The considerations to be presented below are based on two premises. First of all, it is assumed here that it is morally desirable to constantly expand the use of nonviolent programmes in solving individual as well as group conflicts. This assumption, being normative, need not be proved empirically, but in what follows various justifications of this premise will be presented.

The other premise is of a sociological nature, i.e. I assume that among different normative systems which control behaviour of individuals in a society and allow to qualify axiologically their actions it is the common morality norms that prove to be the most effective of all. From the viewpoint of the actual motivational power they are the norms that play the most significant role in shaping behaviours and which help passing from the declared to the realized values.

Referring to the rich tradition of ethical literature I leave the concept of the common morality applied here undefined. I shall only point at two characteristic features of the considered morality:

- avoiding extremes in dictates and prohibitions; fluctuating around the idea of "the golden mean";
- tendency to blur distinct differences between moral and extramoral norms through justifying the former by the latter and vice versa.

These two characteristics allow to use the common morality concept in its intuitive meaning.\(^1\)

\(^1\) S. W o l f , Moral Saints, "Journal of Philosophy" 1981, Nr 1, p. 6.
If the presented assumption has been accepted as empirically valid, then it can be claimed that inclusion of nonviolence programmes into common morality reveals to be the first prerequisite of their actual motivational influence. Having no formalized character, common morality occurs through cognitive and emotional experiences of men. Therefore these experiences must be primarily targeted, affected and changed so as to transform the norms of nonviolence programmes into the rules of common morality.

In common consciousness any realization of a nonviolent programme is associated, first of all, with moral perfection which is attainable only for few. If for the nonviolence postulates inspired by the Christian tradition Sermon on the Mount is the most representative then certainly an average Christian does not always feel obliged by the dictate "of turning the other cheek". For a majority of social movements referring to the nonviolence postulates the tradition going to Mahatma Gandhi’s ideas and actions is of considerable importance. However, the postulates of combining ahimsa - i.e. nonviolent fight - with asceticism, celibacy and entire devotion to the cause can be found uninviting. These radical dictates, certainly easier to accept within the cultural tradition of India, when transferred to the European culture could give the impression of a set of strongly exaggerated or even bizarre postulates.

The present paper aims at showing that the postulates of nonviolence in solving conflicts can be treated as common morality norms.

1. Rejection of Extremes

Programmes referring to the nonviolence idea are numerous and considerably differentiated. Nonviolence postulates are proclaimed by representatives of various religions as well as by movements and people whose ideological programmes renounce any religious systems. They are announced by advocates of radical changes and by conservatives, by representatives of powerful as well as weak social groups. All those programmes can be arranged to form a certain continuum. Then on its one end there will be programmes which treat the nonviolence postulate as an absolute definite moral imperative, compulsory and important for its own sake.
On the opposite end of the continuum there will be programmes in which the postulate is treated purely instrumentally, i.e. those in which usefulness of the postulate is estimated exclusively in terms of the pragmatically understood effectiveness, and therefore easily rejectable as soon as it proves useless. In accordance with the concept of the common morality accepted here the extremes of the programmes continuum should be rejected. Two examples of such extreme approaches will be discussed below.

II. Moral Absolutism (L. Tolstoy’s Ideas)

The classical example of absolutistic arguments in favour of nonviolence are those of L. Tolstoy’s. In his system the most significant moral norm is the love principle. “Love – he wrote – means eagerness of human souls for unification and the activity resulting from this unification is the primary and the only principle in life”\(^2\). This essential norm of behaviour is identical with the norm which makes us resign from the use of any force in defense of our rights or realization of our plans. It is the attitude of “nonresistance” of which Tolstoy says that “...in fact it is nothing else but learning and teaching love not distorted by false interpretations”\(^3\). The postulate of nonresistance is – according to Tolstoy – present in consciousness of most of rational individuals; it was most clearly formulated by Jesus Christ and came down into Christian tradition. I think, however, that this principle can be assigned a more universal meaning, and certainly independent of the official interpretation of the Christian science. Tolstoy assumes that the love principle is intimate to any human being\(^4\). It seems that when Tolstoy speaks of religion he often means, similarly to Gandhi, a certain state of moral awareness characteristic of any human individual.

Two conclusions important for the interpretation of his principles can be inferred from what has been said. First – the love principle is the unreservedly compulsory and primary norm of the

\(^2\) L. T oł sto j, Do M. Gandhiego, [w:] L i s t y, t. II, Kraków 1976, p. 326.
\(^3\) Ibid.
\(^4\) See ibid., p. 327.
human moral behaviour. Second - the postulate of nonviolence should not be treated as resulting from the primary norm but as identical with it in the sense that evil done by violence is evil in itself and not only because it violates the principle of love for one's neighbour.

If people usurp the right of using violence, then by their own deeds they account the very principle insufficient. Consequently, they deny the principle of love for one's neighbour.

The direct clash between violence and the principle of love is well seen in the following formulation by Tolstoy: "[...] the whole history of Christian nations is a tangible contradiction between what they announce and on what they built their existence: a contradiction between the norm of love recognized as the principle of life and violence recognized as necessity and occurring in various forms: as the authority of rulers, courts, army etc. - recognized and praised."

According to Tolstoy there exists only one possible approach one can take when faced with this fundamental contradiction: the utter submission to the idea of love, i.e. the absolute nonviolence irrespective of the consequences to which such an attitude can lead. No consequence whatsoever can have the slightest effect on the positive estimation of the behaviour which follows the love principle.

III. Extreme Instrumentalism (the Programme of the American Revolution)

The representative of this approach - referring in a sense to Trocki's programme - is M. Lerner. He starts his considerations with presenting his diagnosis of the situation in which the American society has come to live. He mentions a great number of "institutional" forms of violence. Violence is exerted by all national institutions not excluding those which seemingly serve social needs. Violence lies in the interest of the ruling class. It

5 See ibid.
6 Ibid.
is displayed, among others, in inequality of position, status, prerogatives, and advantages. American revolutionaries declare to change this situation. They aim at creating a society in which violence, racism, hatred, and exploitation in any form would be absent, and moreover, they would wish to achieve this aim without having to turn to violence.

"The revolutionary hates violence and hates to see innocent people killed" - writes Lerner. But everything shows that the use of the ruling class which is unable to resign from its privileges.

"The revolutionary must always be infused with love and respect for human life. It is this very love for human life that forces a revolutionary to resort to self-defensive, i.e. revolutionary, violence".

The revolutionary action is not possible at the moment. It has no chance of success because the consciousness of a great part of the society is still unprepared to accept revolutionary changes due to the long-lasting pressure exerted by the ruling class. It is necessary to make people aware that revolutionary violence is indispensable for gaining independence. To change the state of common awareness revolutionaries should adopt only such methods of fight which would not evoke an immediate hostile reaction of the society. This method is nonviolence. "It is my assessment of the present period - says Lerner - that the revolutionary movement should rely primarily on a strategy of nonviolence probably at least for the next ten years". Nonviolent actions should change social associations identifying the revolutionary movement with a superficial image of violence. The society should be made to realize that a real revolutionary violence consists in something quite else. Lerner continues: "People must be prepared for the fact that the ruling class has it in its power to make the revolution in this country bloody and violent. And they must learn that we do not welcome violence and that the only way to avoid violence is for enough people to move decisively to the side of the revolution". To achieve this purpose "a tactical use of nonviolence"
- as the author says - might be helpful. "Nonviolence should be adopted by the movement for revolutionary change as a tactic." After such a statement the confession "it would be both dishonest and unwise to pretend that we are nonviolent in principle" sounds entirely convincing.

Nonviolent actions proposed by Learner are mainly to be mass actions, since actions undertaken by individual can lead to individual repressions. This applies also to situations in which undergoing arrest might serve the purpose of exhibiting the strength of one's beliefs. In this type of behaviour the author sees a chance to move and gain social opinion, but he adds that from strategic point of view the result is not worth the price of losing one's freedom.

IV. Moral and Extramoral Justification for Nonviolence Programmes

In common morality - similarly to what can be found in some ethical theories, for instance in utilitarianism - moral norms and values are often justified with extramoral arguments. Even if in fact such an argument is not explicitly pronounced, a possibility of its use is postulated. Any lack of such a possibility is treated as a symptom of moral fanaticism. Consequently, from the point of view of common morality only such nonviolence programmes seem attractive which not only show potentialities in realizing extramoral values but also explicitly refer to those values.

In the broad variety of nonviolence programmes - which still remains broad after elimination of extreme formulations - one may find examples of a considerable differentiation of emphasis put on their moral and extramoral goals.

V. Moral-pragmatic Programmes

Among the programmes in which moral aspect of nonviolence is most strongly emphasized the unquestionably highest position is admitted to Gandhi's ideas. Their moral value comes, to a great extent, from a religious context in which Gandhi places his nonviolence postulate. He identifies it with ahimsa, one of the prin-

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12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
principal values of the Hindu ethical tradition. He speaks of "the right to nonviolence" which he associates with "dharma"\textsuperscript{14}. In one of his writings he quotes two fragments from religious Hindu books and treats the thoughts included in there as substantial inspirations for his own beliefs.

These thoughts are formulated as follows: "Ahimsa is the utmost (supreme) right, i.e. dharma. [...] "There is no other right or dharma but Truth."\textsuperscript{15}

The word "dharma" has a lot of meanings, but in the sense given to it by Gandhi it first of all tepaza duty, proper behaviour, obligation stemming from the religion\textsuperscript{16}. With this interpretation of dharma practical application of ahimsa becomes the primary religious duty of an individual. Being aware of the final aim of the human life defined as "realization of God who lives in us" and treating the nature of the Universe as the unity of all that exist and finding God's presence in all that live, one consequently arrives at a given interpretation of the right to nonviolence\textsuperscript{17}. In the case discussed, this right is treated as one of the fundamental moral norms justified by religious obligations. Any behaviour that violates the nonviolence postulate, any opposition to the principles of ahimsa prevents self-realization of a human being since it means violation of the unity of the Universe, of the primitive bonds between man, world and God.

According to Gandhi, in the conditions of violence the individual is unable to realize his own specific nature and consequently, he becomes more and more brutal. At the same time violence becomes a self-driven force quite independent of intentions of the sides of conflict, which finally results in its expansibility and then complete uncontrollability. In view of this, one should renounce violence not only because it is morally ill but also because - as Gandhi believes - it appears to be ineffective in gaining aims which in common awareness are associated with its application. This concerns situations in which violence is to be used.

\textsuperscript{15} Ibid., p. 202.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 203.
in a counterattack as well as those in which it is to be merely a device used to eliminate social injustice. Since violence proves to be not only evil but also ineffective, it becomes obvious that some other effective method must be employed. This requirement seems to be an immediate consequence of Gandhi’s activist attitude depending on counteraction against passiveness. This method, a tool to achieve given aims, is “fight without fight”, broadly meant as a practical application of ahimsa. Gandhi strongly believed that with the help of ahimsa, the best, never-failing device and the greatest power, any worthy and valuable goal could be achieved. Recognition of ahimsa as an effective strategy did not entirely settle the question of a goal for which it was to be employed. Only one thing was obvious - the goal was morally right. I believe Gandhi was convinced that his method could not be used in order to realise wrong aims. Acting in the way infused with moral values people cannot try to attain vile goals. First of all, because the followers of ahimsa cannot have ignoble intentions. If an individual proved to have dishonourable intentions, he would not be a follower of ahimsa. Second, also objectively, i.e. independently of intentions, acting according to ahimsa cannot bring blameworthy outcomes. Application of ahimsa - independently of a concrete goal - which it serves as a tool or a method - always leads to some additional results permanently connected with submission to the principles of ahimsa. Those results, though incidental from the point of view of the concrete goal realized, are essential from the viewpoint of all the values of Gandhi’s ethics, as they constitute significant steps towards:
- reduction of violence,
- moral strengthening and sublimation of man,
- revival and strengthening of democratic values and democratic social institutions.

If we assume that following ahimsa must always have at least such consequences as the three enlisted above, then in no case its use can serve bad goals. This is in full accordance with the following statement by Gandhi: “People say: means are nothing more but just means; and I say: means are everything. Like means like achievements.

19 Ibid., p. 75.
If we consider the three types of phenomena realized through ahimsa morally valuable - on the grounds of the standards accepted by Gandhi and present in many other ethical systems - then we can claim that employment of ahimsa leads to goals which are morally valuable. Consequently, we can formulate a thesis about a double source of moral value of nonviolent methods in fight in Gandhi's interpretation. On the one hand, a fight carried out with nonviolent methods is already in itself a value. On the other hand, the very decision not to use violence is morally good because it is effective in attaining goals recognized as good. We can therefore speak about a double value of nonviolent methods.

It corresponds with what M. L. King wrote: "I have become convinced that this is the only effective method available for the oppressed in their fight for freedom, which does not evoke moral reservations." In this approach violence applied to realize even accepted goals gives rise to moral objections, and thus already the decision not to use violence becomes a certain value. If the rejection of violence may serve good goals, then nonviolence gains an additional value. It was emphasized by King when he wrote: "Christ furnished the spirit and motivation while Gandhi furnished the method." The nonviolent method is treated here as good because it fits in with Christ's teaching and moreover it can serve effectively the values preached by that teaching.

The use of nonviolent methods is to lead to goals of - roughly speaking - two kinds. The first kind of goals is, so to speak, inseparably associated with the strategy of nonviolence and refers to the three types of consequences discussed above. The second kind of goals refers to concrete purposes for which a given nonviolent action is undertaken, for instance - abolition of salt act in India or cancellation of racial segregation in the buses of Montgomery. Thus we can speak of two aspects of effectiveness of such actions. The first refers to the goals inherent in the social functioning of ahimsa. The second - involves concrete goals of a given action. The question arises which of the two

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aspects, is meant when speaking of effectiveness of nonviolent methods. At the first sight one could say that when Gandhi states that no single case has been known to him in which ahimsa failed or when he recommends common adherence to it irrespective of a situation or circumstances he means first of all the first aspect of effectiveness.

Let us recall that when the problem of defence against the Japanese was considered Gandhi advised the use of non violent methods even if they were to lead to the defenders' death. "Honourable" death was then treated as the justification of nonviolent action associated with effectiveness of ahimsa. The same idea is - I think - present in the following statement: "The German Jews will win a lasting victory over the German Not-Jews as they convert the latter to the respecting of human dignity." Considering the historical facts we have every reason for suspecting that was meant to happen already after their death.

If we assume that in the first situation the goal was to defend independence and in the second - to save the lives of German Jews, then none of those goals was achieved by nonviolent methods. It seems that Gandhi quite knowingly allowed such a possibility. What was to be realized were some goals from within the group defined above as inseparably associated with the use of non violent methods in fight.

I. Pawłowska notices that Gandhi uses the term "victory" also when nothing else but moral values have been preserved. In the first of our examples those values would be self-faithfulness and honourable death. The second example illustrates still more. Moral strengthening of the man acting with nonviolent methods covers also his antagonist (moral sublimation of the antagonist). It seems that this is just this very aspect of goals of nonviolent actions and this sense of effectiveness of such actions that Gandhi had in mind. I am also sure that in the two cases discussed here Gandhi assumed existence of a positive aim in the form of reduction of a total amount of violence, i.e. one more aim inseparable

22 See M. Gandhi, To Every Briton, 1938, quoted after Lazari-Pawłowska, Etyka..., p. 82.
23 M. Gandhi, Zionism and Antisemitism, 1938, quoted after Lazari-Pawłowska, Etyka..., p. 89.
24 See: Lazari-Pawłowska, Etyka..., p. 83.
from the method proposed by him. The importance assigned by him to moral victory resulted in a certain misapprehension of his nonviolent resistance and nonresistance with a strong emphasis put on the moral significance of the nonresistance act. According to R. Niebuhr it is Gandhi himself, "the greatest contemporary representative of nonviolence, who is to be blamed for this confusion. He often used to speak of this method as of the use of the power of spirit or the power of truth. He treated those powers as spiritual in opposition to a physical character of violence".

Keeping in mind the postulate of activity present in Gandhi's ethical system we can have no doubt that his reference to the powers of spirit and truth must not be identified with unwillingness to influence domains other than metaphysical or psychological. His nonresistance in which there are traces of the Christian and Jewish tradition demanded passiveness in the face of an externally stronger enemy. This attitude involved readiness to suffer, self-devotion, self-faithfulness, loyalty to one's own beliefs, while any objective change was supposed to be possible only due to supernatural powers.

However, Gandhi's estimation of effectiveness of ahimsa certainly went beyond the limits mentioned here and covered the question of success in gaining concrete goals. Gandhi admitted that there had been situations in which ahimsa had failed. From all that have been said above it can easily be concluded that ahimsa could never happen to fail in realizing general aims inseparably associated with it. Thus the only domain in which it could was that of casual concrete goals.

The international conference of South-American bishops held under the motto "Evangelic nonviolence - liberation power" passed a proclamation of applying nonviolent methods of fight in their countries. The proclamation, called Nonviolence Movement Charter, has been grounded on the Christian tradition but within the interpretation very close to the views of Dom Helder Camara - the first to propagate nonviolent methods in South America. Under this in-


26 La Carte de La Non-Violence Latio-Américaine, "Cahiers de la Reconciliation" 1978, Nr 5.
interpretation social justice becomes one of the crucial Christian values. Rulers and governments deserve moral approval and support of the congregation provided they act according to the justice principle. In Christian science violence is not an acceptable method to realize this principle. But violence applied by governments to preserve systems which are clearly unjust must be subject to a specially strong moral disapproval.

Condemnation of injustice and renouncement of violence bring forward the question of the forms of acting accepted by the Christian ethics as interpreted by the authors of the document discussed. These forms are nonviolent actions. But the nonviolence principle is not treated here as a mere device. "Nonviolent actions are both an idea and a method. [...] We find our faith in the words and actions of Jesus Christ. There we discover deep motivation and clear examples of how to live making use of the nonviolence principles. A nonviolent action is the embodiment of evangelical form of life in confrontation with all forms of injustice of this world."

The authors of the document stress that nonviolent actions are not a spontaneous and instinctive reaction against imminence and violence. The decision to follow this way of behaving is difficult, requires courage and makes one reach as far as the deepest layers of personality. Basing on acceptance of one's own inner freedom and moral responsibility for one's own life man is able to oppose injustice without turning to violence. It demands strength and courage. "The spirit of reconciliation can never be born out of weakness and meanness."28

Referring to the quotation above it can be observed that while the nonviolence conceived as an idea requires moral maturity and concentration on inner moral values, the nonviolence taken as a method needs reference to one's knowledge of social and political relations. In nonviolent acting "social analysis is never rejected, on the contrary, it is found indispensable to grasp real problems, indications of injustice together with their grounds and various interpretations."

27 Ibid., p. 19.
28 Ibid., p. 20.
29 Ibid., p. 21.
Although the charter discussed above is a document passed by the conference of ecclesiastic persons, it fully allows a possibility of motivations different from the Christian ones in undertaking nonviolent actions. It is possible to treat the nonviolence postulate both as a value in itself and as a method for fighting injustice.

VI. Pragmatical-moral Programmes

In the approach of Gandhi and that of the American bishops autotellic values of nonviolent methods were complemented with instrumental ones. However, there are authors, coming from the closest circles of the main representatives already discussed, who used to put a considerably stronger stress on effectiveness of those methods in attaining concrete goals.

Writing on nonviolence in the fight against racial segregation W. R. Miller says: "[...] its effectiveness, however, is not a question of wishful thinking but of hard facts"30. J. Nehru, whose favourable attitude to Gandhi arises no doubt, strongly criticized other than instrumental treatment of nonviolent methods. It becomes clear from his words: "We took to the nonviolent method (fifteen years ago) because it promised to take us to our goal in the most desirable and effective way. The goal was then apart from nonviolence; it was not mere appendage or outcome of it. No one could have said then that freedom or independence must only be aimed at if they are attainable by nonviolent means. But now our goals itself is judged in terms of nonviolence and rejected if it does not seem to fit in with it. The idea of nonviolence is thus becoming an inflexible dogma which may not be challenged. As such it is losing its spiritual appeal to the intellect, and taking its place in the pigeon-hole of faith and religion."31

When interpreted in terms of psychology the above statement shows how those joining Gandhi's movement were motivated. This could be of special interest for those who are engaged in the

study of the history of nonviolence movements. Which seems impor-
tant is giving a definite priority to those goals which relate to
extramoral values, freedom and independence. Gandhi’s belief that
the type and the moral value of the means used settle the ques-
tion of what goal - in the sense of its moral value - will be
achieve is explicitly rejected here.

In certain special situations a violent action can sometimes
happen to lead to morally good results which actually need not be
involved in a given moral system; it may be sufficient if they
can be qualified as good as within the system. Consequently, the
necessity to apply a method other than a nonviolent one does not
immediately lead to moral conflict, because then the value of the
means used becomes definitely determined by the moral value of
the accepted goal. Any doubts that can arise in that situation
are recognized by Nehru as resulting from adoption of an inflexi-
ble dogma. The position which under a welldisposed interpretation
could be defined as self-faithfulness and loyalty to one’s ide-
als, does not meet acceptence here.

We must remember that this teleological interpretation of non-
violece was given by the man who, in spite of his rationalism so
well seen in the paragraph cited above, believed deeply in moral
values of ahimsa. He wrote: “What I have strongly admired is the
moral aspect of our movement and satyagraha action” 32. However, his
emotional attitude to nonviolence has not affected his reasoning
in which instrumental evaluation remains predominant.

One more remark seems in order here. When analyzing Nehru’s
views to illustrate extramoral justification of nonviolence I have
presumed that such value as the independence of India was for him
of purely political character. It was not included in his
ethical system, i.e. it was an extraethical and extramoral value.
My supposition has been based on the statements cited above which
confirm moral interrelations between Gandhi’s and Nehru’s atti-
tudes. I think that if essential elements of their moral positions
were similar, the assumption has been well-justified.

The views analogous to those represented by Nehru are shared
by O. Lund, one of the leading representatives of nonresistance
movement in Norway during World War II. The value which is exter-
nal towards morality is the rules governing democratic societies.

32 L a z a r i - P a w ł o w s k a , E ty k a..., p. 78.
The most essential thing that should be done by the pacifist is to make people realize superiority of fundamental democratic rules over political systems. This estimation is grounded on a certain quasi-empirical thesis which, I suppose, does not belong to Lund's moral system. He writes: "(One must be aware of the fact) that the life of the individual can be most fully and deeply developed in a democratic society".

On the other hand, the postulate of nonviolence is included, as I think, in the ethical system of the author, since it can be justified within the system by a reference to the metaphysical conception of the existence "of the image of God in every human being."

At the same time, however, no metaphysical justification can be found for his making the nonviolence postulate obligatory or using it in given circumstances as a means of action. Lund remarks: "A great majority of our people turned to nonviolence because they felt that for a small country that was the only effective method of fight against a much stronger enemy. In our case nonviolence was not a voluntary choice of the kind that a strong country can afford in its struggle against a weak one". Thus the decision to use nonviolent methods need not result from strong belief in their moral superiority or greater effectiveness. It can be a simple consequence of some unavoidable situation in which no other methods can be used to defend values and things accepted as right.

Discussing Lund we should recall Gandhi's statement in which he says that the nonviolent method is only for the strong, and that it can never be afforded by the weak. It is obvious that speaking of strength Gandhi means moral values whereas Lund apparently refers to physical strength. It is worth emphasizing that for Gandhi the decision to use nonviolent methods when no other possibility exists cannot be considered a moral decision. But it has a positive moral value for both Gandhi and Lund.

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34 See ibid., p. 356.
35 Ibid.
VII. Conclusions

I believe that the analysis presented has been successful in showing that the programmes postulating nonviolence in solving conflicts or in defence of right cause can be formulated in a moderate way and thus avoid being blamed for fanaticism on the one hand and for pure and not quite moral pragmatism on the other.

Rejection of both absolutistic as well as extremely instrumentalistic versions of the nonviolence postulate allowed to exhibit moral values of the idea of nonviolent fight. In the programmes in which their pragmatic value was emphasized, the nonviolence idea was associated with various extramoral values. If so, then there are no obstacles to accept the postulates of nonviolence programmes as common morality norms and to enjoy social benefits coming from this fact. The advantages of including nonviolence postulates in the common morality were pointed out in the introduction to this paper.

To conclude our discussion one more problem should be mentioned. Common morality norms are usually treated as statements which, apart from their normative content involve a certain descriptive element concerning empirical relations (better or worse justified, true or false) between various phenomena. For a norm to be popular and broadly accepted it seems more important that its assumptions be psychologically attractive than true.

In nonviolence programmes such assumptions are great in number. They relate to nonviolent actions and their effect on psyche of the acting person and his antagonist, on the awareness of the enemy, the outcomes of nonviolence in public and individual activities, in the functioning of political mechanisms, and so on, and so forth. One of the broadly accepted assumptions concerns belief in positive features of human nature and its moral sensibility. Consequently it is assumed that the pressure of nonviolent action exerted on the opponent will turn out effective.

Such assumptions stressing effectiveness of proposed methods can appeal to people and help in gaining followers, but may turn out to be disastrous for effectiveness of undertaken actions if the assumptions prove false from the empirical viewpoint.

Doubts as to empirical foundations of the assumptions mentioned above bring to light a conflict between persuasive attraction
of announcements and their empirical effectiveness in shaping social reality. If the nonviolence postulate is to be treated as the common morality programme, the conflict must be sensible solved. However, no way of solving it can be given a priori. This question should be solved by those who are so seriously and deeply devoted to nonviolence as to undertake the effort of including it in common morality.

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MORALNE PROGRAMY NIESTOSOWANIA PRZEMOCY - NIEKTÓRE WARUNKIICH SKUTECZNEJ REALIZACJI

Moralne programy rezygnacji ze stosowania przemocy są zjawiskiem zasługującym na wnikliwą uwagę. W swym artykułę przyjmuję, że jest moralnie pożądane, aby zakres stosowania tych programów w rozwiązywaniu konfliktów indywidualnych i grupowych uległ rozszerzaniu. Ponadto zakładam, że najbardziej efektywne spośród różnorodnych systemów normatywnych regulujących zachowania jednostek w społeczeństwie, są normy moralności potocznej. Jej cechą charakterystyczną jest unikanie skrajności. W artykule staram się wykazać, że postulaty "nonviolence" mogą być traktowane jako program moralności potocznej po odrzuceniu tych programów, które z jednej strony traktują postulat niestosowania przemocy jako kategorię, a z drugiej zaś w sposób wyłącznie instrumentalny (propozycje M. Lernera).