Sensual Construction of Body and Biography. Suggestions to Mutually Improve Deficient but Widespread Body Concepts and Biographical Research

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Abstract: Against the backdrop of an increasing interest in visual methods in social research, this paper examines some theoretical foundations of human (inter-)action by reflecting on the interplay between senses, the body, and biography. The main purpose of the paper is to combine an integral, non-Cartesian concept of the self as body (respectively the lived body as self) with biographical research—thus enriching research on the body, as well as on biography. Criticizing the Cartesian split of body and mind, classical phenomenological (Leib) and recent concepts of the body (“embodiment”) are sketched, resulting in a processual model of the sensual construction of the lived and living body in its environment. Given the interplay of bodily foundations of the self and processes of biographical structuring, so far, distant fields of research are converged. Some suggestions for conceptual improvements, an attentional shift to body aspects, respective research topics, and the extension of methods exceeding the narrative biographical interview in biographical research are indicated.

Keywords: Lived Body; Embodiment; Embedded and Enacted Mind; Integration of Senses; Critique of Cartesian Dualism; Biographical Structuring; Self as Product and Producer of Interaction; Bodily Constitution of Biography; Gestures; Sensual Research Techniques; Video-Based Interaction Analysis

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Introduction: Seeing and Feeling Bodies?

You learn the most about life if something you did not expect happens. Talking about human senses, you can ‘look,’ to begin with, at the visual. What happens if you lose your eyesight?

To start with a playful scene, children—and in former times, even adults—used to play blind man’s buff. Blindfolded and with arms wide open, one stumbles around to eventually catch one of the other seeing playmates. Then, you have to guess whom you grabbed to be ‘redeemed’ and take off the eye bandage. Though one important sense of the ‘seeker’ is deliberately switched off, this game is fun for all because one is not helpless but able to move and orient oneself by means of other senses (hearing, touching, smelling, a feeling of your moving body), and, finally, one is able to recognize the caught playmate by hugging each other, which is fun for both sides.

If you prefer more dramatic answers to cope with losing eyesight, you may study the experiences of persons as presented by the neuropsychologist Oliver Sacks (2011 [esp. chapter 7]). For example, a man who was reported to have lost not only the ability to see but whose visual imaginations and recollections became faint and who eventually became completely nonvisual. In compensation, his other senses, particularly hearing, became much more intensive and allowed him to experience the world around him much more subtly and with intense and new characteristics. He felt not impaired but enriched. A new sensual center seemed to have created a new perceptive identity. Another person coped with adult blindness by reinforcing his visual imagination, constructing a virtual visual reality more emphatic than the world he had lost. To sum up the different cases, Sacks presents a remarkable shift from impaired visuality to refining the other senses, including proprioception and kinesthetics, thus allowing orientation for many human activities and experiences. Recognizing objects, identifying persons, and feeling situations and space can be achieved by the concert of the other senses in action, motion, and interaction, allowing full interaction with others and the world without the—usually thought of as crucial—ability to see.

Neurologically speaking, according to Sacks (2011), the brain’s sensual areas are not separated and directly bound to stimuli transferred by specialized receptors, but are connected and interact in many ways. In the event of sensual damage or loss, the interaction of sensual areas is reorganized according to the needs and the active life of the person in their environment. The structural plasticity of the brain makes a possible adjustment to future bodily (and social!) changes—as in the case of blindness—and, in reverse, the active living of the person shapes the brain, including perception, that is, ‘reading,’ making sense of, and turning into action whatever sensual data it gets.

However, this neurological account may be strongly criticized from the viewpoint of other strands of neuroscience and by cognitive psychologists. They may have a different notion of the issue of sensual integration, orientation, and acting in a changing world. Focusing on the brain’s ability to construct complex worlds from relatively poor sensual data leads them to neglect what is ‘really out there,’ the person’s conduct, living in their surroundings. What counts are representations of the brain, the world as a model by the brain: at its best, perceptions are hypotheses about the world (Roth 1997:270). Have neuro-constructivism and representationism...
not brought about a lot of puzzling new knowledge compatible with MRT results and fitting to physical conceptions of the body, seeing the body (including its sensual apparatus) as a machine-like object of observation and experiment? Are we all not used to this split between inner (subjective) and outer (objective) entities without realizing that we are true disciples of Descartes? Tacitly, we may build our research questions along this split, taking sides with either the ‘inner’ or the ‘outer’ world, and neglecting the respective other, thus jeopardizing the crucial point: how living persons organize themselves (including their body) when interacting with and acting in their environment? To follow my argument, the reader should be sensitive to this.

This, then, is the main thesis that I shall unfold in this paper: the different human senses are integrated by the lived and living body (German Leib). Living means an ongoing process of confrontation and interaction of the individual and their surroundings, thus shaping the sensual and kinesthetic functions of the brain, constituting the body as a person being able to move around, wish, act, experience, reflect, interact, and communicate with others. This process constitutes a person with a self. This implies, in general, spatial and temporal orientation, being situated on a horizon of past and future, being able to reflect on your affairs and actions, knowing ‘who you are,’ in particular, the development of a specific person, being recognized by others, being able to live in their natural, social, and cultural environment. This conditio humana is processed in actual everyday life and biographical structuring (biographical work). The paper argues to combine an integral, non-Cartesian concept of the self as body (respective, the body as self) with biographical research, thus enriching research on both body and biographical methods.

To unfold such a complex thesis and corroborate the mutual gain of converging two different research traditions in the few pages of this paper, I shall first discuss some widespread, but shortsighted dualistic concepts of the body and mind, including its sensual functions (Section 1). Instead, and this will be the main focus of the paper, we need a holistic research model that meets the requirements of the living person in their lifeworld, a concept that understands the subject and self in the living body (“embodied”) and interacting persons “embedded” in their environment (Section 2). The paper then focuses on biographical work relating to the concept of the lived body (Section 3). To conclude, some consequences and suggestions for research methods will be alluded to (Section 4).

Thus, the main concern of this paper is conceptual. The concepts of the living body and biographical structuring are seen and shown as related to each other and feeding into each other. Only the direction of future research can be indicated in this sense; the demanding task of clarifying sub-concepts and presenting empirical methods and research results cannot be achieved here. This implies research work for many and for a longer time, as well as an intensified interdisciplinary discourse. Nevertheless, hints and starting points for research will be indicated in parts 3 and 4. The theory will not be developed from empirical data; rather, data-gathering will be encouraged in a sensual and living-body-sensitive frame of inquiry. I address a wide audience of students and scholars of sociology, social work, humanities, and body professions, including psycho- and somato-therapists. I know from decades-long teaching in these disciplines how widespread and deeply rooted a trivial, everyday split between body and mind determines observation and research: a bias that
has led to disciplinary profiles and communication problems between disciplines (often at the expense of patients and clients of professional care) that are seldom criticized. In this paper, I shall remind of classical and reinforce recent non-Cartesian embodiment concepts of the living body (Leib) and relate this to biographical research. I am not alone in the wide open and do not pretend to preach a new message, thus I assume specialists in the sociology of the body or the recently developed and flourishing sociology of senses may not find too much new in this article except the perspective for biography.


1. Body and Mind: A Dualistic Model and Some of Its Consequences

Beginning with the body rather than single senses, some common and scientific, but misleading concepts are discussed. They see the human body as an object like other objects in the world. The box-like bodily object is viewed as a special case, evolutionary and biologically created, inhabited by the individual; you may call it the mind or self. In a simple notion, this box has two translucent windows, limbs to move, touch, and grab, and other sensory devices to investigate the outer world. The basic model is the machine, moving and behaving in some environment (like a self-driving car). Besides energy, it needs some program and sensory equipment to get around without bumping into other objects or bodies. The main senses available are viewing to identify objects in near or far space, hearing to identify things by sounds, touching to identify objects and surfaces, tasting to identify categories of edible objects, and smelling to decide if objects or atmospheres are friendly or hostile. All these distinct senses are seen as functional to orientation and self-location of the body in a friendly or unfriendly surrounding (including other bodies comparable to my own).

At first sight, this conceptual approach seems plausible, yet it is reductionistic, neglecting important issues of human conduct and resulting in many problems.

There are issues related to (a) the internal organization of the body, (b) the relation to oneself and others, and (c) the relation to the world in general. In all respects, the dualistic inside/outside concept fails to fully relate to the processes of human living: acting, experiencing, understanding oneself, interacting and communicating with others, building symbolic and ritualized systems of meaning (with language and discourse as a top priority), and experiencing and shaping a shared reality and world.

Let us consider some of the major shortfalls in this Cartesian framework.

¹ In this respect, I owe more than I can express to Anselm Strauss, who accepted me as a member of his working group in San Francisco, 1980–1982.
A. If you consider the body as a box-like object, the main problem arises from asking whom the agent is steering the movements and acts of this object. Metaphorically, who is the captain or helmsman navigating the vessel? As for the internal processing of different senses and external sensual data, what is the integrating principle of the different senses giving us a continuous spatial and temporal unity of what we call our world?

B. A classical answer was given by the philosopher René Descartes (1596-1650); he considered one’s own thinking as an undoubtable fact, the cogito. Consequently, he distinguished between two (and only two) substances (!): thinking and extended things, the res cogitans and the res extensa. Like other objects, the body belongs to the sphere of res extensa, but only because animated by the res cogitans can it perceive and decipher all kinds of sensual data (e.g., as pain when stepping into an open fire). In Descartes’ opinion, the soul is the helmsman of the vessel. The driver of the chassis (interestingly, also “body” in English) is the thinking substance, the ego, and its will; thus, the subject epistemologically outranked the object. A bifurcation of scholarly cultures, namely, those dealing with the inner (e.g., consciousness philosophy, psychology, cognitive sciences, humanities) and the outer world (e.g., natural sciences, modern science-oriented medicine, neurology studying the brain as an object), eventually gained momentum. The benefits of this difference are immense (e.g., optimizing, modifying what is naturally given, creating all kinds of artifacts through sciences, understanding brain processes), but the costs are high (individuals may feel poorly recognized and not respected by institutional development, lifeworld and applied science may turn into opponents, and the concept of consciousness may vanish or become an obscure ghost in the machine (Ryle 1949).

C. Being the subject in charge of my objective body, I can, maybe I have to, reflect on what I am doing. In other words, I start relating to myself. The initial original split between subject and object is repeated in a split between “I” and “me,” leaving open how they are connected (cf. the influential solution in Mead 1967). A Pandora’s box is opened: an endless debate about the modern subject and identity, its modification, and hybridization continues today (cf. Fischer-Rosenthal 1995; Fischer 2017; Reckwitz 2019; Bamberg, Demuth, and Watzlawik 2021). Furthermore, can it be that my body is just another object in the world? This seems to contradict the evident knowledge that I cannot escape my body. If I touch my body, I do not feel my skin as some other object, but I feel myself (as I do by scratching my head when I am baffled). The next problem is closely related. If the subject is in their objective perceivable body, what about other bodies? What about my fellow humans? I obviously treat them as subjects and not objects, but how can that be? Intersubjectivity, self-evidently given in everyday conduct, is hard to explain if you start with the cognitive ego in an objective body. Explaining intersubjectivity by the conclusion of analogy does not work if I am myself imprisoned in a body as an object, just as little as empathy, psychological help construct, or “reciprocity of perspectives” (e.g., Schütz 1971:11). Empathy and taking the role of the other or talking of the “alter ego” is begging the question because what should be explained is assumed. Consequently, if we have good reason to believe in intersubjectivity, we have to revise the premises of the inner and outer reality; the Cartesian concepts of self and the body as sub-
jective and objective realms must be overcome to reflect the conduct and interaction of persons encountering each other in a shared space and in a socially readable, that is, more or less congruently definable, situation by both sides.

D. A final complication is that the subject/object split implies an outer world independent of subjects. This ignores that the ‘world’ as a natural and cultural surrounding is not only perceived but is populated, shaped, and changed for the better or worse by people, their cultural institutions, and their common imagination. Looking at the world ‘as is,’ independently from people, falls short of recognizing the involvement and entanglement of persons in the world and their impact on it. This ecological turn, not older than some decades, is a major result of observing global natural resources and their endangerment by human action. Climate change, risk society, pandemic developments: their management and prevention reflect the involvement and responsibility of acting and suffering persons. The recent Covid-19 pandemic is an illustration of this in many respects. Simultaneously, the ‘world’ is shaping the subject. Nature and society have an impact on what we are, want, like, and dislike, our dos and don’ts. In short, the notion of the subject as independent from the world is a fiction obscuring the real development, competencies, and abilities of persons.

All of this amounts to abandoning, or at least avoiding, such sometimes comfortable and ingrained dualistic notions of inner/outer realities. The crucial question is whether we can find some—monistic or dialectical in the Hegelian sense?—post- or pre-Cartesian concepts for persons in their sensual and bodily competencies, in their conduct, interaction with others, and their responsible and formative relation (in agency and being shaped) to their natural and cultural environment?

Such concepts would have to solve some of the just-mentioned difficulties. They would recognize that the body of an individual is not just there, given by birth and shaped by evolution, simply ‘inhabited’ by the person using it but recognize that the body is more than a ‘box,’ that it is growing, developing, and changing during its lifetime: the person and their body grow up with and through each other. Simultaneously, such concepts would do justice to the ecological relationships of persons.

2. The Living Body: Moving, Interacting, and Shaping the Self and Its Brain

It may be helpful to take a personal perspective to reach a non-Cartesian concept of human conduct (including sensual functions) in relation to others and their environment. In ‘real life,’ I visually do not experience the color ‘red,’ but I am pleased by the roses in my garden; I do not have an olfactory sensation, but upon stepping closer, I am enchanted by a delicate fragrance. Upon reaching out and touching the stem, I do not have a tactile sensation, but I shrug back, feeling a sharp pain in my finger from the prick of the rose; I do not taste a flavor, but sucking my finger, I taste blood.

Or, to give other examples, I do not hear a melody, but I am awakened by the very same blackbird every morning, telling me that it is time to get up. I do not only hear your words, but I see your face, telling me that something is wrong or signaling to me that you are joking. I do not have a tactile experience, but hugging you, I feel your tension, squeeze your hand, and feel the relief of us both. Washing my face after
a long day, I sometimes throw water on my glasses; I obviously treat them as part of my body. Riding a bicycle, playing the piano, or writing an SMS, I do not think about how I use these objects (unless some problem comes up), but they seem to be part of myself and my bodily competencies.

These randomly chosen examples could be endlessly continued. They all prove the unity of me and my sensual body in my world. I am integrated as a person in my body (embodied), and I am embedded in my environment. We always experience ourselves, others, and a consistent world (unless some problem comes up) through proprioception, our emotions, kinesthetics, and sensual perception. The latter is, of course, not restricted to the proverbial ‘five senses,’ but entero- and exterior-perception are much more complex and constitute our body as a whole in its surroundings. Moving around, acting, and always being in a spatially, temporally, and culturally defined situation are bodily defined in a non-Cartesian sense. I, myself, and my body cannot be separated in any actual undertaking. I cannot leave my body; I am bound to it.

Husserl (1952) named the body the “zero point” of my coordinate system. So, am I my body? In a sense, yes. I feel myself as my body. But—and here the difficulties arise—in a way, I am not. I cannot be reduced to my body, and in many aspects, my body is alien to me, and I am not in charge. I can be surprised or disappointed by my body. In case of disease, I may feel that my body is against me. Many important functions of my body are unknown to me and cannot be influenced by me. Yet, I cannot get rid of my body, “the lived body is a total-organ for itself” (Husserl 1973:507).

This notion of a deep ambivalence has inspired philosophers, psychologists, and psychiatrists since the first third of the twentieth century, without falling back on a mind/body dualism.²

Helmuth Plessner—biologist, philosopher, sociologist, one of the pioneers—even found the conditio humana in the double role of the body. He saw the basic human “eccentric positionality” (Plessner 1981) in the double role of the body, the existence of the person “as a body in the body” (original German: "als Leib im Körper” [Plessner 1982:238]).

The German language distinguishes between the animate or living body, der Leib (related to the English life) and der Körper (from the Latin corpus) as the material body. Accordingly, in the German phenomenological tradition, Leib is used when the lived and living³ body, including the first-person perspective (‘I am and I feel myself in my sensations’), the conscious, and the self-reflexive body is addressed. Accordingly, Körper means body in an objectified and instrumental sense (Plessner 1982:238).

In philosophical anthropology—resonating up till now in body discourses (cf. Fuchs 2013; 2018)—Plessner (1982:238) is attributed the basic dictum: “I am my living body (Leib), but I have it as body (Körper).”⁴ Plessner (1982) studied many sensual phenomena. Extraordinary is his interpretation of laughing

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² This early German body/Leib discourse became rather differentiated and is philosophically and psychiatrically demanding. The further development of this research in Germany was interrupted due to the forced migration by Nazi Germany of its major scholars in the 1930s. International reception, especially in the English-speaking world, was and is barely existent, partly because of the language barrier, partly due to the dominance of positivistic and more science-oriented research cultures.

³ To differentiate in English, one has to use clarifying adjectives; instead of the common translation of Leib into English as “lived body,” I prefer “living body” or “animate body” to signify the process quality of corporeality.

⁴ Original: “Ein Mensch ist immer zugleich Leib...und hat diesen Leib als diesen Körper.”
and crying as human bodily expressions beyond language or other symbolic utterances, which are usually thought of as human privileges. Laughing and crying are seen as spontaneous *bodily answers* to situations we cannot cope with otherwise (e.g., in verbal expression and communication). The body takes over when we fail to comprehend a situation and thus maintains and exemplifies our unique and ambivalent human position. Similarly, one can interpret the disease as the answer of the body to a situation not to be coped with otherwise (cf. the case of a woman with cancer [Fischer 2013]). Plessner also sees the reason for developing culture and communication in symbolic systems, mainly language, in the basic eccentric position of humans trying to fix themselves in a natural, self-constructed, and self-reflexive surrounding. Though talk in interaction is not possible without the body, verbal communication, literacy, and textuality seem to become independent and form their own sphere of mind independent from the lifeworld. Husserl (1973), who was very sensitive to the lived and living body as the basis of the human condition, criticized in his later works the neglect of *body and lifeworld* as the main problem of the modern age focused on the limited rationality of mathematics and sciences.

At the beginning of this body discourse, other empirical evidence of the deficit of the Cartesian mind/body split appeared in the aftermath of the First World War. Psychiatry had to deal with traumatized patients. For example, former soldiers refused to resume their previous work or occupation, although available; they became stuck in a depressive mood or saw no sense in any kind of work. This so-called pension-neurosis was psychically interpreted as the mental inability to perceive the available world correctly, but following the patients’ war experience (Straus 1930). Other war veterans were bodily traumatized. They had lost an arm or a leg, but maintained the feeling of a more or less complete body image. They sensed the lost limb as still being there, felt itching, pain, or a distorted shape where there was no body part anymore. This puzzling sensation could not be explained in the dualistic mind-body model with sensory impulse conduction from receptor to brain. Only a unified concept of mind and body where the animate body, the self, still maintained the old pre-lesion situation, could explain the phenomenon. Thus, discussion about the riddle of the *phantom limb* or *phantom pain* supported an integrated model of the mind in the body and the body in the mind (Merleau-Ponty 1962:98; Breyer 2018).

Based on his critique of Cartesian dualism, the philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty developed in the late 1930s an integrated concept of humans as a “being in the world.” Seeking a third way between what he called intellectualism and physicalism, he further developed Husserl’s concept of the lived body (depending on a transcendental ego) as *corps propre* into an empirical interrelationship between the living person and their world. The phenomenology of perception is not a sensually supported activity of the subject (or *cogito*) as opposed to the world (as an extended physical substance), but perception is always bound to the person’s situatedness and living in the world. Similar to Plessner, he stressed the ambiguity of a human’s position in the world; the tactile sense became a *pars pro toto* for the human condition: touching your hand results in the ambivalent feeling of sensing yourself and simultaneously sensing some alien object. Being a subject as an actor in the world and an object as the flesh of the world produces a continuous tension that cannot be reconciled. There is a constant interchange between living persons and their world, their lifeworld, shaping each other, but not reducible to one another.
Georg Simmel, one of the forefathers of the interactionist tradition in sociology, reflected as early as 1907 on the sensual bases of any interaction. According to him, sensual impressions “lead into the subject and out to the social world”; senses create feelings, emotion, knowledge, and the construction of the social world. For example, looking into each other’s eyes is pure interaction (Wechselwirkung); facial expression narrates the person and the human (Simmel 1993:279-282).

Together with pragmatist concepts in the tradition of George Herbert Mead and symbolic interactionism, this notion of the living body in its ambivalence, theoretically and practically related to the partial availability of the world, has become quite influential in recent phenomenological sociology (Schütz and Luckmann 1989), empirical research like ethnomethodological conversation analysis (Goodwin 1995; Have and Psathas 1995), and the new sociology of knowledge (Berger and Luckmann 1966).

Also starting in the 1930s, with more of a focus on human sensual achievements, their special functions, and possible unity, Erwin Straus, psychiatrist and philosopher, studied the “sense of senses” (Straus 1930; 1956; Fuchs 2015). Phenomenologically distinguishing between experience and event, he painstakingly analyzed the special functions of the senses on the premise that one does not experience distinct and contingent qualities of things or events, but a temporally and spatially consistent world. As a psychiatrist having to deal with ‘mental disorders,’ he had to practically assist patients to find their way back to a ‘normal’ world. Trying to find out what was wrong and how this came about, he argued that sensual data did not lead to certain reactions or maladaptation. Rather, the individual would “extract sense” out of the perceived situation, framed by their active and inquiring relationship to the incident and according to their individual previously experienced stories and preconceptions. Thus, Straus elaborated on the imminent role of the lifeworld (Husserl), shaping the person in their bodily skills, including perception and action, thereby partially constructing or influencing the world in turn.

Whatever the differences in the works of these classical scholars—and others like them who cannot be sketched here—of the unity of senses and the mind, they all concur in rejecting simple stimulus-response models of sensual experience and refuse the Cartesian split between inner and outer realities. Rather, the interrelation of the lived and living body and its lifeworld—its social, cultural, and natural surroundings—is elaborated in theoretical and therapeutic-practical terms. The common denominator is the living body, that is, a body oscillating between the sensual self and the body as part of the lifeworld and nature. The self and its lifeworld are constituted via proprioception, perception, kinesthetics, moving, and interaction. Gestures as pre-symbolic expressions of the body and language are crucial to making sense in interaction, but in principle, they have their limits. Thinking is not an activity of the brain but of the person (Straus 1956:112-294). Being in ‘my’ specific world (biographically, culturally, naturally) is a condition framing, but not completely determining myself. The world as is—is not independent of human action.

With a few exceptions in phenomenological philosophy (Ricoeur 1996; Waldenfels 1999; 2000), sociology (Fischer 1982; 1986; 2003; Fischer-Rosenthal 1993; 1995; 1999a; Alheit et al. 1999), and psychiatry (Blankenburg 1971; 1982; Fuchs 2000a; 2000b), this phenomenologically inspired tradition seemed almost
lost or reserved for special interests in the last third of the twentieth century.

However, over the last three decades, a wide array of developments in the philosophy of the mind, cognitive sciences, neurology, brain research, artificial intelligence, and robotics have brought back the living body and animated corporeality.

Ethnography and anthropology have always had a primary focus on body themes, concepts, and practices in observing and understanding other cultures (e.g., Douglas 1978; Stoller 1989; Howes 2003), which seemed to be of little interest to mainstream sociology. However, interactionist sociology, which focused early on different types of bodywork (e.g., Strauss, 1984), has recently developed, together with interdisciplinary approaches, a creative strand of a “sociology of the senses” (Vannini, Waskul, and Gottschalk 2012).

Furthermore, social change in the use of visual media, as well as the availability of audio-visual recording techniques in social research have opened fields of study previously barred to empirical studies and reserved for the implicit skills of people relating to each other and their world.

Besides the mainstream of the Cartesian paradigm in classical natural sciences and psychology still trying to explore the world and people in the frame of outer and inner realities (constructionist or representational models of the world in the brain), a counter-movement of embodiment developed.

Given their different disciplinary origins, the details are complex, even controversial, but it is possible to briefly characterize some of the main issues (Wilson 2002; Robbins and Aydede 2008; Fingerhut, Hufendiek and Wild 2013:9-102; Madzia and Jung 2016; Durt, Fuchs, and Tewes 2017). The basic attitude seems to be the rejection of neuro-constructivism, as expressed by Fuchs (2020b:13 [trans. WF]): “Only as embodied, living beings are we real for each other. There is no communication or empathy between brains, though neuroscientists like to assert this. We only learn empathy in bodily contact with others, in inter-corporeity (Merleau-Ponty).” In the following section, I follow the so-called philosophical 4E approach(es): in contrast to neurological cognitive sciences (operating with constructions and representations of the world in the brain), the mind and intelligence are seen as embodied, extended, embedded, and enactive.

Our Mind Embodied

First, I question the still common (obviously Cartesian) categories of mind, body, and world, along with their divisions and unities. How is the body present in the mind, be it in metaphors, meaning, imagination, or reasoning (Johnson 1987; 2017; Lakoff and Johnson 1999)? Rejecting the idea of the mind as representing the world, John Haugeland (1995) argues that the world is there, and intelligent behavior is developed in senso-motoric and social skills, which are necessary for dealing with the environment to survive or achieve whatever goals may exist. Mind as respective intelligence is not to be located in the brain as part of the body, but exists in the interaction between the lived body and relevant parts of the world intimately related to the body and world. Cognition is always situated, as the body is always in a given situation.

A speciously simple and familiar bodily sensation such as pain is not understood if it is reduced to a stimulus-response process. Whatever the cause...
of the pain may be, it is sensed as immediately and intimately relating to myself, asking for action, irrespective of the location in my body. If my hand touches something, I not only bodily feel some qualities but I know what kind of object is there and how to act. If I use a stick to explore my way (e.g., the white cane of the blind), I do not feel something in my brain or in my hand holding the stick, but I perceive the surface or some obstacle in front of me, letting me know if I should stop or how to proceed to avoid harm.

Structural properties of our body influence the mind’s possibilities. The upright bodily position and a movable head with eyes “in front” produce a visually wide perspective with a flexible horizon and constitutes the (potentially dangerous) knowledge of being seen and techniques of showing, masking, “hiding your face,” and positioning yourself to others (Blumenberg 2002; 2014:779). The upright position implies making the hands free and open to focused touch, tactile explorations of others and the environment, goal-oriented manipulations, and the use of tools—all essential skills to get along in the world and create a lifeworld. Accordingly, the structure of the bodily apparatuses of hearing, smelling, and tasting open up specific aspects of the world we live in, constitute and actively construct our lifeworld (perceiving the sounds of nature, spoken language, music, favorable scents, or those to be avoided, food, and drink).

Embodiment is of great importance as implicit or tacit knowledge of bodily skills and competencies. Mostly learned and achieved from childhood onwards, walking, controlling bodily excretions, whistling, singing, biking, swimming, playing a musical instrument, handwriting, sports or physical exercises, and dancing are routinized competencies and skills, which can be trained, but they work best when we do not think about them. Body memory as implicit knowledge also works in the case of trauma or unpleasant experiences (Koch 2011; Koch et al. 2012). The original traumatizing event may not be accessible anymore in recollection, but it may determine avoiding behavior, bodily expressions such as diseases or behavioral ticks, or may break through as uncontrollable aggression towards others or self-harming behavior when triggered. Psychopathological phenomena can be conceived as the dysfunctional embodiment with bodily, psychic, and behavioral characteristics (Fuchs 2000a; 2020b). For example, eating disorders are not about improper eating, but are best understood as the patient trying to control harmful or traumatizing events or persons in their lifeworld via their body. Paradoxically, the stricter the control of the subject, the more the body takes over, even up to a lethal point. Depression expresses a distorted relation of the patient to their world and living body. Addictions to substances or behavior depend on the person’s relation to their lifeworld and quasi-automatic bodily reward systems, which can hardly be controlled by the subject.

Last but not least, gestures, all symbolic rituals, and, to a wide extent, natural languages and philosophical reasoning rest in bodily competence and experiences with human surroundings (Lakoff and Johnson 1999; 2004; Johnson 2017).

In sum, embodiment (as the most general characteristic of the 4E approach) is an encompassing, non-Cartesian concept signifying the living of the person in their social and natural environment. The lived body “as the nature we are ourselves” (Böhme 2019) refers to the world in a social and ecological sense and to myself as a cognitive, intelligent being,
but not completely in charge either of the world or my body.

Our Mind Extended

This discourse strand tackles the problem of whether the mind is localized in the brain or external objects or media. Obviously, the latter is the case. Turning spoken communication into written language, writing, literacy, and materialized textuality is an early example of the extended mind and is crucial for the development of culture beyond orality. Even simple mathematical tasks can be better solved using paper and pencil. Medieval master builders used to draw sketches in the sand, not to mention modern architects using CAD software to plan the shape of the building, but also their actions, temporal coordination, and control of the different trades involved. In the contemporary modern world, we can find endless examples of materialized and shared planning systems in industrial production, public services, and governance. In everyday life, we are used to all kinds of memory aids, ranging from shopping and to-do lists, mailing lists, telephone directories, maps on different scales for hiking or driving, and including our smartphone with the individualized and general provision of information for immediate needs and on demand.

The development of artificial intelligence has produced more puzzling phenomena. How can virtual realities using different technical devices visually presenting spatial and perspective flexible impressions be integrated with a holistic perception and the real actions of persons? And more puzzling, is it possible to recognize visual or other artifacts in proprioception as my own, as parts of myself? The experimental rubber hand illusion (the touch of the visually present rubber hand feels like my hand being touched [Botvinick and Cohen 1998]), or even out-of-body experiences like feeling myself out of my body can be read as extreme examples of the extended mind.

Our Mind Embedded

This aspect of cognition is related to the extended mind, but refers to more public and general aids for cognitive and actional orientation. A simple example would be traffic and road signs. They help us to routinely act in situations where individual negotiations would fail. But also, institutions (family, religion, organizations), cultural norms, and conventions for types of situations, which have to be learned growing up in a specific lifeworld, are part of our cognition and acting. The organization of shared work processes helps to produce ideas and products, but also may prevent imagination and the development of new products. Religious or cultural rituals provide orientation in certain situations, but can turn into fundamentalistic modes of paternalism and even terror.

Discussing the embeddedness of the mind reveals an ecological dimension of humans, which depends on their highly regulated environment, and by the same token, this environment is shaped by human cognitive abilities and (social) actions.

Our Mind Enacted

This strand of philosophy of cognition explores the intimate relationship between the mind and acting, especially in shaping social relations and the material world. Starting in the early 1990s, cognition biologists like Varela (Varela, Thompson, and Rosch 1991) redefined living processes by taking into account the interaction of the organism with and in its environ-
ment. Cognition is seen as dependent on the structural coupling of world and organism, and cognitions are dependent on the activities of the organism towards the world. Lived body (experience) and the actual living body (organism) are interrelated, though in tension (as the older philosophical anthropology already stated, see above). Cognition and perception are embodied actions: they shape and even create neurological possibilities of perception and regulate actions according to environmental requirements.

In this view, senso-motoric skills are the source of higher cognitive, perceptive, and actional competencies. Alva Noë conceptualizes seeing and other perceptions as senso-motoric explorations of the world (O’Regan and Noë 2001; Noë 2002; 2012). While moving the body and eyes, visual contingencies and irregularities are shaped in interaction with the world until they make sense. Visual, vestibular, tactile, and proprioceptive information is used to adjust viewing as a sense-making process. For example, the visual perception of the world, distinguishing above and below, is a cognitive achievement given the upside-down image on the retina. The proof is the experiment using reverse glasses: after a while, perception is corrected according to the natural posture of the upright body with its usual field of vision. Thus, perception is developed as a skill to interact with the environment. This skill is not explicitly known by the individual, but is an achievement available and used in practical action. The concepts of the lived (experience, biography) and the living (organism) body are brought together in interaction processes. The physical presence (corporeal proximity) of being in a situation and co-presence with other persons (intercorporeal presence and resonance) is studied under the premise that nothing is just there or simply given, but has to be achieved by active sensual explorations and interactions. The resonance of present bodies in a (typical) situation is a skill and capacity achieved in numerous interactions. By this argument, the problem of intersubjectivity is solved in practical action (cf. to resonance in psychotherapy [Broschmann and Fuchs 2019]). Empirical studies in developmental psychology support this thesis of gradually achieving interactive skills of resonance (Group B. C. P. S. 2013).

In comparing the older classical discourse on the living body, one is surprised that these seemingly almost lost conceptions are resurrected in the actual embodiment discourse in the basic aspects of the integrity of the person in its relation to their body, to other persons, and their lifeworld. The older Leib discourse and the embodiment discourse seem to move in the same direction. The older tradition can still deliver basic insights and concepts; to me, the more recent discussion presents mainly interesting empirical details and a strong interdisciplinary approach. The recent development of sensual sociology studies (including cultural anthropology) follows in its interactionist heritage non-Cartesian concepts of the body. Besides dealing with a wide area of sensual experience, these studies encourage unorthodox ethnographic approaches by taking into account the sensual impressions of both, the researcher and their interactants.

Before turning to the next section of this paper dealing with biographical structuring, we need to discuss two more primary bodily conditions. First, the role of emotion and feelings, and second, the frame of space and time.

**Emotion and Feeling**

Academic conceptions of human conduct are, first of all, rational concepts. Although, to give an ex-
ample, Max Weber’s notion of action requires the “subjective intended meaning” (as opposed to sheer behavior) and is open to the agency of the person, the intention is categorized consistently as rational. When it comes to social action, the basis of society in his line of arguing, there is little room for non-intentional conduct as ‘usual,’ routinized behavior without asking or being aware of alternatives and justifications, unwanted consequences of one’s deeds, and even acting in contrast to explicit intentions (like the very moment you decide on a diet, you start eating like crazy). One may, however, assume that these non-intentional and speciously irrational modes of acting overtake the rational-intentional type in the Weberian sense, and thus make up most actions. This being no secret in everyday understanding of people’s motives has recently found support in psychological and neurological explanations. Inquiries into the integrating principles in conduct in specific situations concerning the source of the agency have led to the central role of emotion and feeling in the person. Emotion and feeling are before rational arguing and conscious reflexivity. According to Antonio Damasio (1999; 2010), emotion and feelings as controls of behavior are caused by the organization of the brain and personal desires and intentions. All sensual data are filtered and determined by this emotional mechanism of ‘feeling what happens.’ Developing this further, emotion and feeling became, for Damasio, the center of the self, constituting interaction processes. In other words, my ability to interact with others and the world, using all my senses (seeing, being seen, showing, hearing, touching, being touched, kinesthetics, proprioception, etc.), using my whole body, using language and gestures, identifying cultural practices, and perceiving a meaningful world is rooted in emotion and feeling.

Space and Time

What can we consider to be some of the most elementary achievements of sensual activities of the living body in an early lifetime?

The infant moves around (turning the body, crawling, eventually walking), using and building up all sensual skills of touching, tasting, smelling, hearing, and seeing. In this process, a spatial reality shared in interaction with the other significant persons is constituted.

Senses can only function if they distinguish between ‘now,’ the moment the sensual data are produced and delivered, and ‘before’ and ‘after;’ that is, senses need memory and expectation. Whatever the organic details might be, the living person must be and, in general, can sense time. Husserl (1966; 2001) dealt with this problem of temporality all his life. He distinguished the temporal evidence of the person having a preconceptual knowing of ‘now,’ the present impression related to a ‘before’ (retention) in memory, and the ‘next’ (protention) expectation. The actual process in time cannot be reversed: it is always in the same directed ‘flow.’ This concept of inner time consciousness is seen as the basis of any temporal perceptions and constructions. Any temporal objects, like music, listening to sequentially ordered language, or the experience of unfolding events, can only be perceived in this frame of the inner time consciousness. Acting, observing acts or processes, recollections from personal history (biography) to societal history, and expectations on a small-scale expectation are realized in this form. Different from this phenomenological time (as it appears for perception) is time in classical physics, which is linear time in a continuous space. The time of the living body is phenomenological time integrated by the self.
This is the systematic reason for the importance of biographical structuring.

3. Biographical Structuring: The Living Body in a Double Temporal Horizon

Ontogenetically the individual body and its senses are not just naturally acquired by birth but are built up over time. I and my body are constructed over a lifetime. Of course, some aspects of growing up and old are phylogenetically shaped, and due to human evolution. But, the building of the person, including bodily development (and physical disintegration) over a lifetime goes hand in hand with interaction processes with others and encounters and experiences with my surroundings (Fischer-Rosenthal 1999b). Already in early childhood, memories start to become self-reflexive and form an individual self (Nelson 1993; 1996). Closely connected to the bodily process, the integrated self, including bodily and mental memory, emerges and is maintained and modified over a lifetime. “The living body (Leib) is bearer and expression of the individual biography; it has and knows its (hi-)story. We call this memory of the living body” (Fuchs 2020b:185 [trans. WF]). To put it bluntly, the existence and actional competence of the person is the living body, including all sensual dimensions in their ongoing biographical structuring and structure. The individual memory is, at first, embodied in my daily practices without conscious access on my part. Explicit knowledge about my competencies comes later. [This is of immense practical meaning, especially when it comes to trauma or unfavorable experiences.] Through this lifelong process, my embodied self and my orientational structure are developed. In an ongoing interaction with my lifeworld, I am positioned in the world, and my lifeworld is constituted and constructed. According to my bodily and social competencies and the resources of my world (including artifacts), I can move around, act, and interact with others and the world. I develop a practical (implicit) and theoretical (explicit) understanding of what is going on (to a certain extent), follow my goals, and cope with unexpected events.

I understand myself in spatial-temporal terms: that is, I know where I am and how to move and orient in space; I know about my past and have future expectations. I am situated on a double temporal horizon of the past and future. Accordingly, if I cannot tell my name, where I am, and what day it is, I am seen to be confused, and psychiatric help may apply.

I call this ongoing process biographical structuring (Fischer and Goblirsch 2006; Fischer 2010a; 2019; Fischer-Rosenthal 2000). In practical action, by doing, an orientational structure is found and secured, constantly confirmed, or modified.

One can distinguish biographical structuring on a societal macro level and the micro level of the person.

On the macro level, the development of modern societies produces many risks and liberates people from traditional orientations. By the same token, more load is put on the individual. Eventually, a biographizing process (biographizism [Alheit 1996]) can be observed. Since the eighteenth century, biographical forms of self-description have become more salient. Biographical literature had already started its career (Corsten 2009; Fetz 2009). The common denominator is that you are what you became, not which group you belong to. In social allocation, biographical patterns are developed that give orientation, but also function as inclusion or exclusion devices. Persons orient themselves in decisions (e.g., about raising a family, occupational training, or professional and
organizational processes) according to biographical patterns provided by social institutions and organizations (Alheit and Dausien 1985; Dausien and Kluchert 2016; to modernity and biography cf. Fischer 2018a).

On the micro level, biographical structuring as individual competence and achievement are the focus. The person uses available biographical patterns from society to orient and position themselves in society. Positioning in interaction is closely linked to biographical structures of self-description and attribution of the other. The micro process of interacting constructs biographical structures over a lifetime, thus constructing the identity of a person (Lucius-Hoene and Deppermann 2000; Fischer 2006). The basis of this agency are bodily competencies, as sketched above in the previous section, and temporal orientation on the double horizon of the past and future. These bodily competencies are unnoticed, taken for granted and obscured in language-oriented sense-making, exaggerated: sense ousts senses. However, many little failures of everyday life, like slips of the tongue, manual clumsiness, stumbling, and losing balance, to name a few, as well as functional losses in disease, bring back the bodily base of the self and, in turn, create all kinds of conversational normalizing practices to silence such unwanted bodily utterances. This can be a starting point for researching the ‘normally’ invisible (see part 4 below).

Over the course of many studies, the role of memory turned out to be more of an active constructing mechanism for actual needs than a simple recording archive of past experiences (Brockmeier 2015). Similarly, the orientation towards a future expectation is constantly modified according to present needs (Fischer 2018b). Both insights are crucial when empirically analyzing and reconstructing narrative biographical accounts; one must always be aware of the present situation (biographical and interactional; I call this the interpretation point) of the narrating person to correctly assess narrated memory and expectations.

Biographical structuring serves as a stabilizing mechanism in uncertain times and mobile societies by providing a self-concept that has developed in the past. This includes bodily experiences and ritualized body practices. Biographical structures serve as an integrating frame of contingent (pleasant, unpleasant, or critical) events by providing reliable expectations, that is, orientational structures for oneself and the interacting persons.

Over the last 3-4 decades, a rich research scenery based in Europe, which has spread internationally, has been established. Theoretical concepts and empirical techniques, mostly based on socio-linguistic and hermeneutical reconstructions of biographical accounts and narrative interviews, have been refined. Numerous studies have been carried out on many subjects (cf. outline in Jost 2019). Recent significant handbooks inform about the state of the art and spark future research (Lutz, Schiebel, and Tuider 2018; Jost and Haas 2019). Major national and international sociological associations have founded research committees and networks of biographical research, providing a showcase and inspiration for flourishing research. Last, but not least, helping professions have discovered biographical analysis and use it in social diagnosis and intervention (Fischer 2004; 2010b; 2011; Fischer and Goblirsch 2006; 2018).

This is not the place to go into more detail. However, despite this rich research tradition, which is mostly based on the interpretation of language doc-
uments and texts (transcripts), one misses a more subtle analysis of bodily activities and achievements in reconstructions of biographical structuring. The imperative following out of the above for biographical research then would be: Discover the hidden and exposed living body in the biographical reconstructions! Learn more from the discourse on the body in different disciplines! Raise more awareness for bodily processes and the part of the body in biographical experience and sense-making! Include sensual data in your analysis!

Given all this, what could/should result from the arguments in this paper for practical research, methods, and topics?

4. Research Consequences

I see two lines of argument. One addresses the broad field of biographical research. The question would be whether this tradition can be enriched and made more accurate as to the bodily constitution of the person by developing improved concepts and techniques of discovery. The other addresses traditions of body research: how they could profit from the methods and results of biographical research. The mutual exchange of experiences and techniques could be interesting and is reasonable if one considers the oscillating structuring of a person in bodily (including mental), interactional, cultural, and environmental respects.

Here I shall focus on the first question.

Traditional hermeneutic analysis of language mainly looks at the meaning of utterances and—in the case of actual interaction—the function of speech utterances for understanding and the implicit or explicit goal of the interaction. In this type of analysis, the role of the body stays obscure despite its active role in speech and communication and despite being precisely perceived in fine grain by the interlocutors themselves. Focusing on language and conversation, the most obvious is overlooked: communication is an interaction of living bodies, bodily selves. The general advice to take this into account would be to use research concepts and pay attention to manifestations that can constitute the relevant ‘bodily data’ of speech. So, practically speaking, one has to produce protocols that transport bodily manifestations before and beyond language, and, when analyzing, one has to look more thoroughly for the function and meaning of direct or indirect signs of the living body in the talk. Many of them can be heard (and need audio recording in research), such as slips of the tongue and self-corrections, reception signals, prosody, stutter, filler words, conspicuous breathing, speech-disrupting phenomena such as laughing or crying, and finally all kinds of pauses with or without ums. Other bodily manifestations—in addition, or only—can be visually perceived (and need video recording in research), like position and movements of the body, gestures, touch and bodily contact in interaction, gaze and (avoiding) eye contact, as well as a multitude of facial expressions capable of communicating feelings.

Biographical research so far has focused on narrative biographical interviewing and hermeneutic analysis as the main research strategy. To improve body-related and sensual research, one must open up to all kinds of ethnographic modes of research. “All humanistic methods from non-participant to participant observation; from more traditional to newer experimental strategies; and from all forms of interviewing to autoethnographic introspection can help us collect sensual data” (Vannini et al. 2012:68).
Even the difficult-to-observe senses of touch, smell, and taste have been successfully included in recent studies (Classen, Howes, and Synnott 1993; Ochs, Pontecorvo, and Fasulo 1996; Wiggins 2002; Peynaud 2005; Drobnick 2006; Hennion 2007; Waskul and Vannini 2008; Waskul, Vannini, and Wilson 2009; Mondada 2019).

A totally new field of bodily parameters comes into play if we use the concept of the **extended body**. Detailed analysis is possible, asking in which situations and how artifacts are incorporated into our bodily actions and interactions to help perception, thinking, and doing (Strauss 1985; Schubert 2006; Kissmann 2014a; 2014b). In this respect, workshop studies and studies of situated talk in the style of conversation analysis are paradigmatic (Goodwin 1994; 2001; 2019; Goodwin and Goodwin 1996; Heritage 1997; Drew and Heritage 1998; Heritage and Maynard 2001). Looking at the widespread use of smartphones and digital social networks for communication, information, self-presentation, and, consequently, self-construction seems a promising research area for the merging of body and biographical structuring. The ever-present use of photos, pictures, icons, and video-takes, overcoming the barriers of situational space parameters in comparison to ordinary face-to-face interaction, seems to me of special importance deserving extended research and new access methods.

Of special interest are gestures. They are not simply accompanying talk and action but are pre- and paralinguistic modes of communicating (Tomasello 2008). Since the groundbreaking work of Kendon (1988), many studies have tried to understand the function and meaning of gestures in interaction (Goodwin 1986; Axtell 1998; LeBaron and Streeck 2000; Streeck 2009; 2014; 2019; Kissmann 2016).

In general, recent innovative methods of video analysis, which reconstruct the accomplishment of actions and interactions in a multimodal manner (Kissmann 2009; Deppermann 2018), should be integrated with data gathering and the analysis of biographical research. The key question should be how persons accomplish interaction, considering not only explicit language but also bodily and situational characteristics, and how this can relate to biographical structuring. The presence of bodily action, the ‘now’ (interaction in process, reference in ‘small stories’) must be connected more thoroughly with memory and expectation, the double temporal horizon of the past and future as represented in (auto-)biographical narratives (life stories, ‘big stories’). In both respects, data-gathering and analytical tools are available: interaction analysis by video and biographical reconstruction of life stories by hermeneutics. In the case studies, the results of both techniques can be matched.

However, in my opinion, the main issue is less one of innovative methods, but conceptual. First, one must realize that many issues of personal conduct are bodily. Conventional biographical research in the frame of narrative accounts (critical Bamberg 1999; 2006; 2007) does not focus on the micro-genesis of identity in interaction (Bamberg 2008) and misses bodily activities (unless explicitly thematized), though they accompany us during our whole life and are crucial for the development of the individual. Narrative access makes the body invisible (unless it perturbs it) because it is taken for granted. This can only be compensated by research topics and strategies that explicitly focus on bodily activities. A wide range of **body practices**, like daily body care, selecting and preparing food and drink that you like and which match your (sub-)culture or religion, and the development of musical preferences...
is intricately connected with the shaping of the person during their life. Doing sports (including body building), practicing fitness and wellness styles, yoga—all kinds of body modifications—even types of rest and relaxing are biographically motivated and anchored. Sexual practices and preferences are developed in interactions over one’s lifetime. Growing old (doing age) and gender (doing gender) are both bodily and social and are rooted in bodily and symbolic acts embedded in societal discourses. Bringing up a child is not only an educational but also a constant and exhausting bodily effort for the parents, as well as for the child. Practices of showing and seeing, in general, the use of visual media (photos, videos, smartphones—see extended body above), are like a steady undercurrent of daily private living and public life; they transport all kinds of body discourses (including bodily dos and don’ts) in society. Bodily practices have turned into aesthetic practices promising exceptional experiences, emotional highlights, and satisfaction dependent on societal discourses (Reckwitz 2012; 2016).

Even dressing is a bodily activity representing a whole set of social distinctions, status, power relations, and cultural identities. Modifications of dress codes are a source of individualization in modernity; outfits can signify intentions and anxieties. The exposure of hands, feet or other body parts is culturally highly regulated and thus can be interpreted in single interactions.

In addition to focusing on the body in the analysis of situated interaction, the analysis of biographical accounts (e.g., narrative biographical interviews) should explicitly record bodily conditions and events. This is obvious in the case of talking about accidents, as well as acute, and especially chronic, diseases. Though some research has been done in this respect (Fischer 1982; 2013; Fischer-Rosenthal 1999b), research along this line of investigating body and biography should be intensified. I consider the field of professionally dealing with illness, especially psychiatry, psychosomatic medicine, and therapy as a promising area of joint efforts in therapeutical practices and biographical research. Though structural institutional limits and different disciplinary approaches seem to restrict cooperation, casework with patients suffering from psychic disorders, as well as medical and sociological research, would benefit from such a combined approach. The same is true for other kinds of body topics: sports, dance, ergo- and exercise therapy, et cetera (Delow 2000; Abraham 2002).

In summary and as a key recommendation: in biographical research, bodily manifestations should be interpreted more than is currently the case. Besides increased attentiveness to the topic of body and biography, more multimodal video analysis and more subtle transcripts for the analysis of interaction are needed. The conventional hermeneutical reconstruction of biographical narratives can be enriched by the analysis of interaction, and vice versa. Since available research techniques in both fields are highly refined, training in crossover methods, while challenging, is worth the effort. A useful frame of reference for such a crossover of synchronic and diachronous analyses (e.g., in the style of conversation analysis) can be ethnographic modes of data gathering in field research and processes of sense-making in writing up observations and constructing concepts (Amann and Hirschauer 1997; Dausien and Kelle 2005; Gubrium and Holstein 2008; Hitzler and Eisewicht 2016).

Observing recent research on embodiment and phenomenological anthropology, I conclude that these
traditions could benefit from a rich reservoir of biographical research and the concept of biographical structuring, which so far—if I am correct—have not been considered at all.

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