employment with either the CIA or the FBI and later placed on a wall on his side of our shared office a letter to support his claim that his application for employment was not successful. Hardly anybody believed that Mike's application was unsuccessful; virtually every student who heard about Mike's application maintained that Mike was a spy.

Although Mike was a White man, I figured that his background as an American who was in his late teens during the American Civil Rights movement of the 1960s gave him special insights into what it meant to be Black in North America. One day I informed Mike that I was curious about what distinguished Black Americans from other Americans, controlling for social class. Without hesitation, Mike told me that the answer to my question lay in the shared experiences of Blacks in North America and that the best way to gain insight into these experiences was by being immersed in traditionally Black American music such as Blues and Jazz.

I believed Mike so I decided to delve into why music was at the core of blackness. The most natural place for me to turn was to Dr. Larry Douglas, the only tenured Black professor I knew. I was the only student who was brave enough to register in Dr. Douglas's graduate course in Social Order so the professor and I met for about three hours weekly in his office. This was an excellent arrangement for me since it gave me the opportunity to be vulnerable with and confide in Dr. Douglas— a ripe environment for mentoring. One day I asked Dr. Douglas what he thought about Jazz and Blues music. My question gave Dr. Douglas the opportunity to explain to me that both Jazz and Blues songs typically have more than one meaning and that the readily evident meanings tend to be secondary ones. He indicated that, historically, members of the Black community understood the primary meanings of these songs while outsiders did not. In other words, music was, historically, a boundary marker for blackness. Asante (1990) summarized the importance of music in the life of North American Blacks:

> Perhaps it is in music that we have seen our most authentic sign of continuity. Unquestionably the spirituals which are synonymous with elegant art, the blues which speak our essential pathos, and jazz which suggests all the intricate ways we create and communicate are the legacies of our epic memory. They represent a continuous linkage with the rituals and arrangements of West Africa. Because music sits astride our traditions it will monitor our future.

Since I love music and had an excellent stereo system, I started seeking out and listening to more Black American music. As odd as it now sounds to me, I could not tell the difference between Blues and Jazz music so I returned with my predicament to Mike, who happily gave me a few hints. After expressing his surprise, Mike gave me a few hints. I heeded Mike's advice and borrowed some records from

the main branch of the Winnipeg Public Library. I listened keenly to and enjoyed two songs in particular: B.B. King's blues classic "The thrill is gone" and a jazz song entitled "Mack the Knife."

Due to the influence of Mark, Professor Douglas, and other academics such as Professor Savannah Williams and Rocky Jones, the latter two of whom I met while at Dalhousie University, I started studying the question of blackness. I eventually wrote my University of Manitoba M.A. thesis on military interventions in Nigerian politics.

For my Ph.D. dissertation at McMaster University, I knew I had to deal even more squarely with the issue of blackness. I was not happy with various attempted topics, such as the problems of military disengagement in African politics and the Brain Drain of African countries. My final topic, on community building among Blacks in Hamilton, demanded that I participate within the Black community. Studying the Black community through participant observation became for me a key process of becoming Black. One of the few courses in which I enrolled at McMaster University was one on Qualitative Methods and the professor, Dr. William Shaffir, encouraged students to do field work on religious or other communities. My acquaintances at McMaster University, most of whom were White, were familiar with and directed me to only one local Black church: Stewart Memorial Church (SMC), which was founded in 1835 and is the city's oldest Black church. SMC's founder, Josiah Henson, is believed to be the Black man after whom the hero of Harriet Beecher Stowe's novel "Uncle Tom's Cabin" was based.

When I phoned the church office and indicated my intention to study a Black group in Hamilton, the assistant pastor, Reverend Robert Foster, expressed his interest in the work and offered me rides to and from the church. These trips were very beneficial for me since they offered me opportunities to interact informally with Rev. Foster who in turn used them as opportunities to introduce to me some of the neighborhoods where Black Hamiltonians once lived. My study of SMC launched me into a field research of Hamilton's Black community and, ultimately, helped to anchor me in the Black community. Basically, by doing field research within the Hamilton Black community I gained access to virtually every significant segment of the Black community.

After completing my project on the SMC I found that I could not readily get away from studying the Black community. I had come to realize that most of the Blacks with whom I associated in Winnipeg and, indeed, in Halifax were first generation immigrants who saw themselves primarily in terms of their nationalities; in contrast, most of my new contacts in Hamilton were members of old-line Black families who saw themselves as single-nationality Canadians.

By the spring of 1987 I had begun thinking seriously about basing my dissertation on some aspect of Black religion in Hamilton. At the same time, however, a growing awareness of certain events affecting some local Blacks (for example, the Desmond McIntosh affair in which a local police officer tried to frame Mr. McIntosh), gradually served to shift my interest to the question of racial discrimination against Blacks in Hamilton. In an attempt to understand the matter of racism against Blacks in Hamilton, I spent the remainder of 1987 and all of 1988 attending meetings organized by various Black voluntary organizations in Hamilton.

By early 1989 my observations, interviews and other research endeavors were focused essentially on what turned out to be the final focus of my dissertation: identifying the social conditions and processes that underlie the formation and continuity of Black businesses, institutions, and voluntary organizations in Hamilton. Thus, I had to pay particular attention to social interaction among local Blacks, since interaction is the primary factor in group formation and persistence (Blumer 1957: 128). I found the new

research emphasis to be quite exciting particularly because it was congruent with my long-standing research interest in nation building, an area in which my M.A. thesis was based.[5]

I secured access to the older native-born Black Hamiltonians through participating in the worship services, Sunday School classes, and other activities of Stewart Memorial Church in the fall and winter of 1986. In general, although not all the older native-born Blacks attended SMC regularly, those members of this category of Blacks still residing in Hamilton either attend the SMC or attend no church at all. In any event, church members referred to their church as the "home base" for all old-line Black Hamiltonians; thus, for example, Ontario's then Lieutenant Governor, Lincoln Alexander, who had not attended the church regularly for a number of years, was still regarded as a member. Indeed, Lincoln Alexander's portrait was strategically placed near the pulpit.

Access to the other Black churches was also not problematic because I am a Christian, Black, and a guitarist (Kleinman 1980: 179-181, Lofland and Lofland [1971] 1984: 16-17).[6] In addition, the fact that these churches were constantly in search of new members and adherents facilitated entry (Adler and Adler 1987: 16). In short, not only was I readily accepted into the study groups, but the fact that I am Black made it possible for me to blend readily into these groups–unlike the case with some field researchers (Gans [1962] 1982; Whyte [1943] 1981).

I casually discussed the question of Black community building with almost every Black resident of Hamilton I encountered between January 1989 and June 1990. The conversations with these Blacks--most of who were strangers that I met and conversed with in places such as fast food restaurants, summer festivals, house parties and churches--generally centered around specific current events in the Hamilton Black community. I typically conducted interviews at the interviewees' homes, although some were conducted at my home and yet others on the McMaster University campus. I interviewed each interviewee at least twice, the first session typically lasting between one and two hours. I used the second and subsequent sessions to solicit new information as they became necessary. In addition, the second and subsequent interview sessions were used to clarify statements made by the interviewees. In short, even the interview process helped to immerse me into the Black community.

Conclusion

It is significant that although Blacks have lived in Canada since at least the 17th century and the Black population has grown quite dramatically in the past four decades, intimate interactions between Blacks and Whites is limited (Brym and Lie 2009: 215-217). But Black Canadians regularly interact with one another in informal settings (Etoroma 1996: 196). These interactions, which occur in contexts such as house parties where conversations generally focus on issues such as food, music, and the Black experience, help to create and reinforce group identity among Blacks. Thus, social interactions provide opportunities for Blacks to learn how to become and/or remain Black in Canada. Although the most important boundary marker for the Black

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[5] Lofland and Lofland ([1971] 1984:8) note that the concerns sociologists take to doing social analyses often "arise from accidents of remote biography and personal history--of residence, ethnicity, gender, sexual preference, past identities or experiences...and so forth."

[6] Lofland and Lofland (1971/1984:8 and 16-17) note that access to study groups is facilitated in situations where researchers are committed and/or ascribed members of these groups. See also Shaffir, Stebbins, and Turowetz (1980:25 and 27).

community is skin color, other markers include speech patterns (accents and subjects of conversation), music, and food. While having Black roots is typically a necessary precondition for membership in the Black community, it is not a sufficient condition; one has to learn to be Black by being involved in "Black things"; that is by engaging in informal interactions with fellow Blacks.

Although I am proud to be Black, the initial impetus for my sojourn into blackness was external to me and to the Black community. The initial impetus for my quest for blackness was my experiences with altercasting. I have discovered that the Black community is a willing home for African-born and other Black immigrants. Fluid social structures and not being constantly under the gaze are some of the ways in which interacting with fellow Blacks remind me of the gemeinschaft settings of my youth and young adulthood in my Nigerian homeland. I enjoy Canada's material comforts and it's "peace, order and good government" but I miss Nigeria's personal touch—Nigeria's "gemeinschaft." In Canada I experience civilization and its many discontents as compared to Nigeria's raw nobility. Subtle forms of racism pushed me into making deliberate efforts to interact with fellow Blacks and studying the Black community has been instrumental in anchoring me in the Black community.

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Citation

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Book review:
Conquest: How Societies Overwhelm Others by David Day.
New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2008

Conquest is a remarkable exemplification of the beauty of history. I shall start by saying that this is a beautifully written book and I find it hard to put it down. Reading this book is an experience akin to sailing around the globe, from Mexico to Japan, ancient to contemporary. David Day, an accomplished Australian historian, has before written a book on how the residents of Australia have claimed to and successfully established proprietorship of the land (*Claiming a Continent*, 1996, revised edition 2001, HarperCollins), and *Conquest* is an enormous expansion, both geographically and theoretically. Through numerous cases, often in a vivid and engaging way, Day illustrates that human history has been marked by waves of land intrusions and takeovers by a group of people on another.

The central argument is that the old language of colonialism should be replaced by that of "supplanting societies," which means a group of people move onto another group's land and secure the proprietorship of that land. As Day explains, colonialism does not necessarily indicate the occupation of the land of a society by another, and it tends to mislead by giving the impression that the occupation of land came to an end when the European and American powers had, for the most part, withdrawn from Asia and Africa by the middle of the twentieth century. The new paradigm proposed by Day is meant to move beyond the historical context of colonialism and to view the land intrusion as a never-ending struggle. Through the new lens, we are able to compare land takeovers throughout history and understand them better.

The whole book is organized around three stages of land occupation: (1) making a legal claim to the land, (2) making a claim of effective proprietorship over the land, and (3) establishing a claim of moral proprietorship over the land (p. 7-9). The first stage involves symbolic acts, such as raising a flag or colleting rocks. However, single claimants are rarities, and a supplanting society usually has to make a claim of effective proprietorship, which goes beyond symbolic acts and includes acts such as peopling the land, producing maps, exploring the resources, and fortifying the borders. The last stage is a subtler one, which involves morally justifying the invasion and raising a feeling of national pride.

In this sweeping book, Day tells us numerous stories, many of which are less familiar to readers in the West, such as Japan's intrusion of the Ainu society in Hokkaido, Japan's invasion of Korea, and Russia's takeover of Siberia. Some are still happening and more relevant than ever, such as the turbulent history of Tibet and the politics surrounding the United States-Mexico border.

Conquest is a less polemic book than *Claiming a Continent*, as Day tries to maintain a neutral tone and avoids moral judgments for or against supplanting societies, although readers, in particular those not familiar with history, will likely find many stories disturbing.

My minor complaint, or quibble rather, is that Day does not offer an explanation for supplanting societies. Day seems to assume that societies have a natural and perennial tendency to supplant other societies and stops right here. While offering many fascinating narratives, Day never tells us what propels a society to invade another. Indeed, social scientists have told us that there are a set of mechanisms behind wars and land takeovers, such as taxing, population growth, geography, and even national mentality, and I believe that this body of literature could have shed great light on *Conquest*. However, a book should not be judged by what it does not set out to do, and Day should be congratulated for what he has already accomplished in this book.

Conquest draws from and contributes to many literatures. Not only will it be on the list of "must reads" for historians, it will stimulate discussions from sociologists, anthropologists, geographers and political scientists as well. A *tour de force*.

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Book review:
Women, Doctors and Cosmetic Surgery
Negotiating the "Normal" Body by Rhian Parker

The book "Women, Doctors and Cosmetic Surgery" by Rhian Parker places cosmetic surgery within the Australian context. It outlines complexity and dynamism of foregoing procedure as a process which is simultaneously constructed by both women and their doctors. It shows how shared understanding between those two parties to an interaction is being negotiated.

Cosmetic surgery as a powerful medical procedure becomes the subject of interdisciplinary studies over the body. It transforms bodily characteristics into abnormalities and *correct* them in terms to enable its recipients to compete successfully in social milieu. Now, as an increasingly accessible *way to recreate* the body, it occupies a significant place in social cognition. Moreover, given that this phenomenon is gendered and women are overrepresented as cosmetic surgery recipients, the question of *why* they want cosmetic surgery has produced a significant body of feminist literature. Although substantial number of these studies have much to offer in the area of theoretical analysis over the agency that is exercised by women during the whole process of *recreating* the body they fail however, to elucidate the role the doctor has in *designing* and *reshaping* the patient's body (p. 58-59; 103). In fact, little is known about how doctors and women interact in order to create a unitary concept about the outcome of this cosmetic procedure. That is the reason why studying the discourses that construct and surround both the vision of *normalised* body and the underpinnings of the practice of cosmetic surgery is essential to understand the range of complex factors which mediate the outcome of this dynamic process.

Publicity and advertisements surrounding cosmetic surgery lure women into trusting that their bodies can *easily* be *reshape* just as they want them to be. While emphasising only the benefits of these medical procedures media omit, however, the particular risks of cosmetic surgery what may on one hand, minimise in patient's perception the actual role of the doctor who operates on the passive body and on the other, add to women's perception that foregoing medical intervention is not in fact a *real* surgery. Thus, it is less than surprising that what patients believe in is that they can achieve such an outcome as they expect rather, then feeling dependent on both what the surgeon can provide and his perception of what the *normal* body is (p. 24).

Rhian Parker's argument is based on the analysis of qualitative data of the cosmetic surgery operation. The Author's study over the repertoire of factors that impact upon the whole process of cosmetic procedure "consists of interviews with 32 women who had undergone a cosmetic procedure and 19 medical practitioners who

carry out these procedures" (p. 8). Referring her argument to theoretical framework that explains the phenomenon of how the notion of the body is being socially constructed and providing the overview of influences which are most pertinent to women who have undergone a cosmetic procedure, Rhian Parker analyses the discourses that are surrounding cosmetic surgery and attempts to recapture their impact upon the woman-doctor interaction within "journey through cosmetic surgery" (p. 6). A major objective of the book "Women, Doctors and Cosmetic Surgery" by Rhian Parker is to open cosmetic surgery to critical interdisciplinary scrutiny.

"This book consists of 10 chapters that are organised into three sections. These sections are: literature reviews (Chapters 2, 3 and 4), a presentation of the result of the empirical study (Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8) and a discussion of the main themes of the book and conclusion (Chapters 9 and 10)" (p.11).

The literature review places cosmetic surgery within its historical context and contribute to an understanding of how the body is being socially *colonised* in order to make it *fitting in*.

By elucidating the historical context of cosmetic surgery development, the Author emphasis that the act of undergoing this medical procedure is about *passing in* the society rather, than *standing out* (p. 15; 81-82). Rhian Parker outlines that at the time when psychology was granted an academic discipline cosmetic surgery starts being regarded as a way to improving one's state of being by treating physical *deformations*. Thus, the inclusion of foregoing psychological argument into the discipline of cosmetic surgery is crucial to promotion of this procedure as a *tool* for improving person's self-esteem (p. 18-19) and vital for justifying why treating the body that is physically healthy (p. 86-88).

Claiming that gender is a way of being in the world, Rhian Parker elucidates how the notion of woman's body is being socially constructed. The Author outlines how the woman's body has been standardised and normalised in order to transform it into the sign of culture. Moreover, given that cosmetic surgery constitutes a *tool* that contributes *fitting in*, this medical procedure seems to be a means of cultural *colonisation* of the woman's body, the equivalent of feet bounding and waist constricting.

To contribute an understanding of the body as a *reflexive project*, Rhian Parker provides an overview of literature of philosophy, sociology and feminism that situates the body in a wider context of social worlds and cultural influences. These theoretical approaches enable the apprehension of cosmetic surgery as a current practice that disciplines the body. The significant role of both medicine and male doctors in *controlling* and *colonising* the woman's body has been recognised and analysed in relation to Foucault's concept of *the docile body* (p. 45-48). Moreover, it is clearly indicated that social ideal of the body informs the way doctors perceive, in order to *reconstruct*, the patient's body (p. 49). Furthermore, the review of feminist literature provides the theoretical framework that disposes the reader to question some current assumptions of cosmetic surgery. For instance, in a wide range of theories, cosmetic surgery is regarded as disciplinary regime with the power to take possession of woman's agency over the body (p. 52-55). In others, the act of undergoing cosmetic surgery is seen as a result of woman's choice, an act of empowerment (p. 55-57).

"In Australia, like in many other countries, most doctors who carry out cosmetic surgery need a medical degree but no other training is required" (p. 61). In order to elucidate tensions developed within cosmetic surgery as a *business*, the Author provides a brief overview of *Turf War* that centres around the question of which medical practitioners should be allowed to carry out cosmetic surgery (p. 60-65). Rhian Parker argues that the foregoing debate draws social attention away from the

bigger issue which is cosmetic surgery as a practice (p. 64). Moreover, the Author emphasis that doctors' active engagement in the process of cosmetic surgery commercialisation not only promotes the surgical body alterations but enhances also the socio-cultural system that keeps the body under surveillance. Furthermore, according to women in this study, the act of undergoing cosmetic surgery is in common parlance associated to vanity expression which contrasts with these women's perception of their bodies. Thus, women's narrations elucidate another wider tension within cosmetic surgery that impacts upon patient's engagement in the foregoing process (p.70-72).

Rhian Parker's study was focused on three key categories: women's and doctors' motivations (Chapter 6: The Why of Cosmetic Surgery: Patient and Doctor Motivations), their reciprocal communication (Chapter 7: Communication and Cosmetic Surgery) and their understanding of risks consequent to undergo cosmetic surgery (Chapter 8: A Risky Business? Understanding Risk in Cosmetic Surgery).

The reasons why women in Rhian Parker's study want to undergo cosmetic surgery are: *a long standing problem* like a large nose (p. 76-77), *the consequence of child-bearing* (p. 78-79) and *ageing* (p. 80-81). The foregoing motivations that are reported as *internally* established were however, *externally* influenced by social critical gaze. Thus, what women expected is to *regain* their identity, to *fit in* rather, than to *stand out* (p. 82-84). According to patients' beliefs, doctors who operate on their bodies have been attracted to cosmetic surgery practice because of its financial profitability (p. 96-97). Practitioners however, describe themselves as artists who provide women with a psychological treatment through the cosmetic procedure (p. 98-99). Moreover, what emerges from doctors' narratives is the tendency to translate patient's bodily characteristics into *abnormalities* or *deformities*. Thus, the diagnosis that women make before they enter the clinic is confirmed in a medical discourse. While reporting on women's motivations to undergo cosmetic surgery doctors outline that they refuse to operate on these women whose motivation is not *right* (p. 91-93). They accept however, that these women may seek cosmetic surgery elsewhere. Moreover, by associating some of the patient's expectations to *unrealistic demands*, doctors *produce* the discourse of women's responsibility for the outcome of cosmetic surgery (p. 93-94). Thus, surgeons' responsibility over the altered body is slightly reduced.

By recapturing the repertoire of factors which mediate the outcome of cosmetic surgery the Author emphasis that the doctor-patient communication which is a central interaction within the process has to be contextualised in relation to the cultural, economical and professional pressures both groups face. Both women and doctors regard communication as a vital component of successful outcome of cosmetic surgery. There are however, different perspectives about how patient-doctor rapport is established (p. 121-126; 131). The existence of significant disparity between the lay and medical discourse unmask fundamental stricture of cosmetic surgery which is the uncertain outcome of the procedure that might cause woman's further alienation from her body. Since the ideal body form is negotiated through computer-assisted communication (p. 116-118) women are lured into hoping they can look a certain way. Nevertheless, what the woman ends up with, as a result of cosmetic procedure, depends on both the surgeon's professional skills and the doctor's concept of a particular body that he operates on. Thus, the Author's study accentuates that within the process of cosmetic surgery a patient's agency over the body is being intimately lessened by their doctors' *professional* perception of how the altered body would look in order to resemble the ideal form (p. 118-121; 126). Rhian Parker emphasis that within the foregoing process the women's vision of their bodies is

being permanently negotiated and constructed not only through their experiences and internalised notion of what constitutes femininity but likewise by technological tools and doctor's *professional* surveillance.

A wide range of advertisements promotes cosmetic surgery as an accessible and relatively fast way to *sculpt* the body. What the foregoing commercialisation may add to its recipients' perception is a belief that cosmetic surgery is slightly different from *real* surgical intervention which is in common parlance correlated to certain risk. The analysis of data gathered from women in this study elucidates that in the area of both surgery and post-operative phase, patients feel that they are *kept in dark* (p. 135-141). Rhian Parker emphasis that within the consultations the flow of information is controlled by the surgeons who, instead of *conversing* with patients (lay discourse), communicate through professional medical discourse. Moreover, because of the fact that importance of certain information to patients is often ignored by doctors, there are fundamental misunderstandings between these two groups (p. 141-146). Thus, the way surgeons communicate unveil their paternalistic attitude towards patients. Furthermore, there are significant differences in the way women and doctors conceptualise the notion of risk consequent to the process of cosmetic surgery. For instance, according to women's narrations, post-operative recovery was not identified by many doctors as risk that needed to be indicated (p. 142-144). Consequently, some patients inadvertently *mistreat* their bodies within post-operative phase. However, the most substantial risk for women in this study, that is hardly identified before the surgery, is the risk of not getting the outcome they have expected (p. 147-153). Thus, getting the body that has been imposed upon them rather than the one that has been chosen. Discontent with the altered body that is envisaged to reflect woman's identity causes the dissonance which is difficult to reduce otherwise than undergoing another cosmetic surgery.

In order to draw together all key categories outlined in the empirical part of this book, Rhian Parker provides an overview of the main themes discussed in previous chapters. By elucidating the repertoire of factors that impact upon the cosmetic surgery, the Author outlines how the process of foregoing procedure is being negotiated and constructed by both women and their doctors. Moreover, in order to offer the critique of past debates over the cosmetic surgery within women's and doctors' experiences are not regarded as an integral part of foregoing process, key arguments of the book are contrasted with existing literature in the area.

The book "Women, Doctors and Cosmetic Surgery" by Rhian Parker tends to overbear past theoretical approaches to cosmetic surgery which perpetuate the dual vision of women as victim to cultural oppression or as an individual agent. The objective of this study is rather to move the theoretical debate over cosmetic surgery towards an apprehension of diverse discourses which affect the outcome of foregoing procedure, than to became a theoretical précis.

What may attract a reader's attention is that in women's and doctors' narratives the distinctive notions of the body are unveiled. On one hand, the body is being experienced as a subjective, unique phenomenon, an instrument through which one interacts. On the other, the body is regarded as a material that needs to be *sculptured* by the doctor who is an artist incarnate (s. 98). Foregoing distinction between *experiencing* (women) and *perceiving* (doctors) the body, that does not constitute, however, part of the Author's analysis, is convergent to distinction between *phenomenal* and *objective* body made by Maurice Merlau-Ponty (2001). In a reviewer's opinion, the inclusion of foregoing categories into the study over cosmetic surgery might on one hand, enable more holistic reconstruction of this

process and on the other, offer a reflection over social construction of *embodiment* (Ibid.).

Moreover, although the lack of shared understanding between patients and their doctors, that is often due to uncertain and what is worse unsatisfactory outcome of cosmetic surgery, clearly emerges from women's narrations, practitioner's interpretation of their relations with patients and yet, their perception of the process through which this is achieved, are fairly different from these reported by women (Chapter 7; 8). Despite enumerating wide range of influences which impact upon the doctor-woman interactions and placing them in both cultural and situational contexts, Rhian Parker does not attempt to investigate, in order to explain, the foregoing phenomenon of interaction partner's contradictory perception of shared understanding. Thus, the reader's attention might be attracted to descriptive, rather than analytic dimension of the Author's study.

Furthermore, the interview was the unique technique of gathering data that is applied by Rhian Parker to conduct this research. For some readers, study based on woman's and doctors' narratives only, might be regarded as credible and methodologically sufficient. For others, lack of data triangulation is, however, correlated to lack of data accuracy what might, as a consequence, cast doubt on validity of empirical material and of some part of the analysis. As the Author suggests though, for further data verification and deeper understanding of foregoing phenomenon there needs to be following interdisciplinary analysis that moves debate over cosmetic surgery beyond the current way of thinking and open cosmetic surgery to critical scrutiny (Chapter 10: Looking Forward, Looking Back). This aim may be achieved through the application of visual sociological methods.

Nevertheless, the book "Women, Doctors and Cosmetic Surgery" by Rhian Parker stands out as a study that denotes the complexity and divergence of discourses that are both surrounding and impacting upon the dynamic process of cosmetic surgery and thus constitutes a valuable contribution to the sociology and psychology of health. In the reviewer's opinion, this book may become an inspiring and instructive reading not only for scholars but also for those who are on any level involved in the process of cosmetic surgery.

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Citation

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Book review:
Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society by Hakan Thorn.

Although there has been no shortage of works about the South African struggle against Apartheid, the bulk of this output has fallen outside the purview of 'movement studies'. It has been the American 'civil rights' movement that has generally anchored this research tradition, as can be seen in the fact that books such as Aldon Morris' "Origins of the Civil Rights Movement" serve as foundational texts for the field. Hakan Thorn's "Anti-Apartheid and the Emergence of a Global Civil Society" intends to redress this imbalance.

If movement studies have generally sought out the common features among diverse social movements (features often derived from an American 'civil rights' archetype), Thorn finds reason to explore in massive detail the uniqueness of a single one. In it we encounter an Anti-Apartheid movement (AAM) that has been pieced apart in ways strikingly unlike what has otherwise been produced in the great quantity of written accounts about it. Thorn does not aim merely to chronicle the inner workings of the movement itself; neither is he especially concerned with the institution of Apartheid and its eventual demise. Rather more ambitiously, he argues for understanding the AAM as the prototype of the 'new social movement'—which has superseded the church- and labor-based movements of old—and as the historical basis of a 'new' global space of belonging.

Consequently, Thorn's book sits at the crossroads of multiple subfields, and sincerely intends to contribute to each of them. On one front, Thorn interrogates the nature of social movements, seeking to upset commonplace ideas about what distinguishes the 'old' from the 'new'. Not only have observers neglected the internationalization of 'old' movements, prematurely relegating these movements to a historical past; their ideas about how a social movement might look have also tended to presuppose the social conditions of the West, ensuring a blindness toward nonwestern movements. If these oversights suggest a misrecognizing of the role of the nation state, Thorn's approach is to meticulously excise these misrecognitions from the tissue of movement studies. Thus, conventional models such as "Resource Mobilization Theory" or the related "Political Process Perspective" are chastised for treating "…the nation state as a 'pre-given', largely unproblematized, context for social movement action" (p. 12). Rather than simply departing from a 'pre-given' premise, Thorn imagines a space of action and belonging that is shaped by forces both internal and external to the nation state. This space has many anchors, but three in particular: the increasing globalization of the world system, the condition of postcoloniality, and the major fault lines of world conflict (especially the Cold War).

The 'inside/outside debate'—as Thorn refers to the dilemma of locating social movements in relation to nation states—is referenced throughout the book and is linked to another major area of inquiry to which Thorn wishes to contribute: the discourse on globalization. Against a common tendency to infer the dissolution of the nation state from the increasing globalization of social, cultural, economic, and political institutions, the author shows how the nation state sits between the respective influences of "historically instituted national political cultures" and "transnational processes". Thus the differential impacts of AAM in Britain and Sweden can be traced to how the respective states were each affected by differing internal and external dynamics. In Britain, the AAM shared a closer connection to older anti-colonial and labor movements, which not only enabled more extensive community-building across national borders, but also encouraged the use of direct action tactics characteristic of the earlier movements. Sweden, on the other hand, featured a weaker movement tradition (and weaker ties to transnational activism) bearing official ties to a relatively more 'open' social democratic government, leading not only to fewer direct actions but also to anti-apartheid policy. As Thorn notes, the nation state has therefore not dissolved amid globalization, but has become another actor in a global space of interaction:

> States are no longer political spaces defined by their territorial sovereignty, but one of many political actors, which enter into alliances with other actors, such as corporations or even social movements (p. 205)

Thorn further criticizes the tendency of globalists to 'over-emphasize' the media, and instead redirects attention to the movement of bodies across geographical space and the particular impacts of various contexts of face-to-face interaction. Here we are reminded of the importance of travel and exile to social ties characteristic of 'new social movements'.

Elaborating his argument in the first part of the book, Thorn applies these insights in part two as he empirically investigates a series of news items that were significant to the anti-Apartheid struggle. Subsequently, he draws extensively on the method of 'discourse analysis' to explore how the media frames associated with these news items changed over time and across national contexts. Supplementing the discussion are profiles of movement actor ideal types—the "activist public official", "the activist priest", "the exile activist", "the movement organizer", and "the movement intellectual"—developed from ethnographic interview data. Ultimately, the result is a powerful depiction of the fluidity of national borders and the inadequacy of movement studies in dealing with this reality. The author resists the excesses often associated with discursive approaches by employing the classic 'action-structure' framework so familiar to sociology. Whether or not these parts have added up to the sum total suggested by the book's title however remains an open question. One wonders if the author has simply discovered one of multiple "global civil societies", or if the importance of immigration and visa regulation in these matters has not been downplayed. Furthermore, though Thorn pays ample attention to the ways that actors circumnavigate national political boundaries, the equally important issue of national identity is given short shrift, obscuring important differences between "international" and "global" communities. To his credit, Thorn concedes that, "it is…obvious that the concept of civil society needs to be reformulated when transferred from theories of the nation state to theories of a global society," (p. 203) though he never explores how this might look or bear upon the foregoing analyses. Nonetheless, even if Thorn has ultimately failed to lead us to our promised destination, he has taken us to many important places along the way.

Citation

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Author-Supplied Abstracts & Keywords

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Creating, Sustaining, and Contesting Definitions of Reality: Marcus Tullius Cicero as a Pragmatist Theorist and Analytic Ethnographer

Abstract
Although widely recognized for his oratorical prowess, the collection of intellectual works that Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 BCE) has generated on persuasive interchange is almost unknown to those in the human sciences. Building on six texts on rhetoric attributed to Cicero (*Rhetorica ad Herennium, De Inventione*, *Topica, Brutus, De Oratore*, and *Orator*), I claim not only that Cicero may be recognized as a pragmatist philosopher and analytic ethnographer but also that his texts have an enduring relevance to the study of human knowing and acting. More specifically, thus, Cicero's texts are pertinent to more viable conceptualizations of an array of consequential pragmatist matters. These include influence work and resistance, impression management and deception, agency and culpability, identity and emotionality, categorizations and definitions of the situation, and emergence and process.

Keywords: Cicero; Pragmatism; Ethnography; Reality; Activity; Persuasion; Symbolic interaction; Oratory; Rhetoric; Aristotle; Roman; Kenneth Burke

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Social Introspection of I. A. Bláha and Wittgenstein's' Argument Counter to Private Language. Anniversary Study on Introspection Approach in Social Sciences.

Abstract:
The following text discusses the method of social introspection of the Czech philosopher and sociologist I.A. Bláha. It focuses both on presenting the method and exploring its potentials and limits in order to understand social reality. The application of the Wittenstein´s argument against the private language as a critique of the introspective perspective and a brief analysis of the phenomenological approach in sociology will help to assess the boundaries of this approach. Theoretical conclusions of application of the introspection method in sociology are drawn at the end of the text and thus allow to assess applicability of the Blaha´s own method.

Keywords: I. A. Bláha; L. Wittgenstein; Social introspection; Private language argument; Language games; Czech sociology

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Reconceptualizing Dreamwork (with apologies to Lewis Carroll's Alice) as a Facet of Motherwork

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Abstract

While acknowledging some of the myriad ways in which the term "dreamwork" has been used by scholars over the past century, this article directs especial attention to dreamwork as both a facet of motherwork and form of anticipatory socialization. This particular conception views dreamwork as an interpersonal accomplishment and emphasizes its collaborative character. In arguing for its utility, we note how this conception of dreamwork complements insights found in other works and suggest how these ideas might be related, and future research on parental involvement in the lives of children strengthened, by gathering them together under the concept of dreamwork.

Keywords: Dreamwork; Parenting; Motherwork; Mothering; Socialization

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The Loves of Others: Autoethnography and Reflexivity in Researching Distance Relationships

Abstract
Reflexive accounts of research are important, but they should include attention to a wider range of relations than those between researcher and participant. The researcher's position in relation to the participants does merit discussion, especially when there is an element of autoethnography involved. However, assistants in the research such as transcribers, can play a role in accounting for the research. The relationships participants have with loved ones also shape how they reflexively account for themselves and their experiences, in this case – of being in a distance relationship.

Keywords: Reflexivity; Autoethnography; Relationality; Distance relationships; Interviewing; Transcribing

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Stealing Peanuts and Coercing Energy Drinks: The Underground Economy of a Middle School Summer Camp

Abstract
Economic activities are one important but understudied mechanism which kids use to recreate inequality within their peer cultures. Drawing on ethnographic data from a middle school summer camp, we used Goffman's typology of economic arrangements to analyze sequences of economic interactions within an underground economy. The middle school students drew on coercion, trading and sharing in order to address their own interests and concerns. When negotiating friendships, girls sometimes engaged in a series of interactions which converted previous social exchanges into unfulfilled economic exchanges. Girls also used inappropriate social exchanges to successfully resist boys' private coercion efforts, prompting boys to switch tactics and propose appropriate social exchanges and economic exchanges. Not only were these economic interactions patterned along gender, race, and class lines, but the repetitive, routine nature of these interactions helped to recreate inequality within the peer culture.

Keywords: Underground economy; Middle school; Peer culture; Interpretive reproduction; Inequality; Ethnography

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Narrative Approaches as a Supplementary Source of Knowledge on Marginalized Groups

Abstract
This article reflects upon two different research projects that involve narratives from youth in care and youth growing up in families with gay and lesbian parents. We argue that these narrative approaches may offer a supplementary source of knowledge on marginalized groups that often seem hard to reach. The first method involves the participant and researcher collaborating to convert an oral narrative into a written one. In the second, the participants write an autobiographical narrative by themselves, covering themes specified by a researcher. The article is structured so that we first look at the processes of co-creating narratives and collecting autobiographical testimonies. We then introduce the two different methodological approaches by referring to empirical examples. Finally we reflect on the methodological and ethical challenges that occurred during this research.

Keywords: Narrative approaches; Autobiographies; Youth in care; Youth in gay and lesbian families

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Beyond Conceptual Ambiguity: Exemplifying the 'Resistance Pyramid' Through the Reflections of (Ex) Prisoners' Agency

Abstract
Contemporary resistance scholarship increasingly positions individuals as agents operating within power relations and as such, this stimulating and diverse body of work illuminates the complexity of power-resistance. The richness of this academic engagement notwithstanding, there continues to be a paucity of work which offers a framework for conducting an analysis of resistance. In this article, we propose a general framework through which power-resistance can be coded, analyzed and theorized. Using data from an ethnomethodological study of 20 former long-term male prisoners in Canada, we demonstrate the usefulness of our 'resistance pyramid' to render visible the objectives, purposes, strategies, tactics and skills which characterize the processes, and not just the practices, of resistance. We argue that it is exactly these, often obscured, processes that allow us to appreciate the density of resistance-power, the multiple ways it operates and the significance of individuals' social, personal or political capital.

Keywords: Resistance; Prison; Parole; Ethnomethodology

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Secondary Adjustment in Prisons: Prisoners' Strategies of Influence

Abstract

This participant observation research explores and examines the strategies that prisoners use to influence prison officers in an Asian prison setting. Grounded theory methodology is employed in the analysis process. From the study, eight strategies of influence are conceptualised: *repetition, distraction, finding excuses, feigning ignorance, false compliance, hearsay, direct hit* and *spontaneous protest*. They are further subsumed under three main categories of *Enhancers, Trouble Shooters* and *Resistors.* On the other hand, there are three categories of prison officers with respect to their responses to the eight strategies of influence – *Idealists, Pragmatists* and *Authoritarians.* In summary, this study serves three objectives. First, it provides a fresh perspective on how prisoners attempt to influence prison officers in their daily interactions. Second, it has demonstrated that data collection through covert participant observation can be done effectively without causing any harm to the stakeholders in a prison setting. Lastly, this study has implications for the development of theory, practice and future research in the area of penology.

Keywords: Secondary adjustment; Influencing strategies; Covert participant observation; Grounded theory

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At Home in Blackness: How I Became Black

Abstract
I became and have remained Black in Canada by interacting with Blacks. Altercasting (the "push" from the larger society) moved me into interacting intentionally with Blacks, interacting with Blacks helped make me Black by immersing me in the Black experience, and studying Blacks helped anchor me within the Black community by giving me an understanding of what it means to be Black. In this paper, which is based on autoethnography, I offer a brief overview of the concept of Blackness in Canada and then I discuss the key ways in which my Black identity was developed and is sustained. The key mechanisms discussed are altercasting, interacting with Blacks, and studying the Black community.

Keywords: Altercasting; Autoethnography; Black; Blackness; Church; Community; Identity; Interaction

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