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

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Special issue:
TWO DECADES OF TRANSFORMATION

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Editors: Alicja Stępień-Kuczyńska
Maciej Potz

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CONTENTS

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
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Alicja Stępień-Kuczyńska*, Maciej Potz*

PERSPECTIVES ON TRANSFORMATION

The process of system transformation in Central-Eastern Europe has long drawn the attention of scholars from various backgrounds: sociologists, political scientists, economists, historians. The continued interest in the subject is perhaps due to the fact that even now, more than twenty years since the symbolic date of 1989 – the fall of communism in Poland – the transformation is not over. Obviously, this is not equally true of all aspects of the process. For example, political transition – the dismantling or deep reconstruction of political institutions on the way from authoritarianism to democracy – constituted the initial phase of transformation in the majority of the region's countries and was, for the most part, successfully concluded within a decade. Quite naturally, profound social changes, such as the emergence of civic political culture or, in the case of the former USSR republics, the building of national identity, take much longer to occur. The economic transformation may be quite dynamic, especially when it takes the form of "shock therapy", but the positive effects – which, in turn, generate social support for the institutional changes – are often less rapid and unevenly distributed.

The four articles in this special issue of "International Studies" present different perspectives on the processes of transformation. Larissa Titarenko tackles the difficult topic of the national identity of contemporary Belarusians. Contrary to the popular view founded on the sharp dichotomy of the post-Soviet regime leaning towards Russia and the oppressed pro-Western, Belarusian-speaking society, she shows a much more complex picture. Both the Soviet and the nationalist options are in fact minority choices of, respectively, the regime and a relatively isolated group of intellectuals, while the majority has still to come to terms with conflicting historical, cultural and ethnic identities.

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Paweł Bożyk takes on board economic aspects of the process, showing the ups and downs of the rapid transformation and its impact on countries' (Poland and Russia in this case) economic relations. The major question, of course, is the validity of the route to capitalism (especially in its liberal, rather than welfare, form) modelled, to a large extent, on western democracies, as applied to a very different political, social and economic environment.

The article by Ryszard Zięba situates the Polish transformation experience in the international context and discusses the successful accomplishment of the country's foreign policy priorities. The road has led from the normative agreement (accession to the Council of Europe) through common security structure (joining NATO) to economic integration (joining the EU in 2004).

Finally, Agata Włodarska's contribution is a case study of an ethnic-based political conflict in post-Soviet territory. History took an unexpected turn when Russians suddenly became a low-status minority in Estonia, when Estonians, asserting their freshly regained independence, made language the criterion of citizenship.

Within the same broad subject area, the issue also contains the highlights of a round table meeting of Polish and Russian political scientists, hosted in February 2010 by the University of Lodz. The debate was a follow-up to an international conference "20 Years of Transformation" organized in November 2009 by the Department of Political Systems of the same university.

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ARTICLES

Larissa Titarenko*

POST-SOVIET BELARUS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

ABSTRACT: The paper deals with the formation of a new national identity in Belarus under conditions of post-Soviet transformation. Under the term of "national identity" the author means the identity of the population of the Republic of Belarus that will be adequate to its status of a newly independent state acquired after 1991. Special attention is paid to the existing major research approaches to the problem of constructing this national identity. According to the author's view, both major approaches are inadequate; the author puts forward a new (third) approach that goes beyond discussions on language and national culture, and corresponds to the concept of plurality of identities. The author describes some paradoxes of national identity based on the opposition of "nation" and "people". These correspond to the Western model of the "creation of modern nations", which is not fully applicable to post-Soviet Belarus. All attempts to apply this model to contemporary Belarus lead scholars to several "cultural paradoxes" that can, however, be explained within a new approach.

KEY WORDS: post-Soviet Belarus – national identity – nation – systemic transformation – pluralism

Introduction

The breakdown of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the following systemic transformation of the USSR initiated substantial changes on the institutional level and in the mass consciousness of the former Soviet people. Each post-Soviet state started managing these changes on the basis of its own historical

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legacy, cultural traditions, and new external conditions of its existence. One of the most contested issues is the construction (or reconstruction) of new collective identities. These kinds of identities can be relevant for the whole nation or some ethnic groups within it, depending on the situation in a particular country. In Belarus, even the idea of a national identity was not elaborated during the Soviet time, because the "title" (dominant) nation (ethnic Belarusians) did not develop its national consciousness to a level that is usually considered as "appropriate" for putting forward any nationalistic ideas and constructing the nation as an "imagined community".[1] Nevertheless, during the period of Perestroyka in Belarus some nationalistic movements were formed.[2]

Western social sciences have highlighted several models of nation-building that resonate in the post-communist states. Ewa Thompson points to the relevance of post-colonial theory for post-communist states. In some countries, these models fitted the local cases. In other countries the Western theoretical concepts of the state, nation, democracy, market, etc. have not worked and have been significantly transformed in order to correspond to the changes in the geopolitical situation, the new mosaic of nation-states, and the new vision of the future of each nation (within the EU or out of it).

In post-Soviet countries (mainly, in Russia) scholars identified "special features" that have to be taken into account. These scholars elaborated the main types of identities, showed divergent trends in their formation in different regions of the former Soviet state, and explained the mechanisms of construction of some particular types of identity – gender, ethnic, territorial.[3] In the case of Ukraine, authors focused on the necessity to keep deep ties with the historical past of a nation in order to distinguish one nation from others.[4] Overall, the problems of the construction of post-Soviet national identity have been fixed in post-Soviet states within a discourse of the "struggle against the Soviet legacy", "national oppression" and 'returning to

[1] B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*, London 1991.

[2] E. Gapova, *O natsii bednoy zamolvite slovo*, „Topos" 2005, no. 1 (10).

[3] E. Danilova, *Kto my, Rossiyane?*, [in:] *Rossiya: Transformirujusheesja obshestvo*, V. Yadov (ed.), Moscow 2001; L. Gudkov, *Struktura i character natsionalnoy identishnosti v Rossii*, [in:] *Geopoliticheskoe polozenie Rossii*, Moscow 1999; J. Katchanov, N. Shmatko, *Semanticheskie prostranstva sotcialnoy identichnosti*, [in:] *Sotsialnaya identificatsiya lichnosti*, V. Yadov (ed.), Moscow 1993, vol. 1; A. Malinkin, *Novaya rossiyskaya identichnost: issledovanie po sotciologii znaniya*, "Journal of Sociology" 2001, no 4; *Sotcialnaya*...

[4] Z. Kogut, *Roots of Identity. Studies of early modern and modern history of Ukraine*, Kiev 2004.

historical roots" (although the process of reconstruction of post-Soviet identities is still under way).

The situation in Belarus is not similar. As measured by the typical criteria of post-communist transition, this country differs greatly from others and demonstrates several "paradoxes of democratization" – mainly, as Korosteleva and Hutcheson[5] have noted, a very slow pace of social and economic changes and a low level of mass support for the nationalistic opposition. In regards to national identity in particular, several papers have been published (abroad and in Belarus) to describe the "paradoxes" of Belarusian identity. Ya. Shimov[6] explained these paradoxes as follows: instead of fighting for liberal freedoms, Belarusians prefer social and economic stability in the country, instead of developing nationalism Belarusians are almost indifferent to ethnic-national discourses, and they identify themselves as Belarusians while mostly speaking Russian.

The objective of this research is to examine the construction of a new Belarusian identity under the conditions of post-communist transformation. The goals of the paper are to analyze the approaches (foreign and domestic) of new models of post-Soviet Belarusian identity; to compare the previous dominant theoretical model of identity with the newly constructed models; and to explain the existence of some paradoxes of Belarusian identity (as they are presented in public, in scientific literature, and in politically oriented papers on the Internet).

This research is based on several theories. Firstly, transitional theory: I consider Belarus as a typical post-Soviet country in the process of transition from the Soviet past (i.e. from state socialism) to a new state (there is no certainty about this new state, but from the beginning it was indicated as transition to the market and democracy, so that we have to place discussions about identity within this context). Secondly, theories related to social (in particular, historical) memory: how people build their present on the basis of their past, or, more precisely, on the images of their past on the basis of their knowledge, perception of history, practices, etc.

This subject inevitably presupposes a comparative method. On the basis of comparison, the differences between the previous (Soviet) and current (post-Soviet) models of Belarusian identity, as well as between several post-Soviet models, will be shown. The empirical analysis is based on the national survey data (N = 1000 respondents over 18 years old, face-to-face interviews, limiting accuracy 0,05), conducted in 2000 within the framework of the

[5] *The Quality of Democracy in Post-Communist Europe*, E. Korosteleva, D. Hutcheson (eds.), London 2006, p. 14.

[6] Ja. Shimov, *Belarus: Eastern-European Paradox*, www.belaruspartisan.org [30.10.2006].

European Values Study, using Western methodology, as described by L. Halman.[7] Additionally, the author uses data from the national monitoring survey run by the Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences (2005, 2008),[8] and the empirical data of the IISEPS (2004, 2009).

The major hypothesis is based on the selected theoretical approach to the subject: contemporary Belarusian national identity has not yet been completely constructed, as there is no "dominant" view shared by the majority of the population on their national identity. The current situation is characterized by a plurality of identities, and the whole notion of „Belarusian national identity" can be explained in a different way depending on the theoretical framework of the scholar as „totally negative" or „normal" or even „positive". However, given that the political isolation of Belarus has been overcome, the Belarusian population feels more "involved" in the European milieu and therefore the mosaic of identities is increasing. Belarus is following the tendencies that are common in other European nations, including the adoption of multiculturalism (sharing different modern and traditional values), combining local-national-European types of identity, and ethnic and religious tolerance.[9]

From this point of view, Belarusian identity must be constructed as a civic one – like in the Czech Republic, as described by Hroch.[10] Only this kind of national identity corresponds to the modernity challenges facing Belarus. It can be constructed on the basis of civic consciousness without direct connection to any language or ethnicity. Actually, as Minenkov[11] showed, such a plural national identity has been under construction since the „revolutionary events" of March 2006. Some representatives of the Belarusian intellectual elite (sociologist Babosov, political scientist Abramova) support this approach, which rejects an ethnic basis for contemporary identity.[12]

This approach is based on the following assumption: the combination of components of national consciousness that are sufficient for the construction of a new national identity and acceptable for the majority of people in Belarus, would not include "purely" anti-communist or nationalistic ideas.

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[7] L. Halman, *The European Values Study: A Third Wave*, Tilburg 2001.

[8] *National Surveys*, www.iiseps.org [28.12.2008].

[9] See: *National and European Identities Are Compatible*, www.iue.it/RSCAS/Research/EURONAT/Index.shtml [06.09.2004], C. Grant, *What are European Values?*, "Guardian" 25.03.2007, p. 3.

[10] M. Hroch, *Language as an Instrument of Civic Equality*, "Ab Imperio" 2005, no 3.

[11] G. Minenkov, *K novoy oppositsii*, www.belintellectual.com/discussions, 2006 [18.09.2006].

[12] *Belarus: ni Europa ni Rossija. Mnenija belorusskih elit*, www.arche.bymedia.net/2007-knihi/zmiest01_ru.htm, 2007 [16.12.2008].

On the contrary, the new national identity must provide a strong basis for the consolidation of people of different ethnic backgrounds and therefore include some basic values shared by the population, including tolerance of pluralism and bilingualism. In other words, they have to be oriented to the European future of the country.

A framework for the analysis of contemporary Belarusian identity

In the transitional period, most post-Soviet countries faced some common problems. The problems of rethinking their place in the world and the construction (reconstruction) of their national identity were among the primary tasks. Analysis of numerous texts on construction/reconstruction of national identity in post-Communist countries (including post-Soviet Belarus) shows that research mostly concentrates on four key theses. As for Belarus, two major theoretical approaches and two antagonistic political projects have been developed: nationalistic, associated with Belarusian intellectuals, and pro-regime, developed by the official ideologists.

The first thesis deals with the revitalization of nations, or an increase in the social influence of nation and nationalism in the new political situation. The question is: what is the definition of the nation that all the people (or at least the majority of people) could accept? Traditional ethno-nationalism, developed in Central Europe, emphasized the "title" (dominant) nation, or ethnicity as the core for contemporary nationalism. Within the context of two national projects in Belarus, the concept of a "nation" was introduced by Belarusian intellectuals: only those who have national consciousness and speak the native language represent a "nation".[13] Otherwise, nation refers only to intellectuals. In contrast, the concept of nation in the official discourse was substituted by the concept of "the population of Belarus," or "people of Belarus".[14] it meant all citizens regardless of their level of consciousness or their language.

The second thesis highlights the enormous differences in criteria of national identity considered as necessary and sufficient by different authors. These differences have mainly concerned the native language that in Belarus has actually become a means of division of the nation rather than of the nation's consolidation. Also, as Gapova[15] explained, the "national language debates" were actually shifted into a corporative political project connected

[13] V. Akudovich, *Archipelago Belarus*, www. txt.knihi/frahmenty, 2003 [18.9.2006].

[14] *Belarus*...

[15] E. Gapova, *O politicheskoy economii "natsionalnogo yazyka" v Belarusi*, "Ab Imperio" 2005, no. 3.

with the class interests of new emerging social groups fighting for redistribution of power in the country. The view that the native language is a core criterion for national identity is present in several theories of nationalism.[16] Similar views are expressed by Belarusian nationalists: Belarusian as a core indicator of identity. For the official state ideologists, Belarusian is primarily a means of communication, as well as Russian.

The third thesis refers to contemporary attitudes to the Soviet period. On the one hand, the nationalists rejected the Soviet period as totally belonging to the "era of national oppression and Soviet colonization";[17] on the other, the pro-regime authors have tried to absorb the "best" of the socialist past and incorporate it into the present life, i.e. they consider the Soviet past as an appropriate source of positive ideas to be adopted for the future national project.[18]

The fourth thesis concerns many controversies regarding the methods of constructing national identity and the terms for this process. The first party (nationalists) tried to impose a new national identity quickly, by the so-called "Bolshevik method" of coercion (by introducing Belarusian language in all schooling systems, official documents, and public life as obligatory within a very short period of time). In this way they wanted to transform „Archipelago Belarus" into a real country, i.e. impose their own criteria of nation to „all people". The second party, on the contrary, did not determine any specific dates for the shift from Russian to Belarusian: it allowed for the spontaneous dynamics of this process. In practice, this approach stimulates the younger generation to use Belarusian and can bring better results for the nation than the harsh methods.

The main approaches to the problem of constructing Belarusian identity, presented in the social sciences and in the public realm, can be roughly divided in two mainstreams. The first represents the official "patriotic" position: it is well-supported by state media and state-subsided journals, and incorporated into contemporary (recently approved) school and university history textbooks. According to this approach, Belarusian national identity is characterized by patriotism. It combines some traditional features of Belarusian character (tolerance, hospitality) and some features that originated in the Soviet past (love of the country, pride in its past and present, internationalism). It is based on the concept of the „people of Belarus": all of them personify the new national identity. As a result,

[16] *Nationalism in Eastern Europe*, P. Sugar, I. Lederer (eds.), Seattle 1994, p. 4.

[17] V. Orlov, *Destruction of Identity*, www. belaruspartisan.org, 2006 [3.11.2006].

[18] I. Levyash, *Belorusskaya ideya: v poiskah identichnosti*, "Belorusskaya Dumka" 2003, no. 11.

a Belarusian is depicted as a patriotic person who is devoted to hard work and proud of living in Belarus.[19]

This kind of identity also stresses the legacy of the Great Patriotic War: Belarusians are represented as partisans fighting against the German aggressors. They suffered a lot but they won the war and therefore they are heroes. Regardless of the real history of the nation, contemporary Belarusians are depicted as a heroic nation, working hard to build a prosperous country. In this way, a strong basis for the high self-esteem of the common people is constructed. Within this ideal model (the opponents usually call it "neo-Soviet"), the Belarusian people are conceived as a homogeneous unit, within which all members (regardless of their ethnic identity, their language, or religious identity) are equally good workers and law-abiding citizens of Belarus, who respect the Soviet past of the country. Overall, this new Belarusian identity combines several features of the previous Soviet identity (internationalism, stability, hard work), some traditional values of Belarusians (safety and tolerance), and some new features characteristic of the independence period (Belarusian patriotism). This political project is well represented in many papers published in the journal "Belaruskaya Dumka", in which the official state views always dominate. For example, Krishtapovich stressed that Belarusians are part of the Slavic brotherhood and directly contrasted Belarusian identity to the values of the West, and focused on the heroic war past of the nation.[20]

The opposite position is presented in the nationalistic media, originally associated with the movement Adradzenne and the Belarus National Front. This approach expresses the views of Belarusian intellectuals – a group that considers its members to be the only legitimate representatives of the Belarus nation. These intellectuals feel that they represent the "genuine Belarus", the "real Belarus" – but they in fact constitute a tiny minority of Belarusians ("the whole Belarus"). Their definition of Belarusian identity is based on ethnicity, associated with the Belarusian language and culture. As Akudovich explained, "the whole Belarus" and "real Belarus" were two different concepts or two different parts existing in the same geographical space but constructed in a totally different spiritual space.[21] They did not accept each other. Although "the whole Belarus" embraced the majority of the people, the "real Belarus" (or Belarusian intellectuals, members of the "Adradżenne" movement) discredited this majority and refused to call it

[19] S. Byko, *Belarus – strana druzby i natsionalnogo soglasiya*, „Belaruskaya Dumka" 2005, no. 10.

[20] L. Krishtapovich, *Mozno li zit' kak na Zapade?*, „Belarusskaya Dumka" 2006, no. 9, p. 39.

[21] V. Akudovich, *Archipelago Belarus*...

a nation because this majority did not have a developed national consciousness. In short, Belarusian intellectuals constructed an imagined (ideal) model of the Belarusian nation, as Gapova argued,[22] while the population was refused the status of a nation. This position was represented in the Belarusian media ("Nasha Niva", "Svaboda" newspapers), national history books, and some political intellectual circles. It was supported by the opposition leaders abroad and those who emigrated decades ago.[23] National consciousness represented in Belarusian language and Belarusian ethnicity represented in cultural symbols (folklore), were the core characteristics of this model of national identity. According to Dubavec, this political project included three elements of "nationalistic myth": language, village, and Vilnia, i.e. it stressed an image of the nation as related to native Belarusians speaking "authentic language", living in the countryside ("less Russified"), and being historically related to Belarusian intellectuals living in Vilnius before World War II.[24]

This approach and political project were based on clearly articulated political views: anti-communist, anti-colonialism, and nationalism. All three features were closely interrelated, so that it was necessary to be anti-communist and blame the "Soviet past of Belarusians" to become a "good Belarusian nationalist", as Akudovich wrote.[25] Those who could not speak "real Belarusian" (Tarashkevica), who did not know (or did not appreciate) works by nationalist historians Vladimir Orlov or Mikola Ermalovich, who did not blame the "colonial Soviet past", were called "Belarusian plebs", "social provincials" – i.e. underdeveloped people.

However, the ethno-cultural nationalistic model of identity was not broadly supported. "Common Belarusians" and many educated people could not accept anticommunism and were afraid of the political aggressiveness of the BNF. They rejected this model as there was no attractive (positive) content in it; previous history was explained as the epoch of Russian colonialism, Russian and Soviet oppression. Belarusians were depicted as victims, as poor people who had never enjoyed freedom. In reality, a many Belarusians, especially current urban citizens, moved to the cities after World War II: they became part of the educated Soviet middle class or qualified working class and improved their standard of living during the Soviet time. They had no reasons to call their Soviet history "a period of oppression":

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[22] E. Gapova, *O politicheskoy economii*...

[23] J. Zaprudnik, *Belarus in search of national identity*, [in:] *Contemporary Belarus. Between democracy and dictatorship*, E. Korosteleva, C. Lawson, R. Marsh (eds.), London 2003.

[24] S. Dubavec, *Try skladnika Belaruschyny*, http://draniki.com/ask/dubavec.asp, 2005 [15.09.2006].

[25] V. Akudovich, *Archipelago Belarus*...

it was almost a "golden age" for many of them. They did not want to "return to Europe" as they felt comfortable with their Soviet past and patriotic present.

To summarize: the Belarusian people are viewed as divided into two unequal parts: (1) Belarusian intellectuals (a minority, which nationalists call "a nation") who support ethno-cultural identity with the key elements of language, ethnicity, nation, and culture in general; (2) the rest (nationalists call it "the whole Belarus", official authors – "the people of Belarus"). The weak points in both approaches are similar: both take for granted the image of a "pure national identity", both are unable to deal adequately with the great range of historical and contemporary factors influencing the process of the construction of national identity. Both approaches fail to distinguish between the conditions that hinder the growth of national consciousness and the conditions that motivate growth of national feelings and lead to national self-esteem, etc.

The official academic literature does not fully reflect these debates. Moreover, by the beginning of the 21st century, the nationalistic model lost support. Therefore, a new model of identity is needed that goes beyond the political interests of the two above-mentioned parties.[26] Such a new model relates to the discourse of modernity–post-modernity. According to this model, the processes of forming the nation-state are typical for modernity (both official ideologists and Belarusian intellectuals took this for granted). However, this period is over. The current period is characterized by features of post-modernity: fragmentation of identity, the free choice of several types of collective identities instead of interiorizing the prescribed socio-cultural identities within the framework of initial socialization. From this model, current Belarusians can easily identify themselves as members of a religious community, a particular sub-cultural group, a political party, i.e. as representatives of multiple identities, and get rid of "old" identities such as social class (workers, clerks, and peasants) or nation. As Minenkov[27] stresses, contemporary Belarus is a complex society in a globalizing world; therefore, it needs a multicultural pluralistic identity. Belarus has to become a pluralistic cosmopolitan rather than nationalistic society. From this point of view, the emerging new identity is represented by the young people ("19–25 generation") who came to the centre of Minsk after the presidential elections in 2006 to protest against election fraud and demonstrate their human dignity. These young people refused to be treated as an Object: they were ready to become the Subject, political agents of social change.[28] This genera-

[26] *Belarus*...

[27] G. Minenkov, *K novoy oppositsii*...

[28] T. Rapoport, *Politisheskaya modernizatsiya ili politisheskaya emansipatsiya?*, www.belintellectual.com, 2006 [18.11.2006].

tion may formulate a new national identity, which does not inherit from the Soviet times. One vivid example of this is the state efforts to embed the notion of the "Great Patriotic War of the Soviet People"), despite which all Soviet history, including the war, is perceived as a history of another state, not Belarus.

To sum up: the "paradoxes" of national identity can be explained by its interpretation within one of the two existing approaches that are politically biased and oppose each other. The third, new approach allows us to get rid of nationalism and the narrow linguistic view on identity. This approach is more relevant to post-Soviet, post-modern reality. Therefore, only a plural civic identity can be the key to the construction of a new model of national identity in Belarus.

Important factors influencing Belarusian identity

Two important factors influencing the construction of a new national identity in Belarus are the Union of Russia and Belarus, connected to the official bilingualism, and EU enlargement. The nationalistic approach, based on three major ideas – independence from Russia, Belarusian language, and Belarusian culture,[29] does not help to resolve these issues. A significant reason is that the majority of Belarusians reject anticommunism and do not support the nationalistic view on identity. Instead, some of them support a model of identity called "new-Soviet" or "Soviet-Belarusian".

If we analyze empirical data from surveys, we can understand that the population is very uncertain about its future and its relations with Russia and the EU. However, people are not against bilingualism and the EU. Transitional processes are not finished: for example, the Soviet model of identity, the "Sovietskiy chelovek" (Soviet personality), still exists in Belarus. In the Soviet period, as Smirnov argued,[30] this personality type was characterized by such features as a communist world-view (atheism, science), materialism, collectivism, readiness to subordinate their private interests to state interests, and social optimism. Of course, not all people living in the USSR or in BSSR actually displayed these features; rather, these features constituted the model of the "we-group" for the Soviet people. This type of identity was deeply rooted in the Soviet past and the "collective unconsciousness" of post-war generations of Soviet citizens. According to the 1991

[29] S. Dubavec, *Nezaleznast i „nezavisimost"*, „Radio Svoboda. Vostraya Brama" 02.04.2006.

[30] G. L. Smirnov, *Sovietsky chelovek. Formirovanie sotsialisticheskogo typa lichnosti*, Moscow 1980.

VTSIOM survey, presented by Gudkov, 69% of Belarusians described their social identity as "Soviet citizens" and only 24% – as "citizens of their republic".[31] It means that on the eve of independence (1991) only a quarter of Belarusians gave priority to their national culture and mentality that distinguished them from other Soviet people.

Currently, the situation in Belarus is quite different: the Soviet identity still exists; however, Belarusians share many types of identity. Table 1, constructed on empirical data,[32] shows how Belarusian respondents identified themselves, and how often they selected these types of identification.

Table 1. Main types of identity selected by Belarusians

Type of identity	Often	Rarely	Never
Citizen of Belarus	30	24	14
Nationality (various)	30	24	15
Inhabitant of particular city, village	25	32	20
Resident of Belarus	26	27	17
Soviet person	17	18	26

The social basis for producing and reproducing the model of *homo sovieticus* disappeared together with the Soviet state. Although, as Jury Levada explained, by the mid-1990s, this type did not exist according to survey data,[33] some features were preserved (the ideas of equality, social stability, personal non-responsibility, hunting for enemies, conformity). These ideas can long continue to guide people.

One of the factors influencing the uncertainty and pluralism of identity is the Union with Russia, signed in 1996. The practical uncertainty of the current status of this Union creates some significant obstacles for the construction of a new model of Belarusian identity: if there will be one state in the future, the unified identity will be necessary; if the union will remain in its current status, a stronger model of pure Belarusian identity should be formed. According to IISEPS[34] data, soon after the approval of the Agreement more than half of Belarusians supported the process of unification with Russia, while currently the number of supporters of the full unification (and the formation of one new state) has decreased (see table 2).

[31] L. Gudkov, *Struktura i character natsionalnoy identishnosti v Rossii*, [in:] *Geopoliticheskoe polozenie Rossii*, Moscow 1999.

[32] *Archive Data of National monitoring of the Institute of Sociology*, Minsk 2009.

[33] J. Levada, *Homo Sovieticus: problema reconstrukcii*, "Monitoring of Public Opinion" 2001, no. 2.

[34] *National surveys...*

Table 2. Responses to the question: „What would you choose for Belarus: unification with Russia or joining the European Union?" (in %)

Choice	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	03/2009 (March)	12/2009 (Dec.)
Unification with Russia	47.6	47.7	51.6	56.5	47.5	46.0	42.4	42.1
Joining the European Union	36.1	37.6	24.8	29.3	33.3	30.1	35.1	42.3

In total, according to 2009 surveys, approximately four out of ten Belarusians would prefer joining Russia to joining the European Union.[35] It is quite possible that this number will be less in the coming years because of the "gas war" and economic losses on both sides in the relationship between Russia and Belarus. Anyway, the Union with Russia strengthens types of identity such as Slavic and Soviet, while weakening the European identity of Belarusians. Unification with Russia is still more popular among Belarusians. This attitude cannot influence positively civic and ethno-national identity, but it can increase the local type of identity (*tuteyshie*): in the case of unification this type will be the only basis for keeping the national culture, norms and traditions alive. If unification takes place, ethnic identity will become a more important factor; however, it will divide people rather than unite them (as it is the case now).

The ups and downs in the process of Russian-Belarusian unification, and lingering uncertainty as to the final status of the Union with Russia, contribute considerable ambivalence to the understanding of the positive and negative aspects of the new model of Belarusian identity. Thus, if there is a political union with Russia, who are the Russians for us – "Others" or "Us"? Probably, those Belarusians who, according to IISEPS (2009) data, hypothetically agree to be unified with the Russian Federation, consider Russians as an "us"-group, while those who prefer to join the European Union hypothetically consider Russians as a "they"-group. Such data clearly manifest the ambivalence of the current understanding of the meanings of "we"- and "they"-groups within the framework of identity construction: for some Belarusians, citizens of a country other than the Republic of Belarus (Russia or EU) belong to the "we-group", while for other Belarusians all these countries are truly foreign and therefore their citizens are considered as "others" or even "aliens".

[35] NISEPI surveys (2009). Analityka. www.iiseps.org/index.htm [12.02.2010].

Bilingualism as an indicator of Belarusian identity

One of the major features of the contemporary situation is bilingualism. There are some important historical conditions that predetermined why a good deal of ethnic Belarusians speak Russian either as their mother tongue or as their second major language (together with Belarusian). During the Soviet times, because of the process of Russification, it was not necessary to learn Belarusian for people who were not ethnic Belarusians, even if they were born in Belarus. Also, it was more "prestigious" among the intelligentsia and especially authorities to speak "business Russian" in the office rather than the less developed and less popular Belarusian. As Gapova explained, the shift from Belarusian to Russian was often voluntary, as Russian gave more career chances.[36] It is worth mentioning that both languages belong to the group of Eastern Slavic languages, they are really close to each other in terms of morphology, alphabet, etc., and people easily understand each other when speaking both languages. The Soviet linguistic policy was more supportive for Russian: every Soviet citizen should know Russian well, especially in case of promotion. As a consequence, the languages of the national republics were alive, but not in use in big cities with an international population, in large factories, or even universities. Members of many ethnic groups in the cities found it more practical to use Russian, which became the lingua franca for the Soviet political and economic space. It is no accident that Belarusian nationalists selected "villages" as the "motherland" for Belarusian identity and "Belaruskasti".[37]

As a result of this policy and practice, Belarusians, being a nation with some unique sociocultural features, usually adopted Russian as the language of everyday communication. The contemporary population of Belarus, although consisting primarily of Belarusians (81%) and only in 11% of Russians, practically no longer discuss either a "language issue" or a "religious identity issue". As Kirienko empirically proved, they are tolerant of any language (and therefore speak Russian, Belarusian and Trasjanka), just as they are tolerant of Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant religious denominations.[38]

There is one more historical determinant that contributed to the so called "in-between" status of Belarusian identity throughout the centuries. As Abdziralovich perfectly explained, ethnic Belarusians always lived "on the crossroads" – between West and East, Russia and Poland, being always under the strong cultural and political influence of neighbouring cultures and languages.[39] Belarus was not only "between" East and West; it also

[36] E. Gapova, *O politicheskoy economii*...

[37] S. Dubavec, *Try skladnika Belaruschyny*...

[38] V. Kirienko, *Mentalnost sovremennyh belorusov*, Gomel 2005.

[39] I. Abdziralovich, *Advechnym shljaham*, Minsk 1993, p. 3–4.

belonged either to Eastern or Western states, so that until now Belarusians have never lived in their own nation-state.

Survey data collected by the independent Institute for social and political studies, IISEPS (2004), showed that Russian-speaking citizens of the Republic of Belarus more than any other "ethnic communities" supported the national independence of Belarus, together with a free market and liberal democracy. Actually, there is nothing new in such phenomena: as G. Ioffe argued, non-ethnic Belarusians who did not speak Belarusian (Russians, Jews, Ukrainians) were always more "nationalistic" and "pro-Belarus" in their struggle against conservative authorities of all kinds in the region now called the Republic of Belarus[40] than their ethnic Belarusian counterparts.

According to the IISEPS data (2004), Belarusian is the only language of communication in the family for 13.7% of the respondents, while for 73.6% it is only Russian, for 6.8% it is both Russian and Belarusian, and for 4.7% it is a language other than Russian or Belarusian. If we compare this linguistic situation with the ethnic composition of the population (81% ethnic Belarusians and 11% Russians), we may conclude that the majority of people prefer Russian for practical reasons, and there are no ethnic conflicts concerning this matter. That is why language is not a political or cultural watershed; it cannot be taken as the major criterion of formation of the new model of Belarusian identity. Belarusian, according to Gapova, is no longer a democratic symbol and means of national mobilization as was the case under Perestroyka.[41] Even among the group speaking Belarusian at home there are some people supporting bilingualism, while among those who speak another language at home (neither Russian nor Belarusian) there are many supporting only Russian as a legal language. It is evident that a new civic national identity in Belarus can't be constructed in a way similar to the Czech Republic , where language was a central factor.

Conclusion

The analysis of two main theoretical approaches and models of constructing a new Belarusian national identity has clearly showed that the Republic of Belarus does not fit the dominant western models of national identity construction in post-communist countries. Both of these approaches – supported by Belarusian intellectuals and BNF leaders, on the one hand, and by the official ideologists, on the other – prefer to construct an "ideal model" of nation and national identity to back their own interests. They

[40] G. Ioffe, *Understanding Belarus: Questions of Language*, "Europe-Asia Studies" 2003, vol. 55, no. 7, p. 1010.

[41] E. Gapova, *O politicheskoy economii...*

consider the real people of Belarus as an "underdeveloped population" and an object for manipulation (using the Marxist concept of class consciousness, an object onto which a "proper" national consciousness can be imposed). Both models are closely connected with the different groups of political elites oriented either to change the power structure in the country (opposition) or to preserve the existing structure (official).

Although these two models are narrow and politically biased, the official one is prevailing. This model constructs national identity on the basis of the historical memory of Belarusians referring only to Soviet history, mainly – to the Great Patriotic War. According to this model, Belarusians became free in 1944 when the country was liberated from Nazi troops; so, all talk about any other kind of freedom and liberation is "empty" and inappropriate. Therefore, instead of the opposition's "myth of Belarusianness", consisting of language, culture, and independence from Russia, another "myth" has been constructed: "independence from Germans, internationalism, and Belarusian patriotism". Consequently, the possible space for myths in the construction of a new national identity has been reduced to (a) the historical period of World War II, (b) the Soviet period of successful restoration of the country after this war, and (c) the period of Belarus as an independent country (after 1991). No other history is necessary for this new-Soviet type of Belarusian national identity. However, the new civic model of national identity goes beyond political limits and ethnic frontiers: it is based on the major values shared equally by the population of Belarus regardless of ethnicity: tolerance, multiculturalism, social justice.

All the so-called "cultural" and "political" paradoxes of contemporary Belarusian identity as they are described in the literature ("nation without nationalism", "independent Belarus without freedom and democracy," etc.) simply attest to the fact that the real situation in Belarus differs from the above-mentioned models. Only "terminological play" can perfectly explain these paradoxes, which actually show that Belarus needs a new, non-contradictory explanatory theory and a new type of national identity backed by the idea of Belarusians as the subject of their own actions. The events of March 2006 provided hope that this kind of national identity is under construction.

The contemporary process of the construction of Belarusian national identity can be described within a post-Soviet inertial model: it provides a small space for the construction of a truly new national identity that can correspond to the challenges of globalization, external pressures of different kinds, and give the country a chance for its future. Currently, Belarusians do not have one dominant set of values that all the population would prefer, therefore, there are also no universal values shared by all Belarusians as one "we"-group. The modern identity of Belarusians is multifaceted. Our analysis has discovered a cultural mixture of traditional and modern identities among Belarusians, the eclectic nature of mass values, and the coexistence of several types of identities without a dominant one.

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES
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POLISH-RUSSIAN ECONOMIC RELATIONS UNDER THE CONDITIONS OF SYSTEM TRANSFORMATION

ABSTRACT: The rapid economic transformation in Central and Eastern Europe, modelled on Western economies and based, in some aspects, on neoliberal principles, has found the region's countries to a bigger (Eastern European countries) or lesser (Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary) degree unprepared. The resulting economic recession, especially in Russia, has had an adverse effect on mutual trade between Poland and Russia. In order to improve economic relations with Russia and increase the trade volume, Poland, remaining within the bounds of EU standards and regulations, needs to adapt the commodity structure of Polish exports to the needs of the Russian market.

KEY WORDS: system transformation; Polish-Russian economic relations; economic policy; economic transformation in Central-Eastern Europe

Political determinants of system transformation

The last twenty years have witnessed a major change in the evaluation of the causes and consequences of the system transformation in Poland and Russia. The enthusiasm of most politicians and economists who expressed their opinions on the subject twenty years ago has been replaced with more realistic assessments and balanced criticism. The reasons for the change are not difficult to understand; two decades of experience and experimenting had to lead to such changes in common awareness.[1]

Opinions expressed twenty years ago clearly pointed out that the fast and radical character of reforms was accepted solely due to political reasons; if other factors had been taken into consideration, for instance, economic

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[1] T. Kowalik, WWW Polska transformacja.pl, MUZA, Warszawa 2009.

ones, the transformation would have been carried out in an entirely different way. The process would have been solidly prepared and then divided into stages.

It appears that politicians responsible for the reform mainly feared that the establishment of 'the old regime' would boycott the reform. Immediate changes affecting all basic segments of public life, including economy, served to prevent this.

This argument, however, was untrue, far-fetched, and largely demagogic. In Poland, for example, the establishment of the Polish People's Republic (PRL) responsible for the reforms (I. Sekuła and M. Wilczek among other cabinet ministers) represented an even more radical wing of supporters of system change than L. Balcerowicz, J. Sachs and others recommended by "Solidarity". However, even if the establishment had been made up of the supporters of 'the old order', after the system changes in the former USSR began, their chances of boycotting the reform would have been reduced to zero.

The reformers' conviction of the need for instant implementation of the free market system resulted from the blind enthusiasm for neoliberalism that was common at that time. It was expressed through Reagonomics and Thatcherism – dominant system ideologies in the United States and Great Britain. They proposed to abandon, as soon as possible, economic policy derived from Keynesianism and, in consequence, reduce the importance of the state's role to a minimum, carry out the privatization of the economy, open the market to the import of foreign capital goods, initiate price liberalization and eliminate subsidies or other forms of supporting enterprises. All these recommendations were codified in 1988 in the form of the so-called *Washington Consensus*.[2] The *Washington Consensus* was recognized by the International Monetary Fund as a valid system of principles that had to be accepted by all countries applying for credit aid provided by the organization.

In 2010, after twenty years of reforms, the common fascination with the miraculous qualities of neoliberalism had shrunk to just a few groups of politicians and economists. In the meantime, it turned out that economic policy based on neoliberalism brought about numerous social and economic pathologies. The ongoing world financial crisis is a clear example.

[2] J. Williamson, *Did the Washington Consensus Fail?*, Institute for International Economics, Washington D.C., 2002.

The lack of preparation of Central and Eastern Europe to apply neoliberal principles of economic policy

Twenty years ago Central and Eastern Europe was not prepared for the immediate replacement of their centrally-planned economy with the free market system. The region's countries lacked free market infrastructure: there were no commercial banks, no well-functioning stock markets and a lack of specific free market legal regulations and experienced staff. The organisation of the economy was adjusted to conditions which were different from free market requirements: at that time we could observe the dominance of sector ministries and enterprises subsidised by the state.

Enterprises were not sufficiently independent; their structure and organisation drastically differed from the needs of the free market. When the market system became a reality, enterprises lacked proper guidance or preparation and, not surprisingly, more than half of these enterprises went bankrupt.

Some of the countries in Central and Eastern Europe had no previous experience of the market economy, or the system functioned there in a distorted form. Russia and other republics which constituted the former Soviet Union (apart from Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia), as well as Romania and Bulgaria, implemented the central planning system in the infrastructural conditions typical of a pre-capitalist economy. The transformation of the planning and management system into the system of a free market economy in those countries would turn out to be a particularly costly and long-lasting process.

By contrast, in Czechoslovakia, Hungary and Poland, the countries which for several decades before the beginning of the transformation had attempted to 'civilise' the centrally-planned economy by 'engrafting' various parts of a market economy, the system transformation was a much easier undertaking and it was connected with lower costs.

Due to the lack of a system of infrastructure specific for a free market and a diversified approach towards the capitalist economy, the system changes in Central and Eastern Europe should have been gradual and evolutionary, and the scale of free market implementation should have been diversified among the countries of the region.

The International Monetary Fund determined the transformation method in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe which applied for IMF's help in solving the problem of their external debt. The International Monetary Fund's aid was conditional on economic stabilization in those countries and their acceptance of the package of solutions, recommended by the IMF, which ensured the tight control of inflation and foreign trade equilibrium. The organisation justified its proposal by citing examples of

positive effects obtained in underdeveloped countries, particularly in Central and South America and the Middle East.

The International Monetary Fund treated economic stabilization solely as an introductory stage of system transformation. The transition of the stabilization package from a short-term solution to a long-term process required deeper system transformations. When the system changes in Central and Eastern Europe started, the IMF experts of the period claimed that only a free market could effectively prevent the recurrence of inflation in the region: a uniform solution was suggested by the IMF to all countries in Eastern Europe.[3]

Simultaneously, the IMF presented the view that system transformation (similarly to economy stabilization) should be conducted in a fast and radical way; however, the IMF did not specify the degree of the radicalism involved. The IMF provided Central and Eastern European countries with conceptual help, sending a number of its officials, who, led by Jeffrey Sachs, offered (paid) guidance to national experts.

Government experts in particular countries of Central and Eastern Europe presented diversified opinions concerning the transition towards the free market economy. The Polish government experts chose a radical path, that is, the shortest one, which meant applying free market principles in the Polish economy to the largest possible extent.

Only a small group of Polish economists supported the idea of a gradual transition from the centrally-planned economy to the free market system.[4]

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[3] I participated in two meetings with the representatives of the World Bank in Poland (the so-called 'Marriott Brigades' ('Brygady Marriotta') – the name is derived from the place in which they resided – the Marriott Hotel in Warsaw). The first 'Seminar on Managing Inflation in Socialist Economies' took place in Warsaw on 12–13 March 1990 in the Institute of World Economy SGPiS (Instytut Gospodarki Światowej SGPiS.) The second, 'Conference on Adjustment and Growth: Lessons for Eastern Europe'– in Pułtusk, in Dom Polonii, in October 1990. The World Bank delegation was headed by Jeffrey Sachs, who at present is the severest critic of the system therapy proposed by the IMF and the World Bank.

All the comments concerning the need to differentiate the 'therapy' employed in Central and Eastern Europe with regard to the specific characteristics of the countries, their level of development and the condition of their economy, were disregarded by the representatives of the World Bank. The principal argument was the necessity of an immediate start and a fast completion of the transformation. The costs of the transformation were not considered at all. The need to stabilize the economy was at the top of the agenda.

[4] When near the end of 1991 in the book: *Droga donikąd? Polska i jej sąsiedzi na rozdrożu* [*A Path to Nowhere? Poland and Its Neighbours at the Crossroads*], BGW, Warszawa 1991, I supported the idea of evolutionary transformation and warned about the risk of an extremely high unemployment rate and recession which threatened Poland, there was no reaction on the part of the decision-makers.

However, it had no impact on the transformation method which was applied in practice.

Russia and the majority of former republics belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States chose an even more radical option than Poland. In other Central and Eastern Europe countries the adopted transformation methods were diversified. The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Slovenia took an evolutionary path.

As a result, the highest costs of the transition were incurred by the countries which began their transformation under the conditions of a complete lack of free market system infrastructure (Russia and post-Soviet republics). The costs were lower in the countries which applied a less radical transformation method (among others, in Poland). In the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, where the transition towards the free market had an evolutionary character, the transformation costs were the lowest.[5]

Recession as the consequence of transformation in Poland and Russia; the impact on mutual trade

The first years of system transformation, both in Poland and in Russia, were characterised by recession tendencies in the economy; however, the recession in Russia was much deeper than in Poland. The obvious reason for such a situation was worse adjustment of the Russian economy to the conditions of the free market, as compared with the Polish economy.

The free market economy was an abstract notion in Russia: for years the term was most severely criticized by socialist activists. In Poland, free market capitalism was largely a real concept; for decades millions of Poles had penetrated European and American capitalism, mainly as window shoppers, but also as illegally, and sometimes legally, employed workers. The Russians, by contrast, had no possibility to experience real capitalism: ordinary citizens had no chance of leaving the country.

Not surprisingly, many years passed before the Russians learned the rules of free market activity, and during that time the economic crisis was gradually deepening. The Poles needed less time to understand the functioning of the free market; thus, the crisis in Poland was shorter than and not as severe as in Russia.

During the period of 'shock therapy' in Russia, the decline in trade with Poland had been caused by crisis phenomena in the Russian economy. Russia started its transformation two years after Poland. In the first years the

[5] P. Bożyk, *24 kraje Europy Środkowej i Wschodniej. Transformacja*, Warsaw 2002, p. 21–22.

transformation was of a steady and gradual character, only later did it take the form of a 'shock therapy'. In other words, at the beginning of the 1990s, when Poland experienced a drastic fall in GDP and industrial production, Russia was still to deal with the phenomenon. In the mid-1990s, when Poland started to return to the previous level of GDP, Russia was facing its drastic fall. Thus, we may conclude that the desynchronisation of the transformation processes in Poland and Russia had a major influence on Polish-Russian relations.

Also, strictly political factors exerted a considerable influence on the situation. From the very beginning of the transformation period, Poland and Russia differed in their outlooks on the future of Europe and the roles they should play there. Russia wanted to retain its traditional zone of influence in Europe at all costs. Poland, by contrast, aimed to leave the zone as soon as possible, and enter NATO and the European Union.

Both countries also differed with regard to their political goals. Poland demanded, as an ultimatum, that Russia immediately withdraw the Red Army soldiers based in Poland. Poland also demanded access to the archives of documents concerning the most recent history. In both cases, the demands were highly inconvenient for Russia. Therefore, Russia was trying to play for time on these demands. However, Russia soon had to yield to Poland's requests, especially with regard to the first demand.

These issues soured mutual political relations of the two countries. At the beginning of the 1990s, Poland was seen by Russia as the main obstacle in realizing its strategic goals in foreign policy formulated in 1993 in 'The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation'.[6] Simultaneously, Russia started to regard Poland as a third-category country, with a high level of political risk, which meant a complete marginalization of Poland's importance in Russia's economic relations with foreign countries. Russia took great interest in economic cooperation with Western European countries, and the political relations between Russia and Western countries have improved. The Russian Federation took a similar approach with regard to the United States. During the system transformation period, political factors were undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the decreasing importance of mutual trade, both for Poland and for Russia. Political interaction is a deciding factor determining Russian foreign economic relations: good political relations are an incentive for Russian entrepreneurs to develop economic relations; in turn, poor political relations hinder the development of economic relations.

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[6] *Stosunki gospodarcze Polska-Rosja w warunkach integracji z Unią Europejską*, ed. P. Bożyk, WSE, Warszawa, 2004, p. 17.

Perspectives for the development of Polish-Russian economic relations

In the period of system transformation, the importance of mutual economic relations both for Poland and for Russia diminished considerably, as compared with the pre-transition period. The Russian share in Polish foreign trade has been reduced: it ceased to be a key business partner for Poland and it has been replaced by Germany. At present, 75% of Polish foreign trade is based on cooperation with economically developed countries mainly from Western Europe, and a third part of it in trade with Germany.

Should these proportions be seen as a permanent change? The answer to the question is usually affirmative. The common view is that the geographical structure of Polish foreign trade, shaped in the last twenty years, will not undergo any major changes until 2020.

This forecast is highly probable and the claim will remain true on condition that both non-economic (mainly political ones) and economic factors influence Polish-Russian trade in the next decade in an identical way as was the case in 1990–2010. It is assumed that political relations will still be strained, hampering the development of mutual exchange.

The question arises: have the two countries become irreversibly indifferent to each other with regard to economic cooperation? It is claimed that the present geographical structure of Polish foreign trade should be seen as permanent. The supporters of this position take the view that there are no prerequisites to increase the importance of Russia's role in Polish foreign trade or Poland's role in the Russian trade. They believe that the structural reorientation is not likely to change.[7]

System transformation in Poland led almost all enterprises which had no export alternative to bankruptcy. At the same time, there emerged small and medium-sized enterprises which were focusing entirely on domestic or western markets. With regard to the import of manufactured goods, Poland became completely independent of the Russian market, concentrating its attention on highly industrialised countries. The dominance of small and medium enterprises in the Polish economy has resulted in the fact that our exporters are not treated as serious business partners for the large Russian market. Russia has lost its interest in importing manufactured goods from Poland: Polish enterprises have very limited possibilities with regard to the volume of supplies or granting credits, and it is very difficult for them to compete, both in terms of quality and technology, on the Russian market.

[7] M. Guzek, A. Kuźnar, *Prognoza rozwoju obrotów towarowych Polski z Rosją do 2020 roku z uwzględnieniem głównych grup towarowych*, [in:] *Polska–Rosja. Stosunki gospodarcze 2000–2020*, ed. P. Bożyk, WSEI, Warsaw, 2009, p. 120–129.

Russia is mainly interested in supplies from economically developed countries. At the same time, the markets of these countries are major recipients of Russian raw materials and energy resources.

Poland is unilaterally dependent on Russian supplies of oil and natural gas. This kind of dependence is highly unfavourable for Poland, especially when Poland is of third-rate importance for Russia. Thus, Poland has two alternatives: becoming independent from Russian supplies of energy resources, or alleviating the conflicts with Russia. Both solutions are difficult. Replacing Russia as a strategic energy supplier is theoretically possible. However, it requires considerable investment outlays and, simultaneously, it leads to a considerable rise in the cost of oil and natural gas on the Polish market.

In my opinion, basing Poland's future trade relations with Russia on the present 'status quo' is a great simplification both in the sphere of policy and economy. Increasing the significance of mutual trade would be advantageous for both parties.

In order to develop economic relations with Russia, Poland should aim to increase exports while not limiting imports. Russia's share in Polish global exports should reach at least the level of 7.5–10%. The increase of Polish exports to Russia is a prerequisite for a balanced and growing import of energy resources. At present, the negative trade balance reaches 10 billion a year and is showing a tendency to increase even further. Cautious estimates of the deficit for 2020 show that it will exceed 15 billion dollars a year.[8]

The export of industrial goods should be increased; however, it concerns mainly modern goods which are exported in long batches, supported by State aid. The market for industrial goods in Russia is an extremely vast area of competition for large Western European corporations as well as American and Japanese businesses. At this point we should note that it is not an easy market, in contrast to the reality of the Soviet Union. The quality and technical requirements are much higher, which is caused mainly by competition and the opening of the Russian market to foreign suppliers. Russia is on the eve of technological modernisation. Thousands of enterprises established under the conditions of the former system would definitely benefit from access to new technologies, know-how, modern methods of production management etc. Simultaneously, Russia has the financial means to pay for the technologies: abundant resources of oil and gas, and a developed transport infrastructure, in the form of oil and gas pipeline systems, which allows for fast and relatively cheap transfer of the resources to Western countries.

[8] *Ibidem*, p. 131.

Poland's membership in the European Union has created possibilities of increasing the export of manufactured goods to the Russian market through subcontracted supplies for large EU corporations which export to Russia. At present, some Polish firms already act as subcontracted suppliers cooperating with such enterprises, mainly German corporations.

In order to use all possibilities to increase Polish exports of manufactured goods to Russia in the context of Poland's membership of the European Union, Poland needs to satisfy the following requirements.

Firstly, Poland needs to apply EU standards in its foreign policy, namely, the policy must be based on respect for the interests of both parties.[9] In practice, it would mean the need to refrain from the policy of incessant quarrels with Russia and look to reach a compromise wherever possible.

Secondly, Poland has to develop medium-term and long-term strategies of adapting the commodity structure of Polish exports to the needs of the Russian market.

Thirdly, Poland needs to adjust its foreign economic policy to EU standards and the policy should provide for the interests of Polish exporters (crediting and insuring the exports) by means of signing appropriate treaties and international agreements.

Fourthly, the potential of Polish exporters should be increased. Small and medium enterprises are willing to adapt to new requirements; however, they are surpassed by large enterprises. Considering the difficult conditions of the Russian market, fulfilling this requirement is a necessity. The state should establish associations for the enterprises interested in exporting to Russia, uniting their efforts with regard to penetrating the Russian market and working on common solutions concerning advertising, marketing, transport, etc. Increasing Polish exports to Russia requires firm and ongoing institutional support, especially organisational help provided by the Polish State.

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[9] A. Stępień-Kuczyńska, M. Słowikowski, *Stosunki polsko-rosyjskie na tle relacji rosyjsko-unijnych*, [in:] *Polska–Rosja*…, p. 92.

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TWENTY YEARS OF POLAND'S EURO-ATLANTIC FOREIGN POLICY

ABSTRACT: During the years 1989-1991, after a deep transformation of the internal system and the international order in Europe, Poland pursued a sovereign foreign policy. The new policy had the following general goals: 1) to develop a new international security system which would guarantee Poland's national security; 2) to gain diplomatic support for the reforms conducted in Poland, including primarily the transformation of the economy and its adaption to free market mechanisms, which were designed to result in economic growth; and 3) to maintain and increase the international prestige of Poland and the Poles, who had been the first to commence the struggle to create a democratic civil society in the Eastern bloc. Implementing this new concept of foreign policy, Poland entered the Council of Europe in November 1991. The following year, Warsaw started to strive for membership of NATO, which was achieved in March 1999. A few years later, Polish leaders pursued policies in which Poland played the role of a "Trojan horse" for the USA. This was manifested most clearly during the Iraqi crisis of 2003, and in the following years, particularly in 2005-2007. From spring 1990 Poland aspired to integration with the European Community; in December of the following year it signed an associa-tion agreement, which fully entered into force in February 1994. In the period 1998-2002 Poland negotiated successfully with the European Union and finally entered this Union in May 2004. In subsequent years Poland adopted an Eurosceptic and sometimes anti-EU position. The new Polish government, established after the parliamentary election of autumn 2007, moved away from an Eurosceptic policy and pursued a policy of engage-ment with European integration.

KEY WORDS: Poland's foreign policy, Euro-Atlantic direction, Council of Europe, Euroscepticism, International security, transformation, "Trojan horse"

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New concept of foreign policy

After the deep transformation of the international order in Europe after the Cold War, Poland initiated a sovereign foreign policy. In the years 1989–1991 the geopolitical and geo-strategic position of Poland changed. Poland was no longer a part of the Eastern Bloc, which had collapsed, and found itself in a new international environment, bordering a powerful Germany and a plethora of post-USSR states, including, since 1993, the two states that resulted from the division of Czechoslovakia. Though Russia remained one of Poland's neighbours, it no longer held a strategic umbrella over it, and Poland began to pursue a policy of constructive cooperation with the USA and other Western states.

Poland found itself in a new political situation. In the post-Cold War era and in the increasingly democratic Europe, Polish foreign policy had the following general goals:

to encourage the development of a new international security system which would guarantee Poland's national security;

to gain diplomatic support for the reforms conducted in Poland, including the transformation of the economy and its adaptation to free market mechanisms designed to bring about economic growth; and

to maintain and increase the international prestige of Poland and the Poles, who had been the first to commence the struggle to create a democratic civil society in the Soviet bloc.[1]

As a result of the ambitious and difficult nature of these three main goals in the international arena, the tasks which Polish foreign policy faced were much more extensive in comparison with the previous period. Thus the need for new ideas, views, and concepts concerning this sphere of the state's activity became more acute. It became necessary for Poland to join the initiatives of other states as well as to undertake independent diplomatic actions of an explanatory or polemical nature, to join international negotiations already underway and execute already concluded agreements, both bilateral and multilateral.

In the times of real socialism, beginning with the breakthrough of October 1956, the doctrine of foreign policy of the Polish People's Republic was guided by three principles: 1) the principle of socialist internationalism, which meant unity, friendship, mutual aid, and close cooperation among socialist states, mainly including the states of the Warsaw Pact and Comecon; 2) the principle of solidarity with nations fighting for national and social liberation, i.e. countries of the Third World trying to break free from colonial

[1] R. Zięba, *Główne kierunki polityki zagranicznej Polski po zimnej wojnie*, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2010, p. 17.

and neo-colonial dependence; and 3) the principle of peaceful coexistence with states of a different social and political order (i.e. mainly capitalist states). Since the 1970s the practical order of importance of these principles changed, the principle of peaceful coexistence rising to second rank, after the principle of close cooperation with socialist states. When, in turn, tensions arose in the relations with the Western states (e.g. in the early 1980s), the authorities of the Polish People's Republic placed increased importance on relations with the developing countries2.

Since 1989, Polish foreign policy has undergone wide-ranging and significant changes. In seeking new security guarantees and new opportunities for economic development, Polish foreign policy opened up and established contacts and cooperation with the Western democratic states. Already by the beginning of the following decade, this resulted in the adoption of a clear Euro-Atlantic orientation, which was made the number one priority in determining the trajectories of Poland's international activities. The second direction of Polish policy is cooperation with the states of Central Europe undergoing transformation. This cooperation is also extended to the neighbouring Western states, both in terms of its function and subject-matter, thanks to which several sub-regional groupings involving Poland's participation came into being in the area of the former boundaries between the West and East. The third direction in Polish foreign policy is its Eastern policy, which was focused, in the early period, on eliminating ties of imperial dependency on the USSR, then on the settling of historical disputes and building the foundations for bilateral relations and treaties with our Eastern neighbours. At least one of the directions of the former foreign policy was eliminated at the beginning of the transformation, i.e., Poland's involvement in cooperation with the post-colonial states of Asia, Africa and Latin America. While Poland has maintained some of the contacts with these states, in fact it has been seeking only partners connected with the West, which are developing rapidly and thus hold out the prospect of mutually beneficial economic cooperation. Poland's movement in this direction was influenced by its establishment of diplomatic relations with Israel, the Republic of South Africa (before the overthrow of the Apartheid regime) and Chile, but the new diplomatic ties with these three countries undoubtedly adversely affected Poland's standing in the Arab states and the other neighbours of those three states.

The new Polish government, formed by Tadeusz Mazowiecki in September 1989, declared the extension of political, economic, cultural and civilisation ties with the states of Western Europe and the USA to be one of

[2] For more see: J. Zając, R. Zięba, *Polska w stosunkach międzynarodowych 1945–1989*, Wydawnictwo Adam Marszałek, Toruń 2004, p. 175–179.

the priorities of Polish foreign policy. This aspiration was expressed by the slogan "return to Europe", which consisted of joining three organizations: the Council of Europe, NATO and the European Union.

Entering the Council of Europe

The first step in this direction was manifested by Poland's attempts to join the Council of Europe. Tadeusz Mazowiecki's cabinet took this initiative in January 1990. Soon the representatives of Poland began to participate in the works of all bodies of this organisation and in October of that year Poland obtained "observer guest" status. Following the free democratic elections to the *Sejm* (the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament), Poland was officially admitted to the Council of Europe on 26 November 1991.

In this way it joined the group of democratic states and obtained institutional and political support for its transformations, which were aimed at including Poles in the circle of Western civilisation. Poland's membership in the Council of Europe extended its social and cultural ties with the states of Western Europe and strengthened the opinion that Poland's accession to other, more important European and Euro-Atlantic institutions, would follow.

Cooperation and membership of NATO

The main concern of the governments of democratic Poland was to ensure national security. At the beginning of the transformation period, Polish leaders had attempted to support international initiatives for building a new system of European collective security based on the Conference on Cooperation and Security in Europe (CSCE), simultaneously initiating contacts and dialogue with Western security structures, i.e. NATO and the Western European Union (WEU), which intensified after the dissolution in July 1991 of the Warsaw Pact. In practice they implemented the Western idea of interlocking institutions, announced by the Rome NATO Summit in November 1991.

Gradually Poland took a position which aimed at joining NATO. This was motivated by two types of arguments: firstly, that Poland should obtain security guarantees from the West inasmuch as, in the new geopolitical situation, it found itself in a „grey area" of uncertainty, facing new challenges and probable threats; and secondly, that certain threats were associated with the instability in the area of the former USSR, the unpredictability of the behaviour and role of the Russian army (which until the autumn of

1993 still had troops stationed in Poland), and Poland's military weakness in the face of a potential threat from the East.

This traditional (military-oriented) perspective on security was reflected in such documents as "The Tenets of Polish Security Policy", signed by President Lech Wałęsa, and the "Security Policy and Defence Strategy of the Republic of Poland" attached to it, adopted by The National Defence Committee on 2 November 1992. These two documents formulated the goal of gaining membership of NATO.

This decision showed that Poland perceived NATO as an entity which would provide the so-called 'hard security' guarantees, ensured by the US military presence in Europe. Warsaw was sceptical about the possibility of obtaining security from a Western European security structure devoid of the political and military presence of the USA. The experiences of the interwar period (1918–1939) indicated that the alliance with France and Great Britain would not provide effective security guarantees for Poland. Poland manifested its disbelief in the possibility that Western Europe was able to build an autonomous security system without the participation of the United States. For this reason, Poland did not see the Western European Union as an alternative option in its security policy, and in the early years of the transformation showed no interest in cooperating with the organisation.[3] Another factor which discouraged the authorities of Poland from even presenting opinions on the issue was the existence of continuing disputes concerning the implementation of the concept of a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) and over the role of the WEU in the Western security system.[4] However, on April 29th 1993 Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his Parliamentary exposé, expressed his satisfaction with the fact that the rivalry between the Western European Union and NATO was coming to an end, and supported the trans-Atlantic, pro-American orientation among Western European politicians.[5] This position reflected the general concept (represented by Poland) of integrating the West as a homogenous system, in which the alleged absence of inter-Atlantic rivalry and the dominant position of the USA were to prevent re-nationalisation of the superpowers' security policies and induce the creation

[3] When WEU Secretary General, Willem van Eekelen, came to Warsaw at the beginning of March 1990, he had difficulty finding appropriate partners in the Polish government.

[4] For more information, see R. Zięba, *"European Security and Defence Identity: The Polish Viewpoint"*, The Polish Foreign Affairs Digest, 2001, No. 1, p. 183–212.

[5] See "Statement by Mr. Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland, made on Poland's foreign policy in 1993, to the Polish Sejm, Warsaw, 29th April 1993", Materials and Documents, No. 5/1993, Vol. 2, p. 131–141.

of a cooperative, i.e. internationalised, security system in Europe, the "hard core" of which was to be NATO.

Poland commenced its political contacts and cooperation with NATO relatively early – indeed already by August the 9th 1990 official relations between Warsaw and the NATO Headquarters in Brussels were established. Poland's Eastern policy, however, was undergoing transformation following the rapidly changing situation in post-Cold War Europe. The declaration on the "Partnership with the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe", adopted in early (6–7) June 1991 during the Copenhagen session of the North Atlantic Council, was a clear signal of encouragement for the pro-Atlantic orientation of Poland and other Central European states.[6]

In September 1991, Prime Minister of the Republic of Poland, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, was told in Washington that neither Poland's accession to NATO nor the opening of a security umbrella by the Alliance over Eastern Europe were on the cards, and he was also told in the US Department of State that Poland's road to NATO was envisioned via the attainment of EEC membership. This was a most discouraging response, as it was obvious that the process of adaptation which Poland had to undergo in order to accede to the European Community would be one of long duration. Efforts to join NATO were also made by other countries of Central Europe, especially the states of the Visegrad Group in cooperation with Poland, as well as Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia (in the Baltic Group formula) and Romania.

In November 1991, the leaders of the sixteen Member States decided at their Rome summit that the Alliance would continue to exist even though its main adversary (the Warsaw Pact and the USSR) had disappeared, and that it would take up dialogue and cooperation with the formerly hostile states and other European countries. Pursuant to the decisions of this summit, on 20th December 1991, a consultative structure named the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), to which Poland was invited, was established. Within this structure information was exchanged, staffs were trained, and military forces were prepared for peacekeeping operations which the Alliance proposed to the CSCE and the United Nations in 1992.

Poland continued its efforts aimed at NATO accession, employing a "step by step" approach. In January 1994, the NATO summit in Brussels established the Partnership for Peace programme. Although President Lech Wałęsa strongly criticized the programme as insufficient due to its failure to clearly delineate the prospects for the enlargement of the Alliance, Poland signed the framework Partnership for Peace programme on 2nd February 1994 (as the third country to do so after Lithuania and Romania), and on 5th

[6] See: J. Dean, *Ending Europe's Wars: The Continuing Search for Peace and Security*, A Twentieth Century Fund Press, New York 1994, p. 252.

July Poland was the first country to sign an individual programme within the Partnership. Thereafter it actively participated in the Partnership for Peace programme, and in September the first military manoeuvres involving NATO forces in Poland took place in Biedrusk near Poznań.

In late September 1995 NATO presented a document entitled The Study on NATO Enlargement to the candidate states. From that time on, Poland made persistent efforts to comply with the political and military criteria set forth as preparations for Alliance membership, and actively participated in the Partnership for Peace. At the same time, polemics were engaged in with Russia, which from September 1993 unequivocally and unambiguously criticised the NATO enlargement plans.

In the spring of 1997 the Member States of the Alliance took the decision on enlargement. The preliminary step was the conclusion of an understanding concerning the strategic partnership between NATO and the Russian Federation. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation, and the transformation (at the request of Russia) of the NACC into the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) were preliminary framework conditions. Thanks to them, it was possible for the NATO leaders gathered in Madrid to announce on 8th July 1997 their decision to invite three Central European states, i.e. Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary, to accession talks. The talks ended with the signing of accession agreements on 16th December 1997 in Brussels. The process of ratification of the agreements was smooth, and the approval of the US Senate on 30 April 1998 constituted a breakthrough. Poland became a NATO member after submitting the ratification documents to the US government on 12th March 1999.

Upon joining the powerful North Atlantic Alliance, Poland immediately took on the role of an active ally, clearly emphasising the importance it attached to the military presence of the USA in Europe. Twelve days after its NATO accession, Poland (politically) joined the NATO war effort in Yugoslavia (the so-called Kosovo war), which was controversial from the perspective of international law. In the subsequent months and years, Warsaw has consistently demonstrated its willingness to transform NATO into a "global alliance" in accordance with the expectations of Washington; for instance, it advocated NATO participation in the US-Iraqi war, begun on 20th March 2003, and took actions designed to have the Alliance administer Iraq.

As a NATO member, Poland has openly chosen the strategy of bandwagoning to US foreign policy,[7] and relatively quickly began to play its role as a close US ally. At the end of 2002 it decided to purchase the American

[7] J. Zając, *„Bandwagoning w polskiej polityce zagranicznej"*, Przegląd Zachodni, 2009, no. 3, p. 168–178.

multi-task F-16 aircraft, gave its in blanco support to the invasion of Iraq in March 2003, agreed to administer one of the occupational zones in the country,[8] willingly contributed to the deepening transatlantic disputes (in the so-called 'letter of eight' of 30th January 2003), and opposed closer cooperation among the EU states within the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP). This policy reduced Poland's role to that of a US client state and failed to gain it respect, as reflected in the fact that Warsaw's postulates concerning the obtainment of contracts for reconstruction in Iraq and its demands for liberalisation of the visa requirements for Polish citizens entering the US have both been largely ignored. Although it is a certain oversimplification, one may perceive an analogy between being the so-called "No. 2" in the Warsaw Pact and the efforts of the cabinets of Jerzy Buzek (1997–2001), Leszek Miller (2001–2004) and Jarosław Kaczyński (2006–2007) to obtain similar status in NATO. The similarity in the self-vassalage of the leaders of the Polish People's Republic and the present democratic Poland is striking.[9] However, a major difference lies in the fact that in the previous authoritarian system the leaders did not have to pay attention to the opinions of society, while in the present system they should. It is worth noting that the majority of Polish society opposed Poland's joining the war with Iraq and the participation in the post-war occupation of the country.

Association and membership of the European Union

By implementing the ambitious programme of political transformation, and in particular the economic 'shock therapy' based on the monetarist theory of Leszek Balcerowicz, Poland established broad cooperation with Western European states and their main institution – the European Community. Poland sought to conclude an association agreement with this dynamic and rapidly strengthening entity as soon as possible, and then to join the European Union which was then being created. Poland's commitment to this goal resulted from its conviction that affiliation with the EU was absolutely necessary due to the civilisation choices which the Poles had made in the late 1980s. The formal application to commence negotiations concerning the

[8] M. Stolarczyk, *„Kontrowersje wokół militarnego zaangażowania Polski w Iraku"*, Przegląd Zachodni, 2005, no. 1, p. 63–92.

[9] It is worth noting, however, that the policy of "friendship and cooperation" with the USA has been recently pursued by politicians with considerable experience in the field of strengthening socialist internationalism and "friendship and brotherhood" with the USSR, who in the 1970s and 1980s were prominent activists of the Polish United Workers' Party and the youth organisations connected with the party.

association agreement was placed on the table by the Polish government in Brussels in May 1990, and negotiations began in December of that year in an atmosphere of optimism on both sides. During the negotiations, however, major conflicts of interest appeared. The European Commission, contrary to previous declarations, sought to limit the access of many Polish goods (coal, metallurgical products, textiles, and agricultural products) to the Western European market and to obtain preferential treatment in Poland for its own goods.

On 16th December 1991, following rather short negotiations conducted by Poland in concert and collaboration with Czechoslovakia and Hungary, The Europe Agreement Establishing the Association of Poland with the European Communities and their Member States was signed. This Agreement was to come into force on 1st February 1994, and even earlier, on 1st March 1992, its Part III regarding trade came into force as a transitional agreement. Apart from the extensive provisions on economic cooperation, the Europe Agreement was a political dialogue between Poland and the European Communities (Article 1). The preamble to the Agreement contained a provision stating that "the final objective of Poland is to become a member of the Community and this association, in the view of the Parties, will help to achieve this objective".

The Agreement brought Poland closer to the European Community, but difficulties occurred in bilateral cooperation, arising from the protective policy of the Community Member States juxtaposed with the fact that Poland had opened its market wide for goods from the EU, which resulted in Poland's considerable negative balance of trade with the EU. The adaptation process was long due to the structural and legal discrepancies between Poland and the standards of the European Community. In addition, the then twelve Member States did not practically assist Poland in accelerating the process. Their leaders formulated the criteria of accession only in June 1993, during the session of the European Council in Copenhagen. Subsequently, for the next few years they delayed the issuance of a timetable setting forth the Eastern European candidate countries' path to full membership in the European Community.

Poland filed a formal application for EU membership on 8th April 1994, but the European Union showed no urgency to make the formal decision to invite the candidates for membership. It was not until 13th December 1997 that the European Council invited them to participate in the accession negotiations. Talks with six candidates (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Slovenia, Estonia and Cyprus) were inaugurated on 31st March 1998, and on 10th November of that year the process began. The programmes of all the subsequent governments in Warsaw invariably articulated the goal of Poland's accession to the EU. In the meantime, problems remained in the

relations between Poland and the EU concerning EU barriers placed on the export of Polish metallurgical and agricultural products, which increased the number of opponents of accession in Poland. Only Germany consequently tried to facilitate Poland's road to the EU, and served as an advocate of Poland in that process.[10]

The entirety of issues to be negotiated was divided into 31 chapters. Some of them, e.g. issues concerning research and development, education, training and youth raised no controversies and were (initially) closed on the day when the working talks began. The most difficult issues, such as agriculture, finance, budget, and competition policy were delayed by the Polish government until the end of the negotiations. As a consequence, the European Council session which took place with the participation of the heads of state of candidate countries in Copenhagen on 12–13th December 2002 was most dramatic. Poland, which had posed the greatest demands regarding the protection of its national agriculture (transition periods regarding the purchase of land by foreigners, direct payments for farmers) and subsidies to the budget from EU resources, was very successful in the end; it negotiated highly favourable accession terms, which were beneficial for the other acceding states as well . Admittedly, it made a bad impression on the EU partners, but the entrance gate to the path to accession was opened.[11]

The signing of the Accession Treaty on 16th April 2003 in Athens by the heads of the 25 EU states, including 15 Member States and 10 acceding states (with Poland among them), was a great historic event. On that day Prime Minister Leszek Miller, Minister of Foreign Affairs Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz and Minister for European Affairs Danuta Hübner, in the presence of President Aleksander Kwaśniewski and the first Prime Minister of democratic Poland, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, signed the extensive document defining the terms of Poland's membership of the European Union. The Accession Treaty is almost 5,500 pages long and it contains provisions relating to all 10 acceding states, as well as separate chapters devoted to each of the states. The regulations regarding Poland are the longest – as many as 1,000 pages.

The Accession Treaty was accepted by Polish society in a referendum on 7–8th June 2003. Though there were considerable fears regarding the outcome, it proved to be positive. The voter turnout for the referendum was 58.85% of eligible voters, of which 77.45% gave their consent to Poland's accession to the European Union. The Accession Treaty was ratified by the

[10] See also: A. Zięba, *„Droga Polski do Europy przez Niemcy"*, Studia Politologiczne, (Institute of Political Science, University of Warsaw), vol. 10, Warszawa 2006, p. 153–170.

[11] For more on the negotiations, see: A. Domagała, *Integracja Polski z Unią Europejską*, Wydawnictwa Akademickie i Profesjonalne, Warszawa 2008.

President of the Republic of Poland on 23rd July 2003, and Poland's road to the European Union was officially opened on the Polish side. As a result, on 1st May 2004, Poland, along with nine other states (Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Lithuania, Latvia, Malta, Slovakia and Slovenia) became a new member of the EU. This marks the historic date on which Poland joined what will probably constitute, for many years, the most powerful integration organisation in the world, and which is also a strong centre of European culture and civilisation. In joining the EU, Poland has knotted close and apparently permanent ties with the democratic states of Western Europe. Thus the slogan announced at the beginning of Poland's transformation – "the return to Europe" – has been fulfilled.

Poland's roles within the EU

After the euphoria, loudly expressed by the Euro-enthusiasts, had died down, Poland soon began to re-evaluate its positive attitude towards the European Union. This was the result of at least two factors. First, there were signals coming from Brussels indicating that the European Commission interpreted certain provisions of the Accession Treaty differently than the government in Warsaw (inter alia those on direct payments for farmers and production limits), accompanied by critical judgments from Brussels claiming that Poland was the worst-prepared state with regard to the implementation of EU standards.[12] This gave rise to increasingly voiced criticisms from the Euro-sceptics, who also became more and more numerous. Secondly, Poland's involvement in the war and subsequent occupation of Iraq, strongly criticised by Polish society, fixed the perception of its role as that of "the closest ally of the US among the new states of new Europe". This role gave Polish leaders a false impression of their country's allegedly growing prestige in the international arena, which was used as a premise for the assumption that Poland's position in the European Union would be strengthened thanks to its support of Washington. The effects of this way of thinking were demonstrated in the debate on the institutional reform of the Union.

The government of the Republic of Poland formulated, on 9th September 2003, a critical judgment concerning the Treaty Establishing the Constitution for Europe, previously presented (on 10th July) by the European Convention. Poland made four major postulates: the first and most impor-

[12] This judgement was officially presented in the Comprehensive Monitoring Report on Poland's Preparation for Membership, submitted by the European Commission on 5 November 2003.

tant was that the system of weighted voting in the EU Council established under the Nice Treaty[13] be maintained, which meant rejecting the system of the so-called 'double majority' proposed by the Convention (absolute majority of states plus a stipulated demographic majority, proposed at the level of 60% of the total EU population); the second regarded improving the efficiency of the institutional system of the EU – Poland objected to the idea of establishing a single EU president and advocated a group presidency, as well as abandonment of the concept of establishing a Council for General and Legislative Affairs and maintaining the "one state – one vote" principle in the choice of members of the European Commission; the third involved ensuring the participation of all EU members in decisions defining the cooperation mechanisms in the area of Common Foreign and Security Policy (and in issues concerning the European Security and Defence Policy), as well as including a stipulation regarding the role of NATO in the Euro-Atlantic security system (which in practice meant an objection to the establishment of defence structures in the EU which could be competitive towards NATO); and fourth – the inclusion of a reference to Europe's Christian tradition in the preamble to the Constitutional Treaty.[14]

Poland presented its position concerning all the above four postulates during the Intergovernmental Conference which began on 4th October 2003 in Rome. In subsequent weeks Polish diplomats made intense efforts to gain support for Poland's position, which in fact delayed the work on the European Constitution. This is when the peculiar Warsaw–Madrid axis was established, along with the divisions in the EU caused by the Iraqi crisis. In spite of its intense efforts, Poland did not manage to gain any support for its position from any EU Member State (apart from that of Spain) or candidate country. Consequently, the unyielding position of Poland and Spain during the 13th December 2003 session led to the breakdown of the summit and the work of the Intergovernmental Conference was prolonged.

[13] Warsaw demanded the preservation of the Nice provisions according to which Poland (and Spain) were granted 27 weighted votes, i.e. only two votes less than the "great four", i.e. Germany, France, Italy, and Great Britain. In practice, this procedure meant "a triple majority", as a decision requires at least 255 weighted votes (out of 345) of the states with at least 62% of the EU population, which in turn meant favouring small states. The Polish argumentation referred to the pacta sunt servanda principle. The new voting system proposed by the European Convention, after its entry into force, would mean taking decisions in compliance with the "double majority" principle, i.e. a majority of the states representing at least 60% of the EU population. According to the opinion of the German Minister of Foreign Affairs, Joschka Fischer, this system would reflect the dual character of the EU as a union of states and citizens. In fact, the system gives a considerable advantage to large EU states over the remaining members.

[14] See the Communiqué after the Council of Ministers, 09.09.2003.

Following his return from Brussels, Polish Prime Minister Leszek Miller was greeted as a hero. He was praised in the first instance by a political opposition which was pro-European, which had taken a distinct liking to the slogan presented in the *Sejm* (by MP Jan Rokita of the Civic Platform) – "Nice or death". Even more strikingly, his political adversaries who were opponents of Poland's accession to the EU (the parties League of Polish Families and Self-Defence) could not conceal their satisfaction, arguing that even the head of the Cabinet understood that Poland's accession to the EU was economically disadvantageous and posed a threat to the state sovereignty, as Poland could be dominated by strong states such as Germany or France. The President and his chancellery, as well some liberal circles (the Democratic Left Alliance and independent experts) appealed for granting the Polish government greater flexibility in the further work on the European constitution, coordinated in the first half of 2004 by Ireland, which was holding the presidency of the EU Council. Apparently, the increasing disenchantment expressed in Poland with the choice of its pro-American course in foreign policy, which improved the perception and negotiating position of the main proponents of a strengthened EU, i.e. France and Germany, was a factor strengthening the pro-European attitudes of the Polish political elites. In mid-March of 2004 Poland was left all alone after the Spanish Prime Minister-elect, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, announced a change in Madrid's position and its acceptance of the EU Constitution. As a result, during the meeting of the European Council on 25–26th March in Brussels, Poland ultimately resigned from its defence of the Nice voting system in the EU Council, expressing its consent to a compromise based on a draft containing a double majority system in the decision-making process of the European Council of Ministers.

Agreement was reached at the next session of the European Council on 17–18th of June 2004. Poland accepted a modified formula of so-called double majority voting by EU Council and European Council. It was agreed as a principle of decision-making by qualified majority of 55% of votes of Council members comprising 15 states, with the demographic clause of 65% of the whole EU population; the blocking minority was defined as four Council members. Poland also gave up the inclusion into the preamble of the treaty of the reference to Europe's Christian heritage.

The final result of the Intergovernmental Conference 2003/2004 was the Treaty Establishing a Constitution of Europe, signed on 29th October 2004. It was expected to replace the Treaty Establishing the EC, the Treaty on the EU and other related acts. Acceptance by the government of this document was strongly criticised by the political opposition in Poland. It demanded a refusal of the treaty as it, they argued, reduced Poland's importance and sovereignty.

Finally, Poland joined all EU organs. In June 2004, after the election to the European Parliament, Polish deputies entered this body. In that group there were also adversaries of European integration, recruited from rightist and populist parties. Two Polish deputies assumed the posts of vice-chairmen of the EP, and in November 2004 Danuta Hübner entered the new European Commission, as a commissionaire for regional policy.

In Autumn 2005, after parliamentary and presidential elections, a deep change took place in Poland's politics. In October a new government was formed by nationalistic rightist party Law and Justice (PiS), and in December Lech Kaczyński from PiS was elected President. Poland turned to an openly anti-EU policy. The new government and president revoked the ratification of the Constitutional Treaty and did not participate in any debate within the EU. Their propaganda criticised the EU, presenting it as an enemy of Poland. Simultaneously, relations between Poland and Germany and France deteriorated and were of full of disputes.

On the issue of a new treaty on the EU, Poland demanded the return to the Nice formula of decision-making, and the strengthening of a procedure of decision blocking (using the Joanina mechanism). After numerous endeavours of France and Germany in June 2007, Poland decided to accept a compromise solution. The essence of Poland's position was to accept a treaty reduced to the reforms of EU institutions (Reform Treaty), without the Charter of Fundamental Rights. The Polish president L. Kaczyński finally approved the text of the new treaty, based on the principal clauses of the Constitutional Treaty.

Poland achieved prolongation of the Nice formula of decision-making until 31st October 2014, and in exceptional cases to March the 31st 2017.[15] The EU gave up the plans to establish a Minister of Foreign Affairs, choosing another name for this post – High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. In this way, the deadlock in the operation of the new treaty was prevented. On 13th December president Lech Kaczyński signed the Treaty of Lisbon.

After the next parliamentary election PiS lost power in Poland. The new coalition formed by the Civic Platform (PO) and the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL) moved away from the Eurosceptic policy and undertook actions to reform and strengthen the EU. Its initiatives were disturbed by President Kaczyński, who continued PiS policy and entered into constitutional

[15] From 1st November 2014 a new formula based on so-called double majority will be introduced. For a decision to be made, two criteria will have to be met: first, a majority of 55% (plus one state) of member states; secondly, states which opted for the decision must represent at least 65% of the total population of the EU.

disputes with the government on competences in the domain of foreign policy.

The expression of such a political situation in Poland was the approval by Parliament (Sejm and Senate) of the Treaty of Lisbon (1–2nd of April 2008), and the refusal by the president to sign it. President L. Kaczyński finally signed the treaty, but not before 10th October 2009, following the second Irish referendum approving the Treaty of Lisbon (2nd October 2009). The Polish government accepted the position of PiS and the president to stick to the British Protocol, leaving the possibility of limiting the implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights.

Poland is engaged not only in reforming the institutional system of the EU, but also in establishing a new programme of EU external activity – the Eastern Partnership. That proposal has been promoted since 2002, when the EU was preparing its European Neighbourhood Policy. Poland has taken steps to develop cooperation with Eastern neighbours, and to minimize its position as a "front country". It was difficult to convince partners to support this initiative. Only after Sweden backed the Polish proposition, did the EU Council decide (19th March 2009) to establish the Eastern Partnership. It aims to promote stability, democracy, good governance and development within Eastern neighbours participating in the European Neighbourhood Policy. Officially the Eastern Partnership was inaugurated on 7th May 2009 during the Prague meeting of the European Council, with the participation of six post-Soviet republics: Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The Eastern Partnership is a flexible programme of cooperation in all spheres of mutual relations. For the first four years a rather modest sum of 600 million Euros was provided. Poland is interested in a relaxation of the visa regime for citizens of post-Soviet states and the targetable abolition of visas. Poland has proposed pilot programmes to protect cultural heritage and fight corruption. A very important feature of Poland's position has been to include Belarus in the Eastern Partnership, even though the country does not fulfil EU democratic standards. The Eastern Partnership does not promise Eastern neighbours membership of the EU, but, in the opinion of Polish politicians, it does not exclude such an option either, at least for some of them (first of all Ukraine).

Since the establishment of the Eastern Partnership no agreement with Russia has been reached. Moscow does not want to join this programme, arguing that it is directed against its interests. Nevertheless, leaders of the EU present an open position, hoping to include Russia in the programme.

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RUSSIAN-ESTONIAN RELATIONS AFTER 2007: CURRENT STATUS AND DEVELOPMENT PROSPECTS

ABSTRACT: The article highlights the major points that have influenced relations between Russia and Estonia after 2007. These relations were rather poor during the post-Soviet period. The number of Russian people who lived in Estonia after gaining independence in 1991 exceeded 30%, which resulted in the very keen interest of Russia in Estonian politics. April 2007 created a new reality for relations between the countries. The decision to move the statues of Second World War Soviet soldiers from main squares to cemeteries provoked negative reactions from Russians living in Estonia, but also infuriated leaders of the Russian government. As a consequence there were harsh verbal attacks from Moscow, the Estonian ambassador to Moscow was harassed, cyberspace attacks took place and traffic over the bridge in Narva, which is a key highway from Russia, was blocked. The Estonian authorities know there is no point in maintaining conflict with Russia. The President of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, has stressed that Estonia's relationship with its biggest neighbour, Russia, can only get better. Russia plays an incredibly important role in the Estonian economy and tourist industry, according to Andrus Ansip, the Prime Minister of Estonia.

KEY WORDS: Russian–Estonian relations, Bronze Soldier Night, cyber attacks in Estonia, The Estonian State Integration Programme, Russians in Estonia

Estonia is a country, which is strongly divided taking into consideration the issue of ethnicity. Nevertheless, from 1991 Estonia has made rapid progress in establishing both a democratic political system and a free-market economy. In the first years after gaining independence it was very important to follow a political course which strengthened the democratic system and to integrate Estonia with the EU structures and NATO. Joining the EU and

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NATO were the key goals of foreign policy. Relations with Russia were also significant and crucial for many reasons.[1]

It should be noted that relations between Estonia and Russia have been rather poor during the post-Soviet period. There were some breakthroughs and brighter moments but those occasional events were not significant enough to melt the icy silence and develop cooperation between these two countries. The restructuring of the historically difficult relations was anticipated to take place after the enlargement of the EU and the accession of Estonia to this organization. Unfortunately, three years after Estonia joined the EU, the permafrost in Estonian-Russian relations shows no sign of melting. Moreover, the poor relations have become worse. The issue of the Russian minority living in Estonia remains on the agenda. It has turned out that leaving the past behind and starting new and consensual activities is impossible at this time.[2]

The inquiry regarding the poor and weak relations between Estonia and Russia seems to be as topical as ever before. Estonian relations with Russia remain difficult and tough because Russian authorities claim that Estonia does not respect, and even violates the human rights of Russians living in its territory.[3]

The problem is with the integration of Russians into Estonian society. The large number of Russians is poorly integrated into Estonia and with Estonians. They are denied Estonian citizenship because they have not completed the procedures of naturalization yet. It should be noted that the Estonian government tries to deal with this issue and initiates new integration programmes. The current program is named The State Integration Programme for 2008–2013. It consists of two parts: a strategy and an action plan, and it aims to achieve its goals by the end of 2013. The main goal of the program is to improve knowledge of Estonian language on all levels, and to increase the contact and communication between groups of people who speak different mother tongues. It is also highly important to build trust

[1] S. Woehrel, CRS Report for Congress: Estonia – current issues and U.S. policy, July 2007, p. 1–2, from the Congressional Report Service website [http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/] 02.10.2010.

[2] *Identity and foreign policy: Baltic-Russian relations and European integration*, eds. E. Berg, P. Ehin, Ashgate Publishing Limited 2009, England, p. 1–2.

[3] The Russian-speaking minority constitutes approximately 30% of the Estonian population. 24.9% of the Estonian population are Russians (as of 01.01.2008). At the beginning of 2000 it was 25.6%, at the very end of the 1990s the number of Russians in Estonia was higher, it was 30.3%. (The data are taken from the website Estonia.eu – official getaway to Estonia 02.10.2010: http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/country/population-by-nationality.html).

among residents from different national groups and for Estonia as a state. The other issue is to get regular information from Estonian-language media to residents who do not speak or understand this language. Moreover the government wants to decrease the differences between the salaries of employees of different nationalities.[4]

The point of the new strategy is to bring Russian residents into the social life of the country. It is strongly linked to enhancing Estonia's inhabitants' involvement in the social sphere. Mutual tolerance and equal chances, irrespective of nationality, are the basic requirements of every society.[5]

After 1991, knowledge of the Estonian language was essential to get citizenship of this country. The number of people who did not get Estonian citizenship after independence in 1991 was rather high. People whose ancestors were not citizens of Estonia before the accession to the Soviet Union in June 1940 had to apply for citizenship and had to fulfil certain requirements, such as knowledge of Estonian language and history. Without citizenship those people could not vote in national elections and did not have the rights which were guaranteed to all citizens. Furthermore, Russians living in Estonia suffered from higher unemployment than ethnic Estonians, and their standard of living was much lower. This was mainly due to their jobs. Russians were paid less than ethnic Estonians6. These issues have influenced Russian – Estonian relations after 20047.

After joining the EU and NATO, Estonia faced new challenges. The country was seen as an active and influential participant in the change process. However, there was a danger that Estonia could be marginalized within the EU and bilateral conflict with Russia fostered. From May 2004 all forms of communication between Russia and Estonia had to take place in the context of Estonia's membership of the EU. Estonia's belonging to the EU system influenced both political and non-political relations with Russia.

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[4] Estonia.eu – official getaway to Estonia: http://estonia.eu/about-estonia/society/integration-in-estonian-society.html (02.10.2010).

[5] T. Mătlik, *Estonian Integration Strategy 2008-2013, Tallinn Conference on Conceptualizing Integration*, 18–19.10.2009 (http://www.migpolgroup.com/public/docs/149.TallinnConferenceReport_18-19.10.07.pdf; 07.10.2010).

[6] The income of Estonian–Russians is strongly determined by their citizenship. Estonian–Russians with Russian citizenship and Russian speaking people with undetermined citizenship (before 1991 they were the citizens of Soviet Union) earn significantly less than Estonian–Russians with Estonian citizenship and Estonians. It must be underlined that Russians with Estonian citizenship are younger and better educated, what is more their level of language proficiency is also more advanced. It is easier for them to find a better job and be satisfied with it.

[7] A. Włodarska, *The structure of unemployment in Estonia after 1991*, [in:] "XXI wek: Gumanitarnye i Socialno-Ekonomiceskie Nauki", Tuła 2010, p. 122–125.

Estonia put bilateral problems on the agenda of the institutions in Brussels. Another key issue for Estonian political leaders was Russia's responsibility for creating the USSR's Estonian policy. The most significant consequence of this policy was that a huge number of Russians moved to Estonian territories during the Soviet period.[8]

April 2007 was a very significant time for relations between Estonia and Russia. The crisis appeared because of the Estonian decision to move the statue of a Second World War era soldier[9] from the main park in the capital of Estonia – Tallinn.[10] The change of the monument's location provoked negative reactions from Russians living in Estonia, but also infuriated leaders of the Russian government. According to the Russians, this action dishonoured the Red Army soldiers who liberated Estonians and defeated Nazi Germany.[11]

The decision to relocate the Bronze Soldier statue was not made lightly. The Russians accused Estonians of rewriting history and ignoring those whose relatives died in the Second World War. Pro-Soviet nostalgia was fully approved by the Russians and they could not understand why a statue was such a problematic thing for Estonians. The most significant shortcoming of the Estonian government in the relocation process was that it failed to treat the relocation as an important event, but rather as a bureaucratic, technical and legally correct transfer. Russians claimed that nobody was interested whether there was anyone who was troubled by this relocation.

The night of 27th April 2007 is referred to by both Estonians and Russians as bronze night or bronze soldier night. During that night, groups of young Estonian Russians gathered in the centre of Tallinn to demonstrate against the relocation of the statue. The situation became pretty dangerous. The Russians did not want the monument to be relocated from the main square so they threw stones at the police, they misbehaved and shouted.

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[8] V. Made, Estonian–Russian relations in the context of the international system, p. 102–105. This study was commissioned by the Foreign Affairs Committee of the European Parliament in August 2004. It was published in October 2004 (date taken from the website on 02.10.2010: http://scholar.google.pl/scholar?q=the+estonian+-+russian+relation+in+the+context+of+the+international+system&hl=pl&as_sdt=0&as_vis=1&oi=scholart).

[9] Enn Roos was the creator of the Bronze Soldier statue in 1947. The supervising architect was Arnold Allas. The monument was unveiled on the third anniversary of Red Army soldiers entering Tallinn in 1944 (22nd September 1947). Later, in 1964, the eternal flame was added in front of the statue.

[10] The Protection of War Graves Act was passed by the Estonian Parliament – Riigikogu – on 10th January 2007. The document established the legal foundation for the relocation of the statue from the centre of Tallinn to the military cemetery.

[11] S. Woehrel, *CRS Report for Congress*..., p. 3–4.

Pieces of broken glass were almost everywhere. This situation posed a real danger to human life. One Russian lost his life on this night.[12]

In addition, the monument transfer had further consequences. Firstly, there were harsh verbal attacks from Moscow, secondly the Estonian ambassador to Moscow was harassed by a group of young people closely tied to the Kremlin. In the capital of Estonia more violent demonstrations were organized by active groups of ethnic Russians. The Internet infrastructure in Estonia was also attacked by hackers.[13]

The cyberspace attacks were extremely troublesome for the Estonian authorities and society. The director of Estonia's Computer Emergency Response Team, Hillar Aarelaid, claimed that Estonian leaders could predict some patterns of behaviour because they knew them from experience. He underlined that if there are fights on the streets, there are going to be fights on the Internet. The internet is a regular tool used by Estonians. It is a method of voting, paying taxes, shopping, making phone calls. The cyber war lasted three weeks and forced Estonian leaders to defend their country. The monument relocation precipitated a data flood which was considered to be initiated by the Russians.[14]

The Russian government strongly denied any participation in these cyber space actions. Estonia involved experts from the EU and NATO, the USA and Israel, who tried to help solve the Internet problems.[15] Hackers broke into the websites of many key institutions in Estonia. They posted a fake letter from the Prime Minister Andrus Ansip apologizing for the relocation of such a symbolic monument. Estonian Internet service experts tracked down and blocked all unknown and suspicious addresses. Russia refused any state involvement in helping to catch people who were suspected of cooperation in the cyber space attacks. It should be noted that Dimitri Peskov, the spokesman for the Kremlin underlined that The Estonian side has to be extremely careful when making accusations.[16]

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[12] I. Melchior, *Beyond the cold bronze*, [in] Cultural Anthropology Bsc. & Sociology Bsc., 2007, p. 1, (http://www.google.pl/#hl=pl&biw=1001&bih=638&q=beyond+cold+soldier-melchior&aq=f&aqi=&aql=&oq=&gs_rfai=&fp=e6aa7e8098997018 – 09.08.2008).

[13] The attacks were prepared in late April and early May. According to the Estonians, the cyber attacks were from web services of the Russian government. The Estonian government asked the Russian authorities for help in investigating the cyber attacks, but the Russians refused cooperation in this case.

[14] J. Carr, L. Shepherd, *Inside Cyber Warfare: Mapping the Cyber Underworld*, 2010, p. 180–181.

[15] The first digital intruders slipped into Estonian cyber space on 26th April at 10.00 p.m. It was the starting point of the first cyber space war.

[16] M. Landler, J. Markoff, *In Estonia: What may be the first war in cyberspace?*, "International Herald Tribune", 28th May 2007, (04.10.2010).

Furthermore, Russia blocked traffic over the bridge in Narva, which is a key highway from Russia. Officially these actions were taken because of renovation. Moscow wanted to punish Tallinn for anti-Russian behaviour and make it change its decision.[17]

Russia tried to make the life of Estonians more difficult. One of several highly spectacular actions was the stopping of a British tourist who strayed over the Russian-Estonian border during a sightseeing tour. The man wandered onto the empty reservoir which lies on the River Narva, marking the border between the two countries. The Estonian side explained that the tourist got lost. The tourist was pretty confused when he saw Russian guards and he discovered that he had crossed the border. The Estonians wanted to convince their neighbours that crossing the border and straying into Russian territory was not deliberate, but a mistake. When the tourist understood that he had entered Russian territory it was too late to turn back. There are two checkpoints between Russia and Estonia in this area and both of them are located rather close to Narva. People who do not keep to the rules have to pay a fine, but the legal regulations on the Russian side are tougher than on the Estonian side. According to Russian law, violating a border crossing can lead up to six months in prison.[18]

Bronze Soldier Night opened a new chapter in Estonian–Russian relations. It was a very important factor in shaping the future relations between the two countries. After gaining the independence Estonians have claimed that only by learning Estonian language Russians can better understand Estonian history, their worries in relation to Russia. Russians living in Estonia know that the Kremlin has its propaganda. They are not blind and they understand the situation around them. Even if they are confused about the current situation of Estonia, the Russian minority in Estonia should know about Estonia's current relations with its biggest neighbour. It is essential for both Russians and Estonians because Russians in Estonia are also citizens.[19]

According to Konstantin Kosachev, the Chairman of the Russian Duma International Relations Committee, Russia would neither understand, nor accept, nor forgive the decision of relocating the monument of The Bronze Soldier. Spring 2007 brought arguably the worst crisis in Estonian–Russian relations since 1991, but after such a significant crisis relations between both countries have improved.[20]

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[17] S. Woehrel, CRS Report for Congress..., p. 4–5.

[18] British tourist held in Russia after straying over the border from Estonia during a sightseeing trip, The Baltic Course 29.09.2010, (http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/tourism/?doc=5585; 06.10.2010).

[19] K. Liik, *The Bronze Year of Estonian–Russian relations*, p. 73–75. http://web-static.vm.ee/static/failid/053/Kadri_Liik.pdf (03.10.2010).

[20] *Identity and foreign policy…*, p. 86.

It should be noticed that cooperation between Estonia and Russia after the crisis in 2007 has altogether ceased. There are many reasons, from the geographic, political and economic point of view, why these relations should be fostered.

After the riots in the centre of Tallinn, the President of Estonia – Toomas Hendrik Ilves made a statement concerning the events in the capital. Ilves did not talk about Russians, he concentrated on the situation which took place in Tallinn.[21] Later it was made clear that Estonia's aim was not to be in conflict with Russia. Both cooperation and good relations are key issues for Estonian leaders and Estonians. The president of Estonia claims that Estonian's relationship with its biggest neighbour, Russia can get only better.[22]

To facilitate quicker border clearance for lorries crossing the Russian-Estonian border the Estonian government introduced a new regulation to customs law. Estonia wanted to accelerate the transport of certain goods, like animals, birds, fast spoiling food, magazines, newspapers and materials used in medicine.

In September 2010 Siim Kiisler, Estonian minister of regional affairs, pointed out that the Estonian-Russian border is not a wall but a window for Estonia. His counterpart from Russia, Viktor Basargin, agreed that border cooperation between both countries is essential for further development and it opens new possibilities. The ministers met in St Petersburg to discuss the cross-border programme which will be financed by the EU with nearly 13 million euro. Money from both the Estonian and Russian governments will also be added to this project. The project will bring new investments and create new places of work for both Estonians and Russians. For Estonian leaders it is important to support and develop water tourism on Peipsi Lake, to improve the infrastructure at the Narva – Ivanogorod border crossing and to develop tourist border-crossing infrastructure in south-east Estonia. Agreements in the sphere of cross-border cooperation were also discussed

[21] What we witnessed in Tallinn last night was looting, uproar, plundering. It was a crime, and those who took part in it are criminals (…) I hope for the support and understanding of all parents and teachers, for their readiness to explain, both at home and at school, that participation in brutal violations of public order will leave a stain on the whole future of young people. (The data are taken from the website: President of the Republic of Estonia 04.10.2010: http://www.president.ee/en/speeches/statements.php?arhiiv=2010).

[22] Russia: Estonian President says Moscow sees Democracy as threat: June 5, 2007. Estonian President Toomas Hendrik Ilves spoke with correspondents Jeffrey Donovan and Irena Chalupa about his country's vulnerability after weeks of cyber attacks and Estonia's relations with Russia. (The data are taken from the website: Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty 04.10.2010: http://www.rferl.org/content/article/1076942.html).

during this meeting. The border cooperation programme involving Estonia and Russia[23] was introduced in 2004–2006.[24] The final project was announced for the years 2007–2013 and was included into the framework of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument.

Estonian leaders have been arranging many state actions that should enhance relationships amongst a society consisting of different national groups. To increase citizens' awareness about the adoption of the euro currency in Estonia they organized a bilingual information campaign. The main aim of the campaign was to provide details of the transition to the euro zone.[25] Jürgem Ligi, Minister of Finance, announced that it was highly important to distribute all information in two languages. He also stated that Estonia is the first country where a euro awareness programme was carried out in more than one language. Estonia's experience is believed to be a model for other Baltic states – Lithuania and Latvia.[26]

Recent events indicate that Estonia tries to cooperate with Russia and build a good atmosphere for further actions. One of the most significant gestures was the dispatch of professional fire-fighting equipment to Russia, suffering from huge fires in the summer of 2010. In addition, the Estonian government decided to allocate 100,000 Euros[27] to Russia as financial assistance to help the victims of this natural disaster. Urmas Paet, Minister of Foreign Affairs, underlined that the Estonian authorities wanted to help Russians who had been gravely affected by the fires. Other action was taken by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Ministry of International Affairs. To help all Russians citizens who were unable to return to their homes, the citizenship department office and the migration department office facilitated procedures extending their visas.[28]

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[23] Latvia is also involved into the Cross Order Cooperation Programme.

[24] On 6th July 2006 in Riga there was an international meeting of Russian, Estonian and Latvian counterparts who established the Joint Task Force (JTF), the preparation programme. JTF consisted of representatives of all three countries. There were both representatives of national institutions and local authorities. It was organized on partnership principles.

[25] The first bilingual information campaign was organized in Narva and the euro exhibition was open to visitors for a month from mid-August until mid-September 2010. It took place at the Astri shopping centre.

[26] Estonia organizes bilingual euro-awareness raising groups. The Baltic Course, Tallinn 19.08.2010, http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/finances (07.10.2010).

[27] It was more than 1,5 million kroons.

[28] The Estonian Government allocated an additional 1.5 million kroons for Russian fire victims, The Baltic course, Tallinn 13.08.2010, The data are taken from the website The Baltic Course 04.10.2010 http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/finances/.

A new study concludes that the integration of the Russian minority in Estonia has been improving.[29] What is more, the relations between different nations living in Estonia are getting closer. This is possible because of the Estonian language. Non-Estonians have improved their language skills, and fluent communication helps them to not be afraid of losing their cultural characteristics. It should be noted that the Estonian language is pretty popular with representatives of the young generation. More than two-thirds of Russian-speakers living in Estonia up to the age of 39 can communicate in the Estonian language. In addition, three-quarters can not only speak, but also read Estonian. However, state institutions are not trusted, according to Russians and Russian-speakers living in Estonia.[30]

To sum up, future development prospects for relations are getting better because of cooperation between Estonia and Russia. Andrus Ansip, Estonian Prime Minister, claims that Russia is playing an incredibly important role in the tourist industry and economy in Estonia. The number of tourists who visited Estonia from 2007 to 2009 was higher than in the previous years.[31] Estonian leaders underline that relations with Russia are good and it is believed that this will continue.

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[29] The study was carried out by the International and Social Studies Institute of Tallinn University, with the support of the Culture Ministry and Integration and Migration Foundation Our People. (The data are taken from the website The Baltic Course: Estonia's Russian-speaking population becomes increasingly alienated from the state, Tallinn, 15.09.2010) http://www.baltic-course.com/eng/education/?doc=31621 (04.10.2010).

[30] The study shows that 31% Russian-speakers trust the police, 29% trust the courts, 9% trust to government, 7% trust the Riigikogu and 14% trust the president. In comparison 60% Estonian-speakers trust the police, 40% trust the courts, 32% trust the government, 18% trust the Riigikogu, 67% trust the president.

[31] Russians are the second biggest group of tourists (14%) visiting Estonia after tourists from Finland (52–54%).

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ROUND TABLE DEBATE

"20 Years of Transformation – The Polish and Russian Experiences"

Faculty of International Studies and Political Studies, University of Łódź

Łódź, February 28th, 2010

Alicja Stępień-Kuczyńska[*]

It has lately been increasingly difficult for political scientists to describe the present state of transformation and democratization of young democracies' political systems. It is even more problematic in the case of post-communist states, since integration and globalization processes in which they, to various degrees, participate, force the ruling elites to compare themselves with stable democracies in a "challenge" for democratic values and their implementation. In the context of political instability at the beginning of the XXI century, one is justified in wondering about the future of transformation and democratization in post-communist states given that, in some of them, the authoritarian tendencies of the rulers obstruct democratization processes. Most of the theoretical considerations of Western political science have to be supplemented with empirical observations of transition in post-communist countries.

In the last dozen or so years there have been significant changes in the region of Central and Eastern Europe, regarding the institutions of political systems and electoral law. In general, they comply with democratic standards. Nevertheless, institutionalization of the system has not been pro-

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gressing fast enough lately. The dynamics of the beginning of the nineties of the XX century cannot be matched.

If we refer to the literature on conditions of democratization (Lipset, Linz, Huntington, Rustow), we may distinguish the following factors: social agreement as to the most important goals of democracy; level of economic development (economic growth, stabilization); development of civil society, norms and values of citizenship; trust in institutions and elites of the system; effectiveness of governing.

The region's countries have much to do in each of these areas. Although the democratization process connected with systemic transformation has been completed in most cases, it is necessary to move one step further, i.e. to deepen the democratization. At this stage the source of the system's legitimacy is no longer efficiency, but rather the quality of governing. Most likely, we shall witness a struggle for values, not procedures. If so, the area undergoing major revolution will be the party system. It is the parties that are responsible for the political process. Party leaders who understand it emphasize questions of ideology and party platform. These sorts of questions will make it possible to distinguish between parties when electoral strategies and governing techniques become relatively uniform. The strategies used by parties depend on their financial assets. In this connection we can look back to the initial stage of transformation in 1989/91, when a great variety of party platforms gave citizens genuine choice.

We are now facing a serious crisis of trust in public institutions and political elites in the region's countries. It manifests itself, amongst other ways, in the declining election turnout and high volatility. Both rulers (the often alienated world of politicians) and the ruled feel less and less responsible for the state, sociologists warn. Communication between the two groups is disturbed (Wnuk-Lipiński). Citizens are uncertain as to the intentions and actions of the authorities. A lack of party and political affiliation becomes the preferred attitude of young people, intellectuals, for whom it constitutes an expression of disapproval for the way the country is governed. The responsibility of elites and citizens requires transparent relations between them, dialogue and consensus, whose conditions should not be dictated by the rulers, but should serve the purpose of deeper democratization. It is only possible when the ruling elites, elected in democratic elections and responsible before citizens, share power, rather than concentrating it in the name of effective and efficient governing. Too much stress on the effects of governing at the cost of its quality, as measured by democratic standards, given the weakness of other factors I mentioned before, leads to the retreat of democratization processes.

Democratization is peculiar in each state. The important step everywhere is to empower citizens (not exclusively through the act of voting), to

encourage their active participation in public life, necessary for any free and civil society. Otherwise political scientists will have to reflect on the state of democracy and come up with adjectives to describe it, such as formal, steered, sovereign etc. All of this bears witness to dysfunctional features of the democratization process, an interesting field for political science research. It does not, however, contribute to democratization of the system – it only serves unscrupulous politicians, who use it as an alibi for their mediocre performance.

Valery Kovalenko[*]

In our day, world history is taking shape in the global civilizational river in which all nations, states and regions of the world swim, united by the concern of our common fate. All of them walk into this river equipped with their unique cultural hallmarks, their own traditions and customs, viewpoint and history.

United in diversity, these conflicting entities are the symbol of our world's cultural richness, their existence proves its viability as a complex and dynamic socio-political system.

There has been no country in which modernization has taken place other than through its national and political traditions.

Modernization has manifested itself many times in Russia's social history, including current times, and teaches us that the aims of any such endeavour should go hand in hand with peoples' expectations and correspond to society's condition and its mentality. Only by meeting such conditions can the course of reform get the necessary social legitimization, leave behind the world of ideas and reflections, and become relevant.

We can and even should, as the great Russian historian Vasiliy Kluchevsky has said, have the use of others' inventions, but doing so we should refrain from copying others' way of life, viewpoints and social order. As each honest man has his own mind, his own wife, so each honest man should have his own way of life and viewpoint.

A good part of contemporary political studies researchers' work is concentrated on understanding the crucial factors of societal changes, its vectors and forces that determine their destination points. Among others, there is one such factor that is called a regime's institutional coordinates with regard to the current macro-social dimension. That factor is believed to be responsible for the creation of a particular framework for the institutional environ-

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ment. Institutional constructs that are in conflict with the existing macro-social environment are fragile and short-lived. Historical selection works within the framework of connecting particular macro-social contexts with the right (proper, adequate) institutional environment.

It would be wise to make an assumption that in the past, within the so called classical school of modernization theory, modernization was understood as a linear, progressive process. Nations and states that underwent modernization were expected to overtake other more developed nations and countries, and by that process learn how to organize their economies, political processes and state order. Such an interpretation of modernization has become the subject of sustained critique, because we have witnessed modernization failures and collapses in many countries. That is why so much attention is now being paid to fully understanding the socio-cultural features of the environments in which political processes take place, society's mentalities, etc.

What is our argument? We have made the term of social change a core category in social science. It's logical and understandable: the extent and amount of social changes is overwhelming. A common denominator of changes is too important for all human kind to be missed in studies. The question arises, what really does change, what is the substrate of changes?

The trouble with current changes in Russia started as early as the beginning of the 1990s. Attempts to import designs and ideas, mostly of liberal origin, that were non-traditional for Russian culture have proved problematic.

The welfare state and a socially oriented economy is the most characteristic feature of social life. During its historical evolution, liberalism, a foundational ideal of the European tradition, moved from its most elementary individualistic forms to its more socialized exemplifications. Let me remind you of the discussion of changes in capitalism, which took place at the beginning of the 20th century between Marxists and various groups of leftist non-radicals (revisionists). The debates revealed perspectives on the development (and the forms) of capitalism typical for that period of time.

Narodniki argued that capitalism had no future in Russia, because it increased the exploitation of people and broke traditional peasant ties to the domestic market. They contended that the only salvation was to be found in exports. Unfortunately Russia could not become an exporting superpower, so capitalism as a way of organizing social life had no necessary foundation and that is why capitalism would not take root in Russia.

Marxists (not only Bolsheviks) argued that additional goods could be obtained by constant change in the ways of production. They were right because they fully grasped the evolving European reality.

Even if that model was correct from an industrial modernization point of view, it gave birth to social tensions.

During Roosevelt's New Deal in the United States economic problems were resolved thanks to the development of the domestic market. During that period of American history, and thanks to Roosevelt's policy on the one hand and scientific and technological progress on the other hand, the role of the middle class grew, and this group was expanded to include some farmers, the working intelligentsia and highly qualified workers. The result was that the colossal social tensions existing at that time were successfully softened.

In the Russian social dimension of life, questions of social order have traditionally had the upper hand and have had priority over searching for more acceptable political solutions. The State in Russia was invariably, as always, perceived against the backdrop of its social roles and aims.

Nowadays, in the framework of changes being currently undertaken in Russia, science, education, public health care have become priorities of state policy. In modern societies aspects of social life are often seen as an unpleasant burden by the state administration, which is mainly concerned with the development of the economy. However, education, healthcare, science and culture should be perceived as crucial factors of change, and as fundamental to modernization, providing the proper moral dimensions to social conditions. Without handling these aspects of social life adequately Russia won't become a strong country and won't get the place it deserves in the XXI century.

All these problems and questions place several important challenges in front of political science students. First of all we have to correctly define who is the subject of pro-modernization efforts and changes. We should abandon the illusions of the 1990s that such a role can be played by the "private owner". It is important to acknowledge the fact that if for XIX century's society the main factor driving the development of the economy was labour and capital, for the contemporary post-industrial world such a role is played by knowledge. Our mission is not only to study purely political changes taking place in our social systems, but also to conduct studies on their other aspects, from angle of political science. Let me remind you about the reforms of Alexander II; even if they had no open political component, they ultimately had serious and long lasting political consequences.

An innovative attitude to the development of the country should not be confined to innovative changes in the economy and state's administration; innovation should be transferred to and be used in the spheres of education and science.

Alexandr Shirinjanz[*]

We are now discussing our (Polish and Russian) experiences, gathered by both nations during last twenty years of transformation. It is commonly agreed that there is always some kind of theory, theoretical idea at the bottom of each transformation process. But I have doubts whether such a conclusion is right. First of all, not all social transformations are based on any given and specific theoretical set of ideas; secondly, decisions taken in offices, without social consent, don't always bring the most desired results. I have asked you a question – was there any theory guiding Lech Wałęsa's and Solidarity's actions in their confrontation with communist rule? I have not heard any clear, and what is more important, convincing answer. In my opinion this is quite understandable, because there was no theoretical scheme that was guiding Solidarity to overthrow communist rule. Solidarity's activists and supporters were fuelled by myth and utopias, one of them and probably the strongest one was the myth of freedom, the utopia of solidarity...

Myth and utopia are intimately tied up with the culture of a given society. Taking for granted that society is a group of people and Man is an enigma, it is almost impossible to determine why a specific myth was born in that place and time – social science is helpless when it comes to explaining such phenomena. On the other hand there is one constant feature typical for myths – they do not vanish entirely, contrary to the naive expectations fostered by the Enlightenment's philosophers. To the contrary, during the course of the historical evolution of humankind, its consciousness became more and more mythological; man dove with great eagerness into a virtual reality. The technological revolution and other products of development herald the era when the world of illusion triumphs over reality.

Myth has great magnetic force; this is because myth is relatively easy to comprehend, to understand its message – myth by its nature is part of human consciousness. Myth can be called an illusion, but its influence is so great from a socio-political point of view that we can describe it as a part of reality.

Contemporary myths should be seen as strategic weapons used by politicians all over the world, no matter what kind of ideology they profess. Where there is politics there is ideology, and as we know, politics is not destined to be practised according to its original and fundamental precepts. Utopia is the core of any ideology, an unrealizable dream which is to be reached, but remains unattainable. Still, as with any dream, myth has its

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own logic and meaning, it mobilizes people, drives their energy and actions towards specific targets.

Summing up, it is unwise to blindly follow theoretical schemes; it would be enough to take them as some kind of nonrepresentational set of ideas helping one to attain the desired level of self-improvement, rather than trying to impose them (ideas and values) on other people. Even in times of great change...

Andrei Akremenko[*]

Major problems in Russian transition processes (economical, political and social) have a common root: the ineffectiveness of the institutional system. We see institutions as behaviour-driving rules, supported by exogenous sanctions (new institutional paradigm). So the political system is a system of institutions the basic function of which is to redistribute resources (values) in and for society (this is close to Easton's understanding of the issue). Here we use "resources" as a very broad category: both human capital and oil extraction rent payments may be considered in this way. The central question is whether the institutional design of the political system provides an optimal allocation of the resources – in the Pareto sense. There are three main reasons for a "resource leak" in a redistribution process: management and organizational expenses, including bureaucracy maintenance etc., competition of lobby groups, existence of narrow coalitions of special interests.

We will concentrate on the last point; those coalitions are characterized by the following key features: their size (number of members) is small in comparison to the size of society as a whole. This feature is critical because it provides coalitions with an opportunity to maintain longitudinally fixed or even increasing profits in a situation when overall society resources diminish.

The interests of such coalitions do not coincide with common social interests; in that sense we call them "special interests". Those coalitions obtain significant "negotiation force" (political influence – let's mark it I) that gives them the ability to affect political decision makers.

Members of such groups have incentives for collective action (their relatively small size is one of those incentives). They are usually characterized by comparatively high levels of social capital and the ability to support incomplete institutional contracts.

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They use redistributive (political) strategies to receive revenues (call it P). As far as we see the political world in an "institutionally redistributive" way, we may call those coalitions "institutional investors".

In general such coalitions are very competitive as political actors. The very existence of special interest coalitions is an attribute of any political system, so in general it is quite normal. We are starting to face problems when coalitions receive exclusive access to political power. It is the so called "lock in effect" (D. North). That is the Russian case.

My primary hypothesis is the following: In Russia the redistributive coalitions obtain negotiation power disproportional to their revenues. Mathematically speaking, there is a nonlinear function connecting P and I. Without going into profound mathematics, let us say that the strategic consequences of the redistributive process become unmeasured (or very problematically estimated). I would say that it tends to maximize delayed costs of political power and reduces the overall effectiveness of the political system.

Andrzej Stelmach[*]

Russian electoral law is changing in a huge and very dynamic way. This has been obvious since the time of the transformation of the old system. New and more effective election procedures are being sought. If these changes are to contribute to the furtherance of democratic system transformations, increase the legitimization of power and help build civil society, then they are justified. However, it may be the case that legislators' intentions are different. The intention may be, for example, to stabilize the current political system, reinforce the party system or create conditions for stable government. Another rationale that is fundamental to changing electoral law has more of a pragmatic character. It comes from the desire to improve and simplify election procedures.

Regardless of legislators' intentions, the evolution of electoral law in the Russian Federation may be looked at from several parallel perspectives. As far as the formal legal aspect is concerned, the most important changes are amendments in legal regulations or in the constitution and the electoral statute. Taking the ideological aspect into consideration, the shaping of social awareness and citizens' political attitudes are examined. Citizens should be encouraged to participate in elections and have a preference for one of the political options.

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As far as technical and organizational aspects are concerned, actions undertaken by those in power for their own purposes tend to make use of specific electoral techniques such as the opportunity to vote via mail or Internet, changing the date of the election etc.

From a propaganda point of view it is all about running the election campaign. The most important element in this area is to manipulate opportunities for the electoral committee to have access to the mass media and to voters at the same time.

In terms of the financial aspect, the change in electoral law is connected with the rules of financing and accounting for expenses incurred by the electoral committee during the election campaign, as well as material support for the party from the state budget and other sources.

Russian electoral law is changing. On top of the electoral statutes passed in 2005, further amendments relating to, for example, the nomination of candidates and the rules of voting for all the candidates were implemented in 2006.

It can be assumed that the changes have taken place as a result of the desire to further reinforce the influence of the party on the political system and the mechanisms of ruling. They are dependent upon stimulating the development of the party as well as the reinforcement of their roles and meaning in the electoral process. With further changes proposed for the electoral statute to federal legislation and the legislation of federal subjects, there is clearly an intention to further enhance the importance of the party in the political system.

The increasing importance of political parties in Russia has been accompanied by a significant enhancement of system requirements to which political parties must adhere. The party must have a minimum of 50,000 members and must have its own structures in more than half of the Federation. The regional branches of the party should have at least 500 members. If the organization does not meet the above requirements then it cannot be registered. In the case of existing parties not meeting these criteria, they will lose their status of being a political party.

Particularly characteristic of the current Russian electoral system are the regulations that candidates in elections are chosen exclusively by the political parties. The central resolution authorities make a decision during a secret ballot about putting a candidate forward to the federal candidate list. At the same time a decision about the order of names on the list is taken. The method of nominating candidates and the order of voting are clearly stated in the constitution of political parties. The regulations dictate that non-party people may comprise a maximum of half of the proposed candidates. In order to ensure the representation of all subjects of the Russian Federation in the Duma, each federal list of candidates must have the names of the candidates divided into special regional groups.

The election statute of 2005 increased the requirement for the minimum support for the electoral committee in the elections to the Duma from 5 to 7% of the total voting constituency. This increased electoral threshold favoured (and certainly it was intended by the creators of this electoral statute) binding political parties with similar policies and programmes. This tendency significantly affected the smaller parties that were unable to get 7% support of the constituency on a nationwide scale. By introducing exclusiveness of the political parties to propose federal lists of candidates and the electoral threshold of 7%, the possibility of creating electoral blocks was eliminated. The advantage of it was that the electoral blocks were created practically only to increase the prospects of parties to gain mandates. Once this goal was achieved there was no longer the will to make programme compromises. In reality the electoral blocks were characterized as unstable, lacking in compromise and ability to co-rule.

In the new electoral statute a mixed (majority – proportional) electoral system made way for a proportional system. The main argument that was highlighted was the disproportion which often occurred in the number of votes needed to get a mandate and those obtained in one-mandate constituencies by certain candidates. It often happened that the winner of the election got significantly less votes than the total votes given to all the other candidates. It meant that the majority of the voters in the electoral constituency did not succeed in electing their chosen representative. This argument however is quite weak. It would be enough to introduce the rule of the absolute majority and the problem of the representativeness of an elected member could be resolved. It would require making a decision of admissibility of a second round of elections which would significantly lengthen the electoral procedures and also increase the cost.

Further arguments may be made in favour of abolishing one-mandate election constituencies in Russia. It often happened that mandates were gained by candidates who put themselves forward as 'independent' i.e. those who were not connected with either party. But after the election they sought access to parliamentary party factions. In this way voters' reluctance to vote for political parties and their tendency to vote for independent candidates was taken advantage of. During the election to the Duma in 2003 there were 67 candidates elected who had stood as independents. However, when the parliament started functioning, only 7 of them retained the status of an independent. The others joined party factions.

The proportional electoral system predicts that only three candidates may be proposed from the federal electoral list. The rest of the federal list must be divided into a minimum of one hundred regional groups of candidates. This is designed to encourage the political parties to put forward candidates in all regions of Russia. It will bear fruit in the growth of party

structures regionally and not only in the big political centres of Moscow and Saint Petersburg. Non-party candidates may also be proposed on party lists. New regulations in the compilation of electoral lists have made the leaders of the political parties look for leaders outside the federal structures as well. In this way there has been a decentralization of party structures, and an increase in the influence and significance of regional departments and the local political elite. The parties are made to expand their area structures, which results in extending their political influence in more and more areas of society. Moreover there is a tendency to reject local groups from political influence in regions (federation subjects), and replace them with strong nationwide parties. To execute this plan the social support which must be gained by a political party must be increased on a national scale to take part in the division of mandates to the national Duma.

The electoral statute clearly prefers the bigger political parties. Introducing the proposed 7% threshold instead of 5% shows a tendency to eliminate from political life regional and small political parties with low levels of social support.

Because Russia is a federal state, legislators seek to guarantee representation in the federal legislative body of all subjects of the Federation. To fulfil this aim, a particular division of the nation into electoral areas is required. This is done by dividing the number of voters registered in the territory of the Russian Federation by 650,000. The quotient (the integral number) equates to the number of parts into which the Federation is divided. The difference in the number of voters in each electoral area of the Federation cannot be more than 15%.

The regional part of the federal list of candidates should include all subjects of the Federation. The number of the regional group of candidates cannot be less than 80 and the total number of proposed candidates cannot exceed 600 people. In the original version of the election statute of 2005 these requirements were respectively 100 for the regional group of candidates and a maximum of 500 candidates. This change gives a significantly greater chance for the free formation of the candidates' lists by political parties.

In order to register a federal list of candidates a party must get 200,000 voter signatures But no more than 10,000 of the signatures can come from any one district of the Federation. In the case of early or premature elections, the above-mentioned numbers are reduced by half. A party which took part in the division of mandates in the former elections to Duma does not have to collect signatures of support with their announcement of the federal list of candidates.

On the electoral list (a ballot paper), the names of the candidates from the national-federal list of candidates are given first and then the names of the first three candidates from regional groups of candidates. There is an

empty square to the right of the name of the political party. At the bottom of the list there is the sentence 'against all the federal lists of candidates'.

To make the election valid, at least 25% of voter turnout on a national scale is required. The right to divide mandates is given to the federal list of candidates if on a national scale it gets at least 7% of the votes of those who participate in the election. If all the federal lists of candidates who exceeded the 7% electoral threshold have not got 60% of votes in total, then when dividing the mandates the political parties must also include those who received most of the votes thereafter. This is so that the parties that participate in dividing the mandates have more than 60% of votes in total.

A rather complex system of converting votes into mandates was also introduced. First the so-called electoral quotient is determined, which is of a nationwide quotient nature. To calculate it Tomas Hare's equation is used. Afterwards the method of the biggest remainder is used.

The law says that the amount of money coming from the electoral fund and committed to an election campaign cannot be higher than 400 million roubles. The law regulates clearly the level of expenses of the party structures.

The sources of financing of political parties are also clearly defined. A voter may pay into the fund of an electoral party a sum equal to 0.07% and of a private person 3.5% of the electoral limit. The payment from the party account cannot exceed 50% of the limit of expenses. There is an absolute ban on financing a party from foreign sources.

Before the election a party should pay a deposit of 15% of predicted total expenses for the election campaign (60 million roubles). If the party does not get the minimum of 4% of votes of people taking part in the election on a national scale, or it is not admitted to the dividing of the mandates, then the deposit goes to the State treasury.

In order to reinforce the actions of a political party, its financing has been significantly increased from the State budget. For each vote given to the federal electoral list of the political party it receives 5 roubles. This is 10 times more than it was granted under the former regulations. This sum is paid into the bank account of each political party that received at least 3% of votes in the election to the National Duma (or in a presidential election) on a national scale.

The presented analysis shows that the changes in the parliamentary electoral law exert a huge influence on the functioning of the party system of the Russian Federation. The solutions accepted in the elections to the national Duma are in favour of bigger parties, having well built territorial organizational structures and significant financial back-up. Parties that are widely supported by society can count on significant financial support from the state. Parties that have less social support have found it increasingly

difficult to remain in the political arena. If they do not get a certain level of social support in the election they will not only be unable to participate in the ruling political structures, but they may also be omitted from the allocation of money from the national budget. In extreme cases a party may not get a deposit returned from the registration of a candidate, which then makes the situation even worse. Indeed it is very likely that in the next electoral cycle such a party will not have enough money to participate in the election. In this way it will cease to play any role in the political system. There will be a concentration of the party system based on the elimination of the smaller political parties. Consequently there will be just a few big parties remaining on the political stage.

Małgorzata Rączkiewicz[*]

In Poland, the tradition of a democratic state is one of the oldest in Europe. It covers the period of the so-called gentry's democracy and then the first European Constitution of 3rd May 1791. The Polish people also demonstrated their desire to live in a system of pluralistic democracy in 1989. The transformation of the Polish political system was initiated by the events of 1989, particularly the decisions of the Round Table. The instability of the party system and the electoral system, as well as proposals of constitutional amendments put forward from time to time continue and the process of transformation is not finished yet.

The Polish Constitution was adopted on the 2nd of April 1997 and was accepted in a nationwide referendum held on 25th May 1997. The Constitution lays down fundamental principles upon which the socio-economic system is based, regulates the competence of government organs and state administration, and enumerates the rights and obligations of citizens.

The most radical changes, effected by the new Constitution, focus on the four main issues through the introduction of new constitutional principles. For example, one principle declares the state to be the common good of the citizens, while another highlights the decentralization of public power, or social market economy.

Provisions concerning freedoms and rights: We can observe an open attitude to so called international humanitarian law.

Transformation of the third power – judiciary. There has been a considerable strengthening of guarantees for independence of judges and, in this

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context, an extension of the provisions concerning the National Council of the Judiciary.

The constitution of 1997 occupies the top position in the hierarchy of legal documents, and is applied directly. Other law sources recognized in Poland include parliamentary acts, international agreements, executive orders, directives, local law and regulations.

The constitution also presents the principles of the Polish political system. The most important are: The principle of the sovereignty of the nation. Article 4 reads: 'Supreme power in the Republic of Poland shall be vested in the Nation'. Power is exercised by the Nation through the mechanism of elections and representative democracy. Another form of direct democracy is (local and nationwide) referendum. The Constitution also provides for the procedure of popular initiative, the principle of the independence and sovereignty of the state. One of the fundamental duties of the Polish President is to safeguard the sovereignty and security of the state, and maintain the principle of a democratic state ruled by law.

The principle of civil society – in Poland this refers to freedom of speech and political pluralism. It includes the freedom to create associations, societies and organizations, and respect for human rights. The Polish Constitution guarantees equality before law, inviolability of the home, freedom of conscience and religion, and the right to a fair trial.

The principle of the separation of powers – the Polish system is based on the separation and balance of three powers: legislative, executive and judicial.

The Polish political system, like other systems undergoing transformation, is characterised by high instability and weakness of state structures. Imprecise, socially unaccepted law invites abuses, which, in turn, undermine citizens' trust in state institutions and political elites. It has recently been customary for the executive to question the decisions of the Constitutional Tribunal and to trespass onto the judiciary's sphere of competence. The legislation concerning the functioning of state institutions (Institute for National Remembrance, National Broadcasting Council) has often been changed in an attempt to subordinate the state to the ruling party.

There are many obstacles, too, on the way to civil society as a basis of the relation between citizen and state. The hardships of the transformation period have resulted in numerous political crises and the weakness of cabinet coalitions.

After 1989 the Polish people had to learn the democratic procedures they had no opportunity to experience in the previous 50 years. Sejm elections are based on the principles of universality, directness, equality, proportionality and secret ballot. Senate elections are universal, direct, by secret ballot and non-proportional.

Michał Słowikowski[*]

Nowadays the lack of trust in the main political institutions displayed by Polish society is one of the most acute problems of Poland's political system. A high level of social distrust in political institutions is typical for all regimes building on the rubble of a post-communist past. In post-communist countries citizens were deliberately and almost completely deprived of their political rights and privileges. Regimes that so drastically rob their societies of their rights, even in the sphere of economic activity, are called illiberal autocracies. These were mainly East European communist regimes dependent on the Soviet Union.

In the Polish case, the institutions with the lowest level of trust among all political institutions are political parties and parliament. This is manifested during elections in particular by a high level of electoral volatility, and an extremely low level of turnout. The most striking example of the deepening gap between Polish society and its elites (grouped around political parties) is a regular change in society's political preferences when it comes to deciding the new parliament's composition – every ruling party in Poland since the beginning of the 1990s has lost in a subsequent election.

The roots of the public's lack of trust in political parties can be found in the communist past and in the following period of building a democratic system as well. Characteristic of the Polish democratic transition were attempts to liberate the political system from parties; constant changes inside the party system, temporary political entities and flux in political ideologies and manifestos. Even worse, these changes were masterminded by the same group of people. Consequently, Polish society feels alienated and lost in the jungle of political offers, declarations and promises. The world of politics seems to be a distant and unknown or even a corrupt place for ordinary people. Pre-election political life turns the Polish political system into a grotesque and sometimes cruel battleground, which makes Poles even more dissatisfied with their ruling elite.

Sometimes it looks like Poles and their representatives exist in two different universes; politicians seem to be completely uninterested in the needs and expectations of their constituents. Bearing in mind the mutual lack of interest and comprehension between society and politicians, there are no signs that society is ready to engage in more active participation in politics that could result in existing elite group renewal. There are no signs of political tension within Polish society that may open the way to violent riots like those in Hungary.

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Societal passivity is exemplified by the fact that the main theme of current political discourse –should Poland develop in the future as a liberal or welfare state – was imposed from above by the political elite. The so called conflict between a liberal and communitarian vision of country development was artificial and exaggerated.

Societal passivity can be attributed to the condition of civil society that came out of communist period – it was seriously wounded and is still underdeveloped and unprepared to undertake serious collective actions, and to the fact that there are no sufficiently grave socio-economic problems affecting the various strata of Polish society to potentially stimulate collective action and more active participation in politics.

It is important to understand that, due to the improving standard of living in Poland and the general improvement of all socio-economical indicators, Poles have in a natural and evolutionary way lost their interest in politics.

Moreover, Poles are quite satisfied with their government's policy when analyzed on a long-term perspective. From the very beginning of the democratic transition each Polish government's policy more or less satisfied the expectations of the majority of citizens. Polish society is almost totally homogeneous so there is no rivalry between different groups of society on an ethnic basis.

The almost complete isolation of politicians from their supporters can be partially attributed to the alleviating effect of Poland joining the EU. Many problems, including the high rate of unemployment, were solved by the opening of foreign labour markets. We are now witnessing a huge inflow of money from different European funds, which helps to reduce the developmental gap between Central and Western Europe in infrastructure and in the agricultural sector. By joining NATO and the EU, our government achieved one of the main priorities of Polish foreign policy and fulfilled its strategic goal. Joining the European family is interpreted in Poland as a family reunion, long awaited and warmly welcomed.

Marek Barański[*]

The Constitution of the Republic of Poland of 2nd April 1997 incorporates territorial self-government into the territorial system of the state, which creates conditions for the decentralization of public power. Section 2, Article 16, says that "Local government shall participate in the exercise of public

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power. The substantial part of public duties which local government is empowered to discharge by statute shall be done in its own name and under its own responsibility." The territorial system of the Republic of Poland aims to ensure the decentralization of public power.

The basis for building the territorial structure of the country that was adopted in Poland takes into account the diversity of traditions and interests of local communities and, at the same time, allows the formation of strong units at the lowest level – only about 23% of districts (gminy) are inhabited by less than 5,000 residents.

The second, classic level of local government and administration in Poland was created on 1st January 1999, and consists of 308 land counties and 65 municipalities granted the rights of a county. There is also territorial self-government at the regional level with 16 voivodship self-governments.

Territorial self-government performs two kinds of tasks. The first category comprises the tasks assigned directly to it by particular laws and legal acts. This group of tasks includes mandatory tasks (a district has only limited freedom as to how to proceed in a particular case) and optional tasks, which remain within the discretion of a district. The district finances its own tasks from its own revenues, subventions and subsidies from the state budget.

The second category of tasks of territorial self-government comprises other public duties of state administration commissioned to it by statute. Duties of state administration may also be transferred to the district based on the agreement with public administration organs. This category includes, for example, keeping administrative registers and holding elections and referenda. Local authorities receive the funds necessary to perform these tasks from the state budget.

The range of tasks and competencies of the district and the voivodship self-government is based on the blanket clause. In the case of the county, all tasks performed by the second level of the Polish territorial self-government are defined by statute.

One of the principles of the multi-level self-government is the principle of subsidiarity, based on which competencies are assigned to particular levels of territorial self-government. The first level of territorial self-government is responsible for such tasks as financing nursery and primary schools, housing, roads and local transport, maintaining technical infrastructure (e.g., water supply, sewage, heating), waste management, basic healthcare and welfare, finally, keeping public order. The second level of territorial self-government is held responsible for those tasks that go beyond the scope of competence of the basic level, for example, healthcare, secondary and vocational education, spatial management, economic growth and environment protection.

The independence of territorial self-government within the administrative structure of a state, as well as the degree of decentralization of public finance in a given country, is defined by the share of its spending in total public spending and by its relation to the gross domestic product. The share of spending of the units of territorial self-government in the total spending of the public finance sector rose from 15.6% in 1998 to 22.4% in 2000.

In Poland, the total revenue structure of districts showed that the largest part came from their own revenue streams – 54.8% – whereas general subvention and earmarked subsidies accounted for 33.6% and 11.6% respectively. In 1999 the total revenue structure of the counties showed that their own revenues reached 6.2%, whereas the general subvention and earmarked subsidies accounted for 44.4% and 49.4% respectively. In the case of voivodships, their own revenues reached 18%, general subvention 34.7% and earmarked subsidies 47.3%.

The intention of decentralizing public finance in Poland, which was the foundation of the administration reform, was not realized. The creation of new units of territorial self-government did not result in a decreased level of centralization of public finance, measured by the share of the revenue of all units of territorial self-government in the total revenue of the whole public finance sector. This share decreased from 12.2% in 1998 (when only districts were in existence) to 11.8% in 2000 (including districts, counties and voivodships).

In terms of the organizational structure, units of local government perform their duties through constitutive and executive organs. These organs are referred to as the council and the board respectively. The council chooses its chairperson from among its own members, whereas the chairperson of the board heads the executive organ.

In the case of the first level of territorial self-government, councillors are elected directly. The elections of the representatives of the local community to the constitutive organs of the second level of territorial self-government are also direct. The same mechanism is used to elect councillors to the regional voivodship council. The appointment of the members of the collegial executive body of the local government is conducted by indirect elections. In Poland, at the level of the county, the council elects the starosta, who later nominates the members of the board to be appointed.

The basic issue for the quality of the Polish territorial self-government is the need to strengthen its position by providing more substantial and stable funding.

An attempt to assess the public administration in Poland proves that the process of modernizing it in formal and procedural terms is one of the most advanced in comparison to other countries in the region. Poland has made great progress, compared to other countries of Central and Eastern Europe,

in building territorial self-government. It is the only country which has a three-level territorial self-government system (the district – the county – the self-governing voivodship). The reform, however, has its weaknesses, too. They stem from the focus of its authors on administration and system elements, while social and economic issues – in particular, the problem of regional development policies – have been neglected.

The new territorial organization of the state, adopted on 1st January 1999, has many drawbacks. This particularly concerns an excessive number of counties, which often do not have adequate potential to perform their tasks. The creation of municipalities granted the rights of a county is also questioned. In most cases, their authorities are in conflict with the authorities of actual counties, which leads to numerous difficulties for citizens and hampers the development of administratively divided sub-regions. Another weakness of the administrative reform is the insufficient decentralization of public finance (the transfer of tasks and competencies without providing adequate funds). As a result of flaws in the design and negligence in the implementation of the administrative reform, the county self-government – similarly to the regional self-government – has only limited possibilities of performing its duties.

At the level of regional self-government we can observe recentralization tendencies, the centres of which are not only ministries, but also voivods. All voivodships face conflicts between self-government administration and state administration. Moreover, the issue of transferring property and institutions both to voivodship and county self-governments has not been fully regulated. In terms of regional development, the most significant fact is that the State Treasury (voivods) is reluctant to transfer regional development agencies to Marshall's Offices and local development agencies to counties. This indicates the intention of voivods of the remaining active regional development centres. After 1.5 years of implementing new solutions, the main beneficiary of the administrative reform seems to be the state administration, as it has transferred the most difficult and cost-generating competencies to self-governing voivodships and counties, yet it has retained the funds and administrative structures which allow the spending of these funds.

The main reason for the weaknesses in the Polish public administration is the existence of a number of negative factors which have accumulated in the last ten years. First of all, the administration structures have been colonized by political parties. Furthermore, politicians perceive the administration less and less frequently as a tool that can be used to build the public good, and more and more frequently as a "political reward" that they have earned.

The efficient functioning of the public administration is also hindered by the poor quality of the law and the weakness of the bodies appointed to

enforce it. Inconsistent and flawed regulations concerning the administration are additionally weakened by the growing area of administrative decisions. The poor quality of law, coupled with the increased decision-making competencies of officials (who are not always qualified to make these decisions), causes increasing criticism among citizens.

Another reason for the poor condition of public administration is the weakness of political leadership, which in this context means the lack of a clearly defined target structure. Despite a number of initiatives (e.g., the reform of the centre, the reforms of self-government) and a wide public debate, Poland still lacks a clear and precise vision of the role of public administration (in particular, the state administration) in the system of the state's executive branch.

More and more frequently, criticism can be heard that there are no mechanisms which protect the public interest, both in terms of external procedures, such as civic audit, and internal procedures, operating within the structure of public administration. These inadequate mechanisms are a real cause for concern, in particular in the light of growing problems which can be interpreted as threats to the public interest (e.g., in the sphere of state property management).

Kazimierz Kubiak[*]

The Polish system transformation was initiated by the so-called Round Table agreements, which have marked the beginning of the political transition process, crowned by the first free elections to the Polish Parliament. Social, cultural and economic conditions for system transformation were established.

Following the Polish economist, M. Nasiłowski, the concept of system transformation can be understood as a "transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-orientated one, involving a change of the political system and creating market conditions for the functioning of all economic entities, i.e., enterprises, budget entities and households". In this definition we can clearly distinguish the following concepts: system transformation, political system transformation and economic transformation.

In the Polish transformation we can identify three periods: the years from 1989 to 1992, a period of radical changes sometimes called "shock therapy"; the years from 1993 to 1997, a period of stabilising the situation by introducing institutional changes, attempts to restructure through privatisa-

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tion and deregulation of the state industry sector and the development of market institutions; from 1998 until now, a period of strengthening the new socioeconomic system.

The government of M. Rakowski initiated changes in the economy by implementing the Act of 1989 on undertaking business activities and thus laying the foundations for building a free market. Subsequent changes, known as the Balcerowicz Plan, were supported by the Sejm, which passed a parcel of ten acts, enabling the realisation of the Plan on 27th and 28th December, 1989. The implementation of the Balcerowicz Plan, containing a stabilisation program and a program for system changes, started at the beginning of 1990.

The acts contributed to balancing the market, quickly removing market shortages existent in the socialist economy. The discrepancy between demand and supply was resolved by increasing prices and following a restrictive fiscal policy. The increase in prices was ten and sometimes even fourteen-fold. The prices of food items rose by 30 to 40%. Real wages fell by 35%. The Polish zloty was depreciated against the American dollar with a simultaneous introduction of internal convertibility of the zloty into other currencies. The positive effects of the transformation could be observed in Polish entrepreneurship, unseen in other countries, increasing the innovativeness of enterprises and the competition, which forced economic "thinking".

The social and economic costs of these successes were very high. Analysing the 1990-2005 data of the Central Statistics Office we can see that already in the first year of the "Balcerowicz Plan" production fell by 25% and in the following one – by a further 12%. The drop in the textile sector reached 14-50%. Some economists see this as a positive process of "purifying" the economy of low efficiency enterprises. This view, however, gives rise to justifiable doubts. There was mass unemployment (15-26%). The increase in fuel and raw material prices led to an increase in costs of production. Endless wage demands contributed to the growth of inflation (40% in 1994). The unilateral opening of the Polish market and mass purchasing of imported goods worsened the problems of local producers. Polish enterprises, unprepared for competition, were unable to face the well-organised Western corporations. State enterprises were faced with a particularly difficult situation; in practice their system of tri-governance, i.e. the management, employees' council and trade unions, meant mutual blocking of positive changes proposed by decision-making centres. Business communities placed their hopes in the Polish Sejm's passing an Act on Commercial Chambers (Journal of Laws No 35 of 30.05.1989, item 195). It was expected that entrepreneur organisations would be included in the process of adopting decisions associated with the transformation of the economy. Unfortu-

nately, the transformation process was carried out without taking into account the social factor. This role could have been performed by economic self-government, signalled in the Act on Chambers of Commerce, yet not established to date.

The attitude towards the textile industry is marked by a certain dichotomy: on the one hand it is treated as a cumbersome "hunch" spoiling the image of Łódź, and on the other hand it is expected that its competitiveness will improve without any active support of local authorities.

The huge scientific and research potential and the entrepreneurship of Łódź entrepreneurs is being forgotten. Some officials draw their knowledge of industry from pages of Reymont's famous novel "The Promised Land", whereas the entrepreneurs are interested in developing a new "Innovative Promised Land".

Both Łódź and its region have the chance to become an European centre for the development of innovative techniques and technologies, and for the education of textile and clothing industry personnel. The clothing industry has the ability to transform the voivodship capital into a "fashion city" within the next few years. But the achievement of such goals is possible only through a harmonious cooperation of the triad: the world of science – entrepreneurs – local authorities. The consequences of changes brought about by the economic transformation were particularly painful for the textile and clothing sector of Łódź and the Łódź region. And yet, in contrast to the industries that had billions of zlotys pumped into them, it shows an incredible vivacity, progressing towards a model in which knowledge and innovativeness are decisive for establishing its role and place in the national economy.

The process of transformation is one of never-ending metamorphosis. Its continuation constitutes a prerequisite for constant development.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Z. Brzezinski, B. Scowcroft, *America and the World: Conversations on the Future of American Foreign Policy*, Basic Books, New York 2008

The book is a dialogue between two respected figures in American foreign policy: Zbigniew Brzezinski and Brent Scowcroft, both former security advisers and significant policy observers.[1] These authors have complex worldviews so the book could be incomprehensible, in some aspects, for somebody not interested in foreign policy. However, in the words of the authors, we can detect an authorial need to engage with the reader to find a common language.

The moderator of the discussion is David Ignatius, Washington Post columnist, whose provocative questions do not allow either Brzezinski or Scowcroft to get away with truisms. The dialogue is unscripted, a conversation that includes many political suggestions but also anecdotes from meetings and travels. The readers of this book, as Ignatius believes, can imagine that they are sitting around the conference table and listening to opinions and conclusions. The book is not a compendium of knowledge, but a compilation of ideas and propositions that could be helpful to better understand international relations.

The discussion took place in spring 2008 in Washington; the authors hoped it could serve as a guide for the new president to rebuild American foreign policy. They believed that America's status as a superpower had arrived at a historic turning point.

[1] Zbigniew Brzezinski, formerly President Carter's National Security Adviser, is a counsellor and trustee at the Center of Strategic Studies and International Studies, and professor of the Johns Hopkins University. Brent Scowcroft served as National Security Adviser to Presidents George H. W. Bush and Gerald Ford, and as Military Assistant to President Nixon. David Ignatius writes a twice weekly column for The Washington Post. He was previously executive editor of the International Herald Tribune. Both Z. Brzezinski and B. Scowcroft represent the realist school of international relations, but the former is Democrat and the latter Republican.

The starting point for the conversation is the authors' belief that the world is changing in fundamental ways. They discuss the challenges facing the US today and suggest that the main problems concern the Middle East, China, transatlantic relations, Russia, the Far East, the proliferation of WMD and globalization. Scowcroft emphasizes that after the Cold War America faces not global danger, but hundreds of pinprick problems. The new reality requires a different mindset to deal with dispersed turbulence.

Brzezinski also observes that the world is dominated by three main changes: global political awakening, a shift in the centre of global power and the loss of transatlantic domination, and the surfacing of common global problems.

Both authors agree that the international situation is so complicated that the USA ought to be interested in shaping coalitions of states that share a responsible interest in solving these problems and not determine participation entirely on the basis of whether or not the states concerned are democracies.[2]

The authors describe in this book some aspects of the Cold War's secret history. They agree that the Cold War is over and America needs to adjust to a new changing environment. However, they are also afraid that a Cold War mindset persists among American policymakers.

The main part of the book refers to the situation in the Middle East, especially the war in Iraq. Both authors were against American intervention and warned that the conflict would degrade international cooperation against terrorism. They also agree that the situation in Iraq is complicated and American troops should be withdrawn. Scowcroft, however, believes that it should be done only if the situation is stabilized. He says "Bin Laden made clear his attack was not against the United States per se. The terrorist wants to drive us out of the region because he thinks the governments in the region are corrupt and need to be overthrown and we're protecting them".

Brzezinski, on the other hand, is convinced that the American presence should be ended as quickly as possible. Scowcroft argues that rapid withdrawal could provoke instability in the region.

The authors agree that the conflict in Iraq destabilized the situation and changed the psychology of this fragile region, and influenced the peace process between Israel and the Palestinians. Scowcroft suggests that both governments (in Israel and in the Palestinian Authority) were weak enough to be forced to cooperate and it was a missed opportunity.

Both authors emphasize that the war on terror would have a negative influence on the American economy and prestige. They criticize Bush's administration's policy, especially that practised between 2001–2004. They

[2] Z. Brzezinski, B. Scowcroft, *America and the World*…, p. 232.

also pay attention to Iranian foreign policy. Brzezinski's basic position is that Iran became more powerful because it supported Hamas, Hezbollah, Shia in Iraq, and became more anti-Semitic. It is a defeat for America, because Iran, for a long time, was Israel's natural ally.

The discussion also focuses on East Asia. Both authors realize that in the XXI century the greatest challenge for the USA is China's foreign policy. Scowcroft is convinced that the Chinese leadership fears instability. Both authors agree that the relations with Beijing are strategic, but complicated. Brzezinski, for example, says that if America lectures the Chinese about the Tibetans they are likely to say "What about your problem with the blacks? What about the injustice in America. What about the disparities in income which are getting wider".[3]

The authors believe that America must actively create the international order and this is the most important task for the new president. Brzezinski says that "for the first time in history all of the world is politically activated and this is the challenge for the new administration". Scowcroft adds that the U.S. should and can exercise enlightened leadership in world politics, because only Washington is ready to be a guiding light. They believe that it needs to create new strategies because those employed to win conflicts in the twentieth century are no longer work. It looks like Brzezinski and Scowcroft want to restore a confident America because they believe that the nation has become frightened in the age of terrorism.

The book contains many interesting opinions on international organizations, especially NATO and the UN. The authors agree that people are trying to deal with a new world by using institutions which were not built for this new world order. That is why the organizations must be reformed. They notice that America, during the Bush presidency, missed an opportunity to build a new treaty regime. They attempt to prove that hard power cannot be used to promote democracy and liberal order.

Scowcroft observes, in American history, three general trends related to democracy. The first, the Washington–John Quincy Adams trend describes Americans as like a shining city on the hill and as believing that democracy was the way to go. The second began with Woodrow Wilson who found the Washington Adams foundation too constraining and believed Americans needed to be evangelizers of democracy. The third takes place after 9/11 with the Iraq war and constitutes an emendation of the Wilsonian ideal. It is an American goal or mission to spread democracy, even by force if necessary. He also suggests that democracy sometimes turns against American interests. For example, in the free election in 2005 the Palestinians chose Hamas.

[3] *Ibidem*, p. 132–133.

The book reflects long and in-depth thinking about difficult subjects. The individual chapters succeed in showing the reader the changes in key international problems. The book represents the best standards of scholarship and posits many important questions in a global perspective. It is a good read for anyone interested in international relations and American foreign policy.

Małgorzata Rączkiewicz

Jeff Gill, *Essential Mathematics for Political and Social Research*, Cambridge University Press, New York 2006, pp. 448.

Quantitative research methods play a significant role in advanced political analysis. Even though great importance is attached, especially in comparative politics, to mathematical and statistical tools, there are few books concerning mathematical methods that are directed specifically at political scientists. There are, however, some important exceptions. One of them is Essential Mathematics for Political and Social Research published by Cambridge University Press, which is a good handbook for political scientists concerned with quantitative analytical methods. The book covers essential topics useful for advanced research, especially in fields such as electoral studies, party politics or the dynamics of democracy. Jeff Gill's book is a successful attempt to explain maths with many examples addressed directly to political scientists. The book prepares political scientists for more advanced studies with the application of statistical and mathematical methods. Moreover, the book allows students to understand that mathematics is of great importance in political analysis.

The first chapter covers some fundamental topics, like elements of logic and the definition of a function. In particular, the concept of a function is of great importance for both natural and social scientists. The second chapter is a concise explanation of some basic problems of analytic geometry. The third and fourth chapters, covering the fundamentals of linear algebra, constitute a comprehensive guide to some very important ideas of modern mathematics. In the next two chapters, the author presents elements of scalar and vector calculus. The calculus is a powerful tool that contributed greatly to the development of natural sciences. The last three chapters cover topics concerning probability, random variables and correlation analysis, all very important for political and social scientists. Unfortunately, too little space is devoted to regression analysis, one of the basic research tools of contemporary social sciences.

Most of the topics are well explained. Moreover, there are many examples concerning politics. In sum, Jeff Gill's book is a useful guide for political scientists who apply statistical methods to measure political phenomena.

The book has its shortcomings, too. In electoral studies, political scientists use many coefficients that are based on mathematical distance functions. However, in the book the mathematical concept of distance and similarity was omitted. First of all, the idea of Euclidean metric is an indispensable tool to understand most of the indices of electoral proportionality, such as the Gallagher index or the Loosemore-Hanby index. I would suggest that the various concepts of distance function and their application in electoral studies be included in the next edition of the book.

Besides, there are far fewer examples in the book than, for instance, in similar books for physicists and economists. In addition, some topics are explained better in other books. However, inasmuch as most books concerning applied mathematics do not contain examples appropriate for political scientists, Jeff Gill's work is exceptional and well worth reading.

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