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

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ARTICLES

Nadina Milewska-Pindor*

THE ALMANAC "WOMAN AND RUSSIA" AND THE SOVIET FEMINIST MOVEMENT AT THE END OF THE 1970S

ABSTRACT: This article presents a short history of the origin and creation of the Almanac "Women and Russia," which began as a samizdat underground publication devoted to the problem of women and childrearing in the USSR. The idea for creating such an Almanac originated in the mid 1970s in the Leningrad circle of 'unofficial culture', at the initiative of the artist Tatyana Mamonova, religious philosopher Tatyana Goricheva, and the women author Natasha Malachovska. The women writers featured in the first edition of the Almanac addressed not only questions about the social conditions prevailing in the USSR, but above all exposed the consequences for women living and functioning in a patriarchal social order, and ironically one where all the questions concerning 'women's rights' were deemed to have been resolved in a progressive fashion much earlier. Not only is the substance of the Almanac important, but the circumstances surrounding its publication and the subsequent consequences related to its publishing also reveal the state of the 'women's movement' in the USSR of that time. These include the reactions of the representatives of the dissident culture, the interventions of the security apparatus and the attendant repression of the women activists and its effect on their lives, and the support of feminist organizations from abroad. Each of the afore-mentioned reactions and consequences became an element of and shaped the everyday lives of the activists involved in the creation of the Almanac. The events related in this work confirm the opinion of those researchers who consider that the publication of the Almanac marked the beginning of the resurrection of the feminist movement in Russia.

KEY WORDS: Almanac "Women and Russia," feminist movement in Soviet Russia.

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The Russian feminist movement unfolded against the background of the stormy intellectual, socio-economic and political changes taking place in nineteenth century Europe, and took shape long before October 1917. The increase in social awareness and social activities which took place under the influence of the liberal reforms at the end of the 1850s led naturally to the acknowledgement of women as a perceptible social group, and the raised the question of 'women's rights'. The early activities of Russian women activists, conducted in the atmosphere of an authoritarian political regime, focused on fighting for the rights to work, knowledge, and education. The first institutions for women, founded during this period, co-created the institutional structure for later feminist activities. Child-care institutions were created for working mothers, together with women's academies, women's courses and schools, and in subsequent years organizations supporting self-employment and both secondary and higher educational institutions for women.

Women first entered Russian universities as early as in 1859. Four university centres, including in St. Petersburg and Kiev, expressed their support for women's education, allowing them to attend classes as external 'free students', i.e. not officially enrolled. While these changes did not lead to equal rights for men and women in the area of education—a right which women activists would continue struggle for throughout subsequent decades—they constituted a first step in the formation of the multi-layered system of women's education which was in place prior to the 1917 revolution. Among the important steps/ advances during this period one should mention the opening of so-called Bestuzhev courses, which were conducted in Petersburg from 20 September 1878, the renewed approval of women's places as 'external free students', and their re-affirmation by ten state universities in 1905, despite the opposition of the Ministry.

Despite the fact that feminist activists encountered many obstacles, and that the question of women's participation in state and political affairs did not gather full strength until the turn of the twentieth century, these first stages in the women's movement played a key role in shaping the organizational and ideological foundations for the later concentrated activities. It is critical to note the 'grass roots', independent and voluntary nature of the initiatives undertaken by the activists of that time, which arose out of their conceptual definition of women as a separate and concrete social category. The socio-cultural consequences of the

earliest feminist efforts would seem no less important—the breaking down of woman's assigned roles and places, changes in social attitudes towards women, and the growing acceptance of equal rights for women among intelligentsia circles. The effect of these many years of collectivist activities and experience led to the gradual emancipation of women from the prison of patriarchal structures, so that at the beginning of the twentieth century concrete social groups supporting women's rights, fully aware of their aims and desires, were ready to join in the effort to build a 'new state'. The validity of this assessment is confirmed by the activities of, among others, Inessa Armand—the Chairwoman of the First International Conference of Communist Women or Alexandra Kollotai—the first woman Minister in Europe, as well as a number of other charismatic women who, during the Revolutionary period, made significant contributions in support of the new authorities, carrying our propaganda activities, co-creating Bolshevik committees, and actively participating in local party organizations. Russian women became one of the first to achieve full voting rights, and the Soviet Constitution of 1918 fully and finally confirmed women's rights to study at all levels of the educational system. The Labour Code of 1918 guaranteed women a 16-week maternity leave and a premium for breast-feeding, but most important of all it guaranteed equal wages for equal work. The creation of a Department of Women's Activities in the Central Committee of the Communist Party was aimed at guaranteeing that words would be translated into actions and that the existing obstacles to women's full participation in public affairs would be overcome.

These and other events which occurred at the beginning of the twentieth century led Irina Yukina to posit the thesis that the pre-revolutionary activities of women were fully successful, and allowed Olga Shnirova to emphasize the chronological and ideological similarities between the first wave of Russian and Western feminism. [1] The very different fate of the above-mentioned women's rights' activities in subsequent decades is reflected in the events which took place at the end of the 1970s in the environment of what was known as the Leningrad unofficial culture.

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[1] See O. Shnirova, *Русский феминизм: ждать ли новой волны?* [*Russian Feminism: Is a new wave awaiting us?*]. NZ journal 83 (3/2013). 25 March 2013. http://www.nlobooks.ru/node/2280.

The rebirth of feminism in the conditions of Soviet reality began in 1979 with the appearance of the first samizdat publication devoted to the most important social and spiritual questions determining the lives of women and children in the USSR. The founder of the almanac "Woman and Russia" was the artist and poet Tatyana Mamanova, a declared feminist and one of the few women of the time in the Soviet Union who was familiar with western feminist critiques.[2] Her proposition, floated in the unofficial circles of religious philosophy and presented to the editors of "37"—Tatyana Goricheva and the poet and writer Natasha Malahovskaya—was quickly brought to life. In the summer of 1979 Julia Voznesenskaya, a poet and influential member of Leningrad's unofficial cultural circle, joined the enterprise of the group of pioneering publicists and already in September, only a month after commencing work, the almanac was prepared for print and ten copies were published.

The fact that the almanac appeared in dissident circles as an underground publication protesting against the ossified order of the Soviet regime would hardly appear surprising. This traditional social order was, in the opinion of the authors, the reason for the degrading way women were treated, and was based on a deformed view of women's nature and destiny, and a schematic method of showing life experience. The official culture, which followed the obligatory rhetoric that 'women's issues' had been resolved, or even in the best case presented women's issues in a one-sided and biased fashion, left no space for the explication and demonstration of feminist postulates. Thus it should not be surprising that women activists, joined in their united determination, produced such publications as '37' or 'Chasi,"

[2] It should be noted that, at the time of founding 'Woman and Russia', most of its authors did not have direct knowledge of the topic of feminism (neither with respect to its ideology, Western theoretical works, nor social movements on behalf of equal rights for women). See. T. Rowieńska, "Historia prozy kobiecej w epoce transformacji, czyli 'oczy szeroko zamknięte' rosyjskiego feminizmu," in *Literatury słowiańskie po roku 1989 [History of Women's prose in the transformation epoch, or "Eyes wide shut—Russian feminism" in Slavic Literature after 1989.] Nowe zjawiska, tendencje, perspektywy [New phenomena, tendencies, and perspectives]*, ed. E. Kraskowska t. 2 (Warszawa: Dom Wydawniczy Elipsa, 2005), p. 86. Similar comments can be found in the interview with the co-author of the Almanac for Radio Svoboda]. See. *25 лет женскому альманаху "Женщина и Россия"* [*25 years of the Almanac 'Women and Russia'*]. Radio Svoboda Interview. 29 March 2013. http://archive.svoboda.org/ll/cult/1204/ll.121704-2.asp.

seeing them as creating the groundwork for both self-realization as well as for putting forth and re-discussing issues associated with the supposed equal rights of Soviet women. In a short time, however, it turned out that, as recalled by Malahovskaya "the feminine side of the editors of '37' began to feel like non-conformists within a circle of non-conformists. The materials women put forward for publication were deemed by the male editors to be too extreme, too socially motivated—in a word, too dangerous." (Malahovskaya) Women were willingly assigned technical duties associated with copying and binding published issues, but had little opportunity to express their views on the issues under consideration. This situation led activists to confirm that the almanac was not just the result of many years of women's cumulative efforts, but arose as a direct "reaction to openly-expressed opinions demeaning particular women and the nature of women generally, which was revealed—paradoxically as it may seem—in the circles of those fighting for liberation." (Mitrofanova) This is certainly a reference to the dissident circles within which the women writers began their activities. Mamonova goes yet a step farther in her interpretation of the events of those times. In her introduction to the English language version of "Woman and Russia" she recalls the lack of support (with a few exceptions) received from the male dissidents, and their irritatingly dismissive and protective attitude toward women's creativity. She labels a few of them as outright sexists: "The dissident artists present themselves as nonconformists only in their art; in their attitude toward women, they are absolutely conformist." (Mamonova xiv)

Mamonova's description of the male element in the samizdat circles concerns only one aspect of the reactions the creator of the Almanac had to deal with. Of equal if not greater importance were the reactions of women themselves to the issues raised. The themes of women's dignity, self-respect and quality of life did not interest many of them. They drew their own conclusions from the their own experience. The patriarchal social order, strengthened by years of official socialist doctrine, was felt in different environments at different levels of human existence. Even more, it was maintained not only by men.

Unable to find an outlet for realizing their aims, the activists made a decision to prepare independently a publication—the first of its kind in samizdat history—focused on feminist themes. Despite the very modest number of copies issued (recall that the

first underground issue of 'Woman and Russia' consisted of only ten copies) its appearance in the world of underground literature aroused great interest among the wider circle of persons representing the 'culture'. Nor was there any doubt that the issues ignored for so many years by the samizdat underground were a matter of essence for everyone. The expanding 'reading public' were effusive in their praise of the publication—it was usually read in one night so that it could be passed on the next day to other readers.

More activists and publicists followed the footsteps of the initiators of the almanac, enlarging the editorial board. Natasha Maltseva, Sofia Sokolova, Galina Grigoryeva, and Tatyana Bielyayeva, the poetess Kari Unksova, the artist Natasha Lazareva and the adored 'Mamma of dissidents'—Elena Pavlovna—were all to devote the next years of their work to editing new journals of a feminist and religious nature ("Mariya," "Dalyokiye-blizkiye"—m Far and Near—and "Nadezhda"—Hope), as well as collaborating with local and foreign artistic circles.

It should be emphasized that the publication of a collection of articles under the editorship of Mamonova not only led to the resurrection of the feminist movement today alternately referred to as the Leningrad or dissident movement, it also marked the first in a series of events which would forever change the fate of its authors and collaborators. The reaction of the security apparatus was immediate. Shortly after the issuance of the almanac, the women authors of the publications contained in it, as well as their families, were subjected to a series of repressions. Their private apartments were regularly searched, and being followed and intimidated on a daily basis became a permanent part of their lives. Copies of "Woman and Russia" were confiscated and, in January of 1980, the preliminary mock-up of the new journal "Mariya" was confiscated as well.

The first wave of repressions mainly concerned the instigators and editors of the Almanac. In a later publication of "Woman and Russia" prepared for abroad,[3] Mamonova describes in detail the interrogations she was subjected to in 1979 in the Leningrad office of the regional party committee. Asked about her

[3] This refers to the 1984 publication "Women and Russia. Feminist Writings from the Soviet Union," which also included a history of the first publication of the Almanac in the Soviet Union, entitled: "Woman and Russia: An Almanac to Women about Women," as well as selected articles from Soviet women authors.

participation in the preparation and publication of the Almanac, she replied: "I don't deny it. I am glad that from the day we signed the Helsinki Accords in 1975 we have finally been given the opportunity to give and receive information." In reply she heard: "You are publishing disinformation. Aren't you ashamed? This pathetic little book . . ." (Mamonova, *A Discussion with the KGB* 216).

The scale of repression brought about by publication of the 'pathetic little book' is also described in specific chapters of the English language version published in 1984, as well as in a number of articles and interviews containing relations of events by those who participated in them at the time. The first to be forced to emigrate were Tatyana Mamonova, Tatyana Goricheva, Natasha Malahovskaya, and Julia Voznesenskaya. This editorial board of 'Woman and Russia' left the country in the spring and summer of 1980. They were followed later by the editors of "Mariya"—Xenia Rotmanova and Tatyana Bielyayeva, and in 1981 Elena Shanygina. The editor of the sixth volume of "Maria," Natasha Lazareva, was accused of anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda and sentenced to four years of deprivation of liberty. Altogether she spent five years in prison.[4]

The activists later stated that the arrest, interrogation and even forced emigration did not comprise the worst part of their repressions. Most oppressive was, as it was later dubbed by Voznesenskaya, the 'anti-motherhood' terror applied. Sofia Sokolova's son Andrei was locked up in a psychiatric ward which resembled a prison cell for one month. Other activists, hysterical with fear for the safety of their small children, hid from arrest. The strategy of the security apparatus was made more efficient by their incorporation of an additional factor—their taking into account the sociological and psychological basis for women's behaviour, strengthened by years of Soviet propaganda.

The special situation of Soviet feminists can also be seen from the reaction to the publication of the almanac in foreign feminist circles. It should be noted that it was largely thanks to the efforts

[4] Information concerning the repressions under went by the editors and authors of the Almanac 'Woman and Russia' appear in almost every publication devoted to Leningradist feminism at the end of the 1970s. See, for example, T. Mamonova (Oxford: Blackwell, 1984) I. Yukina (Saint Petersburg: Aleteya, 2007) and Y. Voznesenskaya, *Женское движение в России* [*The Women's movement in Russia*]. 29 March 2013. http://antology.igrunov.ru/authors/voznesenskaya/1145211846.html.

and support provided by Western feminists that a small number of copies of 'Woman and Russia' were preserved. As early as in 1980 special volumes appeared in France, Great Britain, Germany, Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, and in later years it was published in Holland, Japan, and the United States.[5] Nonetheless the first contacts between Soviet and European feminists revealed the deep differences between their ways of understanding the essence of feminism and formulating feminist postulates.

To the Western activists' way of thinking, 'Soviet feminism' was, as Alla Mitrofanova described it "feminism in reverse, turned upside down." (Mitrofanova). The Western feminists were fighting for things which Soviet women had achieved long ago. What could Soviet feminists say, at the turn of the 1980s, about engrained inequality when their grandmothers were attending universities in the second half of the nnineteenth century and the authorities 'gave them' voting rights already in 1917, women worked in the most difficult professions and for decades were encouraged to take part in all spheres of public life and government activities?

"There really is something to be surprised about and something hard to understand," proclaimed one of the woman authors of "Woman and Russia," trying to describe the specific situation of Russian women:

> Here is a society that has proclaimed as its goal the extrication of women from the narrow confines of the family and the inclusion of these women in all forms of public activity. And it would appear that this society had achieved its goal—Soviet women work at the most varied jobs, and many of them are well educated, have a profession, and are financially independent of men. And yet, in this very society, among these very women, a patriarchal social order and its psychology thrive. (Alexandrova 32-33)

The search for the explanation of this "tragic misunderstanding"—as Mitrofanova called it—of Soviet reality became one of the driving forces behind publication of the Almanac.

The Almanac is a collection of articles devoted to the everyday life of Soviet women. Nearly every article illustrates a fragment of reality, presented from a personal experience. The women authors, however, do not stop with the presentation of everyday events. They demonstrate their wide-ranging knowledge of history

[5] See, for example: 29 March 2013. http://www.womanandearth.com/tatyana_v.htm.

and keen perspicacity in analysing legal regulations and observing the evolution of morality, capturing the mechanisms and nuances of the governmental and political pressures put on them. They destroy the long-standing myth that women are supposed to submit to the needs and ideologies of those in power. They also possess the all-important talent of being able to show visually the connections between their own experience and their oppressive dependence on a system that assigns them their roles and status. The articles, very different in terms of their content and form, expose and illustrate the socio-historical links between the events which determine the situation of women in the Soviet Union. They constitute perhaps the most important part of the Almanac, shedding light on the context of the history presented and providing personal reflections which allow the reader to understand the aim of the publicist enterprise and the value of its contents. Along with episodes taken from everyday life we thus find contents focused on the history of women from the time of the 1917 Revolution until the then-contemporary times. The events which occurred following the end of the first wave of women's movements shed valuable light on the reasons for the ideological gap between Soviet and Western feminism, thus helping explain the initial misunderstanding encountered by the women writers and editors of the Almanac in their first encounters with Western feminist circles.

During the period of the Revolution the aims of the social-democrats and the feminist circles were similar. The Bolsheviks principally did not support feminist aspirations, which they regarded as bourgeoisie, and considered the Marxist feminism of I. Babel as too radical. Nonetheless Bolshevik activists such as J. Svierdlov, V. Kuybyshev or L. Trocky understood and appreciated the significance of equal rights for women and the participation of women in the industrial workforce and in party structures. The point of departure upon which both groups were in accord was the Marxist ideology negating the traditional family structure and the monogamous family per se. However, the legal equality of men and women did not resolve the basic problem. In Engels classic 1884 work *Origins of the Family, Private Property, and the State*, he showed that the inequalities reflected in laws were not the cause, but rather the consequences of the economic pressure put on women. The structure of the monogamous family, constituting a guarantee of the private property rights of men, was the factor which pre-determined women's eventual slavery. In this

fundamental social cell, in which the husband is the keeper and lord, women were reduced to the role of wife and servant and, concluded Engels, "a simple machine for giving birth to children" (Engels). In a similar spirit, Kollontai later wrote: "In accordance with the law women received all rights, but in practice they continued to live in the old yoke. They were not equal in family life, enslaved by a thousand details of household responsibility" (qtd. in Yukina 444). The rejection of the typical roles assigned to women as well as the socialization of many spheres of life was supposed to constitute the means to liberate women from male domination, making them socially aware and politically useful.

The fascination of the revolutionary period with Marxism was clearly reflected in the law. On the basis of the decrees of 16 and 18 December 1917, only civil law marriages were recognized, and the decision to enter into or disband a marriage belonged exclusively to the spouses. Along with the secularization of marriage, the decrees gave equal rights to women in the moral and civil spheres. Both women and men were given equal rights to divorce, to property, and to the custody of children. The regulations contained in these decrees were confirmed in the subsequent decree of 16 September 1918, granting child support rights to both parents, regardless of whether the child was the product of a legal union or a free one.

Even more freedoms relative to the sexes are contained in the legal regulations accompanying the decree of 19 November 1926 concerning "The entry into force of a marriage, family, and custody code." The right to an equal division of property is extended to cover the property of person "actually maintaining a marital relation, even if not registered, if such person mutually recognizes the other as a spouse, or if the marital relationship between them is established by a court on the basis of their actual living conditions" (*Decree of 19 November 1926*). Thus any difference in legal consequences between registered marriages and actual partnerships was virtually eliminated. In accordance with the new regulations partners/spouses could retain their original family names or even take the family name of the woman if they so desired, and could maintain separate domiciles. The weakening of traditional family ties was most prominently reflected however in the divorce law. The new regulations permitted divorces to be granted on the request of a single party, requiring only proper service of a registered letter, without the presence of the other spouse in the court. The decree of

19 November 1926 also maintained the equal rights of children born within or outside of a marital relationship.

Subsequent years after the revolution brought about changes diametrically opposed to the early social regime, opening a new phase in the history of feminism. Already in 1918 many women's organizations were shut down. Women became gradually disappointed and ended their activism, or the leading activists were removed from power. The generation of women whose collective efforts formed a self-identity—independent and able to express their aims and tasks—became replaced by a new generation blindly committed to the party and the political regime. In this way, writes Yukina, "[the] ideology of the free individual, with the right to vote and be responsible for herself or himself, became replaced by the ideology of the individual unit, mobilized for the task of building communism, without a voice in the process" (443).

The change in the direction of Bolshevik policies with respect to the 'woman issue' was not accidental. It rather quickly became clear that the progressive programs and ideology of the pre-revolutionary feminists were not included in the party's aims nor among its perceived needs. In response to the dire economic situation the Bolsheviks revised their previous premises. In the face of the growing costs of militarization and industrialization of the state, the issue of social protection was placed on the back burner, and the traditional nuclear family was encouraged and approved. Already at the beginning of the 1930s a new social policy was developing. It found its penultimate expression in the "Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 8, 1944" concerning increasing government assistance for pregnant women, women with multiple children, and single mothers, increasing the protection of motherhood and childhood, and establishing the honorary title of "Mother-hero" and funding the Orders of "Praise of Motherhood" and the "Medal of Motherhood."[6] Despite the expressive and descriptive title of the

[6] See, for example: *Указ Президиума ВС СССР от 08.07.1944 "Об увеличении государственной помощи беременным женщинам, многодетным и одиноким матерям, усилении охраны материнства и детства, об установлении высшей степени отличия – звания "Мать-героиня" и учреждении ордена "Материнская слава" и медали "Медаль материнства"* [*Decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of July 8, 1944 concerning increasing government assistance for pregnant women, women with multiple children, and single mothers, increasing the protection of motherhood and*

Decree, the actual benefits to women were rather illusory. The directions of changes being implemented by the Bolsheviks were obvious—strengthen the institution of marriage as the basic cell of the social organism, reduce the responsibility of the state in caring for women and children, and make women dependent on the traditional family arrangement. In accordance with the Decree single mothers could no longer begin court proceedings to establish fatherhood or seek child support or alimony, the fathers of children born outside the bonds of marriage had no legal responsibility for their offspring, and divorce became a lengthy and costly procedure. The legalization of marriage as the guaranty of a family's material security and social status became once again the essential question faced by women.

According to Ekaterina Aleksandrova, one of the authors of the Almanac, the introduction of the new legal regulations was only one of the methods whereby women were gradually deprived of freedom and made dependent on the traditional patriarchal social order. The whole process lasted for a half a century and was supported by 'a combination of methods of "persuasion" with direct and indirect methods of "compulsion" (34). The ideological mechanism, based on the principle of the 'healthy Soviet family' and communist and administrative morality, became an effective tool for controlling the behaviour of Soviet citizens, particularly women, thus closing the circle. The image of the model mother, wife, and Soviet citizen, moulded by years of Soviet propaganda, defined a woman's destiny and social role and value for the decades to come.

This model image became the chosen object of study for one of the authors of the Almanac. Nina Yarina, in her presentation of the motivations for the publication, opines that the contemptuous and harmful way of treating women in the USSR is the result of a deformed perspective, intolerance, and above all a tendentious approach to women's nature, the result "of one individual's ill will" (224). The theme of 'women' did exist in the press of that era, Yarina adds, but women were promoted only according the pre-defined pattern emphasizing their 'social utility', which showed women in stereotypical roles, extending the already existing forms of exercising social pressure on women. There was no place for

childhood, and establishing the honorary title of "Mother-hero" and funding the Orders of "Praise of Motherhood" and the "Medal of Motherhood]. 29 March 2013. http://www.libussr.ru/doc_ussr/ussr_4500.htm.

'true' portraits of women, nor any space in the press for discussing the wide-ranging nature of women's problems. In her opinion, this schematic and one-sided way of portraying women produced important consequences in their lives. They were viewed through the prism of social demands and expectations, working professionally while having the whole burden of 'women's' domestic tasks thrown on their shoulders, forcing them to fulfil dual roles at one and the same time. These traditional social obligations, taken together with the poor quality of health care, social services, and life in general transformed women into objects of exploitation, deprived them of respect, and gave birth to a whole spectrum of problems. The aim of the Almanac was to address and analyse these problems and put them in the proper context.

The acceptance of this common point of view, i.e. as described by Yarina, explains the women authors' devotion to the publication. It was principally aimed at promoting women's various experiences and 'breaking down' the deformed, stereotypical way in which Soviet women were viewed. But this method of showing the personal experience of the women authors in the context of the moral, social, and economic bankruptcy of the state had far-reaching consequences. Viewed in the wider context, they lost their personal and individual character, taking on a universal human dimension. This was clearly the result of the legal, administrative, and ideological mechanisms used to condition the functioning of society as a whole. All of the histories contained in the Almanac need to also be viewed from this perspective.

The feminists of the end of the 1970s wrote about the difficulties and demands arising from 'ordinary matters', which in their eyes turned their everyday lives into 'hell on earth'. Even the smallest action connected with securing that the basic needs of the family were met required superhuman effort. The lack of foodstuffs and ordinary household products and the low quality of household appliances forced Soviet women to live absurd everyday lives. A woman's attribute was to always be equipped with extra net bags for shopping, since every Soviet female citizen was obliged to be always ready in the event an unattainable product might turn up in the marketplace. The hours spent in lines (often three in one shop) as well as the constant search for basic goods deprived women of time for rest, or personal or professional development. As expressed by one of the women authors, "Soviet men predominate in only one kind of shopping

line—the one for alcoholic beverages" (Mamonova, Matilsky 25). What's more, all family obligations, such as caring for children, elderly, or the handicapped, rested on the shoulders of the female part of the population. In the opinion of the Leningrad feminists, the family thus had become a place for taking unfair advantage of and exploiting women. It might also be noted as an aside that the Soviet regime's support for the traditional family functions arising from the patriarchal social order represented a complete denial of the postulates proposed by Engels one hundred years earlier in his *On the Origins of Family*.

As noted above, the problems faced by women in their everyday lives were exacerbated by the low level of social services. The authoresses wrote at length about the problems of raising children in a state where day care centres and nursery schools were characterized as "the most destructive institutions in the USSR health care system" (Maltseva 112). Medical facilities were not rated much higher. The allocation of health care workers to a given district was decided 'at the top', with many consequences creating burdens on the 'average citizen'. The doctors, assigned a permanent number of patients, treated them as object, devoting more attention to their bureaucratic procedures than the their health care procedures. Many sick persons were essentially forced to pay for private doctors' visits. This problem was made all the more unbearable by the constant propaganda criticizing the Western systems of health care and praising the Soviet model. According to Valentina Leftinova these actions were aimed at calling the attention of society to the virtues of the Soviet state structure, which offered its citizens free health care. The propaganda articles omitted any discussion of the quality of the care offered. "Expensive medical care is inhumane," writes Leftinova, "but anyone can see that it's better to have good medical care which is costly, than poor care which is free" (108).

The women authors found the attitude of doctors and nurses toward pregnant women to be particularly shameful and scandalous. Many places devoted their energies to humiliating women during childbirth, and patients in abortion clinics were treated in an utterly inhumane fashion. In one article they describe very expressively the fate of a pregnant prisoner, subsisting on the standard prison starvation diet, with a value of 37 kopecks per day, giving birth in the presence of prison guards, and then hauled back to her cell two hours after childbirth.

The stories of Soviet women described in the Almanac are all the more valuable because of their expressively drawn images of

the surrounding elements which made up the everyday existence of Soviet women. Basements without windows or daylight turned into communal apartments, or small single apartments shared by several families, deprived of even a minimum of privacy, make up the daily living space of many citizens. The difficult housing conditions determined interpersonal relations, and wielded a destructive force on family and spousal relationships.

The women authors consider women's work conditions to be of great significance. In this area of life every show of independent initiative or attempt at self-realization was doomed to failure. What mattered were connections, acquaintances, and above all social status and the position of the husband. Women performing physical work faced a much more difficult situation—legal work hours were ignored, as were norms and standards relating to women's biological features, nor was any attention given to the fact they performed dual roles as worker and mother. The women authors considered the situation of unmarried women to be the most difficult. Those who resigned from work to take a maternity leave received a monthly government subsidy which was insufficient to survive on for even a week.

The repercussions brought about by the appearance of the Almanac, like its subsequent fate, leave no doubt that the authoresses were not dealing with topics on the fringes of society, but rather touched on questions of fundamental interest to at least one-half of the population—women of all ages and all nationalities, educated women and those without professional qualifications, workers, housewives, women-engineers and students. What's more, it was not only the themes of the articles, focused around the conditions endured by women in the Soviet Union, that was remarkable for its time. Equally remarkable was its open and unfettered approach to discussing reality, revealing the painful consequences arising from the functioning of the patriarchal social order in a state based on an image, promoted over decades, of equal rights for all its citizens. The feminist literature at the end of the 1970s—exposing the truth about the conditions in birth and abortion facilities, rampant alcoholism, family problems, single mothers, female prisoners, and finally the rising trends in domestic violence against women—ripped apart, as Malahovskaya noted, not only the myth of the social welfare state in general. It also debunked the myth about women, substituting it with everyday histories described from the point of view of the women who experienced them.

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THE CURRENCY OF FANTASY: DISCOURSES OF POPULAR CULTURE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

ABSTRACT: The "facts" of international politics constitute the first-order representations of political life and can be reflected in popular entertainment as second-order or fictional representations. This article demonstrates that discourses of popular culture are powerful and implicated in International Relations (IR) studies. The article makes two correlated claims: the first is that the humanist and anthropological methodology often used to analyse pop culture could also be used to analyse international issues, if appropriately contextualized; the second claim is that a nation can manifest its 'discourse' in international politics via its popular culture, as soft power.

KEY WORDS: Popular Culture, Discourse, International Relations, Harry Potter.

Introduction

Nexon and Neumann contend that popular culture intersects with international politics in essentially four ways that are of direct interest to scholars: (1) as a cause or outcome in international relations; (2) as a mirror or medium to illuminate various concepts and processes from IR that helps communicate ideas, for example, about how foreign policy decisions are made; (3) as data or evidence about dominant norms, ideas, identities, or beliefs in a particular state, society or region; and (4) as a phenomenon that actually constitutes norms, values, identities and ideas about international politics, with determining,

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informing, naturalizing and enabling effects.[1] International relations are implicated in, and inter-textual with, popular culture, whose study should not be merely self-confined to the traditional dominant discourses, such as realism and its various offshoots (neo-liberalism and rationalism). Conflicts and cooperation among nations can be observed from heterogeneous perspectives. The writings of scholars such as R. B. J. Walker, Richard Ashley, Michael Shapiro, James Der Derian and Robert Cox have encouraged a deliberate shift to the epistemological premises of the discipline, and resulted in some attention to the issues of representation, discourse, textuality/narrative and culture (Paolini, Elliott, Moran 31). This article provides insight into the images and social systems relayed in pop cultural contexts, and attempts to outline how study of pop culture can offer inter-textual readings of international relations.

Popular Culture: High Data or Low Data?

Popular culture is generally known as "mass culture," "people's culture" or "common culture." It includes popular music, Hollywood blockbusters, soap operas, large-circulation books or magazines, and so forth. It also includes diverse beliefs, practices and objects that are part of everyday traditions, evoking universal enjoyment among different cultural communities. Compared with official documents, data, and statistics, or the speeches and biographies of statesmen or other public figures, popular culture is usually regarded as mere entertainment—low data. It was once seen as an inappropriate source for assessing various social relations on the grounds that such 'low data' were empty, arbitrary and subjective. But, without 'low data', the meaning and significance of 'high data' is difficult to fully comprehend.

Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, there is a growing and marked increase in interest to expand the analysis of popular culture and explore its international dimensions. This development is seen as a new avenue for IR studies and much work promises to be empirically based (Reeves 162).[2] In recent

[1] See the Preface of *Harry Potter and International Relations* 6-27.

[2] Jutta Weldes (1999), who associates *Star Trek* with American foreign policy, is a good example.

years, some analysts have observed that elite cultures cannot now totally dominate a country's social and cultural processes because popular culture has advanced on an unprecedented scale and submerged the elite culture (Yu 205).

In noting this subversive shift (the ascendency of popular culture), it is worth recalling a paradigm of feminist discourse (a broader branch of postmodernism), the attempt to overturn patriarchy (elite culture), as well as the deep-rooted notion that popular culture merely belongs to "low brow," "grass-root" or "low data." Common culture is gradually coming to dominate discourse in public affairs. Now, not only has there been a growing literature on the importance of common attitudes for predicting economic behaviour (Kreps 359-364), but there has also been an increasing interest in the relationship between popular culture and international politics (Nexon and Neumann 6-27). The "facts" of international politics constituting the first-order representations of political life, are reflected in popular entertainment as a second-order or fictional representation. In other words, for several decades, popular culture, apart from merely being entertainment, has also been employed to build consensus, transmit social norms, establish social boundaries and reflect global relations. Popular culture has the potential to offer deeper understanding and amelioration of relations between cultures (Craig 101-105), as well as the opposite.[3]

Take for example, *South Park* (SP), an American cartoon TV series, which is considered as a cynical discourse in the post-ideological era (Weinstock 113-127).[4] It satirizes diverse US domestic and international affairs, and lampoons politicians, celebrities and public icons. The show is filled with irony, parody and dark humour. Since its debut, plots and commentary made in episodes have been interpreted in the framework of popular philosophical, theological, social and political ideas (Hanley 2007). Political commentator Andrew Sullivan has dubbed the growing population of—mostly young—centre-right leaning viewers of the

[3] Take karaoke, for example; its merits as a form of entertainment as well as a tool for doing business in Japan is gaining recognition in the US and Europe, and it is no exaggeration to say karaoke, as part of global popular culture, holds out the promise of improving relations between two civilizations.

[4] The postmodern cynicism is established by the micro-political identity in South Park, neither politically correct nor incorrect, taking advantage of the heterogeneity of late capitalism with the American version of egalitarianism: treat everyone the same.

show South Park Republicans, or South Park Conservatives, and has argued that these people are "extremely sceptical of political correctness but also are socially liberal on many issues," while Brian C. Anderson describes the group as "generally characterized by holding strong libertarian beliefs and rejecting more conservative social policy," and notes that although the show makes "wicked fun of conservatives," it is "at the forefront of a conservative revolt against liberal media" (Johnson-Woods 89-103).

In the episodes, it employs carnivalesque and absurdist techniques to satirise various international issues (Toni 89-103). Nearly all the episodes have some relevant current affairs commentary. In Season 13 Episode 11, *Whale Whores*, it shows, in an ironic manner, bloody scenes of Japanese wildly killing whales and dolphins. In Season 12 Episode 8, *The China Problem*, it satirizes those who claim that China poses a threat. The alleged threat merely originates from a protagonist's dream that China's development (including its booming population and nuclear weapons) would threaten US national security. More ironically, in Season 9 Episode 8, *Two Days Before the Day after Tomorrow*, a global warming state of emergency is declared. The world's largest dam breaks and floods the adjacent town of Beaverton (a virtual city in SP). The plot seeks to reveal with sarcasm and dark humour that global warming is merely a vicious hoax. The break of the dam is totally Cartman's fault.[5]

Who is to blame for the disaster? Nominally on one hand, the episode is ridiculing those elites that have been highlighting the environmental crisis. After a swell of global horror, those warning of global warming in the end engage in a yelling match. However, on the other hand, in a postmodern way, the episode also reminds us of the fact that human activities are having a catastrophic impact on the earth. There is an imbalance or deterioration between humans and the human-influenced environment. The emission of carbon dioxide contributes to the increase in greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. The massive forests that consume carbon-dioxide are vanishing year by year. Overall, the increase of carbon dioxide production and the reduction of carbon

[5] Cartman is one of the 4 protagonists in *SP*. In this episode, he accidentally destroyed a dam after playing in a boat with his friend Stan. However, everyone believed that the destruction had been caused by Muslim terrorists, Russian radicals, or Chinese communists. Finally Stan told the truth to his friend Kyle. http://forums.southparkstudios.com/forum/viewtopic.php?t=33356>.

dioxide consumption are leading to a change in the chemical balance of our atmosphere. Pollution exists and poses a real problem to human beings.

Who should take responsibility? For contemporary international relations, environmental issues have become one of the Gordian Knots to cut. At the Copenhagen conference (2009), all interest groups seemed to show great concern over current global environmental issues. However, ironically, nearly all the states failed to take responsibility for the problems and sought to impose obligations on others. Some interest groups even refused to perform their obligations and tried to circumvent procedures to reach a deal. It is a kind of particularism when a solution to a global problem is blocked because that solution threatens given nations' national interest and security. When nationalism or particularism arises, universalism is rejected. As a result, the optimistic expectations for this conference were not fulfilled. In reality, the environmental crisis does exist, and there is no Cartman to be the scapegoat. Therefore, compared with the dark humour of global warming in *SP*, the elites' decisions at Copenhagen failed to respond to world-wide grassroots anxiety.

Another global issue is reflected in the film *Avatar*. This movie tells the story of human beings' degrading invasion of a planet, *Pandora,* in order to resolve the energy crisis on Earth. The film, together with other sci-fi films exploring similar themes of space exploration, such as *Star Trek* and *Lost in Space*, reflects human beings' ambition for colonial expansion to outer space. Meanwhile, it also alludes to on-going international conflicts that have been caused by the avarice for others' wealth; and suggests that an energy crisis is threatening current and future global development.

The scrambling for energy among nations has been escalating. It is possible to imagine a future in which energy scarcity on earth would encourage the exploration of other worlds for resources. It is also possible to imagine that such exploration would ultimately reproduce the exploitative and non-sustainable relationships that characterise much resource exploitation on Earth.

Inter-textually, international relations are sometimes affected by some pop cultural anecdotes or trivialities. In May 2005, *Newsweek*, an American news magazine, featured a story about American interrogators who had flushed a Koran down a toilet in an attempt to break a detainee suspected of being a terrorist. The story immediately aroused virulent and widespread anti-American

sentiment in Afghanistan. The magazine retracted the story, claiming it was inadequately sourced and probably inaccurate. However, the reaction to the story was a clear setback to American foreign policy, despite the story being retracted (Nexon and Neumann 11-13).

Pop culture does not belong to elite culture and is not officially or ideologically acknowledged as the dominant culture at the expert or official level, yet its discourse has enormous significance in the formation of public attitudes and values (Andersen 51), as well as a profound impact on both domestic and international affairs. Analyses of forms of pop culture, such as literary fiction, films, television series and so forth, have been undertaken within IR studies. The significance of pop culture in contemporary western IR studies is increasingly recognised. Systems of representation manifested in pop culture products take shape in an active exchange process between reader/viewer, context, and text, thereby producing connections and links between texts and political moments (Patricia 9). The meaning of pop culture products is not stable, nor dependent on the intentionality of its producers. Indeed, where fiction and reality differ or converge is sometimes in the eye of the beholder (Pfaltzgraff).

A Case Study: *Harry Potter* and International Relations

Social sciences often make use of literary works to understand how people from different backgrounds and times view the world. This includes analysis of popular fiction. Literature's reflectivity, representation or signification to the outer world offers useful source material to social scientists (Bennet 71-73).[6] In other words, the sets of norms, rules and social relations revealed in stories can shed light on reality. Michael D.C. Drouthas calls attention to:

> A. The transformation of source material without the author's noting, within the text, where the material comes from, but without the author's making special efforts to disguise the source; B. The transformation of source material with overt discussion of the source and the transformation; C. The transformation of source material in which the source is deliberately disguised, of no interest and so not noted, or not recognized by the author.

[6] However, some formalists also call into the question the concerns of the theory of reflection, showing that all literary forms are the semiotic mediation of reality, a signification.

In contextualizing fiction within the current global environment, we can provide insight into people's norms, cultures, and their perceptions of issues from a new perspective. For example, *Harry Potter* (HP) is a work of fantasy fiction with world-wide popularity. It contains a series of "sociological concepts including culture, society, and socialization; stratification and social inequality; social institutions; and social theory" (Fields). If focusing on the political and economic models revealed in the Harry Potter texts in order to see international relations in the real world, we find that, in many cases, the real and the imaginary worlds are quite similar, because the political and economic organizations of the imaginary worlds depicted in popular literary works may be viewed as a mirror to public opinion on the political and economic organizations of real life.

The antagonist, Voldemort, is a villain, tyrannical, dictatorial, and racist. Several people have drawn parallels between Lord Voldemort and some politicians. Even J. K. Rowling has admitted that there is similarity between Voldemort and Adolf Hitler[7] and Joseph Stalin[8]. Alfonso Cuarón, director of *Harry Potter and the Prisoner of Azkaban* compared Voldemort with George W. Bush and Saddam Hussein. Both are selfish, show disregard for the environment, in love with power, and seek to manipulate people.[9] Voldemort's insistence on wizards' blood purity and persecution of mud blood (non-wizards) reveals severe racial discrimination. Andrew Slack and the Harry Potter Alliance compare media consolidation in the U.S. to Voldemort's regime and its control over the *Daily Prophet* (the newspaper in the books) and other media, saying that:

> Once Voldemort took over every form of media in the Wizarding World, Dumbledore's Army and the Order of the Phoenix formed an independent media movement called 'Potter-watch'. Now the HP Alliance and Wizard Rock have come together to fight for a Potter-watch movement in the real world to fight back against Big Volde-Media and prevent it from further pushing out local and foreign news, minority representation, and the right to a Free Press.[10]

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[7] *J.K. Rowling outs Dumbledore*! | PopWatch Blog |publisher = EW.com.

[8] New Interview with J.K. Rowling for Release of Dutch Edition of "Deathly Hallows" – 3. The Leaky Cauldron.

[9] Carla Power and Devin Gordon (4 August 2003). *"Caution: Wizard at Work." Newsweek magazine*. <http://www.newsweek.com/id/152656/page/1>.

[10] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voldemort. http://thehpalliance.org/what-we-do/.

Voldemort is also a terrorist because he sends his Death Eaters to destroy public utilities, murdering the innocents, and forcing children to commit patricide.[11] Indeed, it may be coincidental, but worth noting, that the series has grown in popularity at a time when people around the world have become increasingly fearful of terrorism, and the menace of Lord Voldemort and his followers is paralleled with Al Qaeda. Rowling depicts a similar event to an anthrax poison scare in fiction—the delivery of wizard mail led to the magic ministry arresting many innocent people (Trend 112).

Inter-textually, some scholars have offered parallels to the real-world war on terror. In *HP*, those who tried to destroy Hogwarts were living among common students, hiding in plain sight. The students must learn not to discriminate, while protecting themselves from a stealthy enemy. Similarly, in our world, terrorists mixed unnoticed in the crowd at American airports in 2001, sat unrecognized on a train in Madrid in 2004, rode on a double-decker bus in London in 2005, even boarded a train at King's Cross Station to kill many innocents (Neal 160).

In the context of Bush and Blair's "war against evil" and an intensifying reliance on melodrama in political culture, state power and corporate media are used to organize feelings of national victimization to support agendas of domination (Heilman 177-178).

From another perspective, if reviewing the personal relationships between characters in Harry Potter, the Potterian models may reflect a kind of gift economy, which is quite similar to that in international diplomacy. For example, in *Harry Potter*, Hagrid gained Harry's trust and took him to Hogwarts away from his Uncle's family, who had been ill-treating Harry for eleven years, by sending him a birthday cake and performing magic. It made Harry happy. Harry also helped him in return, such as taking good care of his idiot Giant brother; Harry established a friendship with Ron by buying nearly all the snacks on the train during his first journey to Hogwarts, which allowed poor Ron to enjoy the luxury of food. In turn, Ron's mother also sent Harry some gifts to maintain the friendship, such as a watch, a hand-knitted sweater, and so on. It made Harry, the orphan wizard, feel

[11] Julia Turner "When Harry Met Osama; Terrorism Comes to Hogwarts," 20 July 2005, <retrieved at http://slate.com/id/2123105/>.

at home. Harry would maintain Ron's dignity on any occasion. In return, Ron himself would go with Harry through water and fire.

Pettigrew sold out Harry Potter's parents to Voldemort, the Dark Lord. In return, he achieved Voldemort's trust and became one of his Death-Eaters. Pettigrew also cut off one of his hands to put into a boiling pot as his a gift for Voldemort's revival because the Dark Lord promised him a better hand in return for his gift.

Dumbledore bequeathed Harry, Ron and Hermione some gifts—a sorting hat, a 'deluminator' and a fairy tale book recording the legend of dead hallow. The three gifts are important tools for maintaining their friendship and will to fight Voldemort. In return, the three showed an impregnable allegiance to Dumbledore, so did the members of the Phoenix Order. It is those gift exchanges that promote ideological or moral commitments.

Whether inside or outside fiction, the gift exchange economy is based on the acknowledgement of needs and desires that would strengthen relations between individuals and groups to perform their moral obligations (Mauss 1974).[12] To some extent, the gift exchange economy is not totally free. The recipient should acknowledge the indebtedness and return a gift as well. It is based on Mauss' social practice of gift exchange, who agrees with Derrida's argument that there is a paradox in the concept of gift (Beatty 135-37).[13] The exchanging parties should achieve reciprocity, though the initial gift seems unsolicited. Exchange can encourage reciprocity, though unequal exchange can lead to inequalities. If reciprocity is not achieved, tensions can arise whereas relations of reciprocity can lead to equilibrium and harmony (Cory 160).

In IR studies, Robert Keohane in his *After Hegemony* (1984) divides the gift economy into two forms: specific reciprocity and diffuse reciprocity, which are equated with the transition from the exchange practices of family or gift economy to the practices of a market economy. The former is also identified as prisoners' dilemma or tit for tat exercises in game theory, allowing two players to gain maximum profits through cooperation. However, it is well acknowledged that the pattern is highly idealized and unrealistic, inapplicable in multilateral international trade relations. So the latter is naturally thought as the optimal mode

[12] See the introduction to *The Gift.*

[13] Derrida asserts that the paradox is inherent in the gift exchange. On one hand, the behaviour seems unsolicited; on the other hand, it commands a return, an obligation of reciprocity to the original giver.

to deal with such relations, requiring a general commitment to the set of rules and practices, and showing respect for the interests of oneself and others (Beatty 161). Both are entangled with each other in achieving a mutually beneficial outcome.

In the process of reciprocity, fair trade is expected, which is regarded as the token to build up and maintain friendship, moral obligation and interdependence. However, paternalism can gradually morph into power entrenchment and dominate-subordinate relationships. That is, the reciprocity would be unfair in the end. Pettigrew, like other Death-Eaters, was at first Voldemort's friend. Pettigrew promised to use top-flight magic to exchange support and friendship, so others would become his followers. Eventually Pettigrew is subordinated and calls him Dark Lord. Fudge, and Scrimageur (the two ministers of Ministry Department) all promised Harry that he could get a prominent post in the department on condition that he shifted to their side from Dumbledore's. However prominent the post was, Harry would forever be a subordinate to the minister of the Department. Dumbledore treated every with equality and sincerity. Harry and all the others would still enshrine him as the spiritual leader with unshakable allegiance.

Diverse gift exchanges, in international communications, such as diverse magnanimous international aid, purchasing, low- or zero-rate loans, cash, or other political, economic or cultural cooperation, are all diplomatic tactics to deal with international relations and establish bonds between states. To some extent, Dollar Diplomacy is a good example to fully demonstrate the Gift Economy. It refers to diverse financial aid and even bribery to entice the recipient's support and to maintain good relations between each other, but in essence is not an equal gift exchange. The giver could always be expected to reap more. So it is with the work of fiction, *Harry Potter*. The superior givers, whether Fudge or Scrimageur, Dumbledore or Lord Voldemort, reap far more than their inferiors receive.

In real life, some gifts are humanistic and beneficial for those aided, and help to improve living standards, eliminate poverty, eradicate disease and even promote the process of civilization. However, some are not. Nominally, aid is beneficial. Historically, through various forms of currency control, some powers such as the UK, France, Portugal, and the USA, maintain colonial relationships by retaining total control over monetary and banking systems (Bretton 87-103). And the use of Dollar Diplomacy through international lending and advertising helped

the US to extend its civilization and create a new imperialism, so that even the early supporters became worried. They were concerned that excessive borrowing may cause domestic instability and default in other states (Rosenberg 2003).[14]

However, compared with military occupation and other forms of political intervention, the gift exchange economy is a kind of soft interference, an "invisible infiltration." All behaviours, even altruism, can be reduced to and explanation involving individual rewards and interest, because in practice, actions are motivated by a complex combination of self-interest (receiving the reciprocal gift in the future, self-affirmation, feeling good about ourselves) and group interest (making friends happy) (Klotz 14). The gift economy as a way into the moral dimension of affective bonding is very important in both *Harry Potter* and international relations. At the same time, an unequal gift economy puts human beings into a state of bondage (Harvey 63-65) while evoking emotional and relational intimacy.

To sum up, "imaginative literature and analysis of international relations do not inhabit different worlds [and] they overlap and even intertwine" (Yew 306-308).[15] An analysis of Harry Potter can shed light on international relations—what happens in Harry Potter might be going on, or has taken place, in the real world. Fiction can be considered as a symbolic system, inter-textual with reality. Contextualizing the series into a global network, we could try to bridge the gap between the real and imaginary world to offer some parallels or find similarities in international relations. It's the death of the author. A literary text can be interpreted freely by the reader. Fiction offers insight as to who we are—in terms of nationality and as part of the state in which we live, in a system of international relations. (Sylvester 306).

Conclusion

The article attempts to discuss popular culture's relationship with international relations—how international relations could be reflected and affected by popular cultural. Some detailed

[14] See the comments on the back cover of the book.

[15] Sometimes, nations legitimate the state's boundaries of inclusion and exclusion by citing literary fiction.

examples are provided.[16] The article demonstrates that there is a symbiotic relationship between pop culture and international politics. The association is not subjective, but inter-twined, inter-textual and interactive. It is not arbitrary to "construct discursive objects and relations out of raw cultural materials"; and in combining and recombining the extant cultural materials, the contingent and contextually specific representations can be forged as though they are inherently, necessarily and even accurately connected to the meaning of reality (Fierke, Jørgensen 148). Finally, the article identifies two key, correlated, ideas. The first is that pop culture, as a humanist and anthropological methodology, if contextualized, could be applied to analyse international issues; the other is that a nation could attempt to propagandize its ideology and constitute its discourse in international politics via popular culture, as a soft power.

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[16] However, cultural structures sometimes also constrain actors by preventing certain arguments from being articulated in public discourse or, once articulated, from being favourably interpreted by others or even properly understood. See Ma, Tsai, "Cultural Effects in Policy Process: The Institutional Embeddedness between Neo-Confucianism Thought and the Patriarchal System," presented at the annual meeting of the American Sociological Association, Atlanta Hilton Hotel, Atlanta, *GA*, Aug 16, 2003.

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BOLIVIA UNDER THE LEFT-WING PRESIDENCY OF EVO MORALES—INDIGENOUS PEOPLE AND THE END OF POSTCOLONIALISM?**

ABSTRACT: This article explores the development in Bolivia under president Evo Morales, through a critical postcolonial approach. From a traditional liberal perspective, this article concludes that the liberal democratic system under Morales has not been deepening, though certain new participatory aspects of democracy, including socio-economic reforms have been carried out. In contrast, this article analyses to what extent the presidency of Evo Morales may be seen as the end of the postcolonialism, and the beginning of a new era in which Bolivia's indigenous people finally have been incorporated into the forward development of a multi-ethnic society. By analysing issues such as time, nation, land, space, globalization and language, the conclusion is that the new constitution marks a fresh beginning, one beyond the colonial and postcolonial eras, for indigenous groups, but it will not bring back the old indigenous societies as was dominating the territory of today's modern state.

KEY WORDS: Bolivia, postcolonialism, indigenous people, democracy, socio-economic development.

Introduction

By 2009, as many as fourteen presidencies in Latin America were held by the political left. In Argentina, Brazil, Guatemala, Chile, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Panama, Peru, Paraguay, and El

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Salvador, the reformist and social-democratic presidents have attempted to enact liberal democracy, with modest social and economic reforms. However, in other Latin American countries, such as Venezuela, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Bolivia, the presidents have been far more radical, challenging or trying to challenge the existing political, social, and global economic order (Katz; Walker; Moreno-Brid and Paunovic). These governments are considered radical for several reasons: one is the promotion of radical socioeconomic agendas and how democracy is understood as a concept; in reality, it is the ambition to deepen democracy through peoples' participation in the political and socio-economic spheres. This stands in sharp contrast to the liberal representative democratic tradition and its focus on elections, political rights, and vertical and horizontal accountability (see Dahl).

Bolivia's political development differs somewhat, mainly because the Bolivian left remains strongly supportive of its indigenous people's claims to restore their legacy after several hundred years of colonization and postcolonisation. After independence in the early nineteenth century, the legacy of the former Spanish colonial political and socio-cultural order was taken over by white or *mestizo* landlords, capitalists and the military, and this postcolonial approach endured until the 2000s. In late 2005 this finally changed, when Evo Morales, a former coca-peasant from one of the major indigenous groups, won the presidency. Morales represented the former social movement, *Movimiento Al Socialismo* (MAS, Movement for Socialism), which quickly became the country's most important political party. Morales and MAS secured victory by forming a coalition of supporters, including indigenous peasants, miners, landless peasants, and indigenous movements, and by promoting cultural, civil and social rights. These supporters shared a common hostile view of western globalization, capitalism, and neoliberalism, but lacked any larger representation before the emergence of MAS (Postero, Anria). After Morales took office, a call for a socio-cultural and democratic revolution was made, demanding the nationalization of gas and oil, sweeping agrarian and land reforms, and the creation of a constitutional assembly that could create a more equitable constitution for all citizens in Bolivia—particularly its indigenous people. Morales' objectives could be seen as attempts to bring land, resources, and national identity back to the state enjoyed prior to the colonial and postcolonial periods.

A great amount of previous research on the Latin American and Bolivian political left has focused on issues such as the definition and classifications of the leftist governments: populist, participatory, radical, social-democratic, or the nationalist left (e.g. Castañeda; Walker; Katz; Moreno-Brid, and Paunovic), the left wave as a phenomenon (Castañeda, and Morales), the leadership related to populism, different topics and cases related to the left (e.g. Cameron and Sharpe), and the outcome of leftist policies, their relation to democracy, and a few about the role played by indigenous people (e.g.Lupien; Valdivia; Kohl and Bresnahan). But analysis of the left's ambition to restore the legacy of the indigenous people role in Bolivian society and the outcome of this process remains so far relatively underexplored. In order to be able to conduct this, a postcolonial critical approach will be used. Therefore, the aim of this article is to analyse to what extent to the presidency of Evo Morales may be seen as the end of the postcolonial period, and the beginning of a new era in which the voice and socio-cultural demands of Bolivia's indigenous people finally have been incorporated into the forward development of a multi-ethnic society.

Background: Deepening Democracy under Morales—from a Traditional Liberal View

The second most radical and controversial case of the left in Latin America, after Chávez' Venezuela, has so far been Bolivia (Walker; Maxwell and Sharpe). In late 2005, Evo Morales won the presidency, and the *Movimiento Al Socialismo* (MAS) became the most important political actor. The background of Morales and MAS's victory is that they managed to form a coalition of supporters, including indigenous peasants, miners, landless peasants, and indigenous movements, claiming cultural and civil rights. They all share a common hostile view of globalization and neoliberalism, and lack any larger representation before MAS began to succeed (Postero; Anria). After Morales took office, a call for a socio-cultural and democratic revolution was made proclaiming nationalization of gas and oil, agrarian and land reforms, and that a constitutional assembly would create a more equal constitution.

As in the case of Venezuela, Morales initiated reforms of the political system through the game of the liberal institutional

setting when a new constitution was introduced. After the landslide victory in 2005, an election to a constitutional assembly to rewrite the constitution was held. However, since MAS lacked the required two-third majority to vote for the outcome, the majority of MAS decided that each article would pass with a simple majority, but that the draft of the entire constitution still needed two-thirds majority. In December 2007, the elected constitutional assembly, with the majority of the MAS, voted for major changes to the constitution: The changes would establish both direct and indirect democratic institutions, and Bolivia was about to become an official multi-ethnic country, in which social reforms was supposed to be financed by the national mineral resources. According to Postero ("The Struggle to Create a Radical Democracy in Bolivia" 67), however, some critical voices, mainly from the political right and its allies such as landlords, entrepreneurs and other rich people, were raised on how the constitutional process was run (see also Anria, De la FuenteJeria, Valdivia, Rocabado). As a consequence, some of the richer regions held referendums that resulted in proclaiming autonomous regional status.

However, these referendums were not recognized by the central government or by the judicial system; this was followed by demonstrations and uprising against the Morales administration. The problem was now how to succeed with the constitutional work, since a new constitution by the law needed two-thirds majority pass. A majority of the opposition was against most parts of the constitution meanwhile the regional prefects, in addition, demanded to move the capital from La Paz to the historical capital of Sucre. For a while, it looked like that the constitutional process would end. But after several months of death lock, Morales used a constitutional weapon when he launched recall referendums about his presidency and the regional prefects. Morales won the referendum and several opposition leaders lost. According to Cameron and Sharpe (72) this changed the balance of power in Bolivia; from now on, the leaders of the opposition in Congress, and the regions were more or less forced to negotiate a new draft of the constitution. Finally, on January 2009 the constitution was approved in a referendum by over a sixty percentage margin (Postero, "The Struggle to Create a Radical Democracy in Bolivia" 67).

As a contrast to for example Venezuela where the liberal democratic institutions have eroded in the 2000s, the leftist government under Morales has so far not contributed to

decreasing civil and political rights in Bolivia, nor have any major military coups taken place against the democratically elected government. Though there had been periods of social unrest since Morales took office, such as during the constitutional debate in 2008, and in 2010-11 when some subsidies of gas were decreased, there has been no real attempt of coups, or similar uncivil actions (Anria, Valdivia, Kohl and Bresnahan, Kohl). Nor has there been any decline of liberal democratic institutions, such as civil and political rights.

The key question is, however, to what extent the Morales administration has deepen democracy, and to what extent one could criticize the democratic path. In accordance with the liberal democratic tradition, the voters have continued to vote for Morales and MAS in the completely free fair elections in the constitutional assembly 2006, the recall referendum in 2008, and in the referendum for a new constitution in 2009, and in the presidential- , and Congress elections in 2009. Regard to Freedom House's (2005-2012) index of liberal institutions—civil and political rights, Bolivia is considered as a young democracy, but the recent reports shows that civil and political rights have been stable around 3 (on the scale: 1-7) during the Morales administration. It is the same when Morales assumed office. Regard the horizontal accountability, according to Anria, the congress has weakened its position, but this has to do with the crisis of the party system and the weak and unorganized opposition, rather than as a result of illegal actions taken by the Evo Morale's presidency.

Though the old liberal democratic institutions remain relatively intact in Bolivia, but as we will see the new constitution has broaden and widening the scope of the democratic system, including more opportunities for participation as well as other radical socio-economic initiatives (Montambeault, Lupien, Kohl, Regalsky). In the new constitution, democracy is defined as a combination of direct participatory democracy and indirect representative liberal democracy. Participation takes place through actions such as referenda, citizens' initiatives and prior consultations, while representative democracy is practiced through the regular elections. The new constitution also recognizes departmental autonomy as well as municipal, provincial, and indigenous autonomy. When it comes to economic issues it is stated that Bolivia will have a mixed economy with both

ownership of the state, communes, and private people. It means for example also that natural resources such as gas, oil and water will be administrated in the collective interest through the state. Finally, in addition, the constitution gives the people several social rights to water, food, education, health care and other basic socio-economic conditions.

To summarize, as a result, in accordance with the western liberal tradition, the constitution includes the possibility to deepen democracy, both directly through institutions, but it also gives the possibility for radical reform policies, in accordance with the core content of the new constitution. Though the liberal democratic system has not been developed during the Morales administration, the new constitution and other policies taken have created several mechanisms to increase participation as parallel to the existing democratic system. But the question is how this all relates to the issue about the indigenous people's demand to restore their historical legacy.

Postcolonialism and the Question about Indigenous People

According to Young (2003), a postcolonial status was reached when the former colonial territories received independence in Africa, Asia and Latin America. However, the world did not change very much as a result, and in most cases the same former colonial powers or elites continued to dominate the former colonies after independence. The new, autonomous countries continued to be highly connected to Europe and North America, particularly in regards to capitalism and liberal democracy. This postcolonial approach criticizes the western way of thinking in which developing countries are viewed as being composed of homogeneous people and cultures (Said, Chakrabarty). Quite often this insular view has reduced all countries outside the western powers into a collective third world, or developing world, sharing the same characteristics and facing the same obstacles. In the postcolonial approach, it is recognized that countries outside the western world have heterogeneous peoples and cultures, and that the impact of the colonial heritage and western imperialism vary from case to case. That's why the postcolonial approach includes a reorientation of the way in which knowledge and development are seen, and in particular of the methods by

which people's lives can be analysed. The postcolonial approach challenges the hegemony and biases of western thought.

In this article, instead of discussing Bolivia's development related to western liberal democracy and other socio-economic models, as it was described in the previous background section, this article will use another perspective, the more critical postcolonial perspective. Though, postcolonial thinking raises several concerns (McClintock, Young, McLeod, Krishna, Chakrabarty), which is beyond the scope of this article to further discuss, it is nevertheless, useful to analyse countries such as Bolivia under Evo Morales with a postcolonial approach. It is important to provide a more critical perspective, or another view of the established development and challenge the existing stories or analyses that are founded in the western models, related to for example democratic or socio-economic development (see McLeod). Whereas this article first in the background briefly discussed the deepening of democracy in Bolivia under Morales in the 2000s from a western democratic model, the postcolonial approach is employed to highlight and explore certain additional angles of the Morales presidency, according to the following guidelines.

First, it is essential not to view events as simply occurring after the colonial period ended or to understand the development of these events as representative of a new historical era. This postcolonial approach must be understood, in accordance with John McLeoudand other views, as a concept that recognizes both change and continuity (see also Clifford). For instance, the former Spanish colonialists largely evolved into the new Spanish elite, and these elites maintained power in Latin America even after countries received their formal independence from Spain. In the postcolonial setting the rule of this elite class largely maintained the political and social structures that were established during the colonial time, but in the nineteenth century the western world's political and economic structures of liberal democracy and capitalism were also incorporated, including the role of the United States after the Monroe-doctrine as established. This entire development has all affected the possibility for each country such as Bolivia to develop its own destiny in accordance with older traditions, as represented by indigenous people.

Second, the concept of nation is important. For most indigenous people, nation has always been important as a concept in the establishment of cultural identity, language, and history.

Most indigenous groups identify their nation in a way that does not relate to the western view of formal territorial boundaries or neatly defined states. This creates problems, because a modern western state could then be seen as a mosaic of amorphous, disparate nations; rather the modern state needs to be seen as having been formed by all these nations.

Third, land and space is important, and it implies the same problem as with the concept of nation. The concept of landless people, according to Young (2003) implies, however, that the landless must have owned land in the past. The problem is that most of the current "landless" indigenous people never owned the land now possessed by the colonialists and other people, at least not according to traditional western definitions of legal property rights. Before rich landlords and big *haciendors* came to prominence in colonial Latin America, no one owned land according to the western concept of legal ownership. In fact, nomads and other indigenous people viewed land as something that could not be owned or possessed; rather land could be used and that use was sacred.

Fourth, authors such as Sankaran Krishna (2009) stand strongly against neoliberal globalization. This paradigm rejects the notion that individuals play such important roles in a competitive society; instead its focus is upon the consumption and production of goods on a global market. In addition, globalization is seen as a western phenomenon, as a part of modernization and colonisation, and so postcolonial countries must transcend beyond those limits. Finally, translation—or the use of language—is a key to performing proper analyses (Young). But how can proper translation bee assured? For example, Bolivia's new constitution introduces a concept in Spanish—*Constitución Políticadel Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia*—which originated from indigenous ideas and languages. If any nuance of meaning is lost or misunderstood in the translation from the indigenous language to Spanish—and then to English and other languages—the result could be a lack of congruence with original intentions. But what if certain key components are altered or forgotten altogether? To summarize, what happens if we analyse Bolivia under the rule of the radical left and Morales from this critical perspective?

The Colonial Heritage and the Indigenous Peoples' Demands for a New Socio-economic Order—the End of Postcolonialism under Morales?

On January 21, 2006, after Evo Morales had won the presidential election and before he was officially sworn in as president of Bolivia, he was crowned as Apu Mallku, and accepted the *bastón de mando* from one of the largest indigenous groups, Aymara. The ceremony was held upon holy land in the centre of Tiwanku. According to Kohl (2010) this marked the end of the Apartheid-system that had existed in Bolivia since colonial times, and it represented the end of domination of the white elite (Kohl 107). At his formal inauguration ceremony the following day in the capital of La Paz, Morales eschewed a black tie and wore indigenous dress instead. The political message in his first speech was clear: Bolivia must end the five hundred years of colonialism and begin a new era for the country and its indigenous people. European, university-educated people were relieved of duty when the new government took office. Morales vowed to decolonize Bolivia, remove the western model of democracy and political culture, and replace it with a new Andean policy (Kohl). This cultural revolution relied upon existing political institutions, such as the congress. The question, however, is to what extent the presidency of Morales marked the end of the colonial or postcolonial period and heralded the beginning of a new era in which indigenous people were finally incorporated into a greater multi-ethnic society. In this part, the case of Morales's rule will be analysed though postcolonial dimensions such as time, nation, land and space and the issue of globalization.

First, the understanding of this question relies upon a careful study of Bolivia's historical development, about change and continuity, both during the colonial period and the period from independence up until today. Before the territory today referred to as Bolivia was conquered by the Spanish in the 1520s, the Inca Empire was in control of large parts of the country (see Keen, Klein). After the conquest, Bolivia, or Upper Peru as it was known by the Spanish, became an important source of revenue for the Spanish empire, largely owing to silver mining. Indigenous labourers were pressed into service under slave conditions in the mines. Existing cultural traditions, represented by several major and minor indigenous groups, were completely marginalized. At the end of the colonial period, in the late eighteenth century,

Bolivia was a part of the Vice-royalty of the Río de la Plata, but local political and economic colonial elites held real power in the country. When Bolivia, after some years of struggle for independence, received judicial independence from Spain in 1825, a western-style constitution was drafted (Keen; Klein). A new nation was created within the state of Bolivia, in which Simón Bolívar was glorified as a hero. The elite maintained the colonial culture, including Spanish and other cultural values and customs, such as the Catholicism, but now with the influence of western political institutions. The masses were excluded, since an ability to speak Spanish and economic wealth was required for participation. Most of its main characters remained until Bolivia was democratized in the 1980s (Klein). In the nineteenth century, several caudillos that emerged after the collapse of the Spanish Empire ruled the country. Meanwhile the indigenous people were still forced to work under slave conditions in the mines and at the larger feudal estates, and they were denied access to education and other social privilege.

In the 1940s, the MNR (*Movimiento Nacionalista Revolucionario*) gained influence and looked towards the civil-military government as a route to improving socio-economic prosperity within Bolivia. After being denied victory in the 1951 election, the MNR seized power in 1952. As a part of this "1952 Revolution," the MNR introduced universal adult suffrage, land reforms, access to education for all citizens, and nationalization of the country's largest mines (Keen, Klein). For the first time since the country was colonised, Bolivia had an ambition to attempt the integration of indigenous groups. But these reforms were short lived, and by the 1960s the military was able to reclaim power and maintain elitist order until the first free and fair elections were finally held in Bolivia in 1982.

In reality, therefore, it was not until MAS, the political party supporting Evo Morales, gained power in the 1990s that the hope for a better future for indigenous groups became a reality (Postero, Kohl and Bresnahan). MAS's roots are in the 1980s, when mines were closed and the former miners were forced to switch to coca farming. Most of these countryside miners belonged to various indigenous groups. In the early 1990s, several peasant unions, including indigenous movements, joined together on Columbus Day to honour the "Five hundred years of resistance of the indigenous people." Years of discussion indicated the need for a political voice and so MAS was founded as a political party in

1998. MAS gradually strengthened its political power until, in 2006, it was able to seize control of the country. From its earliest days, MAS promoted a different vision for Bolivia, one which focused on national sovereignty, a clear anti-neoliberal philosophy, and hostility towards the political and economic elites' close connection with the United States. But above all, MAS criticized the modern Bolivia as a failed construction of postcolonialism (Postero, Kohl and Bresnahan). The ruling elite, the oligarchy, was considered anti-national, while MAS promoted the view of a pluri-national state; a state in which the culture and identity of indigenous people, as it existed before colonisation, would prevail. This idea stems from the 1970s *katarista* tradition, which argues that the colonial legacy in Bolivia—from its independence in the early nineteenth century up and until modern times—contributed to the suffering of indigenous people both as a class and as individual ethnic groups.

While a historical description is necessary to understand what happens right now, a second important postcolonial issue is the concept of nation. In the new constitution, Constitución Políticadel Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia (2009), there are several indications of a new state that is far more accommodating to indigenous people. The preamble directly states that Bolivia has left colonialism behind (Lupien). The first article establishes Bolivia as a plural and unitary state: "Bolivia is constituted as a Unitary Social State of Plurinational, Community-Based Law, free, independent, sovereign, democratic, intercultural, decentralized, and with autonomies. Bolivia is founded in plurality and political, economic, juridical, cultural, and linguistic pluralism within the integrating process of the country" (Art. 1).There are several other signs of a new nation as well. In Bolivia, the main languages are Spanish, Guarani, Aymara and Quechua, but Spanish has always been the only official state language. The new constitution gives indigenous people more opportunities, since thirty-seven languages are now recognized as official. In practice, this means that the official authorities across Bolivia are required to use at least two of the official languages in the course of daily work. Another important sign of the changes in Bolivia is religion. Since the Spanish conquest, Catholicism was the official state religion. In the new constitution, however, Bolivia is a secularized state, with no state religion. Though the majority of its people adhere to Catholic beliefs and practice, Protestantism and traditional indigenous beliefs are on the rise. The new constitution states:

"The state respects and guarantees the freedom of religion and of spiritual beliefs, in concordance with their world view. The state is independent of the religion" (Art. 4). To summarize, the new constitution guarantees indigenous people certain collective rights, which in the long run both will have an effect on the nation-building in the state of Bolivia, as well as related to the different nations of each of the indigenous groups.

A third important question the understanding of issues related to land. This involves different parts of the constitution. In Bolivia, the most important one is actually that the new constitution states that indigenous people have the right to their original land territories (Art. 30) and grants the political right of self-government for these territories (Art. 290), including a consulting role to the state in regards to non-renewable natural resources on these lands. The constitution further states that natural resources belong to the people of the country, and establishes that the state shall administer the resources for the best sake of Bolivia's people (Art. 311, 349). Symbolically, though, this means that several important natural resources belong to indigenous people, rather than to multinational companies. Another important land issue, which also has to do with tradition and culture, is the growth of Coca. Coca is recognized as an indigenous tradition with medical use. Article 384 about coca states: "The State shall protect native and ancestral coca as cultural patrimony, a renewable natural resource of Bolivia's biodiversity, and as a factor of social cohesion; in its natural state it is not a narcotic. Its revaluing, production, commercialization, and industrialization shall be regulated by law" (Art. 384). A final important symbolic land issue is that the old town of Sucre was assigned as the national capital (Art. 6), though in practice La Paz, the site of the presidential palace and the home of Congress, remained the true seat of the government. Sucre is the historical capital, and the symbol of the old ruling colonial white elite that drafted the constitution of 1825. With the left in power and enjoying the support of most of the country's indigenous groups, and with a strong anti-colonial agenda, the selection of Sucre stands as a message that the modern Bolivia will be autonomous and integrated, in defiance of its colonial and postcolonial past (Postero). The constitutional assembly began its work in Sucre marking a fresh start for Bolivia. As a summary, the new constitution secures the rights of indigenous people to live on and utilize mother Earth as in the old times, before the country was

colonized, and this is a major difference to how it has been during the last centuries.

Finally, the entire constitution could be seen as rejection against economic globalization, modernization, neoliberalism and the role that individuals play in a Western competitive society and on the global market. The constitution gives for example indigenous people, as collective rights, a special status regard to its historical heritage and culture, including language, use of land and minerals and ownership. It prevents privatization of common land and international companies to own and earn money on minerals in the country. According to Lupien (790), the new constitution declaring the pluri-national state guarantees indigenous people strong cultural rights, including the right to live in accordance with traditional norms. Further, Lupien argues, Bolivia supports the indigenous participation in democracy in connection with issues such as natural resources. The key question is whether the new constitution will lead to real, more inclusive policies. It is still too early to judge, since the Morales government has only run the country for a few years with the new constitution in place. But there are several positive signs and the constitution offers many practical implications for future policies.

At least, it is clear, that the voice of indigenous groups, long ignored, has been incorporated into the new constitution. The postcolonial period, in which the colonial elite ran the country with a western constitution and according to their own elitist self-interests, has ended. Still, this has been accomplished through the postcolonial system of western-styled political institutions such as a constitution and political parties. However, a new nation or nations in today's Bolivia will not bring society back to a pre-colonial society, but to some extent it gives indigenous a role to participate in the future destiny of the modern state of Bolivia, as one of the most important collective actor.

Concluding Remarks

Since Evo Morales began his presidency in Bolivia, the constitution has resulted in new participatory dimensions that have deepened democracy in the country and included far more people (i.e. indigenous people) in the reform process. Meanwhile, the liberal representative democratic institutions still remain relatively intact. In 2005, before Morales took office, Bolivia

scored 3 in Freedom House's ranking of freedom; in 2012 it still scores 3 (Freedom House—Bolivia, 2005-2012). One could argue therefore that the democratic liberal institutions have created possibilities for indigenous people to seize power through a political party (MAS), and to make additional policies supportive of future opportunities to establish socio-economic reforms. This is one understanding of the Bolivian development, from a more traditional view.

Another more critical understanding is that Morales has pushed for policies—through the constitution—intended to overcome the colonial legacy as it applies to socio-cultural dimensions and the incorporation of indigenous people into the nation. Still, this has been done through the western liberal democratic institutions, established by postcolonialist with inspiration from the western world (see also Postero).While it is relevant to analyse the entire colonial and postcolonial time periods, a problem exists in determining which period of time Bolivia and its new constitution should be compared against. It is nearly impossible, for example, to view the new plurination of Bolivia in context of pre-colonial times. The problem is that the entire concept of state, land, constitution, and its relation to the concept of nation or nation state, is largely a western construction. For indigenous people, those who lived in the territories now occupied by the modern state of Bolivia, it is impossible to turn the clock back culturally to how life existed before the colonial and postcolonial eras. But if time is understood to result in change, the rule of Morales could be viewed as a new era, one that offers indigenous people a more fair political and socio-economic order, even if it is within the framework of a modern version of western democracy. Bolivia's new constitution takes a more neutral stance on land rights and minerals, one in which these natural resources are owned by all of the people within the plurination. This means that natural resources are considered to be the property of the state of Bolivia—in accordance with the western liberal institutions—but it is not supposed to be owned by private enterprises, nor any international companies, as has been the case historically. In comparison to the past, where private and international companies exploited Bolivian land to make money, the new constitution and policies enacted by president Morales are more in accordance with the indigenous traditions of land use. The name of the constitution—*Constitución Políticadel Estado*

Plurinacional de Bolivia (2009)—is reflective of Bolivia's desire to recall its historical roots within the framework of its modern historical destiny. However, it is beyond the scope of this article to analyse if this creates difficulties in understanding when translating into the different indigenous languages.

To conclude, democracy has been deepening to some extent in Bolivia under the presidency of Morales. Liberal democratic institutions have created more participatory dimensions, giving particular indigenous people more possibilities for inclusion in the democratic process of the country. The new constitution also includes several possibilities for expanded self-government at a local level, particularly for indigenous people. As such the new constitution marks a fresh beginning, one beyond the colonial and postcolonial eras, for indigenous groups, but from a postcolonial perspective regards to concept such as nation, land, space and time; it will not bring back the old indigenous societies as was dominating the territory of today's modern state of Bolivia.

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SPORT IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS EXPECTATIONS, POSSIBILITIES AND EFFECTS

ABSTRACT: The aim of this article is to show how sport can matter in international relations. Sport can be a subject or a tool of international relations. It can be used by states or geopolitical blocks to display their alleged superiority or any other desired characteristic. Governments may desire athletic victories, which are meant to imply, for example, the power of the state and its political and economic system. Participation in sport can also be used for political reasons on an international scale; a number of political objectives can be achieved by states by participating (or not) in sports events. Not only is sport affected by a country's policies, but on certain occasions sports events can influence states.

KEY WORDS: sport, politics, international relations, sport as a political tool.

Sport can be considered as one of the most exciting modern phenomena—modern because, in its current form, it was born no longer than 150 years ago, exciting because it wins the interest of millions of people. It is estimated that the London 2012 Olympic Games' opening ceremony was watched on TV by 900 million people.[1] Poland's most viewed television broadcasts were the European Football Championships in 2012 in which the opening match between Poland and Greece was watched by 15.5 million viewers, and the Salt Lake City 2012 Olympic ski jumping

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[1] London 2012 opening ceremony audience hit 900 million predicts IOC, 7 August 2012. Web. 4 October 2012 <http://www.independent.co.uk/sport/olympics/news/london-2012-opening-ceremony-audience-hit-900-million-predicts-ioc-8015361.html>.

contest, watched by 14.5 million viewers.[2] No wonder sport has become very attractive for business because of its commercial possibilities. Sports stars earn millions for advertising products, and sport broadcasts are among the most lucrative for advertisers. The great popularity of sport could not be missed by the world of politics. If sports celebrities and victors can be profitable for business, then they can also be good for politicians searching for voters' support, for state leaders searching to foster national pride, and even for political systems in need of accentuating their superiority.

The aim of this article is to show how sport can matter in international relations and to make a prognosis for the future relationship between these two fields. The international sports system can even be seen as a part of the international political system, which means that both systems mutually influence one another and cannot be examined apart from each other, according to system theory. The author will therefore try to describe both how sport influences international politics and how politics influences sport.

Firstly, though, the subject of this article needs to be defined. Sport is, in fact, a term that relatively often tends to be confused. One can distinguish recreational sport, high-performance or elite sport, amateur sport, professional sport, etc. Recreational or leisure sport is performed by the largest group of people, and its main purpose is to enhance society's health (*Wybrane zagadnienia z podstaw rekreacji i turystyki* 67). Elite sport, on the other hand, is meant to be more demanding and sophisticated, includes hard training and requires high quality performance, and is often a full time job (Aman 660). In other words, most sport that can be seen on television and that gains the attention of both media and spectators at sports venues is elite sport, and it is the dimension of elite, high performance sport's physical rivalry that is the subject of this article. High performance sport can, however, have different levels: regional, national and international. For the purpose of examining the associations between sport and international relations, it is international sport that will be my focus.

[2] "TVP podała wyniki: rekord oglądalności pobity!," 9 June 2012. Web. 4 October 2012 <http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/621527,TVP-podala-wyniki-rekord-ogladalnosci-pobity>.

Sport and international relations should have little in common, apart from an international dimension. However, it is commonly known that world politics influences sport, and the opposite, sports events can sometimes catalyze political ones. It was not always like that, however. It is important to outline that sport as a social phenomenon is relatively new. Although its origins can be dated back to ancient times to the sports of Ancient Greece, modern sport appeared in the middle of the nineteenth century. Initially it had a very amateur character and was not popular, so its significance for international relations was rather marginal. That situation changed radically in the first half of the twentieth century, mainly due to the International Olympic Committee and the Olympic Games, which transformed sport to a higher level. The growing popularity of sport during this time can be easily illustrated by the number of athletes participating in the Olympics. A remarkable increase can be observed: Athens 1896—241 participants, Paris 1900—997, Los Angeles 1932—1332, Berlin 1936—3963.[3] The rising popularity of sport could also be seen in the media. Taking British newspapers as an example, *The People* in 1924 sold 600,000 copies with 4 pages of sport, whereas in 1946, 1/3 of each issue was about sport and sales rose to 4,600,000 copies (Holt 309). This radical increase in interest in sport lead to an enhanced role of sports in international relations. As Jay Coakley stated, when sport gains popularity, government involvement usually increases (Coakley 439). Jean-Loup Chappelet and Emmanuel Bayle explain the rise of government interest in sport, claiming that sport became a socioeconomic phenomenon that affects a remarkable proportion of the population (Chappelete, Bayle 20). It can be stated then that the mutual influence between sport and international relations was initiated when sport gained vast popularity, which allowed politicians to profit from it and sometimes even sports officials to influence politicians.

Sport can play a key role in international relations in various ways. It can, for instance, be used by states or geopolitical blocks to display their alleged superiority or any other desired characteristic. That type of sport-international relations tends to be the most common and the most significant at the same time.

[3] The exact numbers of participants in the Olympic Games differ according to various sources. The author decided to cite information publicized by the International Olympic Committee on its website. Web. 8 October 2012 <www.olympic.org/olympic-games>.

In that context, governments may desire athletic victories, which are meant to imply, for example, the power of the state and its political and economic system. That aspect is exceptionally important for non-democratic countries. That message can have both an internal and external dimension. The first one is addressed to the state's society, whereas the second is connected with international relations. Hosting sporting events can in this aspect play a very similar role to sports victories themselves. Nowadays organizing the most popular sports events such as the Olympic Games, Football World and European Championships, etc. are enormous ventures. Therefore, only rich and powerful countries are able to cope with hosting them. What is more, some countries, the ones that are chosen to host world sports event, try to organize the best event of its kind in history, and show at the same time their superiority and power to the world.

Participation in sport is also a very important aspect of sport's connections with international relations. Although at face value sport is a competition among athletes, when we look at its international dimension, athletic competition is less important than competition among nations. A number of political interests can be achieved by states by participating or not participating in sporting events. This can be vitally important for newly emerging states struggling for international recognition. On the other hand, resigning from such participation a —sports boycott—can also be used as a powerful means of influencing other countries or sports organizations.[4]

As mentioned, the correlation between sport and governments is not one-way only. On certain occasions it was sport that affected the main actors in international relations, the states. Organizing great sports events has enormous economical, political and social significance for the host country. The choice of which country or countries are granted the right to host a sporting event belongs to a sport organization, which obviously represents the world of sport. Situations whereby sports events triggered political events have also occurred, such as the Football War between El Salvador and Honduras (Stradling 198).[5] It is worth noting, then,

[4] Sports organizations should also be considered as actors in international relations, as they can both affect and be affected by states' politics.

[5] In the late 1960s, relations between Honduras and El Salvador were tense due to immigration and border disputes. Both countries met in the football World Cup Qualifiers in June 1969. The matches ignited a growing hatred and shortly afterwards war broke out.

that the dependence between sport and international relations is mutual.

Sport's role in international relations can be seen most clearly when countries struggle for victories. Obviously they do so to achieve certain political goals, and manifesting power is probably the most important. The explanation is relatively easy. It is quite difficult to achieve sports success on a world scale. Sport has become so professional and sophisticated that considerable amounts of money and many people are behind every victory. Hence, not every country is capable of achieving such a level in sport, and, among those that are, there can be harsh competition for winning even more.

The struggle for achieving sport victories that can be used for political purposes takes different forms One of the most popular, and probably the most effective at the same time, is the Olympic Games medal table count (Senn 108).[6] Why is this so important? The Olympics are the biggest sporting event in the World, with the greatest number of spectators, TV viewers, and athletes. It is also a multisport event, so during the games athletes compete in many different sports. That gives a perfect statistical opportunity to decide who is the best. Defining a country's power by its sports abilities seems the fairest. An occasional win can always be a matter of fortune or accident. A country can win an Olympic gold due to having an exceptionally talented athlete who could have been born anywhere. Wins can also be achieved by a sportsperson who was naturalized or who lives and trains abroad and only participates in sports contests under their homeland's flag. There can also be states with extraordinary traditions in particular sports, such as Jamaica in short distance running or Kenya and

[6] The medal table takes into account medals won by a country during a sports event, for instance the Olympic Games. There have been many ways of counting, some also taking into consideration further positions rather than just the top three. In general though, the most common way of counting positions in the medal table is taking gold medals into account. If more than one country have the same number of golds, silvers are counted, and if there remain draws, bronze medals are taken into consideration. It is worth mentioning that the Olympic medal table is unofficial in a way. The International Olympic Committee does not approve constructing them, according to the modern olympism rule of separation from politics, and constructing the Olympic medal table obviously has such a connotation. As the IOC has stated repeatedly, the Olympic Games is a contest between individuals.

Ethiopia in long distance running. Their victories in these disciplines do not necessarily mean political power. It is much more difficult to achieve victories in many different events. According to various researches, the Olympic medal table is affected by such factors as population, income per capita, advantage of being a host, and the political system (Bian 37-38). These factors could obviously be at the same time used as determinants of a state's overall power, which could confirm the thesis of the Olympic medal table as a reflection of a country's power.

The Olympic medal count has not always played an important role in international relations. During the first years of the modern Olympic Movement, sport did not draw enough attention. Although countries competed with the aim of winning the most gold medals for the first time in London in 1908,[7] the medal table really mattered for the first time in 1936 during the summer Olympic Games hosted by Germany under Adolf Hitler's rule. Nazi ideology praised physical fitness, so sports victories during Berlin's games seemed to be more important than in previous games. In fact, Germans saw it as a matter of honour. As Hitler stated, by performing "honourably," Nazi Germany could show the world that its commitment to breeding and training a new elite of athletic warriors was rendering the entire nation physically and spiritually superior to the "soft and decadent" Western democracies (Large 165). This quotation perfectly summarizes the purpose of winning in sports—the state shows both to the world and to its own society that it is powerful and strong, and this is especially important when that country is in conflict with other states, and Germany at that time, at least ideologically, was indeed in such a conflict.

Nazi Germany did achieve its goal and won the Olympic medal table during the Games that it hosted. The Germans won 33 gold medals, considerably more than the second place Americans—24 (Miller 613). They owed it to special preparations, the popularity of sport in Germany, and partly to not fully obeying the amateur principle by giving athletes additional, forbidden vacations before the Olympics (Walters 136, 336). Nevertheless, despite some mild controversies, Nazi Germany achieved its goal of promoting the

[7] The United States of America and Great Britain competed to win the most medals.

Aryan race and its undemocratic political system at the same time.

A whole new level of Olympic medal table competition appeared with the outbreak of the Cold War. In the years following World War II, international relations acquired a bilateral character, with the USA and Soviet Union as major superpowers. Both were in ideological conflict, with the Americans representing liberal democracy and the free market, and the Soviets representing communism. Both had nuclear weapons in their armoury, so a "hot war," apart from some peripheral conflicts, was rather undesirable due to the risk of complete mutual annihilation. Alternative means of competition were then needed, and the sports race became one of them, along with the space and arms races.

The Soviet—American sports race began just as the USSR joined the "Olympic family" and debuted during the Helsinki Olympic Games in 1952 (Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society* 367).[8] It was almost certain that these games would mean mixing politics with sport. Soviet leaders demanded victories, as A. Nikolai Romanov[9] recalled in his memoirs: "Once we decided to take part in foreign competitions, we were forced to guarantee victory, otherwise the 'free' bourgeois press would fling mud at the entire nation as well as at our athletes. In order to gain permission to go to international competitions I had to send a special note to Stalin guaranteeing victory" (Riordan, "Rewriting Soviet Sports History" 249). The desire for victories was at the same time the main reason why the Soviets had resigned from participating in the previous Olympics in London in 1948. Americans, on the other hand, dominated world sport by the 1950s, so the competition was fierce.

The Olympic debutant Soviet Union brought to Helsinki athletes in all sports apart from field hockey (Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society* 367), and the western press described their preparations as the most secret in the history of sport ("How Reds 'Mobilized'" 16). The USSR was especially successful in weight lifting as well as in women's sport, which was not well financed in the West. Many of the medals won by the Soviet Union and its

[8] Earlier, the Soviet Union resigned from participating in the Olympic Games and international sport as a whole, calling it bourgeois.

[9] Soviet Chairman of the government Committee on Physical Culture and Sport.

satellite states were won by women, and those medals were of the same value as those won by men (Jay 55). The Americans, on the other hand, had the advantage in track and field and swimming (Guttmann, *From Ritual to Record* 97-98).

The Helsinki Olympics medal table was won by the USA with 40 gold medals. The USSR was second with 22 gold medals (Miller 612-614). Using different ways of calculating the table, the Americans were also victorious apart from in one case, where there was a draw. Nevertheless, the Soviets in their own media called themselves winners by creating more alternative ways of counting or by citing false figures (Tikander 143, *Kultura Fizyczna i Sport w Związku Radzieckim* 10). It was, however, only for propaganda purposes. But in terms of international relations, the sports race had definitely started. Americans won the first confrontation, but the great performance of the Soviet national team could definitely be seen as a predictor of their future supremacy, especially taking into consideration that it was their debut.

The Helsinki Olympics were just the beginning of a series of fierce sports confrontations during consecutive summer Olympic Games.[10] The victories were swinging from one superpower to another, as the table below shows:

Table 1: Summer Olympic Games medal table positions of the USA and the USSR

Olympic Games	USA rank	USA medals	USSR rank	USSR medals
Helsinki 1952	1	40-19-17	2	22-30-19
Melbourne 1956	2	32-25-17	1	37-29-32
Rome 1960	2	34-21-16	1	43-29-31
Tokyo 1964	1	36-26-28	2	30-31-35
Mexico 1968	1	45-28-34	2	29-32-30
Munich 1972	2	33-31-30	1	50-27-22
Montreal 1976	3	34-35-25	1	49-41-35
Moscow 1980	Did not start		1	80-69-46
Los Angeles 1984	1	83-61-30	Did not start	
Seoul 1988	3	36-31-27	1	55-31-46

Source: Miller, David, *Historia Igrzysk Olimpijskich i MKOl. Od Aten do Pekinu* 1894-2008, Poznań 2008, 614-617.

[10] The Summer Olympics were taken into account because during the Winter Games this bilateral competition was never that fierce.

The USA and the USSR remained at the forefront of the Olympic medal table until the end of the Cold War Era, most of the time being ranked first or second, with a slight advantage to the Soviets. Some games turned out to be the arena of particularly fierce competition, such as the Melbourne Games. This sports event had a special political background; the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis occurred in the same year. The atmosphere was tense and the Games were like a giant match between the American, Soviet and Australian teams.[11] New, scientific methods of selecting and training athletes were used in preparation for the Games (Młodzikowski 204). It was obvious that the "sports cold war" had become important not just for communist countries. The West began to care as well. The American press often claimed that the Soviet Union won the Olympics only by dirty determination and without any of the democratic joy and enthusiasm that characterized American champions (Jay 55). Such propaganda was present all the time on both sides. After the Rome Games in 1964, the Soviet newspaper *Pravda* explained Soviet supremacy as follows: "The secret of our victories is sport for the masses, for the people. For instance, Americans did not win a single medal in gymnastics—a very important sport for general health" (Maraniss 384-385). Soviets claimed openly that Olympic victories spoke for the power of the socialist system (Senn 146).

Sport at that time was a matter of international prestige. The Americans seemed to have noticed this at the beginning of the 1960s, when the domination of the Soviet Union, and communist countries more broadly, became more evident. Americans managed to win the most gold medals during the two following Games in 1964 and 1968, but it is important to remember that American individual victories did not necessarily mean communist losses. In Mexico, for instance, 6 Eastern European countries apart from the USSR won 120 medals (40 gold) while the 6 best Western European states won 81 (25 gold) medals (Riordan, *Sport in Soviet Society* 370). The situation changed again in favour of the Eastern bloc in the 1970s, especially after the 1973 oil crisis that naturally hampered Western sport in a much

[11] The role of sports event host is worth mentioning here. Host countries usually achieve good results. It also has its political significance, as the wins are conducted in front of the eyes of their own people. International relations are more connected to organizing sports events, which will be discussed later.

greater way than Eastern sport. Communist countries had economies centrally planned, and since sport was seen as an important propaganda instrument, money simply had to be found. The 1980s, the end of the Cold War Era, can be called the era of sports boycotts, so the medal table rivalry was not so fierce, maybe apart from the Seoul 1988 games, where communist countries simply confirmed their advantage.

It is worth noticing that the USA was ranked third twice, losing not only to the USSR, but also to another communist state—East Germany (GDR). This small state needed to struggle for international recognition due to the fact that the Western World recognized West Germany. The GDR had little influence in that conflict, so its leaders decided to use sport as a means of gaining international attention, prestige and eventually recognition. Once East Germany was permitted to participate individually in international sport,[12] it amazed the world with its performance. However, many of its wins were unfortunately gained due to the use of drugs. It was not proved at that time and the propaganda effect was achieved.

The end of the Cold War Era did not mean that the significance of the Olympic medal table was dramatically reduced. International relations have changed from bilateral to multilateral, but countries can still gain international prestige by performing well in sport, and, as was mentioned, the Olympic medal table is probably the most transparent evaluation of sports competition. In current times China is probably the state that most strongly desires to win the Olympic medal table due to political reasons. The host of the 2008 Summer Olympics not only wanted to organize the best games in history, but also sought to achieve a sports victory. Once Beijing was made host of the 2008 Games, a number of government actions were undertaken in order to win Olympic medals in various classifications (Houlihan 46). Sports events were divided into groups according to the chance of winning, all focused on winning gold medals, those that matter the most in the medal table. The most promising athletes were sent to special venues where they could prepare for the Olympics with the help of scientists and coaches (Lewandowski). All was

[12] At first, international sports organizations recognized West Germany only and did not allow the GDR to participate. In the 1950s there was a joint German team in world sport. East Germany could first compete separately in the Olympics in 1968, and in 1972 it was allowed to use its national flag and anthem.

handled within an Elite Sports System called Juguo Tizhi, which was based on the old Soviet model (Hong, Wu). There was only one aim—winning the Olympic medal table, while at the same time defeating the United States, the world's greatest sports power in past years.

The Chinese fulfilled their aim and won the Olympics with 51 gold medals. The USA was second with just 36 gold medals. On the whole, the Americans won more medals (China—100, USA—110)[13], but, as was mentioned, the Chinese focused on winning gold medals as this matters most, and the results proved them to be successful—most of the medals won by them were gold. Accusations of unfair actions by Chinese athletes appeared, but none of them were confirmed, so it can be stated that China simply won the Olympics it hosted, fulfilling its aims.

In more recent times, a similar process can be seen taking place in the latest Summer Olympics host country—Great Britain. There are, however, a number of differences in comparison to earlier examples. Firstly, the struggle for a medal table victory usually concerns non-democratic countries, or at least democratic ones in rivalry with non-democratic ones. The UK was in neither situation. It's one of the oldest democracies and, in the race for sports victories, does not necessarily have the aim of winning against any particular state. It was more a matter of national pride. As a matter of fact, the 2012 Olympics host performed relatively poorly in the post Cold War Olympic Games. Concerning the Olympic medal table, it was 13th in Barcelona 1992, 36th in Atlanta 1996, 10th in Sydney 2000 and Athens 2004 (Miller 617-619). In 2005, London was chosen as the host city for the 2012 Olympic Games, and at that time a completely new sports policy was introduced in Great Britain. A huge amount of money was invested in Olympic sports preparations. Before the Beijing 2008 games it was between 235 and 265 million GBP, while for the 2012 Olympiad, Britain invested—264 million GBP. The money came from the National Lottery, which funded Olympic sports preparations since the Atlanta Games at which Britain performed so poorly (Anderson).[14] As a result, in Beijing UK came in 4th with 19 gold medals, while in London it did even better, finishing

[13] Web. 15 June 2009 <http://en.beijing2008.cn/>.

[14] House of Commons Debate. 6 October 2008. Web. 18 January 2009. <http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200708/cmhansrd/cm081006/debtext/81006-0001.htm>.

3rd with 29 gold medals and 65 in total.[15] It was the UK's best result since the 1908 Olympics, also in London. What were the political and social results? Most of all, the Games encouraged a rise in national pride. As the post Olympics poll showed, the society's association with UK's flag rose by 10% and is now at 84%, a figure just 1% behind the bond with the monarchy (Hennessy). These figures seem to be a good indication of how sports victories can affect societies, in this case in relation to national identity.

Naturally, sports victories that matter politically are not only those counted in the Olympic Games medal table. Other sports events are also important, such as, for instance, World football championships. There is also another sort of athletic competition important to international relations—prestigious wins over opponents who can be described as political foes. Such events evoke extraordinary emotions among both viewers and athletes, and a win is considered not only as the win of a sports person or a team, but of a whole country, sometimes even of a geopolitical bloc or socio-political system.

No wonder plenty of such politically affected contests took place during the Cold War. But one of the first of such events occurred earlier, before World War II—two boxing fights between American Joe Louis and German Max Schmeling, in 1936 and 1938. American president Franklin D. Roosevelt said to Louis: Joe, we need muscles like yours to beat Germany (Ferenc 30-31).

After the Soviet Union joined international sports competitions and the Olympic Games, single sports contests with political meaning appeared in vast numbers, and Soviet-American clashes amazed fans and spectators. At the Helsinki 1952 Olympics, one of them was the rivalry between Horace Ashenfelter (USA) and Vladimir Kazantsev in the steeplechase. The contest was very exciting, and Ashenfelter won due to the fact that Kazantsev fell while jumping the final hurdle, but the run was even more interesting due to the fact that the American was an FBI agent and the Soviet was a policeman (*Kronika Sportu* 480).

Team sports were always very important in terms of the political prestige of a win. Basketball was one of the most exciting competitions between the USSR and the USA, and those two teams played against each other in Olympic finals five times. The

[15] Web. 30 June 2009 <http://en.beijing2008.cn/>, Web. 15 October 2012 <http://www.london2012.com/>.

most exciting game took place in 1972 during the Munich Olympics. After a very controversial referee's decision and two replays of the last seconds of the match, the Soviet Union won, but the Americans declared a protest. After 14 hours of deliberations, a jury consisting of Polish, Hungarian, Cuban, Italian and Puerto Rican members decided that the USSR was the winner of the match, voting by 3-2 (Stradling 138-139). Although the vote was secret, the nationality of the judges may have played a role. The American players did not accept their silver medals. The match is remembered as one of the most controversial, and Americans still consider its result as unjust.

Among American-Soviet clashes, a hockey match from the Lake Placid 1980 Olympics is also worth mentioning. In a match remembered as a *miracle on ice*, the American amateur team won 4-3 over a pseudo amateur Soviet team, considered to be the best in the World, having won 14 out of 17 annual World Championships since 1963 and consecutively 4 previous Winter Olympics (Miller 599, *Kronika Sportu* 899). Besides the surprising victory, the match was politically important due to its international relations aspect. Shortly before the Lake Placid Olympics, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan, which evoked intensive anti-Soviet reactions in Western societies and at the same time ended the détente period. Although odds for the win were poor, American media expressed deep hopes for a victory and, once it happened, it was described as the symbol of an American victory over the Soviet Union in the Cold War, while American president Jimmy Carter described the hockey team as modern day American heroes (Billings, Butterworth and Turman 137, Hill 126).

During the Cold War, prestigious sports wins did not apply only to the USA and the USSR, but also to other countries of various geopolitical blocs, and sometimes also within them, although such examples had more informal and spontaneous aspects than governmental dimensions. One of them worth mentioning took place in 1952 during the Helsinki Olympic Games. The Soviet Union and Yugoslavia were in conflict after the latter's leader, Josip Tito, introduced a more independent policy. Football teams of these two states played against each other twice during the games. The first match ended with a 5-5 tie despite a 5-1 Yugoslavian lead. Soviet authorities considered the second match as extremely important. Before it, Joseph Stalin sent a telegram to the team, encouraging it to win. On the contrary,

the Soviets lost 3-1, immediately after which the Soviet team representatives were summoned to Moscow (Tikander 143). It is worth noticing that Soviet media did not report the loss until 1953, after Stalin's death (Edelman). That match was no exception. In 1956, during the Summer Olympics in Melbourne, the Soviet and Hungarian water polo teams met in a semi-final match. The international context was very important here, as just before the Games the Soviet Union invaded Hungary. The atmosphere was very tense, and the match was full of fouls, especially with the Soviets as aggressors. But after Ervin Zador, one of the Hungarian players, was hit and started bleeding, Australian viewers supporting Hungary were outraged and the Soviets had to be defended by the police (Grzegrzółka 23, Rinehart 131). The match ended with a 4-0 victory for Hungary, the team that later won the whole tournament. This was a classic example of a political clash inside a geopolitical bloc that was exemplified in a sports match, although it probably was not expected by the governments of the two countries.

After the Cold War ended, politically important sports contests became increasingly rare and definitely had a milder dimension. Nevertheless they still happen and still are usually connected with particular political events. The Beijing games, for instance, began on the same day as war between Russia and Georgia. It was expected that athletes from the two countries might express their mutual animosity if they met, even though the International Olympic Committee strictly forbids such actions. The world media drew attention to a women's beach volleyball match between Russians Natalya Uryadova and Alexandra Shiryaeva and Georgian Saka Rtvelo.[16] However, on the pitch a political clash could not be seen, partly because the Georgian athletes were in fact Brazilians with no ties to Georgia apart from their passports. Despite that fact, the international media were exceptionally interested in the match. Probably more politically charged was a World Cup football match between the USA and Iran in 1998. It was described by the US Soccer Federation President as the "mother of all games." Tensions were high. Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei ordered the Iranian team not to walk towards their American counterparts to shake hands before the match even though according to FIFA rules Team B (USA was Team A) was

[16] DS: "Wzrasta nieufność wobec Gruzji," 14 September 2008. Web. 9 June 2009 <http://www.wprost.pl/ar/138609/DS-wzrasta-nieufnosc-wobec-Gruzji/>.

supposed to. Iranian supporters also managed to piece together a huge banner around the pitch, but TV cameras did not show it.[17] The match itself, however, was peaceful and ended with Iran winning 2-1. In modern times, however, such matches have become very rare and, in terms of prestigious sports clashes, they tend to be seen as more a thing of the past.

Hosting great sports events has fairly similar objectives to winning on the sports field. As was mentioned above, organizing such competitions as the Olympic Games or the Football World Cup and European Championships requires plenty of investment, and not every country can cope with it. Certainly there are a many motivations that drive countries or cities to apply for hosting such events, most of which are of economic and political origin. States and cities usually desire to make a profit out of such events, although it is very difficult these days. The turnovers can come from television rights, ticket sales, and sponsoring. Countries or cities organizing sports events promote tourism as well, with the hope that sports fans will visit them again and recommend them to friends and families. Sports events organizers may also create a positive image that can help, for instance, in attracting foreign investment. Finally, there can also be political reasons for hosting sports championships. Organizers sometimes decide to try to host the best event of its kind in history, which considering the difficulties in hosting at all, proves a country's power, so hosting plays the same function as sports success. Here also the undemocratic factor seems to appear—non- democratic states seem to try to display their strength and power more often.

The first instance of such a case were the Berlin 1936 Olympic Games, mentioned above, organized by Nazi Germany. The Germans decided to amaze the world with architecture and infrastructure. The Olympic Stadium, prepared for the 1916 Olympics which did not occur due to World War I, was completely rebuilt. Organizers were also proud of the swimming pool and the Olympic Village. Transport was described as perfect, and new technologies were introduced, such as the photo-finish and television broadcasts (Miller 125). Germany and Berlin were supposed to show Germany as a country of peace and happiness. Berlin was decorated with Olympic and Nazi flags, and Berliners

[17] "Top 10 football Stories: 3- Iran vs USA," no date. Web. 15 October 2012 <http://starscene.dailystar.com.lb/world-cup-scene/2010/07/top-10-football-stories-3-iran-vs-usa/>.

were told to smile and be kind to visitors. This plan turned out to be successful, and the Western press quickly began to praise Germany as a country of happiness and wealth, and Hitler was described as one of the greatest living political leaders, and Germany as a hospitable, peaceful state (Walters 269, 333).

The Moscow 1980 and the Beijing 2008 Olympics have many similarities to Berlin. Both of them were organized by undemocratic states, and both were meant to be the best games in history and showcase the host countries[18] as great powers. Both countries also decided to use architecture for showing the greatness of the Games. The Soviets renovated Lenin's Stadium, built a Palace of Sports, and demonstrated their famous outstanding cuisine (Miller 259). The Chinese, on the other hand, were proud of their "Bird's Nest" stadium and swimming pool described as the "Water Cube." Also outstanding were the opening ceremonies, which are in fact a perfect way of sending particular messages to the world, as everyone is watching. The Chinese message, for instance, was to pay tribute to Chinese civilization, but also to show China as a peaceful state: "Don't worry, we mean no harm," as the *New York Times* described it (Yardley).

Sometimes sending a message to the world can be the main objective of sports event organizers. Such an impression could be derived from the Munich 1972 Olympic Games, though they are remembered for a terrorist attack. By hosting the Games, the West Germans wanted, in a way, to improve their image after the full-of-politics Berlin games, and at the same time use the occasion as a means of global reconciliation after World War II. Therefore, apart from great organization, the Germans introduced plenty of peaceful symbols in the Games. Olympic venues were located in Oberwiesenfeld, where British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain landed in 1938 on his way to meet Hitler (Porada 163, Młodzikowski 319). In the Olympic Park, streets were named after athletes of various nationalities. During the opening ceremony, West German president Gustav Heinemann spoke of erasing the war that Germany started from the world's memory (Lipoński 56). Regaining international trust was then the main political objective of organizing the Munich Olympic Games.

Major football events have also given their hosts the opportunity to send messages to the world. The FIFA World Cup

[18] Although it is the city that hosts the Olympic Games, it is obvious that organizing them is a mission for the whole country.

2010 was held in the Republic of South Africa and was the first to be held in Africa. Therefore, African symbols were all around, and as former RSA president Thabo Mbeki stated, the aim was to organize an event that would make people from Cape Town to Cairo more confident and that, in the future, historians would think of the World Cup as the moment when Africa arose, definitively leaving behind ages of poverty and conflict (Runciman). It is hard to evaluate if this aim was fulfilled, or if it was possible to fulfil it at all. Yet it seems certain that the first African state to host the world's second biggest sports event managed to do so, and the World Cup was a success.

The latest European Football Championship in Poland and Ukraine seems to have a lot in common with the African World Cup. For the first time such a big sports event was granted to Eastern European states. Partly it was also a matter of national pride—to show the world that "we also can," and at the same time to show that Poland and Ukraine are not so very different from Western Europe, even though Western societies may have such an impression. The Championship's aim was to change this impression and allow as many people as possible see how these countries really are. This aim was probably fulfilled, as foreign media in the vast majority described EURO 2012 as very well organized.

Hosting sports events is a great way of showing that it is not only politics that influences sport. The relationship is a two-way one, and in some aspects the world of sport can affect states, the most important actors in international relations. Since many aims can be achieved by hosting sports events, it may be very important for states to have such an opportunity, and the decision belongs to sports federations and organizations.

There are certain criteria for selecting a host city or country for a sports event, taking into account geographic, traditional, economic and political issues, and the capability for organizing such an event. There can be various political reasons for granting organization of a sports event to a particular state. For instance, the Belgian city of Antwerp was chosen as the 1920 Olympic Games host in memory of victims of World War I,[19] as Belgium was perceived as the victim of the war that defended the right

[19] No date. Web. 16 October 2012 <http://www.olympic.org/antwerp-1920-summer-olympics>.

cause, especially considering it was attacked though being a neutral state.

Tokyo was awarded the Olympics in 1964 as the first host city in Asia. Immediately following the Second World War, Japan was occupied by US forces, so in the 1950s it was slowly becoming a respected state again. In 1951 Japan signed a peace treaty with the War World II allies, and in 1956 it joined the United Nations. The International Olympic Committee seemed to have supported this tendency, and in 1958 the Japanese capital was awarded the Summer Olympics (Miller 194). A very similar situation applied to the Munich 1972 Olympic Games, held in the War World II aggressor country. West Germany in the late 1960s was slowly coming to be perceived more like an ally than a foe, especially in the West. They also wanted to have the opportunity to, in a way, compensate for the historical mistakes that they had made. Being awarded the Games, Germans received the possibility to gain sympathy in the world, as atonement for disasters that their former governments perpetrated on civilization (Miller 225). The IOC, a sports organization, acted as an advocate for peace and reconciliation, affecting the shape of international relations.

The world of sport can be an important area of international relations in another very important dimension—participation. States desire to have the opportunity to compete in international sport, especially in big events such as the Olympic Games. This aspect applies mostly to countries that are not well-grounded in the international arena, who have emerged lately, or who do not have universal diplomatic recognition. In such situations states are not necessarily recognized by sports organizations and consequently do not always have the opportunity to participate in grand sporting events. So these states try to convince sports organizations that promote peace and international cooperation, such as the International Olympic Committee, to invite them to compete in or host an event. Being present on the international sports stage can sometimes be a good argument for being accepted into the international community.

Two of the most important cases concerning the struggle for independent participation in international sport relate to post-war Germany and to China. After Germany lost World War II, as a result of the war, the Allies divided the country into two: capitalist West and communist East Germany. Both countries eventually expressed their desire to participate in the Helsinki 1952 Olympic Games, driving the IOC into an inconvenient

situation. Its policy assumed that every country can only have one National Olympic Committee, but it would simply be taking a political stand by recognizing one Germany. Still, West Germany was considered as a continuation of pre-war Germany, so its NOC was granted recognition in 1950 after German representatives publicly apologized for the war (Jucewicz 76). There was, however, a desire on the part of the IOC to accept East Germany as well, but due to unclear events[20] (Hill 38), the relevant meeting did not take place, and East Germany was not present at the Olympics. In the following years, the German situation in sport changed. After a lively debate, a United Team of Germany, consisting of both East and West German athletes participated in the Melbourne Olympics. However, the team participated as the Federal Republic of Germany, so in a way the IOC backed the West in an inter-German conflict. Nevertheless, the outcome was regarded as a great political success of the IOC. As its president Avery Brundage said, "We have obtained in the field of sport what politicians failed to achieve so far" (Espy 43). The joint German team gave an impression of being provisional, concerning the mutual antagonism between the German states, and proved to be relatively stable. Joint German teams appeared at the Olympic Games in 1960 and 1964, despite problems with creating the united representation. The IOC, however, did concede to East Germany, and since 1960 the United German team did not compete under the West German flag, but under a neutral flag and emblem (Miller 177), which naturally seemed fairer. Later, however, as a result of difficulties in creating joint German teams and in a way as a matter of accepting the international status quo, it was decided that East and West Germany should compete in international sport separately. The only provision was that during the 1968 Olympics both teams were supposed to march together at the opening ceremony and use the same, neutral flag and emblem. From 1972 onwards, East and West Germany competed completely separately.

Probably even more difficult was the Chinese question, concerning the communist People's Republic of China and Taiwan. The main difference from the German question was that

[20] The IOC was to meet East German representatives in Copenhagen in February 1952, shortly before the Helsinki Olympics, but they were late and failed to come to the meeting, while the next day IOC members left for the Winter Olympics in Oslo.

their mutual hatred was much stronger, and they did not see the possibility of participating in the same sporting event. The situation was even more complicated due to the fact that most of the World still recognized Taiwan as the representative of China, whereas communist China had a much bigger population and area. Here again the IOC was in a difficult situation, but it decided to take a more compromising stance and ruled that both countries would be accepted at the Helsinki 1952 Olympic Games. In that situation Taiwan resigned from participating, while communist China made its Olympic debut, even though it came late to the Games and only one Chinese athlete managed to compete (Tikander 142, Hong and Xiaozheng 323). The next Olympics brought a similar situation—again both states were accepted despite their not accepting each other. This time, however, Taiwan's team appeared in the Olympic village first, and once China found out it resigned from participating in the Games (Guoqi 85). After the Olympics, Beijing continuously insisted on excluding Taiwan from international sport and when this demand was not met it completely withdrew from sport organizations, including the IOC, in August 1958 (Hill 45, Guoqi 86, Espy 63). Although Taiwan still had to struggle with political issues in international sport, such as determining under what name it should compete, for some time it was the exclusive representative of China in international sport. The situation started to change in the 1970s when the PRC again became interested in participating in international sport. Its way back to world sport was slow, as Taiwan remained in sports federations, and both states did not accept each other. Still, in 1971 the People's Republic made a huge step forward in order to join both international sport and politics—Ping Pong Diplomacy enabled contact with the USA and quickly, in October 1971, the PRC became a member of the UN, with the simultaneous exclusion of Taiwan. The same situation was happening in more and more sport federations, and communist China was coming closer to participating in the Olympics again. Taiwan's situation was aggravating, but in 1979 a breakthrough appeared, when the PRC suggested it would accept being in the same sports organization as Taiwan, if it would accept a "proper" name, for instance the Chinese Taipei Olympic Committee (Slack, Yuan-min, Chiung-tzu and, Hong 357, Jarvie 111-112). Despite Taiwan's protests, such a solution was approved, and since the 1980s both Taiwan and the PRC have participated in international sport, completely separately.

Those two examples show how international relations can influence the possibility of participating in sport, even though it should theoretically be granted to everyone. Sport is now very closely related to politics; even so, countries not recognized internationally can sometimes freely send their athletes to sporting events. Palestine, for instance, participates in the Olympic Games even though it is not an independent state. So there are some exceptions. Kosovo still does not have a recognized National Olympic Committee although it declared independence in 2008.

Participation in sport and in international relations is related not only by the desire of states to be able to compete. The opposite situation—boycotting an event—can have even greater significance. History shows a number of types of sports boycott, individual or group, as a protest or as a means of exerting pressure. The reason can also vary. It can be the politics of the host of the event, of the sports organization, or sometimes even of a completely different actor. Furthermore, the event can be boycotted by the lack of presence of athletes, but in a milder way it could be the officials that in protest do not appear at the opening ceremony, for instance. The variety of boycotts is vast.

The most recognized boycotts are obviously the group ones of the Moscow 1980 and Los Angeles 1984 Olympic Games. They were obviously a part of the Cold War, but the official reasons were more particular: Moscow was boycotted by the USA and some of its allies due to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (Hazan 124), while the Communist Bloc did not go to Los Angeles, claiming it was not safe there, although it was probably a matter of revenge (Guttmann, *The Olympics* 157, Reich 20). There were, however, many other boycotts. African countries united in the Supreme Council of Sport in Africa, for instance, used a boycott threat as a means of influencing international relations, since they were too weak to do it otherwise. By this weapon they managed to exclude the Republic of South Africa from the Mexico 1968 Olympic Games and Rhodesia from the Munich 1972 Olympics. These two states were the only ones in Africa to be ruled by "white" governments and were traditionally condemned by other African countries for their politics of racial segregation. Taking advantage of sport enabled other African states to tackle these two states very directly. African states used a boycott threat again in 1976 against New Zealand for keeping sports contacts with the Republic of South Africa, and demanded that New Zealand be excluded from the Montreal Olympic Games. The IOC

this time did not step aside, and as a result in 1976 the first massive boycott occurred by African states. These states did not want to resign from participating, they were just used to winning political concessions through a boycott threat, but this time it just did not succeed (Monnington 168, Miller 242).

These were the biggest sports boycotts, but in fact there were many others, most of which related to international relations. The Melbourne 1956 Olympics were boycotted by Spain, the Netherlands and Switzerland, in protest against Soviet intervention in Hungary, and by Egypt, Lebanon and Iraq against the French, British and Israeli action that caused the Suez Crisis. This is an example of a boycott in protest against actors completely unrelated to the host. Currently sports boycotts still occur, but in a rather milder version. China, whose capital city was the host of the 2008 Summer Olympic Games, was condemned by the international community for a number of reasons, such as trading with Sudan, the occupancy of Tibet, and not respecting human rights (Ramzy). No country resigned from competing, but a number of political leaders did not appear at the opening ceremony, such as German Chancellor Angela Merkel, British Prime Minister Gordon Brown and Italian President Silvio Berlusconi.[21] This is probably the modern type of sports boycott, which as a matter of fact focuses on the aim of the protest, but does not punish a country's own athletes by not allowing them to compete.

It appears that sport has political significance due to two facts. Firstly, it is very popular and generates interest in many people. This fact makes using sport for political reasons sensible. Secondly, sport, thanks to its natural character of competition, perfectly fits a non-political determining of superiority, which may play an important role especially in situations when a sort of antagonism between states occurs, but other means of competition, such as war, are not desirable. This applies both to the past and the present. In the past, during the Cold War for instance, war was undesirable due to the risk of mutual annihilation. Nowadays, on the other hand, in times of multilateral international relations, economics is the main field of competition. Still, sport can be a great way of demonstrating power, which could be seen during the Beijing Olympic Games when China

[21] "Kto pojawi się na otwarciu igrzysk? Kogo nie będzie?," 8 August 2008. Web. 7 July 2008 <http://wiadomosci.gazeta.pl/Wiadomosci/1,80708,5563036, Lista_obecnosci___Pekin_2008.html>.

amazed the world both with the great Olympics it hosted and with athletic performance. The Chinese have their ambitions of being regarded as a powerful state, which, at least economically, it is. Nevertheless, sport gave them the opportunity to enhance their self-esteem.

Countries with no general international recognition will struggle to compete in sports, hoping that participation will somehow help them to attain recognition eventually, and there will always be some newly appearing states, established, for instance, by autonomist or separatist movements. On the other hand, great sports boycotts seem to be more a matter of the past. Countries that have participated in the boycott of a great sports event usually do not decide to do so again, knowing the boycotter is usually the main victim and, apart from some exceptions, concessions are hard to achieve through a boycott. Nowadays there is a tendency to express disapproval to, for instance, a sporting event's host country's politics by a more symbolic means of protest, such as boycotts by officials. This was seen at the Beijing 2008 Olympic Games or the Poland-Ukraine Football European Championships in 2012 regarding Ukrainian politics towards its former Prime Minister, Yulia Tymoshenko. Apart from single states like North Korea boycotting the Seoul 1988 Olympics, massive boycotts are rather improbable in modern times.

To sum up, it can easily be stated that once sport achieved a certain level of popularity, it became an important means of international politics, playing a significant role in propaganda and in changing the shape of international relations. During the Cold War era sport's role in international relations was especially important. Nowadays international relations can be described as multilateral, with many centres of power and little desire for war. The world focuses on cooperation, and sport's political role will probably be limited. But it seems likely that the political significance of sport that was attained in the interwar period will be retained, and states will keep using it for the sake of political goals.

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COMMONWEALTH GAMES AND THEIR IMPACT ON SCOTLAND'S FUTURE IN OR OUTSIDE THE UNITED KINGDOM

ABSTRACT: It is more than probable that the Commonwealth Games in 2014 will be used by the Scottish government as a tool in the battle for independence. For the Scottish National Party (SNP), sport events constitute another opportunity to underline Scottish autonomy. During the last Olympic Games, SNP ministers refused to use the name "Team GB" in their message to the Scottish athletes. Nurturing Scottish pride during the Games has already begun, with the official mascot—the Clyde Thistle, which is Scotland's national flower and emblem. The mascot of the Commonwealth Games has never waved the patriotic flag as it does now.

KEY WORDS: Scotland, Salmond, Cameron, Hoy, Murray, Commonwealth Games, independence, referendum.

The year 2014 is crucial for Scotland for two reasons: the Commonwealth Games and the independence referendum. Glasgow is the host of the 20th Commonwealth Games, which are quite often compared to the Olympic Games. The event will be attended by 6,500 athletes from 71 nations, competing in 17 disciplines over 11 days. The main organisers (Commonwealth Games Scotland, the Scottish Government, Glasgow City Council and Glasgow 2014 Ltd) are committed to delivering the Games to the required standard within the approved £524 million budget. The scale of the event is reflected also in the number of volunteers

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who are going to co-organise the Games: 15,000 people (Lach 1). In comparison, the Olympic Games in London had 70,000 volunteers (Hall 1) and the UEFA EURO 2012, organised by Poland and Ukraine, 5,500 volunteers.

During the Commonwealth Games, the sense of *Britishness* is almost tangible. Initially they were called the British Empire Games, and were renamed the British Empire and Commonwealth Games in 1954 and the British Commonwealth Games in 1970, before finally gaining the current title in 1978. The first Commonwealth Games were held in 1930 in Hamilton, Canada, where 11 countries sent 400 athletes to take part in 6 sports and 59 events. Bobby Robinson, a major influence within Canadian athletics at the time, finally brought about the event that had been talked about amongst Commonwealth nations for over thirty years, with the City of Hamilton providing $30,000 to help cover the travel costs of the participating nations. The inaugural games were very utilitarian and did not approach the scale witnessed today. The athletes' village was the Prince of Wales School next to the Civic Stadium, where the competitors slept two dozen to a classroom. Despite missing some basic comforts, the participants were unanimous in their praise for the Games and Hamilton's hospitality. The games have been organized (with one 12-year gap due to war) every four years starting from in 1930.

Only six teams have attended every Commonwealth Games: Australia, Canada, England, New Zealand, Scotland and Wales.

Interestingly, the Commonwealth Games are also often referred to as the "Friendly Games." From 1930 to 1994 the Games programme included only single-competitor sports. The 1998 Games in Kuala Lumpur saw the introduction of team sports, with nations taking part in cricket (50 over game), hockey (men and women), netball (women) and rugby 7's (men). In Manchester in 2002, hockey, netball and rugby 7's graced the programme again, and, at the 2006 Games in Melbourne, basketball accompanied hockey, netball and rugby 7's on the programme. In Delhi in 2010, hockey, netball and rugby 7's again were featured.

The Games are still growing and introducing new competitions. The 2002 Games in Manchester also saw for the first time, indeed a first for any multi-sport event in the world, a limited number of full medal events for elite athletes with a disability (EAD), in a fully inclusive sports programme. EAD events were organised again during the Melbourne Games, with

new competitions added, i.e. athletics, swimming, table tennis and power lifting. In the year 2000, the Commonwealth Games Federation took on the added responsibility of the Commonwealth Youth Games, open to athletes between 14 and 18 years of age. The Commonwealth Youth Games have now been organised three times, and they have grown in stature, as is evidenced by the awarding of the 2011 Commonwealth Youth Games to the Isle of Man.

Table 1: Hosts of the Commonwealth Games

Year	Name	Host
2014	Commonwealth Games	Glasgow, Scotland
2010	Commonwealth Games	Delhi, India
2006	Commonwealth Games	Melbourne, Australia
2002	Commonwealth Games	Manchester, England
1998	Commonwealth Games	Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
1994	Commonwealth Games	Victoria, Canada
1990	Commonwealth Games	Auckland, New Zealand
1986	Commonwealth Games	Edinburgh, Scotland
1982	Commonwealth Games	Brisbane, Australia
1978	Commonwealth Games	Edmonton, Canada
1974	British Commonwealth Games	Christchurch, New Zealand
1970	British Commonwealth Games	Edinburgh, Scotland
1966	British Empire & Commonwealth Games	Kingston, Jamaica
1962	British Empire & Commonwealth Games	Perth, Australia
1958	British Empire & Commonwealth Games	Cardiff, Wales
1954	British Empire & Commonwealth Games	Vancouver, Canada
1950	British Empire Games	Auckland, New Zealand
1938	British Empire Games	Sydney, Australia
1934	British Empire Games	London, England
1930	British Empire Games	Hamilton, Canada

Source: "Past Commonwealth Games." Commonwealth Games Federation.

Although there are 54 members of the Commonwealth of Nations, 71 teams participate in the Commonwealth Games, as a number of British overseas territories, Crown dependencies, and island states compete under their own flag. The four Home Nations of the United Kingdom—England, Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland—also send separate teams.

However, it is more than probable that the Games will be used by the Scottish government as a powerful tool in the battle for independence. For First Minister Alex Salmond and his Scottish National Party, sport events constitute a unique occasion to underline Scottish autonomy. This was clearly visible during the Olympic Games that took place in London in summer 2012. SNP ministers, who are hoping Scots will vote for independence from the UK, refused to use the name "Team GB" in their video message to athletes from north of the border. First Minister Alex Salmond had taken to referring to Sir Chris Hoy and his compatriots as "Scolympians." "The eyes of the world are on the Olympics and the whole of Scotland is united in supporting our Olympians and Paralympians—our 'Scolympians'—to go for gold," said the First Minister on July 27, 2012, i.e. at the very beginning of the Games (Johnson 8).

Undoubtedly, the Olympic Games proved to be a great success in terms of strengthening the so-called sense of *Britishness*. Labour MP Douglas Alexander, who represents the Scottish constituency of Paisley and Renfrewshire South, claimed the £27 million open ceremony undermined the Yes Scotland campaign with a message that there was nothing better than remaining in the Union:

> Friday's opening ceremony was a big cultural moment that will impact on our sense of ourselves and politics here in Scotland even after the athletes have headed home. To win the referendum the Nationalists need to convince us that the rest of the UK has become so foreign a place with such different values that we should split apart. (Ponsonby 12)

With three weeks of unashamed enthusiasm demonstrated by thousands of Union Jacks flying around each and every Olympic arena, wiping tears during the National Anthem, astonishing opening and closing ceremonies, and so many people speaking unaffectedly of their pride to be British, there was no doubt that British patriotism was rekindled (Sandbrook 10). Paul Hayward, Chief Sports Writer at *The Telegraph*, described the Games as "a triumph for warmth, civility, excellence and enthusiasm–hosted by a nation in love with sport, and happy in its own skin" (Hayward 1).

However, Alex Salmond did not feel well in this British skin. The First Minister and SNP liked to point out that 13 out of Team GB's 65 medals (including seven golds) were won by Scottish athletes. These statements were aimed at one clear target:

convincing the Scottish citizens that they are able to function independently from London. On July 19, 2012, Alex Salmond underlined his hopes regarding an independent Scotland team during the next Olympic Games: "An independent country would compete as an independent nation at the Olympics in Rio 2016. Of course, before then as part of the UK or not, Scotland will be competing as an independent competitor nation in the Commonwealth Games" (Johnson 11).

Nevertheless, it is not obvious that Scottish sportsmen and sportswomen who today represent Great Britain would be representing Scotland in 2016. According to UK Sport, the body that funds Team GB's elite athletes, using a mixture of money from the National Lottery and the government, it is unlikely that anyone will be forced to switch flags (Worrall 15). Hence, Scottish athletes may face a very basic dilemma–representation of their nation versus access to more money and better facilities. This issue has already been raised after the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 by Sir Chris Hoy, cyclist and the country's (both Scotland's and Britain's) greatest Olympian, who trains in Manchester. "They have to start investing in sport before they can think about anything like a Scottish Olympics team," stated the Olympian (Worrall 19). The Edinburgh government declares that the problem is being appropriately addressed by increasing the number of world-class facilities across Scotland, such as the Commonwealth Arena, the Sir Chris Hoy Velodrome, the refurbished Commonwealth Pool, the Aberdeen Sports Arena, and the Tollcross Aquatics Centre. Holyrood seems to ignore the fact that recent achievements of Team GB and "Scolympians" were possible owing to a huge injection of money, mostly from the National Lottery, in the 1990s. Holyrood underlined that, after a successful referendum, Scottish athletes will not be deprived of money. A Scottish Government spokesman claimed that "under all constitutional circumstances, Sportscotland [Scottish National Agency for Sport—KO] will ensure that high performance athletes continue get the best possible training that is right for the individual, their circumstances and their sport."

Taking all the above elements into consideration, there is no doubt that the Commonwealth Games will be a significant Scottish campaign. Moreover, cultivating and nurturing Scottish pride during the Commonwealth Games has already begun, with, for example, the official mascot of the Games—the Clyde Thistle, the purple-topped plant which is Scotland's national flower and

emblem. It goes by the name Clyde, probably Scotland's most famous river. The mascot was created by 12-year-old Beth Gilmour and, of course, Mr Salmond had no role in the design at all. But the First Minister probably could not have come up with anything more exclusively patriotic and overtly Scottish if he had done the drawings himself. Even during the last Games in Scotland (in Edinburgh in 1986) the mascot did not fly the patriotic flag like it does now. Then it was called Mac and was a scottie dog—again with no saltire or other overt references to Scotland (Macdonell 8).

Salmond has high hopes for the Commonwealth Games, as can be seen from such statements as: "We will make these Games the greatest sporting event our country has ever seen" (speech on Scotland's winning bid to host the 2014 Commonwealth Games) and "London set the bar pretty high this year and Glasgow is going to go over that bar in 2014" (comment at the parade after the Olympic Games in London).

The First Minister spares no effort in support of *Scottishness* during the Games—one of the best examples of this is his declaration regarding the opening ceremony. Namely, Alex Salmond stated that he wants to open the Games in the costume of Clyde Thistle. "I'm going to make my entrance dressed as Clyde. So you'll see Clyde just walk into the stadium, pull the head off and it'll be me inside," said the First Minister (Donohoe 5). Mr Salmond wants to strengthen his message by presenting himself as the leader of Clyde's Clan. That idea both refers to the Scottish tradition of clans and is intended to show that the First Minister is a strong leader, supported by a significant number of people. "To make the Games happen we are creating Clyde's Clan. Our mascot Clyde wants his clan around him and these are the people who will enable the Games and make Glasgow 2014 a fantastic success," added Salmond (Donohoe 6).

Furthermore, despite financial difficulties, the First Minister was one of the strongest advocates of the overall Games expenditure amounting to £600 million, claiming that it is a cost of a "different degree of the multi-billion-pound spending on London's 2012 Olympic Games . . . We need the facilities anyway, it will put Scotland on the map internationally [and the Games would leave a] legacy effect, more than just bricks and mortar."

However, Mr Salmond's ideas of promoting *Scottishness* may be turned to dust by the athletes who proved during the London Games that they do not want to be involved in a political battle.

The best example of that was the behaviour of Sir Chris Hoy, who rejected Mr Salmond's plan to make London 2012 the last Olympic Games featuring a Team GB: "I'm British. I'm Scottish and British. I think you can be both—they are not mutually exclusive. All I can say is I'm very proud I've been part of this team, to be part of the British team, to be alongside my English and Welsh and Northern Irish and guys on the Isle of Man—everybody." He similarly rejected Mr Salmond's plans for a separate team after winning three gold medals at the 2008 Beijing games.

Even more interesting is the battle over Andy Murray, currently the 3rd-ranked tennis player in the world, who won the Olympic Games in London. Murray, who often underlines his Scottish roots, draped himself in the union flag after winning a gold medal at Wimbledon. But if Murray had chosen a saltire instead of the union flag, his gesture could have been seen as provocative—and an ill-advised foray into pre-referendum politics—following the comments he made as a 19-year-old in 2006. Asked whom he would be supporting in the World Cup, in which Scotland were not represented, he replied: "Anyone who England are playing" (Mott 5). This was seen by some as an anti-English barb, but in his defence Murray said that he was joking. Since that time Murray has been unpopular among a number of English people. Perhaps that could be one of the reasons why Murray placedhimself so unambiguously in Team GB.

Nevertheless, Murray's success was treated as another great achievement of Team GB and it found reflection in the comments of popular politicians. Right-wing politicians did not miss their occasion to sting Alex Salmond and the Scottish National Party. "Andy Murray, great Scot and Olympic champion, holding a gold medal and proudly draped in the union jack—eat your heart out Alex Salmond!" wrote Tory MEP Struan Stevenson on Twitter (Small 5). "As we watch Andy Murray singing our National Anthem, never forget that there are small-minded Nationalists who want to destroy Team GB," commented Murdo Fraser, Deputy Leader of the Scottish Conservatives (Abbas 4).

It seems that Alex Salmond did not eat his heart out because together with his party he continued to cheer for Murray after his triumph in the US Open in September 2012. "Andy Murray is the first adult Scot to win a singles major title since Harold Sergerson Mahony in Wimbledon in 1896. Congrats," wrote Angus Robertson, the SNP's leader in Westminster (Stevenson 8), on Twitter, whereas the Scottish First Minister declared: "Now Olympic and

US Open champion, Andy truly is a Scottish sporting legend and I'm certain that more grand slam titles will follow" (Weldon 1).

While Salmond underlined Murray's *Scottishness*, David Cameron referred to his *Britishness* and wrote: "It is a huge achievement. Seventy-six years Britain has waited for a Grand Slam win in tennis and Andy has done it in huge style. Andy Murray is continuing a golden summer of sport" (Watson 2012). The English media reported that Murray was the first Briton to win a tennis grand slam since Fred Perry in 1936 (ignoring the achievements of female tennis players).

During the Olympic Games, opinion polls showed declining support for Scottish independence. According to an exclusive poll for *The Mail on Sunday*, which was conducted during the Olympics, only 27% of Scots said that they support Scottish National Party plans to separate Scotland from the rest of the United Kingdom. A further 13 percent were undecided (Picken 3). This means that support for independence has nearly halved since a high of 52 % in 2006, and dropped three points during the Olympics alone.

But a poll published in *The Sunday Times* on August 12, 2012, specifically mentioning the Olympics, produced something just as interesting. The London Olympics, which were hailed as a reaffirmation of *Britishness*, have in fact made Scots more likely to support independence, it suggested. The Panelbase survey found that 12% of respondents said that the Olympics had made them more likely to vote in favour of independence, as opposed to just 8% of Scots who say they feel more British because of Team GB's performance (Small 8). The poll of almost 800 Scots also showed that 29% believe Scottish athletes should compete for Great Britain after independence, while double that, 58%, say Scotland should represent itself.

Professor Murray Pittock, head of the College of Arts at Glasgow University, said the Games were "politically difficult" for the SNP because Mr Salmond "wants to be associated with sporting success, but does not want to condone the union." Therefore, the Commonwealth Games will be for the Scottish First Minister far easier, taking into consideration the very fact that Scotland will represent itself on its own territory. It can certainly be stated that the Scottish National Party will do everything to fuel independent thinking in Scots, and Alex Salmond will try to use celebrities—not only those connected with sport—as informal ambassadors for his vision of an independent Scotland.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Marta Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk, *Introducing Cultural Studies*, Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Kardynała Stefana Wyszyńskiego, Warszawa 2012, pp. 168.

Culture is something already created by humans, something that every individual gradually gets to know during their lifetime, yet not necessarily understands. Reading (deciphering) meanings in culture presupposes an act of studying, and studying culture can take different forms. Studying culture is possible, legitimate and stimulating, especially when one is in possession of an educational and thought-provoking "guidebook" that leads the reader through the complexities of both culture and the discipline of cultural studies.

Learning about culture from the perspective of cultural studies might be a challenging, instructive and beneficial activity. Conceived as a collection of essays, Marta Wiszniowska--Majchrzyk's study entitled *Introducing Cultural Studies* presents key concepts and theories concerning cultural studies. Arranged chronologically and thematically, the essays encompass the main stages in the development of the field of cultural studies. They provide extensive analysis and deep reflection on this "new discipline" that is "still trying to establish itself among other time-respected sciences," as the author claims in her introduction to the book. Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk skillfully combines the theoretical and informative material, offering a thoughtfully-designed collection of essays that help the reader to understand the bourgeoning area of cultural studies. The book consists of a preface, seven culturally-oriented chapters and a conclusion, all including bibliographical references. The author puts emphasis on the British contribution to the field, focusing on the forefathers of cultural studies. Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk demonstrates that the research horizons of cultural studies have been

masculinist from the outset. The names, which the author refers to, constitute a fellowship of such luminaries as Matthew Arnold, John Ruskin, Henry Cardinal Newman, Richard Hoggart, Raymond Williams to name but a few, without whom the history and conceptualization of key concerns of cultural studies would have run otherwise.

Introducing Cultural Studies opens with Professor Wiszniowska--Majchrzyk's preface, in which the author not only explains her analytical choices, but also introduces the reader to the labyrinth of developments within cultural studies. In the first essay "To Define the Indefinable—Culture and Cultural Studies," the author dives into the subject, providing the theoretical framework for further analysis. In her attempt at clarifying the concept of culture, Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk turns to pivotal and pertinent definitions of culture, demonstrating in this way that the field of cultural studies has always been an ideological battlefield. The author mentions the input of Raymond Williams and his influence on the formation of the discipline. This chapter also poses some interesting questions about the current status of cultural studies, and highlights the ongoing debate about the relevance or irrelevance of this study field.

The second essay—"Matthew Arnold Then and Now"—is dedicated to a close analysis of Matthew Arnold's notion of culture. This nineteenth-century English writer remains important for cultural theorists. Arnold's ideas provide a frame of reference for contemporary thinkers, who continually borrow from his works, quote him and dispute his ideas. Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk examines Matthew Arnold's contribution to cultural studies and traces the continuing influence of Arnold and his followers on the field.

In the essay entitled "John Ruskin—between Cultural Artifacts, Civilization, Education and Society," Professor Wiszniowska--Majchrzyk draws attention to the work of the Victorian critic and intellectual, John Ruskin. He cannot be omitted in any discussion of the development of cultural studies. The didactic and moralistic tone of his writings did not obscure their educational power. Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk emphasizes Ruskin's involvement in the nineteenth-century debates on culture and civilization, arguing that his aesthetic and social criticism still remains an inspiration for cultural theorists.

The next chapter, "Evolution of the Idea of a University: From Henry Cardinal Newman to the Present," is devoted to shifts in attitudes towards university education that occurred in the mid-nineteenth century. Their importance was recognized by the leading intellectuals of the epoch and by the Church. John Henry Newman, a modern Catholic theologian, was both an educational theorist and practitioner, who paved the way for many reforms to improve the field of education. Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk re-evaluates those aspects of Newman's intellectual and literary achievements, which helped to transform British society and its educational system.

"Fifty Years of Richard Hoggart" is another compelling section of the book. It focuses on another foundational figure in cultural studies, whose name appears in the title of the essay. Preoccupied with cultural, societal and educational issues, concerning the English working-class in the late 1950s and early 1960s, Hoggart (the founder of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham) poured his groundbreaking observations into his landmark book *The Uses of Literacy* (1957). Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk juxtaposes it with another seminal study by Hoggart, entitled *Mass Media in a Mass Society*: *Myth and Reality* (2005), to illustrate British society's transition from a class-based to a classless society. She demonstrates why Hoggart, who analyzed this cultural shift, is now considered such a brilliant observer and chronicler of his own times.

The goal of the sixth essay "Multiculturalism—Interculturalism —Transculturalism—Culture wars—Clash of Civilizations" is to grasp current cultural changes described and discussed in the field of cultural studies. Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk stresses the significance of culture(s) and its(their) role(s) in shaping the contours of our world. The author analyses the influence of political, social, ideological, racial, ethnical and gender factors, as well as the media, on culture. Reflecting on the usefulness of cultural concepts and monikers, the author highlights their volatility.

A re-reading of Shakespeare's *The Tempest* is the subject-matter of the last essay—"*The Tempest* or Interpretation on Request." In order to show how Shakespeare's cultural status has been reconstructed in the globalized, multicultural world, Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk presents two tendencies in Shakespeare studies: the transnational and the postcolonial approach. Since the meaning of Shakespeare's plays cannot be

treated as something stable and fixed, more and more innovative adaptations (discussed in the essay) of *The Tempest* relocate the play into different cultural contexts. After presenting illuminating examples of the play's adaptations and appropriations, Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk concludes that *The Tempest* is "capable of recycling among various poetics, geographical and cultural settings, and yielding to successful interpretations."

Packed with illustrative examples, the book offers a rich survey of fascinating aspects of cultural studies, and shows the applicability of cultural studies' theories to diverse areas of life, hence opening the mind to intricate meanings of cultural issues. The collection of essays presents a detailed and valuable analysis of the importance of the forefathers of cultural studies and of the present achievements of cultural studies. The author provides a systematic and rich overview of a body of key foundational texts covering a wide range of major British thinkers, writers and critics from different epochs in cultural studies. This is perhaps the greatest asset of this study which does not treat cultural studies exclusively as a 20th century phenomenon—it offers an in-depth and incisive analysis of the earlier thinkers whose theoretical innovations laid the foundations for our present discussions of culture. The lucid and compelling prose style confirms the author's expertise and erudition in the field. Professor Wiszniowska-Majchrzyk's *Introducing Cultural Studies* seems indispensable for anyone who wishes to become familiar with the field of cultural studies and deepen their understanding of historical developments and contemporary cultural changes. I recommend the book not only to academics, but also to university students interested in familiarizing themselves with the expanding canon of cultural studies.

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