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Kenneth Burke; Dramatistic Pragmatism; Classical Greek Scholarship; Symbolic Interaction; Rhetoric; Dramatistic Sociology; Knowing and Acting; Aristotle; Cicero; Erving Goffman

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Kenneth Burke’s Dramatistic Pragmatism: A Missing Link between Classical Greek Scholarship and the Interactionist Study of Human Knowing and Acting

For rhetoric as such is not rooted in any past condition of human society. It is rooted in an essential function of language itself, a function that is wholly realistic, and is continually born anew; the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols. [Burke 1969 (1950):43]

Although well-known as a dramatist, rhetorician, public philosopher, and literary critic, Kenneth Burke’s scholarship has been described as fascinating and brilliant, as well as obscure and disconnected. For our more immediate purposes, however, I will approach Kenneth Burke as a “medium of interchange” between the classical literary world of the humanities and the sociological study of human knowing and acting, as well as a conceptual bridge between classical Greek and Latin social thought of the past and the symbolic interactionist tradition of the present with its emphasis on the study of human knowing and acting.

Clearly, there is much more to Burke’s scholarship than his involvements in rhetoric, but because classical Greek and Latin rhetoric has been so thoroughly and precisely articulated, Burke’s dramatism represents a particularly valuable resource for connecting the scholarly productions of the present with the intellectual accomplishments of the past.

Some sociologists, particularly those in symbolic interactionism, may be aware of Kenneth Burke’s “dramatism” through their attentiveness to Erving Goffman’s (especially 1959; 1963a; 1963b; 1971) “dramaturgical sociology.” Still, even most of those who have found Goffman’s materials especially valuable for their own work are apt to have had little sustained familiarity with Kenneth Burke’s scholarship. Although several scholars have attempted to draw attention to the sociologically enabling features of Kenneth Burke’s dramatism prior to,
concurrently with, and beyond that more commonly associated with Erving Goffman's dramaturgical metaphor, they have been only marginally successful in this venture. However, virtually no consideration has been given to (a) the foundations of the analytic approaches that Burke represents or (b) the implications of Burke's works for connecting an interactionist study of human group life with classical Greek and Latin scholarship.

Still, it was only in tracing the flows of Western sociological thought that I became more mindful of the relevance of Burke's work for the sociological venture that extended beyond Erving Goffman's dramaturgical sociology. While highly mindful of the potential of Goffman's analyses of impression management for the study of human group life (e.g., Prus and Sharper 1977; Prus and Irini 1980; Prus 1989a; 1998b), my appreciation of the importance of Kenneth Burke's analyses of human group life developed largely as a consequence of my exposure to classical Greek thought while writing a book on power as a realm of intersubjective accomplishment (Prus 1999) and later (Prus 2003; 2004; 2007a; 2008a; 2013a; 2015) reflecting on the affinities of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Rhetoric with the interactionist approach more generally.

It is in this way that I became more aware of Kenneth Burke as a missing link, a “medium of interchange” between present-day interactionist scholarship and classical Greek and Latin social thought. As such, a consideration of Kenneth Burke's role in this process represents an instructive instance of “the sociology of knowing”—denoting the historical, developmental, and dijunctures of Western social thought. While drawing attention to the partial, marginal, and precarious nature of scholarly developments, this paper also indicates the importance of scholars explicitly acknowledging their sources. In addition to the advantage of “knowing the past,” for more fully comprehending and assessing the productions of the present, references to the scholars and productions of the past represent important resources for thought and more sustained comparative analyses in the pursuit of more adequate conceptualizations of human group life. In attending to some of the sources with which Kenneth Burke worked, we begin to see promising ways of extending the interactionist tradition. Indeed, Burke's pragmatist-oriented texts provide a particularly important set of departure points for a more substantial voyage into the fuller, longer-term pragmatist study of human knowing and acting.

Given the issues at hand, this paper assumes some reader familiarity with Erving Goffman's dramaturgical sociology, as well as Blumerian or Chicago-style symbolic interactionism.4 As well, because few social scientists are familiar with classical Greek scholars' work, the paper aims to provide a preliminary introduction to classical Greek and Latin rhetoric.

In what follows, I first discuss (a) rhetoric as a realm of persuasive interchange from the classical Greek era to the present time, giving particular attention to (b) the major texts that Kenneth Burke developed with respect to the study of human group life more generally and rhetoric as activity more specifically. Then, following (c) a consideration of some other contemporary statements on rhetoric and their affinities with the work of Kenneth Burke, the pragmatist tradition and the symbolic interactionist emphasis on the study of community life, this paper (d) concludes with a statement that more fully recognizes the potent, uniquely enabling potential of Kenneth Burke's dramatism for extending the conceptual and methodological parameters of contemporary symbolic interactionism.

Engaging the Classical Greek and Latin Rhetorical Tradition

Whereas the term “rhetoric” often has been invoked in pejorative terms to refer to shallow instances of deceptive communication, those adopting this viewpoint typically are unaware of the highly detailed analytic accounts of persuasive endeavor that one encounters in classical Greek and Latin scholarship.5 Relatedly, they generally also fail to comprehend the extended relevance of the analysis of rhetoric for the study of contested reality in all realms of human interchange.

While focusing on the contributions of Kenneth Burke to contemporary symbolic interactionism, rhetoric is envisioned as a realm of communication in which people attempt to shape (and resist) the ways that others define, think about, and act towards all manners of objects (denoting any shared point of reference). Instances of influence work and resistance may be directed towards a single person or small identifiable groups, as well as much larger, more diffuse groupings and possibly very vague categories of targets (as implied in the extended instances of the electronic mass media). Still, even in highly unilateral instances (affording no opportunity for interchange), communication endeavors inevitably involve the matters of interpretation and the potential for reflection, deliberation, and meaningful activity on the part of the target-recipients.

People may envision influence work as especially pertinent to political, legal, and other evaluative contexts, but rhetoric traverses all areas of human group life. This includes religion, work and management, marketing, family relations, love and friendship, entertainment, education, scholarship, technology, and science.

Approached in pragmatist terms, this paper acknowledges people's capacities for agency and strategic interchange—as suggested in the enabling features of linguistic communication, reflectivity, intentionality, interpretation, activity, assessment,
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and meaningful ongoing adjustment (see: Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; 2007b; Prus and Grills 2003).

Like many areas of classical Greek and Roman scholarship, the exceptionally potent analyses of influence work (and resistance) developed by Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and others in the classical Greek and Roman eras have received notably limited, as well as uneven attention over the millennia (Prus 2004). Thus, whereas one encounters some explicit scholarly re- engagements of classical Greek and Latin rhetoric here and there in the historical flows of Western social thought, there has been a resurgence of attention directed towards this literature in the 20th and now 21st centuries.

Although the linkages of contemporary scholarship with Greek and Latin rhetoric have only marginally been restored in the 20th and 21st century literature, a number of scholars of whom Kenneth Burke is particularly consequential have contributed to this venture. Even though this material has had a more uneven attention over the millennia (Prus 2004). Thus, whereas one encounters some explicit scholarly re-engagements of classical Greek and Latin rhetoric here and there in the historical flows of Western social thought, there has been a resurgence of attention directed towards this literature in the 20th and now 21st centuries.

The present statement on Kenneth Burke and contemporary rhetoric emerged as part of a larger study of the development of Western social thought (and especially pragmatist philosophy). Focusing on the literature that attends to the nature of human knowing and acting from the classical Greek era to the present time (following my reading of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in 1998), I have been tracing the development of pragmatist scholarship (amidst varying perspectives, agendas, and disruptions) over the millennia and across a number of areas of community life.6

In addition to attending to the interconnectedness of rhetoric and pragmatist philosophy, I also have been mindful of developments (and disjunctions) in pragmatist thought as this pertains to religion, morality and regulation, education, history, politics, (i.e., fiction), interpersonal relations, politics, education, and science. Although I had not anticipated becoming involved in all of these areas of community life, especially on a more or less current basis, these substantive areas are much more interwoven than we are encouraged to think as social scientists.

As well, the classical Greek authors, of whom Plato and Aristotle are most central, have dealt with these and other subject matters in extended analytic detail. Accordingly, whereas my preliminary interest was in rhetoric as a realm of influence work, I became drawn into a much fuller appreciation of classical Greek, Roman, and interim social thought as I learned more about the literature and the integration of people’s activities across the broader realms of community life.7

It is often assumed that scholarship proceeds in an essentially cumulative, progressively sophisticated, and improved manner, with the best of the past being preserved to inform contemporary academic life. However, as history teaches us (see: Durkheim 1977 [1904-1905]; also Prus 2012), this often is not the case. Consequently, even though there may be considerable continuity and remarkable advances in some fields of study over extended time periods, one encounters major gaps and lapses of intellectual activity, as well as pockets of more intense scholarship in particular subject matters.

Relatedly, theories, concepts, and practices claimed to be “new and improved” often represent recycled, sometimes poorly construed versions of ideas, concepts, arrangements, and activities from the past. It is also the case that particularly valuable concepts and practices from the past may be neglected, if not more entirely lost, as a consequence of various human agendas, resistances, fads, fashions and unwitting disregard, along with the natural ravages of time.

More specifically, even though the names Plato, Aristotle, Cicero are often encountered in academic settings, the texts developed by these authors and others from the classical Greek and Latin eras are not particularly well-known—even among scholars in seemingly relevant disciplines. Indeed, a closer examination of the historical flows of Western social thought reveals that a scholarly attentiveness to these texts has been notably partial—subject to considerable divergence of thought, distortion, resistance, and willful destruction, as well as inadvertent neglect at various times and places.

Notably, even the widely proclaimed 16th century Western European Renaissance, with its artistic and expressive emphases, only partially resulted in a revitalization of classical rhetoric and philosophy. As a consequence of the 16th century Protestant Reformation and the 17th century scientific (so-called “enlightenment”) dismissal, if not also denigration, of much of the historically-enabling past, even less attention would be given to rhetoric as a classically informed realm of study in the 17th-19th centuries.8

6 An earlier, but still very viable overview statement of this agenda can be found in Prus (2004). Some more focused considerations of the literature I have been developing on the transhistorical features of pragmatist scholarship can be found in Prus (2003; 2004; 2006; 2007a; 2007c; 2008a; 2008b; 2008c; 2008d; 2009a; 2010; 2011a; 2011b; 2011c; 2011d; 2012; 2013a; 2013b; 2013c; 2014a; 2014b; 2015), Prus and Burk (2010), and Prus and Camara (2010). For a biographical account of the developmental flow of this evolution of this project within my broader involvements in sociology, see: Kleinkeoch (2007).

7 Those familiar with Emile Durkheim’s Moral Education (1961 [1902-1903]), The Evolution of Educational Thought (1977 [1904-1905]), and The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1915 [1912]) will likely appreciate the importance of this observation.

8 To better locate the present statement relative to the longer term developmental flows and disjunctions of rhetoric as a field of study from the classical Greek era to the 19th century, I have provided an abbreviated list of the more consequential enablers of rhetoric as a realm of scholarship, along with a few particularly notable facilitators and detractors: Gorgias (485–380 BCE) Greece; Protagoras (480–411 BCE) Greece; Plato (420–348 BCE) Greece; Aristotle (384–322 BCE) Greece; Cicero (106–43 BCE) Rome; Quintilian (35–95 CE) Rome; St. Augustine (354–430) North Africa [Enabler & Detractor]; Martians Capella (text circa 410-426) North Africa; Alcinus (712-904) Britain/ France; Charlemagne (784-814) France [Scholarly Facilitator]; Hrabanus Maurus (785–856) Germany; Al-Farabi, Abu Nasr (850-950) Iran; Nofker Laboe (950-1022) Germany; Aristides of Besate (circa 1000-106) Italy; John of Salisbury (1115-1180) England; Thierry of Chartres (1150) France; Brunetto Latini (1210-1294) Italy; Aegidius Romanus [Eiles of Rome] (1243-1316) France; George of Trebizond (1393-1486) Greece/Italy;
Envisioning rhetoric as denoting instances of influence work and resistance that permeate all realms of human group life, the material following addresses (1) the state of rhetoric in contemporary scholarship in the humanities and the social sciences, (2) the role that some present-day scholars have assumed in reengaging classical Greek and Latin scholarship, and (3) some of the implications of these materials for the broader study of human knowing and acting.

With little in the way of a 19th century classical rhetorical heritage on which to build, 20th century considerations of rhetoric are highly diverse and largely have lost connections with the works of Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Still, there has been something of an intellectual revival in the study of rhetoric as a humanly accomplished realm of endeavor.

There also has been an increased awareness, through Aristotle’s work, of the necessity of examining persuasive interchange within the context of “the act” on the part of some rhetoricians, philosophers, and social scientists.

Whereas a number of contemporary scholars are acknowledged in this statement, Kenneth Burke represents a particularly consequential bridge between classical Greek thought and contemporary pragmatist scholarship.

20th Century Rhetoric: An Overview

Although his review of the 20th century literature is helpful for situating rhetoric on a more contemporary plane, James Kinneavy’s (1990) statement also indicates that the term “rhetoric” has lost much of its connectedness with classical scholarship. Thus, “rhetoric” has often been used in ways that are indistinguishable from the broader concepts of speech, discourse, and persuasive interchange, where it is not more abruptly dismissed as superficially deceptive instances of communication. As well, most authors using the term “rhetoric” have failed to attend to the activities entailed in people engaging instances of persuasive communication.

In discussing contemporary rhetoric, Kinneavy identifies several realms of scholarly endeavor. These include (a) situated context emphases, wherein the focus is on the social-cultural settings in which instances of discourse are developed; (b) interpretive (also hermeneutics, semiotic, pragmatist) approaches; (c) argumentation themes and considerations of the rhetoric of science; (d) rhetorically-oriented theories of knowledge and philosophy of science; (e) depictions of technical writing, journalism, and information processing; (f) emphases on propaganda, politicized rhetoric, and commercialized advertising; (g) concerns with religious oratory (preaching, interpretation of text); (h) literary rhetorical criticism; (i) the development of women’s and gender studies rhetoric; (j) self-expressive statements (as in catharsis, counseling, existentialism); (k) considerations of mass-media communications; (l) the analysis of symbols, as in semiotics, semiology, and pragmatism; (m) the depiction of rhetoric as metaphor; (n) rhetoric and the teaching of composition; and (o) computer use and rhetoric (as in technologies, word-processing, interactive mediums, information technology).

Kinneavy’s ordering has been maintained so that interested readers might more readily benefit from the bibliographies he provides for each of these themes.

Attempts to codify contemporary discussions of conceptual rhetoric in more systematic ways seem to have become increasingly problematic. Thus, in addition to the more distinctively conceptual material Kinneavy references in his subthemes (a-d) and (l), the other topics that Kinneavy identifies may be seen either as applications of influence work to specific subject matters or as connoting particular modes of communication and realms of instruction intended to promote more effective communication.

While there is a deep contemporary division between theory about rhetoric and communicative applications, there is a yet more consequential problem. Thus, whereas those involved in developing applications (typically using whatever resources they can to pursue their objectives) have given little sustained attention to the study of the ways that human interchange is actually accomplished, most scholars involved in developing theory about persuasive endeavor also have neglected to study the ways in which instances of influence work are constituted (developed and experienced) as activity by the participants in any actual settings.

Relatedly, the more general analytic pattern has been to discuss rhetoric (and the somewhat related “philosophy of language”) in terms that ignore

*The neglect of classical rhetoric on the part of 20th century scholars reflects (a) the comparative disregard of rhetoric as a realm of scholarly analysis in the 19th century (see: Stewart 1990, Johnson 1991) and (b) a corresponding inattention to classical Greek and Latin scholarship more generally. This has been accompanied by emphases on (c) structuralism in the social sciences (as in psychological and sociological variable analysis, rational-deductive models, and marxist materialism), (d) moralism and activism (as in religion, Marxist ideology, and political correctness), (e) idealism (e.g., postmodernism, totalizing relativism, and dialectic skepticism), and (f) artistic creativity (as in people striving for diversity, display, and expression of persona).

Still, as Rosenfield (1971) and Vickers (1998) observe, the more contemporary disregard of rhetoric also (g) is partially the product of a much more enduring split between the fields of rhetoric and philosophy that can be traced back to Socrates and Plato. Nevertheless, present-day scholars have greater access (through translations, as well as extended print and electronic technology) to the classical literature than has been the case in earlier centuries. Thus, there is much potential for an intellectual renaissance.

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10 Readers are referred to Gaillet and Horner’s (2010) The Present State of Scholarship in the History of Rhetoric for further verification of the problems of characterizing the broader contemporary literature on rhetoric. Still, whereas the contributors to the Gaillet and Horner collection of papers provide a valuable series of bibliographic materials pertaining to different historical eras from the Greeks to the present time, the entire set of papers presented within has been largely organized around substantive or topical fields. Thus, this collection of papers focuses on matters such as gender roles, race and ethnicity, and education rather than the conceptual, generic processual, and enacted features of rhetoric that so consequentially characterize the highly enabling analyses provided by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian. Likewise, very little comparative analyses and virtually no attention is given to either memory as a fundamentally humanly engaged process (Prus 2007b) related to rhetorical ventures or the associated matters of interpretation, deliberation and secondary interchanges on the part of targtepintpi (see: Prus 1999). Instead, rhetoric has been approached largely as a unilateral phenomenon in most of the contemporary literature. As well, there has been little sustained ethnographic examination of rhetoric as a socially enacted process.
examinations of rhetoric as activity in the making—as actual instances of persuasive interchange. Notably, too, instead of examining actual instances of influence work, many contemporary rhetoricians have drawn heavily on existing literary (mostly fictionalized) sources for their “data” and/or studied rhetoric only from a distance via media materials (as in “content analysis” versus extended, open-ended interviews with speakers and/or audiences).

**Sustaining the Tradition**

A number of 20th and 21st century scholars (e.g., Richards 1936; Kennedy 1963; 1972; 1980; 1983; 1989; 1991; 1999; Murphy 1974; 1989; 2002; Erickson 1975; McKeon 1987; Vickers 1988; Brandes 1989; Conley 1990; 2000; Enos 1993; 1995; Murphy and Katula 2003) have helped maintain continuities with classical rhetoric through their careful reviews of scholarly involves in rhetoric over the centuries. However, one finds comparatively little in the way of a direct, sustained analysis of "rhetoric as activity" on the part of most contemporary authors.

As well, with some notable exceptions, social scientists (including those who might seem to be particularly attentive to communication and persuasive endeavor) largely have been oblivious to "rhetoric as a fundamental feature of human group life."

Although there seems to have been a revitalized interest in classical rhetoric towards the end of the 20th century, and this bodes well for subsequent scholarship, few contemporary rhetoricians have (a) discussed activity in more direct and sustained terms, (b) invoked more explicit pragmatist analyses of rhetoric, or (c) acknowledged the profound integration of persuasive interchange with all arenas of community life (also see what Murphy [2002] references as "Aristotle's Metarhetoric").

Amidst considerations of some other contemporary authors who have dealt with rhetoric in more distinctive pragmatist terms, some extended attention will be given to the works of Chaim Perelman and (especially) Kenneth Burke. Still, readers are cautioned that one finds little coherence in the styles or emphases of 20th and 21st century authors. Thus, before discussing the more particular contributions of Perelman and Burke, we briefly acknowledge the works of I. A. Richards, James Kastely, Jeffrey Walker, Frank DeAngelo, Ernesto Grassi, Brian Vickers, and Eugene Garver.

Whereas I. A. Richards (1893-1979) is commonly recognized as a significant 20th century rhetorician, Richards' (1936) *Philosophy of Rhetoric* has a more pronounced poetic (versus more extensively analytical) emphasis. Indeed, Richards' relevance as a pragmatist analyst is much more evident in Ogden and Richards' (1946 [1923]) *The Meaning of Meaning*. Albeit focused on the centrality of language for thought rather than the development of rhetoric more specifically, Ogden and Richards' *The Meaning of Meaning* represents a consequential contribution to the broader rhetorical enterprise. Providing a valuable commentary on the enabling and limiting features of language for humanly engaged definitions of reality (especially see: Ogden and Richards 1946 [1923]:1-23, 87-108, 109-138, 185-199), but *The Meaning of Meaning* notably also parallels and engages the American pragmatists John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, and William James' notions of language as a contextually engaged process.

While also characterized by poetic emphases, the texts that James Kastely (1997) and Jeffrey Walker (2000) have developed also merit more attention than most works in this broader genre. Whereas Kastely (*Rethinking the Rhetorical Tradition*) attempts to revitalize classical rhetoric by showing how these texts could be used to engage Marxist and postmodernist positions, Jeffrey Walker (*Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity*) argues that rhetoric initially developed from, and is best understood within the context of, poetic expression. Still, neither Kastely nor Walker approaches rhetoric in more direct activity-based terms.

Frank D'Angelo's (1975) *A Conceptual Theory of Rhetoric* and Walter Beale's (1987) *A Pragmatic Theory of Rhetoric* represent two 20th century philosophical depictions of rhetoric. These texts are more analytically astute than is Richards' (1936) *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*, but D'Angelo and Beale lack the pragmatist (humanly engaged) emphasis of Ogden and Richards' (1946 [1923]) *The Meaning of Meaning*.

Intended to contemporize classical rhetoric, both D'Angelo and Beale maintain a comparatively formal, more structuralist emphasis in their conceptualizations of rhetoric. Neither D'Angelo nor Beale (perhaps more ironically, given the title of his volume) attends very directly to the study of human knowing and acting within the context of persuasive communication.

Ernesto Grassi's (1902-1991) *Rhetoric as Philosophy* (2001) is more closely related to the present emphasis on rhetoric as activity. However, focusing on Italian humanist contributions to rhetoric and using Giambattista Vico (1667-1744) as his centering point, Grassi almost exclusively concentrates on Roman and Italian sources. Still, the consequential analytic and pragmatist-ethnohistorical contributions of Cicero and Quintilian are only marginally acknowledged.

Notably, too, in contrast to a more thoroughly pragmatically-informed approach to the study of rhetoric that encompasses all modes of persuasive communication (see: Aristotle, Cicero, Burke).
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rhetorical venture and human experience more

invoke metaphors in developing analysis of the

ology (Grassi primarily encourages scholars to

aspects of human activity, his consideration of

life, Grassi echoes Vico’s general plea that schol-

turalist approaches to the study of human group

act. Rejecting distinctively rationalist or struc-

logical, rationalist models of human thought.

In developing his statement, Grassi derives par-

icular inspiration from Vico’s criticisms of René

Descartes’ (1596-1650) rationalism. Conseque-

tially, thus, Vico (a) objects to Descartes’ insistence

on reducing thought about human existence to ra-

tionalist, logically derivable, and mathematically

sustained notions. Vico also (b) rejects Descartes’

neglect of people’s emotional, expressive, creative

ways of knowing the world and (c) Descartes’ dis-

regard of the contributions that people have made

in areas such as poetics, rhetoric, political science,

and history, as well as (d) Descartes’ inattention to

the specific things that people do.

Like Vico, Grassi stresses the importance of hu-

man activity and the contexts in which people act.

Rejecting distinctively rationalist or struc-

turnalist approaches to the study of human group

life, Grassi echoes Vico’s general plea that schol-

ars develop a philosophy of language that is more

attentive to human experience. Still, since Grassi

so heavily emphasizes the emotional and creative

aspects of human activity, his consideration of

rhetoric is unduly limited as also is his method-

ology (Grassi primarily encourages scholars to

invoke metaphors in developing analysis of the

rhetorical venture and human experience more
generally).

Overviewing the conflicts pertaining to the prac-
tice and virtues of rhetoric from the classical Greek
era to his own time, Brian Vickers’ (1988) In De-
defence of Rhetoric focuses on the differing
viewpoints that people have adopted with respect
to persuasive endeavor and the shifting emphases
implied therein. Thus, Vickers instructively ad-
dresses the positions that various scholars have

taken with respect to rhetoric over the centuries.

Drawing attention to an assortment of theologi-

cal and moralist agendas, as well as various intellec-
tual disregards and other resistances pertaining to

the study of rhetoric, Vickers argues for the neces-
sity of sustaining a clear scholarly emphasis on the

study of rhetoric as a humanly engaged realm of

deer activity.

In what may be the only book length philosophic

treatment on Aristotle’s rhetoric written in the 20th
century, Eugene Garver’s (1994) Aristotle’s Rhetoric

also has important affinities with the present text.

Like the works of Kastely (1997) and Walker (2000),

Garver’s text has a distinctively erudite flow, and

Garver engages the contemporary philosophical lit-

erature on rhetoric in extended terms. To his credit,

as well, Garver develops Aristotle’s Rhetoric mindful-

ly of the broader corpus of texts that Aristotle has

written.

Still, Garver’s emphases are quite different from

those of the present paper. Graver intends to pro-

vide a contemporary, philosophically-informed

commentary on the character of morality implied in

Aristotle’s Rhetoric. While Garver fails to specify the

more particular philosophic premises with which

he works, he clearly desires to engage rhetoric as an

ethical venture. Envisioning rhetoric as a highly en-

abling, as well as a notably dangerous art, Garver

seems intent on seeing what contemporary practi-
cal, judgmental wisdom he can derive from Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric.

Thus, whereas Garver explicitly acknowledges the

centrality of activity in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and point-
edly recognizes the generic or transsituational, as

well as the comparatively morally neutral position

that Aristotle adopts with respect to rhetoric as an

enabling art or technology, Garver does not ap-

proach Aristotle’s works in these latter, distinctively

more pragmatist terms.

Instead, Garver (1994:8) describes Aristotle as high-

ly unreflective in his philosophic treatment of Ar-

istotle’s Rhetoric. Although cognizant of the highly

reflective nature of Aristotle’s analysis of rhetoric as

activity, Garver takes issue with Aristotle for not en-
gaging what he considers the critical issues of moral

responsibility in today’s society.

Insofar as Garver, along with D’Angelo (1975), Beale

(1987), and Grassi (2001) are among those who are

more particularly attentive to the philosophical

aspects of rhetoric, their texts suggest that a great

many contemporary philosophers are still some dis-
tance from attending the actualities of human lived

(and enacted) reality.18

Expressed in other terms, it appears that most phi-

losophers (as suggested by Rosenfield [1971] and

Vickers [1988]) are still “living in the shadows of

Socrates’ cave” (Plato, Republic, VII [1997]). They

have yet to venture into and examine in some detail

the world of human enacted reality.19 The scholars

discussed in the rest of this paper have made more

substantial contributions to this latter pragmatist

objective.

Kenneth Burke—Rhetoric as Activity

Whereas I. A. Richards, Ernesto Grassi, Eugene

Garver, Chaim Perelman, and some other contem-

poraries have addressed aspects of classical rhetoric

in more distinctive pragmatist terms, Kenneth Burke

(1897-1993) emerges as the 20th century rhetorician

who most thoroughly approximates the pragma-
tist emphasis on human knowing and acting that

one associates with Aristotle (384-322 BCE), Cicero

16 For two 20th century synoptic commentaries on Aristotle’s


and Brandes (1989) provide historical materials depicting the

receptivity of Aristotle’s Rhetoric in Western scholarship. Also

see Prus (2008a).

17 Although not denying the relevance of morality and devi-

ance for all manners of group life (see: Prus and Grills 2003), it

appears that Garver (as with many others in philosophy) large-

ly disregards the study of human knowing and acting as this

takes place in instances.

18 Relatedly, despite the centrality of persuasive communica-

tion as an aspect of speech, one finds little direct or sustained

consideration of rhetoric or influence work in philosophic

considerations of language. Thus, while Borgman (1974:32-34) in his

The Philosophy of Language briefly acknowledges rhetoric and poetics in his dis-

cussion of Aristotle (wherein Borgman astutely emphasizes that

language is the theme and the basis of Aristotle’s investiga-
tions) along with a few other passing references to rhet-

oric, and Gilson (1988:128-129) also makes passing reference to

Aristotle’s Rhetoric in his text, Linguistics and Philosophy, others

writing on the philosophy of language (e.g., see: Land

1986; Martinich 1990) often do not give even this much atten-

tion to rhetoric.

19 Readers may appreciate that this is not intended as particu-

lar criticism of Plato’s scholarship. Indeed, Plato (Republic, VII

[1997]) insists that after being trained as philosophers (and di-

alecticians) these scholars—now about 35 years of age—should

spend the next fifteen years in other, humanly engaged con-
texts prior to assuming roles as instructors of philosophy.
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(106-43 BCE), and Quintilian (35-95 CE). For this reason, it is appropriate to give Burke's works much more sustained attention both on their own and in conjunction with the authors whose materials he addresses in the process.20

Still, since Burke's writings cover an exceptionally wide array of topics and authors, it is advisable to consider his scholarship more generally before focusing more directly on Burke's relevance to the present project.21

Thus, beyond (a) his enduring interest in rhetoric (as persuasive communication), Kenneth Burke had long standing intrigues (b) with literature (as in poetics, criticism, and metaphorical analysis), (c) philosophy (on knowing, on language), (d) history (as in the developmental flows of community life), (e) religion (as in activity, symbols, ritual), (f) morality (as in notions of evil, condemnations, (g) political science (as in governing, conflict, intergroup relations), (h) sociology (as in social order, cooperation, conflict, hierarchies, knowledge), and (h) psychology (as in Freudianism, theories of behavior).

Further, while engaging the literature from all of these fields in a more contemporary sense, Burke also has examined these subject matters across the range of Western social thought, from the classical Greek era (circa 700-300 BCE) to the present time.

Those who examine Kenneth Burke's more analytic texts will find that he incorporates an exceptionally wide array of sources in developing his analyses of particular topics. Although this breadth of scholarship may have contributed to a more adequate appreciation of classical rhetoric, one that is more consistent with the analysis of rhetoric developed by Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, Burke does not achieve the analytical depth or the clarity of focus that characterize considerations of rhetoric by these earlier authors. Thus, Burke's discussions tend to "bounce" unevenly as he moves from one theme to the next and from one author to another.

Likewise, his documentation, as well as his consideration of the classical Greek and Latin literature on rhetoric is far from comprehensive, systematic, or sustained.

Nevertheless, Burke is typically attentive to the task of connecting his thoughts with the mind of the reader. Thus, while notably playful, as well as openly tentative at times, Burke typically strives to achieve a shared mindedness with his readers by more explicitly defining his objectives, terms of reference, and the emphases of particular components of his texts.22

Likewise, even though he addresses rhetoric within an extended range of scholarly fields, Burke is centrally concerned with the analysis of human knowing, expression, and acting in more generic, transdisciplinary terms. Hence, while engaging topics and authors in ways that are mindful of disciplinary boundaries, scholarly practices, and people's sacred beliefs, Kenneth Burke tends to emphasize the generic or pluralistic features of human community life.

Relatedly, whereas Burke (especially 1969a [1945]; 1969b [1950]) writes as an analyst of dramatic interchanges in developing most of his analytic texts, those familiar with American pragmatism (especially Dewey and Mead) will recognize that Burke's dramatism is very much a variant of pragmatist philosophy.

Thus, while building on analytical materials developed mindfully of the theater, Kenneth Burke states that he is not a "dramatist" per se. Burke develops extended use of the theatrical metaphor in approaching the study of human knowing and acting, but his primary emphasis is on the actualities (versus metaphors or analogies) of human behavior as meaningful, purposive symbolically-mediated activity.

Further, although Burke appears to have considerably fluency with the American pragmatists (particularly the works of Dewey, Mead, and James), it is Aristotle whose works are most central to Kenneth Burke's "dramatistic pragmatism."23 Not only does Burke envision much of Aristotle's Rhetoric and Poetics as epitomizing the dramatistic viewpoint,24 but Burke also derives considerable inspiration from Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics and Politics.25

Following Aristotle, Kenneth Burke explicitly identifies people as "symbol using animals." Like other animals, humans not only have biological capacities for activity and sensations, but also live in a world of objects. However, in acquiring speech within the (existing, cultured) community, humans learn to think and act in symbolically-mediated realities. It is speech also that enables people to act in meaningful, purposive, and deliberative terms.

As with Aristotle, thus, Burke sees people as community-based and community-engaged creatures. People require others for association, language, thought, knowledge, senses of self, and all sorts of cooperative effort. Relatedly, people cannot be understood adequately apart from a science (i.e., a political science) of the community (or polis).26

20 Although I had some very general exposure to Kenneth Burke's dramatism through the works of Eerving Goffman (1959) and Stanford Lyman and Marvin Scott (1970), it was only after developing familiarity with analyses of rhetoric from the Greek, Latin, and interim eras that I eventually engaged Burke's texts in more concerted terms. This background in classical rhetoric was extremely helpful for better comprehending Burke's work and its relevance for contemporary scholarship.

21 For some other overviews of Kenneth Burke's works, see: Holland (1995), Heath (1986), Gusfield (1989), Brock (1995), Wolin (2001), and Blakesley (2002). However, as far as I can tell, only some of those (e.g., Holland, Heath, Blakesley) who have commented on Burke's texts appear sufficiently familiar with Aristotle's other works (e.g., Rhetoric, Nicomachean Ethics, Poetics) to acknowledge Burke's more thorough indebtedness to Aristotle and the broader pragmatist tradition.

22 The matter of striving for clarity of comprehension with one's readers may seem a standard, commonsensical feature of academic writing. Still, those writing as "poets," "literary critics," and "postmodernists," among others, have often disregarded this fundamental feature of communication. While some readers appreciate the intrigues associated with ambiguity, and certain authors have achieved prestige by being evasive or mystical, texts of these latter sorts generally are of little value to those genuinely interested in understanding some particular realm of human endeavor. Also see Prus (1996; 1999, 2008c).

23 I have used the term "dramatistic pragmatism" in an attempt to capture the essence of Burke's position as he defines it.

24 More explicit considerations of the affinities and connections between 20th century American pragmatist philosophy and classical Greek scholarship (especially the works of Aristotle) can be found in Prus (2003; 2004; 2006; 2007a; 2008a; 2009a; 2010a; 2015) and Puddreff and Prus (2007).

25 Indeed, when compared to the American pragmatists—Charles Sanders Peirce, William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert Mead, Kenneth Burke appears to have considerably greater familiarity with classical Greek and Latin rhetoric, as well as Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics.

26 For a fuller elaboration of the relevance of language for humans becoming fuller participants in the life-worlds of the other, see: Durkheim (1915 [1912]); Mead (1934); Prus (2007b; 2007c).
Like Aristotle, too, Burke observes that people (as community essences) engage in differentiations of all sorts, as well as embark on wide ranges of structuring practices and hierarchical evaluations. While both scholars are attentive to notions of equality, they are quite aware of differences in people’s backgrounds, characteristics, circumstances, and abilities. Still, the importance of any differentiations between people, like other objects of human awareness, reflects a broader symbolizing process wherein people give meanings to all manners of things and act accordingly.

In addition to the generalized interest they share in fostering more viable (pluralist) community life-worlds, Aristotle and Burke also are highly attentive to the diversity of human perspectives, desires, and objectives. Both are notably aware of the existence of conflict and competition amidst people’s attentiveness to affinities and their cooperative quests for community order.

Importantly, like Aristotle in this way, Kenneth Burke will insist on the centrality of activity for comprehending the human condition and the necessity of examining activity in process terms. It is not apparent from Burke’s texts just when and how he encountered Aristotle’s works, how extensively he read these, in what order, and so forth, but Burke’s dramatism is centrally premised in Aristotelian thought.

Given this emphasis on activity, Burke also exhibits fluency with the work of I. A. Richards (a rhetorician and philosopher of language) who, with C. K. Ogden (Ogden and Richards 1946 [1923]), wrote The Meaning of Meaning. Denoting a sustained consideration of language, symbols, and meanings, the Ogden and Richards text addresses core elements of human group life that parallel the, then, somewhat concurrently emergent American pragmatist tradition.

Although working with an essentially pragmatist base, Burke fuses his analyses with the works of a great many other sources. Since the introduction of these materials generates some significant diversities and disjunctures in Burke’s works, it is important to acknowledge some of these sources.

In addition to Aristotle and the American pragmatists, Burke engages an incredibly wide set of literary sources. These include poets and critics of all sorts (from Homer [circa 700 BCE] to 20th century authors), but Kenneth Burke also builds on a wide array of other sources such as Cicero, Quintilian, Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Francis Bacon, Niccolò Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Baruch Spinoza, Immanuel Kant, Hegel, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, and Henri Bergson.

Whereas Kenneth Burke maintains an essential generic emphasis on human knowing and acting amidst this extended range of scholarship, it may be no less accurate to observe that it is Kenneth Burke’s emphasis on the generic, enacted (activity-based) features of human group life that allows him to address (albeit unevenly) the instances of individually and collectively generated activity referenced within this comparatively massive literature. Thus, for example, while explicitly acknowledging the realpolitik of Machiavelli and the skeptical materialism of Hobbes and Marx, Burke also recognizes the heavy rhetorical base of Marxist social thought and prefers the more pluralist sociology of knowledge proposed by Karl Mannheim.

Other aspects of Burke’s notions of community life, particularly those dealing more directly with rhetoric, will become apparent as we address certain of his texts. Still, before proceeding further, it may be instructive to comment on Kenneth Burke’s methodology lest this become a source of confusion.

Burke does not have methodological procedure of the sort that one might associate with surveys, experimental research, or ethnographic inquiry. Nevertheless, Burke has a methodological orientation. Focusing on activity, Kenneth Burke’s emphasis is on what people do, the ways in which they do things, and how they, as symbol using essences, conceptualize, understand, and explain the things they do.

In developing his dramatistic pragmatist standpoint, Burke spends considerable time talking about “motives.” However, instead of emphasizing the sorts of internal driving forces or external controlling structures that often characterize “motive talk” in the social sciences, Kenneth Burke examines the way that people assign motivations or give meanings to instances of human behavior (before, during, and after acting).

Relatedly, Kenneth Burke does not attempt to explain human behavior in reference to structuralist elements of a more conventionalist psychological or sociological nature. Instead, like Aristotle, Dewey, and Mead, Burke generally considers the way that people (as symbolic using essences) assign meanings to all matters of their awareness and act towards particular things in ways that make sense to them as knowing (and anticipating) agents.

An important aspect of this meaning-making process for Burke revolves around the concept of identification. It is through identification with the other, says Burke, that people define themselves in relation to others—thereby experiencing a variety of affinities with these others. Insofar as people identify themselves with specific sets of others, they seem more inclined to adopt perspectives, practices, and modes of interchange that are more characteristic of those with whom they identify. Viewed thusly, identification fosters integration and cooperation.

Still, whereas identification with others (a) may enable people to transcend realms of difference between themselves and the others and (b) holds the potential for more encompassing realms of congeality, civility, and social order, identification typically also (c) is characterized by ingroup-outgroup divisions. These divisions or disidentifications (with some third set of others), in turn, commonly result in ambiguities, distancing practices, animosities,

27 Because some sociologists are attentive to Marxist thought, it might be observed that Burke has a notably uneven regard (attraction towards and reservations about) for Marxism. Thus, whereas Burke insists on the importance of hierarchical tendencies in the human community, Burke envisions those rankings and orderings as occurring in all modes of human endeavor (vs. the class or material reductionism of Marx). Likewise, although attentive to the inevitability of conflict and people’s (uneven) quests for domination in this and that arena, Burke’s notions of conflict are much more pluralist in emphasis, more closely paralleling Aristotle and Machiavelli than Marx.

Further, whereas Burke (in more utopian moments) desires an extended, more equitable, universal form of social order, his hopes for a world order seem contingent on constitutional (vs. revolutionary) alignments.
Envisioning human life-worlds as symbolically-mediated, Kenneth Burke asks how people linguistically (and behaviorally) engage the world. While not venturing into the world in more ethnographic (e.g., Chicago interactionist) terms, Burke recognizes that people commonly adopt multiple viewpoints on things, and he encourages scholars to examine the ways in which particular features of people’s viewpoints are articulated, resisted, and sustained over time.

Beyond his own experiences and reflections as an author (participant-observer) in the literary world, Burke’s primary database comes from the literature he has read that deals with the humanly known and engaged world. In this regard, Burke considers wide ranges of rhetoric, poetry, literary criticism, and philosophic analysis.

In addition to developing more conceptually-oriented comparisons (similarities, differences, and inferences) in the course of addressing these literary sources, Burke also employs metaphors or analogies and deliberately invokes disjunctures (as in contrasts and ironies) in attempts to arrive at more discerning analyses.

As well, although centrally concerned about developing a theory of rhetoric or persuasive communication, it is essential to appreciate that Kenneth Burke does not propose a special theory for rhetoric. Instead, Burke envisions rhetoric both as an integral component of community life and an essence that cannot be understood apart from a fuller analysis of community life. Still, because it denotes specific instances of persuasive communication, rhetoric is unique from many other aspects of human (symbolic) interchange and merits concerted attention on this basis.

Accordingly, even though it entails a somewhat unique subject matter, Burke emphasizes the point that rhetoric, like all other forms and instances of human interchange, denotes symbolic activity. Rhetoric is to be approached as instances of activity that are developed by specific participants in situations, meaningful, formulative terms.


Whereas Burke’s A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives are particularly central to the present statement, I will first briefly overview these other texts.

Permanence and Change (1984 [1935]) denotes a sustained consideration of the problematics of understanding human behavior and knowing. Here Burke grapples with notions of “motives as situated analyses of human conduct,” “perspectives as metaphors for knowing things,” and “continuities and disruptions of particular life-worlds” in the human community.

In Attitudes toward History (1959 [1937]), Kenneth Burke focuses on the problematics of cooperation in community contexts. Acknowledging the multiplicity of viewpoints that particular groups may adopt within community settings, Burke attends to the acceptance and rejection of differing theological and other moral diversities that groups develop in more situated instances and how these are squelched or are sustained over time.

In his 1959 edition of Attitudes toward History, Burke identifies “The Seven Offices” that epitomize community life on the part of the linguistically-enabled, technologically-engaged animals we know as humans. These seven base-line or generically enabling sets of activities of community life revolve around the matters of governing, serving, defending, teaching, entertaining, curing, and pontificating.

Although written later, Burke’s The Rhetoric of Religion (1961) is somewhat less developed than the preceding volumes and some of his other texts. Even though he emphasizes the centrality of language for all human considerations of religion in The Rhetoric of Religion, this statement is much more limited in scope. Utilizing Augustine’s Confessions and the Genesis of The Old Testament as illustrative (prototypic) materials with which to engage in “the analysis of religious discourse,” Kenneth Burke addresses the generic, linguistic embeddedness of rhetoric of being, acting, and knowing in theological accounts. Still, he very much leaves his analysis at a suggestive level.

[29] Zappen (2009) provides a more extended consideration of the dialectical-rhetorical transcendence associated with Burke’s conception of identification. Aristotle (see Rhetoric and Rhetoric to Alexander, as well as Nicomachean Ethics) was highly attentive to these tendencies towards (and the effects of) people identifying and disidentifying with particular sets or categories of others.

[30] The matter of locating “an appropriate methodology with which to study human agency and interchange” has perplexed and eluded a great many humanist scholars from antiquity onward. For the symbolic interactionists, this fundamental problem was solved when Herbert Blumer (1969) synthesized Charles Horton Cooley’s method of “sympathetic introspection” (ethnographic inquiry) with George Herbert Mead’s “social behaviorism.”

[31] More generally, one might observe that scholars in philosophy, religious studies, and poetics have faced these same obstacles from antiquity to the present time. Relatedly, while the prospects of synthesizing pragmatist thought with ethnographic research can be located here and there, throughout the history of Western social thought from the time of Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon, it is not until the early 20th century that we have seen more sustained efforts along these lines (see Blumer 1969; Strauss 1993; Prus 1996; 1997; 1999; Prus and Grills 2003).
Robert Prus

Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pragmatism: A Missing Link between Classical Greek Scholarship and the Interactionist Study of Human Knowing and Acting

A Grammar of Motives (1969a [1945]) is the text in which Burke presents the fullest version of his dramatistic pragmatist approach to the study of human knowing and acting. However, it is in A Rhetoric of Motives (1969b [1950]) where Kenneth Burke most explicitly discusses rhetoric as a social process. Whereas Burke's Permanence and Change and Attitudes toward History, along with The Rhetoric of Religion, merit more extended attention on the part of social scientists, Burke's A Grammar of Motives and A Rhetoric of Motives are particularly central to the present consideration of influence work.

A Grammar of Motives

In introducing A Grammar of Motives (GM), Kenneth Burke (1969a [1945]:x-xvi) says that his purpose in writing this book is to consider “what people do” and to explain the attributions of motives that people assign to human activities. As his primary enabling mechanism for explaining human motivation, Burke introduces five concepts (often designated the “pentad”).

Thus, Burke’s pentad includes (1) the act as some named or identified behavior; (2) the scene or setting in which some activity takes place; (3) the agent or person who performed the act; (4) agency or the way in which the act was conducted (utilizing what instruments); and (5) purpose or intent.

Burke contends that notions of these sorts are pivotal to any viable consideration of human conduct. Relatedly, the analytic task is to examine the ways in which these five elements come together in any given instance. After noting that the pragmatists may be inclined to encompass purpose within agency, Burke (GM:xvi) explains that his term “dramatism” is derived from the analysis of drama wherein language and thought are envisioned as modes of action (Burke follows Aristotle [Poetics] in this emphasis on activity).

While noting that concerns with the matters demarcated within the pentad (act, scene, agent, agency, purpose) are rooted deeply in Western social thought, Burke also observes that these aspects of human activity have been taken for granted in a great many causal explanations of behavior and are strikingly absent in many academic analysis of human knowing and acting.

However, Burke contends, these elements are at the core of an authentic, informed analysis of human conduct. Thus, it is this conceptual scheme for examining “the act” that represents the basis on which Burke (rather simultaneously) intends to inform rhetoric with philosophy and inform philosophy with rhetoric.5

Emphasizing the centrality of the study of the act for a wide array of scholars, Kenneth Burke stresses the necessity of analysts examining instances of human behavior not only in contextually contained and culturally informed terms but also as knowingly and developmentally constituted processes.

Burke (GM:21-124) subsequently addresses a wide variety of topics pertaining to “definitions of contexts.” These include considerations of substance, tragedy, religion, money, and reductionism. While Burke’s emphasis is notably pluralist (as in his commentaries on “Money as a Substitute for God” and “The Nature of Monetary Reality”), the ensuing discussions are rather fragmentary.

In Part Two of GM (pp. 127-320), Burke engages a series of philosophic viewpoints along with some of their more prominent representatives. In turn, he discusses materialism, idealism, realism, pragmatism, and mysticism. Burke uses this material to compare (as in differences and similarities) his dramatist philosophic position with those of particular scholars adopting these other standpoints.

Although pointedly acknowledging the ongoing, inevitable, and often intense struggles that characterize the diversity of community life (regarding moralities, properties, hierarchies), Burke also is highly attentive to the cooperative features of human relations.

In overall terms, Burke’s position is notably consistent with the pragmatist position that he associates with John Dewey (especially Dewey’s emphasis on agency and instrumentalism). Relatedly, while rejecting Plato’s overarching sense of purpose as highly mystical, Burke (GM:292-294) identifies Aristotle’s analysis of human character (in Nicomachean Ethics) as strikingly dramatistic in emphasis.

Focusing more directly on his own notions of “means and ends,” Kenneth Burke (GM:317-320) stresses the importance of scholars examining the ways that people know and experience the world linguistically. It is a mistake, Burke alleges, to attempt to analyze reality apart from the human symbolizing process. Accordingly, he proposes that people’s relations be studied in ways that are explicitly attentive to the linguistically-informed nature of human knowing and acting.

Burke’s texts are sometimes intermingled with hopes for a more viable global order (amidst recognitions and fears of the large-scale self-destructive technologies that humans have developed). However, in Part Three of GM, Burke provides a more extended paradigm that he hopes will be useful for studying (and fostering) constitutional relations in the broader political arena. Burke attempts to develop this material in ways that are mindful of his earlier emphasis on activity, but this part of GM is notably more discursive and takes readers some distance from the study of action per se.31

Because most readers can relate so directly to Kenneth Burke’s dramatistic approach in reference to their own behavior, many may think that Burke (like the pragmatists more generally) is merely restating the obvious. However, when one compares Burke’s analysis of action and motive talk with most post 16th century philosophy (following Descartes) and most 19th-21st century statements in the social sciences (wherein the emphasis is on structures, forces, factors, and variables of sorts), the contrasts are striking, indeed.

31 Like many in the broader humanist tradition, from Plato and Aristotle onward, Kenneth Burke hopes that a better understanding of human lived experience might enable people to attain a more harmonious life-world. While notably pluralist in his analysis of community life and aware of irreconcilable differences that characterize communities more generally, Burke still hopes, in some way, to facilitate constitutionally enabled tolerance and an enhanced social order.
Burke says that the comic standpoint requires that one explic
ple knowingly taking themselves into account. Envisioning
Robert Prus Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pragmatism: A Missing Link between Classical Greek Scholarship and the Interactionist
Study of Human Knowing and Acting

Expressed in other terms, it might be said that Ken-
neth Burke (1969a [1945], in A Grammar of Motives, has restored an essential theory (philosophy) of the ac-
t within the study of rhetoric. Not only has Burke ques-
tioned the more idealized and structured notions of logic and epistemology that (following Plato and
Descartes) have dominated philosophical thought, but Burke also has established the importance of in-
fluence work (and activity) for philosophy and re-en-
gaged “the study of the act” within rhetoric.

A Rhetoric of Motives

In developing A Rhetoric of Motives (RM) which he
(1969b [1950]) envisions as a “philosophy of rhetoric,” Kenneth Burke addresses three major themes: the
range of rhetoric; traditional principles of rhetoric; and order.

While using an assortment of poetic sources to
introduce this volume, Burke intends that his text
on rhetoric not only would apply to all areas of
community life (as in religion, politics, science, courtship, and poetics), but that it also would
have a comprehensive cross-cultural relevance.

Some readers may be disappointed that Burke
does not develop an extended statement on the
practice of rhetoric (in the tradition of Aristotle,
Cicero, or Quintilian, for instance), but Burke’s
primary objective is to establish the pervasive na-
ture of rhetoric or persuasive endeavor in the hu-
man community and, thus, extend the boundaries
more conventionally ascribed to rhetoric.

Emphasizing the widespread relevance of rhetoric
for appreciating people’s activities, choices, and
attitudes, and assuming the dramatistic frame he
develops in GM, one of Burke’s major concepts in
RM is “identification.”

Following an introductory note on identification
(RM:xiii-xiv) and a more general consideration of
identification, Burke (RM:19-46) discusses the sim-
larities or commonalities (as in properties, loca-
tions, and classifications) that people may associate
with two or more instances of phenomena.

Attending to people’s abilities to invoke concep-
tual linkages between things across a wide array
of fields, Burke uses people’s tendencies towards
identification or notions of affinity as a means of
engaging the more traditional features of rhetoric.

Building on the works of Aristotle (especially), Ci-
cero, and Quintilian, Burke envisions identifica-
tion as a primary element of persuasion. In devel-
oping identification, Burke explains, the objective
is for speakers to establish a thorough connected-
ness with the mind of the other; to express one’s ideas in ways that more completely correspond
with the viewpoints and thoughts of the other.
Still, while identification fosters acceptance or
receptivity to subsequent speaker proposals, Burke
also acknowledges the importance of speakers
establishing “advantages” for their audiences (as
in stressing matters of a timely relevance for the
other) to act.

In discussing “traditional principles of rhetoric,”
Kenneth Burke introduces materials from Aristo-
tle, Cicero, Quintilian, and Augustine. However,
Burke also mixes aspects of the works of these
authors with discussions of Bacon, Kant, Marx,
Machiavelli, Ovid, and Dante, among others. Be-
cause Burke does not deal with the classical Greek and Latin authors in a systematic manner, readers
who lack familiarity with the works on rhetoric by
Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and Augustine are
apt to have considerable difficulty comprehend-
ing Burke’s presentation of traditional principles.

While frequently citing Aristotle in RM, Burke
also makes extensive use of materials on rhetoric
from Cicero and Augustine in his presentation.
Still, Burke deals with their texts in rather frag-
mented terms and in ways that (inadvertently)
obscure the scope, detail, and analytical depth of
these classical authors. As a result, readers rely-
ing more centrally on Burke’s renditions would
have little appreciation of the rich intellectual
resources embedded in the works of these three
authors.

Focusing “on order” in the last section of RM, Burke
returns to the matter of establishing the strategic
relevance of rhetoric for those spokespersons (e.g.,
political, religious, literary) who attempt to provide
direction (and criticism) for various sectors of the
human group.

After emphasizing the importance of envisioning
rhetoric as a pervasive, generic feature of human
group life, Kenneth Burke focuses primarily on “the
traditional principles of rhetoric.” [The material fol-
lowing attends to the overall flow of RM. Howev-
er, because Burke mixes sources and topics rather
freely, this often is not feasible. As well, mindful of the
objectives of the present statement, I have been
somewhat selective in representing Burke’s consid-
erations of the topics developed within.]

Burke (RM:49-55) begins his discussion of the prin-
ciples of rhetoric by defining rhetoric as persuasive
communication. While explicitly referencing Ar-
istotle, Cicero, and Augustine, Kenneth Burke ac-
knowledges a notably broader classical Greek em-
phasis on language and rhetoric.

Somewhat more particularly, then, Burke stresses
the voluntary nature of human behavior and draws
attention to the ways that Aristotle, Cicero, and
Augustine have focused on the tactical features of
rhetoric. After observing that Augustine discusses
rhetoric more specifically with the intention of ob-
taining religious converts (On Christian Doctrine),
Burke notes that Aristotle and Cicero deal with
rhetoric in more distinctively generic terms and
explicitly indicate the ways that people may resist,
as well as persuade one another.
Citing identification as a consequential emphasis in Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*, Burke (RM:55-59) subsequently addresses the foundational aspects of speakers achieving a more complete sense of connectedness with their audiences as the base on which to encourage acceptance of the more particular elements that the speakers wish their audiences to accept.

Still, Burke (RM:59-65) notes, persuasive endeavor involves much more than identification. Thus, after acknowledging Cicero’s claims for the universality of rhetoric and Cicero’s criticism of the split between philosophy and rhetoric (which Cicero attributes to Socrates), Burke says that the notion of “advantage” is highly consequential for rhetorical theory. Observing that most everyone would agree that humans strive for gains of some sort, Burke stresses this element of persuasion.

Then, in the midst of addressing advantage and the diversity of human interests and objectives that speakers may encounter, Burke turns more directly to a consideration of audiences. While stating that Aristotle and Cicero were both highly attentive to audience diversity and the importance of speakers adjusting their efforts accordingly, Burke notes that Aristotle did not address audiences with the same intensity or depth he directed towards those developing speeches.

Following a consideration of the (sometimes overly zealous) cataloguing of oratorical (and grammatical) mechanisms that have occupied the attention of many intervening scholars of rhetoric (RM:65-69), Burke (RM:69-72) distinguishes three major purposes that audiences might have for listening to particular messages. These are to obtain advice; to make decisions; and to attend to existing matters of interest.

After briefly commenting on the corresponding parallels of these purposes with Aristotle’s three realms of rhetoric (political, judicial, and demonstrative or ceremonial), Burke turns to Cicero’s distinctions between grand, plain, and tempered styles or modes of presentation.

Subsequently, Burke (RM:78-90) deals somewhat generally with notions of imagination, images, and ideas as these pertain to rhetorical endeavors. Although his analysis meanders somewhat, Burke acknowledges Aristotle’s observation that people cannot think without images. Burke also gives some attention to the processes by which people (symbolically) communicate images of things to others and the ways that people incorporate images into their sensations of, and ideas about, the things they experience.

Pursuing these thoughts further, Burke attends to some considerations of images that various other authors have developed. Thus, Burke (RM:90-101) appreciates Jeremy Bentham’s observations that legal jargon often is embedded with poetic representations. Burke (RM:101-110) also addresses the rhetoric that underlies Marxist ideology (and the Marxists’ concealment of their rhetorical practices).

Later in this volume, Kenneth Burke (RM:158-166) focuses on “the administrative rhetoric of Machiavelli.” Observing that Niccolò Machiavelli’s (1469-1527) work may be seen as activity intended to produce effects on the part of audiences, Burke deems it appropriate that *The Prince* be viewed as a sustained consideration of rhetoric.

In developing his commentary on Machiavelli, Burke not only (a) presents an extended set of principles of persuasion that he has extracted from *The Prince*, but Burke also (b) identifies a series of accounts of human susceptibilities on which agents may develop their positions and (c) addresses some fundamental resistances with which agents may have to contend.

While noting that Machiavelli often is envisioned as the founder of modern political science and that Machiavelli explicitly emphasizes people’s self-serving interests and their related potential ruthlessness in dealing with one another, Burke also observes that Machiavelli’s work represents but another application of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric*.

Then, broadening his base somewhat, even in the midst of his analysis of Machiavelli’s *The Prince*, Burke (RM:159-161) draws parallels between the tactical emphasis of Machiavelli’s text and the depictions of heterosexual interchange one finds in Ovid’s *The Art of Love*.

Although Burke introduces an assortment of other themes that address aspects of rhetoric in one or other ways (as in grand narratives and utopian notions of society, courtship, and theology), his (RM:221-233) discussion of Baldassare Castiglioni’s (1478-1529) *The Book of the Courtier* represents one of Burke’s more sustained and informative illustrations of rhetoric as a realm of human endeavor. As Burke observes, Castiglioni not only was a contemporary of Machiavelli, but also was highly attentive to the affairs of state.

Like Machiavelli, Castiglioni does not explicitly address rhetoric as a technical venture. Nevertheless, Burke notes that Castiglioni provides considerable insight into the nature of influence work in the political arena.

Presented as a set of four dialogues involving an assembly of aristocrats, the speakers in Castiglioni’s *The Courtier* first address the qualities of the ideal courtier or attendant to the sovereign. Most notably, this would include matters of an appropriate lineage, a substantial family fortune, and a wide array of physical, educational, and social skills, whereby one more readily would be accepted by more consequential others in the political arena.

Having addressed a base of preparation for the role of the courtier and the development of a style of relating to others in an accomplished and admirable fashion, Castiglioni’s second book focuses on the ways that people might achieve reputations as particularly outstanding figures in the court. More centrally, this would involve courtiers displaying valor for God and intense dedication to their sovereigns, while maintaining more modest and congenial senses of self in the presence of others in the setting.

The third book of *The Courtier* deals with courtly love. In addition to identifying a series of more appealing characteristics of females in this setting, Castiglioni gives attention to the codes and graces that males and females of the court are expected to sustain relative to one another. He also discusses...
the challenges of obtaining strategic advantage (paralleling Ovid in this regard) in personal matters of the heart.

Castiglioni’s fourth discourse focuses on the ways in which courtiers might more directly serve their princes. Beyond providing other kinds of assistance to their sovereigns, courtiers are valued for their roles in educating (informing, advising, guiding) their sovereigns so that their governors might more successfully and nobly (virtuously) fulfill their roles as leaders.36

Kenneth Burke could have dealt with the traditional principles of rhetoric in more systematic and sustained terms. Nevertheless, he alerts readers to the importance of considering persuasive endeavor within the broader set of contexts in which people relate to one another. Thus, while Burke understates the (extended) relevance of classical rhetoric for the study of influence work, he does maintain Aristotle’s emphasis on the importance of studying rhetoric as activity.

Somewhat more generally, too, Burke’s depictions of the tactical features of Machiavelli, Ovid, Castiglioni, and Marx instructively encourage scholars to consider the contexts in which, as well as the ways in which, people invoke rhetoric in pursuing their objectives in the broader human community.

Indeed, this is at the core of Kenneth Burke’s entire works on rhetoric. It is analytic folly to try to comprehend rhetoric (and logic) apart from a more sustained study of human activity, and human activity is to be understood within the context of ongoing community life. However, it is no wiser to claim to study human group life without a more sustained examination of influence work and the study of the ways in which persuasive endeavor as meaningful, deliberative activity is accomplished.

Because of the exceptional diversity of topics and sources that Burke incorporates into his texts, there are many other aspects of human knowing and acting that one could consider in his works. Minimally, though, we can be grateful for the attention Burke has given to rhetoric in a more comprehensive sense and for his ability (through his wide-ranging scholarship) to foster a reintegration of the human sciences around the matter of persuasive communication.37

Dramatism, Rhetoric, and the Human Sciences

Of those more commonly envisioned as 20th century rhetoricians, it is Kenneth Burke who most consequently has taken rhetoric into the human sciences.38 As just noted in the preceding discussion of Kenneth Burke’s work on rhetoric, he does this through a pragmatist (dramatist) attentiveness to the “philosophy of the act” and through his dialogues with an assortment of materials from the humanities and social sciences that pertain to human knowing and acting in more general terms.

As well, some sociologists, more particularly those working in the symbolic interactionist tradition—notably including Erving Goffman (1959; 1963a; 1963b; 1971), Joseph Gusfield (1963; 1981; 1989; 1996), Stanford Lyman and Marvin Scott (1970), Dennis Brissett and Charles Edgley (1990), and Charles Edgley (2013)—have derived considerable inspiration from Kenneth Burke in developing variants of “dramaturgical sociology.” Thus, albeit in varying degrees, they have recognized affinities with Kenneth Burke’s text and aspects of pragmatist thought, particularly that pertaining to the rhetorical metaphor, impression management, reputations, and the shaping of images and people’s definitions of situations.

Given the exceptional attention that Erving Goffman’s portrayal of the dramaturgical metaphor and impression management, along with his emphasis on agency and reflectivity, has received, his work may be seen to foster a heightened receptivity to the classical Greek and Latin rhetorical tradition.

Whereas Kenneth Burke’s works and his connectedness with classical Greek and Latin scholarship merit much more attention than they have received in sociology and the human sciences more generally, the material more immediately following acknowledges some other authors who have incorporated aspects of classical rhetoric into the human sciences.

36 Relatedly, while Aristotle discusses the background of the speaker as a foundational aspect of rhetoric in Rhetoric and even more extensively situates the practice of rhetoric within the affairs of state in his Rhetoric to Alexander, one gains other appreciations of the relevance of people’s life-world contexts for comprehending rhetoric in the works of Cicero (especially his comparisons of Greek and Latin styles of developing rhetoric), Quintilian (and his consideration of the education for the orator), Augustine (in his emphasis on the persuasive role of the Christian speaker), and Alcuin (wherein he develops his consideration of rhetoric in ways that more specifically address Charlemagne’s role as a governor).

37 Although their materials are not as attentive to the social production of activity or the ways in which human group life is accomplished as is Kenneth Burke, a number of other 20th and 21st century rhetoricians also have contributed more generally to a pragmatist/Aristotelian analysis of rhetoric through their considerations of classical and interim literatures. This would include Kenneth (1991), Eros and Agnew (1998), Gross and Walzer (2000), Niemkamp (2003), Blakesley (2002), Murphy (2002), and Newman (2002).

38 In using the term “human sciences,” I am distinguishing (a) the focused study of human knowing and acting from materials that (b) are more centrally invoked with entertainment, activism or other applied agendas or (c) would reduce human knowing and acting to structures, variables, and processes largely void of human agency and interchange.
between classical rhetoric and the social sciences. Ironically, thus, the importance of Burke's contributions to the social sciences becomes more apparent only when we begin to more fully comprehend the vast array of conceptual resources that he was introducing (albeit only partially) to the human sciences.

Each of the following authors only partially introduces us to the conceptual potency of the classical Greek and Latin analysis of persuasive interchange. However, when their materials are connected more directly with Burke's dramatism, we gain a notably greater sense of the foundational relevance of classical Greek and Latin scholarship for comprehending Western social thought and extending contemporary scholarship in conceptual and analytic terms. We also find valuable resources for the broader quest for learning about the nature of human knowing and acting that Burke so intensively pursued.

Mindful of these matters, we turn to Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca—a pair of authors (1969) co-authored by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (hereafter P&OT) is distinctively pragmatist in overall thrust and strives to restore philosophic contact with classical scholarship. Thus, as P&OT observe, *The New Rhetoric* represents an attempt to contemporize classical rhetoric.39

Following Aristotle in key respects, P&OT re-engage the pragmatist emphasis on human knowing and acting in developing their text on rhetoric. [As with other materials of more consequence, I have endeavored to follow the overall flow of P&OT’s text. Still, readers may be cautioned that the P&OT text has a somewhat uneven quality.]

In *The New Rhetoric*, P&OT take direct issue with the philosophers (most pointedly the logicians and epistemologists) for their longstanding neglect of the persuasion process. Objecting to the narrow, mechanistic style of reasoning encouraged by René Descartes (1592-1650) and those who conceptually have followed him, P&OT point to the necessity of scholars examining people's sense-making activities rather than insisting that human thought conforms to logical (as in factual, formal, or mathematical) structures.

P&OT do not intend to dispense with scientific inquiry or formal logic as viable modes of analysis in other contexts, but instead insist on an explicitly broader, more encompassing, humanly-engaged notion of reason (including logic and argumentation) in philosophic analysis of the human condition.

It is because of this more enduring neglect of human thought on the part of philosophers that P&OT (1969:1-10) envision a return to classical scholarship as "the new rhetoric.” While acknowledging the rhetorical insights that Plato provides in *Phaedrus*, as well as Plato's condemnations of rhetoric in *Gorgias*, it is Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* that P&OT will use as the base in attempting to redirect and revitalize the philosophical relevance of logic and epistemology for the study of the human condition. In addition to the explicit and consequential challenges that P&OT's work poses for conventionalist philosophers, P&OT introduce a number of themes that have been overlooked in most scholarly considerations of rhetoric in the intervening centuries.

Using Part One to set the frame for their analysis, P&OT (1969:14-17) observe that rhetorical interchange requires a common language. They also emphasize the point that the capacity for people to achieve a “community of minds” is contingent on the willingness of the participants to attend to one another in more concerted ways.

Defining audiences as those whom speakers attempt to persuade, P&OT (1969:17-26) add that the rhetoricians’ interchanges with their audiences are to be understood as ongoing constructions. Thus, not only are speakers to adjust to their audiences on an ongoing basis, but they also are encouraged to recognize that audiences are variable and often assume composite dimensions (as in mixed characters, loyalties, and factions).

Likewise, when addressing “one person” audiences, P&OT (1969:34-40) stress the value of speakers adaptively focusing on the other. Solitary auditors may acknowledge speaker materials in more universal (general community) terms, but since individuals often view things from the standpoints of the more particularized groups with which they identify, it is important that speakers be prepared to adjust to these more specific viewpoints.

Attending to the broader parameters of rhetoric, P&OT (1969:40-45) also address the matter of people “deliberating with themselves” and convincing themselves to adopt particular arguments in manners that parallel encounters with other speakers in many respects.

Then, in an attempt to further indicate the relevance of rhetoric for understanding human behavior, P&OT (1969:45-62) subsequently consider the matters of argumentation, ceremonial (epideictic) rhetoric, education and propaganda, violence, and commitment.

Part Two of *The New Rhetoric* addresses three broader topics: the foundational features of agreement, the matter of interpretation, and rhetoric as instances of an engaged technology. P&OT's considerations of the objects of agreement and the problematic of interpretation are particularly instructive for analysts who attempt to attend to the frames with
which speakers and audiences work as they engage particular instances of rhetoric.

In considering “the objects of the agreement,” P&OT (1969:65-79) stress the importance of acknowledging people’s existing notions of mutuality as the base on which persuasive interchange (and all meaningful communication) is founded.

Part Three of The New Rhetoric focuses on the particular (rhetorical) techniques of argumentation. Although P&OT’s discussions are apt to be instructive for those lacking familiarity with classical scholarship; those who are more fluent with the rhetoric of Aristotle, Cicero, or Quintilian will find little in P&OT’s considerations of rhetorical devices that is new or better articulated overall.

In concluding the volume, P&OT emphasize the necessity of examining people’s reasoning practices in ways that extend philosophic understandings of human behavior well beyond conventional uses of formal logic and the rational-reductionist epistemological emphasis fostered by René Descartes.

Still, even though they envision an activity-centered approach to rhetoric as the key for achieving the transition to a more accurate, viable, and relevant philosophic approach to the study of the human condition, P&OT seem unable to offer a more explicit, sustained set of procedures for studying rhetoric as a realm of activity.

As with most other rhetoricians and philosophers of language (and human knowing), P&OT (1969) seem unaware of the potential of ethnographic research for connecting (and assessing) theoretical notions with instances of human activity in the making.

Fourth, while introducing a wide assortment of historical and cross-cultural illustrations in discussing some more formalistic aspects of rhetoric, P&OT recognize that they can be only partially successful in aligning theory about rhetoric with actual instances of rhetoric in the present formulation.40

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Seeking to avoid the bifurcation of “rhetoric as a formal art” and “rhetoric as enacted instances of argumentation,” P&OT (1969:142-183) subsequently attempt to illustrate how people may engage rhetoric in artistically (technically) informed terms. However, while introducing a wide assortment of historical and cross-cultural illustrations in discussing some more formalistic aspects of rhetoric, P&OT recognize that they can be only partially successful in aligning theory about rhetoric with actual instances of rhetoric in the present formulation.40

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Michael Billig—Revitalizing Social Psychology

In developing Arguing and Thinking: A Rhetorical Approach to Social Psychology, Michael Billig (1996) recounts his disaffection with the one-sided and excessively structuralist emphases of mainstream psychology. He contrasts the current state of affairs in psychology with the enabling vitality of language, purpose, and interchange that he has encountered in “discovering” the works of the classical Greek and Roman rhetoricians.41

Noting that rhetoric as a field of study has been much neglected in Britain over the past century, Billig (who had been trained in experimental social psychology) provides an extended commentary on both the advantages of classical rhetoric and the necessity of recasting psychology in ways that are more attentive to the processes by which people actively influence and resist one another’s attitudes or views on things.

After differentiating the classical rhetorical emphasis from more recent postmodernism and gender-based notions of rhetoric, Billig more fundamentally addresses the inadequacies of modern psychology with respect to (speech-enabled) rhetoric. While acknowledging the contributions of Chaim Perelman on rhetoric, Erving Goffman’s dramaturgical (life as theater) emphasis, and a somewhat related “life as game” metaphor, Billig subsequently centers much of his analysis on Protagoras’ (circa 480-410 BCE) notion that “two positions may be taken on any matter under consideration.”

In developing his text, Billig makes few references to the pragmatist theories of Kenneth Burke and G. H. Mead. Relatedly, even Aristotle and Cicero are given little attention in Billig’s volume. Still, in the process of engaging a number of scholars who have dealt with rhetoric over the millennia, in both analytic and more poetic terms, Billig astutely identifies a series of major shortcomings in theory and research in the broader discipline of psychology. He also argues, in some detail, for the necessity of studying human knowing and acting in ways that are centrally attentive to human interchange.

It would be difficult for readers who are more familiar with the rhetorical tradition not to be struck by the clarity and relevancy of Billig’s observations for the field of psychology, particularly his critical consideration of the social psychology of attitudes. Still, if there is a weakness to Billig’s venture, this revolves around his lack of a clear alternative methodology and research agenda.

Relatedly, because the practices of most psychologists are so deeply entrenched in quantitative research, analysis, publication, and funding, it would be unreasonable to expect that Billig’s argument for a more sustained consideration of human agency and interchange will have much impact on the discipline of psychology or even social psychology more specifically.

40 As with most other rhetoricians and philosophers of language (and human knowing), P&OT (1969) seem unaware of the potential of ethnographic research for connecting (and assessing) theoretical notions with instances of human activity in the making.

41 As someone (see Kleinkecht 2007) whose experiences in sociology largely paralleled those of Michael Billig in psychology, I have very much appreciated Billig’s efforts to reintroduce a humanly engaged element into the social sciences, as well as his dilemmas about how best to proceed in doing so.
Nevertheless, as part of a more extended set of commentaries on the failure of psychologists and other social scientists to examine their human subject matter in more genuine and situated terms, Robert Prus encourages a rethinking of the ways in which the living interfusion of human thought and behavior takes place. No less consequential, Billig alerts social scientists to the value of classical rhetoric for the study of human behavior.

Martha Cooper and William L. Nothstine—Striving for Synthesis

Like Billig's *Arguing and Thinking*, Cooper and Nothstine's (1992) *Power Persuasion: Moving Ancient Art into the Media Age* is developed primarily within a psychological frame. However, in contrast to Billig, who identifies a series of fundamental flaws in contemporary psychology, Cooper and Nothstine appear more intent on synthesizing classical rhetoric with contemporary psychology.

Although their text is marked by a more distinctive emphasis on the moral (evaluative) aspects of rhetoric, Cooper and Nothstine rely on Aristotle and Kenneth Burke in developing their position on rhetoric. Thus, Cooper and Nothstine acknowledge the symbolic, as well as the enacted features of rhetoric.

Another valuable aspect of the Cooper and Nothstine text is its more sustained attempt to broaden the scope of topics to which classical notions of rhetoric may be applied in the field of social psychology. Thus, for example, Cooper and Nothstine draw explicit attention to the relevance of rhetoric for people's varying modes of thought, as well as studies of emotion, motivation, charisma, symbolic (linguistic) realities, and compliance gaining practices. Cooper and Nothstine also attempt to blend notions of classical rhetoric with broader organizational matters such as propaganda, social movements, and persuasion.

Still, relying more extensively on the resources of contemporary psychology, Cooper and Nothstine offer little in the way of an alternative methodology for more directly examining the influence process in any of these contexts. Also, because Cooper and Nothstine have mixed the more distinctively pragmatist (activity focused) emphasis of Aristotle and Burke with the generally more abstract, structuralist emphases on factors, typologies, and motivations that one finds in the psychological literature, Cooper and Nothstine not only have lost much of the centering emphasis that Billig places on the humanly engaged processual study of human interchange, but they also have unproductively let Aristotle's and Burke's concerted focus on *rhetoric as activity* slide away from their analysis.

Thomas B. Farrell—Rhetorical Culture and Practical Reasoning

In developing *Norms of Rhetorical Culture*, Thomas B. Farrell (1993) provides a particularly instructive account of rhetoric as an enduring, highly consequential feature of human group life.

Adopting a pluralist, anthropological/sociological approach to the study of communication, Farrell assumes three tasks in developing this text. First, he approaches rhetoric as a developmental field of cultural interchange. Second, he considers the historical and philosophical study of rhetoric in classical Greek scholarship. Third, Farrell endeavors to connect classical Greek rhetoric with contemporary pragmatist thought regarding community life.

Reacting against the inadequacies of structuralist and rationalist approaches to deal with the dynamic, humanly engaged nature of community life (as signified by meaningful, purposive activity, interchange, and adjustment), as well as the ill-informed postmodernist tendency to reduce human group life to arbitrary, disembodied text, Farrell contends that rhetoric represents an essential aspect of community life wherever people (as living, acting, interacting symbol using creatures) might be found.

Thus, whereas the forms, expressions, emphases, rationales, and emotional features of rhetoric, as well as the contexts of their application can be expected to vary across and within societies relative to the specific life-worlds and associated conceptions of reality with which particular groups of people may operate, persuasive interchange represents a fundamental feature of community life.

Farrell defines “rhetorical culture” as denoting historically developed realms of situated interchange that constitute collective (and individual) instances of reasoning and decision-making activity in humanly accomplished life-worlds.

In developing his text, Farrell presents readers with a particularly valuable statement on the development of classical Greek rhetoric and its relevance for the broader study of human knowing and acting. Rhetoric, Farrell contends, is central to the active, humanly engaged constitution and reconstitution of reality (as in people's conceptions of “that which is” and “that which is not”).

Building on classical Greek scholarship, Farrell seeks to establish the connections between rhetoric and philosophy. Thus, in contrast to those who view rhetoric primarily as a technique or procedure, a mode of deception, or a more peculiar set of time-culture bound practices, Farrell shows how classical Greek scholarship contributes to our understanding of rhetorical culture. He does this by discussing the works of Protagoras, Plato, Socrates, and (especially) Aristotle from the classical Greek era.

Not only is rhetoric to be understood as (a) denoting aspects of human knowing and acting of relevance across the entire set of historical-cultural arenas that constitute community life—as in law, politics, religion, history, and poetics—and (b) modes of interchange that not only have shaped the practices of
the past and present but also (c) situated instances of interchange that enable people to come to terms with the challenges, ambiguities, and limitations of their present circumstances. As well, Farrell observes, (d) the ways that these problematic, often negotiated interchanges take place in the here and now serve to help define the rhetorical culture of an ever-emergent future.

Attending to Aristotle’s considerations of human knowing and acting, Farrell not only acknowledges wide ranges of persuasive endeavor and associated interchange, but he also stresses the unity (i.e., practical, functional inseparability) of rhetoric as humanly engaged activity with other realms of community life (e.g., poetics, ethics, politics). Whereas most rhetoricians (including those who had a good working familiarity with Aristotle’s Rhetoric) have generally disregarded Aristotle’s other texts that address matters of human knowing and acting (as in Nicomachean Ethics, Poetics, Politics, Categories, and Topics), and most philosophers (including those who have a good working familiarity with the broader corpus of Aristotle’s texts) have largely ignored Aristotle’s Rhetoric, Farrell shows how important Aristotle’s philosophic texts are for comprehending rhetoric as a humanly engaged, community-orientated process and how instructive Aristotle’s analysis of rhetoric is for comprehending his approach to the broader study of human knowing and acting.

The key, in part, revolves around the recognition of rhetoric as a realm of practical reasoning. It is through active interchange that rhetoric enables people to come to terms with the problematic features of community life—wherever these may be found. Rhetoric does not replace people’s existing stocks of knowledge or the associated matters of cultural understandings, organizational practices, inquiry, logic, or subsequent instances of collective deliberation and more solitary reflectivity. Nevertheless, rhetoric both reflects the historically/culturally understood realities and practices of the groups at hand and represents a foundational element in their construction and reconstruction. As Farrell stresses, rhetoric represents an essential aspect of the reasoning practices that characterize all realms of human group life.

The third task that Farrell assumes is that of developing connections of classical rhetoric and contemporary pragmatist considerations of communication. Thus, while using Aristotle’s scholarship as a base, Farrell attempts to establish some affinities of classical rhetoric with Habermas’ (1975; 1987) pragmatist theory of communication (with its emphasis on legitimation practices in the public sphere). Still, given the broader nature of Habermas’ theorizing, this latter material lends itself to more discursive modes of analyses and, as such, has notably less relevance for the more focused emphases on “rhetoric as activity” in the present text.

Fortunately, Robert Danisch, the next author considered here, directly addresses some of the missing connections of rhetoric and 20th century pragmatist thought. Although Robert Danisch (2007) does not address influence work with the empirical emphasis of a social scientist, his text provides another important linchpin for the present project since Danisch explicitly draws linkages between the rhetorical tradition and American pragmatist philosophy.

Attending to the longstanding division of rhetoric and philosophy generated by Socrates and Plato, Danisch makes an extended case for the intellectual realignment of these two realms of scholarship. Cogently addressing the affinities of the philosophies of William James and John Dewey with the rhetorical venture, Danisch emphasizes the mutual benefits of a more sustained intellectual synthesis of these two fields of endeavor.44 Notably, thus, whereas Danisch is (justifiably) critical of the disregard of pragmatist social thought by the rhetoricians and the parallel neglect of rhetoric by James and Dewey, Danisch astutely builds on texts from William James and John Dewey in establishing some vital philosophical foundations for those working in the rhetorical tradition.

Accordingly, thus, Danisch draws attention to (a) the importance of pragmatist considerations of activity, meaning, objectives, procedures, reflectivity, interchange, ambiguity, emergence, creativity, and strategic adjustment as central features of the human condition for more fully comprehending rhetoric as a socially engaged process and (b) the potency of persuasive interchange for more comprehensive and authentic pragmatist considerations of people’s lived experience. Whereas instances of rhetorical interchange may represent more focused realms of strategic interaction, the matters of influence work, cooperation, and resistance are basic to communication in all sectors of community life.

Danisch may not be aware of the theoretical, methodological, and substantive resources associated with Chicago-style symbolic interaction as a sociological extension of American pragmatism (via George Herbert Mead [1934] and Herbert Blumer [1969]), but Robert Danisch may be commended for his efforts to more systematically and explicitly foster intellectual bridge-making between these two scholarly disciplines.

Robert Prus—Power as Intersubjective Accomplishment

This literature has been subjected to one primary criterion—does it attend to power as a matter of intersubjective accomplishment; does the approach (theoretical viewpoint, conceptual scheme, methodology) under consideration enable us to envision and study the ways in which human interchange is worked out in the ongoing instances of the here and now in which community life takes place?…Power does not exist as “something out there,” as an objective phenomenon unto itself. And, power does not drive society or community life. People may engage all manners of [physical objects] in relating to one another, but power most fundamentally is a social or meaningful enacted essence. It is dependent on people for its conceptualization, contextualization, implementation, resistance, adjustment, and impact. Power is not the key

44 Also building on the pragmatism of John Dewey, Scott Stroud (2009) considers the enabling qualities of pragmatist thought for the comparative analysis of rhetoric. In particular, Stroud draws attention to the matters of habit, purpose, interpretation, and the importance of attending to similarities and differences in developing process-oriented cross-contextual analyses of rhetoric.
Robert Prus

Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pragmatism: A Missing Link between Classical Greek Scholarship and the Interactionist
Study of Human Knowing and Acting

In contrast to the Billig (1996) and Cooper and Nothstine (1992) texts that were developed out of an ear-
lier emphasis on rhetoric, the material on classical rhetoric in Prus' (1999) Beyond the Power Mystique
[Power Mystique] was only incorporated into (what primarily is an interactionist statement on power)
this text at a much later stage of development. After an introductory statement that establishes
the premises of symbolic interaction and the focus on power as intersubjective accomplishment
(as denoting a humanly formulated, enacted, or engaged process), chapters 2 and 3 of Power Mystique
consider a variety of approaches that social scientists have taken to the study of power. Devel-
oped mindfully of the remarkable contributions of the classical Greek scholars to rhetoric, chapter 4
discusses power (influence work, cooperation, and resistance) as an enduring feature of human group
life. Envisioning power as contingent on instances of human definition and enterprise, chapter 5 estab-
lishes a theoretical approach (symbolic interaction), a methodology (ethnographic research), and
a conceptual frame (generic social processes) for ordering and assessing research on power as a hu-
manly enacted matter. While chapter 6 ("Engaging in Tactical Enterprise") considers the more basic ways in which people may
embark on instances of influence work, chapter 7 ("Extending the Theater of Operations") deals with
influence work as this may be pursued in a broad array of collective contexts, ranging from people's
encounters with third parties to the enacted features of political agendas.

Chapter 8 ("Experiencing Target Roles") not only
gives concerted attention to the multiple ways in which people may become focal points of activity,
but also considers people's capacities (as agents) to act back on those endeavoring to influence them.

Maintaining a sustained interactionist emphasis on the things people do and addressing these broader
sets of activities in more precise terms, the materi-
als developed in chapters 6-8 provide a great many
departure and comparison points for subsequent re-
search and analysis of the influence process.

Envisioning power as denoting realms and in-
stances of intersubjective accomplishment, Power Mystique is intended as a research agenda for en-
gaging the study of influence work in direct, situ-
ated, and humanly engaged terms.67 Relatedly, the
works of Billig (1996), Cooper and Nothstine (1992),
and Danisch (2007) also attest to the potential of the
classical literature on rhetoric for focusing scholar-
ly attention on the study of human knowing and
acting in philosophy as well as the human sciences
more generally.

In Perspective

Approaching rhetoric as realms of communication in which people attempt to shape and/or resist the
definitions, practices, and viewpoints of others, this
paper has located Kenneth Burke's scholarship with-
in (a) the contextual flows and pragmatist qualities
of classical Greek and Latin rhetoric and (b) some
explicit pragmatist emphases within 20th and 21st
century considerations of rhetoric. This statement
also has addressed (c) the affinities of Burke's work
with symbolic interaction and (d) the implications
of Burke's scholarship for the more sustained concep-
tual and methodological study of human knowing
and acting.

Rather than review the latest variants of "rhetoric"
that one finds in contemporary scholarship or pro-
vide an overview of the fuller range of materials
generated in 20th and 21st century academia, this
statement has considered persuasive interchange
mindfully of the pragmatist features of classical
Greek rhetoric and American pragmatist philosop-
hy, particularly as mediated through the scholar-
ship of Kenneth Burke.

Given his attentiveness to the broader study of
human knowing and acting, Kenneth Burke rep-
resents a particularly important medium in the

notes:

64 At the time I encountered Aristotle's Rhetoric, the manuscript
Beyond the Power Mystique was in the last stages of the publica-
tion process. However, on reading Aristotle's Rhetoric, I real-
ized that there was much to be learned about persuasive en-
deavor from Aristotle and his associates. Although my famil-
liarity with the classical literature was limited to what I could
quickly absorb at that time, the material I encountered was so
good that I decided it was necessary to replace a chapter from
that text with another ("Enduring Tactical Themes") wherein
consideration was given to the works of Plato, Aristotle, and
sociates, among others. While I had not anticipated that this
would be the start of a much more sustained inquiry to see
what else to be learned from the classical Greek and Latin
scholars, the present paper (along with some interim publica-
tions) is very much a product of that quest.

65 Whereas Beyond the Power Mystique was centrally informed
by the American pragmatist and interactionist scholarship,
much also was gained from the ethnomethodological and
constructionist literature and the broader array of realist
ethnographic inquiry in sociology and anthropology. Power Mystique also benefited from some earlier examinations of
the influence process through some ethnographic research
in which I was directly involved. See, for instance, Prus (1976;
and Irini (1980). Although the findings from these studies
paralleled many aspects of rhetoric as discussed by Aristotle,
Cicero, Quintilian, and others in the rhetorical tradition,
none of the ethnographic inquiries I had earlier developed
benefited directly from exposure to the classical literature on
rhetoric.

67 Focusing on (a) definitions of deviance and deviants,
(b) people's involvements and continuities in subcultural life-
worlds, and (c) the processes and problematics of regulatory
endeavors from the standpoint of both agents and their tar-
gets, Prus and Grills' (2003) The Deviant Mystique also has ex-
tended relevance to matters addressed in classical Greek and
Latin considerations of rhetoric (e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Cicero).
Examining the implementation and problematics of the "de-
viance-making" process in the community, this text gives
concerted attention to the identity-making process, as well as
associated notions of agency and culpability amidst people's
involvements in deviance and the problematic nature of com-

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Robert Prus

Kenneth Burke's Dramatistic Pragmatism: A Missing Link between Classical Greek Scholarship and the Interactionist Study of Human Knowing and Acting

interim series of links between classical Greek scholarship and the contemporary interactionist study of human knowing and acting. Where-as most interim and contemporary scholars have discussed rhetoric without regard to the broader study of human group life, Kenneth Burke contributed to the study of human knowing and acting both (a) directly through his own scholarship on classical Greek and Latin analyses of persuasive interchange and (b) as an intermediary of sorts through the subsequent works of Joseph Gusfield, Erving Goffman, Dennis Brissett, and Charles Edg-ley, and some others in the interactionist tradition who have yet more indirectly engaged aspects of Burke's dramatism.

The rhetoricians, George Kennedy, James J. Mur-phy, and Thomas Conley, have assumed notably important roles in maintaining present day conti-nuities with classical Greek rhetoric. However, one of the earliest 20th-century considerations of classical rhetoric and pragmatist philosophy (American pragmatism) is C. K. Ogden and I. A. Richards' (1946 [1923]) The Meaning of Meaning. Notably, Ogden and Richards explicitly attend to language and the symbolization process as central aspects of human knowing and acting.46

Even so, of the contemporary scholars who have addressed rhetoric it is Kenneth Burke who brings the broadest array of historical and transdisciplin ary sources into pragmatist considerations of rhetoric. Notably, thus, whereas Burke relies heavily on Aristotle's Rhetoric, Nicomachean Ethics, and Poetics in developing his analysis of influence work, activity, and explanations of human group life more generally, Burke's discussions of rhetoric also are informed by his exposure to Cicero, Quintilian, Augustine, Machiavelli, and Castiglioni.

Addressing (a) Aristotle's extended analysis of human knowing and acting in Nicomachean Ethics, Rhetoric, Poetics, and Politics, (b) the long-standing (since Plato) tradition of literary criticism and the philosophic condemnation of rhetoric, (c) the works of the classical Greek playwrights, and (d) other considerations of human relations, interchange, and emotionality in classical Greek and Latin scholarship more generally, Kenneth Burke's attention to dramatism—as in the social production of images, symbolism, identities, and group relations—has much to offer pragmatist philosophers, symbolic interactionists, and other students of the human condition.47

Amidst (a) his emphasis on dramatism as a distin ctively consequential feature of community life, Burke also is mindful of the importance of (b) examining activity as practical realms of accomplishment, (c) attending to the historical flows and contingencies of human knowing and acting, and (d) focusing on collective interchange, as well as (e) stressing the necessity of developing transissua tional (transcontextual and transhistorical) comparative analyses. Relatedly, Burke stresses (f) the importance of studying rhetoric for comprehend ing all instances, realms, places, and eras of community life.

In developing this paper, I have addressed some other contemporary scholars who have engaged aspects of classical rhetoric in pragmatist-related terms. Even though Kenneth Burke has served as a much more consequential conduit than these other sources, the latter are noteworthy for more explicitly connecting rhetoric with philosophy, psychology, anthropology, and sociology.

While paralleling Burke in some ways, the philosophers Chaim Perelman and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca (The New Rhetoric [1969]) are only marginally familiar with American pragmatism. Likewise, they have minimal familiarity with ethnographic inqui ry. Nevertheless, like Burke, P&OT also envision human societies as constituted through meaning ful, strategic interchange.

Building directly on Aristotle's Rhetoric, P&OT are especially attentive to the processual, humanly accomplished features of persuasive interchange. Accordingly, for P&OT, rhetoric reflects human capacities for purposive activity, planning, interpretation, strategic interchange, and minded adjustments on the part of those involved in the settings at hand. In addition to emphasizing the broad-based significance of rhetoric for comprehending all aspects of community life, P&OT also consider the fundamental relevance of rhetoric for understanding people's reasoning practices in both collective and solitary contexts. Still, P&OT display little connectedness with either the ethnographic study of human group life more generally or symbolic interactionism more specifically. In what is another indication of the procedural limitations of present-day philosophers, P&OT offer no methodology for any research along these lines.

In developing Arguing and Thinking, Michael Billig (1996) introduces rhetoric to the field of psychologi cal social psychology as a conceptual emphasis of fundamental importance for comprehending the human condition. Billig also uses rhetoric as a point of departure for re framing the ossified, narrow, mechanistic approaches to the study of human knowing and acting that so centrally epitomize psychology as a discipline. Thus, Billig stresses the necessity of using rhetoric to develop a psychology that is more genuinely attentive to human lived experience. Still, Billig also is largely inattentive to more sustained instances of ethnographic inquiry and comparative analysis.

In a somewhat related statement, Martha Cooper and William Nosthine (1992) in Power Persuasion encourage the synthesis of rhetoric and conventional (factors-oriented) psychology. Nonetheless,

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46 Whereas the concepts that Burke has derived from these classical Greek and Latin sources have maintained relevance over the millennia, most commentators on Burke's texts have disregarded these foundational sources and missed the more extended relevancy of these earlier scholars for the study of human knowing and acting. Thus, beyond the more immediate potency of the materials Kenneth Burke has to offer to students of the human condition, readers who return to the classical Greek and Latin literature (especially Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian) that Burke used will find a great deal of material of contextual, conceptual, and comparative-analytic value in the study of human group life. For more sustained in-dications of the conceptual, analytic, and substantive value of this literature, see: Prus (2007a, 2008a, 2009a, 2010; 2011a, 2013b, 2013c, 2013d; 2013b, 2013f, 2013d, 2013b, 2013), Paddedeath and Prus (2007), Prus and Burd (2010), Prus and Camara (2010).

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more explicitly illustrates the conceptual affinities between philosophy and rhetoric as realms of human endeavor. As well, and much more explicitly than Kenneth Burke, Farrell develops his text by addressing the broader corpus of Aristotle's works that pertain to the study of human knowing and acting. Farrell may have a limited familiarity with contemporary pragmatist scholarship, but his volume is notably informative in historical, philosophical, and anthropological terms.

Incorporating aspects of classical Greek scholarship only in the later stages of the development of his volume on power, Robert Prus (1999) also considers the linkages of rhetoric and pragmatist philosophy. Bringing the conceptual, methodological, and analytic resources of Chicago-style symbolic interactionism (Mead 1934; Goffman 1959; 1963a; 1963b; 1971; Blumer 1969; 1971; Prus 1996; 1997) to his examination of classical rhetoric, Prus (1999) provides a particularly systematic analysis of “influence work as intersubjective accomplishment.” Building on pragmatism, ethnography, and comparative analysis, along with an emphasis on developing generic social processes associated with Blumerian symbolic interactionism, this text offers an ethnographic research agenda for studying influence (and resistance) as socially accomplished processes.

Like Burke and the other students of rhetoric who have followed the developmental flows of persuasive endeavor from the classical Greek era to the present time, the 20th and 21st century authors considered here are valuable not just for the more particular connections and applications of rhetoric they introduce, but also for the more sustained linkages they encourage between classical scholarship and the contemporary social sciences.

As with the classical and interim sources on which he built, Kenneth Burke recognized that the study of rhetoric is much more than a set of manipulative procedures that people might invoke in their dealings with others. Because rhetoric is so thoroughly interfused with people’s activities, perspectives, identities, emotionality, ongoing collective events, and interchanges, rhetoric is best understood more comprehensively—as a realm of endeavor that permeates all realms of social life.

Relatedly, Burke realized politics, religion, education and scholarship, science and technology, fiction and entertainment, as well as other central features of community life would be more adequately comprehended when analysts attend to the fuller range of human activity and interchange that one encounters within and across all other realms of community life.

Moving beyond the long-standing Socratic and Platonic division of rhetoric and philosophy, the scholarship of Kenneth Burke, with its emphasis on the (enacted) dramatism of everyday, has served as a distinctively enabling “medium of interchange” between classical Greek thought and American pragmatist philosophy and its sociological offshoot, symbolic interactionism. Our task, more modestly, is to build conceptually, methodologically, and analytically on the remarkable sets of resources embedded within these scholarly traditions.
Appendix: Shortcomings and Potentialities of the Contemporary Analysis of Rhetoric

Having engaged some of the more distinctively pragmatist-oriented authors addressing rhetoric over the past century, it seems appropriate that we discuss the contemporary literature on rhetoric more generally relative to the pragmatist-oriented analyses of persuasive interchange that one encounters in the classical Greek and Latin literature, the dramatism of Kenneth Burke, and the sociological tradition of symbolic interactionism. This appendix is not intended to instruct people on how to more effectively strategize, develop compelling arguments, or win cases as rhetoricians, but instead suggests ways of developing more sustained conceptual analyses of rhetoric as realms of persuasive interchange—with the broader implication of attending to, as well as learning more about the nature of, human group life and people’s lived experiences therein. Thus, as we move through this appendix, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between “the analyses of rhetoric as persuasive interchange”—with the broader implication of attending to, as well as learning more about the nature of, human group life and people’s lived experiences therein. Thus, as we move through this appendix, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between “the analyses of rhetoric as persuasive interchange”—with the broader implication of attending to, as well as learning more about the nature of, human group life and people’s lived experiences therein. Thus, as we move through this appendix, it is important to keep in mind the distinction between “the analyses of rhetoric as persuasive interchange”—with the broader implication of attending to, as well as learning more about the nature of, human group life and people’s lived experiences therein.

First, because the terms “rhetoric” or “oratory,” along with particular techniques and other aspects of persuasive interchange, have been employed in a great many contexts with analysts pursuing highly diverse agendas, personal intrigues, and emotional mindsets and greatly varying degrees of scholarly interest, it is not surprising to find that a great many contemporary discussions of rhetoric have an overall “hodge-podge” quality. Further, the terms rhetoric or oratory often are employed in vaguely defined ways—seemingly with the presumption that these terms would have one meaning to the analyst/author and reader/assessor, along with any other audiences. Thus, despite the considerable enterprise one encounters in the contemporary considerations of rhetoric. Whereas 20th and 21st century discussions of rhetoric have addressed a wide array of substantive fields, including religion, education, ethics, women and gender roles, race and ethnic relations, home-front politics and international relations, a great many of these ventures (see, as illustrative, the Gaillet and Horn [2010] collection) have only loosely pursued the study of rhetoric in conceptual and methodological terms.

When one uses the materials from Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian, along with Kenneth Burke and symbolic interactionism as reference points, we become aware of the pronounced weaknesses of many contemporary analysts’ terms of reference or more sustained analyses of human knowing, acting, and interacting. Instead, because they are more extensively focused on the challenges or intriguers of the day, few analyses of rhetoric have benefited from the foundational conceptual materials developed by Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian or the dramatism of Kenneth Burke.

While there is a commonplace tendency to focus on “the message” and associated objectives, words, phrases, representations, and styles of delivery, as well as particular media formats, there is much more to rhetoric than the great many “one-way” depictions of rhetoric one encounters in the literature. Thus, whereas speakers typically “frame situations,” frequently expressing “encouragements to act” directed towards target audiences, little attention is given to actual speaker viewpoints, intentions, preparations, dilemmas, and related experiences or the minded adjustments that speakers might make along the way. Even less consideration is directed towards actual audience viewpoints, dilemmas, interpretations deliberations, activities, interchanges, reinterpretations, resistances, and adjustments.

Relatedly, much contemporary analysis of rhetoric has a presumptive quality wherein authors/analysts not only impute motives to speakers, but also assume that audiences will interpret messages in ways consistent with the authors/analysts’ own definitions of the situations under consideration. They seldom interview or otherwise directly consult with speakers, audiences, or other involved parties in more sustained ways regarding their concerns, intentions, tactics, activities, dilemmas, adjustments, and so forth.

Typically, as well, minimal consideration is given to (a) the activities and background circumstances in which instances of persuasive communication emerge, (b) the subsequent activities, interchanges, and the ongoing adjustments that people make as they relate to others, and (c) the activities in which people engage following one or other sets of interchanges with others in the setting. There also is little recognition of (d) the possibility of subsequent interchanges, assessments, adjustments, and so forth on the part of speakers and their audiences.

Further, rather than addressing rhetoric in more consistently analytic ways, some authors impose the rhetorics of “morality,” “vilification,” and “dissent” on the speakers and/or audiences under consideration in developing their analyses. Disregarding the importance of sustained inquiry, comparative analysis, and conceptual development, spokespeople adopting advocacy-related agendas effectively obscure, if not more directly obstruct, the more careful study of persuasive interchange and human relations more generally. Indeed, in dramatizing particular standpoints of morality, denigration, and activism, they miss the essential, humanly engaged features of Kenneth Burke’s dramatism.

Given these tendencies, one finds relatively few contemporary discussions of rhetoric that focus

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51 Being a successful rhetorician (as most completely epitomized by Demosthenes [384-322 BCE]) and analyzing developments in specific cases is not synonymous with a more generic analysis of rhetoric as a humanly engaged social process (as so astutely articulated by Aristotle [384-322 BCE]).

52 For somewhat parallel sets of criticisms directed towards some sectors of contemporary sociology, see Prus (1999, 2007d).
in detail on actual instances in which human interchange (i.e., definitions, persuasion, acceptance, resistance, assessment, and adjustment) as these are mindfully engaged from the standpoint of the participants. Very little attention is given to the matters of interpretation, deliberation, resistance, and other kinds of minded adjustments that the participants (speakers, targets, judges, others) as living, acting, thinking, and adjusting essentially actually make within the dynamic sets of human theaters in which persuasive interchange takes place.

Likewise, and in contrast to actual human experience, there is almost no recognition of people’s adaptive learning processes (and situated strategic adjustments) as those involved in related (previous, ongoing, or parallel) instances of persuasive interchange reflect on these earlier associated matters. Similarly, there is little cognizance of the relevance of longer-term group related memories regarding the particular matters at hand in more extended cultural-historical terms (see: Farrell 1993; Prus 2007b).

Surprisingly little consideration also is given to the fuller range of participants in the settings under consideration. Thus, in addition to (a) initial speakers (and any supporters, assistants), this could include: (b) oppositional or competitive speakers (and their supportive associates); (c) judges and/or other audiences/assessors; (d) particular targets (of negative, as well as positive claims) as central participants, co-participants, and other “implicated” associates; (e) plaintiffs and/or victims and their associates; (f) witnesses and other sources of testimony; and (g) outside audiences (interested parties, media representatives, organizational or government representatives, moralists and activists) who also may enter into the broader, more extended sets of interchange characterizing some instances of influence work and resistance.

Relatedly, despite the particular emphasis that Aristotle, Cicero, Quintilian, and Burke place on developing generic or transsituational conceptions of rhetoric or oratory as “something in the making,” most analyses of contemporary rhetoric have not been extended much beyond immediate applications and specific subject matters. Not only is there little consideration of the broader implications of particular focal points for understanding the interchanges characterizing community life more generally, but even less attention is given to the articulation of the trans situational (trans-contextual and transhistorical) processes or the generic social features of rhetoric as these might be derived from more sustained comparative analyses of instances of persuasive interchange within and across particular substantive contexts.

Whereas rhetoric (as persuasive interchange in a more comprehensive sense) is extremely important for comprehending human relation more generally, rhetoric as a realm of human interchange (as Kenneth Burke so appropriately stresses) is best comprehended within the broader parameters of human relations—within the context of the fuller array of people’s activities that enable community life in practical living terms.

Moreover, and in contrast to Burke’s scholarship, much of the contemporary literature is poorly informed about the historically developed and situationally invoked interusions of rhetoric with poetics (fiction and theater), politics and law, historical events, religion, education, and pragmatist philosophy (knowing, acting, relating, assessing, and adjusting). While rhetoric can be discussed as a realm of endeavor on its own, it is to be recognized that the modes of influence and resistance that developed in particular societies are best understood in conjunction with the broader, somewhat congruent flows of human knowing and acting across the broader fields of activity that constitute community life in the making (also see: Farrell 1993).

There may be little that specific individuals or even more extended sets of scholars might do to quickly or effectively change more general tendencies in any realm of studies. Still, one may still contribute to a more enduring, more vital social science as well as achieve a more genuine awareness of community life by pursuing the study of persuasive interchange in historically-enabled, participant informed, conceptually articulated, and pluralistically-oriented analytic terms.

I begin by encouraging a greater overall atten tiveness to classical Greek and Latin scholarship. While mindful of (a) the importance of the works on rhetoric developed by Plato, Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian in this paper, so much more insight can be gained through familiarity with the broader literature on community interchange developed by (b) Plato (particularly Republic and Laws; but his dialectic [sustained comparative] analyses of various aspects of human knowing and acting also merit study), (c) Aristotle (especially his work on ethics, politics, and politics), and (d) the ethno historians Herodotus, Thucydides, and Xenophon (Prus and Burk 2010).

Although Plato provides some extremely valuable insight on people’s religious viewpoints and practices (Prus 2013c), Plato does not directly engage

“...I particularly stress the conceptual and analytic potency of the works of Plato and Aristotle. Indeed, their contributions are so foundational and extensive that I often tell my students that, “If you know the works of Plato and Aristotle, you will be familiar with virtually every major concept (including totalizing skepticism) encountered in Western social thought for the past 2500 years, and, most likely, the great deal of the future scholarship in the humanities and social sciences. You may not know exactly how and in what ways future scholars will portray aspects of the works of Plato, Aristotle, and others from the past, that is, how extensively and explicitly they will be represented, what will be lost, what will be maintained, emphasized, badly misconstrued, arrogantly denigrated, and so forth, but you will have an incredible array of resources with which to comprehend and engage the broader study of human knowing and acting.”

“As Emilie Durkheim (1915 [1912]; 1997 [1904-1905]) would remind us, both the humanly known present and any future state are emergent, collectively achieved essences. There is no doubt that the future is highly enabled by the past, including the ever fleeting present. However, the actual “whiteness” that will be carried forward and in what ways things from the past might be accepted and rejected, expressed, modified, or transformed are matters that typically extend well beyond the concerns and efforts of particular organizations and governments, as well as any individuals within. For this reason as well, like Lucian (120-200 CE) who provides an exceedingly thoughtful analysis of the problematics of people developing ethnohis torical accounts of community life in the classical Roman era, one may express guarded optimism regarding the quality of future scholarship on rhetoric as persuasive interchange. Still, if one considers a conceptually and methodologically informed pluralist scholarship to be of value for the longer term study of community life, then this can be a worthwhile endeavor, even within the context of an uncertain, ever unfolding present.”

“... I more generally, rhetorical acts of human interchange (as Kenneth Burke so appropriately stresses) is best comprehended within the broader parameters of human relations—within the context of the fuller array of people’s activities that enable community life in practical living terms.”

“...Moreover, and in contrast to Burke’s scholarship, much of the contemporary literature is poorly informed about the historically developed and situationally invoked interusions of rhetoric with poetics (fiction and theater), politics and law, historical events, religion, education, and pragmatist philosophy (knowing, acting, relating, assessing, and adjusting). While rhetoric can be discussed as a realm of endeavor on its own, it is to be recognized that the modes of influence and resistance that developed in particular societies are best understood in conjunction with the broader, somewhat congruent flows of human knowing and acting across the broader fields of activity that constitute community life in the making (also see: Farrell 1993).”

“...There may be little that specific individuals or even more extended sets of scholars might do to quickly or effectively change more general tendencies in any realm of studies. Still, one may still contribute to a more enduring, more vital social science as well as achieve a more genuine awareness of community life by pursuing the study of persuasive interchange in historically-enabled, participant informed, conceptually articulated, and pluralistically-oriented analytic terms.”
religion in sustained dialectic terms. Moreover, because Aristotle’s (presumably pragmatist rather than divinely inspired) texts on religion have been lost or destroyed, we do not have these as analytic resources. Accordingly, (e) Cicero’s work on religion (Prus 2011d) is especially consequential for more adequately acknowledging the interusions of rhetorical and religion—not only in the classical Greek and Latin eras but also during the intervening centuries to the present time.

Given their enduring relevance to Western conceptions of entertainment, as well as significant portions of the conceptual imagery that more broadly permeates Western social thought, (f) the epic poems of Homer and the theatrical productions of the tragedians (Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides), as well as the “comic poets” (Aristophanes and Menander) also merit consideration for a fuller appreciation of rhetoric. Although these fictionalized representations of community life may seem removed from rhetoric as a humanly engaged process, the classical Greek poets are remarkably well informed about rhetoric as a humanly engaged process, the classical Greek poets are remarkably well informed about

tions of entertainment, as well as significant por-

In the analyses of persuasive interchange, as with other realms of human knowing and acting, one also would ask how people as agents mindfully (both causally and casually) enter into the ongoing flows of activities, interchanges, and other collective events through their observations, interpretations, intentions, behaviors, assessments, and adjustments. In this regard, it is important to attend to the ways that the things take place in the particular theaters at hand—to attend to the things that people experience, think, say, and do before, during, and after specific activities and interchanges with others.

As well, since human group life involves many matters that people cannot fully anticipate or control in either individual or collective terms, human life-worlds and the intellectual limitations of the Western European “dark ages” (circa 500-900).57 A second suggestion for the development of a more scholarly analysis of rhetoric revolves around focusing on “what is” rather than “what should be.” A related matter is to examine and delineate all components or aspects of a situation—to see “where and how” the particular matters under consideration do and do not fit together. This will require sustained comparative analysis wherein one attends in proces-sual terms to similarities, differences, connections, and the conceptual implications thereof.

Further, because rhetoric is social activity in the most basic terms, the analysis of persuasive interchange is not just about rhetoric in abstract terms. It is about human group life much more fundamentally and comprehensively. The subject matter of rhetoric revolves around culturally-enabled life-worlds and human relations. It revolves around people talking, remembering, acting, interacting, observing, defining, anticipating, generating, performing, cooperating, contesting, and making adjustments within the theaters of the other. To ignore these matters is to restrict the authenticity of one’s analyses of rhetoric.

Third, whereas much analysis of the human condition focuses on people as individual psychological entities, it is much more productive to focus on people as socially engaged (i.e., group-enabled, group participating, and group attentive) agents. Because “human life so fundamentally is group life,” it is only in becoming active, linguistically-enabled participants in the community that people (as individual beings) achieve a comprehensible, meaningful “oneness with the reality of the community.” Like other animals, people are physiologically-enabled and have capacities for sensation and motion. However, meaningful realms of knowing and acting are possible only because of the activities, language, concepts, practices, conventions, moralities, and memories that people acquire within the context of ongoing group life (Durkheim 1915 [1912]; Mead 1934; Blumer 1969; Prus 2007b, 2007c).

Because human group life revolves around activity, it is especially instructive to attend to the things that people do and the ways in which they do these things. To better comprehend rhetoric as humanly accomplished activity, it is essential to provide detailed accounts of people’s anticipations, deliberations, acts, interchanges, obstructions, and adjustments. This means questing for openness and authenticity, as well as emphasizing pluralist inquiry and analysis. Like other conceptually informed aspects of human group life, the analysis of rhetoric is to be understood as a collectively-enabled emergent process with the scholars thusly involved endeavoring to be comprehensive, thorough, and detailed in their conceptual formulations.

As much as possible, it is also desirable to examine instances and realms of persuasive interchange from the viewpoints of all of the parties in the setting without imposing political, religious, or other moral evaluations on particular people and/or their lifestyles. Relatedly, it is important to ensure that these matters are not compromised or reshaped to suit one’s own more immediate moralities and preferences or those of particular others.

Consistent with Thucydides’ (circa 460-400 BCE) remarkable account of The History of the Peloponnesian War, analysts are encouraged to “write things to last forever”—to strive for more encompassing, long-term relevance rather than just addressing the more immediate problems and/or intrigues of the ever fleeting present. While pursuing clarity and authenticity, as well as detail and the fullness of representation, this also is facilitated by comparative analyses wherein one attends to similarities, differences, and conceptual implications.
Still, since even highly responsible analysts cannot be expected to have access to as much background and participant-based information as they might desire, it is particularly important that scholarly-oriented analysts exercise caution in any claims they might make about people’s viewpoints, definitions of situations, plans, intentions, attentiveness to outcomes, assessments, adjustments, concerns with others, and the like. Otherwise, in yielding to speculation, their analyses are more apt to assume misleading or otherwise inauthentic dimensions.

Recognizing not only that “the truth” (in pragmatist terms) is whatever audiences accept as authentic or viable, but that people also act mindfully of their knowledge of situations, Plato (following Socrates) openly and extensively condemns the practice of rhetoric. He does so as a consequence of the creativity, selective concealment and revelation, dramatizations and strategic misrepresentations, deliberate fabrications and other inauthenticities that speakers may introduce in the process of promoting their positions. Plato’s student, Aristotle, also is highly mindful of the potency of persuasive interchange for shaping and reshaping people’s definitions of situations. However, in contrast to Plato, Aristotle systematically, thoroughly, and non-judgmentally takes rhetoric apart piece by piece to display its components, tactical endeavors, and strategic interchanges, as well as address at some length the associated emotionally-engaged nature of human knowing and acting. Whereas Isocrates, Cicero, and Quintilian, like Aristotle, are primarily intent on developing instructional analyses of rhetoric, they encourage speakers to pursue more virtuous or noble agendas whenever possible in pursuing their causes. Still, like Kenneth Burke, all of these analysts are highly aware of the discrepancies between what may be termed “known authenticity” and “the strategic misrepresentations” that speakers may invoke in their pursuits of more desired outcomes.

For readers or other audiences attending to specific instances of persuasive interchange as well as analysts’ presentations, the challenge is to consider particular instances of rhetorical interchange, as well as any broader analyses of rhetorical endeavor in more discerning, skeptical terms—to recognize that instances of more compelling persuasive interchange in either specific rhetorical ventures or people’s analyses need not be synonymous with speakers’ known definitions of “situational authenticity.”

It is for this reason that those studying and developing analyses of persuasive interchange, as well as those assessing these productions are encouraged to pursue all opportunities to learn about human relationships and people’s interchanges therein and approach these in comparative analytic terms—rather than judging, moralizing about, or prescribing lines of action for others. Relatedly, it seems most productive that those in the human sciences spend as much time as possible “listening to, learning from, and striving to understand people” wherever and whenever they might encounter others. Likewise, it is important for scholarly-oriented analysts and audiences to be inquisitive, questing for more detail and fuller, process-oriented, participant informed instances of data in pursuing their humanly engaged subject matters.

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