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ARTICLES

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MOVING BEYOND EDWARD SAID: HOMI BHABHA AND THE PROBLEM OF POSTCOLONIAL REPRESENTATION

ABSTRACT: The essay takes up the issue of postcolonial representation in terms of a critique of European modernism that has been symptomatic of much postcolonial theoretical debates in the recent years. It tries to enumerate the epistemic changes within the paradigm of postcolonial theoretical writing that began tentatively with the publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism* in 1978 and has taken a curious postmodern turn in recent years with the writings of Gayatri Spivak and Homi Bhabha. The essay primarily focuses on Bhabha's concepts of ambivalence and mimicry and his politics of theoretical anarchism that take the representation debate to a newer height vis-à-vis modes of religious nationalism and Freudian psychoanalysis. It is interesting to see how Bhabha locates these within a postmodern paradigm.

KEY WORDS: Postcolonialism, representation, Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, Gayatri Spivak, postmodernism, Third World/First World, mimicry, religious nationalism, ambivalence

The Politics of Space

As a subaltern critic of culture, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak had pointed out what the Third-World postcolonial subject "cannot not want," thereby creating an aporetic space for the deconstruction of metropolitan historiography on the one hand, and creating newer

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dimensions of positionality on the other: "Claiming catachreses from a space one cannot not want to inhabit and yet must criticize is, then, the deconstructive predicament of the postcolonial." (64)

Such claim of a catachrestic reading of the postcolonial Third World subject was a unique means of opening up the cultural space toward the possibilities of a pluralistic debate. It is through explorations of such alternative strategies of reading that Spivak had effectively used affirmative deconstruction as a means to subvert the hegemonic formations of Western historiography. What emerged out of this was an almost contingent, arbitrary space within which the entire debate about representation could be played out, a non-foundational, non-discursive space that could only be defined in its differential limit.

It is this problem of defining or locating that is central to the discussion of the Third-World, postcolonial intellectuals in the First World. In this paper I would like to take up this debate about the politics of location vis-à-vis some of the issues raised in the writings of Homi Bhabha. In fact, with the abundance of postmodern concerns in Bhabha's works, it is even more difficult to categorize or place him within a particular paradigm of the development of Third-World intellectual positions. His theoretical anarchism rejects any consistent metalanguage, thereby "refusing to let his terms reify into static concepts," which is akin to but much more complex than Spivak's arbitrary and interventionist critique (Spivak 146). The radical postmodern position that he assumes leads him to a rejection even of the anti-humanist tropes that some of his predecessors such as Edward Said have used more or less successfully. His movement "outside the sentence" is a movement beyond any possible logocentrism, and opens up this debate about representation into an unforeseen hybridity.[1] Primarily, in moving outside the sentence, Bhabha tried to cancel out any possibility of falling into the trap of the politics of binaries, that he felt had considerably weakened Edward Said's argument, Said being one of the beginners of this argument about postcolonial location and representation. This is where, I presume, Bhabha is more like Spivak in choosing an arbitrary method of disruption to launch a counter-narrative against the pan-assimilationist strategies of the Western theoretical system.

[1] For a discussion on Bhabha's concept of hybridity and its implications on agency, and vice-versa see Bhabha, Homi, "The Postcolonial and the Postmodern: The Question of Agency" in *The Location of Culture* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994; rpt. 2004), 245-82.

Differences with Edward Said

At the time when Said had begun to publish his writings on the politics of domination and governance, he was considered quite revolutionary in his mode of attack and influences. This was one of the primary reasons of his immense popularity, particularly among Third-World intellectuals, whose primary instinct was the desperate instinct of survival against the all-pervasive techniques of assimilation of the Western socio-political system. With the publication of *Orientalism* they acquired a new weapon against Western humanist politics. Considering Said's influences, namely Foucault and Gramsci, and his stance on the subjects of imperialism and colonialism, one might easily conclude that he was anti-humanist in his politics. Notwithstanding the fact that this stance of anti-humanism was quite fashionable to assume in the America of the sixties and the seventies, one must also admit that this was a veritably valid means of registering one's protest against discursive dominance at that time. I say this to disarm the argument that some critics put forth about Edward Said's anti-humanism being a fashionable strategy to survive in the Western academia. What is also interesting to note is the way Said has used this weapon of anti-humanism. He has never rejected humanism, two of his major theoretical influences being Erich Auerbach and Leo Spitzer. On the contrary he has liberally used their research methodologies and resource materials to gather the information he has used against them. Only, his tools were different and new. He used the counter-discursive logic of anti-humanism to explode the myths about the "white man's burden," the lazy native, the objectivity of literature, or even the discipline of history. Two of his most read books, *Orientalism* and *Culture and Imperialism*, are documentary evidences of such a contrapuntal manner of reading.

However revolutionary Said might have been during his time, Homi Bhabha and his techniques of reading have really challenged not only the Western discursive systems, but their critiques by the likes of Said as well. His basic intention was to move beyond the debate between discourse and counter-discourse and think of a location for the postcolonial intellectual (or even the common man; distinctions between the intellectual and the common man also dissolve in Bhabha's works) that is beyond this categorized, defined dynamic of contestation. His politics is arbitrary and disruptive, even more so than Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak. Thus, inevitably, he has moved out of the teleological or the causal bind that is at the root of liberal humanist assumptions; those assumptions which, I am afraid, Said had worked within. But first let me note the basic points where Bhabha departed considerably from Said.

The Politics of Binaries

It is rather interesting to note the way Bhabha tackles the problematic of binary opposition—the way Edward Said uses it, and he himself opposes and transcends it. What Bhabha initially looks into in his essay "The Other Question" are the basic patterns of the development of colonial discourse and the tropes that they use. He immediately notices how the predominant strategic function of colonial discourse was to create a space for the colonized through the production of knowledge, a continuous mechanism of surveillance, and the creation of stereotypes. Such a strategy of surveillance and typification helped the colonizer to categorize and hence establish a system of administration on the one hand, and to locate the colonized as the 'other' so as to ratify cultural authority/superiority, on the other:

> Despite the play of power within colonial discourse and the shifting positionalities of its subjects (for example, effects of class, gender, ideology, different social formations, varied systems of colonization and so on), I am referring to a form of governmentality that in marking out a 'subject nation', appropriates, directs and dominates its various spheres of activity. Therefore, despite the 'play' in the colonial system which is crucial to its exercise of power, colonial discourse produces the colonized as a social reality which is at once an 'other' and yet entirely knowable and visible (Bhaba, "The Other Question"101).

This is how the inherent politics of binarism is played out. Many Third-World intellectuals dealing with the politics of colonization failed to notice the implicit paradox within this system of operation. Whereas the consistent 'other'ing of the colonized is used to situate the West in a position of binary superiority, the complete knowability or visibility of the subject people is also assumed, as if the paradigms of Western systems of knowledge have managed to know or read the 'other' completely. Bhabha's slow but sure movement toward a psychological critique of imperial politics is perhaps a ploy to address this gap or catachrestic flaw that has been overlooked by the Third World critique of imperialism.

Bhabha sees Said to have fallen into the same trap of binary politics. This, according to him, is only a consolidation of Western hegemonic strategy, as the very acceptance of this binary logic is in a way succumbing to the assimilationist strategies of imperial power. One of the chief emphases in Said's works has been the problem of representation, a trope intrinsically linked to the problematic of location and space. It is while addressing these issues that Said uses the Foucauldian paradigms of knowledge and power. It is exactly at this moment, Bhabha notes,

when Said unconsciously falls into the trap of binarisms: power as opposed to powerlessness; knowledge as contrasted against ignorance.

The differentiation that Said makes between latent and manifest orientalisms is also symptomatic of the same implicit binary politics that completely eludes him.[2] This is not to say, however, that he misunderstood the problem of imperial politics and domination. On the contrary, as I have already insisted, he was one of the foremost intellectuals from the Third World who addressed the politics of representation in such detail. What he perhaps failed to realize was that his studied invectives against the epistemic knowledge systems of the West could easily be essentialized by the fluid mechanism of the binary framework that was (and perhaps, is) continuously in operation.[3]

Bhabha clearly shows us this binary pattern that Said easily succumbed to. He elucidates how Said's manifest Orientalism talks about the learning, discovery and practise of imperialist politics—those signifiers of stability that constitute a static system of rule and discipline, and the logic of governance. On the other hand, latent Orientalism is the site of dreams, images, fantasies, myths and obsessions that are manifested through literature and the arts, cultural geography, and myriad other means of informing the unconscious. These polarities that Said creates are easily separable and can be destabilized by consistent discursive attacks, which is what his critics like Bernard Lewis have done. Such distinct binarisms fail to create a unitary epistemic system of protest or subversion that has multiple polarities and is essentially fluid in its dynamics.

What is denied in Said's idea of latent and manifest Orientalism is a differential quality that allows the concepts to play against each other. This would have enabled a continuous movement without any stable position or fixed co-ordinates thereby denying colonial discourse any chance to construe an attack. What Bhabha is suggesting is that in his creation of structures of resistance, Said has failed to problematize counter-discourse, and his pattern of protest was easily subsumed. Although, I feel, a lot of this is true, one must realize the advantage that Bhabha has in working with postmodern tools that have allowed him free play, which Said was perhaps denied of. By situating himself within the postmodern condition it has been possible for Bhabha to maintain

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[2] For Said's concept of "latent" and "manifest" Orientalisms see Said, Edward, *Orientalism* (New Delhi: Penguin, 2001), 201-25.

[3] Jean Baudrillard has discussed how as soon as the 'other' can be represented, it can be appropriated and controlled. See Baudrillard, Jean, *In the Shadow of the Silent Majorities . . . Or the End of the Social, and Other Essays*, trans. Paul Foss, Paul Patton and John Johnston (New York: Foreign Agents Series, 1983), pp.20-2.

a differential quality throughout his work, something that was not entirely possible for Said to imagine in the theoretical milieu that he was working in.

Representation of the 'Other'

I have already pointed out how the colonial stereotype is one of the models for the development of colonial discourse, the kind of *cataloguing* that helps the imperialist to create a monolithic construction of the Orient that should be dominated and ruled. Said immediately latches on to the idea of the stereotype and tries to deconstruct the myths created around it, and throughout he has maintained this as a valid course of attack against discursive formations. One of Said's chief agenda in terms of the politics of representation is to oppose the othering of the colonial subject through the formation of stereotypes. He realizes in his binary conceptions that a complete negation or disavowal of stereotypical representation might not be possible (even if decolonization is possible), and thus there is the need for an alternative language of resistance within this encounter between East and West. We notice his seething anger in a passage in *Orientalism*:

> One [the West] tends to stop judging things either as completely novel or as completely well-known; a new median category emerges, a category that allows one to see new things, as versions of a previously known thing. In essence such a category is not so much a way of receiving new information as it is a method of controlling what seems to be a threat to some established view of things. (58-9)

This sense of disgust culminates in a realization of confusion within colonial discourse itself, which idea unfortunately he does not further develop:

> The orient at large vacillates between the West's contempt for what is familiar and its shivers of delight in—or fear of—novelty. (Said 59)

Here we might anticipate both the anger and the frustration of the Third-World intellectual. It is a realization of the power of colonial discourse on the one hand, and its inherent confusion on the other. Unfortunately, however, at the time when Said is writing he does not possess the necessary tools that postmodernism has devised much later, to conclusively deconstruct this kind of ambivalence. Said understands his (the Orient's) powerlessness to take advantage of this theoretical aporia. Ideally, he could have pointed out the inherent contradiction

within imperial paradigms and hence situate the problem of representation on a separate plane altogether. He realizes the moment but cannot seize it because of the ultimately traditional framework that he was working within.

This is the moment where Bhabha steps in. His stance is that of the Third-World intellectual who has arrived in the First World equipped with postmodern theoretical tools. He constructs and cancels, deconstructs and re-constructs at ease, thereby playing the game of representation on a plane completely removed from Said's. Here is something we need to understand from the point of view of location. Although both Said and Bhabha are representatives of the Third World in the First, their approaches to the problem of representation are markedly different. In Bhabha there is much less anxiety about his location than in the early Said. He approaches the problem of the stereotype in a manner very different from Said: "My anatomy of colonial discourse remains incomplete until I locate the stereotype, as an arrested, fetishistic mode of representation within its field of identification" (Bhaba, "The Other Question" 109).

He takes up the same trope of representation as stereotype but locates it out of the political into the psychological. He tries to identify the problem in terms of the "Lacanian schema of the Imaginary" (Bhaba, "The Other Question" 109-10). At the present moment I am not going into a detailed discussion on Bhabha's concept of the 'fetish' which he has talked about in much detail in some of his essays.[4] But talking in terms of representation we see how Bhabha re-locates the Saidian concept of latent Orientalism. He sees the Imaginary as constituted of two forms—narcissism and aggressivity. While narcissism reminds the subject of his inherent difference from the Orient and a consequent feeling of superiority, his aggressivity masks this difference in terms of the politics of identity with the colonized. The identity of the colonizer is thus qualified by both fixity and fantasy—the fixity of a monolithic image of the colonized subject to dominate, compare, or identify with, as also the fantasy of the narcissistic pleasure of superiority. Both these functions of the Imaginary therefore need the stereotype as an imperative.

By lifting this problematic of representation out of the political into the psychological, Bhabha allows a free-play of meanings which are not inevitably caught up in the discursive paradigms of colonial rule. What

[4] See, for example, Bhabha, "Difference, Discrimination, and the Discourse of Colonialism" in *Literature, Politics and Theory. Papers from the Essex Conference, 1976-1984*, ed. Francis Barker et al (London: Methuen, 1986), pp.194-211.

Bhabha is trying to achieve is a dynamic of equality between the First and the Third World in terms of representation. We need not over-emphasize the possibilities of such equality, but the movement out of the political into the psychological or the Imaginary can at least ensure a pluralistic, uncertain, ambivalent framework for the construction of identity. What I have tried to show in the discussion above is how Bhabha qualifies Said's protests about the problematic of representation and looks to re-constellate it out of its simplistic binary, oppositional logic, into a postmodern one of ambivalence, hybridity and heterogeneity.

The First World Location: Differences and Discontinuities

It is indeed true that both Gayatri Spivak (who I do not have the space to discuss here) as well as Homi Bhabha have departed considerably from Edward Said in their approach. This is, of course, not to say that they acknowledge Said only casually, as a predecessor, who also wrote about the problems of imperialism and representation. On the contrary both of them acknowledge him as a precursor, as someone, who for the first time categorically defined Third-World representation as a site for debate and discussion. It was only after him that Western academic discourse began to seriously address the question of Third-World representation, and the location of the Third-World intellectual in the First. However, what both Spivak and Bhabha departed from was the technique that Said used. Spivak's technique was one of arbitrariness and disruption. Homi Bhabha, with his postmodern tools, has taken this technique of disruption to new heights. As a major theoretician from the Third World the pressure that Bhabha has exerted with his unique ideas of mimicry, ambivalence and hybridity, has not only challenged Western discursivity, but has also finally consolidated the position of the Third-World, postcolonial intellectual in the First.

Mimicry: Resemblance and Menace

An interesting aspect of Bhabha's work is the way he stitches aspects of his issues with colonial politics with that of his strategies of representation. While he discusses colonial tropes of discursivity and appropriation on the one hand, he methodically addresses the problematic of his (or the Third-World intellectual's) location in the West, on the other. The truly postmodern aspect of Bhabha's work is in the neatness with which he undertakes this enterprise, cleverly camouflaging his agenda of location

within his well researched discourse on colonialism and its critique. What I mean is really that it is easy to miss Bhabha's strategy because of the layered masks he puts on them. Let us take mimicry, for example. Apparently it might seem to be a discourse on colonial strategies of domination and a consequent thwarting of the same by the imperialized. Of course it is a critique of colonial domination and an interesting psychological unravelling of possibilities of challenging it. But it is also more than just this. Once the reader removes this mask, he discovers the face of the Third-World intellectual lurking behind it. He also mimics; he also uses the English language; he has also chosen the First-World location. So is mimicry not his (Bhabha's) strategy of protest, of consolidating his position, of trying to negotiate possibilities of a dialogue or debate? This is the reason why reading Bhabha is so interesting—a continuous intellectual challenge to unmask and decipher.

Let us see what his concept of mimicry entails—both in terms of method and strategy. In the first place mimicry is born out of the necessity of colonial domination, to assert itself through a panoptical vision of domination. This entails not only a pervasive strategy of cultural imperialism, but a regular supply of indigenous imitators of an identical cultural logic who would maintain the mechanics of the imperial administration: ". . . colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognizable Other, *as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite*. Which is to say, that the discourse of mimicry is constructed around an *ambivalence*" (Bhaba, "Of Mimicry and Man" 122).

This ambivalence is both reassuring and menacing. The similarity that is 'not quite' helps the colonizer to locate the other as 'a difference', the fine objectivity that sustains the master-slave binary and helps the tropes of power. But what is implicit is the other obvious argument that is located antipodally, and holds true by the same logic. The subject position of this mimic man has shifted from its conclusively binary one of the colonized 'other'. He is now 'other' but 'not quite'. This lateral movement places him in the ambivalent position of the hybrid subject who is neither colonizer nor colonized, but something in between. This in-betweenness of the emergent colonial subject who is 'white, but not quite' portends the beginning of a counter-gaze that effectively displaces the social control of the power centre. As Bhabha writes, ". . . the reforming civilizing mission is threatened by the displacing gaze of its disciplinary double . . ." (Bhaba, "Of Mimicry and Man" 123). This continuous slippage from the legitimate pattern of the colonizer-colonized binary is something that Bhabha discovers from his postmodern location, and this is what is menacing about the otherwise sound administrative logic of the creation of the mimic man.

This kind of a double bind is something that the colonial masters did not obviously anticipate. However, once this mechanism of the creation of the mimic men was set in motion, the inevitability of this 'disciplinary gaze' became apparent. The initial necessity for the master was to create a 'reformed' colonial subject who would help in matters of administration. As Macaulay had clearly laid down the exact denomination of this pandering colonial subject, who is trained to help and not to think, trained to imitate rather than imagine, to execute much less to know matters of colonial policy: ". . . a class of interpreters between us and the millions whom we govern—a class of persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals and in intellect" (Macaulay 49).

Clearly, the basic idea behind the creation of these Anglicized (but not English) subjects was to make them *repeat* rather than *represent* the West and its socio-cultural formations. It was also to transform Indian knowledge into European information that would facilitate domination and rule:

> The Indians were sources or "native informants" who supplied information, *viva voce*, in English or Indian languages; who collected, translated, and discussed texts and documents; and who wrote exegeses of various kinds that were classified, processed, and analyzed into knowledge *of* or *about* India. (Cohn 51)

However, what the European master failed to realize was that many of these chosen and educated colonial subjects who were meant to play the role of the mimic men were also men of letters by their own right. They realized that they were being used by the colonizer for the simple reason that they were better than many of their brethren in certain respects. In many cases, they were even superior to some of their English masters, and this is why there was always the implicit possibility of the counter-gaze: "The Indian scholar knew he was superior to his European Master in respect of Indian languages, [but] he was primarily an informant, a mere tool in the exercise of language teaching to be handled by others" (Das 107).

This sense of a deliberate suppression by the British master, the humiliation of being merely an 'informant' and not an intellectual was something that automatically created the occasion for counter-gaze, for making the colonizer nervous and uncomfortable. This is the ambivalent location that Bhabha talks about. The English educated colonial subject has the advantage of being conversant with the cultural tropes of both the colonizer and the colonized. He thus becomes a representative of a difference that works both ways—that is both for the colonial master and his colonized other. Bhabha compares this kind of colonial textuality

with the partial nature of Freudian fantasy that is caught between the unconscious and the preconscious. This is how Freud talks about fantasy:

> Their mixed and split origin is what decides their fate. We may compare them with individuals of mixed race who taken all round resemble white men but who betray their coloured descent by some striking feature or other and on that account are excluded from society and enjoy none of the privileges. (Freud, 'The Unconscious' qtd. in Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Man" 127)

It is this kind of an interdictory location that is the ideal site for mimicry, a blurred frame of reference from where this mimic man revalues the normative principles of race, writing, history that have been laid down by colonial hegemony. This is what Bhabha calls the 'metonymy of presence'—a camouflage, a form of resemblance, which differs from or defends presence by displaying it in part, metonymically: "The desire of colonial mimicry—an interdictory desire—may not have an object, but it has strategic objectives which I shall call the *metonymy of presence*." (Bhaba, "Of Mimicry and Men" 128). Thus the desire for mimicry, that I had argued in the beginning to be the desire of the colonizer is eventually transformed into a strategic desire of the colonized, who, metonymically subverts the location from one of disadvantage to one of advantage.

When I talk about the mimic man revaluing the normative principles of hegemonic imperialism in terms of race, writing or history, I do not necessarily insist on this being an academic or a pedagogical process-a process which is perhaps the most obvious one for the middle class native representative. No doubt there were conscious intellectual enterprises on the part of the native men of letters to make full use of their interdictory locations, and thereby subvert the discursive imperial dynamic: obvious examples in Bengal were the likes of Raja Rammohan Roy, Raj Narayan Bose or Bankimchandra Chattopadhyay who wrote and spoke in both their native tongue and English and who were some of the chief and most powerful instruments of nationalism in India (and obviously Bengal). However, I want to address this issue of interdictory locations from a somewhat different perspective rather than this obvious one of counter-discursive nationalism. I have already spoken about an implicit possibility of counter-gaze that started working in the minds of these mimic men. The permanent pressure of imperialism on the one hand, and the perpetual desire of subversion on the other, let the native to prepare himself psychologically for a fight back. Interestingly, this manner of psychological seasoning was not always conscious or deliberate. Sometimes this happened suddenly like an epiphany and sometimes from a continuous deliberation within the subconscious. Religion or

more precisely, religiosity played a key role in such methods of counter-gaze. The tradition of Indian spirituality and a return to religion as a buffer was thus an interesting method of both evasion and subversion of the imperial logic. Religiosity or spiritualism is sometimes a bit abstract in its logic, and thus, this trope of using the divine was a unique way of subversion. Here I shall try to establish this point.

The Case of Aurobindo Ghose

Aurobindo Ghose could be a classic example of this kind of an evasive, differential religiosity. His stance as a god-man of sorts not only subverted the much used trope of imperial rationality, but also supplied, at least for a certain period of time, a frenzy associated with religious nationalism. Aurobindo was born Aurobindo Ackroyd Ghose to a completely Anglicized and Brahmo father Krishnadhan Ghose. Krishnadhan belonged to that category of brown sahibs who would never conceive of using his location as a 'metonymy of presence'. From his unilaterally defined location he hated everything Indian—its culture, language, religion and people. At the age of seven Aurobindo was shipped to England and housed under the care of Reverend and Mrs. Drewett, with strict instructions that he be well guarded from anything remotely Indian. Thus Aurobindo took lessons in English, Latin, Greek and French, and did not even know how to speak properly in his mother tongue. Sisir Kumar Mitra rightly points out that Krishnadhan "took the greatest care that nothing Indian should touch this son of his."[5]

Due to such strict instructions Aurobindo never made any friends in England, and he grew up a nervous and petulant child who was called "Baby Ghose" by his classmates.[6] It was perhaps in his loneliness that the first seeds of rebellion were sown. He began to review the West and the implications of imperialism with inputs from his maternal grandfather Raj Narayan Bose, and certain nationalist magazines that would trickle through to England. He took the first part of the Classical Tripos with a first class, and then did not take the degree. He also deliberately flunked in the Indian Civil Service examination. Having fared extremely

[5] Mitra, Sisir Kumar, *The Liberator: Sri Aurobindo, India and the World* (Delhi: Jaico, 1954), p.24. This and other references to Aurobindo Ghose have mostly been acquired from Ashis Nandy's writings on Aurobindo in *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988).

[6] Government of India, Home Department, Political File No.13, June 1908, Note on Aravinda Acroyd Ghose by A. Wood, ICS

well in all the exams of the civil service he deliberately missed the riding test and was thereby disqualified.[7]

Aurobindo dropped the 'Ackroyd' from his name and came back to India. The seeds of nationalism that were sown in him during the final phase of his stay in England now germinated with a vigour in Baroda where he was a bureaucrat and a language teacher. He started learning Indian languages and quickly picked up Bengali, Sanskrit, Gujarati and Marathi. It was during this phase that he started having spiritual experiences and had the experience of being enveloped by a deep calm and silence (Mitra 34). He also claimed that he had seen the Goddess Kali as a living presence, and it is through such spiritual experience that the subversive logic of nationalism started to work. The mythography of India as a powerful but oppressed Mother started to feature in his literary works. He writes:

> In the unending revolutions of the world, as the wheel of the Eternal turns rightly in the courses, the Infinite Energy, which streams forth from the Eterna . . . sets the wheel to work . . . This Infinite Energy is Bhavani. She also is Durga. She is Kali; she is Radha the beloved, she is Lakshmi. She is our mother and creatress of us all. In the present age the mother is manifested as the Mother of Strength. [8]

This was almost like a manifesto of nationalism, but spread by means of the frenzy of religion. This was obviously a very oblique and subversive method that Aurobindo was using. These tropes of *swadharma* and *swajati* were beyond the traditional weapons or means of subversion—opposition, or direct confrontation, or questioning the master narratives of the West. Religion and the concept of the 'jati' that were being used in this kind of nationalism was exclusive of the Foucauldian power-knowledge paradigm that the colonial masters were so used to. As Bhabha writes:

> Its [colonial discourse] predominant strategic function is the creation of a space for a 'subject peoples' through the production of knowledges in terms of which surveillance is exercised . . . It seeks authorization for its strategies by the production of knowledges of colonizer and colonized which are stereotypical . . . (Bhaba, "The Other Question" 103-4)

Aurobindo was acting outside this stereotype, and thereby subverting the binary logic. The brown sahib who was supposed to be the pro-

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[7] Mitra, *The Liberator*, p.26. Aurobindo was eleventh in the open competition of 1890, twenty-third in the first periodical examination, and thirty-seventh in the final examination. See, Government of India, Judicial and Public File 1396 of 1892.

[8] Aurobindo Ghose in *Bhavani Mandir*, trans. Mitra, Sisir Kumar, *The Liberator*, p. 48.

imperialist interlocutor, the link that would consolidate the empire was reacting in a completely incomprehensible manner. What Aurobindo was doing was really simple: he was using his ambivalent location—that of the English educated native—against the expected pattern of its use. Thus, the imperial perspective of viewing the colonized 'as a social reality which is at once an "other" and yet entirely knowable and visible'[26] was frustrated by Aurobindo's actions. He was arrested for sedition, and on his release moved into a completely spiritual life in Pondicherry, a French colony at that time. This part of his life is not topical to our present discussion. However, Aurobindo's location, I presume, remains quite interesting in terms of the 'metonymy of presence' that Bhabha is talking about.

Religion as Nationalism

Aurobindo Ghose's life in India—both political and spiritual—might be seen as a perpetual search for self-esteem and cultural autonomy. His reaching back to the classical texts of Hinduism, was to develop a critical awareness of one's own culture, as also a search for individual authenticity. The logic of evasion that he was using against British imperialism was interesting. One of the well-known tropes of cultural imperialism has always been to trivialize the 'present' of the colonized country as contrasted to its 'glorious past'. Thus the past is already authenticated within the logic of imperialism itself. The past was glorious and noteworthy, and the present is not even a shadow of that past. Aurobindo, instead of playing the obvious game of opposition, used this trope of the glory of the past to perfection. In a short pamphlet called *Bhawani Mandir* he liberally used resources of the past, particularly from the *Markandaya Purana*—which was a Brahmanical text with Tantric influences.[9] The concept of 'Shakti' that he evokes in *Bhawani Mandir* is clearly borrowed from the *Markandaya Purana*:

> What is our mother-country? It is not a piece of earth, nor a figure of speech, nor a fiction of the mind. It is a mighty Shakti, composed of the Shaktis of all the millions of units that make up the nation, just as Bhawani Mahisa Mardini sprang into being from the Shakti of all the millions of gods assembled in one mass of force and welded into unity. The Shakti we call India, Bhawani Bharati, is the living unity

[9] A good discussion on the *Markandaya Purana* can be found in Farquhar, J.N., *An Outline of the Religious Literature of India* (1920; Varanasi: Motilal Banarasidass, 1967), pp.150-1. On the Tantras in general see Woodroffe, Sir John, [Arthur Avalon, pseudo.], *Principles of Tantra*, 2vols. (Madras, 1960), pp.212ff.

> of the Shaktis of three hundred million people; but she is inactive, imprisoned in the magic circle of tamas, the self-indulgent inertia and ignorance of her sons. To get rid of tamas we have but to wake the Brahma within.[10]

This is an interesting revival of the past, a complete surrender to spiritualism, that both underplays and consolidates nationalism and a sense of cultural identity at the same time. This harking back to the past is essentially rooted in indigenous tradition and beyond the immediate scope of binary games of essentialism. This evocation of the Brahma is very self-contained, completely independent of all foreignness: "In *Bhawani Mandir* the British are not present and are not held responsible for the fall of India. Rather, Indians abandoned Shakti and therefore were abandoned by her" (Gordon 113).

What needs to be noted is the element of surprise and shock of the British master at the behaviour of the brown sahib. This is a movement beyond all scopes of essentialism. In fact this is a use of the 'past' that is rarely problematized by imperialist discourse, the past that is advertised as glorious by the colonialist himself.

Thus the ambivalence of location of the brown sahib is suddenly overshadowed by an ambivalent temporality where the possibility of the 'past' is re-evoked in the 'present', and used as a means of disruption. Bhabha notes this kind of a deliberate return to tradition:

> Counter-narratives of the nation that continually evoke and erase its totalizing boundaries—both actual and conceptual—disturb those ideological manoeuvres through which 'imagined communities' are given essentialist identities. For the political unity of the nation consists in a continual displacement of its irredeemably plural modern space, bounded by different, even hostile nations, into a signifying space that is *archaic* and *mythical*, paradoxically representing the nation's modern territoriality, in the *patriotic, atavistic temporality of Traditionalism.* ("DissemiNation: Time, Narrative and the Margins of the Modern Nation" 300, italics mine).

Through such movement into traditionalism and an evocation of *brahmatej*, the politics of nationalism moves on to a mythographic framework, beyond the immediate reach of imperial stereotypes.[11] This

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[10] Aurobindo Ghose, *Bhawani Mandir*, rpt. in Purani, A.B., *The Life of Sri Aurobindo (1872-1926)*, 2nd edition (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1960), pp.88-9. The entire pamphlet has been reprinted in Purani, *The Life of Sri Aurobindo* (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1964), pp.84-97.

[11] There is much debate about the nature of such a mythographic nationalism. While statist historiography has wanted to see nationalism as essentially a secular enterprise, historians of the subaltern valorise an ahistorical notion of Indian religion as the only authentic site of nationalist resistance. Dipesh Chakrabarty has drawn our attention to the 'remarkable failure of intellect' in Sumit Sarkar's book on the subject whenever it

kind of a displaced 'atavistic' plurality easily overcomes the tropes of both fixity and fantasy with which the colonizer tries to arrest the colonized subject within a unilateral and stereotypical representation.

This game of traditionalism, of seeking cultural nourishment from the past that the brown sahib played, sometimes consciously (like Aurobindo), or sometimes unconsciously (in a way like Keshab Chandra Sen, who I cannot discuss within the scope of this paper), completely unsettled the purpose of creation of these mimic men. The colonized 'other' who is 'white but not quite' makes full use of this ambivalence to transform narcissism of the colonizer to paranoia, and to violate the rational, enlightened claims of his enunciatory logic. As Bhabha writes:

> The ambivalence of colonial authority repeatedly turns from *mimicry*—a difference that is almost nothing but not quite—to *menace*—a difference that is almost total but not quite (Bhaba, "Of Mimicry and Men" 131)

It is this same 'not quite'ness that is symptomatic of the location of the Third-World intellectual in the First World academia. Bhabha's concept of mimicry is thus a way of writing back, a way of registering one's presence. His choice of postmodernism as a theoretical tool is to maintain the dynamics of ambivalence, to locate the Third-World intellectual within a certitude of uncertainty. He liberally uses their theoretical tools, their discursive logic, and thereby clearly walks around the paradigm of binary confrontation, but never, for a moment, steps inside it. This is a 'menace' that cannot be theorized, and hence cannot be essentialized or appropriated as Bhabha never takes a position or assumes a role. His ever shifting, ever evasive location creates multiple aporetic possibilities and this is perhaps what Bhabha sees as the predicament of the Third-World intellectual in the First World.

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addresses the question of religion. See Chakrabarty, Dipesh, 'Radical Histories and the Question of Enlightenment Rationalism: Some Recent Critiques of Subaltern Studies' in *Economic and Political Weekly* (8 April 1995), p.753. See also Sarkar, Sumit, *The Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-1908* (New Delhi: People's Publishing House, 1973), p.316.

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MODERNITY, (POST)MODERNISM AND NEW HORIZONS OF POSTCOLONIAL STUDIES. THE ROLE AND DIRECTION OF CARIBBEAN WRITING AND CRITICISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

ABSTRACT: My article will take issue with some of the scholarship on current and prospective configurations of the Caribbean and, in more general terms, postcolonial literary criticism. It will give an account of the turn-of-the century debates about literary value and critical practice and analyze how contemporary fiction by Caribbean female writers responds to the socioeconomic reality that came into being with the rise of globalization and neo-liberalism. I will use David Scott's thought provoking study-*Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality* (1999)-to outline the history of the Caribbean literary discourse and to try to rethink the strategic goals of postcolonial criticism.

KEY WORDS: postcolonialism, Caribbean literary criticism, Caribbean female writers

The beginning of a new century is a good time to look back on past constructions of canons, traditions and critical practices in order to anticipate some of their future developments. This type of reckoning did not bypass the Caribbean, and by extension the whole of postcolonial criticism. Consequently, the turn of the century abounded with publications about historical, ideological and critical moments that shaped the canon of Caribbean literature and dominant reading practices in postcolonial studies. Many publications stressed the idea that the current Caribbean and, in more general terms, postcolonial literary criticism is heading for some momentous and long overdue changes.[1] Simon During, for

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[1] These publications include among others Alison Donnell's *Twentieth-Century Caribbean Literature* and a number of articles mentioned in the introductory part of this article.

example, claimed that "postcolonialism, with its emancipatory conceptual overtones, only obscures analysis of globalization" (23). During contended that postcolonialism, which was "first nurtured in literary studies, which was so important a feature of the 1980s and 1990s intellectual landscape seems to be less able to deal at least on its own terms with the increasingly urgent issues surrounding globalization" (23). The most trenchant criticism of postcolonial thought came form Neo-Marxist critics, such as Arif Dirlik, who accused postcolonial criticism of being "no more than ideological reflection of capitalism" (Dirlik qtd. in Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 137). According to Neo-Marxist critics, "there is a complicitous and ideological relation between the conceptual themes and theoretical strategies of postcolonial criticism on the one hand and the contemporary character of capitalism on the other" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 136-7). These articles seemed not only to be real signs of discontent with the dominant views, but they also betrayed a growing realization of the hegemony of the neo-liberal capitalist state and of globalization. They highlighted the shortcomings of postcolonial/Caribbean literary criticism and called for mapping out new directions in postcolonial studies that would be able to take more fully into account the present socioeconomic reality transformed by the ascendancy of neo-liberal ideology and globalised capitalism.

Of all provocateurs who encourage us to rethink strategic goals of postcolonial criticism, David Scott seems to be the most insightful. David Scott, who comes from Jamaica, is a founder-editor of the leading Caribbean postcolonial journal, *Small Axe*, and a teacher of anthropology at Columbia. Scott's 1999 book-*Refashioning Futures: Criticism after Postcoloniality* is a thought-provoking study that grapples with some of the issues raised earlier. It is interested in "how . . . and with what conceptual resources do we begin to extract a new horizon of possibilities, from within the moral and epistemic contours of our postcolonial present" (3). He evolves a concept of strategic criticism of "reading the present with a view to determining whether (and how) to continue with it in the future . . . determining at any conjecture what conceptual moves among the many available options will have the most purchase, the best yield" (7). So far established paradigms, Scott terms them problem-spaces,[2] such as Marxism, cultural nationalism, post-essentialism etc. are, in his opinion, no longer apposite to examine the new postcolonial reality or the new international world order

[2] Scott's problem-space can be understood as a political or theoretical orthodoxy that scans and analyses literature/political discourse for specific conceptual, political and theoretical positions.

changed by the globalization of capitalism, the failure of socialism and the concomitant triumphant rise of neo-liberalism. Scott thinks that Postcolonial criticism has become bogged down in theoretical practices "that have lost direction and force" (140) and that is it is on the wrong path. According to Scott, we are presently in a transitional moment (which he calls "after-postcoloniality"), on the threshold of a new discursive space that demands from us the abandonment of all exhaustively well-rehearsed epistemological claims for the sake of a new set of questions that will contribute to the emergence of a new problem-space. In other words, Scott discusses the inadequacy of the cognitive apparatuses of contemporary postcolonial criticism that have for decades now defined the conceptual terrain of postcolonial critics, the problem-space within whose confines those critics have so far worked and whose confines they ought presently to break.

Scott, who ultimately rejects Neo-Marxism,[3] partially agrees with such critics as Dirlik who maintain that the main deficiency of postcolonialism is its reluctance "to address itself to the impasses [that] mark our political modernity" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 133). The most important of these impasses is the development of a capitalist world economy and the end of what Scott calls the Bandung Era[4]-a period in which postcolonial criticism was animated by anti-capitalist, anti-liberal and anti-imperialist sentiment, and most of postcolonial critics believed in some version of socialism as a goal in the political future. Since all great experiments with socialism have failed and neo-colonial regimes and corrupted governments produced only a growing disappointment, postcolonial critics have found themselves in a kind of ideological void. In the words of David Scott, "we inhabit [a] reconfigured cognitive political space"-"a paradoxical historical moment in which we appear, in Zygmunt Bauman's very vivid phrase, 'to be living without an alternative'" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 134). Therefore, as Scott sees it, what this present historical moment demands from us is to have a closer look at the postcolonial political modernity and how it has adapted to the inroads of liberalism, capitalism and globalization.

The aim of this essay is to look closely at what seems to be the eclipse of an old orthodoxy that paves the way for the emergence of a new discursive space. It will briefly look at the historiography of Caribbean literature and criticism in an effort to define major critical approaches of

[3] In his opinion Neo-Marxism is too totalizing and categorical because it is based on the premise that the political is exclusively concerned with the advance of global capitalism rather than cultural matters.

[4] From the Bandung Conference in 1955 to the establishment of Group 77 in 1975.

the twentieth century and to see how postcolonial Caribbean literature and criticism have responded to the global developments that led to "the end of history," to use another well-known phrase.[5] In other words, I will use the analysis of the Caribbean literary tradition to highlight collisions between politics and cultural/literary theory in times of globalization and neo-liberalism. While David Scott's study is primarily concerned with the political discourse of postcolonialism, my article will focus on the literary discourse of Caribbean criticism. It will attempt to give an overview of key historical trajectories of the of Caribbean literature through the lenses of David Scott's strategic criticism and problem-space framework to show how major theoretical moves of postcolonial political criticism have shaped the West Indian thematic and aesthetic. My discussion will end with the analysis of the critical reception of the work of contemporary Afro-Caribbean women writers whose novels have often been criticized for "the failure to make the political appear," to quote David Scott out of context. I am going to try to undermine the veracity of this claim. In spite of the fact that these women writers seem to be more concerned with the issues of identity, gender, sexuality, and less with economics and collective struggles, I will hold that their novels not only express the sociopolitical realities of the post independent West Indies, but that they also address ethical and political questions raised by globalization, especially those connected with diaspora and migrancy.

Postcolonialism was institutionalized in the late 1970s and 1980s at the end of the Bandung Era. By that time it was a constituted field of clearly defined argument-its problem-space had been outlined by anti-colonial movements of the 1940s and 50s. The masculine anti-colonial nationalism in the Caribbean answered the demand for political decolonization, the overthrow of colonial power, political sovereignty and freedom. It focused on the restoration of an authentic relationship between representation and reality and of the self-representation of the colonized. It was bent on establishing national cultural identities posed in opposition to the colonizer's identity and on founding national traditions in literature on the basis of common cultural roots.

Anti-essentialist counter move, which is currently *au currant* in postcolonial circles, was a part and parcel of the same problem space. As Bongie eloquently argues in "Exiles on Main Stream: Valuing the

[5] This phrase was used by Francis Fukuyama who claimed that "the exhaustion of all possible alternatives to Western liberalism" means that we have arrived at "the end of history"–"the universalization of western liberal democracy as the final form of human government" ("The End of History?" 4).

Popularity of Postcolonial Literature" (2003), the turn to "polyphonic," "mosaic," "nomadic," "diasporic," and "relational" politics was a predictable reaction against cultural nationalism (29). It was a kind of ideological tug of war, totally predictable because, as David Scott argues, "once the game is known [game in the sense of theoretical apparatus] it is possible to anticipate in advance the moves that are to be made in an argument" (8). According to David Scott anti-essentialists tried to establish epistemological superiority over the older generation of essentialist critics with the effect that "hitherto existing strategies of criticism [were] found out, admonished and dismissed for their epistemological naïveté" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 4). In other words, anti-colonialists' key assumptions about the value of such categories as culture, class, subjectivity, history and knowledge were exposed as erratic and discredited for their Eurocentric epistemic genealogy. For post-essentialist critics it is "an epistemological law that cultures are not pure or homogenous, that subjectivity is never outside the discursive practices that constitute it, that identities are never fixed or immutable; that the boundaries of communities are not given but constructed" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 9). But still, as David Scott is quick to point out, what post-essentialists considered culture, identity, nation, class, or community was largely defined in terms and theories borrowed from the grand narrative of the Enlightenment. Therefore anti-essentialism is for Scott nothing more than an "updated counter-design procedure, a counter-nationalism, a counter-claim"(4) that fails to problematize the old paradigm. Anti-essentialists are "historicists" who "historicize the answers not the questions" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 9).

The critic who, according to Scott, was more successful in creating the problem space was Edward Said. With the publication of Edward Said's *Orientalism* (1978), anticoloniality was deposed by postcoloniality (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 3) whose focus was the relationship between the colonial power and the colonial knowledge. Colonialism was no longer seen as a structure of material exploitation, but "a structure of organized authoritative knowledge (a formation, an archive) that operated discursively to produce effects of truth about the colonized" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 12). The objective of postcolonial criticism, as understood by Said, was decolonization of the conceptual apparatuses through which the political objectives [of colonialists, cultural nationalists and anti-nationalists] were thought out" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 12). It aimed at-"decolonization of the West theory about the Non-West" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 12). It is a well known fact that poststructuralism (and its project of the deconstruction of representation) was the discursive context which, in the words of Scott, made possible

"a sustained interrogation of the internal structures of the cultural reason of colonialist knowledges" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 14). It made it possible to step out of anti-colonialism and "problematize colonialism as a discursive formation enduring into the present" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 14). Scott acknowledges the importance of the towering intellect of Edward Said in whose wake, as he puts it, all postcolonial critics now write, but at the same time he expresses a doubt whether this strategy can achieve anything more.

In the Caribbean the confrontation between cultural nationalist and anti-essentialist reached crescendo during the first international conference on Caribbean literature hosted in 1971 by the University of the West Indies, when Brathwaite, who argued for re-alignment of cultural standards, clashed with V. S. Naipaul, who disapproved of "folking up" the criticism (Kenneth Ramchand's words). The friction between the two eminent writers and their followers made it clear that Caribbean literary practice and criticism was split into two opposing and apparently incommensurable agendas: the Great Tradition inherited from colonial institutions and, what Brathwaite called, the Little Tradition–the native agenda that "grew from folk traditions, Caribbean languages and politics of social commitment" (Donnell 31). The Great Tradition was based on modernist Leavisite thought–it treated literature as a tool for cultural and moral advancement. The Little Tradition called for "voicing of the folk consciousness, vernacular traditions, social conscience, and the possibilities of horizontal relations between poet or writer, subject and audience. . ." (Donnell 30). The Great Tradition was elitist–it cherished the writer and the critic, and treated the text as a fetish. The Little Tradition was more egalitarian in its insistence on a "horizontal" rather than "vertical" i.e. hierarchical relationship between the author and his or her audience. The Great Tradition valued literary criticism, whereas the Little Tradition valued cultural criticism. According to many critics such as Simon Gikandi or Mary Lou Emery, these two seemingly incongruous traditions–literary and aesthetic, cultural and political–have shaped the Caribbean discourse in terms of content, style and form.

Thus the present critical moment is characterized by two parallel though conceptually different trends: essentialism and anti-essentialism, combined with the conceptual move towards the avant-garde. It is at the intersection of these two critical strains that I would place the writing of contemporary Caribbean women, whose work synthesizes the concerns of The Great and the Little Tradition, trying to reconcile modernist relish for the avant-garde with political agenda, promoting stylistic difficulty and radical social change.

Anglophone literature by Caribbean women is often hailed for its linguistic and narrative resourcefulness and there are many contemporary critics who see such rhetorical strategies as formal experimentation, fragmentation or preoccupation with the question of identity, discourse and representation as postmodern characteristics. Emilia Ippolito, for example, notices in her study *Caribbean Women Writers: Identity and Gender* that in contemporary female fiction "there has been a trend toward a rejection of the linear, realistic narrative" (7). Antonia MacDonlad-Smythe gives the example of two Afro-Caribbean writers Michelle Cliff and Jamaica Kincaid as paragons of formal innovation: "the eclectic and fragmented form favored by Cliff and Kincaid for encoding the female experiences is a rejection of linear polemic of some earlier male authored West Indian Writers" (5). Gina Wisker claims that whereas "modernism was enabling for Black men," women in the later part of the twentieth century "turned to the narrative structure of postmodernism-to fragmentation, intertextuality, parody and doubling, locating gender differences as a site for representing and reconstructing new identities." (Wisker 89) In my opinion, putting texts by Caribbean women in the postcolonial frame runs the high risk of stripping them of their political power by means of treating them merely as discursive allegories. In the words of Helen Scott,"contemporary scholarship on postcolonial women's literature is often concerned with questions of 'identity' according to which class, race, sexuality, nationality and ethnicity are primarily understood discursively" (6). This trend towards generic or allegorical readings of the novels of Caribbean female writers has often diverted the reader's attention form the political, historical and social backgrounds from which these novels emerged. This relativizing outlook of postmodernism, as Helen Scott contends, is a very dangerous tendency because the:

linguistic turn and descent into discourse in postcolonial studies risk obscuring the material coordinates of imperialism and depoliticizing a field of study that from its inception engaged with inherently political questions of empire, race, colonialism and their relationship to cultural production (10).

Attributing the enhanced interest in the literary and textual in contemporary female texts to postmodernist precedent allows some critics to formulate interpretations that treat history, reality and the self in these female-authored texts as purely discursive creations. These critics apply postmodern notions of identity to the discussion of Caribbean fiction, picturing it as something cultural and fluid, as it changes under the influence of different and competing discursive claims. As David Scott rightly warns, critical preference for such a model of identity:

> depends unproblematically on a notion of the self/identity that is always available for unmaking and remaking . . ., one that thrives on such making and remaking. It depends upon a self/identity that can choose to step back form its moral commitments, and through its autonomy-grounding faculty of critical reason suspend its particular entanglements and enter into the public space of political reason. (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 154)

Similarly, the Caribbean region, in the oeuvre of these writers, is often seen merely as a trope or a symbolic concept that helps to reconfigure the meaning of diaspora. Covi, who thinks that the Caribbean has become "an icon for a metaphysical status of in-betweens, a sort of crossroad where all dichotomies find their point of encounter and pre-given solution" (98) objects to reducing the Caribbean to "a facile postmodernist gesture" (130). Even Jamaica Kincaid, reputedly the most "postmodern" of all contemporary Afro-Caribbean female writers,[6] is fiercely committed to abolishing "the collective American fantasy revolving around the Caribbean" (Als). Covi sees in Kincaid's later novels antithesis to "seductively reductionist descriptions of the Caribbean as unchartable territory" (99). In Covi's opinion, though Kincaid's language and rhetoric play an important role "in the production of social agency and subjectivity," ultimately they are nothing more than vehicles for "accountability, responsibility, sustainability which have been increasingly developed to counter dominating global forces of power" (99). As Helen Scott recapitulates:

> Many critics then discern in contemporary women's texts a shift from the anti-imperialist, nationalist, and/or class-based political agenda of the earlier (predominantly male) texts and a concomitant rejection of realist (sometimes 'modernist') literary forms in favor of experimental (sometimes 'postmodernist') narrative strategies. (5-6)

I think that Helen Scott is right to warn readers and critics against dangers of such a neat compartmentalization. First of all "gendered generic generalizations are hard to sustain" (6) in the light of the immense range of female writing and because similar formal innovations can be found in many male writers of older and younger generations. Secondly, "the distinction between modern and postmodern is less definite than often asserted" (Scott, *Caribbean Women Writers* 6). In her article-"'Dem tief, dem a damn tief': Jamaica Kincaid's Literature of Protest," Helen Scott maintains that "many of literary features habitually associated with postmodernism are in fact identifiable in the high British modernism of the early mid twentieth century" (Scott, *Caribbean Women*

[6] Kincaid is often read figuratively, through the maternal-colonial matrix.

Writers 23). This opinion was born out by Kincaid herself who repeatedly rejected all postcolonial labels attached to her fiction. She admitted in the often quoted interview with Cudjoe that she owes much of her inventiveness to the tradition of European literary modernism and that she rather places her writing in the context of Caribbean modernism, usually associated with male exiled writers (such as V. S. Naipaul, C.L.R. James, George Lamming or Derek Walcott,) who reworked basic strategies of European modernism and refused to subjugate their art to the overtly ideological indigenous agenda of cultural nationalists.

The Caribbean (and in general postcolonial) alliance with modernist aesthetics has been a very disputed issue since the outset of the debates between essentialists and anti-essentialists, which I discussed earlier. For example, Chris Bongie insists on treating modernism as a synonym to "morally reprehensible" Eurocentrism and therefore an evil that should be overcome. Bongie thinks that the very selective treatment that Caribbean writers receive from postcolonial critics is proof of their favoritism of counter-discursive novels written in modernist fashion. Caribbean critics tend to pay more attention to writers like Condé, while excluding "popular" writers such as Tony Delsham from their field of vision. He attributes this unanimous critical neglect to the continued reverence for avant-garde novels, calling postcolonial critics "later-day Adornos." Bongie identifies the postcolonial lingering preference for "writerly novels"[7] as a legacy of modernism and censures the postcolonial studies as "the last redoubt of modernism." Following Young's argument, Bongie posits a theory that postcolonial emphasis on text (preferably highbrow and notorious for difficulty) that is best read in a "modernist way" reflects the anxiety of postcolonial critics to find a common denominator for "such a geographically free-floating concept as the 'postcolonial'–even more open than it predecessor, Commonwealth studies" (Bongie 16).

I disagree with Bongie who seems to underestimate the political efficacy of modernism. Bongie is quite positive that the modernist "underpinning of postcolonial studies" accounts for its failure to politicize its discourse. I will be pursuing a counterargument that the dispute over the depth of the collusion of modernism and imperialism only obscures the fact that Caribbean writers and critics have invested a lot in modernism, inflecting modernist tradition with the details of Caribbean life i.e. "naturalizing" it or "creolising" it in an effort to adapt

[7] Roland Barthes's term meaning avant-garde.

it to their political agenda.[8] Thus in aligning himself with tribes of cultural nationalists, who would like to obliterate what they consider residual colonial presence in Caribbean letters, Bongie presents a reactionary stand. Bongie's preoccupation with the conjunction of modernism and imperialism compels him to perpetuate anti-colonialists' obsolete views that "stripping away of colonial Eurocentrism, including the principles of modernism, to revive indigenous cultural expressions," (Pollard 198) is a must. In this way Bongie redeploys long established negative clichés of cultural nationalists of the 1940s and 50s.

Unlike Bongie, I believe that contemporary Anglophone Caribbean literature is not so much a bastion of modernism, as it is a site of an on-going debate about the values of European modernity-its promises and failures. It is counter-discursive, as Bongie maintains, but in a sense different form the one that he uses. Looking at the contemporary fiction through the prism of Edward Said's strategic criticism-as a counter-discourse to modernity, rather than a reversal of the core-periphery model, is, to my mind, more rewarding. It allows for a better interpretation of the contemporary female prose and offers a fuller understanding of what Scott describes as "a will-to-truth about the colonized" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 12). In other words, I propose to read this literature as an epistemic interrogation of what Scott terms "postcoloniality" through the aesthetics of modernism.

I want to stake out an argument for critics who argue that modernism has a central place within in the nexus of Caribbean discursive representation. One of them is Simon Gikandi whose study *Writing in Limbo: Modernism and Caribbean Literature* (1992) provides an insightful explanation of the Caribbean writers' alliance to modernism and Caribbean critics' objections to it. Gikandi posits a theory that Caribbean critics used to resist modernism because "the questions [modernism and modernity] raised in relation to Caribbean literature and its symbiotic relationship to colonialism, were possibly too paradoxical to fit neatly into a nationalist discourse that was trying to effect a clean break with

[8] Gikandi sees Caribbean modernism as related to the process of creolisation-this home-made variety of modernism "develops a narrative strategy and counter-discourse away from outmoded and conventional modes of representation associated with colonial domination and colonizing cultural structures" (5). Creolisation, in other words, is a unique kind of Caribbean modernism that manages to reconcile: the values of European literacy with the long repressed traditions of African orality (16). It defies the colonial historiography by showing the colonial subject and colonial culture as capable of transmuting and transforming into freedom. Thus the naturalization of modernism consists in combining European elitist tradition with African Caribbean folkloric and vernacular tradition.

its antecedents" (253). Now they resist because, like Bongie, they think that modernism converges with imperialism and, due to its a-historic formalism and aestheticism, provides an escape from the prison house of colonial history. Whatever their reservations are, Caribbean discourse cannot escape, claims Gikandi, from the history and culture of European modernity and modernism which both "haunts and sustains" Caribbean literature. It is a fact accepted by most Caribbean authors, who, like Walcott, believe that "revolutionary literature is a filial impulse, and . . . maturity is assimilation of the features of every ancestor" (36-7), and who set out to decolonize modernist tradition by mastering it. Those writers, as Pollard contends, are "less anxious to sweep the burden of modernism and more anxious to exploit its resources for new purposes" (211).

Gikandi uses interchangeably the two interrelated terms of modernity and modernism–to describe the vexed relationship of Caribbean critics to the Great Tradition, and claims that "much hostility towards modernist Caribbean texts arises from the tendency to limit definitions of modernism to the twentieth century and to the high modernist aesthetic articulated by Anglo-American writers such as Ezra Pound, T.S. Eliot, and James Joyce" (5). According to Gikandi, modernism and modernity exist in "a chiasmic relationship" (254)-these terms relate to the high bourgeois theory which is often seen "as a dangerous fallacy that represses the historicity of art and its function as a form of social struggle" (2), as well as to the New Age-the historical period that ensued in the wake of Columbus's discovery:

> for Columbus and the European conquerors, the 'discovery' of the Caribbean initiated modernity; but . . . the implication of this modernity for the natives of the islands and African slaves was nothing less than the loss of cultures, physical annihilation and historical displacement. Thus modernity and its art forms must of necessity have different meanings for Europe and the African diaspora. For the former it generates or justifies the rationalist and absolutist claims that anchor the foundational narrative of modern Western culture. Indeed, as contemporary advocates of modernity as a project of Enlightenment have reminded us, by the eighteenth century the period of discovery had become conceptualized in European thought and historiography as the New Age. In this sense the Caribbean is fully implicated in the historical events that initiate Western modernist discourse, it cannot escape from the ideologies of modernity and its consequences; it can confront the possibilities and limitations of modernism. (253)

For Gikandi then, the resistance to literary modernism is a corollary of the resistance to historic modernity and while it seems that many Caribbean writers throughout the twentieth century embarked on the project of creating a "counter modernity"[9] by subverting the modernist

[9] Homi Bhabha's expression.

dictum-its political and ideological assumptions-some critics (especially those engaged in the stubborn defense of the Little Tradition) do seem to lag behind, pulled backwards by their gnarled skepticism of everything European. While these critics hold back, Caribbean writers engage in the Western modernist discourse and dismantle modern regimes of representation. As Gikandi asserts, "what Caribbean writers have done then is to weaken the foundation of the Western narrative, expose what Laclau calls 'the metaphysical or rationalist pretensions' of Western modernity and its absolutist theory of history" (253). In doing that (so I argue) the artists of Caribbean modernism anticipated Edward Said's agenda and set the stage for his incisive theories.

According to Gikandi, the task of abolishing metaphysical assumptions regarding history, subject, knowledge and community was started by modernist writers of the 1950s and 60s[10] and is continued by the second generation of Caribbean mostly female writers, such as Kincaid, Cliff or Brodber. These writers are also vocal about the damage wreaked in the Caribbean by the advent of modernity. Their writing either revises the philosophical foundations of the political discourse of modernity (Kincaid) or provides a devastating critique of the failures of political modernity (Danticat) that has enshrined liberalism as the only political goal in the future. Thus Afro-Caribbean women writers create another kind of counter-discourse-a counter-discourse to modernity. What Caribbean female writers write back to is not only the canon of nineteenth century Victorian literature, but first and foremost the precepts of the Enlightenment project which still configure the political and cultural discourses on their islands. These women neither reject modernity (as cultural nationalists) nor embrace it (as liberal nationalists)-they constitute what Gilroy would call "a counter culture to modernity." Their writing invites readers to engage more seriously in "a critical interrogation of the practices, modalities and projects through which modernity inserted itself into and altered the lives of the colonized" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 17).

What then should we look for in the texts of Caribbean women and what strategy of reading should we adopt? Chris Bongie encourages us to study popular cultural forms as the primary sites of cultural invention and resistance, and as a way of offsetting the elitist practice of modernism

[10] These writers include Harris, James, Lamming and Selvon, who productively adapted modernist strategies and ideas, and yoked "the language of modernism" to reclaim "colonial modernism" as "a narrative of liberation" (256 qtd. in "Traveling with Joyce" 210).

and its hierarchical assumptions about the aesthetic value. He thinks that critics should give up literary criticism altogether because, as he argues, due to its literary (often modernist) genealogy, it is so ill-prepared to face the challenges of the problematic political modernity. Instead, Bongie proposes that critics should turn to cultural studies, which seem to be better prepared to face the challenge of the present times. I think that what Bongie calls for has already happened–in the words of Simon During, "transnational cultural studies is gradually 'eroding' postcolonial studies" and the influence of cultural studies on postcolonial literary criticism can already be clearly discerned. According to Huggan, also cited by Bongie, postcolonial theory has already followed the suit of cultural studies: "some of the most recent work in the [postcolonial] field gives the impression of having bypassed literature altogether offering a heady blend of philosophy, sociology, history and political science in which literary texts, when referred to at all, are read symptomatically within the context of larger social and cultural trends" (239). Bongie clearly thinks that postcolonial criticism has a lot to learn from cultural criticism–first and foremost that the idea of literary value is nothing more than a cultural construct. Therefore postcolonial/Caribbean literary criticism should give more heed to the reception theories and study how postcolonial texts are received by the reading public in the Caribbean, in the transnational literary marketplace and in academia. Though I acknowledge the importance of cultural studies, these changes seem to me to be rather cursory and not likely to problematize the present problem space.

My argument counters that of cultural critics for whom the popular is the main site of resistance. I strongly believe that postcolonial literature, such as the literature of contemporary West Indian women, has a very important role to play in the struggle with the global reach of economic imperialism and its attendant social ideology. As David Scott argues, opposition to globalization will not be possible without the concerted effort of all Third World countries, and it is my contention that the literature of Afro-Caribbean women, global in outlook and international in scope, prepares the ground for such an organized resistance. Many of these cross-over women writers live in diaspora and hence they are a part of global connections. Their fiction creates alliances across diverse communities and, through the themes of dislocation, migration and assimilation, brings into focus the unjust mechanisms of the global workplace, and illustrates the detrimental effects of the intensified globalization of culture. Numerous novels by contemporary West Indian women dwell on the social and political evils brought about by neo-liberal/capitalist policies: the conditions of austerity in towns

and villages, the incursion of First World powers and international institutions into their home islands. Occasionally they document mass struggles against oppressive and corrupt post independence bourgeois regimes that have been unable to fend off new forms of foreign domination that have replaced colonialism. In this sense, I would argue, the work of these female writers, though sometimes full of formal sophistication, retains an organic unity with the complexity of the postcolonial world and does make the political appear. I think that if anybody should be castigated for failing to make the political appear, it is the critics who tenaciously and single-mindedly insist on reading mainstream Caribbean fiction discursively rather than politically and contextually.

David Scott encourages contemporary critics not to relinquish their interest in the political. As literary critics, we should also adopt a new approach to modernity/modernism and our strategic criticism should be geared towards "thinking fundamentally against the normalization of epistemological and institutional forms of our political modernity" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 20). Scott thinks that we should preoccupy ourselves with the nature of modern power, which, contrary to what neo-liberals or post-Marxists think, is not a "benevolent and liberating form of power that carries with it the new possibility of freedom and agency" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 152). For Scott such a claim is nothing more than a repetition of the old Enlightenment fallacy. Modern power admittedly differs form the pre-modern power–centralized, embodied and malevolent–"concerned with subduing the body, with taking hold of it and directly extracting from it a useful surplus" (Scott, *Refashioning Futures* 152), but the difference is not so big. Modern power does not govern the body, but manipulates the subject through the discourse of identity formation: "modern power is concerned above all . . . with identifying and restructuring the conditions of subject formation and action so as to oblige these into a desired direction." In the words of Michel Foucault, whom Scott quotes, modern power "[structures] the possible field of action of others" (152). Thus the abolition of slavery and the creation of the secular modern state is not proof of the progressive emergence of freedom. There is still a lot to be done to expose the manipulative value systems by means of which the postcolonial peoples are "urged in an *improving* direction" (153) by neo-liberal governments reorganizing the emergent global political space. I think that the writing of contemporary Caribbean women engaged in re-imagining the status quo produced by the Enlightenment project provides a fertile ground for such an investigation. For these women authors race, class and gender are interrelated axes of power that manipulate the ex-colonial subject

through the discourse of identity formation. Therefore even though the work of these writers does not seem to be so overtly political as the literature of the national liberation period, it is my belief that it is not entirely true that their fiction is "radical more for its formal innovation" (Scott, *Caribbean Women Writers* 5) than its subject matter. In my opinion, their highly original aesthetics enhances rather than impairs their politically oriented art, while their approach to the politics of power and their rendition of the political in fiction validates David Scott's observation that the political is not exclusively limited to discourses and practices of the state.

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STATE-BUILDING AND DEMOCRACY: PROSPERITY, REPRESENTATION AND SECURITY IN KOSOVO

ABSTRACT: The traditional assumption of the state sovereignty norm has been that an international society of states will structure the international order to safeguard the interests of the state. The end of the Cold War era transformed international relations and led to a discussion on how states interacted with their populations. From the early 1990s, research on international relations, war and peace, and security studies identified the growing problem of failing states. Such states are increasingly unable to implement the core functions that define the sovereignty norms. This article explores the state-building process of Kosovo with a focus on the political road taken from independence in February 2008 to the challenges Kosovo faces today. Kosovo still has substantial issues to address regarding core state functions in the development of prosperity, popular representation and security.

KEY WORDS: Failing state; State-building; Prosperity; Security; Representation; Kosovo

Introduction

From the 1990s, research on international relations, war and peace, and security studies has increasingly focused on the growing problem of failing or failed states. Definitions vary but when a state is unwilling or unable to provide a minimal level of state and human security most analysts consider that the state is failing or that it has already failed in its core obligations. Failed states are deemed to have certain identifiable characteristics; political instability is rife, there is limited access by

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citizens to essential services, popular representation is deficient or non-existent, and there is a fundamental lack of prosperity in economic and societal development (Helman & Ratner 3-20; Wade 17-36).

The popular uprisings in the Arab Spring of November, 2010 have once again focused the debate on what to do about state-sponsored atrocities against civilians in places such as Egypt, Libya, Tunis and Yemen. Today Sub-Sahara Africa and the Middle East continue to suffer from various levels of instability, insurrection and upheaval that have resulted in serious challenges to state sovereignty and regional stability (Hampson, Fen. & David Malone 77). Somalia, Chad, Sudan, Afghanistan, Haiti and the Ivory Coast have become black holes of despair in the international landscape. Such states are increasingly unable to uphold the core duties that define sovereignty norms.

This article proposes that failing or failed states pose significant international challenges, and it seeks to explore the state-building process in the newly independent Kosovo. We argue that the former Yugoslavia failed to provide for a lasting federation in the 1990s and that Kosovo lacks fundamental state functionality to adequately provide for prosperity, security and popular representation for its citizens. Kosovo still has a number of significant state-building measures to implement despite a decade of United Nations commitment and trusteeship.

Weak States, Failing States

The majority of the research on failed states identifies at least three core state functions that severely challenge failing states. One of the most essential of these functions is the provision of *socioeconomic services* which are required to address economic growth and to support social development (Eizenstat and Weinstein 134-47). An inability to provide a reasonable level of living standard leads to a capacity gap that often promotes internal conflict where socioeconomic injustices are expressed unequally by ethnic or tribal differences, religious intolerance, or class divisions. The lack of socioeconomic capacity amplifies social unrest by citizens against the state regime which further undermines political and social unity.

Another essential function of a state is to provide *security* by having the capacity to legitimately monopolize the use of force against external or internal threats. The absence of such a capacity leads to a security gap where armed domestic groups challenge state power or the state has great difficulty in dealing with external threats (Eizenstat and Weinstein 134-47; "The State and Internal Conflict" 61-85).

Representation is an important third function. State legitimacy is derived from the people and when states fail to protect political rights and civil liberties then a legitimacy gap develops which may threaten the overall security of the state. This in turn leads to the state resorting to the use of force, coercion, and other forms of oppression in order to secure its political base (Eizenstat and Weinstein 134-47). By comparison, strong states have governments that are much more representative, accountable, and transparent in dealing with the wants and needs of their citizens. These states tend to exhibit a high level of political and social cohesion where citizens are able to participate in their own governance (Jackson, "The State and Internal Conflict" 65-81).

An inability of a government to provide prosperity and security for its citizens is often directly due to weaknesses in institutional settings and an erosion of state capacity (Milliken & Krause 753-74). The inability for states to deal with these issues opens up a continuum from lower to higher levels of state capacity. Weak states have medium to low levels of state capacity while failing states have low to very low levels of state capacity. Failed states have very little, if any, state capacity. The danger for weak states is that they may succumb to internal and external pressures where state capacity becomes so degraded that the state is in danger of failing or even totally collapsing (Krasner 85-120).

The Failed State of Yugoslavia

The 1992 to 1995 civil wars between Serbia and the breakaway states throughout Yugoslavia engulfed most of the Balkan region. Secessionist movements in Slovenia and Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo demanded independence from Yugoslavia resulting in widespread conflict and open warfare. On September 19, 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 777 which declared that the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia had ceased to exist (S/RES/777). This forced Belgrade to form the new Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) consisting of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Vojvodina. This did not, however, stop Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo continuing their separatist ambitions which resulted in increasingly brutal suppression by Serbia.

The Dayton Peace Agreement of 1995 was a direct result of long and hard negotiation efforts by the US diplomat Richard Holbrooke (Bell 98-112). The US decision to deal directly with the Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic as the single spokesperson for the Serbian minorities in the former Yugoslavia, and to exclude Kosovo from the agenda, was

a short-term tactical strategy to stop the long running wars in Bosnia and Croatia. However, this had long-term negative effects as the war in Kosovo developed in 1998-1999 between secession movements in Kosovo and the Serbian authorities in Belgrade. By late 1998 and early 1999, events in Kosovo were rapidly escalating out of control with heavily armed Serb forces moving into the province (Silander 161).

The UN was incapable of deciding what to do about what was happening in Kosovo and NATO argued that the escalating violence in Kosovo warranted humanitarian intervention regardless of internal disagreements within the UN Security Council. NATO declared its right to act under UN Resolution 1199 which had imposed the demand on Serbia for a general cease fire (S/RES/1199). On March, 24 1999 NATO began its eleven-week air war without explicit UN approval against the FRY. NATO's intervention resulted in the forced withdrawal of Serbian forces from Kosovo and the installation of an interim government by the UN in Kosovo. The Kosovo crisis of 1998-1999 and subsequent NATO action that was justified on the basis of a humanitarian need to protect the Kosovo people provoked new political, legal and scholarly debates on the subject of state's rights and humanitarian interventions (Independent International Commission 1-48).

State-Building Challenges in Contemporary Kosovo

In 1999, a trusteeship and transitional authority over Kosovo was announced by the UN. The post-conflict UN mission in Kosovo highlighted a development in extended peacekeeping that involved a harder edged peace enforcement doctrine. This mission was mandated with a wide scope of responsibilities including a reiteration of the UN's capacity to assume trusteeship over territories once major conflict had ceased. UN Resolution 1244 established the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (Friedrich) empowering the UN in Kosovo to be responsible for all branches of government (Strohmeyer 46-63; Ker-Lindsay 15-6).

UN Resolution 1244 (S/RES/1244) established broad responsibilities and presented a range of proposals but it did not set out a clear roadmap for Kosovo's future. The final status of Kosovo was to be decided by the UN Security Council at some future time. (Independent International Commission 1-48). The disparate range of proposals suited almost nobody in the region and, after a decade, without a clear future for Kosovo, the newly formed Kosovo Assembly claimed independence for Kosovo on February 17, 2008. From Kosovo's perspective the claim

of independence was a logical and necessary end to the long-term international engagement in Kosovo. However, the UN Security Council continued to be divided over formally recognising Kosovo as an independent state (Economides 99; Ker-Lindsay 106-7).

Since 2008, Kosovo has acted as an independent, state, supported by the US, 22 of 27 EU member states, and all neighbouring states except Serbia. In total, Kosovo has been recognized by 80 states around the world (Economides 99-100). Although political tension remains between Serbia and Kosovo, the overall political context for an independent Kosovo has gradually improved. Firstly, the on-going democratisation process in Serbia has resulted in a new type of leadership in Belgrade after the October 6, 2000 resignation of Slobodan Milosevic, and his indictment in the Hague for war crimes and subsequent death on March 11, 2006. Secondly, Serbia has actively sought improved relations with the West in order to strengthen its influence and role in European politics (Rogel 86-8, Kostovicova 23-5). Thirdly, new policies and improved engagement of Serbia with the international community has been recognised by the EU. This has led to EU financial assistance programmes towards the region (EU Commission 67).

Kosovo has attempted to implement some political, judicial and economic reforms to build state capacities after the NATO intervention of 1999 and the establishment of the UN trusteeship 1999-2008. Despite some favourable developments in selected areas towards a new independent state, Kosovo has serious problems in other areas of the state-building process. These are significant issues and if they are not resolved then Kosovo's future remains highly uncertain (Economides 102-3).

Prosperity

An essential function for a sovereign state is to provide for prosperity and economic development, and one of UNMIK's critical roles was to promote economic recovery and social reforms in a post-war Kosovo. Economic reconstruction has begun in some areas in Kosovo but the overall economic and social situation is very fragile. This is due to many factors; the economic legacy of the communist era, the economic and political isolation of Kosovo during the Milosevic era, decades of violence and ethnic tension between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs as well as the unresolved status of the independence of Kosovo. These factors have all played a part in constraining Kosovo's road to recovery.

Kosovo has a significant black market economy which severely limits remittances to the government for economic, welfare and social reforms.

In 2009, Kosovo had a GDP growth rate of about 4% but the problem is that Kosovo has started from such a low baseline of economic development (EU Commission 21). The economy remains highly dependent on the international community's willingness to provide foreign aid. The global financial crisis in the EU and elsewhere has resulted in significant doubt as to whether such aid can even be maintained. 13-15% of GDP comes from remittances from the large diaspora of Kosovars in the Nordic states, Germany and Switzerland, and in total international donor programs and foreign aid account for about 7.5% of GDP (Ceres 5; US Department of State).

Despite some structural adjustments to its market economy, Kosovo has the poorest population in Europe. About 30% of Kosovo's two million Kosovo Albanians live under the poverty line and 15% live in extreme poverty (UD 3). Sixty-one percent of households have an income of less than 200 Euros/month. In addition, the unemployment rate is estimated to be about 45% resulting in a migration exodus of people seeking work elsewhere (Mustafa). Unemployment is far higher among women, ranging from 70% to 85% or more in rural areas. Kosovo has the youngest population demographic in Europe with more than 30,000 young job-seekers (EU Commission 24). This young and rapidly growing population has very little if any real opportunity for paid work despite efforts to restructure the economy. Many young Kosovars do not see a future for themselves in Kosovo and those who are able to leave to other parts of Europe do so (ESPIG 10, EU Commission 33).

Kosovo has been unable to access any significant economic assistance from international financial institutions such as the World Bank (WB) and the International monetary Fund (IMF). In June 2009, Kosovo became a member of IMF and WB but the high number of states (including China and Russia) that have rejected Kosovo's claim of independence has continued to severely limit the process of economic recovery (Hamilton). China and Russia have also refused to accept Kosovo as a member of the UN. Kosovo's uncertain status severely restricts Kosovo's trade opportunities with other regional economies in the Balkans. The lack of bilateral or multilateral economic treaties and other trade arrangements between Kosovo and neighbouring states remains as a serious constraint on Kosovo's economic development. Unclear territorial borders and the overall uncertain status of Kosovo as an independent state have hampered private foreign and domestic investments. Very few financiers dare to invest in Kosovo when Kosovo's future is so uncertain.

With the lack of foreign or domestic investment has come a very low level of entrepreneurship further hindering economic reform or recovery. UNMIK has attempted to promote privatisation in Kosovo's economy

but this has led to immediate and strident accusations by Serbia that this was tantamount to institutionalised theft of public assets from the Serbian people. The many political and judicial problems of determining ownership in Kosovo have essentially halted any further privatisation processes that were aimed at bringing economic reforms and more business opportunities to Kosovo. Ownership issues plague reforms to the economic base of Kosovo when neither Kosovo nor Serbia can agree on who owns what or even what the division between public and private should be. This leads to significant constraints on economic development when the recognition of locally issued certificates of origin is required for the ability to export goods and services (UD 2; World Bank 67).[1]

There are some signs that Kosovo is moving towards a more market based model that is more orientated towards services and industry and one that is less reliant on a very inefficient agriculture sector. For example, the agricultural sector's contribution to Kosovo's GDP has dramatically dropped from more than 33% in 2007 down to 12.9% in 2010. Today, Kosovo's GDP is 22.6% industry based and 64.5% service based. Some 50% of previously state owned enterprises are now privately owned although Serbia continues to challenge the privatisation developments in Kosovo thereby casting doubt on the overall legality of the process. So, despite some improvements in some sectors, overall economic development Kosovo still lacks a stable economic base. The lack of investment in Kosovo, very high unemployment, and the exodus of young people from the region are serious problems and they will not be solved or reversed until Kosovo's status as a sovereign nation is determined. A clear determination of statehood would help Kosovo's attempts to encourage investment and economic development but there is little indication that the major stumbling blocks to full sovereign status can be overcome. Russia and Serbia continue to strongly reject Kosovo's goal of complete independence from Serbia.

In addition, civil society in Kosovo lacks cohesion and development resulting in citizens that are politically disempowered. People are much more concerned about their immediate day to day struggle for employment, the future of Kosovo as an independent state, and dealing with narrow political agendas rather than concerns over analysing different political positions and influencing the political apparatus overall. The marginalisation of citizens in Kosovo contains many gender disparities as well (Mustafa 6-8). Men dominate politics; the number of women in the 120 seat Kosovo Assembly continues to be low (10%) and

[1] See also World Bank 2005. Kosovo Poverty Assessment-Promoting Opportunity, Security, and Participation for All. Washington D.C.: The World Bank.

women only hold 6% of Chairs in Parliamentary committees despite international efforts to promote gender equality throughout the political system. In addition, the judicial sector is dominated by men, men overall earn about 4 times as much as women, and men dominate all sectors of the labour market in business, politics and education (Sida 4-7, 13, UD 4).

Popular Representation

A second essential state function is for the state to effectively represent its people and for people to be involved in the political process (Friedrich 286-7). Popular representation requires the state to engage with and to respond to its citizen's needs and wants. People must feel that they are able to participate in the functions of state and that their ideas and visions for a just and fair society are respected. Kosovo is, however, an ethnically divided society where Serbian minorities live in enclaves that still require the presence of armed international forces to keep the peace. Violence between Serbs and Albanian Kosovars in and around these enclaves continues to be a serious problem (OSCE 1). The most populated Serb enclave exists in the northern part of Mitrovica at the Ibar River. On July, 27 2010, armed Serbian citizens set up roadblocks on the roads leading to the administrative border line between Serbia and Kosovo in expectation of the return of Special Police forces sent by Prishtina to enforce the block of imports from Serbia. This resulted in KFOR's deployment of troops into the region in order to maintain freedom of movement and to try to limit the violence between the different ethnic groups. Such flare-ups of violence reflect serious societal and political divisions in Kosovo.

Kosovo established a 120 seat Kosovo Assembly after its declaration of independence in early 2008. 20 of these seats were reserved for ethnic minorities and the Serbs in Kosovo were expected to dominate these seat allocations. In response, the Serbs established their own Serb Assembly because they refused to recognize or approve of Kosovo's claim of independence. The Serb dominated municipalities repeatedly declare that they do not recognize Kosovar's independence and that the ultimate political authority remains with Belgrade. They also only recognize the Serb Assembly within Kosovo and not the Kosovo Assembly. The largest enclave of Serbs in northern Mitrovica has boycotted parliamentary and presidential elections in Kosovo, while 35-40% of the remaining Serbs south of Mitrovica have participated in Kosovo's elections (Freedom House, Kosovo).The participation rate in the Kosovo Assembly from the large Serb minority has been very low.

Kosovo's political system is fragmented, very fragile and the party system is weak and poorly organised. Serious development of democratic norms and values is not a priority when the political system is struggling to establish its fundamental identity. This will not improve nor will democratic development progress until complex questions about political authority, the status of Kosovo as an independent state, and the ever present ethnic tensions are resolved. From early 2000, numerous loosely formed political parties arose in Kosovo. However, few of these parties demonstrate organizational cohesiveness or party policy direction. Party ideological development consists essentially of reiterating entrenched ethnic positions. Most parties in Kosovo have their origins in national movements aggregating demands for national independence from Serbia. In day to day politics, the struggle for independence overshadows political decision-making and most attempts at societal reform comes a poor second. The dominant political party is the Pro-democratic League of Kosovo (LDK). This party has its roots in the non-violent movement against Belgrade and it was led by Ibrahim Rugova until his death in 2006. The two other major parties in Kosovo have their roots in the violent struggle for independence against Belgrade through the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA).

The many institutional weaknesses of Kosovo's political system came to the fore during a serious political crisis in 2010. Kosovo's Constitutional Court stated that Fatmir Sejdiu, the President and party leader of LDK had violated the constitution by his dual positions as President of the Republic of Kosovo and also as leader of the LDK ("Kosovan president resigns"). This resulted in the withdrawal of LDK from the government which ultimately led to a no confidence vote against the remaining coalition parties in government and new elections in December 2010. The election process was itself compromised due to high levels of fraud and corruption which forced municipalities to reorganize and rerun voting polls. In addition, a two year inquiry resulted in a 2010 report by the Council of Europe accusing widespread political networks being directly involved in criminal activity and organized crime (European Commission 55-56). Secret NATO documents leaked to *The Guardian* identified Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi as the head of an organized crime group. The Council of Europe Report stated that he was the head of a 'mafia-like' Albanian group responsible for smuggling weapons, drugs and human organs through Eastern Europe (Council of Europe Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights; The Guardian, UK).

There is little serious attention being directed at the development of social cohesion or improving popular representation in Kosovo because

political harassments and assassination campaigns as well as crime syndicates continue to play a significant political role (Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP). Tension between political parties and armed guerrillas from the former KLA remains, and ramifications of the Balkan's war continue to arise. In July 2010 the former Prime Minister, Ramush Haradinaj, was indicted for war crimes in 1998-99 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). This involved a trial then a retrial as the ICTY had been forced to initially drop their charges due to what the court saw as intimidation of witnesses including the sudden death of some witnesses.

The complexity of governmental and administrative structures in Kosovo has resulted in a fragmented society where so-called popular representation depends on which enclave one belongs to and the limited extent to which each of the conflicting political entities permit any meaningful engagement in the political process. Popular representation has further been complicated by the continued oversight of Kosovo's political development by UNMIK, the EU and the EULEX, NATO and the International Civilian Representative (ICR). The ICR still retains the authority to override political decisions and legislation that is in conflict with the UN roadmap for democracy-building and human rights protection for all in Kosovo. This oversight has proved to be necessary because most political campaigns and elections have been harmed by serious ethnic tension between Serbs and Albanian Kosovars, and by the involvement of officials with criminal networks. The Serbs also have some justification in their many complaints about political, social and judicial discrimination in Kosovo. Until the ethnic and political divide between Serbs and Albanian Kosovars is resolved then collective and popular representation is minimal at best. (Sida 3, UD 1-3).

The Kosovo political structure has very limited organisational capacity for political mobilisation and popular representation in the civil or public arena. Kosovo's civil society has no historical tradition of popular engagement in democratic societal organisations and associations. Most civil organisations are small and dependent on short-term funding from donors. These organisations are also ethnically homogenous; there are very few, if any, civil society organisations that bridge the ethnic gap in Kosovo. Moreover, there are few signs of cooperation or mutual planning between authorities and civil society organisations, and most organisations have weak organisational structures when it comes to administration, finances, and managerial capacities.

Security

A third important core function of a state is to provide security. NATO has continued to guarantee the external security-dimension but domestic security concerns due to serious and unresolved ethnic animosities are constant flashpoints. There are a decreasing number of Serbs in Kosovo which has lowered the potential for outright violence between Serbs and non-Serbs but tensions in and around the various ethnic enclaves remains. In March 2004, 50 000 Kosovo Albanians took part in widespread attacks on Serbs resulting in 19 deaths, and 4 000 people (mostly Serbs) fled their homes after escalating violence and riots. There were also attacks on cultural and religious symbols in mostly Serbian-Orthodox churches (Friedrich 227). These riots came as a shock to the international community that had patrolled the streets of Kosovo since the NATO intervention in 1999. Further violence flared in the Mitrovica region in 2010 when KFOR forces came under attacked by armed Serbs. Overall, the many challenges for minorities in Kosovo are part of a broader picture of human rights violations. Lack of freedom of movement, physical integrity and property rights etc have undermined for human security in Kosovo (Friedrich 265). It has also come to challenge the international vision of ethnic peace and stability in Kosovo. Failure to promote minority protection and integration will most certainly continue to obstruct reconciliation and peaceful ethnic relations (Friedrich 286).

Vandalism against Serbian religious sites has continued sporadically in Kosovo and there are very few examples where Serbs and Kosovo Albanians are living together without fear or hostility. Kosovo Albanians living in Serb-dominated areas in northern Kosovo feel as threatened as Serbs living in Albanian Kosovo majority areas. Freedom of movement for all minorities is highly restricted and dependent on security provided by established international forces (Early Warning Report 8-22; McKinna 18-9). The number of Serb returnees to Kosovo is also very low. Returnees and minorities that include the Roma, Ashkali and Gorani continue to have significant problems reclaiming lost property after the Balkan's wars. Tent camps of returning Serbs to Kosovo were attacked by Kosovo Albanians in the Spring of 2010 (McKinna 15-7).

The strategy by the international community to identify displaced persons from the war and to encourage a return of displaced persons to Kosovo has led to virulent resentment among Kosovo Albanians over the resources expended to help Serbs to return to their homes. There has also been much concern over the lack of information within the municipalities about the number of returning people and whether or not they were even originally residents who had some claim over property (McKinna 16).

Conclusion

This study set out to explore the failing state syndrome and to analyse the state-building process of Kosovo. Kosovo is an interesting example of state-building. The quasi-independent status of Kosovo came out of a failed Yugoslavian federation and international intervention by NATO based on the notion of a possible humanitarian catastrophe that would come with the collapse of the FRY. Kosovo still faces substantial challenges to its state building ambitions. The ethnic divide dominates politics in Kosovo resulting in a lack of nation building, democratic institutionalisation is far from complete, and economic reform is nearly stagnate with very high levels of unemployment. Kosovo lacks fundamental state capacities in the three core areas of prosperity, representation and security.

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CURRENT PROSPECTS OF KOREAN REUNIFICATION AGAINST THE BACKGROUND OF THE INTERSTATE RELATIONS

ABSTRACT: Forecasts predicting the reunification of the Korean Peninsula were common throughout the 1990s. Since then, enthusiasm for such predictions has dampened, and though the fundamental assumption of reunification remains, predictions of when and how this will happen have been more restrained. Reunification leaves two unresolved yet interdependent issues: reunification itself, which is the urgent challenge; and the strategic issues that emerge from reunification, which have the potential to fundamentally transform strategic relations in the region of Northeast Asia. Within this context, this paper examines the prospects of Korean reunification against the background of the interstate relations. Initially, it will establish the framework from which such scenarios will emerge: the historical background of the division, the extreme differences between the two states, the role played by the North Korean nuclear threats and the impact of the September 11, 2001 on the interstate relations, and finally general situation and relations in the East Asian region. Then, three possible scenarios of the unification will be developed: through peaceful integration, through the fall of North Korea or through a war. Summing up, even the death of Kim Jong Il will not bring change in the domestic and foreign policy of North Korea which is going to continue an aggressive approach toward the South. In the short-term reunification is definitely not in the interest of the current ROK administration, and the South has no intention of encouraging it. None of the considered scenarios envisions early reunification, and it seems that for the future, the status quo on the Korean Peninsula will remain.

KEY WORDS: Korean reunification, inter-Korean relations, the Republic of Korea (South Korea), North Korea

Artificial borders that divide any country always lead towards serious problems that a separated society has to face. The example of Germany after the end of the Second World War helps explain why the

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Korean division attracts the world's attention to such a great extent. The Korean Peninsula has an extremely strategic position in East Asia, and that is why any changes in its mapping would affect the whole region. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) with Kim Jong Un, who is governing North Korea according to former Chairman Kim Jong Il's "army-centered policy," poses a threat to the world with its vague statements about its nuclear potential. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is no longer trying to negotiate a solution, and president Lee Myung-bak has no intention of changing his non-aligned approach to the foreign policy towards the northern state. The North stopped propaganda broadcasts against the South. The United States of America, which is allied with the South, plays an important role in these relations since the terrorist attacks on American mainland. The USA has declared North Korea to be of one of the three countries constituting an "axis of evil."

There are three possible scenarios for the unification of the Korean Peninsula: through peaceful integration, through the fall of North Korea or through a war. In order to fully analyse the subject, it is essential to consider some research questions:

1. How was Korea divided into two countries that are hostile towards each other?
2. Are the inner socio-economic situations in both Koreas contrasting?
3. Do North Korea's nuclear threats play a significant role in the negotiations?
4. What was the impact of the terrorist attacks on September 11th 2001 on the inter-Korean relations?
5. What is the influence of Koreas' neighbours, the major regional players-Japan, China and Russia on the prospective process of unification?

The Historical Background of the Division

Since 1910 the Korean Peninsula had been under Japanese control. After the Japanese defeat in 1945, the USA and the USSR agreed to divide the country into two zones along the 38th parallel (at a latitude of 38 degrees north), so that they were able to jointly organise the Japanese surrender and withdrawal the Americans in the south and Russia in the north (which was bordered by the USSR). From the American point of view, this division was seen as a temporary one. Moreover, the United Nations insisted on free elections for the whole country. The Americans considered it to be the best solution, due to the fact that the southern zone contained two-thirds of the population, and they believed in the

possibility of outvoting the communist north. Unfortunately, unification never arrived (Jinwook, *Korean Unification and the Neighboring Powers* 63).

The artificial border became a battlefield of Cold War rivalry, and agreement could not be reached. The elections supervised by the UN were only held in the south, and the independent Republic of Korea was set up with Syngman Rhee as the president and its capital at Seoul (August 1948). The next month, the north controlled by the USSR, created the Democratic People's Republic of Korea under the communist government of Kim Il Sung, with its capital at Pyongyang. In 1949, Russian and American troops were withdrawn, which triggered an extremely dangerous situation, because obviously most Koreans bitterly resented the artificial division forced on their country by outsiders. To make the matters worse, both governments claimed the right to rule over whole country.

In June 1950, North Korean troops invaded South Korea, beginning the Korean War. The United Nations forces, mostly American, hastened to help the south, while the Chinese helped the north. After much advancing and retreating, the war ended in 1953 with South Korea still non-communist (Lowe 144-7). Since then, the United States of America has remained the Republic of Korea's closest ally, and analogically the North Korea has had Chinese and Russian support. The division still remains Scenarios of reunification are discussed below (Fuqua 120-32).

Extreme Differences Between the Two States

There is a yawning gap between the North and the South parts of the Korean Peninsula. It is estimated that the South's economy is 30 times larger than the northern one. The statistics show that two percent of ROK's Gross Domestic Product is allocated to national defence, which is equal to twice the national defence paid by DPRK, although it spends around 25 percent of its GDP for its military programmes (Ku-Hyun 23).

The Republic of Korea is governed by Lee Myung-bak, and is perceived as a powerful country in its region. For instance, the amount of current ROK trade through Asian Sea Lines Of Communications (SLOCs) reaches over 40 percent of its total trade, and about two-thirds of its energy supplies flow through the South China Sea.

In 2001, ROK was confronted with some grave problems such as economic downturn, increase of unemployment rates and some political and financial scandals, which undermined the president's popularity. Like many democratic countries, South Korea has to deal with problems like political disputes in the National Assembly. In the elections held in 2001, six political parties gained seats in the National Assembly.

While considering South Korea's position, it is necessary to mention the Sunshine Policy which provided greater political contact between the two Koreas and, most importantly alliance with the USA. As opposed to the conservative Lee government, the Kim Dae Jung administration had emphasised the "friendship" with the Americans which resulted in the trilateral co-ordination mechanism among ROK, the USA and Japan (which is known as the Trilateral Co-ordination and Oversight Group-TCOG). What is more, South Korea in order to support the Sunshine Policy, has focused on the support of countries like Russia, China (Jinwook, *US-China Relations and Korean Unification* 182). This approval had been formalised in 2001 when several countries declared their cooperation with ROK's policy towards North Korea. The Bush administration in the US praised ROK at the South Korean-US Summit in March 2001 as well as on other occasions. Bush stressed that he would continue his own policy toward DPRK, calling for a dialogue between Northern and Southern states on the Korean Peninsula ("The Korean Peninsula" 151).

South Korea is paying a lot of attention to relations with superpowers like Russia and China for two reasons. Firstly, this is due to close connections that the states established with North Korea, historically and geographically (Chung-in Moon 34) Secondly, China and Russia have been willing to improve their relations with DPRK in recent years. This attitude meets the approval of South Korea, since it may help to mitigate the alienation of North Korea on the international arena. Mostly due to its geographical situation, ROK cherishes the hope that the North will open up. Closed borders between the Korean states are an obstacle for southern trade. One of the most significant companies, Hyundai Motor Company, is known all around the world, and constitutes the basis of the Korean development, as well as Samsung which became South Korea's number one company (Lee B. 44).

In North Korea, it is still a common practice among Pyongyang's administration to use slogans such as: "building of a powerful nation," "the army-cantered policy," or "army-first policy." Some of the phrases constitute acts of propaganda like that used in the USSR. For instance: "discard outmoded thought [and] follow the new" ("The Korean Peninsula" 154-7).

North Korea is perceived by the world as a state closed to international relations, where the army rules consistent with communist policy. Some politicians are making attempts to change world public opinion. Kim Jong Il after issuing a call 'to follow the new', took his second trip to China. That trip gave hope to South Korea and Japan and many other countries that the North was going to push through some radical reforms. However, the former North Korean leader made no

effort to attract further positive attention. Currently, the country is in an awful economic situation and suffers from food shortages, unemployment and a very low general level of development. Aware of that situation, DPRK's government created the Economic and Trade Zone established in Rason City, in order to introduce new technologies. Yet, nothing has changed. In reaction to society's demands and problems, Kim Jong Il used the army first, then the Worker's Party of Korea made some steps towards controlling enterprises and farms, aiming to increase their effectiveness, by introducing some new technologies. In fact, most of these products were used for the military.

North Korea suffers from food shortages. According to Jung Ku-Hyun, it is estimated that the number of people who have died due to starvation over the last ten years reached about 2 million (Ku-Hyun 23). The World Food Programme (WFP) estimates the amount of shortages at around 1 million tons each year. This is a dangerously weak point in DPRK system, because this shortfall is covered by the international aid, including South Korea, Japan or the USA. Another aspect of the critical food shortage is the process of fleeing of civilians to South Korea. The number of people that succeeded in escaping from the North, due to food shortage significantly increased during 2001. In June, there was an incident that took place in the UN organisation office in Beijing. A family entered the office asking for asylum and safe passage to the Republic of Korea. This case did not cause any serious crisis (Bluth 67).

Yet another aspect is North Korea's attitude towards the world's superpowers. North Korean official statements refer to possible attack by the United States and its allies, Japan and South Korea, who, in the opinion of many Northern officials, are just waiting for a proper opportunity to get rid of the socialist system. This is one of the official reasons, why North Korea is paying attention to its military power.

However, some steps towards negotiating with the United States to bring peace to the country have been taken. In October 2000, US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, and Vice Marshal Jo Myong Rok, first vice chairman of the National Defence Commission, visited each other's capitals to join in the discussion ("The Korean Peninsula" 156). Madeleine Albright spent a dozen hours exchanging ideas with Kim Jong Il (Thomas 16). North Korea wanted president Bill Clinton to visit Pyongyang, however this never happened due to the lack of agreement on the nuclear weapons conference.

After there was a change in the American government, a new administration came to the White House and the hostility between USA and DPRK grew even further (*A White Paper on South-North Dialogue in Korea* 11-15). This was caused mainly by the statement uttered by the

newly elected President, George Bush, during his talks to Kim Dae Jung in March, when distrust of Chairman Kim Jong Il was clearly expressed. The American president has been reported to call Kim Jong Il a "pygmy" and to compare the DPRK's leader to "a spoiled child at a dinner table." There are many factors that contribute to the hostility. One of the sources is the presence of US troops in South Korea; another is the nuclear potential of North Korea. Not surprisingly, North Korea maintains "friendly" relations with China and Russia, but what is a very promising sign, in recent years it has also established some diplomatic contacts with member states of the European Union as well as with Canada.

The Role Played by the North Korean Nuclear Threats

North Korea wants to be perceived as a military state. It aspires to build-up its military power under slogans such as: "the building of a powerful nation." The vast, forward deployed conventional force of DPRK causes instability on the Korean Peninsula and in the whole Asia-Pacific region.

In late 1991, North Korea signed the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Exchanges and Cooperation and the Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, but early in 1993 the North Korean government withdrew from the treaty to halt the spread of nuclear weapon. Although later on, it announced the unilateral suspension of its withdrawal from the treaty, its nuclear development continued and is still carried out. The history of threats is quite long and complicated, but the analysis of the present situation is vital to find out whether the unification could be possible in the future. The world has changed since the terrorist attacks in the United States. The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 prodded the international community under the US leadership to find those who were responsible for the attacks, as well as to prevent possible future threats. In January 2002, North Korea found herself on a list of countries that might proliferate and export nuclear weapons.

The DPRK strongly denied possessing such a weapon. In mid-October 2002, the US government presented their evidence and reported that North Korea acknowledged having possessed a secret nuclear weapons programme. The Communist State's admission places it in violation of a 1994 agreement signed with the administration of former US President Bill Clinton, under which Pyongyang agreed to freeze its nuclear programme (Scobel 201). In recent months there has been a thaw in Pyongyang's dealings with the outside world.

In October, Mr Bush sent Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly to North Korea to initiate security talks. The response of North Korea was cautious since the state reportedly confessed to the nuclear programme after being confronted with the American documentary "evidence" on the issue by Mr Kelly during the visit.

At first, the North Koreans tried to deny the evidence, but eventually they declared the 1994 Clinton-era framework for containing its plutonium-fuelled nuclear program "nullified" (Hirsh M., T. Lipper, M. Isikoff. 24). Washington considers North Korea's long-range ballistic missile programme as the most serious threat (Calabresi 30-1). Pyongyang is the major exporter of sensitive ballistic missile technology to states like Iran, Libya, Syria and Egypt. The BBC News Website estimates North Korea to have: A military budget of around $1.3 bn; an army of one million, eight hundred combat aircraft, as well as five hundred missiles of conventional medium range and longer range missiles in development. It is assumed that North Korea also came into possession of weapons of mass destruction: chemical, some biological capacity, and is developing nuclear weapons. North Korea is projected to have ballistic missiles capable of reaching the United States by 2015, and may have the plutonium to build one or two nuclear weapons.

North Korean military power is enormous, and many times, it has been used to force South Korea to agree to the conditions of further cooperation. It is believed that about two-thirds of North Korean military strength is placed along the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), which is a two kilometre wide piece of land extending to north from the truce line. It is necessary to add, that the southern capital is situated about 40 kilometres from the DMZ, which means that it is located within the missiles' range. This places South Korea in a very difficult and uncomfortable position in the talks.

North Korean nuclear weapons constitute an extremely important factor shaping the international relations with South Korea as well as with the United States. The atmosphere between the two states is filled with mutual distrust that was built over the recent years. The North as well as the South need to change their attitude, build up confidence by contact and talks in order to enable mutual understanding. Only under those conditions could any joint agreements be reached (Dong-won 82).

The first steps towards reconciliation were made in September 2002 when amid ceremonies on both sides of the border, North and South Korea began clearing mines along the Demilitarised Zone between the two nations. The work will allow road and rail links severed during the Korean War to be reconnected. That reconnection would not only join the North and the South, but would also link the whole Korean Peninsula to

the rest of the world, thanks to connection with the rails of the Trans-Siberian Railway (TSR) as well as Trans-China Railway (TCR).These projects were accepted by both sides, and would enable the Korean states to rebuild its strategic logistic position (Dong-won 82)

The Role of the September 11 2001 Terrorist Attacks on the Inter-Korean Relations

September 11, 2001 was a day that has changed the world. On that day the international community witnessed the horrifying terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre and the Pentagon in the United States. The US changed its attitude towards North Korea, and what is more it reformed defence planning from a "capability-based" model that pays attention to how an adversary might fight (*Quadrennial Defence Review Report* 143). The world population condemned the attacks, but the response of certain countries accentuated the diversity present in contemporary world. The behaviour of the South and North Koreas was different from each other.

Japan and South Korea, the allies of the United States of America, strongly condemned the attacks. They even proposed support for the American response. Moreover, the South Korean government paid a lot of attention to public opinion at home as well as to the relations with Arab and Middle Eastern countries. It also took measures to respond to all kinds of terrorism on a domestic (Hakjoon) level. However, society's awareness of a direct threat of terrorism was rather low. South Koreans asked for cooperation and dialogue on this matter together with North Korea. The DPRK did not respond positively on the issue. A week after the attacks, President Kim Dae Jung, stated that South Korea perceives the situation as an act of war; furthermore he sent a message to Bush that his country is ready to provide all-out support for the United States actions towards retaliation. The scope of support was announced in details on September, 24. First of all they were to dispatch medical support teams to function as "mobile surgeries." What is more, they promised to provide some necessary means of transport. Besides that, the expedition of liaison officers to facilitate smooth cooperation was guaranteed. South Korea assured of its active participation in the global coalition against terrorism. The state agreed to share any information concerning terrorism with the USA ("The Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Security in East Asia" 31-3).

The ROK government was trying to provide aid equal in range to the support promised by other countries. Due to the fact that some states,

like Japan, did not make this type of offer, the dispatch of combat troops was not promised. The ROK National Assembly carried out a comprehensive study which analysed the international response, domestic public opinion and US relations with Middle Eastern and Arab countries.

Although a positive diplomatic reaction was presented, among the South Korean society and some people in the government, serious talks about the wide-range and the power of the US response to the attacks were pointed out. President Kim Dae Jung stated that, "at the start, I had the impression that the United States was being overly excited in carrying out a wide ranging military campaign" ("The Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Security in East Asia" 32). Later, the President was more approving: "the United States has shown considerable self-restraint, and is carrying out measures that are sensible" ("The Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Security in East Asia" 33). He added that the US campaign was: "a war against terrorism to maintain peace and security for mankind" ("The Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Security in East Asia" 33). On 9 October the Republic of Korea, signed the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism.

After the attacks, the South Korean armed forces and the police were placed on high alert. Some special training was undertaken, including the Army NBC Defence Command, which specialise in dealing with nuclear, biological and chemical (NBC) warfare. Since South Korea is an ally of the United States, they examined the likelihood of a terrorist attack on ROK, as well as the possibility of an attack from North Korea. North Korea was conscious of being a target for global condemnation, thus the chance for using the international pandemonium to launch the military action against the South was relatively low.

The first of the Five-Point Instruction proposed by Kim Dae Jung and accepted by ROK's government on October 7, 2001, imposed maintaining the peaceful relations on the inter-Korean cooperation, in the case of war against terrorism. As far as inter-Korean dialogue is concerned, it is necessary to emphasize the South Korean will to produce a joint declaration on the terrorism aspects. President Kim Dae Jung expressed such opinion just before the fifth inter-Korean ministerial talks that were held in mid-October.

However, the oppositional Grand National Party proposed that North Korea apologises for the acts of terror committed in the past, provided that the two countries would publish a declaration. In the past, North Korea was not keen on the idea of some joined declaration as well (Burdelski 114). It has highlighted terrorism as a topic to be discussed bilaterally between the US and itself, but not between the two Koreas.

The North Korean reaction to the attacks was very cautious. It took some necessary measures to ensure that they would not have a negative impact on the US-DPRK's relations, but its interpretation was that when the roots of that attack are considered "the blame lay on the United States". For the United States the attacks were a chance to put a diplomatic pressure on North Korea in terms of the chemical and biological weapons such as anthrax as it is believed to possess (Barry, *"The Axis of Evil"* 29).

The attacks on Afghanistan prodded North Korean forces to go on an alert. It seems like the military action in Afghanistan frightened North Korea. This is especially evident in the statement of the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs which was full of restraint. It commented the just launched action as follows: "the action of the United States should not be a source of a vicious circle of terrorism and retaliation that may plunge the world into the holocaust of war" ("The Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Security in East Asia" 34-6).

North Korean actions were contradictory. The day after the attacks, the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs presented his country as the one which is "opposed to all forms of terrorism and whatever support to it." This statement underlined that North Korean had signed the Joint-North Korea Statement on International Terrorism of October 2000.

In November, the same Ministry announced the North Korean will to sign the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, as well as the motivation to accede to the International Convention Against Taking Hostages. Notwithstanding these statements, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), citing the *Washington Post* several days after the attacks, suggested that arrogant foreign policy such as forcing through the missile defence plan might be the cause of the US isolation in the international community and Bush's unilateral foreign policy that prioritizes benefits for the United States alone could have been the cause of the recent events.

All in all, there have been a few more statement exchanges, which finally led to a direct appeal to North Korea made by Bush at a news conference in November: "I made it very clear to North Korea that in order for us to have relations with them, we want to know: Are they developing weapons of mass destruction? And they ought to stop proliferating" ("The Terrorist Attacks in the United States and Security in East Asia" 36). That chain of events and official statements, finally led President Bush to state on January 29, 2002 that North Korea is regarded as a one of the countries that are the base of an "axis of evil" together with Iran and Iraq. This was discussed widely among newspapers all

around the world, as a very controversial opinion. It was much more than denying North Korean policy that sacrifice its citizens' lives for the building of military power (Tkacik 1). In October, North Korea admitted having weapon of mass destruction.

General Situation and Relations in the East Asian Region

An important aspect of Asian and Pacific relations is the multilateral character of correspondence among the countries. The Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) is one of many organizations that aims at improving international cooperation. The most significant cooperation is the one among ASEAN plus three countries, which are: Japan, People's Republic of China and the Republic of Korea. There are some opinions that this is an attempt to create an alternative economic structure less dependent on Washington ("Region Azji i Pacyfiku-Qua de nef?" 371).

The institutional base for the political order in the region is the system of military agreements signed by the United States with Japan, Republic of Korea, Australia, Thailand, Philippines, as well as with Taiwan (on the ground of the unilateral Taiwan's Relation's Act 1979, which gives some basic peace guarantees for the People's Republic of China) (Weiss 123).

The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the ASEAN Plus Three summit was held in Shanghai in October 19-21, 2001. This summit was extremely significant mainly due to two reasons. The first one is related to the place of the meeting. Shanghai is becoming a business-financial centre, and is the best evidence of the People's Republic of China development and trade conversion. The summit was to be a very important and meaningful meeting, which was revealed by the enormous amount of journalists' accreditation to it (about 3000).

However, the summit did not manage to pass without disruption. An "unpleasant" situation was caused by the People's Republic of China, which did not invite the representatives of Taiwan even though it was agreed in 1992 that Taiwan and Hong Kong were to participate in APEC not as sovereign countries but as economic subjects. The second reason for the summit's significance is connected with agreement over political declaration that condemns terrorism in all forms. The role of the United States as a leader in counter-terrorism action had been accepted, nevertheless the military action in Afghanistan did not gain any support ("Obszar WNP: koniec Eurazji?" 225).

As far as the institutional side is concerned, the dialogue of so called the "10 + 3" group played a meaningful role. The roots of this group can be found in the financial crisis in that region, because it revealed how weak the cooperation had been. The countries were not able to prevent the crisis from happening and were not ready to deal with it. (Boisseau Du Rocher 34).

The first meeting of the group was held in Kuala Lumpur in Malaysia, in 1997. A few characteristics of working of that group can be listed. First of all, countries in that region of the world are very sensitive about their sovereignty and they agreed that no law solving can be carried out; additionally the system of voting based on majority was introduced and adopted. The second feature is based on the economic issues, which encouraged ten ASEAN countries to cooperate with the three most powerful states in Asia-Pacific region, which are at the same time their biggest trade partners. Finally, the ASEAN countries proposed that sort of joint talks, because they were aiming to achieve by this increased access to the three countries' domestic markets. In addition, the talks between ASEAN and China about creating the free trade area began (Boisseau Du Rocher 36); this was firstly announced on November 4, 2001 at the summit in Brunei. When more detailed talks took place, it was known that within the next ten years this free trade area will cover about 1,7 billion people and during the first step towards this kind of "unification," up to July 1, 2004, the reduction of duty for some goods is to be performed (*Peace and Prosperity* 240). This shows that the transformation of the People's Republic of China from a very cheap producing base country to an extremely receptive market for goods produced in the region is an on-going process.

China-North Korean relations were tightened up, but without prospects of changes in their situation. In 2001, visits were made by two leaders, Kim Jong Il, the general secretary of the Worker's Party of Korea (WPK) Central Committee and chairman of the National Refuse Commission of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. It was a surprise visit, at the beginning of the New Year, during which Kim Jong Il toured places such as Shanghai General Motors Corporation. This might have been related to Kim Jong Il's New Year's Address, in which he claimed that North Korea has to adopt a new way of thinking to boost its economy (Wolf and Akramov 33). Nevertheless, it does not mean that DPRK is preparing to open like China did previously.

In September, Jiang Zemin revisited North Korea, who while talking to Kim Jong Il was prodding him to accept the path of development. He underlined that China's attitude towards the stability on the Korean peninsula was as follows: "maintaining and promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula is extremely important." These visits

constituted the reconfirmation of the traditional "friendship" between the two countries ("China" 188-9).

The dialogue between China and South Korea was important (Xiaoming 134-6). Li Peng, the chairman of the standing committee of the National People's Congress, visited the Republic of Korea. The visit of Prime Minister Lee Han Dong to China took place as well. The talks touched upon political and economic issues. China's main objective was to strengthen economic ties with South Korea. In October 2001, the twenty-first century Korea-China Leaders Society headed by Kang Young Hun, who used to be the prime minister of the ROK, visited China, and had a meeting with Li Peng. Li Peng stated that the Chinese government sincerely supports and welcomes the restoration of dialogue and cooperation between the ROK and DPRK, and hopes for reconciliation through dialogue and the eventual voluntary reunification of the two Koreas (Jwa, Sung-Hee, Chung-in Moon 92). However, China is also aware of some obstacles to the possible unification, the most serious problems were listed: political, economic and psychological barriers between the North and South, that cannot be overcome overnight (Xuehan 32).

This statement shows that China really cares about the situation on the Korea Peninsula. This is connected with its economic objectives; peaceful development in both Koreas is essential for the Chinese economy. As long as South Korea had stuck to its Sunshine policy towards the North, stability on the peninsula has been prominently easier to maintain as opposed to the current government leadership politics on foreign issues and international relations (Kim I. J., H. P. Lee 64).

In October 2001, Jiang Zemin met with South Korean President Kim Dae Jung at the summit meeting of APEC. Afterwards, the Chinese leader highlighted his support for maintaining good North-South relations and mentioned that during his talks to Kim Jong Il, he prodded him to pay a visit to Seoul. At the press conference following the summit, Jiang expressed his support for the North Korean participation in APEC. China's attitude towards both Koreas differs in that these countries are completely different from each other, but in both cases, the People's Republic of China is using diplomacy to ease the tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and encourage peaceful dialogue ("China" 189-90).

Russia is the second superpower in the region. Its basic objectives towards the Korean Peninsula is very close to the policy promoted by China. Russia wants peaceful coexistence between the two Koreas and is doing her best to prevent any destabilization. As such, Russia supports the status quo. Russia's attitude towards the North Korea regime is to help it to survive, as though it may help to stabilize the tensions on the

peninsula, which might be helpful in restoring Russia's influence in the region (some within the Russian defense industry hope to resume exports to North Korea). In April 2001, the Minister of the People's Armed Forces, Kim Il Chol visited Russia, and the trip resulted in signing a pact of military cooperation as well as assistance in military technology. That subject was also an incentive for Kim Il Jung's visit to Russia from late July to mid-August. On August 4, Chairman Kim and President Putin signed a joint declaration at the Russia-North Korea summit in Moscow. According to it, Russia claimed that North Korea constructed its missile plan in a peaceful character, and it was highlighted that it would not be a threat to any nation that respects North Korea's sovereignty. One of the leading summit's subjects was arms supplies. Putin visited South Korea in February 2001 and new economic deals were made ("Russia" 248). Countries that play a significant role in the Korean Peninsula neighborhood, support unification, although there are different roots of that attitude.

Conclusions

The reunification of the Korean Peninsula seems to be barely possible due basic changes in South Korean foreign policy. Despite the historic handshake of the leaders, Kim Dae Jung, and Kim Jong Il in 2000, there is still room for improvement in inter-Korean relations. Senior journalists from South Korea visited the North to establish communication. Decades after politics drove hundreds of families apart, a tearful reunion of many relatives took place. One hundred North Koreans met their family members in the South in a highly-charged, emotional reunion. Reopening the border liaison offices at the "truce village" of Panmunjom, in the no-man's-land between the heavily fortified borders of the two countries, was also regarded as a sign of goodwill. South Korea granted amnesty to more than 3,500 prisoners. On October 4, 2007, Roh Moo-Hyun and Kim Jong Il signed an eight-point agreement on issues of lasting peace, high-level talks, economic cooperation, highway and air travel and renewal of train services.

Despite the events that undermined inter-Korean relations such as in June 2002 when North and South Korean naval vessels waged a gun battle in the Yellow Sea, which was the worst skirmish for three years, (thirty North Korean and four South Korean sailors were killed) or in 2010, when North shelled island of Yeonpyeong and killed four South Koreans, reunification is still possible.

While considering the topic of 'whether the total opening of the inter-Korean borders is possible within next few years and if so

under what conditions', it is possible to come up with scenarios for reunification which are as follows:

1. The first one is through a peaceful integration. This can be perceived as the most optimistic scenario, but in fact, it would be extremely difficult to perform. That kind of inter-Korean development would involve steps like: an initial acceptance of the status quo by the two Koreas and by four major powers which are the United States, China, Russia and Japan. This can be described as a two plus two model. What is more, a mutual recognition of that model would be indispensable. The next step would involve a formal peace treaty. A period of peaceful coexisting before these steps would be taken, is necessary as well. The integration itself, would entail levelling of each countries policy, which are completely different. Cooperation on economic level with limited political and social integration is required before the next step could be reached (Choi, *Perspectives on Korean Unification and Economic Integration* 245). In such case, the most troublesome part would follow, not only for the governments' officials but especially for the two societies: structural change evolving along the lines of a "one country, two systems, two governments" approach evident in previous Republic of Korea proposals for unification. Only after these steps are completed could a peaceful integration could happen. An important factor is the protracted time period of peaceful coexistence, because a recognition of status quo or formal treaty without few years of good cooperation is hardly possible. Despite the fact that North Korea in August 2002, have introduced market reforms in the first move away from its planned economy, for instance the currency was devalued, food ration coupons were scrapped, and workers' wages were boosted to pay for goods sold at new rates, it is rather unlikely that this country would abandon its communist ideology.

"North Korea goes to market–maybe" this is the title of the article published on the BBC News website. A senior South Korean official has said the North had begun what he called "sweeping reforms," aimed at turning round its collapsed centrally planned economy. Reports from Seoul say that the rationing system is being phased out in a partial move towards a free market. It remains notoriously hard to gauge what is happening in North Korea, with even foreign aid workers based in Pyongyang being denied access to large parts of the country. However, it does now seem clear that significant economic changes are under way. David Morton, who represents the World Food Programme in Pyongyang, reported that the introduction of a limited free market had already had an effect. On July 1, 2001 the state of DPRK introduced a new price system (Lee J.-Ch. 358). In one sense, these moves towards a free market are a formal recognition of the reality that has existed for

some time. The state had lost control of the food distribution system, partly due to the farmers who were withholding produce to sell on the black market.

BBC News website presents Hazel Smith, a Korea analyst at the United States Institute for Peace, who claims that the state would rather tolerate and regulate the market than lose control altogether. Together with the rise in prices, wages and living allowances are going up too. Smith also warned of possible trouble ahead. South Korea is observing the process of reform in its impoverished northern neighbour keenly. There is a good deal of cynicism in Seoul about whether the reforms are a genuine attempt to move to a free market, or simply a short-term measure to wrest back control from the black marketers. If the North Korean Government asks for economic assistance, then the international community will be willing to provide it. In the case North Korea is not willing to accept the offer, there will be very limited room to maneuver. Otherwise, this may cause some problems in the future. A degree of political liberalisation would be necessary if North Korea wanted substantial support from South Korea and the rest of the international community. Moving on from tolerating, then legalising the markets to a system where there are economic incentives and the individual gets rewarded is a problem for the government. The next step would be political freedom for individuals. North Koreans would look at-but probably not follow-the reforms introduced in China. It is impossible for the North Korean Government or anyone else to predict exactly where the reforms will end up. Nevertheless, the changes are a sign that the authorities in Pyongyang are adopting some more pragmatic approach as they seek to turn round an economy that has produced misery and starvation for the bulk of the population. The government is genuinely committed to its huge experiment, including sweeping price reforms designed to emulate Beijing's capitalist experimentation in the early 1980s (Wehrfritz and Tahayama 27).

These economic reforms are being introduced as a result of the dramatic situation of economy and citizens' standard of living, rather than because of North Korean will to open up. Annually, 6 to 8 million of North Korean citizens are being supplied in food by the UN (Hirsh, "Kim is the Key Danger" 19). In order to analyse the strength and durability of these performances, it is necessary to wait a year or more, because in the past there were some attempts of the North Korean government that gave hope for coming out from isolation, but it always came back to its previous ideology.

The unification through peaceful integration could be realised, only under some external and impartial control. The United States hopes to be

an honest broker, who could regulate the processes between the two Koreas, especially as they see themselves as an advisor in managing the confidence-building measures or monitoring mutual force reductions that might emerge from a peace treaty.

2. The second scenario of unification through default assumes a state failure in North Korea and an abrupt unification of absorption. This view was particularly popular during the late 1980s and early 1990, with the end of Cold War and widening of a yawning gap between the North and South economic development. The general steps in the collapse scenario begin from some kind of triggering event. This could be a mass disorder that derives largely from the initial steps by the DPRK towards initiating reforms and abandoning them in due course. Such reforms could very easily create a spiral of expectations among society by giving it a force to purse the government to follow the already initiated path of changes. On the other hand, a trigger might come from the elite, also by waking up the hope for major economic changes. If the trigger occurs, then an international intervention might be obligatory for restoring the order. There are some doubts about the character of the intervention. Should it be a result of the ROK-US alliance-a joint military action of the two? Do the South Koreans need to obtain the US or international consent to act on their own in the North? Or perhaps, the action should be undertaken by the multinational force under the UN supervision?

The next aspect is connected with the socio-economic integration problems, which are believed to be the most acute under this scenario. First of all, it is due to the lack of clarity in comparison to the effects of unification through a war. The issues could be nearly the same, but who would owe the right to seize the power and govern the administration? The questions are then: who will gain the authority and under what conditions? How should the intervention be performed so as not to usurp the sovereignty of the Northerners? Unpopular policies telling how to govern and administer the territory problems connected with currency conversion, enfranchisement or border control, all of them might face strong opposition by indigenous populations in a way that might not occur in a post-war military reality.

In that scenario, the role played by the United States is worth mentioning since the Americans see themselves as the ones who could play a constructive role both in a short and long term perspective. In a short term outlook, it might act as a major support for the intervention. While in the long time perspective, the US could behave as a coordinator among China, Japan and Russia, and other regional states facing the possible negative regional effects of the DPRK collapse. On the other hand, the Americans have to be aware that although at the beginning

their help would be welcomed by the Koreans, later on, after gaining the knowledge how to manage with new situation, some negative sentiments are likely to occur towards the US presence on the peninsula.

3. The last option, is often referred to as the "worst" end of spectrum. Unification in that context would be an effect of war. This could be, hypothetically, a repeat of the North invasion of the South, as happened in 1950. Such similar action is rather not possible, because the US-ROK alliance is very strong and this would be a suicidal action undertaken by the North. The US-ROK cooperation acts as a deterrent for invasion, but when it comes to such an unpredictable leader as Kim Jong Il, it is impossible to anticipate his actions. In the past, wars occurred more often through miscalculation or accident during a period of high tension than through cold, rational calculation, which makes that scenario still very plausible. The more likely trigger would be if a possible new status quo for the Korean Peninsula brought so many losses to DPRK that by military action, a desperate attempt to change the status quo was made by the Northern state.

In the case of war, its outcome may include characteristics such as: many civilian casualties among Koreans and Americans, as well as large-scale industrial devastation in Seoul and in other major cities. As it was proved that North Korea has a weapon of mass destruction, possible chemical damage to the environment in the South has to be taken into consideration. Massive destruction in Japan might be possible due to DPRK missiles attacks, in order to forestall US and Japanese joint action. Eventually, the effect would be the post-war occupation and administration of former DPRK. The scenario based on war, would cause some acute problems between the US and ROK with China. The full extent of the Chinese reaction to such a war is not known. A significant issue would be China's probable attempt to create a buffer zone, which would prevent refugee flows. These refugees would be settled down on Korean territory. The question is, how the US and ROK states should react to the military presence on during the conflict. The role of the United States in that scenario, in comparison to the two other possible unification outcomes, would involve the largest US military presence on the North territory. It is very likely that the US would play a crucial role in the North occupation. In the long term, the American role would be similar to the one in the unification through default scenario.

The reunification reached by any of the presented scenarios and the process of rebuilding will involve countless adjustments to form the new society's economic, political, and other key social institutions. Southern values are likely to dominate due to their demonstrated success in the global economy, and due to simple demographics: two-thirds of the

unified population, probably 75 million people, would be South Koreans. While forming societies people usually create five major institutions to establish order and transmit their values to next generation: family, religion, education, economy and government.

It is difficult to estimate and describe a society that may not appear soon, however some basic characteristics can be predicted. For instance, family, which can be found in every society, constitutes a foundation, because it instils basic values and behaviour for average citizen, in reunified Korea would probably maintain its strong unit. The discrepancies between the Southern and Northern families are visible, even tools that are used in everyday life differ a lot. In the South Internet, democracy and market economic are universally accepted, but for the Northern society it might be difficult to adapt. Unified Korea is likely to be pluralistic in terms of religion, although in DPRK Confucianism has been blended with socialist values, which in fact created the cult of Kim Il Sung, (also called Kimilsungism). While in the ROK Christianity gained a lot of popularity, the government would probably outlaw Kimilsungism religious practices and would encourage some Christian missionaries and others promoting commonly accepted religions.

As far as education is concerned, unified Korea is likely to implement South Korea's relatively liberal educational system to produce individuals who can improve the country's ability to succeed in the global economy and overcome the stress of unification. The North Korea's system is seen by the Korea Worker's Party (KWP) as a tool to control political conciseness of the society. Unified Korea would need to develop new understandings of itself as an independent nation-state, without resorting dysfunctional nationalism. The unified Korea would undoubtedly seek implementing economic principles of the free market and trying to become part of a vast Eurasian market connecting Pusan, Paris, Moscow and Beijing. Some urgent measures would have to be taken to neutralise the socialist economic concepts. Another problem which a unified Korea would have to face is the massive North Korean migration to the prosperous south, which economically could be disastrous. The last public institution is the government, which most likely would be democratic. The perception of the government's role in the society is completely different in the North and in the South. The Southern Koreans will require an increasingly transparent government accountable to voters and oriented to help them to achieve their socio-economic objectives. The government role and the responsibilities of the Northern Koreans as free citizens might be confusing for them. Such confusion, if improperly managed, could be a source of serious instability.

All in all, if unification occurs and leads two separate countries to enter into the alliance on all levels. The possibility that there will be

a total opening of inter-Korean borders is highly unlikely in the next few years. Nowadays, the international relations, especially after the attacks of September 11, 2001, are rotating every day and what is more the Asia-Pacific region faces instability.

Throughout the 1990s, enthusiasm for Korean reunification predictions has faded due to the resilience of the North regime. Although the underlying assumption of reunification remains, forecasts of when and how this will occur have been more restrained. Even the death of Kim Jong Il will not bring changed to domestic and foreign policy as North Korea is going to continue adopt an aggressive approach toward the South. In summary, in the short-term reunification is definitely not in the interest of the current ROK administration, and the South has no intention of encouraging it. None of the considered scenarios envisions early reunification, and it seems that for the future, the status quo on the Korean Peninsula will remain.

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BOKO HARAM *SHARIA* REASONING AND DEMOCRATIC VISION IN PLURALIST NIGERIA[1]

ABSTRACT: In the decade since Al-Qaeda, led by the late Osama Bin Laden, attacked America, there has been a resurgence in the debate about the relationship between religion and politics. The global Islamic terrorist networks and their successful operations against various targets around the globe increasingly draw attention to what constitutes the core values of Islamic extremism: the logic of evangelistic strategy, the import and relevance of its spiritual message and consideration of the composite view of life that does not distinguish between sacred and temporal mandates. Suspicions have been fuelled that Islam is incompatible with modern democratic systems and pluralist outlooks. The real cause of Islamic militancy is at once universal and particular. The Nigerian experience of this radical Islamism–Boko Haram–brings home the once "distant" threat to global peaceful co-existence. While there exist arguments regarding the *raison d'etre* and means or methods of the operations of Boko Haram, the end has been normative; to achieve a purely religious nationalistic system on the basis of the *sharia* code of ethics. This paper, therefore, critically analyses the historical and philosophical interpretations of Islamic history constructed as an infallible corpus, and how it has been impacted by the democratic vision in Nigeria. It concludes with a consideration of the possibility and practicability of a liberal system at once free and religious in a pluralist and global society.

KEY WORDS: terrorism, Islam, Al-Qaeda, education, jihad.

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Introduction

On September 11, 2001, America was shaken terrorist planes crashed into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon killing thousands of people. Just as the world was trying to figure out what went wrong, it further experienced shoe bomber Richard Reid in 2001, the two Tel Aviv 'Mike's Place' bombers in 2003, the four July 7 London bombers in 2005 and the attempted Christmas Day bomber Umar Farouk Abdulmuttalib in 2009. In Nigeria, the Boko Haram Islamic sect has been active since July 2009, with large numbers of causalities.

When one observes the trend of these actual and attempted attacks, it is noticeable that young Muslim people are involved and that Islam as a religion has received a negative public image leading to Islamophobia, radicalization of the religion and a reinforced, deliberate or inadvertent interest in the debate on the symbiosis between religion and politics as well as global insecurity. While these are true and global, they are at once local–as expressed in the Nigerian religio-political space.

The underlying principle has been identified as *sharia* reasoning, that is, the militants believe that the *sharia* code of ethics should guide the lives of Muslims wherever they live. Western liberal democratic values are believed to have corrupted the Islamic faith. The variants of this stringent position have been manifested in the inveterate attacks carried out with the aim of achieving a comprehensive Islamic global state. This essay will therefore discuss the historical and philosophical interpretations of Islamic history constructed as infallible corpus, which is believed to be equally relevant in the twenty-first century as in the sixth century. It will then detail how Boko Haram has keyed into this 'philosophy' as a guide to its operations in Nigeria. Then, it will be argued that the flawed hermeneutics of contextual and exigent history do not mean that Islam cannot be compatible with global, pluralist and democratic society, but there is the urgent need for mass education of the pool of people from which Boko Haram recruits.

Historical Basis for *Sharia* Reasoning

The one religion that has been largely misunderstood and mischaracterized in recent time is Islam. Its geographical provenance invites "intuitive, often condescending, comparison with its putative cultural cousins-Judaism and Christianity; the mode and pattern of its evangelistic strategy, especially at its incipient stage, is often cited by some to call into question the authenticity of its spiritual message" (Ilesanmi 27-36). Islam embraces a composite view of life, which

incorporates both the sacred and temporal spheres into a single and undifferentiated whole with a divine mandate or guidance. These strictures are perceived as incompatible with modernity and its pluralist values. The modern society's secular ethos is deemed to be antithetical to the Islamic code of ethics because God has been presumably removed from the schema of life. The removal of God therefore, as perceptibly done by the West, is an invitation to jihad in contemporary society, which Ilesanmi refers to as "jaundiced understanding of the Islamic tradition" (27).

The point in history being referred to is the Medina Order in which the religious cum spiritual, social, administrative and legal frameworks of the Ummah–Islamic community–were solely provided and adjudicated by Prophet Muhammad, and carried further by the caliphs who succeeded him. This provides the somewhat historical template for Islamic militants who believe that the Medina Order must be restored. Thus, the militants draw parallels between what transpired about 1400 years ago, that is, the struggles of the early Islamic community and the post-colonial Islamic struggles (Oh 50-58). As Kelsay argues, "the point of holy history is to answer religious questions; not simply or even primarily "How did these events transpire?" but "Why did they occur?" (Kelsay). Since the aim of the early Islamic community was to unite the growing community in religion, administration and legislation, around the historical figure–Prophet Muhammad; the militants find this historical need urgent in modern society because Islam is still growing and expanding although persecuted.

The prophet of Islam administered the early community with *sharia.* By the twelfth century, *sharia* had become an established process such that those professionally trained in Islamic religious and legal history could distinguish "between history and present circumstance, or between approved texts and new contexts" (Kelsay 125). It is within this prism that Kelsay defines *sharia* reasoning as an "attempt to forge links between the wisdom of previous generation and the challenges posed by contemporary life, in hopes of acting in ways consistent with the guidance of God" (Kelsay 4). In other words, instead of distinguishing the exigent historical texts and contextualizing them within the socio-political framework of modern reality, and consistent with their faith, Islamic extremists reject such negotiation and insist that present contexts must of necessity fit into the ancient texts. If "reasoning implies a movement, both dynamic and dialectical, in which one draws inferences or conclusions from known or assumed facts" (Ilesanmi 51) it stands to reason that the historical account upon which the militants draw inspiration must receive a cautious "balance between continuity and

creativity" (Kelsay 83). As Kelsay expatiates, their arguments are characteristic of "conscientious" form of movement:

> between precedent and new contexts. One proceeds with due respect to other judgment articulated in approved texts. It must never be assumed that the sharia is closed, however. To take such a position is to deny the freedom of God. It is to render God static, whereas the voice speaking in the Quran, and to which prophet's sunna bears witness, is very much dynamic and living. (177)

Since God is not static but dynamic and relevant to every political order, it is argued further that:

> *Sharia* reasoning supports a political order in which persons and groups are free to hear the word of God, to accept it, and to worship according to their deeply held conviction. *Sharia* reasoning also supports the converse; in order to protect the right of believers to practice their religion, it must be possible for others, nonbelievers, to hear the word of God, to reject it, and to live according to the dictates of conscience. (Kelsay 169)

However, the moral latitude of this form of *sharia* reasoning incisively confronts the global, democratic and pluralist contours because it is an invitation to violate the freedom of others who may not share their belief and religious leaning. Above all, it seems to arrogate God's right in matters of faith to human beings as well as abdicate the responsibilities attached to it, which militants have interpreted to mean that they are equipped to carry out as part of their religious duty–*jihad*.

James T. Johnson queries the arrogation by the militants of such interpretive and practical powers. According to him, three fundamental Islamic documents, as examined by Kelsay, provide a scintillating understanding and interpretation of *sharia* reasoning of Islamic radicalism. He argues that the authority vested on the *Ulema*–the learned jurists–has been usurped by modern *malik* [kings]. The documents are: creed of Sadat's assassins, *The Neglected Duty*, from 1981, the charter of Hamas, from 1988, and the *Declaration on Armed Struggle Against Jews and Crusaders*, which is styled in the form of jurisprudential ruling issued by Osama Bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri and three others, from 1998. According to Johnson, these documents obviously relied on a long history reaching back through the Mongol incursions and the crusades to the time of Prophet Muhammad and his successors, stretching to the Quran itself. But the crisis of practice noticeable in these documents is the expansion of "*Sharia* reasoning" beyond the small circle of elite scholars bearing the authority of "the learned" to a larger circle, in which literate and professional Muslims consider themselves qualified to engage in arguments about the guidance of God" (Johnson 45). Apart from that, the

crisis that followed the collapse of the Ottoman caliphate in 1928, which was the last caliphate, and of course, the crisis of western influence made the circle wider. The end of the Ottoman caliphate was a watershed. It opened up the contest about who could rightly interpret the *sharia* since "the political theory embodied in traditional reasoning [that] was framed in terms of the ideal of a universal Islamic community, ruled according to Islamic law by a single ruler" (Johnson 45) was rejected with the collapse of the caliphate.

These crises–*sharia* reasoning, political authority and historical understanding–correspond with the radical Islamists' thinking that the West has been very aggressive to Islam, Muslim leaders have become corrupt, some are even apostates; and Muslims generally have not shown faithfulness to their faith. This self-understanding of Islam resonates in the modern concept of jihad as depicted in the three documents listed above. The thrust of these documents is that Islam is portrayed as a religion in a state of emergency, which requires all faithful Muslims to defend it. This call to duty supersedes all other loyalty to rulers and even families (Johnson 46).

The Neglected Duty expresses this emergency as one that calls for urgent mobilization because Muslim rulers have become apostates by innovation and adoption of western paradigms and code of conduct to the neglect of strict Islamic law. These rulers have also been accused of persecuting genuine Muslims, especially Anwar Sadat of Egypt whose assassination was justified on the basis of his romance with the West, and allowing non-Muslims to dominate Muslims (Johnson 41). It has also been argued that the formation of the Muslim Brotherhood by Hassan al-Banna in 1928, which was responsible for the assassination of Prime Minister Began Menachem and President Sadat of Egypt, revolutionized Islam, and reinforced radical Islamism. It was a reaction to the limiting of the roles of the *ulema* [Muslim legal scholar] in public life by modern government, and secularization of public institutions. The Muslim Brotherhood resisted the development that brought religious institutions under closer state control, and ultimately assumed the duty of practice of *sharia* ("Islam in Egypt"). Irene Oh illustrates that the interpretation of the *sharia* by the *ulema* was a "historical accident" caused by the high level of illiteracy and non-availability of the text to most Muslims (Oh 54). However, the situation changed in the twentieth century when more Muslims could read and also have access to the texts as a result of the development in print technology. So the respect for the *ulema* weaned considerably. Nevertheless, while the Muslim Brotherhood and its South Asian counterpart, the Jama 'at-i Islami led by Abu'l a'la Mawdudi continued to have respect for the *ulema*, they "effectively reserve judgment on matters of practice for themselves" (Oh 54).

The charter of Hamas approves "armed resistance as a matter of imposed war" (Kelsay 133) to reclaim land believed to belong to the Muslims, and acts in the order of the crusades, and in contrast with *The Neglected Duty*, which fights apostasy. Herein, the world is uncompromisingly divided into two unrelated parts: *dar al-islam* (the house of Islam) and *dar al-harb* (the house of war), meaning the non-Muslim world.

The *Declaration* is an extrapolation from *The Neglected Duty* and the Charter of Hamas in its expression of the state of emergency. It argues that the whole of the Muslim world and Muslims themselves are under severe attack, especially from the West and America. These attacks are led by Americans and "the satanically inspired supporters allying with them" (Johnson 44). So the declaration that America and all its allies should be destroyed as agents of Satan who want to annihilate Muslims and Islam becomes a duty of every able Muslim worldwide (Mandel 103). With the *Declaration*, the deference for the *ulema* seemingly ended because "for Osama bin Laden and those who stand with him, the *ulema* are nearly as irrelevant as the leadership of historically Muslim states. At best, they are focused on splitting hairs; at worst, they publish opinions that identify *Sharia* reasoning with the policies of acquiescence to Europe and the United States" (Kelsay 153). So people like Bin Laden "consider themselves qualified to issue a formal *Sharia* opinion on the duty of Muslims, including the learned" (Kelsay 153) and also mobilize resistance against European and American 'invasion' of Islam.

Radicalization of Islam in Contemporary Society

The events of recent history now popularly referred to as 9/11 and 7/7 are hinged on the instigation of Al-Qaeda (AQ) then under the command of the late Osama Bin Laden. In February 1998, Bin Laden and his associates, under the aegis of the World Islamic Front, issued a statement accusing America and its allies of unpardonable crimes against God and Muslims. According to the statement, "All these crimes and sins committed by the Americans are a clear declaration of war on God, his messenger, and Muslims" (Mandel 103). This means a direct declaration of holy war against America and its allies. The statement reads further:

> On that basis, and in compliance with God's order, we issue the following fatwa to all Muslims: The ruling to kill the Americans and their allies–civilians and military–is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it. We–with God's help call on every Muslim who believes in God and wishes to be rewarded to comply with God's order to kill the Americans and

> plunder their money wherever and whenever they find it. We all call on Muslim ulema, leaders, youth, and soldiers to launch the raid on Satan's U.S. troops and the devil's supporters allying with them, and to displace those who are behind them so that they may learn a lesson. (Mandel 103)

As noted above, *sharia* reasoning has been taken over from the *ulema* in that they have been so summoned to join the armed forces of the house of Islam against the house of war by the militants. The usurpation of the role of the *ulema* in *sharia* reasoning is at once religious and political. Not so many researchers think about it this way. Rather, many of them tend to focus on the psycho-political implications of the effects of what ordinarily has a deep religious history. Whether or not it is rightly interpreted, such social science researchers as Niza Yinay, Kien S. Lee, among others, tend to downplay the critical historical impetus of Islamic religion as the summoning factor to radicalization and "new terrorism" (Yanay 131-142). However, Benjamin Zablocki and Anna Looney recognize the crucial and urgent need to appropriate religious paradigm to global social science investigation especially with the events of 9/11. As they put it:

> The social movement aspect of these entities was sometimes noted but rarely emphasized. The quantum leap in global consciousness precipitated by 9/11 has propelled us into seeing that our field of research can benefit from being looked at as a part of the larger field of social movements. At the same time, we have come to recognize that there is nothing particularly new or exclusively religious about many of the ideologies driving these movements. Distinctions among ideologies that are purely religious, those that are purely political, and those that are purely cultural are difficult and often impossible to draw. (Zablocki and Looney 314)

The taxonomy of this complex admixture of religious, political and cultural paradigms can only be difficult to dissect from the western binary conception. However Islam does not separate them. They are part and parcel of faith and guided by *sharia*. Understood from this prism, the *Declaration* insists that the forced distinction of these paradigms by the West and America is a considered policy to exterminate Islamic culture hence the various terrorist attacks.

Basia Spalek argues that new terrorism, which is now associated with Al-Qaeda (AQ) is facilitated by globalization forces and is a response to them. Whether or not AQ is best classified as 'old' or 'new' terrorism, the fact remains that since 9/11 the thinking about new terrorism has filtered into policy, security, policing, and media at global level. According to him,

> 'New terrorism' constitutes a set of rationalities and technologies in relation to a so-called new form of terrorism that is global and indiscriminate, linked to groups

> associated with or influenced by AQ. Importantly, this new form of terrorism . . . is linked to Islam as a religion, . . . the 'new terrorism' is said to be unbounded and uses indiscriminate targeting, and interpretations of Islamic texts and concepts are said to be used not only as a moral foundation, but as sacred motivators and legitimisers. (Spalek, "'New Terrorism' and Crime Prevention Initiatives" 194)

Spalek, Lambert and McDonald further argue that even though 'new terrorism' is a contested concept, it is nevertheless the case that it is related to AQ, which presents Islamism in the context of violence; "violence as intrinsically linked to Islamic theology, and thus as an extreme articulation of Muslimness" (McDonald 77-189). The concept also underscores "a new phase in terrorist practice, one in which terror is an indiscriminate and unrestricted end rather than a bounded, pragmatic means" (McDonald 178). Clive Field notes that Islamism is more or less a political rather than religious Islam, and it is also on this political thought that it easily radicalizes the youth (Field 171).

Since 'new terrorism' is linked to AQ, it is apt to underscore that AQ in its *sharia* reasoning tries to legitimize violence. The 'ideological strategy' it employs is to bring to the front burner the idea that all Muslims are members of the *ummah*-the global Islamic community-and as such deserve to be protected and defended. AQ believes that members of the ummah face difficulties in western states, which make it almost impossible for them to practice their faith. "AQ ideology is reflective of a homogenous Muslim group identity and standpoint" (McDonald 184) hence it laboriously constructs a borderless loyalty to the cause of Islam through jihad.

The radicalization of jihad of the sword is instructive. Although it appears in early Muslim history, it is ostensibly not a concept found in the Quran. The root word, *jhd* denotatively means "striving to follow the path of God" (Johnson 40). Although it appears in the *hadith* (the sayings and doings of Prophet Muhammad) literature with the connotation of fighting against non-Muslims, McDonald recognizes that it is "a noble and complex set of duties, incorporating physical defense that is bound by a set of explicit and uncompromised principles" (McDonald 185). In effect, *jihad* of the sword as a collective duty is only authorizable by the caliph, the head of the *ummah*, rather than an individual, even though there is a provision for individual jihad under the construct of personal defense. The caliph or his designee assumes the position of commander in chief in the jihad of collective duty. But this is only operational in the context of caliphate, which perceptibly ended with the Ottoman caliphate. Johnson argues that:

> So long as there was a caliphate, the juristic conception of the jihad of collective duty could remain the normative form of welfare. The fundamentals of this understanding

> of war were not undermined by empirical fragmentation of the Muslim world, by the coexistence of multiple rival caliphates each of which claimed universal jurisdiction or by the coming into being of effectively independent local rulers so long as they claimed to be acting in fealty to one or another of the caliphs then existing. (Johnson 41)

With time, the authorization of the jihad of the sword could not be guaranteed by the juristic conception; it lied with the *malik*, but progressed to incorporate the "ability" to demonstrate "divine blessing by success in warfare," (Johnson 43) which has come to be the propelling authority AQ depends upon. Broadly speaking, AQ noticeably acts on the basis of individual duty translated as collective, even though *The Neglected Duty* and the *Declaration* reject present Islamic rulers as unjust and apostate. This stance of AQ raises the question whether or not its members are Muslim in the true sense, a question which snowballs into identity crisis.

AQ has been variously described as "not really Muslim," "irrational agents," "insane," "monsters" (Oh 50). Such glib characterizations have been presumably turned into a positive or sympathetic posture for the organization. The leaders believe that being vilified is an attestation to the fact that Islam is being persecuted, and they must rally support to defend it. For instance, instead of Muslim youths, especially in UK, seeing AQ in that light, they tend to believe that it consists of "sons of Islam," the suicide bombers are martyrs, and the British and American war against terror is actually "a war against Islam" (Field 166). Identity is crucial to the radicalization of Islam, because it is "rarely innocent of power" and it is shaped in response to the "ruling apparatus of society" (McDonald 182). It is suggested that a more positive construction of the image of Islam must be a good beginning rather than widespread Islamophobia. This entails critical creation of "the sense of citizenship and shared values" (McDonald 183). "Preventing terrorism requires effective interventions to build and reinforce social, inter-cultural and community cohesion . . . Participation of citizens should be also promoted at all times" (McDonald 183).

However, the dialectic between prevention of terrorism through deterrence and continued violent radicalization of Islamism has yet to find a consensus. In other words, AQ and its allies continue to fund, sponsor, instigate and recruit young people to carry out heinous terrorist operations wherever they can. Violent radicalization securitizes Islam "where securitisation might be thought of as the instigation of emergency politics" (Spalek 192). Within this premise, it is argued that the security policies, legislations and other measures are in themselves exclusive rather than integrating. The "otherization" of AQ, Muslim Brotherhood,

Salafi, etc. representing violent extremism to be exterminated has articulated Islam into a binary of moderate and radical. The notion that the former can be tolerated while the latter must be fought to a standstill dominates the argument. Blears captures the political rhetoric this way:

> Our strategy rests on the assessment of firstly whether an organization is actively condemning, and working to tackle, violent extremism; and secondly whether they defend and uphold the shared values of pluralist democracy, both in their words and their deeds. By being clear what is acceptable and what isn't, we aim to support the moderates and isolate the extremists. (McDonald 182)

David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, did not mince words when he authoritatively declared as follows: "Governments must also be shrewder in dealing with those that, while not violent, are in some cases part of the problem. We need to think much harder about who it's in the public interest to work with" (McDonald 182). This clarifies the reason for the hunt for Bin Laden and his allies. In spite of this, violent radicalization in the form of new terrorism has continued to spread across borders. The same *sharia* reasoning about texts and contexts is still a potent tool of mobilization toward new terrorism. Whether or not it resonates in political ostracization or marginalization, a decisive level of resistance has always followed its trail. And Nigeria is having its share as we witness in the violent radicalization of Boko Haram.

Boko Haram on *Sharia* Reasoning

Boko Haram, one of the Islamist sects in Nigeria, has a complex mix of identities which it strives to idealize. Spalek underscores the intricacies of identities within Islamist reasoning and emphasizes its pertinence in trying to deal with them. According to him, "it is important to highlight here that the problematisation of Muslim identities goes beyond the problematisation of Muslim ethnic and cultural identities . . . to the problematisation of Islamic *religious* identities within wider discussions regarding citizenship and cohesion" (Spalek 195). In Nigeria, these complexities of identities are at once cultural, ethnic, political and religious. This is why some have argued for true secular state-formation, an idea Boko Haram finds to be anti-God and obstructive to the full realization of Muslimhood or Muslimness (Igboin).

Many attempts have been made to understand the ideological bent of mind of Boko Haram. Such attempts have led to one conclusion: the sect is anti-western in its entirety. However, it is significant to note that in its etymological rendition, *Boko*, an Hausa word, roughly translates

to education in its descriptive rather than definitive sense. *Boko* might have got its derivative root from, or be a corruption of, *boka*, which associates with witchcraft. In a deft analysis of it, it has no theological conceptualization. *Haram* on the other hand is an Arabic word, meaning impermissible, the opposite of which is *halal*, meaning permissible. In its historical contextual meaning, *ilimi* means education while *ilimi boko* was actually used to derogate western education during the colonial period, being different from *ilimi islamiyya*, Islamic education. In its conceptual analysis, Muslims think that Islamic education is in all ramifications superior to western education. Just as *boka* [witchcraft] is inimical to the wellbeing of the people so is western education thought of as being fake and counterfeit. The strange and suspicious notion about western education defines contempt for the latter, the reason for the incredibly high rate of 'illiteracy' in northern Nigeria (Kukah, "Boko Haram: Some Reflections on Causes and Effects" 1-6).

Kukah argues that the success of Boko Haram depends on a number of factors. The lack of formal education for many children has provided space for itinerant teachers to promote a form of Quranic literacy. Such education is usually given to children for between five and six years. The teachers are not paid but depend on the proceeds from begging by their pupils. It is these thoroughly indoctrinated pupils that constitute the reservoir for recruitment into Boko Haram. The curriculum of the Quranic schools is purely on recitation of the Quran and hatred for the western style of education (Kukah, "Boko Haram: Some Reflections on Causes and Effects" 13).

It is, nevertheless, difficult to delineate a systematic *sharia* reasoning in Boko Haram. The leaders of this sect are articulate in western knowledge and demonstrate skill in utilization of its technology. It will therefore be a performative contradiction to insist that their ideology, if it qualifies to be so defined, is purely to exterminate western education and its influences in Nigeria. But the socio-political reality is that a limited and strict adherence to Quranic education is counterproductive in a fast moving world. As a consequence, those who have not acquired the requisite knowledge of contemporary education will inevitably have to contend with what they perceive as corrosive effects of modernization. Modernization challenges the values which define their humanity and may result in an identity crisis. The argument is that since society, just as human beings, is dynamic rather than static, values and ideologies must compete intensely within the context of dynamism.

Situated within the house of Islam and house of war, Boko Haram's belief that western education and democracy violate *sharia* reasoning becomes somewhat ideological. According to this sect:

> We want to reiterate that we are warriors who are carrying out jihad in Nigeria and our struggle is based on the traditions of the holy prophet. We will not accept any system of government apart from the one stipulated by Islam because that is the only way that Muslims can be liberated. We do not believe in any system of government, be it traditional or orthodox, except the Islamic system and that is why we will keep on fighting against democracy, socialism and whatever. We will not allow Nigerian Constitution to replace the laws that have been enshrined in the Holy Quran. We will not allow adulterated conventional education (*Boko*) to replace Islamic teachings. (Agbo, 46-7)

In fact, the former leader of the sect, Mohammed Yusuf said: "Democracy, and the current system of education must change otherwise this war that is yet to start will continue for long" (Umejesi, "Rule of Law as a Panacea to Religious Crises in Nigeria" 237). No less a person than the President-General of the Nigerian Supreme Council for Islamic Affairs and the Sultan of Sokoto, Muhammad Sa'ad Abubakar affirms the importance of education within Islam. In tracing the historical legacies of Islam in West Africa, he notes that the famous universities of Timbuktu and Birni Gazargamo are products of Islamic intellectualism. These universities and many other higher institutions do not solely focus on Islamic education but rather of other disciplines as well. He further insists that Uthman Ibn Fodio, Abdullahi Ibn Fodio and Muhammad Bello held on to intellectual commitment and integrity that put them above their contemporaries, a hallmark Muslims are enjoined to strive to achieve. He cites Uthman Ibn Fodio to counter Boko Haram's position thus:

> A man without learning is like a country without inhabitants. The finest qualities in a leader in particular and in people in general, are the love for learning, the desire to listen to it and holding the bearer of knowledge in great respect . . . If a leader is devoid of learning, he follows his whims and leads his subjects astray . . . All that requires outstanding learning, keen insight and extensive study. How would he get on if he had not made the necessary preparations and made himself ready for these matters . . . (Abubakar)

He adds that Uthman Ibn Fodio insisted that women must necessarily be educated. He frowned at the traditional practice that confined women to janitorial duties and being child-bearing machines, serving the selfish interest of their husbands. Thus, he summoned them to reject men's fixated agenda when he said: "O Muslim women, do not heed the calls of those misguided folk who deceive you into obeying your husbands rather than the messenger of God" (Abubakar). This seems to be a call to Muslim women to revolt against their husbands who deprived them from being educated.

Abubakar argues that developments in every field of human endeavor have made it easy to acquire vast knowledge. "Scientific breakthroughs have also made it possible to achieve human development at an unprecedented scale and to enhance the welfare and wellbeing of each and every one of us" (Abubakar). He recalls that the first anti-modern sect was Maitatsine, which was a distinctly anti-Boko group prior to Boko Haram.

However, Ojo argues that such a simplistic view of history can be counterproductive as it betrays intellectual integrity, particularly with regard to the interpenetration of religious, ethnic, political, socioeconomic realities amongst Nigerians. The truth is that Uthman Ibn Fodio's jihad of the first decade of the nineteenth century has continued to be a reference point and inspiration on how best to utilize violence in Nigeria. According to him, "the aggressive nature of this episode [jihad] undermines its claims for universal appeal" (Ojo 1-8), this perceptibly disconnects faith from spirituality. By and large, the jihad did not only seek to purify the existing 'peaceful' Islam from all forms of traditional and syncretistic beliefs and rituals and restore Muslims to orthodox and undiluted faith, which was the religious conception of the jihad, but also brought a political revolution, which overthrew the Hausa dynasties by the immigrating Fulani; an act that has continued to spread suspicion and hate, because of the domination of the aborigines and their religion and culture (Umejesi, "Rule of Law as a Panacea to Religious Crises in Nigeria" 94-5).

Be that as it may, what Abubakar's argument demonstrates is simple: Boko Haram is not truly fighting against western education, at least from the perspective of true Islam. If he has held on to this position, it means that the sect has no authority to declare jihad of the sword due to the intricate role of the *ulema* in *sharia* interpretation. The Sultan does not only spiritual authority, he also assumes the role of a jurist as the final arbiter of *sharia* 'statute', regardless of the plethoric schools of thought (Badaiki 17-8). As far as this is true, Boko Haram must be perceived as an Islamist sect or political Islam. This conclusion is incisive because though Islamists seem to rely on *sharia* as the only authentic law, which should apply to all facets of life, and radically reject western ideologies and institutions, particular education and its benefits, they "know more about new sciences and technology than their religion" (Mvumbi 121). In fact, when Bin Laden was accused of AQ trying to obtain chemical and nuclear weapons, he emphatically responded thus:

> Acquiring weapons for the defence of Muslims is a religious duty. If I have indeed acquired these weapons, then I thank God for enabling me to do so. And if I seek to

> acquire these weapons, I am carrying out a duty. It would be a sin for Muslims not to try to possess the weapons that would prevent the infidels from inflicting harm on Muslims. (Alanamu, Muhammed, Adeoye 426)

As Daniel Pipes sums up: "[f]undamentalist Islam is a radical utopian movement closer in spirit to other such movements (communism, fascism) than traditional religion. By nature anti-democratic and aggressive, anti-Semitic and anti-western, it has great plans" (Ogunbanjo 110). But John Esposito's perspective insight is pertinent in order to determine how best to respond. He avers:

> The challenge today is to appreciate the diversity of Islam actors and movements to ascertain the reasons behind confrontations and conflicts, and thus to react to specific events and situations with informed, reasoned responses rather than pre-determined presumptions and reactions. (Esposito 169)

This challenge will be viewed within Nigerian pluralist, democratic space.

Boko Haram and Democratic Vision

It should be recognized that *sharia* is fundamental to Islam. But it appears that it is used as a smokescreen for ends other than true religion. The compatibility of *sharia* in a pluralist, democratic society is problematic regardless of the fact that the Constitution recognizes the *sharia* court up to the appellate level. While conceptually it may be defended within a unitary Islamic worldview, recent empirical events indicate that such defense does not absolve it from caustic criticisms. This means the fear is real. The cases of Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Yemen, Syria, among others, quickly point to the fact that *sharia* could be difficult to fully implement in contemporary society. These examples have not clearly demonstrated the political or moral rectitude that *sharia* envisions. Rather, these are as bad as, if not worse than countries with liberal democracies in matters of human rights, governance, corruption, poverty, intolerance, discrimination etc.

Perhaps we could be persuaded along with Kofi Annan, who argues that religion and its precepts can be exonerated from the negative consequences that confront the world today. Since "the problem is not with the belief system," it is indisputably "with the believers" (Ukwuegbu 31). This point appears to be behind former President Olusegun Obasanjo's reaction to the introduction of *sharia* in northern Nigeria in 1999 and 2000. For him, it was political rather than real or true

sharia. Even though he was heavily criticized for trying to bifurcate *sharia* into political and religious divides, (*Human Rights in Nigeria: Hopes and Hindrances* 24-7) later events justified his position on it. In spite of the euphoria that greeted its introduction and the seeming successes it achieved, the unceremonious abandonment of *sharia* has been adduced as one of the critical reasons for the rise of Boko Haram. Boko Haram members, as well as ordinary Muslims, have come to discover that "the apostles of *sharia* have been caught in the same web of corruption like their other contemporaries" (Kukah, "Boko Haram: Some Reflections on Causes and Effects" 17). The sect has foreign links and sponsorship, e.g. Al-Qaeda in Pakistan.

How does *sharia* fit into democratic vision? This question is complex. However, Jonathan Fox and Shmuel Sandler observe that "about half of all Muslims live in democratic and semi-democratic states" (Oh 56). As such what needs to be investigated is how they have been able to negotiate their faith in the context of democracy. In doing so, it is crucial to understand that there are varying degrees of *sharia* such that what obtains in Jordan and Qatar differs from what operates in Saudi Arabia and Yemen. In democratic and pluralist Nigeria, Abdullahi An-Na'im has argued consistently that full implementation of *sharia* is an invitation to civil war because non-Muslims would be regarded as second class citizens and the case of traditionalists would be worse than the Christians. However, he emphasizes that democracy does not obstruct Muslims' fidelity to *sharia* as a personal law. (An-An'im)

The disagreement between "Muslim militants" and Muslim democrats" borders on whether or not *sharia* should be a private law under democracy. This incongruity on the real kind of political structure to establish raises three fundamental issues: (1) "the identity of the political system (2) the inclusiveness of citizens' participation in the system, and (3) the scope of rights enjoyed by the citizens." The fact is that pre-modern Islamic law has not remained the same in modern nation-states, even in strictly Islamic states. The "modern setting" though has multivalent interpretations, offers ample opportunities to negotiate, "there is . . . a long narrative . . . in which Muslims try to negotiate between models involving a complete separation of religion and a complete conflation or convergence of these two dimensions of life," and apart from Prophet Muhammad's Medina Order that operated theocracy, such convergence "is an unrepeatable event" (Kelsay 180-1).

In Nigeria, the structure has not obviated Islam nor does it hinder Muslims from the practice of their faith. Rather it is the case that they are more favored constitutionally than non-Muslims in matters of religion, and even judiciary. As a result, the Muslim militants (Boko Haram) and

the Muslim democrats have a contest; "the contest has to do with the ability of participants to articulate a fit between past and present, and persuade others that this connection serves to enable the Muslim community to fulfill its mission of calling people to God" (Ilesanmi 34) rather than engaging in a titanic battle against God's people created to live in a free pluralist society.

Conclusion

Is the Boko Haram sect Muslim? It is argued by some that it only claims to be Islamic, but in the true sense does not represent Muslims. Boko Haram on the other hand maintains that Muslims who have identified with western ideologies are apostates, therefore, not Muslims because they have abandoned *sharia*. Interestingly, these positions are at once existential and intellectual; they involve reasoning, and a hermeneutical method with its self-referential rules, which define pluralist, democratic society.

The instrument to sustain such intellectual engagement from degenerating into physical terrorist violence is education, the acquisition and application of knowledge. After all, the prophet of Islam enjoined Muslims to seek knowledge, even as far as China, a faraway place then considered *terra incognita* (unknown land) (1 Awoniyi 20). Kolawole Olu-Owolabi has noted the high price of ignorance as capable of destroying human development and society, and insists that knowledge is the sine qua non to end conflicts (Olu-Owolabi). Haroun Adamu, in fact, complained and blamed the British for their refusal to enforce western education in northern Nigeria. However, he acknowledged the selfishness of the leaders when he said that "the "backwardness" of northern Nigeria is due to the reluctance of emirs to introduce English from the beginning of colonial rule" (Osasona 193). The argument was that Islamic education was the best, and therefore sufficient for the administration of the conquered Hausa dynasties without foresight. This is the thought of the Muslim militants, whereas the Muslim democrats, who nevertheless are insignificant in number, understand that western education is a sure way to development and growth. Therefore, the continuous denial of western education to the region will effectively send it further 'back to a state of retrogression and perpetual backwardness.'

With particular reference to Boko Haram, which seems to be averse to western education, we make bold to say that the sure way to curb it and others of such inclination is education. There must be massive investment in formal education to replace the *Almajiri* schools which

enroll about seven million children, a veritable reservoir for recruiting into fundamentalist sects. This large number of unschooled children is easily deceived into believing that what the sect leaders are saying is true regardless of the fact that they are rarely educated in their own right. "A way of dealing with the phenomenon of terrorism is to get the community from which these agents stem and learn to minimize the receptivity of people to recruiting organizations" through education (Ukpokolo). Such education should entail citizenship, liberal, civic and accommodative studies, and interfaith networking. This is urgent and incumbent on government and all well meaning groups and individuals. This is urgent because of the global nature of Islamism. Various countries are devising ways to arrest the situation according to their contexts.

Finally, the dividends of democracy must be seen to be deployed irrespective of political office-holders' religious affiliation. Government must re-invent itself because its failure at all levels has been an excuse for the inveterate terrorist convolutions. Where justice is lacking, an unjust means can attempt to right the wrong in an unjust way, which generally receives applause and approval from the deprived. Democratic justice will be a sure way to navigate out of the precarious situation instead of a "fire for fire" approach. As the leaders are true to the principles of democracy, so will the citizens be, irrespective of their religious leaning.

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THEOLOGY, HERMENEUTICS AND PHILOSOPHICAL POETICS

ABSTRACT: The article deals with Heidegger's attitudes towards theology. Heidegger, stating that existential philosophy and theology are incompatible, advances a thesis of not objectivating poetic thinking. Whereas, Ricœur's biblical hermeneutics is based on his theory of metaphor. The lingual act here means the destruction of the old outlook for the sake of the new one. In this dramatic way cognition occurs as a meeting. The poetic thinking of the late Heidegger is also based on a meeting that covers both horizontal coexistence and vertical direction. The author raises the question whether the poetic thinking of the late Heidegger is not theological?

KEY WORDS: theology, existential philosophy, hermeneutics, and poetic thinking

Preface

Theology is inseparable from exegesis of the Holy Writ. The New Testament itself, especially the Gospel of St. John, which is open to the Neo-Platonist tradition, identifies *logos* [word] with God. In this sense, the Holy Writ as God's word is accessible only by explaining it in a proper way. The proper explanation of the Holy Writ is the aim of theology, starting with Origen and Augustine. However, understanding is inseparable from the intellectual environment of the time and from the outlook that has formed within a particular society. This is how Bultman's and Tillich's existential theologies, influenced by Heidegger's concept of being there (*Dasein*) and being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*), appear in the twentieth century. Theology, as the hermeneutics of the Word, corresponds to the late Heidegger's concept of the lingual existence.

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However, Heidegger himself is inclined to separate phenomenology from theology as well as lingual *Dasein* from belief.

Similarly, philosophical poetics is lingual *par excellence*. Metaphor ruins the old world and opens the new one by emerging as *a seeing as* (Davidson), i.e. by reflecting a certain outlook. It seems that the Word appealing to Jesus Christ, similarly ruins the old and opens the new order. Where do philosophical poetics and hermeneutical theology intersect? According to Heidegger, if theology is just a conceptual basis of the Christian event, and if theological philosophy and phenomenological theology cannot exist, how can philosophical poetics be compared with theology, even if the latter is hermeneutical? Philosophical poetics could be developed by following the hermeneutics of Gadamer and the theory of metaphor of Ricœur. The first one is based on Heidegger's concept of worldly being and being-with (*Mitsein*). The second one is critical towards categorical thinking. Thus, two different questions arise: 1) can we explain the comparisons of the New Testament in a metaphorical way? 2) is it possible to separate a belief as *a seeing as* from a lingual point of view? They lead to a more general question: 3) can theology be existential, i.e. is its Christian content (positive, according to Heidegger) compatible with the worldly *Dasein*? I will develop these questions by searching for the interconnection between philosophical poetics and hermeneutical theology. In other words, theology will be taken into consideration as far as it is accessible to philosophical poetics as an openness to other (Ricœur, Gadamer), as a creative direction (Ricœur), and as a tragic meeting (Gadamer). Also, I will try to enrich philosophical poetics with some new features. Therefore, after an analysis of Heidegger's theological attitudes (chapter *Existential Philosophy and Theology*) I shall try not so much to analyse the thinking of Heidegger as to enrich philosophical poetics (chapter *Poetic Theology*).

Existential Philosophy and Theology

While analysing the relation[1] between phenomenology and theology Heidegger notices that theology as a positive science differs from philosophy in all respects. What is a positive science and why is theology positive? Is being positive a scientific condition? If yes, does that mean

[1] My analysis is based on Heidegger's lecture *Phenomenology and Theology (Phänomenologie und Theologie)*, which appeared in 1927 and was supplemented in 1965. I shall not pay attention to the early lectures on religious philosophy: *Einleitung in die Phänomenologie der Religion* (1920/21), *Augustinus und der Neoplatonismus* (1921), *Die philosophische Grundlagen der mittelalterlichen Mystik* (1918/19).

that theology is more scientific than philosophy? Is the difference between philosophy and theology based on the different scientific level?

According to Heidegger, theology is related to the history of Christianity, it "belongs to this history of Christianity, it is upheld by it, and it forms it once again" (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 51). The relation between theology and Christianity is mutual, they influence each other, and both develop on the basis of one another. However, the history of Christianity as a part of the humanities (*Geisteswissenschaft*) oversteps the boundaries of the conceptual science by influencing the culture (religious art) in a narrow sense as well as in a broad sense (religious outlook). Analysing the religious metaphor (chapter *Poetic Theology*) I will try to develop it considering the negative aspects of culture: does the religious metaphor reflect the religious structure of the culture? If yes, does it avoid the negative cultural relations?

Heidegger agrees that theology belongs not only to Christianity, as a historical phenomenon, but is related to the common culture (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 52). However, he does not develop Christian cultural studies any further. He is interested in theology as far as it is nourished by and nourishes Christianity, as the primary historical event, in a conceptual way. Theology as such is a positive discipline. Its positive (being in front–*vorliegende*) content is Christianity. The relation of philosophy and Christianity is different: Christianity is not the only content or basis of philosophy, and also philosophy does not nourish Christianity. What nourishes Christianity? Heidegger answers: belief.[2] What is belief? Is it *a seeing as*, i.e. a certain outlook influencing and being influenced by a life art? Heidegger claims this: "belief is a mode of human *Dasein*" (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 52). However, belief is not temporal, not based on *Dasein*. It is manifested by the matter of faith–by Christ, the crucified God. Thus, even if it is *a seeing as* or "the mode of existence," according to Heidegger, it is not nourished by temporal *Dasein* and does not spread out freely (*ausfreienStücken*). Belief, conversely to thinking, is based on witnessing the Christian event dedicated to its participants–to the believers, the participants of the revelation. One has to believe in order to take part in the event of Christianity. Belief allows this event to occur again and again. This characterises the existential sense of belief: belief is a revival (*Wiedergeburt*). In this way belief as a mode of existence involves its participants in coexistence for the revival via a historical dimension (Christian event). In other words, it is a historical existence of the revival for the revelation. This belief is the content of theology. It has been

[2] *"Christlich nennen wir den Glauben"* (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 52).

thought about and discussed by theology. Does this "positiveness" of theology mean it is scientific in character? What are the criteria of being scientific? Does a different degree of being scientific distinguish theology from philosophy?

On the contrary, after emphasising the fact that theology and philosophy are incompatible, Heidegger claims that they can be compared only as sciences. Does that mean that those two disciplines are conceptual ones? By questioning the limits of the scientific character of theology Heidegger raises another question: How far can the very specific requirements of belief based on conceptual penetration (*Durchsichtigkeit*) reach or can reach and still remain part of the belief (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 60)? Here the German philosopher is interested not only in the scientific criteria for conceptual rigour. However, the conceptuality of theology arises out of itself. As such it is a conceptual self-interpretation of existence in belief (*begriffliche-Selbstinterpretation der gläubigenExistenz*) (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 56) and a closed whole of the basic concepts. Does the scientific character imply an explanation of the concepts by the concepts, i.e. thinking in a circle? Heidegger's criticism towards science is based not only on this irony. It is directed to theology as well as to philosophy and the natural sciences.

Heidegger verifies the scientific character of theology not according to its degree of conceptuality. Despite being the science of God (*WissenschaftvomGott*) theology is not a speculative cognition of God (*Gotteserkenntnis*). Also, it is not a discipline of the relationship of God and man or a discipline of the religious experience. As science theology is directed to an entity (*Seiende*) according to requirements of its basic concepts. So, theology as philosophy can be described as an ontic explanation based on ontology. Therefore for Heidegger scientific character is inseparable from ontological relations, from direction to an existential dimension. In this sense, viewing of natural science and technology, attempting to objectivise language and thinking, is not only dangerous because of creating an illusion that it is possible. It creates an aggressive simulacrum culture directed against the very human. I will not analyse here to what extent this aspiration to objectivise is a closed self-interpretation based on belief. Moreover, in Heidegger's context, this viewing is not scientific because it does not have an ontological dimension. Theology, in contrast to natural science, has this dimension. All that is comparable between theology and philosophy is their relation to *Dasein*, to the human temporal being. What is the existential dimension of theology and why is it difficult to reconcile with the philosophical *Dasein*? As mentioned, the basic concepts of theology

appeal to belief and the event of revival. According to Heidegger, pre-Christian existence is overcome by belief, even if it is done in an existential ontic way (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 63). What does it mean to "overcome existence?" How is it possible to overcome existence in an existential way?

I will come back to these questions after looking at the absolute metaphors of Blumenberg. While questioning to what extent metaphors are legitimate in the philosophical language, Blumenberg claims that they are possible reminders "in the way from *mytosto logos*" (*ParadigmenzueinerMetaphorologie* 10). However, he notices that they lead to rethinking of the relation between fiction[3] and thought (*logos*): the absolute metaphors act as a catalyst of thought by nourishing the conceptual sphere. This "basic component" (*fundierende Bestandteil*) becomes a model of reflection and a key principle of ideas. Finally, they enable one to reach God's cognition, which can only be symbolic. Such absolute metaphors as "a naked (*nackte*) truth," "a light," "the book of nature," "a cosmic mechanism" feed "the questions, which are unanswerable in principle and which are important just for they are irremovable: we do not raise these questions but we pre-find (*vorfinden*) them raised as the base of *Dasein*" (*ParadigmenzueinerMetaphorologie* 23). In other words, these are the world-viewing components, which influence the human attitudes, aspirations, actions, interests during a certain epoch. They structure the human world covering a question that is inaccessible for theoretical discourse: "what is the world"? By filling the lacunae of theoretical discourse, absolute metaphors reflect the human way of thinking in a certain epoch and herewith they weave a cultural dress of the epoch.

Back to the Heidegger's basic theological concepts. To overcome, according to Heidegger, is not to push away but to cover anew (*in neue Verfügungnehmen*). The basic concepts of theology overcome the pre-Christian existence by "raising it in an ontic way", by preserving the dimensions of pre-believing (*vorgläubige*) and not believing (*ungläubige*) as the self-understanding of human *Dasein*. As *Dasein* is inseparable from being-with (*Mitsein*) and being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*), the concepts of theology, covering all these dimensions, correspond to the Blumenberg's absolute metaphors. The concept of resurrection (according to Heidegger, revival–*Wiedergeburt*) as well as the concept of guilt by involving the believers into a new coexistence of belief "is the primary ontological and *existentiell* defining of *Dasein*

[3] For more about the relationship between fiction, reality and thought see (*Tikrovėirkūryba*).

(*Existenzbestimmung*)" (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 64). The basic concepts of theology nourish the existential questions. Therefore Heidegger claims that theology is not "a speculative knowing of God." Also, it is not "a science of God and man in general" because the relations of *Dasein*are not to be objectivated. These are the relations of humans in the world and their coexistence with others. That is why it is neither "a discipline of religious experiences" which includes only the relationship between God and a man (woman). Theology based on its basic concepts has been developed as the history of the human existence in the world. As the temporal coexistence it nourishes the cultural process. In this way the basic concept of "sin," even if it is valid only in the community of believers, binds it with relations of worldly coexistence by constituting the certain cultural relations, by becoming, according to Blumenberg, a fig-leaf–the first cultural document, with the help of which it is possible not only to hide but to dress as well. Blumenberg ironically notes that, from time to time, truth uses culture as a dress for changing. Similarly, Gadamer while defining the main law of the theory of understanding–the horizon of hermeneutics–uses an example of dressing. He claims that dressing has been used to hinder recognition of the actor.

Who dressed like a Spanish officer of the sixteenth century and, moving around on a raft on his way to the mythical El Dorado, said: "I am the wrath of God"?[4] Was it the actor Klaus Kinski? If yes, what is all this masquerade for? What is this hide-and-seek of truth in art for? According to Gadamer, recognition momentarily occurs in a work of art, however, there is also the non recognition of an actor under the clothing of some hero. It is not the recognition of truth in the masquerade of culture. In this sense, the title of the work *Truth and Method* is very ironic, too. The spectator recognises something that has already quasi happened to him. However, at the same time he forgets himself. A spectator perceives this film of Herzog's as a story of getting lonely while the raft is floating to nowhere on the river of an unknown land, the storm of spears is thinning the ranks of his fellow-travellers and the music of an Indian's whistle is getting weaker. All this becomes a vision of a flying ship together with the sallies of anger, madness and genius. It does not mean that the actor Klaus Kinski is recognised here. If this recognition happened, a spectator would leave the cinema immediately. Conversely, the spectator has been drawn into the film more and more, he quasi forgets himself, and at the same time he recognises his own story of becoming lonely, and assumes the clothing offered by the film's author.

[4] From Herzog's film *Aguirre, the Wrath of God*.

This is the way in which the meeting between the spectator (or the reader) and the author occurs, presupposing the understanding of an art work. Therefore Gadamer states that hermeneutics is a matter of meeting always open to other interpretations. This coexistence in the world enables the fusion of horizons and understanding in general. Gadamer means not only the fact that the theory of understanding has been developed on the basis of the perception of the art work but also that truth is to be accessed only as the creative robe of an art work. There is no direct way–a tunnel of light–to the truth. Herewith temporal existence with Other and for Other enables the consideration of the cultural robe as a condition of understanding instead of an obstacle in the way of truth's knowledge.

Back to Heidegger. Similarly, the basic concepts of theology, as far as they cover the ontological dimension and express *Dasein*, reflect the human temporal coexistence in the world. For Heidegger ontology is not an anatomy of pure existence, not a straight way to its "scientific" truth. Ontology as such should be an objectivating science, a direction. Meanwhile, ontology for Heidegger is a correction. What and how does it correct? Heidegger develops being as coexistence of *Dasein* in the world. This is his long way of ontology, which considers ontology not as direction, i.e. not as a straight and objective (in a double sense: directed towards an object and objectivating) direction but as correction that is based on an existential conception and enables human culture. According to Ricœur, metaphor, as a conscious categorical error, by distancing one from an object, brings together its author with the reader and opens the way to a new understanding of both the piece of art and of oneself (Ricœur, *La métaphore vive* 1975). Metaphors (not only absolute ones), as basic concepts of theology, reflect human perspectives, way of thinking, and mode of life.

Theology, as it seeks to be the thinking of God or a science of the relation between God and man, is being corrected by its own basic ontological concepts. It is not possible to eliminate the existential content in these concepts by not eliminating them. Therefore Heidegger claims that theology as well as philosophy is "not objectivating thinking and speaking" (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 69). However, theology is like this because of the existential content of the basic concepts. In this way, when ontology corrects theology, philosophy closes with theology. But theology is distanced from philosophy as far as the former needs the correction. They are separated by the *existentiell* contradiction between believing (*Gläubigkeit*) and a free taking (*Selbstübernahme*) of *Dasein* (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 66). Although the existential region nourishes both the basic concepts of

theology and the conception of *Dasein*, it has been developed freely in philosophy, while in theology–by the directing of belief. This allows for Heidegger to state elsewhere that "philosophy decides neither for nor against the divine *Dasein*" (*Phänomenologie und Theologie* 36). Theology remains a closed exploration of sanctity if it is not lightened in the clearing of human *Dasein.* On the contrary, philosophy spreads freely as an openness of *Dasein* to another human being in the world. Theology seeks to go on the straightest way of the exploration of God. However, all that forces it to make a detour, that hinders the pure relation between God and a man (woman), that hinders theology's becoming an objective (positive) discipline, is worldly (*existentiell*) content of the theological basic concepts. This content, actually, closes theology with philosophy.

Sartre understands the presuppositions of the existential philosophy similarly: a man (woman) enters the world first of all and only then solves questions, including theological ones. According to Sartre, existentialism treats man (woman) as a free entity whose choices constantly constitute himself (herself). Here lay both his (her) creative power (to create morality) and immense responsibility. Sartre claims that existential philosophy is atheistic not because it denies the existence of God. In doing so, it would have become, in Heidegger's words, a positive (objectivating) science. In this sense it would be similar to theology. Existentialism supposes: "if God existed, nothing would change" (*L'existentialisme est un humanisme* 95). In other words, a man (woman) would still constitute himself (herself) with the help of worldly coexistence (Heidegger) and of free choice (Sartre). It is human misery while he (she) is not lord of his (her) being, herewith it is his (her) richness while he (she) leads his (her) *Dasein*.

If theology and existential philosophy can hardly be harmonized, if the former is a closed interpretation of its concepts and the latter is an open direction into the world and other human *Dasein*, if the former is concerned with its purely positive content and the latter adopts a non-objectivating attitude, if the former is based on belief, while the latter–on choice, if the former is a straight-lined attempt to understand God while the latter is a cultural detour, if all that unites them are undesirable relics of the former, is existential theology then possible? What is the relationship between the existential theology and hermeneutic theology as the existential interpretation of God's word?

I will return to this question after a close look at Heidegger's poetic objectives proposed in the supplement to his article *Phenomenology and Theology*, which was added after 37 years. In his criticism of the scientific and technological way of thinking, Heidegger notes that not all forms of thinking may be treated as objectivating. The purple of a rose in the

garden and the sway of roses in the wind are neither thought of, nor pronounced in, objectivating way. Although the statue of Apollo in a museum may be an object of natural-scientific viewing, this thinking and speaking do not see in the way it emerges and appears in its beauty as God's vision (*Anblick*) (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 74). The chemical examination of the statue marble would be similar to the recognizing of actors in the film *Aguirre: Wrath of God.* A spectator, however, recognizes not the dressed actor Klaus Kinski, but his own state embodied by the actor. In this way he (she) meets coexistence (Heidegger) of the film's authors by merging his (her) open worldview with their hermeneutical horizon (Gadamer). In this sense an art piece is a directed showing of that which appears for a spectator as his (her) ownership. Thinking, according to Heidegger, is a stay next to that which appears and herewith conformity (*Entsprechen*) with that, which shows itself (*sichzeigt*) (Heidegger, *Phänomenologie und Theologie* 75). He adds here that poetry is not available for objectivating speaking. Now let us ask what is the meaning of 'God's vision' that presupposes the appearance of the truth of an art work? It is metaphor without any doubt. But why was a theological metaphor given here? Is literature about the relationship between theology and existential philosophy an appropriate context to discuss philosophical poetics?

Poetic Theology

The examples of the purple of a rose in the garden and the statue of Apollo, as well the metaphor of 'God's sight', indicate the pattern of the late Heidegger's thinking. The question arises here whether theological aspects lay in the thinking of the late Heidegger. This leads to another question–what is the relationship between existential philosophy and hermeneutical theology? Being unable to cover all the works of the late Heidegger, I shall appeal here to his two works: *Erläuterungenzu Hölderlins Dichtung* and *Zur Erörterung der Gelassenheit*. Herewith, I shall deal with two texts by Ricœur's devoted to biblical hermeneutics (*Stellung und Funktion der Metapher*; *Philosophische und theologische Hermeneutik*), in which the author further develops his theory of metaphor proposed in *La métaphore vive*.

In his project of hermeneutical theology, Ricœur interprets the simile as a narrative metaphor. As a kind of interpretation of the New Testament, theology deals with such poetical forms of narrative as metaphor and simile. Elsewhere he mentions "theology of word" as inseparable from "event of a word". To interpret in the light of belief

means to "unfold in front of the text the way of being-in-the-world (*In-der-Welt-Sein*)" (Ricœur, *Philosophische und theologische Hermeneutik* 32). In which ways does the interpreted Biblical metaphor 1) transfer us beyond the text into human being in the world, 2) how does it support or even constitute belief in the supernatural being? The first question I analysed in other contexts (Kačerauskas, *Tikrovėirkūryba*), while the second was raised in a different form by Heidegger. For him, belief, as a positive content of theology, is not allowed to unfold freely for *Dasein* that tends towards "self-expression" (*Sichsagenlassen*). This idea, which was expressed in the supplement to his article *Phenomenology and Theology*, may be perceived as a project of his late philosophy. Are the ideas expressed in the end of his lecture, concerning the difference of existential philosophy and theology, a further search for D*asein's* development, in other words, an auxiliary theme? Or, on the contrary, is the poetical development of *Dasein* by interpreting poetical language, for him, a project of reconciling theology and existential philosophy?

Elsewhere (Kačerauskas, *Filosofinėpoetika*) I analysed Ricœur's theory of metaphor. He raises the extra-linguistic aspects of this poetic trope-visual (iconic), ethical and ontological. In the theological context, by understanding the Christian metaphors, these aspects require a new reasoning because in addition to human *Dasein's* horizon, there appears a vertical strand of belief. According to Ricœur, we have a case of 'conflict of interpretations': where should one direct the metaphors of the New Testament–to the horizon of human temporal coexistence or to the vertical of the relationship with God? How does Ricœur solve this problem?

Ricœur sharpens the problem even more by treating The Bible as a text. As a text it is 1) a closed compositional whole that 2) is encoded to a certain genre and composition, 3) being original and having its own style. In other words, a text is a closed original world, which ignores and contradicts not only reality, but also its author. If the Word is a closed text, neither a horizontal, nor a vertical direction of understanding it is possible. In the first case, it would contradict the human world, in the second–its Divine author. In which way could the closed nature of the text be overcome? How could both the human world and 'God's Kingdom' be constituted by the same text?

Ricœur applies the theory of metaphor as extravagancy of narration. Metaphor and narration belong to different levels: if the first is a structure of words, the second is a structure of sentences; if the first is not temporal, the second is temporal; if the first is a poetic figure, the second is a prosaic one. How does Ricœur cover both of them with one theory? Metaphor as a tension between usual and new attitudes towards reality

emerges as a linguistic event for him. Although it occurs in a moment, being similar to Gadamer's recognition, it is a dramatic process. Metaphor, as a strategy of absurdity, works by destroying the primary reference of the text. However, on these ruins (on a different level) the self-understanding of a reader develops as a new attitude towards the world. That is why it is an event stimulated by recognition. It is a dramatic (tense) process: only after the collapse of the old worldview does a new one form. The inner change of a hero is influenced by tragedy as the sudden crash (in a moment) of unexpected events. Here the understanding is tragic as well, since it requires self-destruction: "I, the reader, find myself through losing the self" (*Philosophische und theologische Hermeneutik* 33). This is, however, a generous self-losing. It allows the reader to constitute him/herself, while reading the text. The poetic language and the use of metaphor creates a dramatic moment for a reader.

Now let us consider how the late Heidegger reads a poetic text. While interpreting Hölderlin, he notices: "where there is language, there is the world" (Heidegger, *Erläuterungzu Hölderlins Dichtung* 38). Language is for him also an event, which exceeds most human opportunities. Thinking occurs via language for him. Elsewhere Heidegger speaks about human essence as acquiescence (*Gelassenheit*) for meeting while he connects it with the truth. Here, differently than in *Phenomenology and theology* and *Being and time*, we deal with poetical thinking inseparable from ontological aspirations. By interpreting Hölderlin Heidegger uses another metaphor, "collection (*Mitt*) of destiny." Therefore poetical thinking defined by metaphors is open, end-less, as opposed to technological (positive) thinking. As such it is hard to define. Heidegger maintains that remaining has no name. For Heidegger God appears as being hidden. Similarly, poetical word "allows the appearance of the connection between God and Man" (Heidegger, *Erläuterungzu Hölderlins Dichtung* 69). In this way poetical thinking appears to us as "the horizon of transcendence." "Meeting covers us and appears for us as the horizon" (Heidegger, *ZurErörterung der Gelassenheit* 55). Poetical reasoning of *Dasein* provides both the connection with God and the closeness of things. That is why the human essence for the late Heidegger is meeting.

The late Heidegger, in contrast to Ricœur, does not offer a theory of metaphor. He interprets poetic texts and the question of human *Dasein*. Poetic thinking for Ricœur; 1) opens generously human *Dasein* via 2) a linguistic event that 3) occurs while meeting with the Other. As we have seen, the metaphor for Ricœur is a dramatic event of meeting which opens for its interpreter a new world-view, i.e. a new being in the world.

Heidegger's detour is not theology, however poetical thinking means meeting that 1) opens a vertical dimension of *Dasein* and herewith 2) focuses on "God and man's connection." Is Heidegger's philosophical poetics theological?

Conclusions

According to Heidegger, philosophy and theology are incompatible. Philosophy is directed to free the development of human coexistence in the world while theology is based on belief and must obey this "positive" direction. Theology is connected with philosophy by the existential dimension of its basic concepts. In this way ontology corrects the positive content of theology. Herewith it shows Heidegger's aim to develop ontology, while ontology is to be understood not as direction, i.e. a straight way of the exploration of being. This aim is confirmed by the supplement to the article *Phenomenology and Philosophy*, where he gives the examples of the purple of a rose in the garden and of a statue of Apollo, as well the metaphor of 'God's sight'. All this has been contrasted with "objectivating" natural sciences and positive theology. For Ricœur, metaphor emerges also as an event. It is the tension between the usual and new attitudes towards reality, the destruction of the text's primary reference. However, on these ruins the reader's self-understanding as a new viewing of the world takes place. Such dramatic self-destruction leads to new self-constitution. The same process takes place with metaphors of "God's sight." For the late Heidegger poetic metaphorical thinking contrary to the technological (positive) one is endless. The interpretation of poetic texts as a detour closes the question of human *Dasein*. For him, poetic thinking means a linguistic event, the meeting of the Other. This event opens a vertical dimension of *Dasein* and focuses on the connection of God and Man.

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THE DISSOLUTION OF THE MONASTERIES AND ITS IMPACT ON EDUCATION IN TUDOR TIMES

ABSTRACT: In 1536 the English Parliament under pressure from Henry VIII and the Lord Chancellor, Thomas Cromwell, gave its consent for the dissolution of the lesser monasteries and abbeys in the king's realm, and three years later with the sanction of MPs some of the greater religious houses also suffered the same fate. The principal aim of this paper is to assess the importance of this political decision with a view to examining the progress being made in the field of education in England in the middle of the sixteenth century resultant upon this dissolution. The evaluation of the merits and demerits originating from the suppression of the English monasteries is made in terms of both primary and academic education. The answers to these key questions are preceded by a short analysis of the reputation monasteries and abbeys had acquired by that time. Also on a selective basis, some opinions have been presented here to provide an overall picture of the standing of the monks and nuns and their concomitant activities, as perceived through the eyes of English society; the eminent scholars and humanists in particular. Subsequently, before assessing the consequences resulting from the dissolution of the religious houses in England, some consideration is given to the reasoning and rationale which lay behind both Henry VIII and his Lord Chancellor's political decisions.

KEY WORDS: the reign of Henry VIII, Thomas Cromwell, the dissolution of the monasteries, Tudor education

By the beginning of the sixteenth century most English monasteries had become exceptionally wealthy due to their location along a number of wool trading routes. The monks had been able to amass huge fortunes thanks to their devotion to business activities i.e. the wool trade and the acquisition of large parcels of land and chattels. By becoming increasingly prosperous with the additional possession of vast lands, the monks

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thrust their way to the for-front of public affairs in the kingdom. Ownership turned out to have been a ticket for thirty senior abbots to take up seats in the House of Lords. The heads of the monasteries, engaged in forging their careers and occupying themselves with accumulating greater wealth, paid little, if no, attention to the spiritual development of either themselves or the monks, who they were supposed to look after and serve as an example. Instead, they would have preferred to lead the life of a lord, hunting and dining lavishly away from their monasteries (*Henry VIII and the English Monasteries*, passim). Besides, at the beginning of the sixteenth century the monasteries and abbeys were no longer monopolists of educational and cultural centres, where future generations were taught and manuscripts produced. Although the monks still performed their original functions of providing hospitality to travellers and charity for the poor, these activities were not sufficient to redeem them in the eyes of English society when set against their grandiose lifestyle, coupled with corruption and debauchery. The monks' evils were commonly known to the public therefore at the beginning of the sixteenth century the English bishops decided on conducting visits to several monasteries in the hope that some disreputable practices could be rooted out. As one would expect, the visits proved that there was much immorality within the walls of English monasteries, but brought no tangible change or improvement in the matters under discussion.

In the 1520s the monks' lifestyle was so scandalous that it was arousing nationwide indignation. Leading humanists both from the continental mainland and England began to write on monasticism with contempt. For instance Erasmus, who strongly supported Church unity and peace there-in, was sarcastic about monasteries and abbeys and publicly scourged monastic vice, hypocrisy and immorality. According to him, monasticism could only be associated with obscurantism, false faith and materialism (Lecler 149). The English monasteries came in for severe criticism in both his private correspondence with other European humanists and also in his published works such as *Colloquia.* However, it is *The Praise of Folly* which is considered to have been Erasmus' most scathing denunciation of monastic scandalous practices. On almost every other page the author blackens reputations and taunts the monks about "observing with punctilious scrupulosity a lot of silly ceremonies and paltry traditional rules" (Trevelyan 117). Erasmus used his literary talents not only to ridicule the monks' lifestyle, but also to gibe at their intellectual capabilities (Desiderius 111).

Also, some English scholars were no longer able to tolerate the monks' abuses and follies, and eagerly set to writing tracts similar in

tone to those written by Erasmus. For instance, Simon Fish, a popular pamphleteer, composed his work entitled *Supplication for the Beggers*, in which he suggested that friars' houses should be closed down. *Supplication for the Beggers* was produced in the form of a letter addressed to the monarch, where between the lines the author wrote:

> In the times of your noble predecessors past, craftily crept into this your realm [...] of strong, puisant and counterfeit, holy and idle beggars and vagabonds [...] the Bishops, Abbots, Priors, Deacons, Archdeacons, Suffragans, Priests, Monks, Canons, Friars, Pardoners, Sommoners. . . . The goodliest lordships, manors, lands, and territories, are theirs. (Trevelyan 117)

Thomas Starkey in his work *Dialogue of Pole and Lupset* wrote on the aggravation of population decline through deliberate celibacy, comparing clergymen withdrawn from society with sailors afraid to leave the port in case of storms (passim). This, like many other opinions expressed in numerous humanistic works of the decade, was highly critical of the monastic lifestyle. These orthodox humanists, who on one hand were holding sincere religious beliefs, on the other hand objected to the monks' upholding scholastic philosophy and forbidding the studies of the Testament. To the same extent, Erasmus and his English colleagues were appalled by the clergymen's leech-like practices of "sponging off" the poor and ignorant. In their works, therefore, the scholars attempted to suggest explicitly the taking of a new approach to religion, which should be based not on contemplation but on true and profound love of others.

At the beginning of 1535 Thomas Cromwell was authorised by Henry VIII to carry out a series of visits to all churches, monasteries, convents, abbeys and other religious houses throughout the king's realm. The evidence acquired during these inspections pointed to the shocking irregularities and disorder within the church as an institution, in particular monasteries, convents and abbeys. This, however, served the king only as a pretext rather than a real reason when arriving at the decision on the dissolution of the monasteries in England. In fact, Henry VIII was driven by his greed coupled with bankruptcy when confiscating the monastic land and properties.[1] The king's greed certainly played a part in Henry's decision to liquidate the monasteries, but was this also an opportunity to assert his power over Church and combat those who dared to question him being the Head of the Anglican Church.

The parliamentary Act for the Dissolution set the whole machinery in motion and upon completing the enterprise meant that the king had

[1] G. M. Trevelyan argues that if the monarch's financial needs had not been so pressing, he might never have considered dissolving the monasteries at all.

come into possession of vast lands and huge wealth, which the monks and friars had accumulated over the centuries. Everyone had a stake in the dissolution; Henry simply craved money, his Parliament hoped to be able to raise money without being compelled to impose taxes, humanists believed that the wealth should be invested in national education, the nobility saw an opportunity to enlarge their already huge estates, whilst the merchant middle class in return for their loyalty hoped to be granted newly confiscated lands and become gentry themselves.

As the monasteries were indeed rich, there was much to divide in order to satisfy all parties. Most of the revenues and possessions of the houses came directly to the crown, and then were sold to wealthy gentry. A substantial amount of this wealth became a source of cheap materials for local residents. The greatest beneficiary of the Suppression was, however, the new class of gentry to whom the king either granted or sold the lands. The king's generosity was not gratuitous because with this rise in status and wealth the new class became a guarantee for Henry VIII in opposing the restoration of the Pope's authority in the kingdom. Last but not least important beneficiaries were the educational institutions in the king's realm. There, certain but limited success was achieved by those who hoped to divert monastic property to the endowment of learning.

In the 1520s Thomas Wolsey and John Fisher had dissolved some small and dilapidated monasteries in order to use the lands and revenues for the foundation of St John's College in Cambridge and Cardinal College in Oxford (renamed Christ Church College in 1546). In view of all this it was natural to hope that money and property released by the Dissolution of the fifteen thirties would be devoted at least in part, to a number of educational necessities.

One of the consequences resulting from the dissolution of the monasteries in England was the creation of a plan according to which new bishoprics were to be founded on the sites of the old religious houses. The bill was drawn up by the King himself and then was put forward for approval to the Houses of Parliament. This parliamentary Act-which was brought into force immediately-reflected Henry's intention to replace the slothful and ungodly religious houses with new sees and cathedrals:

> wherby Gods worde might the better be setforth, Children brought upp in lerning, Clerkes nourished in the Universyties . . . Reders of Grece, Ebrewe, and Latten to have good stipend. (Shadwell 124)

Several projects for new bishoprics were drafted, including one drawn up by the King, which allowed for thirteen sees in the kingdom. Eventually only six bishoprics came into existence: Bristol, Chester,

Gloucester, Peterborough, Oxford and Westminster. The last-named see was made accountable for finding funds to cover the salaries of six professors employed at both Oxford and Cambridge. In addition, the bishopric of Westminster was obliged to guarantee a scholarship for twenty students studying at either of the two universities and to maintain a grammar school which would remain under its auspices (Shadwell 130-131).

It is noteworthy that whilst making proposals for new bishoprics neither Henry VIII nor his Lord Chancellor put forward any scheme which would guarantee that both the old and newly founded sees would take on the responsibility of devoting some of their revenue to the endowment of education. The lack of precise definition in the legal system according to which bishoprics were to be held accountable for the standards of learning in their dioceses, meant that heads of the old and new sees did not give the development of learning any priority. Consequently, the common practice was that the foundation of schools and their maintenance was dependent on the goodwill of individual bishops and the generosity of private patrons. Thus humanists' endeavours to reform the national education and make the new learning flourish under the reign of Henry VIII were varied in achievements. This is best illustrated by Simon Heynes' example. This man, who by appointment was Dean of Exeter, believed that various educational reforms were needed at his Cathedral and of his own accord, he prepared certain proposals; including for example the foundation of a free grammar school and the establishment of grants for twelve poor students from his region at the two universities. Heynes' strove in vain since his proposals never came to fruition (Searle 201-6).

Similarly, Thomas Cranmer's reformatory attempts ended in failure. He devoted a lot of time and effort in attempting to abolish altogether the posts of prebendaries at Cambridge. In his view, these cathedral priests were no more than sluggish voracious eaters, unable to contribute to the religious and cultural life at Cambridge. Archbishop Cranmer was convinced that instead of employing these useless workers, their prebends would be sufficient to maintain twenty students of theology and forty studying either foreign languages or other humanistic courses (Simon 183-6). Although it was a noble idea, the Lord Chancellor did not share his point of view. Not surprisingly, failure to gain approval of this reform from Thomas Cromwell meant that no further action was taken in this respect.

Archbishop Cranmer could sometimes be successful. Unquestionably, Thomas Cranmer must be credited with the implementation of the 'new learning' at his cathedral school at Cambridge. Thanks to his

efforts, a stipulation was introduced that only those fluent in foreign languages and had qualifications as an able teacher, could apply for a post of headmaster at this school. The first applicant who fulfilled the new requirements and successfully went though the interview was John Twine, a former student of Juan Vives' from Oxford. The archbishop also stipulated that candidates wishing to study at this school had to meet specific requirements before admission viz. they were expected to know by heart Decalogue, pater noster and the creed. The curriculum devised for the school guaranteed that students would be instructed in a variety of courses and modules. For instance, the syllabus of the literature course included the analyses of both ancient and modern works. The long list of compulsory readings ranged from Cicero to Erasmus. Thomas Cranmer's greatest concern, though, was that the cathedral school was open not only to students whose parents could afford to pay the fees, but also to fifty poor ones, who could put in for grants (Nichols 273-5).

Apart from Thomas Cranmer, Hugh Latimer was another bishop prominent in the promotion of elementary humanistic education in his diocese. In October 1538 this bishop of Worcester requested the Lord Chancellor to help him obtain the king's financial support in maintaining the guild school of the town. After the dissolution of the monasteries, the school found itself in a financial crisis and the bishop, despite his own poverty, did his utmost to support it. His perseverance in helping the schoolmaster get through difficult times stemmed from his strong conviction that he "was honest and was bringing up children as best as he could" (Corrie 403). The bishop also believed the Lord Chancellor's mediation with Henry VIII would persuade the monarch to grant the town the lands and property after the suppression of the local monasteries of the Franciscans and Dominicans. This, in turn, would make it possible to maintain the school. The king did grant the town the right to use the properties after the monasteries, but at the same time established his own school in town, which was modelled on Cranmer's cathedral school at Canterbury. Despite the financial problems, the guild school survived and continued its educational work-independently of the king's school-thanks to Hugh Latimer's continuous support (Simon 186).

F. J. Furnivall in his work entitled *Manner and Meals in Olden Time* claims that between the years 1541-1547 fourteen schools were founded. These were either new cathedral schools or new educational centres which were set up on the grounds of the old monastic schools (53-4). Converting monastic property or collegiate churches into new educational institutions was dependent on the initiative of local communities, both clergy and laymen. For instance, as the result of the bishop of Llandaff Robert Holgate's efforts, two secondary schools were founded in the

county of Yorkshire on monastic properties. It is noteworthy that education in these Yorkshire schools was provided free of charge for all the pupils and the emphasis of instruction was put on the teaching of humanistic courses and foreign languages such as Greek, Latin and Hebrew especially. Similarly, John Hales from Coventry was authorised to hand back old monastic lands to the town council and assist the councillors in establishing a new educational institution, which was named after the reigning monarch. Whilst on his own initiative, the Duke of Norfolk set about replacing an old collegiate school with a new one modelled on the school set up earlier in Stroke-by-Clare (Strype, *The Life and Acts of Matthew Parker* 25).

During the period of the suppression of the monasteries not all the monks gave up their residence and work. Some of them endeavoured to use property released by the dissolution to set up schools and continued to teach the youth in their localities. Robert Witgift, prior of Wellow, serves as an example of a friar who preferred his teaching career to entering office within the regular church. After the dissolution he still continued to teach the sons of local country folk in the convent buildings. Other monks, such as Thomas Coventree from Evesham, did not stop research work and continued their studies in the tongues (Simon 181).

The dissolution of the monasteries and abbeys created a unique opportunity to establish new teaching institutions replacing monastic property. The shortage of official regulations, which would control the setting up of new educational endowments, meant that the progress in this field was unsystematic and hinged on the goodwill and dedication of the local representatives of Church and community. A varying degree of participation in these matters can best be illustrated by the example of the bishoprics: the dioceses of Westminster and Worcester maintained forty scholars respectively, Ely and Chester twenty four, Rochester and Peterborough twenty and Durham eighteen (186). These dioceses can be contrasted with the bishopric of Norwich, which did not have even a cathedral school, whilst the dioceses of Gloucester and Bristol showed little concern for educational endowments in their lands (186).

The king's court neither made nor even drafted a national educational reform bill to regulate the criteria of such educational enterprises. Neither did the government create a set of obligations and responsibilities of local boroughs for the utilisation of monastic property in respect of the development of elementary education. In this light, the presentation of Henry VIII as the greatest reformer and founder of schools seems groundless and overestimated (Dickens 211). In the fifteen twenties Thomas Wolsey, who had been setting up new educational centres and implementing changes in the national education, had at least acted in

accordance with some semblance of a scheme. Twenty years later, the king's court, being engaged in the suppression of the monasteries, could have seized this opportunity to carry out far-reaching educational reform. The king and his Lord Chancellor confined themselves, however, to only a few symbolic and uncoordinated changes and in practice, the only group of people keenly interested in the problem, were evangelical adherents of whom only Thomas Cranmer and Hugh Latimer were well-known figures in humanist and reformer circles.

Similarly, no policy was formulated high-lighting the monastic librarian resources which could be utilised for further use, either in new educational institutions or at the king's court. In the early thirties Henry VIII had commissioned John Leland to make an inventory of the manuscripts and books available in the monastic libraries throughout the realm (*Ecclesiastical Memorials* 483-488). The aim of this task was probably to compile a catalogue, which could later enable the monarch to select the most valuable items for his own library. This is, however, pure speculation since no evidence has survived to either support or refute this theory.

Soon after the dissolution of the monasteries the most valuable works were collected at random and unsystematically. Neither was the royal library augmented to any significant extent, with new items. The collection of books in St Augustine's library at Canterbury amounted to 1800 volumes of different sizes, but only a dozen of them found their way to the king's library. The king's librarian's resources were enriched with only four items due to the confiscation of the monastic library in Reading (Dickens 209-10). It is impossible to estimate what losses English culture suffered as the result of the Dissolution. A great number of monastic libraries full of priceless manuscripts were destroyed with little or no regard to their value. The whereabouts of some manuscripts remains unexplained up to the present and it can only be surmised that those which were not burnt, having been purloined from monastic libraries may have fallen into the hands of private collectors (Dickens 209-10).

When comparing gains with losses in the suppression of the English monasteries against considerations of the national education at both primary and secondary levels, the outcome seems to show that the demerits definitely outweighed the merits i.e. comparatively little was achieved on behalf of elementary learning within the kingdom.

Soon after the king's court embarked on the suppression of the monasteries, the university authorities at Cambridge hastened to submit a petition to Henry VIII pointing out their impoverishment, in the hope that at least some of the confiscated religious houses would be converted

to educational institutions; where the new learning and truly Christian faith would be propagated (Mullinger 156). Their request was justified by the explanation that for the last nine years university expenses had been higher than its income. The petition emphasised the financial difficulties the university had been labouring under in recent years, using as an example the lecturers who had frequently had to give up one third of their allowances in order to cover the wages of visiting professors. The situation, of the already insufficiently financed university, had worsened since the court's decision taken several years earlier, on the basis of which the university had had to hand over some of their lands to the adjoining monastery. That had been justified then by stating: "It was then thought to be a dede more meritorious and acceptable to God to gyve suche landes to religious persons then to students in the uniuersitie" (Mullinger 156).

All the arguments presented in the petition must have been convincing enough because upon receipt of this letter, Henry himself guaranteed that in future university properties would never be interfered with or taken away unlawfully (Shadwell 128). In response to the petition, Cambridge gained in additional ways viz. the king's court took over the university's financial obligations and promised to pay out all stipends to the lecturers and readers for the classes that had been run and not paid for (Cooper 403). Furthermore, in 1542 Buckingham College was re-founded as Magdalene College.

It must be remembered that the dissolution of the monasteries did not only mean a series of advantages from the universities' viewpoint. By the year 1536 it had become common practice that candidates applying for a place at university, had at the same time to join monasteries. The suppression of the religious houses caused a drastic decrease in the number of applicants wishing to study at universities. This can be explained by fact that they had been deprived of accommodation and full board, which those monasteries had previously guaranteed. For example, Oxford university authorities complained in their letter to Thomas Cromwell of a 50% fall in applicants after the dissolution (Simon 203).

Meanwhile, there was a threat that the monarch may well have been considering eventually closing down the universities in England. In 1545 an Act of Parliament was passed on the basis of which English universities were to be liquidated and the accumulated wealth belonging to Oxford and Cambridge passed on to the Crown. The motive for making such plans must be sought in Henry VIII's financial embarrassments.[2]

[2] G. M Trevelyan claims that the monarch's financial problems resulted from "profligate finance and foolish wars in France that had emptied his treasury."

Possibly, the monarch was prompted by his closest advisors to suppress the universities, who saw in both of these universities mainly valuable lands rather than leading education centres in the king's realm (Bruce and Perowne 34). It appears somewhat unlikely that Henry VIII intended to do away with the universities in the same way as he had got rid of the monasteries. Nonetheless, between March and November 1546 three Oxford colleges surrendered to the Crown. In January 1546 after the appointment of the royal commissioners, who were accountable for conducting surveys at all colleges, both universities threw themselves on the king's mercy. At the same time the authorities controlling higher education in the kingdom embarked on a search for those sympathisers at the king's court willing to provide support in the event of their suppression.

The uncertainty which worried the university authorities and scholars in those days was dispelled by Queen Catherine Parr, who in her missive of February 1546 to Cambridge wrote among other matters:

> notwythstanding hys Majesties propertie and intrest throwgh the consent of the high court of Parlement, hys Hyeghness, being such a patron to good lernyng, he woll rather advance and erect new occasion therefor, than confound those your colleges: so that lernyng may hereafter ascribe her very original . . . (Strype, *Ecclesiastical Memorials* 337).

It is of note that the king appointed the commissioners whom he had singled out from the acadamic world, for example the university Vice-Chancellors and other academics rather than hostile inspectors from the court. Therefore the above analysis as well as the Queen's letter conveys explicitly that Henry VIII's intentions must have been misinterpreted and that the fears of the authorities of both Oxford and Cambridge universities were groundless. Eventually, after heated debates and expressed doubts concerning the fate of higher education, the alterations resulting from the dissolution of the monasteries were undoubtedly advantageous for the universities in England.

Similarly, changes for the better were to be seen at Cambridge. Trinity College was established on the site and with the revenues of Michaelhouse and King's Hall.[3] The merging of these two old colleges gave rise to a number of further alterations. Thanks to the permission granted by the monarch to found Trinity College, sixty lecturers and canons gained employment at this new education centre. The university Vice-Chancellor also obtained special funds from the court. This money

[3] Michael house was founded in 1324 and King's Hall was set up by Edward II in 1317.

was to be invested in building new and refurbishing the old academic buildings (Venn 10-19).

For the last ten years of the reign of Henry VIII a number of distinct improvements were brought about in both national education and culture, in contrast to the irretrievable losses suffered in these fields. It is beyond any question that the suppression of the monasteries did not help to improve education on the elementary level. To the same extent, the other great loser during the period of dissolution was the national culture; numerous priceless illuminated manuscripts, which had previously enriched the monastic libraries, were either destroyed or lost. The period under discussion was produced a much more favourable climate for higher education to flower in the kingdom. The newly founded Trinity College at Cambridge and Christ Church at Oxford continued the tradition which earlier colleges had created, and from the very start embarked on educating their students in the style of humanism. As with the colleges founded at the beginning of Henry's reign viz. John Fisher's St John's College at Cambridge and Richard Fox's Corpus Christi at Oxford-the two established at the end of this period-also organised public lectures in humanities. The financial problems had been sorted out, and at long last the universities had at their disposal funds for developing their infrastructure and enough subsidies to guarantee stipends for lecturers in Greek, Latin and Hebrew. Clearly, at the conclusion of Henry VIII's reign, adequate conditions were created at higher education level, so that the new humanistic learning could flourish when the king's daughter-Elizabeth I ascended the throne.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Richard Gott, *Britain's Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt*, London & New York: Verso, 2011, pp. 568, ISBN: 9781844677382

Richard Gott's 2011 study *Britain's Empire: Resistance, Repression and Revolt* taps into recent "history wars" about the legacy of the British Empire and its "secret" history. In sixty-six brief chapters arranged both chronologically and spatially, Gott presents the less sunny and often shameful story of the Pax Britannica i.e. the Empire's dealings with the "lesser nations." The book records numerous instances when the Empire used military conquest and dictatorship to gain new lands and then often resorted to extreme violence to quell the violent reactions that its rule by the sword sparked.

Gott's study spans two hundreds years of imperial history, from the 1750s to the mid 19th century, and it straddles various locations such as Ireland, America, the West Indies, India and African countries. It is a pity that the book does not finish with the demise of the Empire, but, on the other hand, there are other books that engage with the late history of the British Empire, such as Jeremy Paxman's *Empire: What Ruling the World Did to the British,* Kwasi Kwarteng's *Ghosts of the Empire* or, first and foremost, Mike Davis's *Late Victorian Holocausts: El Nino Famines and the Making of the Third World* (also published by Verso) to name but a few. Gott's narrative of the conquest, subjugation and extermination of various indigenous peoples' and their heroic, though futile, resistance can serve as a prelude to these earlier studies. What seems even more important is that the book can also be considered as a welcome corrective to the official history of the Empire disseminated by mass media, complacent educators and apologists for British imperialism, such as the maverick historian Niall Ferguson whose widely read books (*Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power* published in 2004; *The War of the World: Twentieth-Century Conflict and the Descent of the West* published in 2006) circulate an uncritical perspective on the history of Anglo-American imperialism.

By concentrating on the stories of the colonized rather than the Empire builders and rulers, and by reckoning with the often unheard-of stories of resistance to British encroachments, the book achieves a very important objective–it brings to light the underside of British imperialism and shows the extent to which it was resented by local societies. As Gott argues in his introduction, "wherever the British sought to plant their flag, they met with opposition. In almost every colony they had to fight their way ashore. While they could count sometimes on a handful of friends and allies, they never arrived as welcome guests, for the expansion of empire was invariably conducted as a military operation. The initial opposition continued off and on, and in varying forms, in almost every colonial territory until independence." Gott gives voice to those who defied the imperial expansion such as the Northern American Pontiac, Jamaican Nanny and Tacky or Quebecois Louis-Joseph Papineau, challenging "the customary depiction of the colonized as *victims*, lacking in agency or political will." In this way Gott demolishes the triumphalism of the history of the British Empire, convincing the reader not to purchase "a self-satisfied and largely hegemonic belief . . . that the empire was an imaginative, civilizing enterprise, reluctantly undertaken, that brought the benefits of modern society to backwards people."

Gott's book is liable to touch a raw nerve of British society by challenging and contesting the dominant stories of British imperialism. When read contrapuntally with the work of such ideologues of western imperialism as Niall Ferguson, for example, Gott's counter-narrative shows that the Empire was certainly not a godsend "obtained with a minimum degree of force, and maintained with maximum cooperation form a grateful indigenous population." It was not a benign and benevolent power that brought the underdeveloped world into the modern, liberal and capitalist fold, but a vicious foreign force that operated through fierce repression, wholesale slaughter, nothing short of genocide or holocaust, as Mike Davis has pointed out.

Gott's book is narrated in a dispassionate tone-he does not explicitly denounce the Empire (except in the "Introduction"), but the gruesome stories of the brutal oppression and violent resistance do make the point, bringing it home to readers that all empires come notoriously with shockingly high death tolls among the native peoples. This message seems particularly relevant not only for some historians who remain trapped in the colonial mindset. It is particularly important for many British consumers of heritage cinema, who in words of Paul Gilroy's, are still suffering from "post-imperial melancholia." According to Gilroy it is very difficult for an average British person to look back at the history of the Empire with

shame rather than pride-British society, argues Gilroy, "found itself oddly unable to mourn and work through its loss of the Empire" or come to terms with "the shame that has attended the exposure of Britain's colonial crimes." Tapan Raychaudhuri, an Indian historian, offers an interesting explanation of the British postcolonial malaise. Namely by drawing on the example of the Japanese post-war reckoning of their historical past, he quotes a Japanese historian who "pointed out that nations do not assess their historical past radically unless they have gone through the experience of social revolution or crushing defeat in a war." Since Britain was spared such experiences it is quite natural for its public opinion to turn a blind eye to the Empire's crimes and lend an ear to historians who, like Ferguson, glorify its achievements. But Gott's book provides irrefutable evidence that the British Empire was not "an Empire of good intensions," but an entirely "wrong empire," to quote Simon Schama out of context. Its civilizing mission was only a smoke screen for extermination and exploitation, extortion, killings and tortures. Its ultimate source of power was not the enlightened civilization but military operation, routine violence and raw coercion.

Thus Gott's book challenges the mainstream history of the British presence in various nooks and corners of the world. It is an honest and thought-provoking book, difficult to read at times, because of the harrowing atrocities it describes. But this is a much needed book which may finally annul the feeling of regret and nostalgia that often accompany the recollections of the British imperial past. It invalidates any attempt to use the story of British colonial past as a means to teach patriotism to the masses, as it makes impossible the repetition of the old lies about the grandeur and goodness of the imperial mission.

According to Gott, "Britain's colonial experience" was characterized by the "physical and cultural extermination" of native peoples. It "ranks more closely with the exploits of Genghiz Khan or Attila the Hun than with those of Alexander the Great, although these particular leaders have themselves been subjected to considerable historical revisionism in the recent years." Consequently in Gott's study the great heroes of the British Empire are on their way to becoming the great villains of the twenty-first century. They "provided a blueprint for the genocides of twentieth century Europe," and consequently they "rank with the dictators of the twentieth century as the authors of crimes against humanity on an infamous scale."

The only shortcoming of this extensive and inspiring study seems to be the swiftness with which Gott takes the reader through the ignoble episodes of the British imperial history. The laconic, shorthand manner of narration swamps the reader with overwhelming facts. Gott does

explain how the Empire managed to secure its continuity, but he does not explain the rationale behind its existence i.e. the economic underside of the imperial ideology, in a way that some other historians, most notably Mike Davis does. Also the arrangement of the book, which resembles a chronicle with quickly alternating sections about different loci of resistance, makes it a little bit difficult to follow Gott's narration and to grasp the larger sense of the events he describes. To follow one particular story of resistance, let's say of the Jamaican people, the reader has to flick through half of this massive book. Moreover, the author devotes the same amount of attention to each of these events so the reader might be at a loss in trying to assess their scope and relevance to the world's history. A little bit of authorial guidance or comment would certainly help the reader to create a more comprehensive and cohesive picture of the historic context in which they appear. This is, however, a small inconvenience that is fully compensated by the book's numerous accomplishments. The great strength of this provocative book, and its greatest achievement, is that it brings in one volume, in brief but vividly narrated chapters, compelling stories of resistance of the conquered and the vanquished, which together "make nonsense of the accepted imperial version of what went on."

Izabella Penier

Reghina Dascal, Ed., *Episodes from the History of Undoing. The Heritage of Female Subversiveness*, Newcasle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2012, ISBN: 1-4438-3611-7

Female Rebels with a Cause:
"Whenever you see a board up with
'Trespassers will be prosecuted,' trespass at once."

Virginia Woolf's rebellious statement noted above encouraged an army of heretical women to act politically, to have a cause. For a woman to break the law as an illegal trespasser has meant, in a metaphorical sense, to disembowel herself from a stereotypical female nature, which like entrails, culturally formed her substance. Discussions on the essence of femininity have a long tradition, and one contention is worth recalling here. It is believed that many generations of women passed on to other women a "hereditary disease," which might be called cultural inertia.

The term suggests that since mass can be considered a measure of a body's inertia, they contributed to a heavy production of cultural inactivity. Even though women were biologically fertile, for centuries they did not count as (visible) cultural producers. That their bodies matter has been acknowledged differently by themselves and by those, who wished to boil it down to a very minor matter, that is to say, to "an empty vessel" (an ancient Greek concept), *per analogiam* to an internal space of their bodies that is open, waiting to be filled by men, or to be occupied by growing children.

As the life inside a maternal environment develops, it is not aware of the fact that when it leaves this safe "envelope," the cultural territory that awaits it has a long-lasting tradition of fashion patterns, namely gender clothing. It is a newborn "penis" that is culturally most wanted, not "a vagina." Here are some reasons (or just a small portion of argument), explaining why gender difference (and inferiority) are in effect and maintain "the law of the father" (as Jacques Lacan describes the symbolic-linguistic order of Western culture) as well as certain social practices. In *Women, Science, and Myth: Gender Beliefs from Antiquity to the Present*, Sue V. Rosser explains that:

> If the baby is a girl, in addition to receiving a pink cap and diapers with different reinforced padding than that given to boys, the adults will talk more to her and describe her as smaller with finer features than they would the same if told he was a boy. These responses suggest the initiation of a series of behaviors, expectations, and stereotypes that will determine parameters and norms for whom that baby is likely to marry, what career she is more likely to have, and a probable series of other likes, interests, and outcomes for her life. If the baby is a boy, he'll be described as larger, be talked to less, and be given more visual stimulation. The adults will also anticipate gender determinations based on his sex such as falling in love with a woman and being more likely to become an engineer than a nurse. These determinations result from the beliefs that masculinity and femininity are associated with particular roles and behaviors in a particular culture, time, or society.

It is worth noting that within a globally shared human condition, a patriarchal structure (having many "local" variants), men are privileged, promoted and stimulated to repeat societal norms that re-create a mythical scenario, in which a strong, virile, active and rational male figure is worshipped. Generally, women also reinforce these qualities, be it as mothers, wives or widows, therefore male domination is still a norm. By changing societal norms of masculinity, situation of both, "colonizers" and "colonized" might be negotiated, or more radically speaking, gradually altered by "tunneling through" a solid cultural ground. Especially women, who shed the light on some facts and figures about the status of women in Western society, have played a pivotal role

in this process. Acting as tunnel-diggers, remaining in hiding, they found a way to act subversively: ooze, infiltrate, pervade, foray from under the ground. Taking actions against the oppressive system belowground, they also acted against gravity. If this natural force of attraction is taken into consideration, a male discoverer–Isaac Newton–has to be evoked. Perhaps, if women were allowed to establish physical laws, we would not associate gravitation with Newton's apple but with Émilie du Châtelet, one of the most enlightened feminine minds of the French Enlightenment-era, a physicist and a translator of Newton. Recalling such prominent figures as the above-mentioned female trail-blazer has a short tradition, yet as women became aware that only through "thorough excavations" within history or his-story (as it was suggested by feminists), her story might be found.

Among many "digging tactics," one has definitely left tangible evidence, that of writing against the grain. Subversiveness as a strategy of women's resistance and manifestation of their cultural presence is discussed in a collection of essays, *Episodes form a History of Undoing: The Heritage of Female Subversiveness*, edited by Reghina Dascăl and prefaced by Margaret R. Higonnet ("Unwinding Narratives of Gender and the Weaving of Antistructures"). Eleven articles written by women from different cultural backgrounds, namely American, Brazilian, Hungarian, Polish, Romanian and Turkish, raise the issue of "trespassing" when it is forbidden, recalling and refreshing the stories of feminine daredevils. In their attempts to revive particular styles of resistance, they evoke examples ranging from Queen Elizabeth I to contemporary feminists, who not only theorize but use their provocative and ground-breaking ideas in practice. The collection of essays is organized in five sections/chapters, each presenting "the history of undoing" (the term is inspired by Rada Khumar's title of the book (1993), *The History of Doing: An Illustrated Account of Movements for Women's Rights and Feminism in India, 1800-1990*).

Chapter one is devoted to "Early Fashionings of Agency and Auctorial Self" and comprises two illuminating articles: Dana Percec's "Elizabeth I: Creativity, Authorship, and Agency" and "A Woman for All Seasons: Christine de Pizan" by Reghina Dascăl. The Virgin Queen is portrayed by Percec not only as one of the most admired English monarchs but, thanks to a discovery and discussion of a large body of her writings (poems letters, prayers, speeches, translations and even prayers), as "a refined scholar, and a talented author." Another example of a subversive woman writer at the turn of the 15th century, who "was the first professional female author to write in her own name since Sappho in Ancient Greek," is a Frenchwoman, Christine de Pizan. Whereas Elizabeth I crosses gender boundaries, revealing maleness/femaleness of

(her)self, de Pizan-the target figure of Dascăl feminist analysis-lays bare social inferior position of women, urging them to refuse remaining silent and invisible.

In the second part Nóra Séllei and Voichita Nachescu deal with "Feminist Consciousness Coming of Age" in two compelling essays: "An Island of Dissident Thoughts": Orwell versus *Three Guineas* by Virginia Woolf" and "Feminist Consciousness-Raising and the Psychotherapeutic Sensibility of the 1960s: Rethinking the Connection." Séllei's intention is to juxtapose Wool's and Orwell's attitude to politics, its institutions and ensuing power/gender relations. She finds Woolf's writing more radical than Orwell's and concludes that the text of the first author aims at "the radical critique-or undoing-of all the major elements of Englishness in history from a markedly feminine perspective." Nachescu's article shows the complex relationship between radical feminism and the psychotherapeutic discourses of the 1960s. The latter were criticized by radical activists, but simultaneously some aspects were adapted to their philosophy in order to remain subversive within the Women's Liberation Movement.

Part three–"Re-reading and Re-writing the Past"-consists of three essays, which turn to different narrative forms as places of resistance, where history might be undone and rewritten. In "Herta Muller and Undoing the Trauma in Ceausescu's Romania" Adriana Raducanu explains that Muller, a Nobel prize winner, exploits "the particular type of Gothic that pervades her novels" that becomes a textual strategy of coping with traumatic experiences from the past and her fight for being acknowledged as a female writer. In the next essay by Rita Terezinha Schmidt, entitled "(Re)Engendering the Past/Recovering Women's Writings: The Works of Feminist Criticism in Brazil," the author considers a recovery of Brazilian women's writings (non canonical texts, written in an unconventional way) as crucial to understanding national identity, based on gender and racial discrimination. Gender stereotyping is an issue raised in another essay within this section, namely Andreea Serban's "(Little) Red Riding Hood: A British-American History of Undoing." She selects four narratives that use the concept of Red Riding Hood to "challenge and break gender and social schemata" and demonstrate how crucial fairy tales are to building an imaginary gender-related schema.

The subsequent chapter focuses on "Undoing Interlocking Systems of Oppression," exploring how "cultural outsiders" (women) might be brought back to their "motherlands" and finally become visible and audible. It opens with Amber West's "Power Play: Two Black Feminist Playwrights (En)counter Intersectionality," where the author clearly

demonstrates how "interrelated forms of oppression," especially experienced by the most subordinated, that is to say, groups of African American women, are presented in literature created by the oppressed themselves: Adreinne Kennedy and Ntozake Shange. Another inspiring essay, entitled "Undoing the History of Engendered Nation in Three Narratives of Caribbean Feminism: *In the Name of Salome* by Julia Alvarez, *The Autobiography of My Mother* by Jamaica Kincaid, Krik? Krak! by Edwidge Danticat, is a contribution by Izabella Penier. She investigates how "the three expatriate women writers," "daughters of a different West Indian nation," become consciously entangled (within their narratives) in the issue of nationalism and nationalist discourses while they criticize patriarchal structures repeatedly recreated by male authors through their usage of a gender-biased rhetoric of the nation.

In the last section–"Challenging the Curricular Canon"–two different essays: "English Cultural/Gender Studies: An Eastern European Perspective" by Nóra Séllei and "Loitering with Internet: Gender Studies and English Studies in the Romanian Academe" by Reghina Dascăl, address an issue of the status and presence of gender/cultural studies as an academic discipline in Eastern Europe, discussing Romania as a case study. Both authors highlight the fact that these fields of studies are still treated with tolerance, yet characterized by a tongue-in-chick-attitude. In Dascăl's opinion: "academic feminism is seen as a challenge, as a critique of a severely hierarchical, rigid and ossified system, authoritarian, excessively competitive and revolving around the "boys' networks.'" The closing articles confirm the thesis that in order to survive, women of different cultural backgrounds still have to follow Woolf's advice and "trespass at once", no matter the consequences. All in all, they have a cause . . . and they are crafty and shrewd rebels. On the one hand they may run the gauntlet, while on the other–they meticulously and persistently dig the tunnels.

Episodes from a History of Undoing deserves attention since it keeps the reader awake each time either a new subversive strategy is presented, or a "dynamiter's" story retold. It offers a valuable publication to a gender-minded reader. He volume attests to the importance of the need to contest, change and correct the mistakes of the past. This book is also a tribute to women actively negotiating, reconstructing, and re-imagining their identities in opposition to dominant cultural constructions. This ambitious collection of daring and elaborate essays should not be overlooked by those readers, who wish to become textually engaged in the way women "break the law of gravity," constituting new laws that revolutionize the cultural worlds they inhabit.

Monika Sosnowska

Marta Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk, *Studies in 20th Century Literary/ Cultural Britain*, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kardynała Wszyńskiego, 2011, pp. 440, ISBN 978-83-7072-707-9

Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk's latest study, entitled *Studies in 20th Century Literary/Cultural Britain,* is a very ambitious project to map out major developments in British literature, culture and criticism in the previous century and to outline possible new trajectories in the twenty-first century. Not surprisingly the book is sweeping in scope and massive in volume. It focuses primarily on drama and theatre (about half of the book's chapters) and will be of particular interest to scholars and students working in this area. The book is meant to be a continuation of Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk's previous study *...by action dignified... British Theatre 1968–1995: Text and Context* published in 1997 by Nicholas Copernicus University Press (Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Mikołaja Kopernika). The present study, as the author explicates, is meant to be a revision and expansion of her previous publication. From the vantage point of the twenty-first century, Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk looks critically back on her previous assumptions by placing them against the backdrop of momentous cultural and social transformations of the twentieth century such as globalization, multiculturalism and rise of new social movements such as feminism.

The book shows how the dramatic social and political changes in Great Britain were intimately intertwined with cultural production and criticism. The book not only provides an overview of all important traditions and concepts that are still relevant to the cultural landscape of the twenty-first century but it also investigates the connections/ collusions between literary studies and current political issues. The book discusses for example the highly politicized theatre of the 1970s and 1980s and numerous clashes between the so called heritage drama and its anti-heritage postmodern rewritings. It draws the reader's attention to the new visibility of the contemporary alternative feminist theatre. It also mentions some notable re-stagings of Shakespeare whose aim was to explore current agendas, not only political and feminist but also existentialist or environmental.

Studies in 20th Century Literary/Cultural Britain presents a subjective and authorial point of view on the history of English prosaic and dramatic literature. It proposes a re-periodisation of English literature by arguing that postmodernist aesthetics is a "common denominator" for much of literature produced in the twentieth century. Thus the study takes issue with many outlines of twentieth century British literature that write its history in two large strokes: first there was modernism and then, in due time, postmodernism. Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk

convincingly argues that it is a history that abbreviates and misleads because the seeds of modern practices can be found in many writers publishing their work from the first to the last decade of the previous century. In books by writers form various epochs, such as Oscar Wilde, Rudyard Kipling, Lawrence Durrell, V. S, Naipaul or Tracey Chevalier, a discerning critic will be able to see some of the characteristic postmodernist aesthetics such as "merging arts, conventions and traditions, resigning form their verifying/verifiable goals, balkanizing genres, transgressing conventions (hybridization), negating probabilities both external and internal . . . rewriting history (history as text), using 'classics' as 'memory blank,' thus partaking in the ongoing debate on the using of intertextuality , carnivalizing registers and personalizing texts, oscillation between almost de-personalization of criticism and literature and the insistence on the writers' re-defined authority, rejecting and re-writing ideologies." It is this "postmodernism in hiding or *avant la lettre*," combined with "the globalization of themes" in postcolonial literature, that, as Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk provocatively contends, was the vehicle of acculturation and maybe even cultural imperialism in contemporary Great Britain. As the study surveys the literary scene from the early 20th century to the present, it excavates, as a part of its revisionist project, some undervalued literary creations of both famous and lesser-known literary figures.

The book will also acquaint readers with major theoretical contributions to English literary studies. One chapter of *Studies in 20th Century Literary/Cultural Britain* is devoted to the upsurge and flourishing of British cultural studies. It recounts famous debates on the meaning and definition of culture, ranging form Mathew Arnold's *Culture and Anarchy* to Raymond William's *Culture and Society*, and it relates the ongoing discussion with reference to Terry Eagleton's *The Idea of Culture* (2000) and Raymond William's 2004 study *Mass Media and a Mass Society*. Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk seems to concentrate a lot on the negative critical assessment of mass culture, bypassing those critics who showed more appreciation of its democratic vistas. Numerous citations, almost exclusively offering negative views of popular culture in 20th century Britain, reinforce the impression that, on the average, British critics favored high culture and were averse to popular culture. Moreover, what also seems to be missing in Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk's account is the contribution of Black cultural theorists such as Stuart Hall or Paul Gilroy, who emphasize the continuing relevance of race in any analysis of culture in Great Britain. But to include even more in this otherwise sizable and comprehensive volume would perhaps be too much to ask.

Of particular interest to Polish readers will be the chapters that explore the connections between the English studies and European and

Polish culture. For example, the chapter titled "'Creeping counterrevolution' or "Hamlet behind the Iron Curtain" illustrates how Hamlet's rich political potential was used in Polish performances in the communist period. On the other hand, the chapter "Sex, gender and the female body" proposes a comparative reading of female authored texts form England, Poland and Germany, which bear, in Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk words, "striking ideological and artistic convergences." Finally, the chapter "Narrating foreign culture in the Age of Globalisation: British writers on Poland" presents post-war British literature that features Polish protagonists or has a Polish setting, such as, for example, in the plays: Rattingan's *Flare Path*, Mercer's *The Birth of a Private Man*, Poliakoff's *Coming to Land* or in the novels: Tuohy's *The Ice Saints* or Murdoch's *The Flight from Enchanter* or *Nuns and Soldiers*.

Due to its immense scope, the study may give an impression of drifting off in different directions that seem to be less relevant to its main subject matter, but, in the end, Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk always manages to deftly tie up all the loose ends. On the whole, the book is highly original, compelling and thought provoking. Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk is very persistent in her attempt to highlight various elements of postmodern practice in its various literary oeuvres of the twentieth century and she manages to steer clear of the pitfall of oversimplification. Therefore *Studies in 20th Century Literary/Cultural Britain* is a good introduction for anybody with serious interest in English studies.

Izabella Penier

***Man, Chicks are Just Different* (*Baby są jakieś inne*) dir. Marek Koterski, Poland, 2011, 90 min.**

This is a man's world, this is a man's world
But it wouldn't be nothing, nothing
without a women or a girl
He's lost in the wilderness
He is lost in bitterness
– James Brown, Betty Newsome

Why should I be bothered, what people in America might think about me.
I care if dudes from the neighborhood appreciate my movie.
– Marek Koterski

Marek Koterski is one of the few contemporary Polish film directors cultivating the tradition of auteurism. His previous projects mostly concerned matters concerning locals and compatriots. Nevertheless, this

latest film touches on the universal phenomenon of the battle of the sexes. *Man, Chicks are Just Different* (*Baby są jakieś inne*) is a controversial work both because of its content and form. The film is a feature-length work, but it lacks conventionally understood plot and gender roles-in it the "feminists are guys with fake boobs." However, before I focus on the film, I think it is worth taking a closer look at Koterski's filmography.

Adaś Miauczyński, the director's alter ego and the main character of his films, is a perpetual malcontent, a red-hot nonconformist, an obsessive-compulsive loser in life, an alcoholic-intellectual full of big dreams and even bigger claims about the world which he despises. He appears in various guises as an assistant director of a poor film, an unfulfilled writer, a culture critic, an educator who hates his students, a divorcee who is constantly looking for an ideal woman, a sissy who did not bear the burden of fatherhood. He is a reflection of a generation which had fed their dreams on socialism, which later on without any warning, was devalued and turned into loose change by capitalism. He is somebody who we (Poles) all laugh at and, at the same time, are terribly afraid to discover as a part of ourselves. Adaś Miauczyński is a cult figure of Polish cinema, a successor of national archetypes, a bard-philologist, who inhabits a post-Soviet block of flats, where all his ideals are trapped. Koterski fits him in the pageant of national heroes and myths, and places him on the Akkerman steppes (see the author's notes) of capitalist concrete car parks among the jungle of monumental Soviet-style architecture of his youth, and, flagstone by flagstone, block by block, unveils a mosaic hidden underneath the slap-dash atmosphere that surrounds him.

But most of all, it is language that is one of the keys to, if not the most important element of, Koterski's cinematic work. Koterski is best known for the movie entitled *Dzień Świra* (*Day of the Wacko,* 2002), which made Adaś Miauczyński a peculiar celebrity in Poland. It is a parody of the national epic *Pan Tadeusz* (the full English title is *Sir Thaddeus, or the Last Lithuanian Foray: A Nobleman's Tale from the Years of 1811 and 1812 in Twelve Books of Verse)*, written as a syllabic lyric with specific meter. It is almost like a national bible, whose introduction every Polish child must learn by heart, even before the Lord's Prayer. Koterski, in the same sophisticated metric form of this idyllic apotheosis of Polishness, incorporates the contemporary slang of the Polish streets, the language behind the closed doors of ridiculously small flats, the language of unintelligibly long corridors, trashy subways, concrete backyards and devastated playgrounds, the language of flashy media and clamorous parliamentary sessions.

Similarly, in *Man, Chicks are Just Different*, language carries a certain critical weight. On the one hand, as a ground for gender stereotypes, it

reflects the patriarchal culture; on the other hand, the main characters in the film–two guys in a car–carry a conversation that lacks the words to establish their position in the reality they happen to inhabit. The language becomes a kind of restraint, a game, in which the men are deprived of their dominant position and so they fight with hags, chicks, whores, businesswomen, feminist-gladiators, butch women, witches and bitches in an effort not to lose, not to become fags, sissies, queers, an unemployed Mr. Housewife or clumsy Mr. Mom. The weapon with which the director equips his characters Adaś (Adam Woronowicz) and his mate Pucio (Robert Więckiewicz) is the language itself. It is a very insidious tool, an armament of discrimination, but also of law, science and superstitions, which you simply cannot escape or hide from. The battle field is set in the car on the road with few intersections. The roadway space seems to be the last male bastion, where men find themselves unrivalled, and, thus, safe.

Traffic regulations are the provisions of the male-dominated world: clear, transparent, analytical and dependent on a dichotomous choice. They allow the characters to navigate seamlessly if you read the signs in a proper way. There is no room for discussion, hesitation or emotions. These are the kind of rules that women find so hard to adapt to. Maybe because it is not inherent in their nature to make quick decisions or perhaps due to the fact that, according to popular belief, they have a poor sense of direction, or maybe because the world for them is not divided into the left and right side.

Koterski takes us on an hour-and-a-half journey with two frustrated, socially castrated males, who, while talking about women, reveal unconsciously their own fears. In the words of one of the protagonists': "I feel hemmed in by women, I am afraid of them, I am in retreat, pushed against the wall, cornered." In the very first scene the director sets up the rhythm of the film, smoothly moving from the prosaic situation where two buddies are complaining about the chick behind the wheel to the broader discussion, which will become the subject matter of the film, and which opens with a diagnosis of the female brain. Koterski, the screenwriter of all his movies, through his characters carries out a sophisticated dialogue between scientific or sociological research and the superstitions and prejudice that such research may inadvertently encourage. He is juggling with statistics, colloquial sayings, scientific theories and sexist vulgarities. However, he is not legitimizing any of the discourses. He undermines them and puts question marks after all cardinal statements.

In the very beginning of the embryonic development all human beings are women. It is the activation of androgens at some point of that

development that determines that the fetus will be male. The protagonists of the film discuss the condition of the Y gene associated with the male sex, which seems to disappear over the course of evolution. *Man, Chicks are Just Different* refers to another cult Polish movie, *Seksmisja* (*Sexmission*, dir. Juliusz Machulski, 1984, see the author's notes), in which two men are put into a state of hibernation as a part of an experiment. When they wake up, after fifty years instead of three, it turns out that they are the only men left in the world. In the diegetic world of this movie, a civilization created only by women in the mine underground is the result of disaster, an outbreak of nuclear war that led to the extinction of the Y gene. In this story, the men are presented as heroes, who by rescuing women trapped underground restore the natural order of things and the joy of life generated through sex and procreation. Those two male characters are supported by her Excellency, the leader of apocalyptic feminism, who turns out to be a man with numerous complexes and stuffed fake breasts. Koterski's characters, Adaś and Pucio, apparently live in a nightmare which has come true; they will not save the world with their penises, will not inseminate it with their views, as this world has been intentionally castrated and with premeditation. It is a world which is not the result of a cataclysm, but a development of civilization. This is where they find themselves during their conversation in the car on the roadway, a road to doom. According to the film's protagonists, equal rights for women and men are in fact discriminating against men. Women are taking over male domains one after another, but for men there is no social acceptance to function in stereotypically feminine roles. As Adaś and Pucio speak, important and not very politically correct opinions emerge, a male point of view suggesting that men are now a modern cultural minority.

The virtues traditionally attributed to men, such as strength and care-giving, are nowadays perceived as being brutal and patriarchal, while, at the same time, women's magazines are filled with articles in search of "true" men. The modern man must be both a knight and an empathetic partner, weak and strong at the same time. A lack of cultural patterns, which could conceivably establish a certain balance in all this ambivalence, is one of the reasons, as the director suggests, for what he calls the "Peter Pan syndrome." One of the characters defiantly declares: "Since I do not know what kind of man I should become I'll remain a boy." Among different and more or less humorous statements that criticize feminism, there is also a position which defines feminism as a movement that, paradoxically, legitimizes the patriarchal order. Instead of searching for a new order, women are said to prefer to wear trousers just to gain access to knowledge and power, which for ages they were

denied. Nevertheless, the male characters admit that if one day women disappeared, they would not see any reason to live.

It is worth noting how perverse the promotion of the film was. The poster, featuring a naked female torso with her nipples covered with censor-like titillating stars, and the sexually-explicit trailer, suggested this was not going to be an overly sophisticated film. It clearly appeared this would be a light-hearted comedy colored with trite chauvinistic jokes, outright politically incorrect in all form and manner, the kind of talk usually shared among male buddies in a locker room or bar. The only part that did not fit into this jigsaw puzzle was the slogan: "The most feminine comedy about men." This vicious game that Koterski plays with the audience is constructed on several levels. Almost like a self-referential chess game with social expectations, this is a significant commentary on a phenomenon shaping mainstream society, but it also carries a certain self-ironic humor as the most effective weapon in the fight against stereotypes. Koterski aka Miauczyński is an uncompromising observer, whose provocative, ironical and often outrageous diagnoses cause extreme reactions on the part of spectators. The director claims he does not have any predilections for his audience. If he had to name an ideal recipient it would be just a typical "dude" from the neighborhood. There is only one rule: he treats the spectator as being at least as intelligent as himself, with no simplifications or generalizations, which have recently become a lame excuse for many poor productions intended for mass consumption.

Man, Chicks are Just Different is not built upon story; it is not a feature film in the classical sense. There are meanings that are revealed in the conversation between the main characters, and, for this reason, it may be classified as a 'parametric narration', according to David Bordwell's terminology, or as a film with a discourse dominant in accordance with the Tomasz Kłys classification. The director himself declares: ". . . When it comes to cinema, I believe that I have developed my own style, that I am beginning to be involved in the creation of the language of film. Some rules of narration, which are not principles, without systematized turning points or the American structure." If we were to perceive Koterski's latest film as a road movie, then it would undoubtedly evoke the style of the Jim Jarmusch's films in which the road leads nowhere. To be on the way is a goal and end in itself, like a conversation that can be a search, the mapping of meanings and not the provision of pre-set coordinates. It is also an inner journey revealing personal fears, a quest for the right language that can express them.

Most of the movie was filmed on green screen and the picture was filled in during the post-production process. Unfortunately, there is

a discrepancy between the film's form and its discursive level. Even though in Koterski's previous projects the picture was secondary to the narrative layer, dialogue and the construction of the protagonist, and it was often used only as illustration, all of these elements were clearly outlined in the story. In *Man, Chicks are Just different*, however, the layer of the text and dialogue dominates all the other components to such an extent that it could just as well be a theater performance or a radio play, or even a book. This production lacks the cinematic means of expression that would enrich this text with a new and greater quality or meaning. Therefore, some critics and the general audience expressed the opinion that the work is too "wordy" and, in the end, boring.

Despite a formal asceticism of the dense text, the film is definitely well worth seeing, and its message is worth talking about, worth disputing. It is self-ironic cinema not intended for a specific IQ or an audience with multiple diplomas. It is the cinema of a reflective man, the cinema of moral anxiety.

Tamara Skalska

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Author's Notes:

1. In trying to accurately translate the title of the film it is important to note the difficulties in capturing the true meaning and tone. "Baby" is a term sometimes used to describe women, but it encompasses a very wide semantic field, which, on the one hand, can be identified with the English word "chick," but, on the other hand, carries a shade of the term "hag." A particular meaning of the term depends on the way it is uttered and the context of its use; it is similar to the different uses of the word "women" in English.
2. Adaś Miauczyński, the character's name, is a self-ironic game the author is playing. It refers to his mother's words–"Stop meowing"–which she used to say when he was pestering her for something.
3. "Akkerman Steppes" is part of the *Crimea Sonnet*s written by Adam Mickiewicz, perhaps the most preeminent poet in Polish literature, and a prime example of the Polish Romantic Period. It is a matrix for a certain nostalgia and mindset that colors Polish culture. Koterski is one of the first contemporary artists to showcase the national bard in pop culture.
4. It should be noted that the mentioned film *Sexmission* is mostly a parody on the then prevailing Communist system. The futuristic science fiction approach was used in an effort to avoid censorship. This common trick, thus, carries an even greater message about authoritarian regimes and their tendency toward homogenization.
5. There is a trend in Polish cinema known as the Cinema of Moral Anxiety, which has been internationally recognized in Krzysztof Kieślowski's films.

CONTRIBUTORS

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