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JOURNAL**

THEMATIC VOLUME
Varieties of Contemporary Radical Politics
editor Ryszard M. Machnikowski



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CONTENTS

Introduction: Ryszard M. Machnikowski	5
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ARTICLES

Asta Maskaliunaite <i>Exploring the Theories of Radicalization</i>	9
Monika Bartoszewicz <i>50 shades of Radicalism: an Analysis of Contemporary Radical Parties in Europe</i>	27
Ljupcho Stevkovski <i>The Rise of Right-Wing Extremism in European Union</i>	43
Stefan Mertens <i>Who is To Blame on July 22, 2011? Psychological And Sociological Blame Frame In The Reporting Of Anders Breivik In The Dutch Speaking Broadsheet Press</i>	59
Marko Babić <i>Defining Political Extremism in the Balkans. The Case of Serbia.....</i>	73
Denis Proszin <i>Breaking the Waves: How the Phenomenon of European Jihadism Militates Against the Wave Theory of Terrorism.....</i>	91
Miroslav Mares <i>Strategies of Islamist Extremism in Europe</i>	109
Damian Szlachter, Aleksandra Zięba <i>Countering Radicalisation of Muslim Community Opinions on the EU Level....</i>	119
Iztok Prezelj <i>Relationship between Security and Human Rights in Counter-Terrorism: A Case of Introducing Body Scanners in Civil Aviation</i>	145

REVIEWS

Raffaello Pantucci, “We love death as you love life.” Britain’s suburban terrorists. Hurst & Co, London 2015, p. 377 (Ryszard M. Machnikowski)	159
--	-----

Jerzy Sobieraj, <i>Collisions of Conflict. Studies in American History and Culture, 1820-1920.</i> (Izabella Penier)	161
Ewa Winnicka, <i>Literature as a Source of Knowledge. Polish Colonization of the United Kingdom in the light of Limeys</i> (Ewa Kołodziejczyk)	167

INTRODUCTION

As Asta Maskaliūnaitė rightly claims in Her opening article in this Issue, “*Radicalization*” became a new buzz word and it is within Western societies and their integrated or non-integrated immigrant communities that the birth of a terrorist was sought. The importance of “*radicalization*” only grew with the start of Syrian civil war and the influx of ‘foreign fighters’ with European passports into it.” In 2006, the European Commission defined *radicalization* as “[t]he phenomenon of people embracing opinions, views and ideas which could lead to acts of terrorism.” These types of radicalization which are leading to acts of terrorism are clearly visible in Western Europe, to mention only the most recent attack in the streets of London, Paris and Copenhagen. Moreover, we can observe in Europe the emergence of both old and new radical political parties, movements, organizations, social networks and above all ideas influencing the public and transforming politics. Along that goes notable increase in number of violent incidents, including street fighting between members of radical factions, clashes with the police, online hatermongering and “hate crimes,” attacks on journalists, public insults and publishing so called “target lists” in social media. We can also observe increase in international co-operation between radical groups and networks – far right, far left, radical ecologists, neo-nazis, anarchists, neo-communists and above all – jihadists – in many European countries. Members of foreign groups participate in local events supporting local groups e.g. 11.11.2011 *Independence Day* marches in Poland gathered militant leftists from Germany who were involved in street fighting.

Are we facing a new stage of radical politics in Europe? Can we expect going from *pressure* and *coercion* towards more *political violence* and further *terrorism* there? What is the scope and dynamics of this processes? Are they stable or reversible? Is the economic crisis the central factor in explanation of radicalization or other

factors should be considered more important? What role is played by radical ideologies – old and new – in this process? Could all these processes lead to the emergence of new terrorist organizations/networks or facilitate the actions of new generation of so called “lone wolves”? In the 2015 Issue of *International Studies* we attempt to address these problems in a wide variety of contributions delivered by the Authors coming from many European countries.

We start with the review of the key theoretical perspectives and concepts proposed by Asta Maskaliūnaitė, who proposes brief definition of “radicalization” as well as the matrix of analysis of factors leading to this phenomenon. Her “theoretical” contribution is followed by Monika Bartoszewicz’s article offering „a comprehensive overview of European radical parties,” providing the readers with the “practical” review of central themes of radical politics in Europe. Our next author, Ljupcho Stevkovski focuses his attention on the problem of right-wing extremism in the European Union and the methods of coping with this problem. Marko Babić follows with careful presentation and analysis of the extremist movements in Serbia. Stefan Mertens investigates a sample of articles that were published about Breivik and his deeds in the Flemish and Dutch press, looking for the so-called “attribution of responsibility frame.” Moreover, Stefan presents a typology of subtypes of frames and investigates how many times these types of frames occur in different media outlets.

Then we are entering the domain of the European jihadi extremism analysis, starting with the critical insight of Denis Proszin into so called *Wave Theory of Terrorism*. His interesting remarks prove that this approach has rather limited explanatory value at least as far as jihadi terrorism is concerned. In the next article Miroslav Mares identifies the most important variants of Islamist extremism in Europe and deals with their goals and with strategic approaches of how to achieve these goals. A comprehensive outlook and threat assessment of Islamist extremist strategies are also included in his article. This subjects are continued in the next article: Damian Szlachter and Aleksandra Zięba explore selected factors influencing the process of radicalisation leading to the use of political violence and terror by the Muslim minorities living in the European Union member states and examine various counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation efforts of the EU. We conclude our *Issue on Radicalism* with an insightful analysis of the debate on the relationship between security and human rights exploring the case of the introduction of body scanners on the European airports, provided by Iztok Prezelj.

We hope that this issue of 2015 *International Studies* contributes to the difficult task of understanding the varieties of contemporary political radicalisms in Europe. I would like to thank very much Katarzyna Fossa and Kamil Kuśmider for their assistance in preparation of this Issue.

Ryszard M. Machnikowski

ARTICLES

Asta Maskaliūnaitė*

EXPLORING THE THEORIES OF RADICALIZATION

ABSTRACT: After the London bombings in July 2005, the concern of terrorism scholars and policy makers has turned to “home-grown” terrorism and potential for political violence from within the states. “Radicalization” became a new buzz word. This article follows a number of reviews of the literature on radicalization and offers another angle for looking at this research. First, it discusses the term “radicalization” and suggests the use of the following definition of radicalization as *a process by which a person adopts belief systems which justify the use of violence to effect social change and comes to actively support as well as employ violent means for political purposes*. Next, it proposes to see the theories of radicalization focusing on the individual and the two dimensions of his/her motivation: whether that motivation is internal or external and whether it is due to personal choice or either internal (due to some psychological traits) or external compulsion. Though not all theories fall neatly within these categories, they make it possible to make comparisons of contributions from a variety of different areas thus reflecting on the interdisciplinary nature of the study of terrorism in general and radicalization as a part of it.

KEY WORDS: radicalization, theories, terrorism, ideology, grievance, threat

Introduction

September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States serve as a benchmark in the discussions of the post-Cold war era of international relations and of the new impetus for the terrorism studies,

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until then a rather marginal field of investigation on the edge of a variety of disciplines, such as sociology, political science, international relations, psychology or criminology. Overnight the researchers already working in this field became celebrities, numerous others have joined their cohorts forming legions of brains probing the “whys” and “therefores” of this event, or exploring, together with the security services and the policy makers, the ways to prevent new such from happening. Terrorism became the trendiest topic. Between the pressures of policy makers to advise on what they should do given the magnitude of the threat and the demand of the public for answers on “why do they hate us,” the researchers kept following the long tradition of spilling more ink than the terrorists spill blood in trying to explain the phenomenon.

These attempts more often than not focused on remote places, with the West implicated in their internal dynamics through its foreign policy, historical legacies and cultural disagreements. With the European attacks, on March 11, 2004 in Madrid and July 7, 2005 in London, the emphasis of research shifted. “Radicalization” became a new buzz word and it is within Western societies and their integrated or non-integrated immigrant communities that the birth of a terrorist was sought. The importance of ‘radicalization’ only grew with the start of Syrian civil war and the influx of ‘foreign fighters’ with European passports into it. It will undoubtedly gain even more prominence with the attacks in France 7-9 January, 2015.

Yet, while most researchers and policy makers agree that ‘radicalization’ is a problem, there is less agreement as to what exactly the word entails. In this article, I will outline the main trends in the vast field of radicalization studies. Attempts at synthesizing this literature have already been made and in greater length than the article proposed here, however, they tend to focus on quite exclusively on the relatively new research on Islamist radicalization forgetting the rich theoretical and empirical¹ heritage of the studies of terrorism prior to September 11 attacks. The paper is

¹ Admittedly, theoretical works on terrorism outnumbered those based in empirics both before the September 11 attacks and after them (Silke, *Research on Terrorism. Trends, Achievements and Failures*) (Silke, *The Devil You Know: Continuing Problems with Research on Terrorism*) (Silke, *The impact of 9/11 on research on terrorism*), yet, there were always notable exceptions, such as Donatella Della Porta’s seminal work on the Leftist terrorists in Germany and Italy (Della Porta) or the insider accounts, autobiographies of former terrorists, give a great insights into both a decision making process attached to joining the terrorist organizations and the internal functioning of such organizations.

divided into four sections. The first section discusses the conceptual framework of radicalization and explores the different ways to conceptualize it. The other sections discuss various hypotheses regarding why people “radicalize”: the psychological traits based explanations; coercion and ‘manipulation’-based explanations; the explanations centring on grievance; and finally those of rational choice.

This, of course, is not the only way to approach radicalization. For example, Alex Schmid (Schmid) in his study of radicalization literature starts from micro, meso and macro- level explanations of it. Randy Borum distinguishes between explanations in ‘individual, group, network, organization, mass movement, socio-cultural context, and international/interstate contexts’ (Borum 14), later focusing on the social movement, social psychology and conversion theories. Similarly, Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen (Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Studying violent radicalization in Europe. Part I. Potential Contribution of Social Movement Theory*) and (Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Studying violent radicalization in Europe. Part II. The potential contribution of socio-psychological and psychological approaches*) puts potential social science contributions into two blocks: social movements and psychology/social psychology. The literature review by Minerva Nasser-Eddine and her colleagues focused on the five theoretical frameworks, such as rational choice, structural or societal theory, relative deprivation, social movement theory and psychological theories. (Nasser-Eddine) My choice for classifying theoretical approaches into the four previously mentioned clusters is based on internal/external and rational/compulsion types of motivators for ‘radicalizing’, with the individual at the centre of the enquiry.

Two limitations were set here, with the individual processes in focus, the group dynamics and related explanations of radicalization are only briefly explored within the given framework. Secondly, due to the lack of space, the actual policies devised using these theories will be only briefly mentioned in the text, their deeper analysis and evaluation is a task for another paper.

Radicalization. What is in the Word?

Many books on terrorism start with the lament that there is no unified and universally acceptable definition of terrorism, and the experts in the area take this problem to be one of the major obstacles for the development of the field. (Stampnitzky) The term

‘radicalization’ is not exempt from such problems. In the most general way, the interest in radicalization is subordinated to the interest in stopping acts of terrorism. Therefore, in the most general sense we can see radicalization along the lines described by Peter Neumann as “what goes on before the bomb goes off.” (Neumann) Yet there are definitions that are even more general than that, e.g. McCauley and Moskaleiko see it as “development of beliefs, feelings, and actions in support of any group or cause in a conflict.” (McCauley and Moskaleiko 4)

Though historically, ‘radicalism’ and its derivative ‘radicalization’ have a much broader meaning², in the context of current studies and policy-making radicalization tends to mean a pathway to terrorism, gradual slide into extremism, fundamentalism or, even more generally, a movement towards justifying violence and finally personally engaging in it. Most definitions thus agree that radicalization is a process, what they do not agree upon is where that process leads. E.g. the European Commission expert group on radicalization sees radicalization as “socialization to extremism which manifests itself in terrorism” (European Commission Expert Group 7), similarly the US Department of Homeland Security sees it as a “process of adopting an extremist belief system, including willingness to support or use violence as a method to effect social change.” (Homeland Security Institute) Other governmental definitions see it as a pathway towards terrorism (e.g. UK definition: “the process by which a person comes to support terrorism and forms of extremism leading to terrorism” (House of Commons Home Affairs Committee))

The conflation between these terms, however, can sometimes lead to misunderstandings and result in policies that not only lack utility, but can result in the opposite of the intended effects. For that purpose one has to be clear what is meant by radicalism, fundamentalism, and extremism.

The traditional definition of radicalism, such as the one given in the Oxford dictionary, sees it as “representing or supporting an extreme section of a party.” According to Mark Sedgwick, such a definition, by opposing the “radical” and “moderate,” raises the question of what is moderate, while at the same time assuming

² I.e. nineteenth century ‘radicals’ would be viewed quite positively today often as fighters for the expansion of rights, most often reformists while sometimes revolutionaries, yet always attached to what could be called a progressive agenda of promotion of democracy and empowerment of various social groups.

that what is moderate is self-evident in a with-us-or-a-against-us sense. (Sedgwick 482) McCauley and Moskalenko make a somewhat clearer distinction of “radicalism” vis-à-vis “activism” where the former would indicate willingness to engage in illegal actions and the latter seeking social or political change through legal activities. (McCauley and Moskalenko, *Measuring Political Mobilization: The Distinction Between Activism and Radicalism* 240) Daniela Pisiou argues forcefully for retaining the term radicalism with two of its historic characteristics – going to the roots and sweeping change thus presenting the following definition of the phenomenon: “political ideology, with the objective of inducing sweeping change based on fundamental or ‘root’ principles.” (Pisiou 23) This definition emphasizes the “fundamentalist” aspect of the phenomenon, a wish for a “sweeping change,” but does not focus on the potential for violence in particular or illegal action in general.

Fundamentalism as a term is less often used in connection to the outcomes of radicalization. Adoption of fundamentalist beliefs, however, is associated with a phase of radicalization. The concept itself comes from the sphere of religion and, more precisely, the Protestant movement in early twentieth century US, characterized by “premillennialism and the verbal inerrancy of the Bible” as well as being rooted in the “generalized antimodern and anti-liberal mentality.” (Carpenter 5) Currently, the term is used much more widely and not only in the religious, but also in the political settings, meaning here a strict, uncompromising attitude and an unwavering attachment to a set of beliefs. It is, however, again not necessarily violent and does not, in most cases, lead to imposing such beliefs on others by way of force.

Extremism is the third term often used in connection to radicalization. According to Alex Schmid, “extremists strive to create a homogeneous society based on rigid, dogmatic ideological tenets; they seek to make society conformist by suppressing all opposition and subjugating minorities” (Schmid 9). While in general it can be understood more in line with fundamentalism as being a strict, uncompromising, intolerant position, for those talking about radicalization, extremism is often understood as being against democratic norms, human rights, equality and tolerance.

The basic concern with regards to radicalization is the issue of people turning to violence. Yet, some definitions may result in a wrong focus for policies and/or research. E.g. if we take seriously the definition of radicalization into extremism and accept

that extremism is against democratic norms, all forms of extremism should be proscribed and governments should not engage in attracting the so-called non-violent extremists and asking for their help in the fight against their radical counterparts. (Schmid) (Pisiou) (Sedgwick) The UK program of countering violent extremism was often criticized along these lines, instead of stopping radicalization, the opponents claim, the program only creates a breeding ground for terrorism by distinguishing between violent and non-violent extremists and using the latter to “identify” the former. As according to the given definitions of extremism rejection of democratic norms is at the core of this phenomenon, such programs cultivate this breeding ground and are thus counterproductive.

For the purposes of this article, radicalization will be defined as a process by which a person adopts belief systems which justify the use of violence to effect social change and comes to actively support as well as employ violent means for political purposes. From this definition it appears that radicalization is a process, often a slow and gradual one, the final result of which is a person engaging in a violent campaign to effect social change. It identifies two different stages of radicalization – endorsing beliefs and acting upon them – without giving a temporal preference to them and without claiming that one is necessary for the other. One can adopt radical beliefs and not act upon them, and vice versa, one could act without even holding some deep and inalterable beliefs. At the same time this definition is general enough so as to accommodate different types of radicalization to different types of radicalisms. In the next sections I will look into the four clusters of theories identified in the introduction and assess what they have to say about the process of radicalization.

Radicalization Process. Assessment of Theories

According to Peter Neumann, after the attacks of 9/11 talk about “root causes of terrorism,” probably the major concern in the field, was suddenly associated with justification for the killing of the innocent and thus became a statement of a political bad taste (Neumann 4). While there were political statements about poverty breeding violence³ and attempts to establish a list

³ US President George W. Bush famously linked poverty and terrorism in his speech in March 2002, stating “We fight poverty because hope is an answer to terror” (Bush).

of possible causes of terrorism (Richardson), the major focus was on the measures directed to physically preventing and stopping the attacks or militarily dealing with terrorist bases (the war in Afghanistan being the prime example of this). Neumann argues that it was through the introduction of term “radicalization” that it became possible again to talk about the roots of terrorism and, consequently, to treat the causes rather than symptoms of this phenomenon. The research on radicalization can thus build⁴ on a rather vast number of investigations on the origins and development of terrorism linking individual psychology investigations, social movement analyses and theories arguing for understanding of structural conditions that lead to the appearance of violent political actors.

In the introduction, I suggested that theories of radicalization can fall into four broad categories according to the level of personal choice that they allow and according to whether the incentives/constraints for joining come from the “outside,” i.e. the environment, or the “inside,” of the individual him/herself. These criteria and theories grouped accordingly are shown in Table 1. I will analyse them in counter clock-wise sequence starting from the top right corner.

Table 1. Theories grouped along two dimensions

	Choice	Compulsion
Internal	Rational choice	Psychological traits
External	Grievance	Coercion/motivation

Psychological Traits

The idea that those who engage in violent political activity in general and terrorism in particular are insane or somehow otherwise psychologically abnormal resurges now and again in media depictions of terrorist attacks, but has long been discarded by researchers and consequently policy makers as groundless. Research on the violent Leftists of the 1970s has already shown, and later studies have confirmed, that those engaged in terrorist activities were not notably different from other politically active

⁴ As Richard English writes, “history has far too often been ignored in analyses of, and responses to, terrorism; and certainly the post-9/11 period has witnessed a frequently amnesiac debate on the subject” (English 57).

people. For example, as Franco Ferracuti writes, “Psychiatric studies have not identified any psychopathological characteristics common to the Italian left-wing terrorists” (Ferracuti 60) that were under examination in his study, and the same findings were confirmed in case of (West) German leftist terrorists (*ibid.*). Though certain “personality disturbances” are quoted in such studies (see, e.g., Post 27) the general message is that those who engage in terrorist activities are “more like us than we ordinarily care to admit” (Rubenstein 5).

Nevertheless, the efforts to try find some common traits in the “terrorists” have not stopped and profiling of potential terrorists, while frequently criticized, (Bongar) (Moghaddam) (Huq) is still actively sought, especially in law enforcement, and is usually applied along three strands: racial-physical, psycho-pathological, and socio-economic characteristics. (Rae) The racial-physical profiling is here especially problematic as it is discriminatory, borders on racist and works by criminalizing entire communities. Yet, these types of profiling have not been completely eliminated from the law enforcement attempts to find terrorists. E.g. the NYPD report on radicalization identifies such individuals as “particularly vulnerable” to step on the ladder that leads to terrorist attacks: “fifteen to thirty-five year-old male Muslims who live in male-dominated societies” especially as part of Muslim diaspora in the West and particularly if they belong to middle-class families and/or are students (NYPD 24) This particular report has been criticized for its exactly this attempt to turn entire communities into suspects, (Muslim American Civil Liberties Coalition) and (Huq 46) the appeal of such categorizations is still palpable in their continuous resurgence in policy papers. (German)

The psycho-pathological or simply psychological profiling of who can eventually be “radicalized” enough to commit violent acts has fared a little better. One of the most prominent investigators in this area is Jerrold Post, whose theories on terrorist psychology and the notion that there are “people with particular personality traits and tendencies are drawn disproportionately to terrorist careers” (Post 27) has been quite influential in the policy circles of the US and elsewhere.

Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen identifies three paths of potentially fruitful investigations into individual psychology that could help determine the factors leading to radicalization: psychodynamic approaches, identity theory and cognitive approaches. (Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Studying violent radicalization in Europe. Part II. The*

potential contribution of socio-psychological and psychological approaches 5) The first rely on narcissism,⁵ paranoia⁶ and absolutist⁷ hypotheses and are linked to the Freudian tradition of psychoanalysis and the linkage of violence to past traumatic events, childhood experiences and other subconscious dynamics.⁸

Identity theory focuses on the formative stage a person's life and argues that for young people in search for identity, ideologies might assist in identity formation and "joining terrorist groups can act as a strong 'identity stabilizer', providing the young adult with a sense of belonging, worth and purpose." (Dalgaard-Nielsen, Studying violent radicalization in Europe. Part II. The potential contribution of socio-psychological and psychological approaches 7) This theory, linked to that of social networks which will be explored in more detail later, has been used to explain the involvement of the 7/7 attackers in London in terrorism. Finally, the cognitive theory links cognitive capacity and violence, and hypothesises the potential linkage between "cognitive style and individual's disposition to join a terrorist group" (Dalgaard-Nielsen, Studying violent radicalization in Europe. Part II. The potential contribution of socio-psychological and psychological approaches 8).

The usefulness of these explanations, however, has been notoriously low. "Terrorists" have been found to be physically and mentally similar to other people who do not engage in violent activities. Thus, no matter how tempting psychological profiling could be with regard to potential terrorists, the success of such endeavours

⁵ Parental neglect in childhood leads to development of unhealthy self-image and morality as result of which individuals "narcissistic grandiose fantasies, exalting the self or submerge him or herself into a group and thus let a strong group identity replace the damaged self-identity" (Dalgaard-Nielsen, Studying violent radicalization in Europe. Part II. The potential contribution of socio-psychological and psychological approaches 6).

⁶ Individuals suffering from paranoia are said to be dealing with "socially unacceptable feelings through projection," idealize the in-group and demonize the out-groups. (Dalgaard-Nielsen, Studying violent radicalization in Europe. Part II. The potential contribution of socio-psychological and psychological approaches 6).

⁷ Absolutist or apocalyptic individuals in this context are "uncompromising moralists" often with "weak identities" easily susceptible to conspiracy theories about the attempts of out-groups to destroy the in-group and thus "legitimising the use of violence in 'self-defence'." (Dalgaard-Nielsen, Studying violent radicalization in Europe. Part II. The potential contribution of socio-psychological and psychological approaches 6).

⁸ E.g. Volkan links joining terrorist organizations to childhood trauma: (Volkan).

is dubious and the vast variety of individuals involved in organizations supporting and enacting terrorism is too wide to lead to any generalizable results.

Coercion/Motivation

While the theories looking at the psychological traits try to find such personal characteristics which make an individual more likely to join terrorist groups, the investigations into compulsion or motivation look at external actors: charismatic leaders, firebrand preachers, radical clerics or intellectual gurus, and assess their role in recruiting new members for terrorist organizations. These theoretical approaches can be linked together as one looking at the process of attraction to organization/acts from below, others from above. Yet, even these theories start from the criticism of general inadequacies of terrorist psychological profiling and look at the possibilities of finding other ways to explain people's engagement in violent political acts. The researchers working in this area suggest looking at the dynamics of psychological manipulation in order to assess the radicalization process.

An article by Trujillo et al. suggests two types of recruitment to terrorism. First is self-recruitment, where a group of friends gets radicalized mainly using internet "to exchange knowledge and practices and reinforce ideological positions" (Trujillo, Ramirez y Alonso 723-724). The second type of recruitment is an outcome of "the process of systematic directed and conscious psychological manipulation, very similar to that produced by sectarian or totalitarian groups" (Trujillo, Ramirez y Alonso 724) This type of investigation sees similarities in the behaviour of individuals attracted to terrorist organizations and those engaged in religious sects led by a charismatic leader.

These theories have also been quite popular in the law enforcement circles, as they allow focusing on a number of charismatic, probably quite visible individuals whose elimination should then lead to disappearance or at least weakening of the terrorist groups.⁹ The importance of leaders has been emphasized in other contexts as well, e.g. William Zartman in his examination of the dynamics of intrastate conflict emphasizes the role of political entrepreneurs in mobilizing people around certain grievances in the build-up to

⁹ This is one of the motivations provided for the use of targeted killings of terrorist leaders.

civil war. (Zartman) In social movements theories, some emphasis is also put on movement entrepreneurs especially when it comes to recruitment of new members for the movement organizations. (Dalgaard-Nielsen, *Studying violent radicalization in Europe*. Part I. *Potential Contribution of Social Movement Theory* 8)

Yet, it is unclear how much of the leader's role is due to psychological manipulation or pressure and how much of it is simple persuasiveness that leads people to follow such leaders and finally also to engage in terrorist acts. Trujillo and his colleagues find evidence to suggest that at least in case of the group they analysed it was manipulation and psychological pressure at work. Thus it could be taken as one path to terrorism though, as the researchers themselves admit, not the only one.

In addition to the importance of the leader, two more types of pressure could be added here: peer pressure exercised in the tightly knit groups of close friends that join the cause together as is often examined in the social networks approach; second, so-called "slippery slope" radicalization (McCauley and Moskaleiko, *Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us* 35-48), when a person reluctantly moves from legal activism to more and more radical forms, eventually engaging even in violent acts. These two paths exemplify what has been termed "involvement without radicalization" which has to be considered if we want to have a fuller picture of how people end up committing terrorist offenses.

Grievance

Grievance explanations are among the most popular when it comes to evaluating political violence in general and terrorism in particular. As collective action is associated with the desire to enact some social change or right some social wrong, and political violence is understood as an extreme form of such collective action, grievance explanations seem to be the most obvious place to start. These explanations usually focus on structural level flaws and the way these encourage individuals to engage in political action and its extreme forms. Perceived injustice has been seen as one of the strongest motivators to join social movements, but also for joining violent groups.

Grievances explanations are also among the oldest ones when it comes to theorizing about why people revolt or engage in other acts of political violence. Ted Gurr's study *Why men rebel* (Gurr) with its focus on relative deprivation has not lost its appeal even forty years

after its publication. In the recent re-publication of the work, the author admitted to using the term grievance as a synonym for relative deprivation in the later works (see, preface to the edition) and argued forcefully for its continuing relevance. Theories on terrorism have also long focused on structural conditions that imbue the individuals with a sense of injustice prompting them to action.

A number of structural conditions have been said to contribute to the sense of grievance. Tore Bjørgo suggests examples such as “civil war or deep-rooted conflicts, invasion and occupation by foreign military forces, economic underdevelopment, bad governance and corruption penetrating the state at all levels, rapid modernization or technological developments like the rise of internet and social media” (Bjørgo 39) Lack of political opportunities is often added to such a list as well as social exclusion, disaffection of a religious-ethnic minority, wrongful foreign policy, etc.

Another important aspect to note in the theories talking about grievance is the distinction between personal and group grievances. While both may be present in the motivation for engaging in political violence, the grievance of the group with which the individual associates him/herself is more prevalent. According to McCauley and Moskalenko, individuals engaged in terrorist action often exhibit high levels of altruism, strong reciprocity and group identification (McCauley and Moskalenko, *Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us* 26-29) thus linking the structural conditions that produce grievance with the individual psychological traits that help translate them into action.

A major criticism of grievance-based explanations is the so-called specificity problem (Pisiou 40, Schmid 26). The factors that are supposed to influence an individual's decision to support violent action or engage in it are quite widespread across social groups and societies, yet only a tiny minority of individuals actually do actively support/perpetrate such acts. At the same time, the lists of potential grievances are so long that they become unhelpful as more and more circumstances have to be added to them for them to have any explanatory value. E.g., lack of political opportunities should create grievances in non-democratic states, yet, there are many such states which do not face terrorist violence while there are many democracies which do. In this case, the democracies get classified as those which offer fewer political opportunities for young people (e.g. Italy in the 1970s) or those which support autocratic governments abroad (e.g. Britain or the US today). The diaspora groups in different countries may suffer different hardships, discrimination,

economic or social marginalization, but again, terrorism is much less pervasive even in such difficult circumstances. Fewer diaspora communities give birth to even fewer terrorists. In other words, the conditions that could potentially produce terrorism are much more widespread than the terrorism itself and grievance explanations have a hard time accounting for this “lack.”

Rational Choice

The most promising theory of radicalization so far links the process to a series of rational choice decisions. This type of analysis sees engagement in terrorism as a part of cost-benefit analysis that an individual conducts with regard to any serious activity. E.g. for Martha Crenshaw a group chooses terrorism after it assesses costs and benefits of such action taking a decision that is collectively rational. (Crenshaw) Ronald Wintrobe in his article “Can suicide bombers be rational?” argues that suicide bombers are also perfectly rational individuals and that suicide bombings can be seen as a kind of rational activity that is “an extreme example of a general class of behaviour in which all of us engage.” (Wintrobe 2)

The rational choice theorists are therefore interested in behaviour rather than in psychological traits. They assume that individuals are rational and make choices based on (though maybe not always explicit) calculation of costs and benefits. Daniela Pisiou takes this approach to analyse Islamist radicalization in Europe and suggests that becoming an engaged Islamist radical can be seen as an “occupational change process.” Individuals choose to follow a “career in terrorism” as they choose any other career, evaluating its downsides, but also the “reward, standing and recognition” (Pisiou 55) that it conveys. Standing, similarly to social prestige, is one of the most important reasons for joining. A sense of heroism and a type of elitism are also linked to this factor. Recognition depends on perceived support and approval from the referent community or social surrounding that are given to the perpetrated actions and reward can be both material gain, but also emotional satisfaction. (Pisiou 85-106)

The rational choice approach to radicalization also has links to social network theory. In its first perceived phase of radicalization, the probing in Pisiou’s terminology, chance encounters mean a lot, but much of the consequent engagement in radical political action depends on the entry into social networks that support and promote such engagement. Later these network help maintain a focus on action and make it difficult to leave the organization/group.

This tendency has been observed in various underground political groups, where over time the primary motivator for continuing engagement becomes loyalty to the group members rather than any great belief in the action itself. (Della Porta)

The rational choice approach does not offer a panacea from all the ills that trouble radicalization research. A number of issues still remain – e.g. the specificity problem, why actually only some people choose to become terrorists. (Pisiou 49) Are there any personal characteristics that induce some and not others to choose such an occupation? The social networks approach helps answer this question, but it then raises a doubt as to how rational that choice is. If a group of friends decide to become, say, jihadis, and two out of five are very committed to this idea while the others have some doubts, yet just decide to follow their friends, on what level can we talk about the rationality of the choice? Is it rational for them as a group? Or is it rational for all the individuals involved? One answer again is that it could be rational for all the individuals involved, but their values are different – for those who want to get engaged, it is the political action that is valuable and for those who follow them without much convincing, it is the solidarity factor that is key. Though such detours to other frameworks may explain a lot, the parsimony of theory does suffer in the process.

The question also remains as to what the policy implications of this model are. While looking for terrorist traits leads to profiling, coercion hypotheses to attempts at elimination of terrorist leaders and grievance explanations to focus on the socio-economic conditions, where does the rational choice take us? One possibility would be to increase the costs and lower the benefits for joining the terrorist organizations, yet this suggestion lacks precision. Daniela Pisiou's recommendations after using the model focus on "deconstructing radical interpretative frameworks" and countering radical frames (Pisiou 164). This sounds like a proposal to develop better strategic communication, yet we have not seen much result from this approach over the last ten years of concentrated effort.

Conclusions

Radicalization is currently on the top list of priorities of policy makers, law enforcement agencies and researchers working on the issues of political violence and, especially, terrorism. A number of analyses of this vast literature have appeared over the last years, trying to assess

what we know about this phenomenon. This article presents another attempt to systematize this knowledge, looking at the phenomenon of individual radicalization through four types of approaches: individual psychological traits, coercion and motivation, grievance and rational choice. A number of different theories or parts of those theories work within this framework. Somewhat less attention was paid here to group dynamics as an explanation of radicalization, though it was mentioned in all parts in connection to individual processes.

To summarize, what we note from these theories are the following features of radicalization:

1) It is understood as a gradual process. Here, I focused rather exclusively on this process as it looks for an individual, but similar processes can be observed in groups and even entire societies (McCauley and Moskaleiko, *Friction. How Radicalization Happens to Them and Us*).

2) It is a process that can stop at any particular step. An individual who adopts quite radical political/religious beliefs does not necessarily act on those beliefs and does not necessarily move from a legal political action to an illegal one.

3) At the same time, it is a process that can take a number of different routes. Motivations for engaging or not engaging in terrorist activities differ and circumstances in which people become engaged in radical actions differ as well.

4) An enormous variety of factors that may influence individuals' adherence to a terrorist organization make profiling of potential terrorists an impossible task, yet, given that the radicalization more often than not is facilitated by social networks, observing the formation and dynamics of such networks could be a useful way of identifying potential offenders.

5) There is more evidence to suggest that engagement in terrorist activities as a result of radicalization is a process based on rational choice than an outcome of processes beyond individual's control. Yet, such factors as peer pressure and the "slippery slope" have to be taken into account.

6) Social networks are of a crucial importance when "deciding" to engage in violent action. Evidence both from older (such as Red Brigades or ETA) and contemporary groups suggests that decisions to engage in violent activity are easier taken when a group of friends takes such a decision together. (Sageman) This factor also helps to understand different levels of motivation behind the joining, as some members of a group might be less enthusiastic about violence while others are more so.

7) Few theories quote ideology as the most significant factor in radicalization. In fact, none of the serious theories treat it as something determining engagement in violent action even if it can serve to provide justification for it. Rather, the shape of political activity is determined by what Tilly and Tarrow would call “repertoires” of action in the given community or the existing outlets for frustration (Tilly and Tarrow).¹⁰

The discussion above, hopefully, has shown that there is much we already know about radicalization. Even if it might not be possible to profile a potential terrorist and to identify each and every individual who might have an inclination to join ISIS, Al Qaeda or FARC we have a better understanding of the processes that may lead to this engagement.

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¹⁰ Olivier Roy emphasizes that there is nothing specifically “Islamic” about the contemporary political violence and states that “Twenty years ago these men would have joined a radical leftist movement, but such movements have disappeared from the space of social exclusion...” (Roy 48).

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50 SHADES OF RADICALISM: AN ANALYSIS OF CONTEMPORARY RADICAL PARTIES IN EUROPE

ABSTRACT: The paper provides a comprehensive overview of European radical parties. The main aim of this paper is to examine whether there are common patterns regarding these parties, and to analyse the implications of this phenomenon. In order to achieve the above, the paper proceeds as follows: Firstly, the phenomenon of political radicalisation in contemporary Europe is explored. This leads to mapping the radical political landscape in Europe. Finally, the paper concludes with the analysis of the possible outcomes of radicalisation of European politics including the possible societal effects. By doing so the paper argues that a fresh theoretical approach to comprehend the phenomenon is necessary .

KEY WORDS: radical politics, far-right, populism, European politics, societal insecurity

The Problem of Radical Politics

Why are European radical parties increasingly popular and what are the possible outcomes of this phenomenon? This paper aims to connect the issues and perspectives which, thus far, have not been explored in a systematic and thorough way. Such study is vital especially in the light of recent elections to the European Parliament and events in France with continuing popularity of Front National in the carnage of “Charlie Hebdo” attacks or Greece, where the victory of SYRIZA prompted many to question whether the Eurozone will survive until the end of 2015. Also, popularity of hitherto a-political movements like PEGIDA, requires a deepened reflection on whether

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the radical parties a temporary occurrence or will they become a permanent feature of European political landscape (The Economist)? Not only it is vital to identify those parties but more importantly, it is necessary to delineate what these parties have in common and what are the differences among them. Such map of European radical landscape will allow for analysing the likely consequences of certain radicalisation in European politics.

The possible ramifications are profound regardless of whether the radical parties will be isolated by the mainstream parties or will the radical parties achieve and/or retain significant position in their countries. Firstly, political victory might enforce the radical parties to 'civilise' and moderate their political programmes. Secondly, continuing pro-radical electoral trends in Europe are likely to influence the mainstream parties who will strong incentives take over some of the radical parties' agenda and/or language. However, the most pressing question is: What societal effects will the increased popularity of the radical parties have? The level of societal insecurity in Europe steadily rises and its ramifications might be of momentous significance and consequence. This paper attempts to tackle some of the above questions. Firstly, it explores the phenomenon of political radicalisation in contemporary Europe. This leads to mapping the radical political landscape in Europe. Finally, the paper concludes with the analysis of the possible outcomes of radicalisation of European politics including the diagnosis of possible societal effects. By doing so the paper argues that a fresh theoretical approach to comprehend the phenomenon is necessary.

European Political Horizon

Up until recently, European political cake seemed to be cut with a painstaking care. The biggest portions were given to the conservative parties (built to a great extent on Christian foundations) towards the right side of the political scene and the different variances of socialist parties drawing upon the Marxist ideals situated on the left. In a fairly typical situation for mature democracies these two blocks were customary opposing. Therefore the balance of power and at the same time the available alternative would be secured by centrist parties or the parties under a green-and-rainbow banner representing an assortment of ideological postulates from the global warming to gender issues. The tiny fringe on the right side of the mainstream right parties was occupied by a collection of political 'far-right' while

the left margin would be populated with not-so-numerous leftist extremists of various proveniences. Those marginal groupings would be advocating everything that was not included into the official narratives of political mainstream. Political consensus would deny these 'radical' parties and movements any rights of representation and preferably a *cordon sanitaire* would guarantee marginalisation of those political parties who did not fit into the political status quo. If such party increased its sphere of influence, like it happened with Jörg Haider's Freedom Party in Austria in 2000, isolation and freezing of diplomatic cooperation would be immediately applied.

Interestingly however, within the last couple of years Europe saw a real surge of the anti-establishment parties. They are commonly referred to as the 'far right', 'hard-right' or 'populist' parties but this essentialist approach befuddles the picture as some of them (especially in economic terms, but not only) are firmly rooted in the leftist tradition. These parties have one in common – they are parties of protest, they do not want to work within the current political status quo. To the contrary, their main political objectives are aimed at overturning the establishment; they want to change present strategically objectives but they do so not through a revolution, but using perfectly acceptable political means.

The increasing popularity of the radical parties in many European countries is potentially lethal for the current socio-political situation in Europe. The fact that so many Europeans in different states declare their support for parties espousing such radical views is a phenomenon that should not be ignored. Quite surprisingly however, the research on the unexpected popularity across the continent is scant. Thus it remains unclear whether this popularity is a temporary anomaly, or whether the radical parties play a simple role of a safety vent indispensable in every political system. One could go as far as to argue that the scale and rapid rupture in politics resembles changes in the political agenda that occurred in Europe before the outbreak of WW2, especially with the endeavours to unite the parties from different countries and create a united front (*The Times*).

Who Are the Radicals?

When thinking about 'radicalisation of European politics' one cannot escape the simple question: What is radical? A claim that 'radical' is nothing but a label or a political tool however partially

justified ignores the fact that language has an inherent normative dimension: There are no words devoid of meaning and none whose meaning is not open to interpretation. Undoubtedly, 'radical' is one of those buzzwords which have been invested with many emotions. Sometimes its very use hinders scholarly pursuit since people have troubles with agreeing on the very definition of the subject they are discussing let alone agree on the characteristics of analysed phenomenon. Understanding what being a radical mean and what it involves is a key to understanding the processes connected to this phenomenon.

It is the sign of our times and the growing and deepening interdisciplinary connections that the literature on radical politics can be found in many academic fields from international relations to psychology, from economics to sociology. Various theories and approaches are complementary and different studies feed into each other: Both those analyses carried on micro level, interested primarily with individuals *per se*, their electoral preferences influenced by personalities, beliefs, attitudes, motivations and socio-economic backgrounds and those carried on macro level from, mainly from the angle of political parties. This multitude of approaches, theories, levels of analysis only intensifies confusion as to what the breath, depth and indeed the very nature of radical politics is and constitute the most potent trap, i.e. the lack of conceptual clarity without which the term itself is nothing more than a bumper sticker available for everyone to use it as they please.

When two factors: political programmes and electoral popularity are taken into consideration, the following political landscape of European radical politics emerges:

- France – National Front (Front National); at present with 21% of support and steadily growing.

- UK – United Kingdom Independence Party with 13% share of votes.

- Denmark – Danish People's Party (Dansk Folkeparti); with 20% of support became the second political power in the country.

- The Netherlands – Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrijheid); according to the latest polls 24% of voters in Holland would cast their votes for them.

- Austria – Freedom Party of Austria (Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs); at 20% would be the third strongest political power in Austria if the election were held now.

- Sweden – surveys give the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) 13% making them third biggest party in the country.

– Finland – the True Finns (Perussuomalaiset); reached 19% of support, ranking at number two in Finland.

– Norway – the Progress Party (Framstegspartiet) is at 14% and growing.

– Hungary – serving as an ‘extreme’ case; the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom) commonly known as Jobbik being the political force in power.

– Poland – National Movement (Ruch Narodowy) despite poor results its leaders do not deny their political ambitions (Polonia Christiana, 2013) and has proposed its of candidate in the upcoming presidential elections in Poland.

– Italy - Northern League (Lega Nord) secured nearly 20% of the vote in last elections and its leader, Matteo Salvini, has 33% of approval securing position of a rising political star.

– Greece – SYRIZA (Greek: ΣΥΡΙΖΑ, Synaspismós Rizospastikís Aristerás) founded as a coalition of left-wing and radical left parties in January 2015 defeated the ruling coalition and went on to become the winning coalition getting 36.3% of the popular vote.

If the programme vs. popularity method was deemed too theoretically imprecise, another approach might be employed. Should the results of elections to the European Parliament were taken into consideration, when juxtaposed with the general political scene of respective member states, the list of European radicals would comprise of the following parties:

– UK: UKIP, 30% – 24 mandates;

– France: Front National, 25% – 24 mandates;

– Hungary: Fidesz-KDNP, 51% – 13 mandates; Jobbik, 17,8% – 4 mandates;

– Finland: True Finns, 21.7% – 3 mandates;

– Denmark: Danish People’s Party, 23% – 3 mandates;

– Austria: Freiheitliche Partei Österreichs, 20% – 4 mandates;

– The Netherlands: Party for Freedom, 13.2% – 4 mandates;

– Sweden: Swedish Democrats, 6.9% – 1 mandate.

Arguably, European radical parties differ in many respects. They have different histories, different leading personas and operate in different political contexts. Most of all, their political programmes differ: some of them are Eurosceptic while for others the issue of European integration is not an important part of their agenda; some are emphasizing national character and roots, while others are more ethno-pluralistic or at least progressive in terms of societal changes; some are concerned about preserving the welfare state, others approach the economic issues from a more liberal

stance. In short, they are not identical clones springing from the same root and it is necessary take these similarities and differences into consideration when analysing what is truly 'radical' in European politics. One cannot exclude that a certain interpretation of 'radical politics' is dominant (Newman 179) or that these parties are indeed far right yet only in socio-cultural sense of the term (Rydgren 3). Simultaneously, it remains unchallenged that these parties differ and only the 'politics of rupture' or 'politics of contest' is their binding element and at the same time, the only universal horizon across Europe. They use it unabashedly perceiving it as a useful tool in obtaining various (even contradictory!) goals with varied responses to various social and political settings.

The Conceptual Limbo

As far as the generalist theories are concerned, most of the scholarship still treats the radical parties as if they were fringe and marginal. They base the support on fear (Kitschelt) or economic crises (Flecker et al.) and assume it being rather unstable (Givens). Furthermore, there are some problems with conceptual clarity. Firstly it needs to be emphasized that the term 'far right' or 'populist' is insufficient. Not only is this notion ambiguous, emotionally laden and pejorative, but also, because norms and values are intricately infused into this concept, it becomes inherently subjective. Secondly, in addition to confusion and frequent misinterpretations, speaking about 'far right'/'populist' only is not applicable in the context of radicalization of European politics, particularly with the elements of leftists ideologies being present.

As to the reasons of increased popularity of radical parties, political sciences lack a unanimous and convincing theory. Regarding the particular electoral preferences, several earlier studies on far right parties take on the more popular explanations that post-industrialisation and globalisation have restructured social stratification in Western societies thus creating new 'pools of frustration' to be exploited (Rydgren 1). Others argue that the voters' choice should be explained not in economic terms but rather through socio-cultural policy-preferences (Ignazi) which become more salient in Europe. Kemper bases on a grievance theory (Kemper) while Goodwin and Jasper point to in-group out-group dynamics (Goodwin, Jasper). Finally, factors like migration (Ivarsflaten) and ethnic competition (Lubbers et al.), discontent (Belanger, Aarts) are

proposed as the ultimate leverages. More importantly, recent studies looking into the causal models explaining the success of radical parties (Arzheimer, Norris, van der Brug et al.) are one-dimensional when juxtaposed with other political actors. Other studies aimed at measuring radical parties' impact, mistake correlation for causality (Williams 66) putting forward quite a tautological argumentation, e.g. that the increased anti-immigrant sentiments prove that right wing parties have played a part in fuelling these negative feelings. In her study Williams entirely ignores the possibility of a bottom up reaction or a demand-supply dynamics.

Question of the leadership cannot be ignored. The leader often sets the tone for the whole party to such extent that they epitomise its programme, ideals and values. Consequently, the leader inevitably contributes to any change in party reputation. Stewart and Clarke run multivariate analysis in order to confirm the practical wisdom that leader images had strong effects on party choice thus constituting a significant factor influencing party's popularity (Stewart, Clarke). This is supported by Luther who claims that parties' success to a great extent depends on their leaderships' capacity to identify and implement strategies (Luther). Furthermore, Harmel and Janda suggest that any change in the political programme does not 'just happen', but instead results from leadership change (Harmel, Janda), while Garzia's study confirms that voters' evaluation of party leaders plays a crucial role in shaping their feelings of attachment to parties (Garzia). Accordingly, Haiders untimely death proved that the change of the leader can be devastating for given party. Davies and Mian confirm that any leadership change can also significantly alter party's rhetoric or reshuffle priorities like it happened when Marine Le Pen replaced her father as a president of Front National (Davies, Mian).

Need for a Paradigm Change

The foregoing discussion has elucidated that traditional approaches are merely able to provide the vast list of factors influencing electoral preferences, however this still does not answer the question of recent increased popularity of radical parties. Furthermore, the up to date research is also admittedly patchy when it comes to analysing potential impact and consequences of such popularity. But the primary concern is caused by the fact that overexploitation of the 'far right'/'populist' paradigm lost the

capability to apprehend the whole complexity of political changes in Europe. Thus, a paradigm change is needed and this paper proposes to depart from the confines of traditional conceptualizations and analyse the current political milieu in Europe via the 'radical politics' framework based on the concept of societal security.

Radical politics was defined by Giddens as breaking away from the holds of the past while simultaneously bringing and controlling such change (Giddens 1). Hence, radicalism is an advocacy of and commitment to bringing about a sweeping social, political or religious change and a total, political and social transformation. In terms of means used, radicalism can be a perfectly legitimate challenge of the established norms or policies which defines the contemporary political 'off-stream'.

Naturally, 'radical politics' can only be understood in reference to what it means in given context and must be identified and ultimately explained by reference to the unobservable subjective experiences and the non-deducible meanings. This is so because any study focused on radicalism in politics inevitably touches upon certain phenomena associated with 'political consciousness' and this research in particular purports to show that something suprasensible and non-deducible like values, meanings and purposes influences radicalisation of European politics. Perhaps, as Newman observes, in case of new radical politics theory is lagging behind practice (Newman 178). However, if the political parties are treated as if they constitute a homogenous monolith across countries, this kind of scholarship aspires to prediction and flattens the complex issue by creating essentialist view. Consequently, if we agree to the theory that a homogenous set of factors can produce political radicalism, this hinges on an assumption that political radicalism itself is a homogenous phenomenon, we are therefore ignoring its susceptibility to adapt to the specific momentum of time and place as well as the complex relation between the structural and contextual factors.

Another layer of difficulty is added when one realizes the fluidity of normative dimension connected with the issue of radicalisation in politics – the perception of what constitutes 'radical politics' changes over time, varies in different places and, last but not least, is framed independently by each individual. This observation belies a stipulation that all European radical parties are radical in the same way. Perhaps if among all the differences one common denominator was to be identified, the anti-migrant or anti-Islamic stance of radical parties should be pronounced. From *Ruch Narodowy* to

Front National, what binds the radical parties is a staunch opposition against migration in general and Islam specifically (but not only). Such observation stipulates that notwithstanding the particular voters' electoral preferences, the increased widespread popularity of radical parties is generated by the deepening level of societal insecurity (Buzan et al.) in Europe.

Societal Insecurity and its Dilemmas

The concept of societal security was designed to tackle the changing reality of post-cold war Europe, adjusted to new settings and conceived to deal with emerging political reality of the European Union (EU). It places heavy emphasis on society as the main focal point of European security concerns. And if societies constitute the cornerstone of the new security agenda, then, Buzan et al. argue, issues of identity and migration that underpin the possible threats and vulnerabilities (Buzan et al. 120). Consequently, the processes that place 'us' versus 'them', the situations where one identity is challenged by another one and hence reinforce each other reciprocally, is what leads to a societal security dilemma. Societal insecurity, on the other hand, appears when societies define given change, development or potentiality as a threat to their survival as a community.

One of the fundamental assumptions governing the societal security concept is that the state and the society 'of the same people' are two different things. Wæver argues that states can be undermined or destabilized by 'their' societies becoming threatened or weakened in terms of social cohesion and identity, the society becomes the referent object by itself (Wæver et al. 42). Since societal identity is able to reproduce itself independently of the state and even in opposition to it, societal security being an integral part of state security should be considered as something more than just a factor to state security. The discrepancy is even more visible Friedman argues when one considers that the elites and the general public pursue a different logic (Friedman), with the elites more closely linked to the state and the public to the society. By neglecting this factor, in the words of Holton, one may hastily ascribe the reaction of 'mass politics' against cosmopolitanism to single phenomena (racism, populism, xenophobia) that are not able to provide satisfactory explanation for the complex canopy of society (Holton 141).

To answer the question why would political radicalisation stem from societal insecurity one must look carefully to the concept of the societal insecurity dilemma. As its name suggests, it consists of two ideas: the security dilemma and societal security. Roe explains that:

societies can experience processes in which perceptions of ‘the others’ develop into mutually reinforcing ‘enemy’ pictures leading to negative dialectics whereby groups tend to define their national identity and national consciousness in negative terms, through distinction from or comparison with neighbours (Roe 22).

In accordance with this theory, within the societal sector, the main threats to security come from competing identities. They can be mutually exclusive or one with overbearing influence that disrupts the reproduction of the other triggering protection against seductive cultural imports. Societal security dilemma denotes then processes whereby a group perceiving its identity as threatened starts to act in a security mode on this basis (Wæver et al. 23).

With the societal, as with other forms of security, what is perceived as a threat, and what can be objectively assessed as threatening, may be quite different. Real threats may not be accurately seen. Perceived threats may not be real, and yet still have real effects. Wæver et al. argue, that internal threats to society are symptomatic for weak states (Wæver et al. 43-44, 49); a claim that needs to be scrutinized in the contemporary European context. Spinner-Halev et al. present arguments to support this new problematic (Spinner-Halev et al.). Their analysis demonstrates that self-respect and group identity are strongly connected and can lead people to place collective interests above their individual ones. They also make it clear that the assumption that low-status groups have little self-respect and majority status groups have it in abundance is mistaken.

Societal security dilemma is not a static configuration, but a process with its own dynamics whereby the nature of the threats is changing and “some changes will be seen as part of natural process by which identities adjust and evolve to meet alternations in historical circumstances” (Wæver et al. 42). However, it is important to note that when religious and national identities reinforce each other they can create very strong identities (e.g. Muslim immigrants vs. Christian indigenous Europeans), and very strong patterns of fear, hostility and societal insecurity. In such a dispute, how do cultures defend themselves? With given identity threatened, one has to strengthen its expression. Thus, culture, Wæver et al.

extend their argument, becomes a security policy and over time the physical and symbolic boundaries (Wæver et al. 70), dividing the communities may become reinforced even further (Watson, Boag).

Buzan et al. explain that societies can react to threats through activities carried out by the community itself or by having the threat placed on the state agenda (Buzan et al. 122). The former trend is visible through emergence of radical parties and their political programmes laden with anti-immigrant or xenophobic discourse, while the former is supported by the fact that various non-state actors have mobilized a resistance against EU and immigration based on the security claim that they threaten national identity. Similar responses can be observed particularly towards Muslim presence in Europe, suffice to mention civic movements like PEGIDA or Stop the Islamification of Europe. If societal security concerns escalate to a level where the state is called back in, this will signal a potential retreat from integration (Buzan, Wæver 356) and opens up the space for radical parties. If not, it could possibly enhance further integration, but – one could argue – could be a stimulus for further political fragmentation and regionalization, both conducive towards violence.

Threats to Societal Security in Europe: Migration and Identity

Since identity is constructed, threats to identity always depend on the construction of something perceived as threatening to ‘us’. Globalisation is undoubtedly the source for vast influx of immigrants to Europe in a relatively short time span that threatens society with powerful inflows of language, style, culture and values that may weaken or overwhelm their indigenous counterparts and damage the ability of local identities to reproduce. In fact, Europe, which has never thought of itself as a place for immigration, is experiencing an unprecedented massive intake of people. In Europe however, not only do not national identities include a constituent belief that immigration should and can contribute to the process of building and redefining them; also intra-European migration cannot be a useful guide to the ability of European states to adjust and to integrate the latest waves. The reason for this is the sheer scale and different cultural background.

George Friedman poses a difficult question: What does one do with the foreigner who comes to your country and wants to be

a citizen? And further: What happens when a foreigner comes to your country and wants not only to be a citizen, but to become part of your nation? Citizenship can be granted; nevertheless it is difficult to change identity. National identity for Europeans is not rooted in choice. The issue of immigrant assimilation in Europe is a fault line that, under sufficient stress and circumstances, can rip Europe apart not only because of numbers. The European states are not configured to deal with immigration and have a definition of nationhood that is, in fundamental ways, incompatible with immigration. Assimilation in such situation is not impossible, but it is enormously more difficult. In this atmosphere, Islam has grown in Europe as a major complication and challenge. It becomes the second religion of the continent; a development that has raised practical questions about societal life. Holton who investigates the order-creating function of culture and its impact on societal identity under the persisting influence of globalisation, observes that culture seems to be harder to globalize than economics (Holton 145). In this context, monotheism such as Islam, encourages the development of imagined communities, and enhances spiritual bonds between believers even when they are separated geographically. It has particular appeal to those who perceive themselves as excluded from the society.

It has to be emphasized that people willingly perceived as outsiders are not necessarily immigrants in any evocative sense of that term. This issue refers to a situation where individuals born and bred into certain society are still perceived as strangers and/or societal burden as explicit from the anti-migrant agenda of European radical parties. This factor is particularly significant in respect to Muslims in Europe especially that in Europe's past, this group constituted the main 'other', and hence a point of reference for identity construction. Mastnak's thesis proposes that Islam was essential for the formation of European identity, and remains so for its maintenance (Mastnak). He argues that this identity was formed not by Islam but, predominantly, in the relationship to Islam and that Europe has developed a 'collective identity' and the ability to orchestrate action, a unity articulated in relation to Muslims as the enemy. These factors would explain why radicalisation of European politics manifests itself in a staunchly anti-Muslim way. The first dimension of Muslim presence is that this group change the balance of indigenous European population. Although there is certainly no proportional formula, simple numbers can change the identity (Laqueuer 19). This is then primarily about how relative

numbers react with absorptive and adaptative capabilities of society. The second dimension point to a hidden hand of socio-economic issues, which, unquestionably prominent, still have a subservient role to the main set of ideational factors. They stem from the ever-present societal security dilemma in Europe, as Wæver voiced it: "Threats strengthen identities at which they are aimed. Attempts to suppress an identity may work, but equally they may reinforce the intensity with which the group coheres" (Wæver 43).

Conclusions

While undoubtedly Hungary still remains a sole exception to the rule, in several countries the radical parties become second or third political power and actively strive to take over political control. This pattern was also palpable during recent elections in Greece. While we are not able to define authoritatively the source of radical parties' popularity, estimate its stability or predicts what results it might bring in the future, certain generalisations can be put forward. Firstly, The increasing popularity of the radical parties in many European countries is potentially lethal for the current socio-political situation in Europe. Secondly, an overview of Europe's radical parties proved that they are not identical clones springing from the same root and it is necessary take these similarities and differences into consideration when analysing what is truly 'radical' in European politics. Finally, overexploitation of the 'far right'/'populist' paradigm lost the capability to apprehend the whole complexity of political changes in Europe.

Thus, there is a need for paradigm change and this paper proposes to depart from the confines of traditional conceptualizations and analyse the current political milieu in Europe via the 'radical politics' framework based on the concept of societal security. In line with this claim, the paper proposed to analyse the phenomenon of political radicalisation in Europe through the emergence of radical parties and their political programmes laden with anti-immigrant or xenophobic discourse. Furthermore, such argument is also supported by the fact that various non-state actors have mobilized a resistance against EU and immigration based on the security claim that they threaten national identity. Similar responses can be observed particularly towards Muslim presence in Europe, suffice to mention civic movements like PEGIDA or Stop the Islamification of Europe.

It needs to be reckoned with that the increasing popularity of radical parties may trigger further radicalisation of European politics whereby the mainstream parties would take over some of the arguments or language used by their radical competitors. What is more, if we focus on the societal side of the whole situation, it is undeniable that the current trends impact the society, too. Nonetheless, it remains unclear whether the social divisions along the political lines might further harden, deepening the polarisation of societies with 'critical situations' like "Charlie Hebdo" attack happening more often, leading to social tensions, instability and, at least potentially, violence.

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Ljupcho Stevkovski*

THE RISE OF RIGHT-WING EXTREMISM IN EUROPEAN UNION

ABSTRACT: It is a fact that in the European Union there is a strengthening of right-wing extremism, radical right movement, populism and nationalism. The consequences of the economic crisis, such as a decline in living standards, losing of jobs, rising unemployment especially among young people, undoubtedly goes in favor of strengthening the right-wing extremism. In the research, forms of manifestation will be covered of this dangerous phenomenon and response of the institutions. Western Balkan countries, as a result of right-wing extremism, are especially sensitive region on possible consequences that might occur, since there are several unresolved political problems, which can very easily turn into a new cycle of conflicts, if European integration processes get delayed indefinitely.

KEY WORDS: Right-wing extremism, European Union, Western Balkan, European enlargement process.

The Right-wing Extremism in the European Union-political and Security Aspects

The first chapter of the research will deal with the reasons for right-wing extremism occurrence and forms and methods of manifestation in different countries. According to the Office for the Protection of the Constitution of Germany, right-wing extremism is an ideology that has its roots in nationalism and racism. This means that the ethnicity of a nation or race is an essential matter for the individual (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz). All other interests and values, including civil and human rights are

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subordinate to this ideology. This ideology is closely linked with the emergence of xenophobia and in that direction with acts of violence against minorities just because of their ethnic origin (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz). In scientific theory the notion of right-wing extremism often associated to neo-Nazism, neo-fascism, racism and similar categories. Rob Riemen in his book "Eternal return to fascism" (2011) seeks reasons of appearance of fascism through "cultural and moral emptiness of man in mass society." According to Riemen, the phenomenon of right-wing extremism or fascism is a political demagoguery which aims winning and maintaining power through manipulation of human emotions, exploiting the anger and helplessness of man in mass society (57). In fact, this thesis set to the conclusion that the appearance of right-wing extremism is a psychological category that occurred as a result of tendentious indoctrination of the population in the past. So, one way to explain the reasons of appearance of this phenomenon is through the tools of political culture. Such attitudes confirmation today we can find in any group, political party or right-wing extremist movement, in the sense that "we are not fascists, we are party that fights for freedom," or "we are not fascists, but Islam is fascist." As confirmation of these views often can be heard sentences how those right-wing members fought for defense of "the Jewish, Christian, humanistic, or anti-communist traditions." Breivik is a classic example of an extremist who did not hide his mindset drawing on previous "values." Such views expressed the Dutch Party for Freedom, as well. Their action, although it is not expressed through physical violence, is based on a verbalism by using psychological methods of expression of hate speech, as a civilization discourse (61). Through analyses of this party, Riemen actually confirms the thesis that these movements, which are associated with populism and right-wing extremism is a logical consequence of the level of development of a society, to which actually we all bear responsibility. Namely, responsibility rests in all the instruments of political socialization in one society: political parties, the family, the mass media, educational institutions, devising a way for everyday struggle to acquire more material wealth, etc. In the context of explaining the thesis, it certainly has to be taken into account the social circumstances that undoubtedly affect the occurrence of these phenomena. Once again it has to be recalled that the members of right-wing extremism are basically feeling "un-free." The question is whom are they threatened of, who is banning their motion, and finally what lies behind the alleged non-freedom. As a result of economic crisis we've got increased

unemployment, falling living standards, poverty, increased corruption, fear of the future and so on. Assessment is that these consequences have an immediate impact on strengthening the right-wing extremism in the EU, and recruitment of young generations in their ranks. Young people are especially vulnerable category. Namely, according to a survey of Eurostat, youth unemployment in the EU each year is rapidly growing. On the other hand, unemployment and low living standard gives space on nationalists and populists, to exposure their ideas of right-wing extremism. It makes sense to carry out recruitment of people who have lost their jobs, or from young people who are waiting to be employed. These circumstances affects in seeking culprit for this situation. Usually, history has shown that the culprit is either a foreign ideology or foreigners who live and work in their neighborhood. In this case it has been seen a tightening of anti-immigrant policy, but also attacks on foreigners working in the EU, who belong to Islamic religion.

The development of the negative tendencies associated with right-wing extremism repose on many stereotypes that exist in the EU, as a result of the cultural differences of different ethnic groups and religions. In Germany, according to statistics data in the period 1990-2006, right-wing extremism, racism and violence has been constantly rising. In 2005, according to data of the Ministry of Interior, in the province of Brandenburg, registered are 97 attacks of right-wing extremists, and one third of those were committed against foreigners. The structure of the right-wing extremist groups was mainly younger people (Ripenberger). It is indicative that the rise of right-wing extremism was much higher in East Germany, the former DDR. Namely, in towns and villages in the east of Germany right-wing extremism became a dominant culture of the youth where there were frequent cases of beatings of foreigners. The town *Gräfenberg*, in the district of Forchheim, since 1999 there was tradition to march on Nazis and since 2006 they were marching down almost every month. Bavaria is housing the leadership of the radical right party National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD), where often could be seen "Nazi" symbols (Colik: *Novac za Kosovo 'završio' u mračnim kanalima?...*). Financing of the NPD was by the state, since it was legally a registered party. Political scientist Andrea Repke claims that there were opportunities for its funding from donations of the old Nazis, private loans, their own companies and from other chains of economic entities. According to research done by organization *Mobit*, reportedly 14-15% citizens of Thuringia had right-wing extremist beliefs,

and the situation was not better in percentage of results obtained in the western Germany provinces (Beše and Bašić: *Samouvereni neonacisti*). In their campaigns, NPD advocated for social issues such as providing additional cash benefits for German mothers, with aim of gaining better election results, at the same time were registered hostile and racist statements against foreigners, notably in the province of Thuringia, where 1.5% foreigners are living (Beše and Bašić: *Samouvereni neonacisti*). The conclusion, to which the German Office for the protection of the constitution in its report of 2006 came, was that right-wing extremism in Germany has increased. Increasing in violent acts with right-extremist background, according to Interior Minister Wolfgang Schaueble, was worrying. In 2006 there was 9.3% more such cases than in 2005, or precisely 1,115 delicts (Firstenau *Пораст на насилствата на ...*).

As a result on the unification of Germany, it was thought that right-wing extremism is more dominated in eastern part of the state. But lately it has been registered growth on neo-Nazis in western Germany, too. Since 2007, vice President of the European Commission Franco Fratini when asked about this phenomenon said that “Germany, Belgium, Denmark and Italy,” are EU members where right-wing extremism is a big problem (*Komisija EU za zabranu NPD*). Uwe Karsten Heje from the association “*Show your face*” indicates the fact that best illustrates the current gloomy situation. Specifically, since the reunification of Germany 20 years ago, right-wing extremists killed about 150 people. Official data, however, does not exist. Heje believes that the “fight against right-wing extremism has to be taken by entire German society and thus right-wing extremists will not easily be able to infiltrate among young people” (Firstenau, Bašić Savić). Statistics show that every 26 minutes in Germany right-wing extremists do a criminal act. Uwe Karsten Heje considers it necessary to invest in higher education. In fact, around 100,000 young people each year are leaving school before graduation. Young people with no prospects are easier subject to right-wing extremist propaganda (Firstenau, Bašić Savić).

As a result of the economic crisis, in Hungary Jobbik party, whose slogan is “Hungary to the Hungarians,” noted a growth in popularity. According to the philosopher Gaspar Miklos Tamas, the reason for the growth of right-wing extremism, as a movement of the middle class is its “panic” fear of the future, since its position and prestige depend on the position of the state, which is considered quite uncertain (Ferzak, Briski).

In fact during the economic crises one feature marks all right-wing extremists: the attempt to use the fear of the citizens. They rely on the dissatisfaction of the citizens from the current social and political situation; they offer simple answers for complex problems derived from the economic crisis, unemployment and the social insecurity. That is their terrain, and hence the right-wing extremists blame foreigners or “others,” who are different from them, for all these injustices, using measures of violence, expulsion or return of “the culprits” back where they came from. These parties usually remain relatively marginal political phenomena that never go out from the shadow of protests parties and are not capable of a coalition in governmental alliances. But even then they performed adequate impact on conservative parties in government, shifting their positions more to the right range, fearing for their electoral potential. Sociologists (Nasar, Modood 34-40) already have been talking about anti-Islamic racism, because the aim ideology of these parties is spreading fear and trying to profile the Muslims as easily recognizable enemy of the society.

Indicative findings are published in the annual report for 2009 by the German Federal Office for the Protection of the constitution. They found a decreasing number of violent acts of right-wing extremists, and increased violence on the far left inspired by political motives. Commenter of the “*Frankfurter rundsau*” cynically notes “it seems that in Germany a single revolutionary block is formed, that works all together to abolish the democratic order in the country” (Briski). Livelier than this comment to me is the manner of the treatment of extremism by a powerful German state institution, unless this way of presenting problems is not part of the manipulation by the political elites in order to blur the actual security situation through the left-right scheme.

As a form of promotion, right-wing extremists are using more the Internet. The number of neo-Nazi networks in just one year, have more than tripled in 2010. NGO “Jugendschutz.net,” formed in 1997 to protect the youth from the influence of right-wing extremists, registered 1900 websites dealing with the ideas of Nazism. Around ten thousand users’ daily read neo-Nazi blogs and are visiting Internet platforms with such content (Firstenau, Kine Veljkovic). According the German Counter intelligence service estimations there are around 22.500 neo-Nazis in Germany and many of them use Internet to gain attention beyond local areas (Firstenau *The many faces of neo-Nazism*).

Political parties and neo-Nazi discourse

Massacres and the attacks of Breivik in Norway initiated a debate about how dangerous are the radical ideas that advocate individual parties in Europe, because they have significant support among citizens in many EU states. For example in 2006 Breivik was in the leadership of the youth union of the Norwegian Progress Party. Although the President of this Party Siv Jensen publicly distanced herself from the crime of Breivik, outstanding fact is that this is a nationalist party with program for fight the immigration of foreigners in Norway (Riegert, Bojić). In the parliamentary life of Norway its importance stems from the fact that since 2005 it has the second-largest parliamentary club in the Norwegian Parliament, however it is in opposition. Hajo Funke, from the Free University of Berlin, which has practiced with the study of right-wing extremism, expressed surprise of such attacks in Norway due to the fact that right-wing extremists in Sweden have been more numerous, more powerful and ready to commit violence (Riegert, Bojić).

Right-wing extremist Party of the Swedes, at the election in 2010 got 5.7% of votes and had 20 parliamentary mandates. Its program was drastically limited to the immigration and reintroduction of measures of border control. Interesting fact is the monitoring of right-wing extremist Party of real Finns, which on elections in 2012 got 19% of votes and had fourfold increased their number of seats in the parliament. This party is in opposition, but its activities are based on Euro skepticism and xenophobia. Unlike the situation of extreme right parties in the previous states where they are out of power in Denmark, the National Party is part of the ruling coalition and in 2012 they succeeded to push forward its proposal for introduction of customs control at the border, regardless the fact Denmark has signed the Schengen Agreement (Riegert, Bojić). In this context, the National Party, as opponents of the immigration, managed to incorporate their proposals in new legislation, which provided the strictest regulations in Europe about immigration and asylum. Similar ideas can be found in the Dutch Party for Freedom. Its leader Geert Wilders is seen as a proven enemy of Islam and from 2010 the party is third highest in the Dutch parliament (Wilders). All above mentioned right-wing extremist parties have condemned the crimes of Breivik.

Progress in the political life experienced extreme right-wing National Front, led by Marine Le Pen, which in 2011, on the local elections, was just a point less than the winning party of Sarkozy. It

is interesting that Le Pen won 18 percent of votes in the 2012 presidential election. National Front as a party is a great opponent of Islam and immigration in the EU. Similar parties with right-wing extremist orientations and programs exist in Austria, Switzerland, Italy, Belgium and part of them are represented by its members in the ruling coalition.

In Germany, at the federal level, these parties do not have more success, but locally are present with politics based on anti-Islamic program, by declaring foreigners, especially the members of Islam, as a main problem of the society. At the local level right-wing extremists are usually members of the parties that have the prefix "for," for instance "Pro Cologne," "Pro NRW" and so on. Such protests organized by the "Pro NRW" were organized in Bonn on May 05, 2012 followed by provoking the Muslims who at the same time scheduled a peaceful protest, and as a result the police had to intervene to avoid serious conflict between the two opponent sides (Tanjug Švajcarci *ograničavaju imigracije?*). Minister of Interior of North Rhine Westphalia, Ralf Jeger, blamed the right-wing extremists for their intentions of causing violence. The far-right party Pro-Deutschland on August 16, 2012 won a case at the Administrative Court in Berlin, which allowed them to use publicly provocative cartoons of the Prophet Muhammad. Berlin court rejected the appeal of three Islamic communities and stressed that the cartoons are protected as "freedom of art" and by that law it cannot be considered as an abuse by a certain religious group. Pro-Deutschland planned to carry cartoons of Muhammad during their protests against the Muslims under the slogan "Islam does not belong to Germany - stop the islamization" (Metodijev).

In Hungary, country member of EU, the parties Fides and Jobik are considered as nationalist and right-wing party, even in the case for Jobik it is claimed to be a Nazi Party, are both in power (Riegert, Bojić). Lately, prominent members of the right-wing extremist groups are involved in sports. They are active in establishing sport clubs or are involved as referees of sports matches (Omerašević). Their aim is to spread neo-Nazi ideas in the amateur leagues, especially among the younger generation, where recruitment is very easy. In that sense, fan groups are infiltrated by extremist right members. Right-wing extremists are often leaders of fan groups and are also nominated for local elections. In addition certain numbers of shirts were preferred, as is the number 88, and if we know that the eighth letter in the alphabet is H, and then the number 88 in translation would mean "Hail Hitler" (Velicki 70-71). Core

values of fans groups were: honor, community, loyalty and motherland (Fric, Vranković).

Interestingly, these values could be heard in the statements of the leaders of the National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD). German Interior Minister Hans-Peter Fridrich, at the end of 2011 acknowledges that the extreme right in Germany applies terrorist methods. The statement was regarding revealed group of neo-Nazis that in the period 2000-2007, killed ten people among which eight were of Turkish origin, one Greek and one policeman. The arrested perpetrators belonged to the illegal group called the National Socialist Underground (NSU) (2011). Almost at the same time, the Danish Intelligence service-PET, in its annual report, in section on political extremism stated that “a small group of right-wing extremists members are actively working on compiling an inventory of political enemies and have carried out armed training to its members.” Assessment of PET was that in Denmark, part of the members of right-wing extremist organizations are preparing for racial war and were ready even to apply violence (B92 *Bez uhapšenih huligana iz Srbije*).

Every year on November 11, during the National day, on the streets of Warsaw in Poland, a real war happens between the young radical nationalists on one side and anti-fascists on the other. In 2011 the number of these radicals was over 7,000 young people, some of whom came from Serbia, Montenegro, Ukraine, Russia, Slovakia and Croatia. The reason for these protests was the growing number of unemployed among the young people in Poland, as well as the negative consequences of the economic crisis in the EU (Beta *Bez uhapšenih huligana iz Srbije*). Marcin Kornak, in its “*Brown Book*” has recorded crimes motivated by right-wing extremism in the period from 1987 to 2009 (1-25). A website was registered owned by a neo-Nazi group in which were posted photographs and addresses, for so called enemies of the “*white race*” (21).

Violence motivated by racial motives, according to sociologist Rafal Pankowski, was a real phenomenon in Poland, and based on this occasion he wrote a book “*Populist Radical Right in Poland: Patriots*.” Objectives of the right-wing extremist attacks in Poland were not only national minorities but also feminists, the homeless and others. According to his assessment the line between patriotism and legal political parties operating in Poland and associations of the extreme right is very thin (Maciol, Metodijev). Few weeks later in Spain, in front of the Royal Palace in Madrid were several hundred citizens gathered in order to pay a tribute to the fascist

General Franco. It was conducted by the famous fascist salute. At the beginning of December 2011, according to police sources, about 400 right-wing extremists participated in protests against immigrants in Stockholm (Tanjug Švedska: *Osujećen marš desničara*).

On December 13, 2011 the Italian right-winger Djanluka Kaseri in Florence, killed two and injured three hawkers of African origin, then committed suicide. British agency Reuters claims that the attack was racially motivated (Tanjug Švedska: *Osujećen marš desničara*). How would the news on April 28, 2012 be interpreted, that the members of the Association of Italian fascist veterans found a memorial plaque in front of the house where in April 28, 1945 Mussolini was executed, and this act was attended by the President of the municipality, having that the earlier municipal council voted for this act (Tanjug Švajcarci *ograničavaju imigracije?*).

Austria also faces the problem of right-wing extremism. Each year in January in Vienna a ball of right-wing student organizations is being held, which usually ends with protests and clashes with the police. The most visitors the ball has had, was in the period 2000-2005, when the right-wing Freedom Party (FPÖ) participated in the Government of Austria. Besides this ball, other events were organized, such as “gathering of the patriots,” which mustered representatives of right-wing parties from all over Europe (Tanjug Švajcarci *ograničavaju imigracije?*). “Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of Occident,” in the German original “Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes” (PEGIDA), from mid-October 2014, every Monday evening they demonstrated in Dresden, the capital of Saxony, against everything they considered Islamic, exploiting asylum or threat to German culture. In this context, given are the results of the newest poll, conducted by the Bertelsmann Foundation according to which 57% of non-Muslims Citizens of Germany has perceived Islam as a threat (Dege). Luc Bachmann has publicly addressed as speaker in front of the PEGIDA protesters. Bachmann is owner of “photo and PR agency.” The research of the *Sächsische Zeitung* showed that Bachman have been convicted already and currently is on probation for drug trafficking. According to the aforementioned list, criminal records of Bachman includes: burglary and other thefts, false suspicion, incitement to false statements, violation of abstinence, Driving under influence of alcohol and causing bodily harm. This raises the question of what good we can expect in the future from such profile of a man. (Denis).

Way of Counter the Right-wing Extremism Threat in the European Union

The answer must always be multifunctional and to cover not only political and security measures but broader measures of social, educational and cultural discourse. But the dilemma arises from the system, in which we live, from the constitutional principles, in ensuring freedom of speech, protection of human rights and so on. We will take the German example of the response, due to their seriousness attached to this threat. In German society, there is a dilemma whether taking measures in initiating a criminal charge to right-wing extremists would be an act of violation of the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the constitution? The question that arise is whether the marches with neo-Nazi symbols and verbal threats or insults to the “other” on a personal, ethnic, racial or religious grounds, is an act of freedom expression as part of the democratic system, or perhaps is it an act of abuse of democracy. Not knowing how to fight back, a lot of people thinking not to endanger the democratic rights and freedoms that right-wing extremists are called upon, as a counter measure they are expressing disagreement that often ends in conflicts (Wolfgang).

How was it possible, members of National Socialist Underground to remain undetected, and committed ten murders in the period 2000-2010, in five federal states in Germany, all done with the same weapon. First, investigation was pointing towards Kurdish population, than later on it was discovered that it is a three far-right terrorists of the National Socialist Underground (NSU). How was it possible, 36 Security Services on different levels in Germany to make such a mistake in the assessment for the perpetrators? Experts say the problem is in the minds of the officials and the politicians. Failure is associated with the information they had or in their desire to have them dispatched to the right addresses. Bielefeld University professor Christopher Gusy is not convinced and doubts that all information about NSU were stored and processed in the database (Pfeifer). Violence cannot be prevented if the information or data is not analyzed from the very beginning at one place and by one center. If so, the mosaic is impossible to be completed, and it means the conclusion would be wrong and counter measures will be applied in the wrong direction.

The fault is even greater if it is known that the intelligence strategy could not have become operational, due to the fact that right-wing extremists have managed to infiltrate themselves in the

state's security structures in Thuringia, region of their origin. In this sense, what is worrying is the knowledge that Helmut Rever, the former head of the Security Service in the province Thuringia, "had no great affinity" to monitor the activities of right-wing extremists. Just imagine in the period from 1994 to 2000 he was a boss in this area (Wolfgang, Cutanoski). Responsibility for illegal operation of National Socialist Underground was asked by the Commission, established by the Parliament of Germany. In their research the Commission was faced with errors, omissions and negligence, even with surprising ignorance of this threat by a part of the intelligence officers. They wondered whether domestic counterintelligence services maybe intentionally cover their blind eye to the violence of right-wing extremists. Sebastian Edathy, a member of the opposition Social Democratic Party, chaired a parliamentary inquiry into the NSU, called the botched police and secret service investigations a "historically unprecedented disaster" (Kiesel). According *Amadeu Antonio Foundation*, the German authorities regularly considered the violence of right-wing extremists' as trivial and less dangerous (2012). Different investigations on conducted murders have been variously interpreted since the results of the inquiries were not analyzed in one place. As it has been said, the version that possible perpetrators of the killings could be members of right-wing extremist organizations was not even considered. Bernard Falk, former vice president of the Federal Criminal Police (BKA), said to the Commission that the investigations were conducted superficially and in an amateurish way.

Moreover, at all levels problem was the coordination between securities agencies. The key question is why after the terrorist network of NSU was finally discovered, in November 2011, the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz) destroyed an important files pertaining to the NSU (Werkhäuser). Regardless of the officials' justification that in this way the informants embedded in this right-wing extremist structure were protected. This issue, even after the completion of the investigation, will continue to dominate. The Commission, in the end of 2013 in its report issued recommendations for urgent reforms in the security sector in Germany (Kiesel). Meanwhile German government in its fight against right-wing extremism approved creation of a central database in which all relevant authorities will have access to. In this context the Bundesrat, Germany's upper house of parliament, approved the "Act to Improve the Fight against Right-Wing Extremism."

Moreover, the government Committee found that if German society wants properly to fight right-wing extremism, it must not involve taking only security measures, but also to influence the younger generation primarily through education, because they are the main recruitment contingent of right-wing extremist organizations. In this context, in Germany numerous non-governmental organizations have been established with an idea to recruit mostly young people and to become their members, in order to protect them from joining right-wing organizations. The fight takes place via the Internet and social networks. Within the wider activities of the state in the fight against extreme right, Interior Minister of Germany called Muslims in Germany, for more intensive cooperation with the security services in the efforts for dealing with extremism, radicalism and violence. On the other hand Ayman Maziek, *General Secretary of the Central Council of Muslims in Germany* claims that although a lot of discussions occur regarding integration, there is no effect, because so far all undertaken measures had security character. He estimates the integration cannot be achieved only with security measures or with exclusive focus on the so-called Islamic extremism, without paying attention to growth of right-wing extremism (Kaufmann). In Norway, after the massacre of Breivik, an independent commission was established which reported that few months before the attack, that intelligence was able, to learn more about the plans of Breivik, when the perpetrator bought the components for making bombs and police had enough information to stop him from the moment while he was in move between the site of a bomb attack and the youth camp (Atanasovska).

Conclusion

The threat of right-wing extremism is only seemingly low. The economic crisis is impacting on the following aspects: decline of living standard and increased youth unemployment; creation of psychological situation conducive to “witch hunt” phenomenon.

The members of right-wing extremism have already marked “the others” as main culprits for the economic and social decline. Political elites obviously have no courage to call on problems using \real dictionary. The reality of European society is that institutions that are paid for monitoring this type of threat are keeping their eyes shut. The measures that are taken to counter the right-wing extremist threats are limited and are mainly of a repressive character. The political elites and the major political parties are either

firting or are coupling with right-wing extremists, just to maintain their power. If the economic crisis continues further on, we may certainly expect further growth of right-wing extremism and populism, as well as a feedback reaction from “the others.” As a consequence, such a development, with great probability will bring tightening of the security situation in the EU on multiple levels. In regards to the Balkans, there is where the problems arise. Balkans is still burdened with numerous conflicts by the past, with various programs for normalization of the relations between the Balkan states, as well as the threat of recurrence of national and ethnic tensions, due to the implications from the economic crisis. The assessment is that nationalist platforms with neo-Nazi or right-wing extremist platforms are yet to come to the fore if social problems deepen (Bartlett, Prica 4-8). It seems that European integration is a unique remedy for all of us, without an alternative. In this regard, the statement of the previous President of the European Council Herman Van Rompuy was that “the entry of the Western Balkan countries in EU will end a history filled with constant conflicts” (Beta W. *Balkans’ EU accession will mark end of conflicts*).

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**WHO IS TO BLAME ON JULY 22, 2011?
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND SOCIOLOGICAL BLAME FRAMES
IN THE REPORTING OF ANDERS BREIVIK
IN THE DUTCH SPEAKING BROADSHEET PRESS**

ABSTRACT: On July 22, 2011 Anders Breivik murdered a large amount of people in Norway. In this study we investigate a sample of articles that were published about Breivik and his deeds in the Flemish and Dutch press. We will investigate these articles looking for the so-called “attribution of responsibility frame.” The murders from Breivik could be explained psychologically (“he is insane”) as well as sociologically (far-right political parties are responsible because of having spread hate speech). We present a typology of subtypes of frames. We will furthermore investigate how many times these types of frames occur in different media outlets.

KEY WORDS: Breivik, framing, content analysis, newspapers, causal attributions, ideology

Introduction

On July 22, 2011 Anders Breivik murdered a large amount of people in Norway. A bomb exploded in a car in Oslo and 8 people were killed. Subsequently Breivik moved to the isle of Utøya, where youngsters from the Norwegian socialist party had their summer holidays. Breivik killed 69 youngsters and was arrested afterwards by the police. Breivik explained the motivation of his deeds as a protest against the supposed dominance of Islam in western societies such as Norway. He argued that this dominance was made possible

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by the rise of what he calls *cultural Marxism*. Cultural Marxism is the idea that all cultures should be treated equally propagated by particularly socialist ideologies in Europe. Although socialism is the main ideology criticized by Breivik, he recognizes similar arguments among almost all European political parties, excluding only Far Right parties.

The murders of Breivik were extensively covered by the European press. The press evidently condemns his deeds. Nevertheless one could wonder if all press outlets condemn this acts in the same way. Breivik wrote a 1500 page manifest in which he explained his motivations, and in which he sought support for his deeds by quoting (far) right intellectuals and politicians. In this research our question is how this claimed support for his deeds by right wing intellectuals and right wing politicians is explained in papers that have a historically different ideological conviction. How do conservative newspapers interpret the link between right wing politics and Breivik and how do progressive newspapers interpret this link? Are there any differences between newspapers that prove different stances of the editorial team towards Breivik?

The central question is discussed in this article by means of a comparison of four Dutch language newspapers. Hallin and Mancini point out that the historical differences between ideologies of newspapers are becoming obsolete (Hallin and Mancini). A recent observation about Dutch mass media reflects and deplors this trend (Gautier). The aim of this study is to provide a very specific but relevant case study on this matter. Do newspapers still have different ideological orientations if they cover issues with an ideological angle?

We chose to focus on those media that are the backbone of news reporting and that play a leading role in the intellectual public debate i.e. broadsheet newspapers. In each geographical context, we selected one leading progressive and one leading conservative newspaper: *De Morgen* (left-leaning) and *De Standaard* (right-leaning) for Flanders, and *de Volkskrant* (left-leaning) and *NRC Handelsblad* (right-leaning) for The Netherlands. These are not the most read Dutch speaking newspapers, but are considered to be intellectually the most influential newspapers (Hijmans, Schafraad, Buijs & d'Haenens). Both Flanders and the Netherlands are important regions in the debate about Breivik because they are the home country of the far right political parties *Vlaams Belang* in Flanders and *Partij voor de Vrijheid* in the Netherlands. Breivik quotes these parties.

Application of a Terminology by Philip Zimbardo to Formulate a Hypothesis

To deal with this question we rephrase the question in a terminology coined by the American psychologist Philip Zimbardo in his book “The Lucifer Effect: Understanding How Good People Turn Evil” (Zimbardo). Lucifer is claimed to be Gods favorite angel until he challenges Gods authority. Then he turns out to be satanic. Zimbardo points out that this evolution could happen to any of us. We could all turn out to be evil, if the situation urges us to be like that. The empirical data that Zimbardo uses come from the so called “Stanford prison experiment.” In this experiment random people were assigned to either a guard or a prisoner role. Although there were no reasons to predict that the guards would turn out to be sadists it did happen. The reason why this happened was because the situation gave them the opportunity to do so. Zimbardo argues that in general people tend to underestimate the influence of situational circumstances and to overly attribute the origin of evil deeds to psychological characteristics of individuals.

If we transpose the terminology of Zimbardo to our case on the newspaper coverage of Anders Breivik we might argue that the deeds of Breivik could be explained in two ways. The explanation that mirrors popular belief is that the deeds of Breivik are mainly the cause of psychological shortcomings. Of course this is to a large extent true, because a large scale massacre of this degree can never be entirely explained by situational circumstances. Nevertheless we can also say that the environment of hate speech created by right wing politics might be partially responsible. The murders from Breivik could be explained psychologically (“he is immoral and/or insane”) as well as sociologically. The sociological explanation says that extreme right parties are also responsible, because of having spread hate speech.

Transposing this terminology to our hypothesis about the coverage of Anders Breivik we could argue that holding right wing politics responsible for the murders of Breivik could be a more used strategy in left wing news coverage, while this link is less popular in conservative news coverage. This leads us to the next central hypothesis: Progressive news coverage about Breivik will be inclined to use situational explanations for Breiviks deeds more often while conservative news coverage uses psychological explanations more often. Next to this hypothesis, we will investigate an

additional research question: are there any systematic differences between the Dutch newspapers and the Dutch language newspapers in Belgium?

Application of the Frame Concept to Operationalize the Hypothesis

To operationalize this hypothesis we need to search for a content analytic device to measure the distinction between psychological and situational explanations. Therefore we look at the framing analysis instrument that was developed by Semetko and Valkenburg (Semetko & Valkenburg). Framing analysis departs from the assumption that public perceptions about issues are shaped by how these issues are represented in the news. As such these so-called “frames” are “conceptual tools which media and individuals rely on to convey, interpret and evaluate information.” (Semetko & Valkenburg 94). Another classic definition of framing is provided by Entman (Entman 52). Framing “is to select some aspects of perceived reality and make them more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral evaluation and/or treatment recommendation.”

Semetko and Valkenburg identify five predominant frames: the conflict frame, the human interest frame, the economic consequences frames, the morality frame and the responsibility frame. One could argue that each news article could to a certain extent contain different degrees of these frames. Many, if not all, news articles would for instance evoke some sort of responsibility for the phenomenon that is covered. In the case of reporting about Breivik this implies blaming Breivik himself or the ideological context that surrounds him. Our study takes this responsibility frame as a main topic of interest and looks at how this responsibility is covered in news articles from four Dutch speaking newspapers. If we look at the four dimensions of framing Entman distinguishes we focus on “causal interpretation” rather than on problem definition, moral evaluation or treatment recommendation.

Interpreting if Breivik himself or the social conditions he lives in are hold responsible in a newspaper article might not be an easy task altogether, because many shades of interpretation may be present in newspaper articles. It is therefore not easy to opt for

“deductive coding” (Semetko and Valkenburg), which means applying preexisting codes. “Inductive coding” implies reading through the material and searching for different frames. Although we distinguish between psychological and situational accounts of responsibility we need to work inductively to search for the different dimensions of responsibility that fit this basic distinction between psychological and situational responsibility.

Searching inductively for attributions of responsibility implies searching for linguistic choices. A key premise in discourse analysis is that texts are based upon choices and that alternative choices were always an option (Fairclough 202). The words and sentences of the analyzed texts are also linked to different actors. The journalist who wrote the article might be giving his own opinion or representing the opinions of others. We look at the voices in the text and how they are constructed to identify inductively an array of frame types.

In this article we present a taxonomy of responsibilities that we find when we inductively investigate a sample of newspaper articles from four newspapers. The grid that we derive from this endeavor is quantified in a second phase, to test the central hypothesis. This study works with a limited sample of articles (N=247) and serves as a benchmark for a broader further study including other Dutch speaking newspapers and English newspapers as well, that is currently being developed. All articles published in the four analyzed newspapers up until October 15, 2013 (the date of data collection) that refer to Breivik on the one hand and to at least one of four key terms on the other hand get selected. These key terms are “Islam,” “multiculturalism,” “multicultural society” and “cultural diversity.”

Inductive Coding : Seven Types of Frames

Our taxonomy of responsibilities includes seven subtypes of frames : the factual frame, the dispositional frame, the hate speech frame, the denial of hate speech frame, the network frame, the systemic frame and the reaction frame. The definition of these frames will be discussed below, followed by a quantitative comparison of the occurrence of these frames in the four analyzed newspapers. Often articles are multilayered, but each article is coded as being a representative article for the frame that occurs predominantly in this article.

The Factual Frame

A first frame we need to discern is the “factual” frame. One of the central values in Western journalism culture is objectivity (Obijofor & Hanusch 25), and this is also mirrored in our selection of newspaper articles on Breivik. Although we specifically selected articles that make a link between Breivik and his motivation because of our use of key words we do find a lot of articles that are strictly descriptive. A quote illustrating this frame is this one (from *De Morgen*, April 17, 2012, translated in English): “Breivik recognizes the facts, but he does not think that he is a guilty. He deems he acted out of self-defense against the “state enemies” that opened up Norway for multiculturalism and made a “Muslim invasion” of Norway possible.” The words between quotation marks are also in the original article and represent the fact that the journalists in this article merely quote Breivik. They explicitly do not want to add further interpretation. The dominant linguistic feature of this type of articles is what Fairclough has called “discourse representation” (Fairclough 79-85): through the use of quotes we know that a journalist is not giving his personal opinion.

The Individual Frame

But many articles do leave factuality behind and contain opinions about the nature of the causes of Breivik's actions. Such an argumentation can for instance be found in *De Standaard* from 14 April, 2012. It is argued that ideologies may not be irrelevant, but that we do not need to condemn movies or video games, because they are not the root cause of the action of Lone Wolves. *De Morgen* (May 24, 2013) for instance published an article that says that the loudest screams are the ones by Lone Wolves.

This Lone Wolf interpretation primarily condemns the acts of terrorists as manifestations of psychiatric diseases. The specific terminology of psychiatry is present in many articles about this interpretations. Terms such as “narcissism,” “schizophrenia,” “accountability,” “delusions” and “psychosis” are frequently used in the studied press outlets (cfr. Melle, 2013 for a psychiatric evaluation of the Breivik debate). Two types of voices are represented in this category of articles. On the one hand psychiatric specialists are quoted. An article in *NRC Handelsblad* (29 November, 2011) says that Breivik is not accountable and merely quotes psychiatric

reports. On the other hand journalists themselves may participate to this debate to prove a point. An example is an article by a journalist from *de Volkskrant*. In this article the journalist argues that the deeds of Breivik are very tragical indeed but they remain an isolated phenomenon and political interpretations of this phenomenon are far-fetched.

The Hate Speech Frame

The individual interpretation contrasts with the situational interpretations. These situational interpretations can be further divided in three subtypes. The first two subtypes directly blame right wing politics, but they do so for different reasons. The first subtype of the situational explanation blames hate speech for stimulating Breivik, but it does so on a merely intellectual level. Belgian intellectual and journalist Marc Reynebeau for instance explains in *De Standaard* from 16 November, 2012 that freedom of speech is a right, but not a right that can be cut off from the duty of responsibility. Belgian political scientist Marc Hooghe explains in *De Morgen* from July 28, 2011 that politicians from the far right cannot have peace of mind when it comes to Breivik.

It is possible to find references to the potential psychiatric disease of Breivik but these references are rather denials of psychiatric conditions. In *de Volkskrant* we find an article with the title (translated from Dutch): “Whether Breivik is crazy, remains to be seen.” The discourse that is echoed in these articles is a journalistic version of the media critique of scientists such as Elizabeth Poole and John E. Richardson. The climate of “threat, fear and misunderstanding” (Poole & Richardson 1) in the current media and public opinion creates a breeding ground for the extremism of terrorists as Breivik. The voices associated with this frame may be journalists, but often also intellectuals contributing to the Breivik debate.

The Denial of Hate Speech Frame

Sometimes the reference to the influence of hate speech may take the form of a meta-critique stating that the responsibilities of far-right discourse might be exaggerated. Such an example is the article “The witch hunt from the Left is very hypocrite” (*NRC Handelsblad*, August 4, 2011). The critique and meta-critique are

two manifestations of a political interpretation, that contrasts with a merely factual or psychological interpretation. Sometimes the right wing variant says that Muslims and/or left wing intellectuals are even responsible themselves because tolerance towards Muslim extremism caused frustration. The most quoted source in these articles is *Éloge littéraire d'Anders Breivik* (Millet) by the French author Richard Millet, who condemns Breivik, but also says that his murders have a *literary* value, because multiculturalism and related social developments destroy Europe.

The Network Frame

Situational explanations suggest that Breivik is not a Lone Wolf, because he got inspiration from the far right. The hate speech is however markedly different from another interpretation that says that Breivik is not a Lone Wolf. This interpretation, the “network” interpretation does not only point out the intellectual responsibility of right wing politics, but also points out that these politicians form networks that actually support ideas similar to the ones of Breivik. An example of this type of article is the article on 16 February, 2013 in *De Morgen* about a counterjihad conference in Brussels where ideas similar to those of Breivik were propagated. An article in *NRC Handelsblad* (November 25, 2011) talks about a “curious conglomerate of marginal groups in Norway.”

The difference between this frame and the hate speech frame is that these articles talk about actors that might actually do the same things as Breivik did. The “hate speech frame” blames right-wing actors on a discursive level, but it is nevertheless seen as merely a discursive responsibility. The network frame talks about actors intending to practice islamophobia rather than only preaching it.

The Systemic Frame

A fifth general subtype is a situational explanation that says that Breivik's actions can be explained by more general conditions in society. This can be called the systemic attribution. Zimbardo distinguishes between two basic types of cause attribution that are consequently used in social psychology, but he further adds a third layer of attribution: systemic attribution (Zimbardo). This type of attribution involves political, economic and legal conditions that shape

the phenomenon to be explained. Examples of this type are an interview with philosopher Martha Nussbaum in *De Morgen* on the July 6, 2013 and an article on the of December 28, 2011 by philosopher Johan Braeckman in *de Morgen* about the events that happened in 2011. Both refer to the importance of anxiety in our current society. The culture of anxiety might be partly responsible for actions like the ones of Breivik, but this condition transcends the direct responsibility of right wing politicians. Interpretations pertaining to the systemic frame go beyond the situational frame and the voices that articulate these frames are the voices of intellectuals.

Yet another example of this systemic frame is to be found in *NRC Handelsblad*, 13/12/2011 where the theory of Slavoy Zizek about the cause of Breiviks deeds is explained, in Zizek's own words (http://www.lacan.com/thesyntom/?page_id=2310):

There is thus an interconnection between the rising anti-immigrant tide in Western countries (which reached a peak in Anders Behring Breivik's killing spree...) and the ongoing financial crisis: clinging to ethnic identity serves as a protective shield against the traumatic fact of being caught in the whirlpool of non-transparent financial abstraction—the true “foreign body” which cannot be assimilated is ultimately the infernal self-propelling machine of the Capital itself.

The Consequential Frame

A final frame that needs to be added to our list of subframes is a frame that is not so much about responsibility but focuses on the answers Norwegians give to Breivik. Breivik accused Norwegian society of being too open, but Norwegians can and should respond with even more openness. An article involving this framing of Breivik is the article “Flowers for the Utøya ideal” in *De Morgen* on July 30, 2011. Another example is the article “The answer to Breivik: more humanity” (*De Standaard*, 27 August, 2012). The voices that get represented in articles pertaining to this frame are almost exclusively voices coming from within Norway.

Deductive Coding: Quantifying the Frames

A combination table (N=247) with all frames and all newspaper, though containing small cells, provides interesting information on our hypothesis (concerning ideological differences) and our

research question (concerning the difference between Flemish and Dutch newspapers).

Table 1: Occurrence of frames

Frame	Total	De Morgen % (Flemish)	De Standaard % (Flemish)	de Volkskrant % (Dutch)	NRC % (Dutch)
Factual	17	22.9	17.9	14.8	15.2
Individual	9.7	8.3	15.4	13.6	3.8
Hate Speech	29.1	18.8	33.3	29.6	32.9
Denial of hate speech	12.6	0	5.1	16	20.3
Network	8.9	20.8	7.7	1.2	10.1
Systemic	6.9	6.3	2.6	9.9	6.3
Consequential	15.8	22.9	17.9	14.8	11.4

The results show that the Flemish newspapers (*De Morgen*: 22.9% and *De Standaard*: 17.9%) represent the factual frame somewhat more frequently (*NRC*: 15.2% and *de Volkskrant*: 14.8%). An additional Chi-square test did however not yield any significant results that prove this. There are neither any differences in the degree of factuality between left-wing and right-wing newspapers.

Chi-square tests did not yield statistically significant differences between right-wing and left-wing newspapers and between Dutch or Flemish newspapers when it comes to the choice of the individual frame, but we do see an important trend in the results. In the more right-wing Flemish newspaper *De Standaard* the individual frame is chosen more (15.4%) than in the Flemish left-wing newspaper *De Morgen* (8.3%). This difference does not reach statistical significance. The sample size of the subset of Flemish articles is small ($N=87$) which makes it difficult for statistical results to reach a significance level. The difference between *NRC* (3.8%) and *de Volkskrant* (13.6%) however is the other way around, with *NRC* (right-wing) reporting less individual responsibility. The difference on individual framing between both newspapers within the subsample of Dutch articles is statistically significant ($X^2 = 4,794$, $df=1$, $p= 0.029 < 0.05$).

After having considered the choice of factual and individual frames, we can now move on to a consideration of the three frames that imply the responsibility of the far-right: the hate speech frame, the denial of hate speech frame and the network frame.

A Chi-square test was applied to a cross-tabulation of these three types of frames with on the one hand the difference between left-wing and right-wing newspapers and on the other hand the difference between Dutch and Flemish newspapers. The difference between left-wing and right-wing newspapers did not yield statistical significance, but the difference between Dutch and Flemish newspapers did. In Dutch newspapers hate speech was clearly framed more often as a denial of the influence of hate speech than in Flemish newspapers ($X^2 = 17,185$, $df=2$, $p = 0,0 < 0,05$). Probably the Dutch far right politician Geert Wilders has a larger influence on the international far-right movement than his Flemish counterparts. In *de Volkskrant* 16% of the articles have a denial of hate speech frame and in *NRC* even 20.3%. In *De Morgen* (0%) and *De Standaard* (5.1%) this percentage is much lower.

The analysis can be taken a step further by detailed analysis of the choice for the network frame. One might argue that this frame is the strongest articulation of the framing that suggests responsibility of the far-right, because this frame suggests a behavioral involvement that transcends the level of intellectual responsibility. Within the subsample of the Flemish newspapers the network frame is chosen in 20.8% of the articles in *De Morgen*, remarkably more often than in *De Standaard* (7.7%). When we compare the “network frame articles” with the articles that choose another (i.e. non network) frame and cross-tabulate this difference with the difference between *De Morgen* and *De Standaard* within the subsample of Flemish articles ($N=87$) we see a statistically significant difference ($X^2 = 2,924$, $df=1$, $p = 0.087 < 0.1$), at least when we accept a significance level of 0.10, which is acceptable (Noymer) in the case of smaller sample sizes. This result suggests the importance of differences between left and right wing orientations in the frame choices about Breivik within the Flemish subsample. If we continue to apply a similar analysis to the difference in the application of the network frame within the Dutch subsample ($N=160$) we see once again a significant difference ($X^2 = 5,957$, $df=1$, $p=0.015 < 0.05$), but the right-wing oriented newspaper *NRC* (10.1%) more often applies a network frame than the left-wing oriented newspaper *de Volkskrant*. The support for the hypothesis in the Flemish case is neutralized by the non-support for the same hypothesis in the Dutch case. There is no general statistical significant relation between the ideological stance of the newspapers and the choice for the network frame.

The table above shows some differences between the individual newspapers in the choice for the systemic and the consequential

frame, but Chi-square analyses did not show statistically significant relations between the choice of these frames and the origin (Dutch or Flemish) or political stance (left-wing or right-wing) of the newspapers. One further observation on the consequential frame however needs to be made. Although the choice of the factual and the consequential frames are not statistically significantly related to the origin or the stance of the newspapers in itself, we can combine both the factual and the consequential frame and link this with the origin or the stance of the newspapers. The factual and consequential frame share with each other the characteristic that they are both primarily oriented towards what happened in Norway, be it the tragic facts or the reaction towards these facts. We did not see a statistically significant difference between the stance of the newspapers and this combined factual or consequential framing, but we do see a statistical difference between this frame choice and the debate in either Flanders or The Netherlands. The primarily fact oriented frames are chosen in 41.4% of the Flemish articles and in only 28.1% of the Dutch articles ($X^2= 4,492$, $df=1$, $p=0.034 < 0.05$). This broader interpretation reflects a more direct sense of involvement towards the Breivik case in the Netherlands when compared with the Dutch speaking part of Flanders.

Conclusion

This paper started from the observation that ideological differences between newspapers might still be relevant in present newspaper reporting, because newspapers with a right-wing stance and a left-wing stance might attribute the responsibility of right-wing politics in the case of Anders Breivik differently. This hypothesis proved in general not to be true when we tested it on two regional cases, i.e. two Dutch broadsheet newspapers and two Flemish broadsheet newspapers.

Although the hypothesis was falsified, we did find some indications in the Flemish case that did point towards the pertinence of the hypothesis. The Flemish conservative newspaper did chose slightly but not statistically significant more often an individual framing and opts less often for the stronger involvement of the far-right as suggested in the network frame. In the Dutch case these two specific interpretations of the hypothesis pointed towards a difference in attribution tendencies between both investigated newspapers,

but they indicated attribution tendencies that were hypothetically more left-wing in the however right-wing *NRC Handelsblad*.

To ultimately test the hypothesis it is necessary to add more international newspapers to the study. Such an endeavor would make it possible to test to which degree national influences in the debate are important to consider as well. In this case study two important national differences in the debate between Flanders and The Netherlands emerged. In the Dutch debate the denial of the influence of hate speech was more outspoken and the broader context of Breiviks deeds was more important than the facts. These two conclusions can be added to the observation that with the same key words used in our search query the Dutch newspapers (N=160) published almost twice as much articles as the Flemish newspapers (N=87). The Dutch far-right and Geert Wilders might be eventually more influential in the international far right as the Flemish far right, and Breivik himself saw Wilders as a more clear influence than Filip Dewinter, his Flemish counterpart.

A further perspective to be added to our future research about this theme will be the integration of complementary intersubjective perspectives. This will be done firstly by applying reliability coding tests to assess to which degree our coding taxonomy implies subjective judgments. Furthermore interviews with the journalists who wrote the articles will add a necessary estimation of the degree to which attribution differences might be intentional. A final research step may be an assessment of the way in which the audience and different demographic groups deal with the different political interpretations of the Breivik case, because as Haider-Markel and Joslyn argue: "Characterizations of political events and tragedies are not simply rhetorical representations but rather important determinants of citizens' causal reasoning" (Haider-Markel & Joslyn 537).

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DEFINING POLITICAL EXTREMISM IN THE BALKANS. THE CASE OF SERBIA

ABSTRACT: Political extremism (and particularly right wing political extremism) remains relatively insufficiently explored due to the fact that the phenomenon is controversial and hard to define. Its ambiguity and variability depending on time and spatial point of view further complicates its definition. Its structure is amorphous and eclectic as it often includes elements from different ideologies and connects incompatible ideas. A multidimensional conceptualization and an interdisciplinary approach - sociological, social, psychological and historical, are the Author's tools in explaining the phenomenon of political extremism in Serbia, hopefully contributing to its clarification and laying a foundation for its further explanatory theoretical studies.

KEY WORDS: Balkans, extremism, political extremism, right-wing, Serbia

Introduction

Fifteen years after downfall of the Slobodan Milošević's authoritarian regime in Serbia this country still fails to distance itself from its nationalist past. Although not as destructive as in the 1990s, nationalism in Serbia today is present in many spheres of social life – from foreign policy to education and culture. Such socio-political climate favors the creation and strengthening of the extreme right-wing organizations. This paper deals with the specificities of right-wing extremism in Serbia and begins with defining basic concepts of right-wing extremism as such. Using a multidimensional conceptualization and an interdisciplinary approach – sociological,

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social, psychological and historical, the Author analyzes specificities of the phenomenon in contemporary Serbia through the review and analysis of some major extreme right-wing organizations in this country. It should be noted however that additional problem for a researcher concerning this country is that it is very hard to find and systematize information on members of extremist organizations, their education and social status etc. which further burdens the study of the phenomenon. This is due to the fact that some of them are banned, others function in the underground.

Extremism

In order to define extremism as a phenomenon which sustained many contextual meanings (and as something that is per se understandable for general audience), we need to realize that the history of the terminology of “extremes” and “extremism” proves their variability and dependency on context (Backes 2007). Therefore we must think of the notion in its ‘uniqueness’ aiming to underline its essence. What does that mean? If the meaning of a phenomenon is controversial, it is always useful to begin with a linguistic side of it as its primary determinative merit (remaining often explanatory insufficient though). First thing we notice is its equivocation which retained all of its original meanings, expanding with the entry in the field of policy *ipso facto* obtaining *new* meanings. The word “*extremism*” is of Latin origin meaning ultimate or extreme which is on top of the borders of sustainable, allowed or normal. Hence extremism as a behavior or a tendency toward extremes usually gets designated lexically as excess, top range, something that is hardly bearable – sustainable, but the last in importance and the last thing that can happen (Glare 662). As each extremism is formally defensive, and usually defended are the highest values and well-being of the members of the group which extremists declare to struggle for. Those values range from the spiritual values to saving “endangered” bare lives. Thereby the right for uncompromisingness in the name of the struggle for those values very fast and easily converts into the right for the hostility and intolerance. Intolerance towards “Others” treated as a threat to the established identity of “We” (“our values,” “our well-being”) is closely linked to prejudice against everything that is different. It is characteristic for an “authoritarian personality” (Adorno et al.) that glorifies “Us” and demonizes “Others.” Authoritarianism in this context is

understood as argumentation following an indisputable authority and not accepting truth-searching arguments. For such a “personality,” an opinion does not consist of assumptions and hypothetical judgments necessary for proving and/or reinterpreting facts, but of the ‘taken for granted’ attitudes. Doubt gets a negative connotation because it disturbs the safety of an authority guaranteed beliefs. Such attitudes are based on beliefs rather than on reflections and debates with facts. An ideal type of the “authoritarian personality,” according to Adorno (Adorno et al.) and Reich (Reich), is a person who blindly believes in the authority and is prone to stereotypes and prejudices expressed through conformism and dogmatic acceptance of values and beliefs. Incapable of independent judgment, he relies on the strength of the authority rather than arguments. “The authoritarian personality” sees as a disaster every attempt for change of given structures and contents of adopted opinions and therefore he considers each dialogue as an attack due to his conviction that there is only one, his own, correct opinion.

Political extremism

As Uwe Backes explains, the idea of the political extreme is rooted in the ancient Greek ethics of moderation. In every situation there is a midpoint (*mesotes*) between the too-great (*hyperbole*) and the too-little (*elleipsis*), a distinction between the excessive and the moderate (Backes 2006). Nevertheless, the concept of political extremism is still difficult to determine because it is not a universal category: something extreme for one might seem normal for someone else. In linguistic terms, the extreme is what is “stretched to the limit,” and in the political sense, it concerns values “stretched to the limits” of a society. One of the conditions of occurrence of extremism is a crisis in society (causing the crisis of morality and/or the crisis of values) or feelings of inferiority. This brings the envy and desire to threaten those who have a better position. Actions against them bring a sense of superiority which is a sort of a negative self-affirmation. This straight ahead leads to xenophobia. When discussing the causes of political extremism, apart from a crisis of society, there are worth mentioning structural and objective circumstances existing in society. Political extremism is more prone to authoritarian regimes (or those who had been such), the feelings of revanchism in the society (the case of the post-Yugoslav political space: there still is a smoldering desire for revenge

for war crimes committed during the civil war in Yugoslavia in the nineties), poor economic conditions causing the population at the lower end of the socio-economic hierarchy to create a parallel world where the extreme nationalism and religiosity trigger feelings of superiority. It is interesting that during the self-identification of parties or movements of the “extreme” (this mainly concerns right-wingers) European experience shows that their members rarely approve labeling themselves as “extreme” (Hainsworth 12). This especially applies to the parties that take part in elections where every single vote is important. They never publicly declare themselves as “extremists” due to negative connotations of the term, but willingly admit to be “elitists,” “nationalists,” “defenders of Christianity,” “patriots” etc.

Social and political roots of right-wing extremism

Experience of countries in transition, such as Serbia, shows that causes for the rise of modern right generally represent a combination of circumstances. Among the most important ones are: legacy of communist rule and suppression of nations, the challenges of democratization and the construction of national identity, social and economic problems as reflection of difficulties of transition (Vujačić 351). History largely determines to what extent society is “open” for the development of right-wing extremism. Experiences of German and Italian societies indicate more or less successfully accomplished process of distancing themselves from the past and trying to build a collective identity based on new values. For a society in transition, this process is far more challenging and painful: an attempt to distance itself from communism often ends up in another form of extreme. What continuously keeps being an obstacle for such countries are remains of the authoritarian regimes and their durability. This makes it hard for the countries to get rid of the ideological ballast and long-ago acquired forms of a servile political culture, political intolerance and, last but not least, craving for a leader. Every society, in accordance with its system, forms certain standards of behavior, imposes morality both in its descriptive and normative sense, supports certain values and attitudes that people within the political culture adopted.

The case of Serbia is particularly interesting. In the 1990s in Serbia (although this can be more or less applied equally to other post-Yugoslav societies) prevailed “traditionally-authoritarian type

of personality” (Golubović et al; Lazić). Inherited authoritarian mentality emerged from the compound of the traditionally patriarchal society of the old XIX century Serbia and the authoritarian system of both Yugoslavias¹ had very slowly been changing. In support of this we can note that the majority of the population in Serbia long opted for status quo and social security that the Slobodan Milošević’s regime had provided them, regardless of the negative effects of its politics and policy. Before Milošević’s fall in 2000 the majority of voters voted for party leaders rather than their programs. Today the majority of voters support a strong paternalistic state which is expected to provide all individuals with their needs, at the same time freeing them of responsibility and necessity to solve problems on their own. Most of them find it hard to sacrifice inherited belief that a collective (such as the nation, for example) should be the main focus over which all individual needs and interests will be met. There is still a strong orientation towards traditionalism, and with the awakening of nationalism in the 1990s, towards the historically traditional myths which had been favored over reality and future.

Although we mention the rise of the right-wing nationalism after the fall of communism, in historical sense, the post-communist nationalism has absorbed ages-old prejudices and hatreds suppressed in the days of Communism (Vujačić 352). This concerns the countries of the Western Balkans and a few other post-communist states that have not only evolved from communism to autocracy and dictatorship due to the ‘appropriate’ structural and contextual timing, but also due to the preconditions rooted in the deep past. The long period of foreign rule and domination, the late formation of the state in its present form and equal treatment of individual freedom and democracy of both communism and nationalism, were the prerequisites for nationalism to inherit communism (Mundjiu-Pipidi). The syntagma ‘foreign rule’ in the context of the region of Central, Eastern and Southeastern Europe means the three multinational empires – Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian. After their collapse in the First World War new national states with non-democratic arrangements and territorial claims have emerged. Interwar period, during which there were dictatorships in the Balkans and the Soviet Union and the problems that have emerged after the collapse of communism, could be seen as

¹ The first monarchist Yugoslavia 1918-1941, the second socialist Yugoslavia 1943-1991.

renewed problems from the interwar period of non-democracy in South East and Eastern Europe (Vujačić 353).

Communism, with its universalism and the idea of ‘Brotherhood and Unity’², problems that previously existed ‘swept under the carpet’ and have never been addressed. The ethnic violence that took place in the former Yugoslavia was not an entirely new phenomenon. The disintegration of Yugoslavia and the late formation of the nation-states in the post-Yugoslav political space (“the delayed nations”³) have again raised the issue of frontiers or boundaries of the states and nations through the problem of defining national identity. This struggle for national interests and defining the nation was a subject of manipulation by political and intellectual elites in the countries. It determined the difference in the formation of the extreme right between the Balkans and Eastern European countries and Western and Central European countries. The post-Communist conservatism, besides nationalism, emphasized religion and tradition. Being based on myths and romanticized history it revitalized problems that have yet occurred in the interwar period. Although a large part of extremist right programs is based on anti-Communism and posed as its antipode, no doubt that both have a lot in common. It is about the attitude towards democracy and individual freedoms, not in the context of consequences that both regimes leave in the political system, but concerning the impact on individuals and their political culture and consciousness. Both

² Popular slogan of the Yugoslav Communist party during WWII and a guiding principle of the country’s post-war interethnic policy.

³ I use the term “the delayed nation” referring to the works of Helmut Plessner (Plessner, H., 1974, *Die Verspaetete Nation*, (“The Delayed Nation”), Koeln & Mains, Suhrkamp] and Istvan Bibo (Bibo, I. 2010, *Nędza małych państw wschodnioeuropejskich*, Alkano). Due to long time of foreign rule in Serbia, the institution of citizenship was not able to emerge and that resulted in no liberal tradition and lack of modernization processes. Therefore, the Serbia’s political history was rather characterized by the primacy of the national rather than the democratic. For the countries with “delayed nations,” such as Serbia, some reasonable questions could be asked: are there possible the “civil state” and the “civic nation” based on freedom and democracy political concepts? Could there be a realistic expectations in today’s post-socialist circumstances of a shift from the current dominance of ethnic nationalism to a purely civic principle? There have been debates in scientific community over the still unresolved question – what is the unifying factor of the modern state: citizenship or nationality, or both principles? I think that much overemphasized differences between ethnicity and nation, ethno-cultural and political concept of nation, national and nationalistic led to a dichotomy dilemma of potential answers: either national or civic state, either civic or national identity. As a matter of fact, nation and democracy are compatible, nationalism and democracy are not.

Communism and nationalism are hostile towards democracy as they imply autocratic rule (either by a leader or a party, often being equivalent) and sanctioning of diversity in every aspect of political and social life. In the countries where nationalism inherited Communism, multiparty system was introduced as a step towards the democratization of the system and one of the fundamental differences in relation to Communism. In reality this was not the case. The freedom of the individual in both regimes was also compromised. Diversity of opinions and attitudes in Communist regimes was not possible. Nationalist regimes *pro forma* allow such attitudes but an individual who dares to think differently than majority is being labeled a traitor of the “national interest” and banned.⁴ Termination of the right to freedom of thought and highlighting examples of those who have in this context challenged the regime and failed, has supported the rise of a *vassal* political culture preventing any politically active stand of the population. Such a pattern of behavior is being revitalized by the extreme right. The collective identity over individualism remains superior whether it is about collectivism embodied in “Brotherhood and Unity” or collective identity embodied in ethno-nationalism. Individuality is undesirable and suppressed.

Another important feature of the right wing extremism is a process of *ethnification* of politics and political life as an introduction to ethnic nationalism. Clauss Offe explains that embedded in a cognitive and evaluated frame, strategies of social and political bodies in a post-Communist society are based on the “ethnic identity as a primordial and trans-individual set of highly valued qualities that have been formed in a long collective history and are acquired through birth and primary socialization, and are inaccessible, even incomprehensible, to others not born with these qualities” (Offe 51). Offe thesis on ethnification policy derives from the fact that every political life is an operating political system and the cumulative outcome of decision making in hierarchical three different levels: the first level decides on the identity, and it is most often associated with passion, patriotism and courage. The second level concerns the key constitutional decisions – rights, procedures, rules and institutions of political life. The third level involves regular political decision-making which is regarded as the implementation of certain interests into political decisions. In the Balkans, the first level of decision-making was overstated in relation to the other

⁴ “Diversity is evil” – type of mentality has been inherited by the previous repressive regime.

two so politics and, indirectly, public opinion was diverted at this level of decision-making.

As equal as other features for understanding ethnic nationalism is human behaviour. Potocky-Tripodi underlines four components of human behavior that are evident in ethnic nationalism: ethnocentrism, prejudice, stereotyping (that creates caricatures of individuals) and scapegoating. Prejudice is having an adverse opinion or judgment before examining or without examining the facts. Stereotyping involves making generalizations about other groups as well as ascribing superficial characteristics to all members of that ethnic group (Potocky-Tripodi). Scapegoating refers to making a person or a group to bear the blame that another or others should take. The last three components fit very well within the phenomenon of antisemitism and antiromanyism (antiziganism/antigypsyism) as integral parts of ethnic nationalism. It is not easy to establish a clear structural cut between the traditional religiously motivated anti-Semitism and modern political anti-Semitism. Both are characterized by fear of the "Other" and the negative collective identity formation. Like any antagonism towards a racial, ethnic, religious or cultural group, anti-Semitism is characterized (at the level of individual and collective consciousness) through these three categories:

1. Conviction: latent hatred of the Jews that are not manifested openly.

2. Feeling: open hostile feelings expressed towards Jews forming strong ethnic and religious distance, discrimination and finally, open public propaganda.

3. Action: means social operationalization of the "feeling" through an ideology, politics and all constitutional norms, ultimately leading into physical violence (Radenović 17).

Thus, all the manifestations of anti-Semitism can be subsumed under the above categories of structural schemes dynamics of anti-Semitism: conviction - feeling - action. At the level of "feelings" an individual may act alone, but the level of "action" always requires a group, functioning through dichotomy "we" and "they" (which is Jews) (Sekelj 59-60). When it comes to the presence of anti-Semitism in the former Yugoslavia (also in Serbia) it should be noted that anti-Semitism was an integral part of anti-Yugoslav ethnic nationalisms, but did not have (and still does not have) such a significance as inter-national antagonisms. It remains peripheral or marginal political phenomenon (Sekelj 84-85).

If we assume that anti-Roma bias presents a specific form of prejudice against the Roma by the majority of non-Roma population

then we can distinguish several types of manifestations of antiromanyism:

1. Gossiping and stereotyped evaluation of Roma minority – typical stereotypes that reflect the ambivalent attitude of the majority towards Roma. Roma are often described as lazy, dirty, noisy, prone to theft etc.;

2. Avoiding contact or expressing social distance;

3. Discrimination, discriminatory behavior (factual limitation of rights);

4. Physical attacks (transition from verbal to physical aggression);

5. Extermination (genocide) (Radenović 20).

Nevertheless, both anti-Semitism and anti-Romanyism are never objective nor authentic, but always exist within various anti-democratic ideologies. While anti-Semitism is characterized by a continuous playback “knowledge” about the alleged guilt and responsibility of the “World’s Jewish notables – the enemy| for conspiracy, mischief, robbery, for all global and local wars of revolutions, anti-Romanyism is characterized by an understanding that “eternally different Gypsy” that lives at the margins of European and World’s societies remains a personification of clutter, dirt and idleness (Radenović 21).

Nationalism can manifest itself through the territorial and cultural concepts. The concept of territorial nationalism implies the idea that the territorial boundaries of one state should coincide with cultural boundaries of the people, while cultural nationalism focuses on a national identity shaped by cultural traditions and by language. Language in this case is crucial as political rights are given only to those who speak the dominant language. In Serbia and other Western Balkan countries due to the specific socio-political context, nationalism manifestsequally through its territorial and cultural dimensions (the latter with a negative attitude towards minorities) followed by chauvinism and xenophobia.

Discrimination of other groups, hatred or intolerance appear and rise throughout a process and a context and therefore there is an unquestionable role of political elites in boosting inter-ethnic hatred, chauvinism under the pretext of settling the national question and the construction of ethnic identity. What is characteristic for the Balkans was expressed in the formulation of István Bibó about the misery of the small Eastern European nations: they experienced internal homogenization by an external threat or internal dangers but all orchestrated by political elites. In moments of

danger, the elites have served to the masses the romanticized history often with altered facts, glorifying the role of their own nation in history, propagating the ideology of “Blood and Soil,” an organic understanding of the State, applauding a great comeback of religion and using the political myths and manipulating the symbols.

Selected Extreme Right-wing Organizations in Serbia

Unfortunately, the scope of the paper does not allow an insight analysis of every and each right-wing organization in Serbia. Therefore, only some of them are briefly analyzed. Interestingly no serious research on motives to join extreme right-wing organizations has been done so far in Serbia. What can be noticed however, is that their members are mostly younger people between 18 and 30 who grew up and were politically socialized during the Yugoslav wars of the 1990s and sanctions.⁵ The primary political socialization in this case played a very important role, because then the children, and today members of these organizations formed their opinions based on the attitudes of parents, teachers at school or their peers. Political views at that time in general were very conservative, authoritarian and illiberal. Therefore, the political context of the 1990s has created conditions under which authoritarian personalities of the present members of these organizations were formed.

Национални stroj (Nacionalni stroj – NS)

NS is a neo-Nazi organization formed in 2004 but for inciting racial and national hatred, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Serbia banned this organization on June 2, 2011. After the ban, the website of this organization was deleted but continued promotional activities via the website of Stromfront (Stormfront Srbija), a worldwide extremist right-wing organization. In any case, the organization is built on the foundation of the German neo-Nazism and racism somewhat customized to the Serbian cultural environment. It is

⁵ The United Nations Security Council imposed broad trade, financial and political sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro (then constituting one state – Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) which lasted, with different intensity, from May 1992 all throughout the 1990s. The sanctions were one of the reasons of the Serbia’s economic collapse during this period.

a paradox that such a neo-Nazi organization emerged and has followers in the country with a history of a very strong antifascist resistance movement during WWII that resulted in a huge number of victims. So, this conglomerate of disparate irrational ideas should be treated as an insult to all victims of the World War II in Serbia. Its emergence can be explained by extreme nationalism, a phenomenon of the 1990s that occurred parallel to the civil wars in the former Yugoslavia, but also with the fact that after the end of the Cold War, in general, the extreme right has increased its influence throughout the world.

The new extreme right obviously represents amorphous heterogeneous phenomenon in which it combines contradictory elements. The organization is an interesting combination of typical left-wing ideas of social justice with the idea of racial identity: “Национални строј is a political organization of propaganda-educational character based on the idea of national freedom, social justice and racial identity” (Stormfront Srbija). Interestingly it favors the Serbian nation, which remains incompatible with “classical” Nazism as it is well known that Adolf Hitler had contempt not only the Serbs but also to all Slavs considering them an inferior race.

Next contradiction is related to the article 3 of the statute explicitly stating that: “To achieve its objectives, Национални строј uses only means of political action and does not call for any form of incitement to violence, racial, religious and national hatred, but calls for the truth and the right to freedom of speech and thought of all Serbs in Serbia” (Stormfront Srbija). However, members of the organization have repeatedly been involved in political riots and unrest in Serbia using violence as the main method of operations. The statute therefore does not correspond with their activities. Obviously we deal with a demagogic political and inconsistent organization without a clearly defined goal. For example, it is committed to creating a purely national state of Aryan Slavic populace of «predominantly Dinaric⁶sub-race type.” Ethno-psychological research conducted by a famous Serbian ethnographer Jovan Cvijić in the early XX century proves that “the Dinaric type” makes 2/3 of the Serbian population (Cvijić 377) and the question is how to treat the other “non-Dinaric populace”? Cvijić argued that the Dinaric man belonged to a ‘patriarchal stage of culture’ and was ‘original and exceeding patriotic and is untouched by contact with foreign peoples or civilizations’ (Cvijić 377). The main psychological characteristics of the Dinaric

⁶ Dinaric (derived from Dinara), a large mountain chain in the Balkans also called Dinaric Alps or Dinarides.

Serbs were sensitivity, lively temperament, idealism, honour, heroism, a strong link to nature and one's ancestors and the desire to fight for justice and freedom (Cvijić 378-383).

Nevertheless, today such research conducted a century ago is considered archaic as modern societies undergo intense migration processes which impose significant influence on the validity of the above research. Serbian neo-Nazis therefore misuse science for ideological purposes, for example in the case of racial identity and racial types "measurement." Ignorance regarding basic historical and ethnological facts and bias remains the basic problem of many ideologically similar groups which makes uncontrolled irrational operations with predominantly aggressive feelings against anyone designated as "enemy" possible.

As for the state organization their goal is a unitary state based on "national freedom, social justice and racial biological protection of the People" (Stormfront Srbija). The racial selection in the form of eugenics is one of the main objectives of the organization. This is the reason why this organization is against any form of racial mixing and advocates the so-called "geographical segregation": each indigenous nation must remain within its territory and protect itself from potential invaders. They are opponents of the "human depravity" which includes homosexuality, pornography, pedophilia, etc. They stand for the abolition of some basic human rights such as freedom of speech and freedom of the press suggesting that all media should be state-controlled. Taking the law into their own hands according to their understanding of the law stems from the fear that potential "enemy" may harm Serbian nation. Their fear of globalization processes, strengthening of neo-liberalism and multiculturalism are just some of the factors that influence the intensification of the aggressive vigilantism.⁷ The idea of National Socialism, which traditionally is distant to the Serbian people today, exist only on the margins of the society among the few but aggressive groups.

Србска Акција (Srbska Akcija – SA)

After the ban of the NS, the right-wing extreme in Serbia did not limit their activities. Some new right-wing organizations such as SA appeared having similar but not identical ideology as NS. SA

⁷ Majority of the followers of the organization are young and uneducated people easily manipulated.

is an anti-globalist type of organization using clerical and nationalist symbols. Their respect for tradition and ancient ancestors can be seen through glorification of a classical right-wing triad: God-King-Homekeeper. Their views are highly euroskeptical, opposed to the Euro-Atlantic integration of Serbia and advocating for Christian Orthodox integration by merging all Christian Orthodox nations. This would include the political, economic, security and spiritual dimensions: "We want Orthodox integration instead of the so-called Euro-Atlantic integrations. Similar to local Orthodox Churches which are the branches of a single tree of the Universal Church, the states of these nations should be parts of a single, strong international organism. In this way, the Orthodox nations will increase the possibility of their own spiritual and physical protection, as well as economic and cultural advancement" (Srbska Akcija). Ideologically, SA considers itself an organization of the, so-called, "third way," thereby denying affiliation to any leftist and right-wing ideology. However, this standpoint seems to be far from reality as, by all indications, SA in ideological terms belongs to the right-wing. The SA sponsored magazine *Bojcka Smehe* [The Army of Changes] claims that the organization belongs to the "metaphysical right-wing which combines national revival with social justice and differs very much from the so-called right-wing politics because it is not controlled by anyone" (Srbska Akcija). According to the «Political and economic program," their fundamental principles and ideas are based on the following: without the spiritual revival of the people there can be no political or economic development; they criticize neoliberal order that favors the concept of individualism; as an alternative they propose nature-based organicist concept of society (Srbska Akcija).

One of the main points in this program is patrimonial-type political power which corresponds with the idea of a monarchical system of the country can be accepted. The idea of the Greater Serbia was incorporated into the political and economic program of SA. Unsatisfied with modern economic processes this organization criticizes capitalism as much as communism and finds some mutual points of the two:

1. Man becomes a measure of all things and focuses on 'earthly' life;
2. The work becomes a necessary evil and leads only to achieving certain goods;
3. The fact that is hidden is that the production of the Nation is the fundament of life;
4. Both favor only one dimension of property relations (either state or private property) (Srbska Akcija).

In ideological terms, SA is a typical ultra-right-wing organization with overwhelming influence of clerical nationalism. Their self-identification is linked to Orthodox Christianity. Elements of possible violence justified by the Christian religion can be found already in the paradigm of “the combat Serbian Orthodoxy” (борбено србско православље) which allows struggle of the sword against evil. Members of SA are opponents of democracy which they call “demonocracy.” Democracy, according to them, originated in the Western civilization is full of egoism and materialism and therefore cannot be imminent to the contemporary Christian world. In sum, SA remains right-wing extremist organizations of a clerical-nationalist type. Unlike the NS which is a typical neo-Nazi organization, elements of extreme nationalism can be noticeable in SA with a potential to turn into chauvinism. This particularly reflects in the quasi-racial theories of the Aryan nation and genetic subtypes that are based on eugenics.

Отачаствени покрет Образ (Fatherland Movement Obraz)

Obraz, as a movement, had been very active on the Serbian right-wing political scene until June 12, 2012 when by the decision of the Constitutional Court of Serbia was banned. The role of the *Obraz* can be described as very essential due to the fact that it represents a bastion of ultra-nationalist ideas. Although not registered as a political party, its influence is significant in the social and political developments in Serbia. For example, they were very active in organizing protests against the illegal secession of Kosovo and Metohija, against gay-parades in Belgrade and numerous campaigns against cooperation of Serbia’s officials with the ICTY.

The program of the movement clearly indicates that the “*Svetosavlje*”⁸ is its basic ideological matrix from which all other ideas and axiological system of *Obraz* develops. As its official program on the website reads: “*Obraz* advocates for schools with faith (religion), politics with honesty, the Army with patriotism, the State with the blessing of God. *Obraz* is fighting for spiritual renewal and

⁸ The Saint Sava Cult expressed in national mythology as *Svetosavlje* refers to the particular worldview, ethics and morality inspired by the life of medieval Serbian Duke Rastko Nemanjić (1175-1235) who was later acknowledged as a saint by the Orthodox Church [Halpern, Kideckel 2000, p. 174].

Nation-Building on the foundations of the St. Sava heritage.”⁹ The basic elements of their ideology are as follows:

1. Devotion and patriotism is the first and foremost principle. Devotion is understood as religiosity of the Christian-Orthodox character while the ideal period of spiritual elevation of the Serbian people took place during the rule of the Nemanjić dynasty¹⁰ when all the Serbs were Orthodox pious. Patriotism understood as appreciation and love for the homeland is a part of piety and these two ideas go side by side.

2. ‘Serbian Serbia’ (Српска Србија) is the second principle of the program and has the intention to unite and preserve the Serbian nation due to a fear that the Serbian living space is constantly being reduced which causes serious existential and security problems for the nation. This principle is in line with the so-called “territorial pessimism” that Serbs share with the Croats related to the conviction that Serbia (or Croatia) through the history of permanent territorial reduce.

3. ‘Homekeeping’ principle (Домаћински поредак) is present in almost all Serbian right-wing clerical-nationalist type of organizations. It is related to the already mentioned triad of God-King-Homekeeper by which God is the host of the world, king is the host of the country and the devout Serb is the host of the family.

4. This principle implies the existence of the Serbian army, which must constantly be on alert due to an adverse geopolitical position of the Serbian state (they pay much respect for the police as well). Therefore the most developed Serbian state industry must be production of weapons and military equipment.

In line with its ideology *Obraz* made the list of political “friends” and “enemies.” The group of “friends” include members of the Serbian nation, clergy, military, police, workers and peasants. They should be the driving force behind the development of the Serbian state. Among the “enemies” of the organization we can find Zionists (which points to their anti-Semitism), Croatian Fascists-Ustasha, Muslim extremists, Albanian terrorists, members of political parties, drug addicts and criminals. *Obraz* cooperates with other European national movements such as the *Noua Dreapta* (Romania), *Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski* (Poland), *Forza Nuova* (Italy), *La Falanga* (Spain), *Slovenska Pospolitost* (Slovakia) and *Renouveau Francais* (France). It

⁹ http://www.obraz.rs/?page_id=398 (accessed: February 2, 2015)

¹⁰ The Nemanjić dynasty was the most important Serbian dynasty in the Middle Ages. It produced eleven Serbian monarchs between 1166 and 1371.

is important to point out program and ideology similarities between *Obraz* and the Serbian Action, so it is not unusual that many members of the former are also members of the latter.

Српски Народни Покрет 1389 (SNP 1389)¹¹ (Serbian People's Movement 1389) was formed in 2004 and it is an official and registered association with its seal, principles and statute which sets it apart from previously analyzed Serbian right-wing organizations. While working closely with right-wing type organizations, the SNP 1389 has committed itself not to endanger human or minority rights nor spread racial, national or religious hatred. Founders claim that the reasons SNP 1389 was established can be found in great moral, economic and political crisis of the Serbian nation. Assessing the fundamental objectives and goals included in the SNP1389 statute, it is not extremist organizations:

1. Fulfilling Serbian national interests;
2. Protection of territorial integrity and sovereignty of the Republic of Serbia;
3. Struggle against global trends in politics, culture and economy;
4. Affirmation of Serbian culture;
5. Human rights and equality.

Ideology derives from the Christian Orthodoxy and tradition that aims to preserve family values, Cyrillic script and moral purity. The word "*Sabornost*" is common not only for this organization but to all right-wing more or less extremist organizations in Serbia. It is a multifaceted philosophical, theological and political term. In theological terms it is often translated as 'catholicity' (from Greek: Καθολικη – universality, generality) as one of the four marks/attributes of the Christian Church: One, Holy, Catholic, Apostolic. In political discourse, the idea of catholicity comes down to idealization of patriarchal and feudal cooperative organization of society. It seems that such a concept is a cover for political mindedness [Djordjević]. According to the Serbian right-wing understanding of catholicity, all Serbs are either Christian Orthodox or they are not Serbs, and for them there can be no other religion except the Serbian Orthodox Church. That way a theological concept of catholicity involved into organicist thought, turns into an ideological cover for collectivism and authoritarianism.

¹¹ 1389 in the name states for the year of the famous Battle for Kosovo between the army led by the Serbian Prince Lazar Hrebeljanović and the invading army of the Ottoman Empire. Although in its consequences the battle was a defeat for the Serbian State and Serbian nation, it remains particularly important to history, tradition and national identity of the Serbs until today.

In sum, SNP 1389 is a clerical nationalist organization but its goals defined in the statute cannot be classified as extremist. However activity of its members may qualify as violent and sometimes extremist. They participate in many right-wing and extreme right-wing marches organized across Europe.¹²

Conclusions

Contemporary right extremism in Serbia shares basic characteristics with the European extreme right, but also has its own specifics which are primarily the result of socio-political circumstances of the 1990s in former Yugoslavia: 'normalization' of nationalism, the rise of anti-anti-fascism, questioning secularity of the state, rule of law deficit, ethnic homogenization, the pursuit of merging national and ethnic borders, anti-communism, strengthening of traditionalism and authoritarianism, fundamentalist interpretation of Christian Orthodoxy regarded as a superior religion in relation to other ethnic and religious groups (especially Croats, Muslims and Albanians), opposition towards the ideas of multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism and hostility towards the "new" minorities (LGBT population) and traditional minorities (Roma). However, right-wing extremism in Serbia is not so radical in terms of consequences. There are, of course, cases of violence, but nothing similar to very aggressive right-wing groupings in the Western Europe whose actions often end in murder. But, contrary to the latter which are pushed to the margins of society, Serbian extreme right flirts with political elite precisely because they are not as prone to violence. "The reason for this is that they believe that can in the future even become a part of the mainstream, and that will be able to 'smuggle' some of its ideas into official political discourse" (Deutsche Welle).

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¹² For example, in Warsaw on November 11, 2011 protesting against the controversial Kosovo's independence.

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BREAKING THE WAVES: HOW THE PHENOMENON OF EUROPEAN JIHADISM MILITATES AGAINST THE WAVE THEORY OF TERRORISM

ABSTRACT: David Rapoport’s Wave theory of terrorism is one of the most often-cited theories in the literature on terrorist violence. Rapoport is praised for having provided researchers with a universal instrument which allows them to explain the origin and transformation of various historical types of terrorism by applying to them the concept of global waves of terrorist violence driven by universal political impulses. This article, testing the Wave theory against the recent phenomenon of homegrown jihadism in Europe, uncovers this theory’s fundamental weaknesses and questions its real academic and practical value.

KEY WORDS: the Wave theory of terrorism, the Fourth Wave terrorism, European homegrown jihadists, critique

Introduction

Recent decades have witnessed wide academic debate over the issues of the genesis of terrorism, its historical types and trends in terrorist violence. In this debate the dividing line runs between two major camps of researchers. The first of the two includes those who understand modern, “new” terrorism as being qualitatively and quantitatively different from previous forms, deriving its hatred and its force from new sources, organizing its activities along new lines and, as a result, becoming much more dangerous than “old” terrorism (Hoffman, Lesser et al., Neumann, Zanini and Edwards). The second camp is represented by those who deny this “old-new”

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dichotomy and view terrorism's metamorphoses as parts of a continuous process with "the old" and "the new" being intertwined and "the new," after all, not being as new as it is regularly said to be (Copeland, Crenshaw, Tucker).

Among those whose ideas are often cited in the context of this "old" vs. "new" terrorism debate is David Rapoport, professor at University of California, Los Angeles, and an originator of the Wave (or, alternatively, the Four Waves) theory of terrorism (Rapoport, "The Four Waves"). According to Rapoport, starting in the 1880s, terrorism, previously a local "nuisance" (such as actions of the Ku Klux Klan in the post-Civil War United States), became a global phenomenon. Since then, Rapoport argues, the world has experienced four consequent waves of terrorist violence, each one being informed by the influence of a certain political or ideological impulse. These are the anarchist wave, the anti-colonial wave, the "New Left" wave, and – most recently – the religious wave, which dates back to 1979, the year of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the beginning of a new century according to the Muslim calendar. All waves are said to last approximately forty years, sometimes overlapping each other (which means, "if the pattern of its three predecessors is relevant," that the fourth wave will give way to a fifth one sometime around 2025); and all of the waves allegedly display an internal homogeneity of political or ideological principles, strategy and tactics (Rapoport, "The Four Waves" 4). According to Rapoport, even those terrorist organizations that emerge in a context alien to a dominating wave impulse are at least partially transformed by its influence (e. g., turn to tactical methods that appear with the arrival of a new wave of terrorism).

Obviously, the scope of the Rapoportean theory is much wider than the issue of the current trends in terrorist violence. On the other hand, it is no less obvious why the Wave theory is regularly cited in relation to this issue. Since the 1990s, it has become a common point to depict modern terrorism as predominantly religious in character. Present-day terrorists are said to be driven for the most part by the Manichean vision of the global battle between good and evil, inspired to engage in indiscriminate violence against the unfaithful or non-believers – and to do so on an unprecedented scale and even end their own lives in fanatical suicide missions. The picture drawn by Rapoport of a completely new, religious, wave of terrorism emerging early in the 1980s perfectly corresponds with the views of those who assert that terrorist violence changed its nature

and its forms at the turn of the twentieth century. Moreover, because of its universality, the Wave theory seems to add depth to the “old” vs. “new” terrorism dichotomy. In such a perspective, recent trends turn out not to be a singular anomaly but rather a fresh part of a recurring historical pattern.

The Wave Theory and Its Contradictions

In the debate over the nature of these trends one can take any side. (I personally do not subscribe to the opinion of those who view current developments in terrorism as the manifestation of something fundamentally “new.”) Certainly, there are a great many controversial questions related to what precisely “religious terrorism” means, how much religious fanaticism affects terrorists’ intentions, etc. Even such a prominent expert as Paul Wilkinson faces difficulty trying to answer these questions in a conclusive way. In one and the same chapter of his classic work, *Terrorism versus Democracy*, Wilkinson first writes about “a dramatic emergence of terrorism motivated by extreme Islamist movements” citing Lebanon’s Hezbollah, Palestine’s Hamas, Egypt’s al-Gama’a al Islamiyya and the transnational al-Qaida network as examples (31), and then admits that “one is struck of the *political* [i. e. secular] nature of their agendas” (35). He continues:

Hence we see what *appears to be at first sight a purely religious phenomenon* is in fact in large part about political control and socio-economic demands [italics added] (Wilkinson 35).

But whichever side a researcher takes in the “old” vs. “new” terrorism debate, the Wave theory will not be of much – if any – help. For sure, one can be impressed by its chronological and factological scope. It would seem that Rapoport’s arguments are supported by the historical evidence. Clearly, there were periods in the history of terrorism marked by the rise and fall of anarchist, anti-colonial or leftist sentiments, with terrorist organisations or individual terrorists active during these periods sharing common features in their ideology or practice. The same events indeed quite often influenced terrorist actors that belonged to the same periods (the war in Vietnam as a symbol and example of “anti-imperialist resistance” for various left-wing terrorist groups around the world in the 1960s-70s). Some underground movements and organisations indeed played the role of “trailblazers” in employing

certain strategic or tactical novelties later emulated or adopted by other terrorist actors (such as the urban guerrilla warfare concept in 1969 pioneered, or reintroduced after a long time, by the Brazilian revolutionary Carlos Marighella and then borrowed by diverse terrorist groups like the Tupamaros in Uruguay, the Red Army Faction in West Germany or the Irish Republican Army in the United Kingdom). And, regardless of all possible controversies, there *has been* a significant increase in the weight of the religious factor in terrorist activity in recent decades.

All this is reflected in the Wave theory with reasonable accuracy. Nevertheless, on closer examination, some fundamental questions arise. Does the Rapoportean theory offer anything beyond the arranging of numerous well-studied facts in a certain order? Is it capable of not merely portraying events but explaining them? And, probably the most important of all: when explanations are provided, do they actually uncover anything substantial? Is the “wave phenomenon” allegedly “discovered” by Rapoport *real*, which means that a wave constitutes not merely a bundle of contemporaneous / loosely interrelated events but a coherent *entity*? As I have argued recently, the answers to all these questions are negative (Proshyn). Rapoport’s “Wave theory,” which has been hailed as one of the most important breakthroughs ever achieved “in the vast literature on terrorism” (Simon 44) and “one of the greatest contributions to the study of terrorism in the past two decades” (McAllister and Shmid 228), in fact represents an unsuccessful attempt to find a single explain-all solution for the extremely complex problem of the origins and transformation of terrorism. It “works” only if one agrees not to notice how superficial and sometimes even flimsy its author’s reasoning is.

It is obvious that quite often the activity of terrorist organisations is not conducted in parallel with the dynamics of “their” waves. For instance, within both the anti-colonial and leftist waves we observe the cases of sharp increases in terrorist activity towards the end of the wave (full-scale terrorist-backed insurgencies in Cyprus, Algeria, and Peru). Rapoport conveniently explains this away by saying that while “a wave is composed of organisations,” waves and organisations “have very different life rhythms” (Rapoport, “The Four Waves” 4). What matters for Rapoport is the impulse forming a particular wave, not the dynamics of individual terrorist groups, which might emerge at any point along the wave. Some groups may disappear long before “their” wave is gone; others may even outlast “their” wave, “adapting” to the next one. But

this explanation barely explains anything. If the global wave-forming impulse is *the major driving force* behind all terrorist groups related to a given wave, then, once again, why are some organisations so slow to emerge in response to “their” generative impulses? Furthermore, what factors enable terrorist organisations to continue their campaigns after “their” wave impulses expire?

I argue that the emergence, activity and life span of terrorist organisations (however powerful global influences may be) are in the first place determined by local factors, i. e. socio-political conflicts inherent in particular societies, not by global impulses (Proshyn). Surely, Rapoport is aware of those conflicts, but we are never given the answer to the inevitable question: how exactly do global wave-forming impulses (by definition external to the absolute majority of conflicts) “override” the context of local socio-political issues to become the main force and, correspondingly, the main explanation behind the activity of variegated terrorist organisations throughout the world? It is presented as an a priori assertion that a “wave’s energy” (*somehow*) “inspires” or ceases to “inspire” terrorist activity (Rapoport, “The Four Waves” 5).

Terrorist organisations may appear or disappear at any time through a wave’s life span, evidently in accordance with local socio-political conditions, and nevertheless they are supposed to be viewed as “inspired” by external – “global” – influence. Other groups outliving “their” waves and entering new ones are described as changing their nature under the influence of new impulses. However, the mechanism of such transformation is also never revealed and analysed in any significant detail (what happens to an organisation’s previous goals, leadership, supporters, etc.; why should a changing terrorist organisation be viewed as transformed in the first place from the outside, by an impulse emanating from a distant source, but not from the inside, by local factors?). When Rapoport is attempting an explanation, he says too little and basically manages only to rephrase himself by simply asserting that a terrorist organisation transcending its wave “reflects” (*somehow* once again) “the new wave’s influence,” which “may pose special problems for the group and its constituencies...” (Rapoport, “The Four Waves” 5).¹

¹ Moreover, citing the case of the IRA as an example (Rapoport, “The Four Waves” 5) Rapoport moves in the diametrically wrong direction, for instead of relinquishing in the late 1960s its nationalist nature to adapt to the third, “New Left,” wave, the IRA, a left-oriented organisation for approximately ten years, rejected its Marxist sympathies to become (in the form of its most aggressive Provisional faction) a stridently nationalist force (Coogan 341).

In short, Rapoport fails to prove the entitic reality of his alleged “waves of terrorism.” From what he says, only one “definite” conclusion could be derived – namely, that different subjects of terrorism may be in one way or another influenced by the same political events. No reasonably identical or regular pattern of such influence was shown by Rapoport. Obvious differences in the behaviour of terrorist groups belonging to the same wave were never convincingly explained.² Moreover, arguing that a wave could be studied and understood virtually independently of the subjects of terrorism it is composed of, Rapoport further underscores the weakness of his theory. To produce a wave of terrorism a political impulse needs to manifest itself in the activities of concrete terrorist subjects. If a researcher dismisses such concretics as epiphenomenal details and focuses exclusively on “universal” factors (which is basically what Rapoport does), his or her theory will turn out to be a kind of tautology. A global wave is generated by a certain global political impulse, but since the activities of particular subjects pertaining to a given wave are assertedly of secondary importance, the impulse itself appears to be the only thing that matters, or *stands for a wave*. To put it differently, a wave is an impulse is a wave.

Despite its weakness, the Wave theory of terrorism, as previously mentioned, remains one of the most widely cited theories in the literature on terrorism. Besides earning its author praise from other academics, this theory became the starting point for a great deal of research – from dissertations (Smith) to monographs (Gupta) to collective research projects (*Terrorism: Critical Concepts; Terrorism, Identity and Legitimacy*). Such popularity seems to be accounted for by the seductively simple answers to complex questions which

² For instance, if the major driving force of the third wave of terrorism was the agonising Vietnam War, why did the terrorist Weather Underground Organisation (WUO) that acted in the 1970s in the United States, the nation most deeply involved in the Indochina conflict, cease all its violent activities after less than ten years of existence, while the Red Army Faction that emerged in West Germany almost simultaneously with WUO continued its struggle for more than two decades, the deaths of its “historical leaders” and arrests of many rank-and-file members notwithstanding? Is it possible that the impulse of the Vietnam War affected American extremists less than their West German counterparts? Is it not self-evident that for West German left-wing terrorists active from the early 1970s through to the early 1990s (as well as for left extremists in many other countries during the same period) the war in Indochina (which ended in 1975) was only one of numerous driving factors, the rest of them originating from internal political conflicts? Even WUO’s strategy, tactics and eventual dissolution could not be exhaustively explained by referring solely to the war in Vietnam.

the Wave theory proposes (practically everything in the genesis and evolution of terrorism is attributed to the influence of a single factor) and by the apparently close match of the facts cited to its assertions (if we dismiss concretics in favour of broad, “global” strokes).

Paradoxically, what in fact is the reflection of the weak points of the Rapoportean theory, of its schematic and superficial nature, is perceived as its advantage. But what is probably even more paradoxical is that there have been, to the best of my knowledge, no attempts whatsoever to fashion a comprehensive critique of the fundamental flaws in the Wave theory. Even in those works that are devoted to the multi-aspect analysis of terrorism (of its origin, different types, transformations, etc.) and where it would seem natural to encounter at least partial criticism of Rapoport’s theory, we find nothing of the kind (*Critical Terrorism Studies; Networks, Terrorism and Global Insurgency; Root Causes of Terrorism*). Taking into consideration how widely and uncritically the Wave theory is used, it appears doubly desirable and appropriate to judge its analytical value and its applicability to the needs of counter-terrorism. I have already made a step in this direction (and some of the present arguments are borrowed from my above cited article), but that previous criticism was broad and focused mostly on what Rapoport calls the first three waves of terrorism, all of them long gone. In this article, my intention is to test the Wave theory once again, this time against the much more recent and dangerous phenomenon, which, according to Rapoport’s logic, belongs to the newest, fourth, wave of terrorism – namely, homegrown jihadism in Europe.

The Fourth Wave and the Coming of Homegrown Jihadists

Disturbing examples of the phenomenon of European homegrown jihadism are plentiful these days. The tragic case of the French satirical weekly *Charlie Hebdo* and ensuing events in Paris and its surrounding area are a painfully fresh reminder of the extreme virulence of this threat. But at the time Rapoport first published his theory in the very early 2000s (Rapoport, “The Fourth Wave”), only the initial signs of Europe becoming a hotbed of homegrown jihadists had appeared. Thus the problem has remained outside the Rapoportean theoretical scheme. However, it is exactly because of its late origin that homegrown jihadism may serve as an almost ideal example of the distribution of another Rapoportean global wave of terrorism, and consequently it is the perfect test case

for the Wave theory. European jihadism originated long after the events, which, according to Rapoport, had started the wave of religious terrorism and in an environment sharply distinct from that where those events and their immediate repercussions had taken place. If Rapoport's theory works, it should coherently explain the chain of events stretching from the late 1970s and early 1980s Middle East and Afghanistan to the 2000s-10s United Kingdom, Germany or France.

For objectivity's sake it must be underlined that neither for Rapoport himself, nor for those who share his views, is religious terrorism to be identified exclusively with Islamic terrorism. As early as 1984, almost a decade before going public with his Four Waves theory, Rapoport published an article dealing with early examples of terrorist violence in no less than three religious traditions – Jewish (the Sicarii), Muslim (the Assassins) and Hindu (the Thugs) (Rapoport, "Fear and Trembling"). Regardless of their controversial nature,³ these examples demonstrate Rapoport's readiness to look at the problem of religious terrorism from different angles. Later, in his Wave theory proper, along with Islamic terrorism Rapoport mentioned activities of Jewish and Christian fundamentalists, the Japanese totalitarian sect Aum Shinrikyo as well as Sikh and Tamil separatists supposedly influenced by the global impulse of religious extremism. Still, it is Islam that is the main current of the religious wave. As Rapoport puts it:

Islamic groups have conducted the most significant, deadly, and profoundly international attacks. Equally significant, the political events providing the hope for the fourth wave originated in Islam, and the successes achieved apparently influenced religious terror groups elsewhere (Rapoport, "The Four Waves" 17).

As previously stated, Rapoport's theory seems to be reasonably well borne out by the facts. Indeed, the Iranian Revolution and the invasion of Afghanistan sent shockwaves through the Muslim world, providing alarming evidence of the threat to Islam from the infidels and therefore a stimulus to defend the faith. One of the

³ Strictly speaking, the actions of the ancient Jewish Sicarii ("daggermen") fighting the Roman occupational authorities and their Jewish collaborators were more of a nationalist nature (however dramatic their religious trappings), while India's Thugs (literally – "deceivers"), worshipers of the dark goddess Kali, never pursued any other goals than to please their dreadful patroness (therefore their numerous murders fall completely outside the scope of any discussions on terrorism).

consequences of this upsurge was the emergence in the first half of the 1980s of a cluster of terrorist organisations that began their struggle under Islamic slogans (Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Islamic Jihad Organisation, Hezbollah). Having first been felt in the Middle East, in the course of the 1980s-2000s this impulse spread to other countries and regions – from East Africa to Asia-Pacific.

In the middle of the 1990s Islamic terrorism reached European shores. In 1994-95 the Algerian Armed Islamic Group delivered several blows against France. In 1998-99 in West Germany a group of radical students from Muslim countries emerged. Later this so-called Hamburg cell was integrated into the structure of the Afghanistan-based al-Qaida, and its members upon receiving their training in Afghan camps played a crucial part in the September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States. However, the role of *European* Muslims in these dramatic developments remained modest until the middle of the 2000s when finally homegrown jihadists themselves burst onto the scene with resonant political assassinations and mass terror attacks (such as the murder of the controversial Dutch filmmaker Theo van Gogh in 2004 and multiple bombings in Madrid in 2004 and London in 2005).

In another variation on the Rapoportean wave theme, the well-known American expert Marc Sageman depicts European jihadists as the “ripple” on the surface of the wave of religious terrorism, previous “ripples” being the core al-Qaida cadres whose pedigree goes back to the mid-1980s and those Muslim expatriates who, like members of the Hamburg cell, joined the jihadist ranks in the late 1990s (Sageman, “Ripples in the waves” 87-89). But once one moves beyond these vague, metaphorical schemes, which are far more descriptive than analytical, there immediately arise serious questions regarding a possible or already proposed wave-based interpretation of the phenomenon of European jihadism.

Breaking the Wave: the Global and the Local in Homegrown Jihadism

It would be logical to begin with the question of how precisely proponents of the Wave theory envisage the mechanism of preservation of the 1979 wave-forming impulse among homegrown European jihadists. Is it possible to argue in earnest that the events that took place several decades ago far away in parts of south-western and central Asia and which are totally foreign to present-day young

European Muslims are still capable of decisively influencing would-be jihadists? Posing this question appears to be even further justified when one considers the fact that the probing (insofar as it is possible to probe) of the European jihadist scene with its subculture, religious literature, videos, audios, improvised martyrology, etc., has failed to reveal either special interest among European Muslim youth in the distant upheavals of the late 1970s and early 1980s or a special reverence towards those who participated in those past events. Instead of all this, the attention of European (would-be) jihadists was (or still is) concentrated on such recent or contemporary topics as the war in Afghanistan against al-Qaida and the Taliban; the invasion of Iraq; the Arab Spring; the Syrian Civil War; and, most recently, the rise of the Islamic State (Drissel 10, Venhaus 7-8).

No doubt, supporters of the Wave theory would readily object by pointing out that the 1979 impulse was not an “eternal mover” but a “*trigger*” that started the prolonged chain reaction. Considered in this light, the decades-old “global impulse” does not overshadow newer developments. Naturally, at the same time the opposite will be stated: however remarkable succeeding events may be, they do not detract from the importance of the “trigger event.” In this light, whatever the impact on the Islamic world produced by the protracted war in Iraq or the onslaught of the Islamic State’s militants, these conflicts still remain but links in the chain stretching back almost forty years to 1979. Nevertheless, such counterarguments, if they are voiced, will do nothing but once again demonstrate the schematic nature of the reasoning of Rapoport and his followers. One cannot claim to have properly understood the genesis and dynamics of terrorism if one reduces the problem to a few initial “trigger events,” explaining away the rest by resorting to the causally trivial domino effect.

There is no doubt that the events of 1979 mentioned by Rapoport⁴ influenced the Muslim world to a considerable degree. There is also no denying the fact that this influence is still felt indirectly by millions of adherents of Islam. And of course there is an obvious connection between the dramatic developments of late 1979 and the emergence of a number of religiously motivated terrorist groups, whose activities inspired other groups in their turn. What the proponents of the wave theory are unable to do, however,

⁴ The impact of the advent of the new Muslim century, the third of 1979’s wave-forming events mentioned by Rapoport, was not nearly as compelling as the political and armed strife in Iran and Afghanistan. It seems that by including this third factor Rapoport sought to add intricacy to his scheme, which hardly speaks in favour of the Wave theory.

is to substantially expand this simple causal scheme. Knowing that the Islamic Revolution in Iran was a force behind the emergence of the Lebanese terrorist organisation Hezbollah, which (under various *noms de guerre*) pioneered the use of suicide bombing in the early 1980s, will add little to understanding why twenty years later young British Muslims decided to blow themselves up along with their co-citizens in the trains of the London Underground. And even if we pay due attention to the much nearer conflicts in Iraq or Syria and their effect on European Muslims, the key question will remain of why radicalisation of certain elements within the Muslim diaspora in Europe should be traced to chronologically and geographically distant sources rather than to the influence of intra-European and intra-diasporic factors in the first place? I have already raised a similar question with regard to the Wave theory taken in general and pointed out that Rapoport's assertions about universal wave-forming impulses coupled with his tendency to ignore local specifics have led him into some kind of political "mysticism" (Proshyn 264-65).

The workings of the European Muslim diaspora and the personal circumstances of its individual members turning to terrorist violence deserve special attention. Here it will suffice to highlight the most significant topics.

The very definition of "*homegrown* jihadism" coined by experts in the field clearly indicates that we are dealing with a predominantly endogenous phenomenon. Seeking to uncover the roots of European jihadism, researchers constantly address the lack of promising economic perspectives for many representatives of the Islamic diaspora in Europe, the voluntary or involuntary ghettoisation of European Muslims and the unmistakably xenophobic attitudes towards Muslims held by a large portion of "autochthonous" Europeans (*Understanding Violent Radicalization*).⁵ To that one must add deep fission among Muslims themselves⁶ and the absence of influential Islamic forces in the mainstream of European

⁵ A number of 2013 surveys showed that more than 60% respondents in Spain, more than 50% respondents in France and Germany and more than 40% respondents in Britain view Islam as "incompatible with the West" (qtd. in Islam in Europe).

⁶ In this regard, the notion of the "Muslim diaspora," used here because of its brevity, is not strictly satisfactory for it fails to reflect substantial ethnocultural differences between immigrants (or the children and grandchildren of immigrants) from various parts of the Islamic world (North Africa, the Middle East, Southwest Asia, etc.), not to mention specific religious differences between Sunni and Shia Muslims.

politics (these could potentially resemble the Christian Democratic parties), which would have closely integrated Muslims into the socio-political systems of European countries and helped to channel the discontent of many potential jihadists in a legal and constructive manner (Warner and Wenner).

In this context, sentiments engendered by the conflicts in the Middle East or Afghanistan, the theme of relentless animosity between the Muslims and the “unfaithful,” extremist ideas and the “escape into jihad” for a sizable number of European Muslims represent more a framework to shape the feeling of alienation already grown on European soil than an original source of militant zeal. In a great deal of cases opting for the jihadist struggle and joining the secret ranks of the “brethren in arms” serve as an ersatz for non-existent social opportunities and solid attachments. It is worth noting that in their earlier lives many of the future jihadists did not evince the slightest interest in either the plight of their coreligionists abroad and or even the main tenets of Islam, as they followed the lifestyle typical of secular European urban youth with all its hedonistic pastimes, vices, and excesses (*Understanding Violent Radicalisation*; Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*).

The Rapoportean concept of the universal impulses behind continent-sweeping waves of terror is too abstract to provide us with a reliable research instrument. The maximum (yet regrettably modest) result it can help us to achieve is to describe some connection between various events lined up along a common historical vector and remind us that certain developments are indirectly linked to a distant “trigger event.” This fundamental superficiality, if I may allow myself an oxymoron, will be once again made obvious, should we try to apply the Wave theory to explain the phenomenon of European homegrown jihadism. Instead of being a part of some “global wave of terrorism” driven by a historically remote impulse from the far abroad, this particular kind of jihadism reflects essentially intra-European contradictions and is in the first place powered by internal conflicts and tensions. We can still use the notion of a “wave of terrorism” if we wish to stick to it, but we must be aware of the local nature of this wave, of its being a European “wave in itself,” so to speak. The same applies to the Sageman’s “ripples in the waves.” In a sense, homegrown jihadism is the “ripple,” the splash of religiously motivated – or religiously “coloured” – violence, however, not on the surface of a global wave of some sort but rather in the variegated stream of local developments.

Whatever the importance of the questions addressed above, they may be perceived as objects of abstract theorising. But the next question is definitely of practical value.

Rapoport argues that the general character of a wave of terrorist violence manifests itself in the practice of terrorism – in the ways terrorists organise their activities, in the methods they use. There is obvious logic to this; after all, if it were not for the efforts to find such connection, the Wave theory would be nothing but the collection of commonplaces. Unfortunately, this does not mean that Rapoport’s reasoning on this matter is immune to criticism (Proshyn 266-67). In the case of European jihadism, attention should be paid to the following.

In his discussion of the organisational and tactical specifics of religious terrorism Rapoport goes no further than to point out the relatively large scale and resilience of Islamist terrorist groupings as well as their predilection for staging suicide attacks, the latter being attributed primarily to religious fanaticism and expectation of heavenly bliss reserved for martyrs (Rapoport, “The Four Waves” 18-19). Yet at the very time that Rapoport was promoting his ideas, the trend became visible – and not least in Europe – towards decentralisation of the jihadist movement and the emergence of networked and leaderless (often virtual) jihadist structures (Sageman, *Leaderless Jihad*; Zanini and Edwards). Quite possibly, in the long-term perspective, this will prove to be the most important organisational and tactical peculiarity of present-day jihadism and, correspondingly, the main source of the threat it poses. However, the Wave theory says nothing about this peculiar feature of Islamic terrorism. (Here is a telling detail: in all Rapoport’s widely touted works we will hardly find the term “Internet,” not to mention the in-depth analysis of how the Internet has influenced terrorist activity.)

The problem here, however, is not that Rapoport was too “hasty” in publishing his works, which focused attention on large and long-established terrorist organisations such as Hezbollah or al-Qaida (before latter’s Afghanistan bases were wiped out by the forces of the US-led coalition) and therefore “missed” the most recent developments in Europe and elsewhere (Rapoport, “The Fourth Wave”).⁷ The main problem is essentially that the Wave theory does not provide any ground whatsoever for the accurate prognosis of changes

⁷ It is worth noting, though, that in his contemplation of *the future* of Islamic terrorism Rapoport dwelled on the Palestine and Kashmir issues but never mentioned European countries.

in terrorist practice (be it terrorist violence of a religious or any other nature). Regarding the concrete case of networked jihadism in Europe, it is clearly impossible to explain its networked / leaderless nature conjuring the overthrow of the Shah of Iran or the “exploits” of the assorted Mujahideen who fought the Soviet troops in Afghanistan or, much less so, the jubilant celebration of the birth, on November 19, 1979, of a new Muslim century. Even *if we agreed* to view these events as a global impulse initiating a new, religious, wave of terrorism, we would still have difficulty figuring out what is specifically *religious* about the formation of amorphous and acephalous networks or autonomous cells comprised of like-minded people or about online sharing of extremist content.

We need nothing more than a brief look at the history of terrorism to find out that underground networks and the very idea of “leaderless resistance” appeared decades prior to the emergence of the first European jihadist cells and networks. Quite possibly, the first to systematically develop the strategy of leaderless resistance was an obscure American anti-communist Colonel Ulius Amoss in the 1960s (Kaplan 266). Later into the second half of the century principles of this strategy, learned from Amoss or on an independent basis, were adopted by various terrorist groups ranging from white supremacist organisations in the United States to the left wing Revolutionary Cells group in West Germany to a motley assemblage of ecoterrorist groups in Britain, the United States, Canada, etc. Needless to say, in none of these cases was the decision to create a dispersed terrorist network motivated by religious dogma of any sort.

As for jihadist autonomous cells and leaderless networks in Europe, their roots similarly lie not in purely religious soil (and definitely not in that “fertilised” from exclusively foreign sources). To better understand the origin of the phenomenon of networked homegrown jihad and find effective means to counter it, we need to remember not so much Ayatollah Khomeini but alienated and frustrated (yet, more often than not, Web-savvy) Muslim youths scattered across Europe; the obstacles many of them face (due to additional security measures) when they are trying to reach the hot spots where the struggle against “enemies of Islam” goes on; the seductive opportunity to substitute for such a complicated voyage by becoming a “martyr” at home by assailing much more easily accessible “soft targets” in crowded European cities.

Once again, an attempt to address a particular case of terrorist activity (this time its practical details) from the Rapoportean universalist position proves to be disappointing. In the practical

dimension it is even more evident than in the ideological or strategic aspects that the clue to understanding the origins and the “mechanics” of terrorism lies first and foremost in the specific circumstances of a given case and not in the far-fetched instances of extraneous political or military conflicts. Terrorists’ organisational solutions and terrorist tactics are at one and the same time an instrument and a result of adapting to the concrete socio-political conditions they face, a “balance sheet” of terrorists’ abilities and weaknesses. To overlook this concretics in favour of distant, permanently “established” factors is to confine oneself to artificially matching reality to a rigid prefabricated scheme.

Conclusion

What is perceived by many as David Rapoport’s main achievement, his idea of global waves of terrorism, each one being driven by its particular wave-forming impulse, proves instead to be an utterly erroneous simplification of the problem of the origin and transformation of terrorist violence. Testing Rapoport’s Four Waves theory against the phenomenon of European homegrown jihadism, we clearly observe basic weaknesses of this much-lauded theoretical “achievement.”

In accordance with the Rapoportean scheme, European jihadism belongs to the fourth, religious, wave of terrorism, which is supposedly powered by the political impulse originating during the dramatic events of 1979 – the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. However, even if there remains some “relic” influence coming from this historically distant source, one cannot incontrovertibly and exhaustively explain homegrown jihadism on European soil by linking it to already semi-legendary exogenous conflicts. To schematically attribute the origin of a particular type of terrorism to some distant “universal” factor while overlooking immediate – should I say “real”? – causes is not only analytically incorrect but also futile and potentially dangerous from a practical point of view. One will hardly succeed in countering homegrown jihadism by dint of exorcising the shades of Ayatollah Khomeini or the mujahedeen of the 1980s while overlooking the internal – *homegrown* – problems of xenophobia, social frustration and alienation threatening to rent the fabric of European societies.

For the sake of fairness, it must be admitted that probably no such broad theory as Rapoport’s could ever succeed in unravelling

the details of concrete types of terrorism. Quite possibly, the criticism aimed here solely at the Wave theory should be equally distributed among all overarching theories. Nevertheless, this caveat will neither bolster the Rapoportean scheme theoretically, nor improve its practical applicability. While deserving some share of “bibliographical” interest, the Wave theory of terrorism should be decisively cast aside as a crude and misleading research tool.

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STRATEGIES OF ISLAMIST EXTREMISM IN EUROPE2**

ABSTRACT: This paper explains various strategies of contemporary Islamists extremism in Europe. The author identifies the most important variants of Islamist extremism and deals with their goals and with strategic approaches how to achieve these goals. Quasi-legalist strategies as well as violent forms of interest-empowerment are described. The author uses sources from various Islamist organizations and analyses these materials within the framework of modern insurgency. A comprehensive outlook and threat assessment of Islamist extremist strategies are included in this article.

KEY WORDS: Islamist Extremist; strategy; Europe; political violence; Insurgency

Introduction

Contemporary Europe is facing a rise of Islamist extremism. Various strategies are used by Islamist extremists to undermine the legal and societal order of European democratic constitutional states. The aim of this article is to identify the most important strategies of contemporary Islamist extremism in Europe. Previous typologies of insurgency (Merari) and categories elaborated by German “theoreticians of extremism” are used as an analytical framework (Jesse & Thime).

Extremism is in this article understood as an anti-thesis of democratic a constitutional state. It includes intolerant approaches

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towards other political and religious beliefs and the leaders and activists of which struggle to establish dictatorship. Islamist extremism is a part of religious extremism based on intolerant sovereignty of religion. Islamist extremism uses in political and societal sphere the principles and values from Islamic religion, which are incompatible with the values and democratic character of modern Western democracies. The final goal is to establish and develop a caliphate or other state form based on this non-democratic use of Islamic religion and its political dimension. The achievement of these goals is carried out by various actors (from the point of view of political strategies and tactics as well as from the point of view of sub-confessions of Islam) (Bötticher & Mares 244-245).

Strategies of religious-political movements

Contemporary Islamist extremism consists of many different actors and ideological and religious variants. Islamist extremism can be characterized as a social movement in a transnational area (Vertigans 163), however, this movement is very heterogeneous and some parts – at least temporarily – fighting each against the other (mostly it is valid for the Shia-Sunni conflict). The spectrum of strategies can be conceptualized on an axis where one pole can be characterized as a non-violent quasi-legal activity and the second pole as mass militancy, including a war against “non-believers” (Bötticher & Mares 258-261).

The activities of selected actors of the Islamist extremist movement can be combined. They can include both violent strategies (terrorism) as well as electoral party political strategies (Jesse & Thieme 21). The term strategy can be used in relation to Islamist extremism in its political meaning (Raschke & Tils 127) as well as in its military meaning (Collins 4). Some authors even in relation to current Islamic fundamentalism use the term “militarisation of the religion” (Gemein & Redmer 205).

On European territory a broad concept of insurgent strategies can be used. The term insurgency is used in various and very different meanings. In this article we can start with the definition by Bard O’Neill: “a struggle between non-ruling group and ruling authorities in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e. g. organizational, expertise, propaganda and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate, or sustain the basis of one or more aspects of politics” (O’Neill 15).

In this article the broader conceptualization of insurgency elaborated by Ariel Merari is respected. His categorization can be used for an analysis of non-religious as well as religious movements, including Islamist extremism. Merari distinguishes between the following forms of insurgent strategies:

1. Coup d'état (sudden, forceful stroke in politics, especially a sudden overthrow of a government);
2. Violent Revolution (violent radical social, political or economic change, Merari uses the term Leninist revolution);
3. Guerilla (a diffuse type of war, fought in relatively small formations, against a stronger enemy);
4. Riots (mob violence, usually non-organized in the sense that the rioters are neither totally controlled by a leader nor organized in units or another hierarchical structure; sometimes they are intentionally incited by organized political activists);
5. Terrorism (a systematic use of politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine state agents, usually intended to influence an audience);
6. Non-Violent Resistance (demonstrations, labor strikes, hunger strikes, merchandise boycott, refusal to pay taxes etc.) (Merari 217-223).

It is important to mention that Merari is focused on insurgent strategies. Terrorism is sometimes used also in the context of repressive governmental violence (including war terrorism etc., revolutionary or contra-revolutionary terrorism etc.) (Kraus). In the future Islamist extremists can also use military strategy of regular war against European countries.

Contemporary Islamist Extremist Spectrum in Europe

With the knowledge of the previous definitions and concepts we can categorize the contemporary Islamist extremist spectrum in Europe. In the Sunni as well as in the Shia spectrum we can find organizations and networks which use quasi-legalist methods, and violent organizations and networks. Sometimes violence can be used only in a non-European area, while in Europe the group propagates non-violent behavior (as the Muslim Brotherhood). The line between extremism and non-extremism seems to be unclear in many cases. For example, the foundations and groups supported from Islamic countries announce fight against extremism and

terrorism on the one hand and they promote anti-Semitic and intolerant materials on the other hand – as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth – WAMY (Stand for Peace 10-11). As Alex P. Schmid writes:

trying to distinguish between non-violent (religious) extremists and violent (religious) extremists is futile seems inescapable. It makes more sense to look at what both groups of extremists share in their political outlook. The idea that one can hold extremist beliefs without being inclining to use extremist methods to realise them when the opportunity presents itself – something attributed to non-violent extremists – is naïve and dangerous. Religious Islamist extremism is a unitary phenomenon of which violent and non-violent extremism are two sides of the same coin. To be clear: this statement refers to the ideology of Islamism and not to the religion of Islam (Schmid 20).

With respect to the above mentioned problems we can identify the spectrum of Sunni extremist organizations which in Europe are not using violence (at least up to now) – mostly the Muslim Brotherhood and its cover groups – as the Federation of Islamic Organisations in Europe (FIOE) (Kandel 150-159). The second important representative of this stream is the Party for Islamic Renewal (Hizb ut-Tahrir). In Europe also the dogmatic group Tablighi Jamaat is active, with its roots in Asian theological school Deobandi (Kandel 165-169). Support for extremist Islamism is carried out by various Islamic foundations (Burr & Collins 237-262). The relatively new Sharia⁴ movement combines violent and non-violent methods.

The Militant and clearly violent Sunni spectrum (so called Jihadism) is connected with the activities of global networks –Al Qaeda and affiliated groups (as the Islamic Jihad Union – IJU) and currently also with the Islamic State (IS). The “virtual Jihadist ummah” is an important part of this spectrum (from the point of view of radicalization of new supporters). Ideologists and strategists of Jihadism are spreading their concepts with the help of the internet as well as extremist Muslim meeting points (mosques, community centres etc.) (Brachman 189). Branches of regional terrorist groups operate on the European territory mostly with logistic goals, as the Hamas, Caucasus Emirate or Taliban (Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan) (Bötticher & Mares 268).

Shia extremist networks consist of groups which promote “Khomeinism” (as a result of the Islamic revolution in Iran) by non-violent methods and of violent groups affiliated with the Hezbollah structures in Europe and with hidden units of the al-Quds

– a special branch of the Iranian Revolutionary Guards (Kraus). Also in the Shia networks selected centres play an important role, as the Islamic Centre Hamburg (Bötticher & Mares 274).

Quasi-Legalist Strategies

Islamist extremists try to use European legal environment for their own purposes. They claim their own legal demands – sometimes using unclear words – with the goal to establish non-democratic rule according to a non-democratic interpretation of Islam, or they try to harm seriously the human right standards of current European countries (in the fields of human women’s rights, pluralism, freedom of speech, rights of sexual minorities etc.).

For example, according to Jytte Klausen “the Muslim Brotherhood now seeks influence through a strategy of integration into European societies” (Klausen 209). The legal Muslim organizations organize various actions for the public, where the “positive image of Islamism” should be presented. However, as during the so called Peace congress in Oslo 2013 in 2013, in fact extremist views were presented there. In this congress activists Fahad Qureshi from the group Islamic Net defended death penalty for homosexuals, gender segregation, stoning etc. After a wave of criticism this organisation wrote (quoted with original spelling mistakes):

The Chairman of Islam Net, Fahad Ullah Qureshi asked the audience, and the answer was clear. The attendees were common Sunni Muslims. They did not consider themselves as radicals or extremists. They believed that segregation was the right thing to do, both men and women agreed upon this. They even supported stoning or whatever punishment Islam or prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) commanded for adultery or any other crime. They even believed that these practices should be implemented around the world. Now what does that tell us? Either all Muslims and Islam is radical, or the media is Islamophobic and racist in their presentation of Islam. Islam is not radical, nor is Muslims in general radical. That means that the media is the reason for the hatred against Muslims, which is spreading among the non-Muslims in western countries (Islam Net).

Muslim extremist groupings were trying to use norms against discrimination in such a way that also legitimate criticism of selected parts of dogmatic Islam and political Islamism should be prohibited. The campaign against blasphemy was typical after publishing of cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed in Denmark. During this campaign

non-violent mass demonstrations were combined with violent demonstrations and terrorism (Ranstorp & Hyllengren 11).

The establishing of Sharia zones is the next strategy how to establish Islamic extremist rule. The demands, to put parts of the Sharia to civil and commercial law are step by step enhanced to create zones where Sharia should be applied also in penal law and where the traditional European law is not valid. In some countries, as in the United Kingdom or in Germany even vigilante units were established with the goal to control public areas in Muslim quarters (Deutsche Polizeigewerkschaft). This strategy to establish Sharia-Zones is also combined with violent elements.

Terrorism

Terrorism is used as a strategy of Islamic insurgency against European countries and democratic legal order. Petter Nasser identifies four forms of the use of European territory for Islamist terrorist purposes. The first form can be characterized as Europe as a support base (it was typical of the activities of the Al Qaeda in the 1990s). The second form is the so called classical Jihad in Europe (connected mostly with the situation in traditional Muslim countries, as the bombing perpetrated by the Armed Islamic Groups – GIA – in France in 1995). The third form is called global Jihad in Europe against targets from abroad (US, Russian or Israeli targets) and the fourth form is called “Global Jihad against Europe” (Nasser 180-186).

Small cells connected with global networks or individual freelancers are the most important perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Europe. In the journal Inspire published by Al-Qaeda the following targets of individual jihad in 2012 were defined:

1. Main political figures who lead the campaign against the Muslims such as the heads of states, ministers, military and security leaders;

2. Large strategic economic targets, such as: The Stock Exchange, power and oil installations, airports, harbors, railroad systems, bridges and highway intersections, tunnels on the highways, metro systems, tourist targets... and so on, [targeting] resources and sources for the economy;

3. Military bases and barracks where the armies are concentrated, especially the American military bases in Europe;

4. Media personalities and media centers that are leading the war against the Muslims and justifying the attacks on them, coming from the Zionist and Zionist-friendly Crusader media institutions;

5. Centralized information and computer centers that are in control of connecting the different institutions within the state, because this will completely paralyze the activity within that state;

6. Places where Jews are gathered, their leading personalities and institutions in Europe, avoiding places of worship and synagogues;

7. Official offices of the governmental institutions of those countries that are waging war, both on the state level and on the level of unions and political and military alliances, in the case where they participate in the aggression. Such as the offices of the NATO and the European Union... this requires decisions that have been studied carefully from a political perspective;

8. Buildings of the security services and the central intelligence in the capitals of America and allied Western states;

9. Striking civilians in general, to deter them or for retaliation (avoiding women and children when separated from men in places especially designed for them, like schools and the similar) (Al-Suri 23-24).

In fact, mostly the Jewish and military targets and targets connected with alleged blasphemy against Islam (cartoonists, as in Charlie Hebdo in 2015) are attacked in Europe. The al-Qaeda was during the first decade and in the first years of the second decade the main organization from the point of view of planning and inspiration for Islamist terrorist attacks in Europe (of course, with the exception of Russia, where Caucasian terrorist groups operate). Only some attacks were committed by other groups, for example the plot in Cyprus and the attack in Burgas against Israeli tourists in 2012 by Hezbollah (Levitt 8-9). A new phenomenon are attacks connected with the Islamic State, as in Brussel in 2014 or in Copenhagen in 2015. The return of foreign fighters – mostly related to the conflict in Syria and Iraq – is a huge challenge for contemporary counter-terrorism policy (Verfassungsschutz Nordrhein-Westfalen). They have potential to enhance terrorism to more serious forms of violence.

From Riots to the War For Caliphate

For the current era terrorism seems the most dangerous strategy of Islamist insurgency in Europe. However, in the future it can be combined with more serious violent forms and as a final strategy the traditional military offensive with support of guerilla warfare and riots behind the main frontline can be used. However, this

situation depends on the development in the traditional Islamic countries, mostly in the Middle Eastern area. If Islamist extremists with aggressive anti-European goals are able to win power in these countries, they can start mass military attacks against Europe. During such offensive guerilla warfare and mass riots can complicate the situation in Western Europe where local caliphates can be established (Mareš 97-99).

Because of this threat it is important to analyze previous riots and mass violence committed by Islamist extremists. Mass riots occurred in French suburbia in 2005, however, at that time the Islamist ideology motivation was only one of more factors behind these riots (many rioters of West African origin were not Muslims). They were supported also by European leftist multi-cultural activists (Mareš 95). However, these riots inspired the future “Islamic urban guerilla” in Europe (Centrum strategických studií).

Violent demonstrations and riots in Europe can complicate the current situation and the development of relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in Europe in the near future. The cases of clashes between Islamic extremists and their opponents were observed in Germany, where also street violence and violent demonstrations are typical of the Salafist scene (Behnam 24-26). Psychological war connected with terror against “non-believers,” prisoners, moderate Muslims etc. will be used, as contemporary media strategy of the Islamic State shows. In 2014 the Islamic State published also a map with territories of parts of Europe (and specific Andalusia) in the borders of previous Muslims rule (Lewis). Another map claims the whole globe for the IS (Al-Tamimi).

With respect to the previous fact, we can repeat the previous findings about the combined strategy of Islamist extremists. It can be characterized in the following steps:

1. Restoration of Islamic regimes in traditionally Islamic regions (by means of terrorism, civil war, revolutions and coups d'état);
2. Establishment of new Islamist states in territories in which contemporary Islamist separatist movements are agitating (guerilla warfare, terrorism);
3. Subversive activities of Islamists in the diasporas of Western democracies as well as other non-Islamist regions (quasi-legalist Islamism; use of Western anti-discrimination norms for prohibiting criticism of Islamism; terrorism, mass unrest, formation of an Islamist parallel society [also with the help of demographic expansion; in general acquisition of the most important positions and influence in originally non-Islamist states]);
4. War of Islamist states against non-Islamist states (classical war, war and terrorism with ABC-weapons, utilization of the Islamist diaspora for sabotage and uprisings) and systematic Islamisation of other territories;

5. Establishment of Islamist rule with strict application of sharia on a global scale;
6. Maintenance of Islamist rule by means of totalitarian regimes – theocratic state structures and ideology, suppression, execution and liquidation of opponents, reformists and non-believers, control of private lives by means of secret police and theocracy – with the support of state-guided fundamentalist control organs (Bötticher & Mares 259, Schmid 19-20).

Conclusion

Contemporary Islamist extremism is adapted to European legal and societal environment. It uses quasi-legalist strategies as well as various forms of violence. Geopolitical connections between traditional Islamic area and extremist communities in European countries open a broad spectrum of possibilities for a combination of various forms of attacks against European democratic constitutional states. It is important not to see current issues, as riots or individual terrorist attacks, as isolated acts. They create a base for strategic use in the long term perspective.

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COUNTERING RADICALISATION OF MUSLIM COMMUNITY OPINIONS ON THE EU LEVEL

ABSTRACT: The paper explores selected factors influencing the process of radicalisation leading to the use of political violence and terror by the Muslim minorities living in the European Union member states. Internal and external catalysts conditioning this process and methods of their analysis have been presented. The second section examines various counter-radicalisation and de-radicalisation efforts of the EU. The authors analysed the multidimensional European Union policy in the area of counteracting radicalisation for empowering the population and member states in preventing the radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism and emphasising the role of social partners and local authorities. Also, the promotion of good practices for combating radicalisation, developed under the auspices of the multidisciplinary Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) is presented.

KEY WORDS: Radicalisation, De-radicalisation, Terrorism, European Union, Strategy.

Introduction

European Union countries, which during the last decade incurred losses resulting from terrorist attacks, initially focused on prosecution of the perpetrators. Later on they launched long-term planes of prevention and counteraction of radicalisation often constituting the first stage in the formation of potential terrorists. The identification of factors fostering radicalisation allowed the

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development of a joint a EU action plan, which to a large extent rests on two pillars:

- prevention of the formation of radicalisation – a fostering environment, that creates resistance to extremist propaganda;
- reversal of processes which have already started within an individual/group succumbing to radicalisation, in other words bringing back those, who have already “crossed the line” in an ideological sense, but have not committed a crime yet (a so-called “exit strategy” assisting individuals in escaping from brutal extremism).

The social and legal situation of Muslims in Europe is varied and depends on historical background, the regime and the public opinion in the host country. A comparative analysis of factors which may foster radicalisation of opinions in countries such as Great Britain, France, Italy, Denmark, the Netherlands, Belgium, Spain and Sweden may improve the understanding of the phenomena in general, and consequently – ameliorate the strategy and tactics of counteracting terrorist threats.

In this context, it seems crucial to provide an answer to the question of why more and more often cases of terrorism concern educated people who are born in the European Union states, and live and work there. Moreover, the issue of efficiency of assimilation and multi-cultural policy, promoted presently in many western democratic states is important. Self-radicalisation, concerning especially the 2nd and 3rd generation of young Muslims (including western converts) requires special treatment: they use modern technical devices such as the Internet¹ with more ease than the previous generation.

The high level of civilization and technical development of the EU states is paradoxically both hindering and facilitating radicalisation. An open society, the possibility of free expression of own opinions, criticism of authority and attractive economic opportunities are the reasons for which a vast majority of European Muslims choose deep integration with indigenous citizens and peaceful co-existence.

On the other hand, a citizen-friendly state organisation system facilitates activities of individuals and groups, such as extremely radical Muslims who show incomprehension and absolute hostility towards the West. The protection of citizen rights may have

¹ Presently, in descriptions of Islamic immigrants in the EU, the following division into generations is adopted: 1st generation – people aged 60 and more, 2nd generation – people aged 30-50, 3rd generation – people aged 30 and less.

impact on weakening the efficiency of law enforcement institutions and judicial authorities which often have their hands literally “tied” in clear cases of threat with extreme radicalisation, and consequently with terrorism (e.g. the acquitting judgement in case of the Dutch Hofstadt Group – Hofstadgroep). Apart from political areas, economic and technological development (e.g. widespread access to network mass media) equips radicals with modern instruments for battling a system very difficult for definite and successful counteraction (e.g. a constant set up of new “www” sites by Islamists in order to replace websites blocked due to dissemination of hatred or encouragement to acts of violence).²

The Concept of Radicalization

In literature, radicalisation is defined as a process of adopting an extremist system of values combined with expressing disapproval, as well as supporting or using violence and threat as a method of achieving changes in the society. An often quoted definition of radicalisation resorting to violence is the one developed by the European Commission, compliant to which radicalisation is the “phenomenon of people embracing opinions, assessments and views that could lead to the commitment of terrorist acts.” On the other hand, experts of e.g. Dutch intelligence services (*Algemene Inlichtingen – en Veiligheidsdienst*, AIVD) present the process of radicalisation as a (growing) readiness of a given individual to independent realisation and (or) introduction of changes in the society (with various methods, including non-democratic ones) or encouragement of others to do so. At the same, AIVD emphasizes that in this case an especially important factor is the attitudes among immigrant societies which influence the radicalisation process taking place gradually without any clearly accentuated beginning and end. In addition, it may develop very violently. Consequently, radicalisation is a process including a change in the way of thinking – heading towards fundamentalist ideas and increased readiness to act in order to achieve a specific goal (Veldhuis, Bakker 4-7). The term employed in the further part of the article shall be understood as socialisation for extremism (a set of opinions and behaviours characterised by the main feature of extremism in reference to the

² *Hofstadgroep* was composed mainly of Muslims of North-African origin aged 18-28, mostly of the 2nd generation immigrants and converts.

existing distribution of political forces), manifested with the negation of the existing political system/order by the threat to use or an actual use of political violence (terrorism). Radical attitudes and behaviours shall be recognised in relation to political mainstream, that is to democracy of EU states, and they may result in readiness for illegal operations.

It is worth emphasizing that the same radicalisation process does not have to result in commitment of terrorist activity. Radicalisation may concern: individuals, groups and masses, their beliefs/opinions, feelings and behaviours. Behaviours, including engagement in political violence result rather from interaction and inter-group conflicts, than from the urge to destroy individual psychology (Maculey, Moskalenko 415-433). Consequently, “self-radicalisation” constitutes a form less frequent than recruitment into a terrorist organisation and preparation of a recruit (also mentally) for the task of killing with the aim to attain the objectives of the organisation. Identification with a group facilitates creating an alternative moral system supporting the process of mechanisms neutralizing aggression towards “not us”/”strangers”/”enemies.” However, it does not mean that the self-radicalisation process will not push the individual to join groups using violence.

Conditions of Radicalization

Complex separation of radicalisation threat directions seems possible with the engagement of research instruments remaining in the scope of the whole range of scientific disciplines, such as economy, psychology, sociology, political science and international relations or anthropology (See more: Veldhuis, Staun). Among factors fostering radicalisation of opinions of Muslims in the West, we may list a whole range of various conditions and incentives, inter alia:

- poor political, economic, social and cultural integration;
- identity crisis intensified with the feeling of humiliation, inferiority and discrimination (real or imaginary problems – in a subjective opinion of an individual);
- foreign policy of the host country (supporting governments recognised as unfair by a given Muslim, and causing harm for the so-called “Muslim world,” literally “abode of Islam” (Meines 35-36).

The so-called root cause model may be useful in the research of factors radicalising opinions of Allah supporters in the EU

countries. It assumes the existence of causes which constitute a foundation, and a specific catalysis which accelerates the radicalisation process (Veldhuis, Staun 22). An individual is located in the centre of the discussed model (individual dimension) and is subject to influence of various external and internal factors. Even though every such factor may become the main reason for radicalisation of a given person's opinions, usually a combination of several of them launches the discussed process.

Among macro factors (conflicts, integration, globalisation) we may include other categories such as demographic, political, social, economic and cultural changes together with participation in the labour market (Veldhuis, Staun 24). This set of elements is conditional for an initial occurrence of risk of dissatisfaction, frustration and eventually – potential radicalisation process onset of a given individual or group (e.g. young Muslims which are not able to compete on the labour market, who become trapped in the “vicious circle” of poverty and doubt). However, the macro category alone cannot explain the radicalisation phenomenon. What becomes useful here is the micro dimension of the discussed model which focuses on direct characteristics of a given individual, as well as his or her social relations.

A division of micro categories into a social and a more private, individual dimension aims at emphasising the important role of every individual and his or her internal (usually unique) motivations. Personality features of a given Muslim may be discussed together with his or her opinions, temperament and the remaining elements of the psychological profile (See more: Mellis). Radical Muslim imams teaching in mosques on the territory of the EU often refer to an individual feeling of humiliation of Muslims in their public speeches. In 1966, in the so-called “Declaration of War” (Declaration of jihad against American occupation of the land of two holy sites) a contemporary leader of Al-Qaeda argued that death is better than life when it comes to humiliation, which may be interpreted as an incentive for committing suicidal attacks (*The Change Institute* 119).

Alex P. Schmid presents another proposition for analysis. He decided, that radicalisation should be discussed in referral to: vulnerability, recruitment, indoctrination and actions, each time taking account a psychological, social, economic and political context (Schmid 3-5). The first level (*micro level*) should take into consideration an individual's identity problems, crisis and aspiration deprivation issues, humiliation, stigmatisation, desire for revenge

and retaliation. The second level (*meso level*) concerns should draw attention to the radicalisation of the environment surrounding the individual, including family, the closest relatives, colleagues, friends, neighbours, social networks. The third level (*macro level*) takes a broader circle into account, that is public opinion attitudes and behaviour trends. It is worth noticing that political decision-makers may also succumb to radicalisation, which is often visible at a verbal level and at a level of permissible social behaviour (discrimination), as well as a legislative level: reinforcing provisions of the penal code and the code referring to visas.

The full picture, composed of causal and catalyst factors is dynamic. Political, social, economic and individual life experience is all subject to the process of formation in time. However, the causal factors themselves do not have to have causative power (*Causal factors* 9-31). Moreover, they are easier to diagnose and foresee, in contrast to cases of incidents or impulses specified as catalysts. On the other hand, they are not able to independently initiate the very process of self-radicalisation. It is possible only as a result of a specific combination of the catalyst with factors originating from a macro, mezzo, micro or individual dimension. For example, publishing Muhammad cartoons in Denmark and their reprinting in many EU countries may be recognized as one of the crucial catalysts launching the present wave of radicalisation processes of certain individuals or groups in Great Britain, the Netherlands, France, Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Italy and Denmark. Differentiation of the radicalisation phenomenon causes was already indicated in the '80s of the 20th century when, among others, the breakthrough work by Martha Crenshaw titled *The Causes of Terrorism* was published (See more: Crenshaw).

The Facilitation of Radicalization

An analysis of radicalisation cases indicates that causes of this phenomenon cannot be found exclusively in poverty, poor adolescence conditions or lack of possibility to integrate with the citizens of the host country (e.g. due to lack of knowledge of the language). Rather contrary, extremists usually appear to be non-distinctive, well-educated married citizens (with children) who become vulnerable to the message sent by the adversaries of western values (*Causal factors* 12).

Materials disseminated by the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Great Britain and in the Netherlands that is: Mohammed

Siddique Khan (one of the originators of the attack in the London underground in 2005) and Mohammed Bouyeri (the assassin of the film director Theo van Gogh in 2004) indicate a strong influence of the political factor. In the above-mentioned cases, radicalisation took place as a result of impossibility to agree with an unjust, in the opinion of the terrorists, fate of Muhammad's followers abroad (in Palestine, Afghanistan, Syria). In the case of this pattern's confirmation, as well as in other situations connected to the radicalisation of opinions, it would signify a serious challenge for western communities. At that moment we cannot expect that the improvement of living conditions of Muslims in the host country is sufficient for considerable reduction of the threat coming from the activities of extremely radical individuals (Emerson et al. 44).

Nowadays, the results of research over individual, personal factors fostering radicalisation may contribute to supporting anti-terrorist tactic, as well as prevention. It was not always the case, because in the past, it was often believed that terrorists were people with mental diseases, fostering the assumption that they were not able to think in a reasonable manner and plan their actions. The modern approach to the issue of terrorism resulting from the application of a series of specialist scientific sub-disciplines, such as e.g. psychology of terrorism, delivers more comprehensive research instruments in the discussed scope. In 2006, Dutch psychologists Roel W. Meertens, Yvonne R.A. Prins and Bertjan Doosje performed a review of radicalisation theories in the area of the scientific discipline which they examined. They analysed the impact of environmental conditions of a given individual such as authority, leadership and social pressure reaching the conclusion that they may radically change the manner of behaviour: from regular to exceeding generally accepted norms (Veldhuis, Staun 54-7).

Supporters of the theory of a decisive personality factor in radicalisation believe that issues of faith may constitute a secondary impulse. Compliant to this assumption, gaining extremist opinions by M. Bouyeri, the assassin of T. van Gogh in the Netherlands, might not have had a direct connection to his faith. A radical interpretation of Islam supposedly constituted an additional radicalisation factor, but not the root cause, because in the period preceding the attack, M. Bouyeri experienced a series of traumatic experiences, among others the death of his mother and his imprisonment (Veldhuis, Staun 56).

In 2006, a research conducted by the European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUCM) showed that Muslims

in the EU countries, in a majority of cases, did not feel the connection with public institutions and organisations which are supposed to represent them. The acquired data showed an indifference coming from the conviction that in the political life of European countries they live in, there is not enough space for debates about the problems and the situation of Muslims. Respondents said that they did not have institutional support for challenges Islam faced in Europe. Among the most important problems, the following were listed: insufficient representation of the Muslim community in state and local administration, discrimination on the labour market, as well as in the housing and education domain. It causes a situation resembling a "vicious circle," where socio-cultural integration of Muslims in Western countries is hindered by a set of listed factors. Muslims living in large groups on the outskirts of large European cities (in the so-called ghettos) experience, among others, lack of the sense of belonging to the rest of the population in which they live (Veldhuis, Staun 31).

An important factor influencing radicalisation of Muslims is long-term conflicts in the international area perceived by Muhammad's followers as a conflict between Islam and the western world. It concerns mainly the Middle East problem between Israel and Palestine, which has been engaging consecutive generations. Olivier Roy, the well-known researcher of political Islam, considers it to be the main reason for radicalisation of contemporary Muslims (Veldhuis, Staun 35). It needs emphasizing that, despite the domination of subjective conviction of the Muslim majority, it is not a true picture, because the military operation goals in Iraq and Afghanistan were not to fight with religion, they were actually directed against regimes and counteracting terrorist threat caused by jihad fighters hosted by Talibs. It may be considered as a method of protection against a political form of aggressive Islam having a strategic dimension.

Public opinion research, already conducted in December 2002 in Great Britain on the commission of the BBC television network showed that the majority of British Muslims considers war on terror as war against Islam. Muslims are the largest religious minority in this country (around 1.6 million) which in their opinion is presented either as radicals ready to use violence or as defenders of peaceful Islam. On the other hand, a detailed interdisciplinary social research, managed in the context of radicalisation of young Allah worshippers living in the EU countries, showed that currently this process proceeds not only in extremely radical mosques,

but also in youth shelters and clubs, thematic libraries or via the Internet.

In reference to the problem of radicalisation of European Muslims, the economic factor has a significant meaning. In the era of an economic slowdown, when living conditions of citizens dramatically drop, the so-called phenomenon of negative association may be discussed, noticed among others by Brock Blomberg (Veldhuis, Staun 14). In short, it may be defined as an increase of occurrence probability in cases of terrorist events during the time of poor economic situation in the country. In the situation of adverse economic conditions, that is poverty, and the connected risk of social marginalisation, many Muslims choose extremism as a “reasonable solution.” In fanatic organisations, they are offered everything which they missed so far, that is: the feeling of belonging to a community made of people resembling them, coherent and clear aim of actions (fight with the western enemy), and financial means. We may even risk a statement, that they gain a specifically understood prestige and recognition also increasing their own self-esteem (Veldhuis, Staun 14).

In the opinion of a larger group of Muslim communities in the EU, this environment also suffers from pauperisation resulting from comparison to indigenous population (the remuneration level, availability of senior posts, etc.). Economic differences in the level of life are not a decisive factor influencing the launch of radicalisation process, but they create a fostering environment. Many Muslims who used to be suspected of connections to terrorism were very well educated. In the past, the difference between less the wealthy Muslims living in Europe and the wealthier ones living in the USA was more visible, but now it seems to have become less important. Attempts at terrorist activity are undertaken on both sides of the Atlantic, irrespective of the level of income, social position or type of work (e.g. in 2009, an Algerian scientist was arrested in the LHC research centre at the French-Swiss border, and in the same year 13 soldiers were murdered by the American major Nidal Malik Hasan in Fort Hood in Texas). In the terms of factors fostering radicalisation connected to globalisation and modernisation processes, we may mention two dimensions of this issue:

– The first is the technical and scientific progress realised by dissemination of modern communication means such as the Internet (The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 79-81). By the intermediary of global mass media, radical Muslim groups disseminate extremist content with ease, directly or indirectly inciting

for hatred or (and) acts of violence. Salafism is one of the most active Islam factions developing globally with the use of modern technical achievements.

– The second dimension may comprise the predominance of western patterns which is an ideological mainstream shaping globalisation presently (democracy, liberalisation of socio-cultural norms, etc.). This picture is particularly well grounded in a certain groups of Muhammad followers perceiving this situation as a threat to their religion (The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 16, 20).

According to Benjamin Barber, who created the idea of the so-called “McWorld,” globalisation is simultaneously associated with consumerism, immoral lifestyle, emancipation of various environments (e.g. sexual minorities) and development of modern technologies (Barber). Most of those developmental trends are generally considered to be contradictory to the cannon of Muslim faith, even though it seems that this belief is not fully true. The change of lifestyle in western democratic states (so-called westernization) is clearly visible in many EU states and concerns Christians to a similar extent, as they are more flexible in their adaptation to social changes and modernisation (Veldhuis, Staun 35).

The risk of radicalisation of Muslim communities representing relatively moderate opinions is more probable if we assume the impact of specific factors, such as gaining influence by the so-called Islamism and politicized Islam. Identity and social identification disorders, which are beyond all doubt present among young British and Dutch Muslims, constitute an important radicalisation factor. According to the social identity theory, a group becomes a reference point, being defined based on the contrast between the supporters – in other words the in-group, whereas the hostile environment created by the representatives of the remaining structures or relationships among people turns into out-groups (Veldhuis, Staun 40). Some researchers even state that identification with a group constitutes the main factor responsible for the radicalisation of Muslims. Research conducted during 2006-2008 in the Kingdom of the Netherlands (Philip Hermans, Elenor Kamans, Ernestine H. Gordijn, Hilbrand Oldenhuis, Sabine Otten) clearly shows that Moroccan youth living and growing up in this country painfully experiences lack of acceptance and a certain type of alienation.³

³ In case of Moroccans in the Netherlands, their situation is analysed by among others Paulo de Mas drawing attention to the problem of migration. Moroccan emigrants who settled in the Kingdom of the Netherlands acquiring the citizenship

Other analysts (e.g. Frank Bujis) go one step further stating that, additionally, this generation does not feel emotional-cultural relationship with their parents representing a different type of Muslims. This state has an interesting name of hybrid identity, which is not accepted by any of the two groups in the environment of young Moroccans (family, Dutch community). Not belonging to any of the above-mentioned groups, the Muslim youth turns towards the community of faith (Arab. *Ummah*), which permeates the issue of nationality or ethnic origin and creates the (false) impression of a specific “safe” harbour for young people searching for their place. Instead of identifying themselves in the context of nationality (Briton-Pakistani, Dutchman-Moroccan, Frenchmen-Algerian, Swede-Somali), such people start to perceive themselves in exclusively religious categories or rather in pseudo-religious categories (*Causal factors* 18-19).

The Internet is an element worthy of particular emphasis in terms of Muslim youth radicalisation issues. Rapid dissemination of this technology taking place for over ten years redefined the values of a safe environment and conditions of the very policy of counteracting terrorism. Easiness of access and relative anonymity of this medium causes prerequisites to call it a crucial weapon of extreme fundamentalists active in the EU and across borders. In the domain of the progressive self-radicalisation of moderate Islam followers, we may state that in this case the Internet network provides the main instrument, a source of information and relationships among people. A computer connection today may be specified as a factor instantly supporting the global jihad movement.

The specificity of the penitentiary system cannot be left out in the radicalisation of a share of Muslims. Imams often play an active role here. Mohammed Bouyeri, the assassin of Theo van Gogh, the Dutch director, most probably adopted extremist opinions when serving his sentence to imprisonment. In such conditions, the process of belonging to a given group (in this case a group of radical Muslim co-prisoners) is crucial for the convict to survive in prison conditions. It accelerates radicalisation and strengthens

and good economic status often support their countrymen facilitating them (not always legally) the acquisition of passports or visas. It is worth mentioning, that majority of terrorist attack perpetrators in Madrid 2004 were of Moroccan origins, but the decisive impact on radicalisation leading to terrorist acts comes not from nationality or ethnic origin, but from understanding the Muhammad faith (The National Coordinator for Counterterrorism 85-117).

its foundations – a specific understanding of the bond among co-prisoners who support each other (Veldhuis, Staun 46).

At the same time, the threat coming from the phenomena of self-recruitment requires emphasizing. According to Marc Sageman (the author of the bunch of guys' theory), this process consists of an independent organisation of individuals into a group which, by applying the ideology of radical Islam, initiates the self-radicalisation process, resulting in initiating the activity of terrorist nature (Sageman 8; Causal factors...8). Those individuals train in their own scope and independently radicalize their opinions with the use of propaganda materials placed on the Internet by extremists. The Member States report cases where EU residents support actions of terrorist groups show the severity of this situation. As a result of radicalisation, the Union becomes a platform for preparation and initiation of attacks in other parts of the world (recently most often on the territory of the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (Arab. *ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-'Iraq wa Ash-Sham*)).

Various events influencing the mental state of a Muslim may constitute to triggering a factor which would initiate the process of radicalisation. Among them we may list the following: persistence of unemployment, detention of a friend-Muslim, and observation of ultra-realist, violent films concerning the situation of Muslims in specific regions (e.g. civil victims of armed conflicts). Another serious cause of Muslim radicalisation is the activity of extremist centres and single units which are supported (financially and ideologically) abroad (state-sponsored radicalization). Sponsors usually come from countries having an ultra-conservative perception of Islam such as Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates. In countries of this type, European Imams frequently undergo religious indoctrination (Exploring Root... 11).

In general, four approaches may be applied to the analysis of the terrorism phenomenon (and indirectly – also radicalisation):

1) *a multi-causal approach*, consisting of a whole range of factors: psychological, economic, political or sociological – searching the sources of terrorism among a combination of conditions, in this case it focuses the least on examining its genesis;

2) *a political/structural approach*, that is recognizing the environment as having the strongest impact in the form of political events on a domestic and international stage;

3) *an organizational approach*, emphasizing an informed selection of an instrument for terrorist battling as an optimum strategy to realise political goals;

4) a *psychological approach* focusing on the analysis of individual motivations of people facing the threat of radicalisation and terrorism (Exploring Root... 13-6).

Table 2. Differences in root and trigger causes (catalysts) of radicalisation

Root causes	Trigger causes
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Rapidly progressing modernisation and urbanisation is strongly connected with the development of an ideological type of terrorism. 2. Shortages in the democratic system, civil liberties and the rule of law are a necessary prerequisite for developing many forms of national terrorism. 3. Historical conditions for using violence in political life. 4. Oppression of a foreign occupant or colonial-type policy. 5. Experience of ethnic or religious discrimination. 	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Events connected to the possibility of undertaking revenge or other counter-reaction (e.g. as a result of questioned choices, cases of police brutality etc.) 2. Lack of possibility to participate in political life. 3. Concrete proofs of dissatisfaction among specific groups of community. 4. Belonging to strong community groups which put pressure on the identity of their members. 5. Peace talks.

Source: “Exploring Root and Trigger Causes of Terrorism,” *Transnational Terrorism, Security and Rule of Law*, (28 June 2007, revised April 2008), p. 20

The organisation system of democratic states characterised with political openness seems to foster free dissemination of radical Islam ideas. It is pointed out, among others, in the report by *Policy Exchange*, a tank type analytical institution, developed during yearly research (2006-2007) of literature and other information materials available in places of worship and Muslim centres in Great Britain (mosques, libraries, etc.). The analysed materials show a picture of places where, under the cover of spreading faith, extremely negative content and opinions about the culture, customs and political system of Western states are disseminated. The authors of the report, trying to pre-empt the potential accusation of *islamophobia*, reasonably show that many of the official (the so-called mainstream) British Muslim centres *de facto* spread ideologies of hatred. In the USA these types of actions are close to the definition of hate crime which is very severely treated by the judicial system. This type of message reaches the Islam community on the EU territory in religious sites such as mosques, where, in comparison to practising Christians in churches, many more Muslims gather, increasing the disquietude.

Having noticed a difficulty in adequate definition of social groups vulnerable to radicalisation slogans, we may draw a general

conclusion that the group most vulnerable to the discussed problem is representatives of minorities feeling discriminated. European Muslims living in Great Britain, France, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany or Sweden certainly belong to such minorities. Community identity of a given individual is crucial here. Analysis of this identity may, with a large degree of probability, enable to foresee the individual's behaviour in the future. Here it is worth noticing, that diversity of the very Muslim minority and the factors triggering its radicalisation (from low economic status to international conflicts unsolvable in the foreseeable future) makes the risk in the discussed scope particularly difficult to level.

EU Initiatives to Counter Radicalisation

Adequate recognition of factors fostering rapid radicalisation and their neutralisation constitute a crucial element of the European Commission's work in the scope of counteracting terrorism. Prevention and resistance to radicalisation are the priority elements of anti-terrorist measures listed in key documents such as:

- *Declaration on Combating Terrorism*, founding the institution of the Coordinator for Combating Terrorism;
- *Action Plan on Combating Terrorism* of March 25, 2004;
- *Commission's Communication on Prevention, Preparedness and Response to Terrorist Attacks* adopted on October 20, 2004;
- *The Hague programme for strengthening freedom, security and justice in the EU* adopted on November 5, 2005 for 2005-2009;
- *The Stockholm Programme – An open and secure Europe serving and protecting citizens 2010-2014* of December 11, 2009 and the action plan for its realisation;
- *The EU Internal Security Strategy in Action: Five steps towards a more secure Europe* of November 22, 2010;
- *The Commission Communication on Preventing Radicalisation leading to terrorism and violent extremism: Strengthening the EU's measures* of January 15, 2014.

EU Strategy for Combating Radicalisation and Recruitment to Terrorism

All the above listed documents have reference to the radicalisation and recruitment phenomena translated into the pressure on the stage of prevention in the European system of combating

terrorism. Based on the Commission Communication of March 25, 2004 to the European Parliament and the Council on the Recruitment of Terrorists in December 2005, the Council adopted a *EU Strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism*. Member states shoulder the responsibility to assure security, but the Strategy delivers common standards and indicates new means for combating sudden radicalisation of attitudes among socio-religious minorities.

This Strategy together with the action plan constitutes a foundation for preventing the creation of extreme attitudes and recruitment to structures of terrorist organisations. Means to achieve those goals are: neutralisation of individual operations and groups of people who attempt at recruiting new members into terrorist organisation; moreover, assuring a dominating position of moderate voices in reference to those who express radical opinions, and intensifying efforts in order to promote security, justice, democracy and equal opportunities to all.

In the globalized world, the radical messages reaching specific groups have become simpler than ever before. It is due to new communication means and the possibility of rapid travelling, together with a dynamic development of instant transfer of financial means. It signifies that in a short period of time, terrorist groups may have funds necessary to promote radical ideas and train recruits at their disposal. The Internet is a medium which supports radicals' actions to a large extent; moreover, it informs about the motifs of the realised terrorist attacks. Surveying public sentiments, monitoring the content posted on the Internet and reaching zones experiencing conflict situation are the adopted measures of recognizing radicalisation, which may lead to violent acts. Knowledge allowing the recognition of areas subject to risk should be collected based on the exchange of domestic reports and analyses. Neutralising measures aiming at radicalisation of the environment also cover places of prayer and religious activity, academic centres and prisons. It also concerns areas of residence and any other sites with access of individuals who may influence the occurrence of extreme attitudes in the community. People travelling to destinations where conflict occurs will be subject to particular supervision. The EU decided to take steps towards adequate protection against incitement to violence and justification of its use. In this scope, defining the most efficient means to combat recruitment via the Internet became crucial. At the same time, the EU expressed its will to promote such actions outside of its borders as well. The conducted

political dialogue and readiness to offer support in technical issues could bring other countries to undertake similar steps counteracting rapid radicalisation.

In its Strategy, the EU expressed its belief that radical opinions justifying violence and encouraging its use are being spread. The root of the problem is the propaganda presenting global conflicts as an alleged proof for a clash between the western and Muslim civilisation. It triggers the feeling of bitterness among people who consider themselves to be victims of the world divided into better and worse parts and it is an expression of their anger. It is even more dangerous when we take into account the fact that the politics of the western countries is perceived with a lack of trust and suspected of hidden intentions, as well as applying double standards in contacts with partners. Cooperation with Muslim organisations, which by general rule reject the distorted version of Islam promoted by extreme organisations belonging to the Al-Qaeda movement, constitutes a EU way to level the impact of an extreme voice and emphasize the voice of the middle-of-the road majority. It has been assumed that an efficient strategy has to include an element of dialogue among the governments of states, scientific staff and Muslim community inside and outside Europe. It is required to provide broad access to literature containing middle-of-the road opinions and also support education of European Imams and organise courses, including language courses for Imams from outside of Europe to make their message even more efficient. In addition, Europe believes it is necessary to supervise and intensify efforts for changing the perception of European and western policy, especially among the Muslim community. Unfair or imprecise opinions about Islam and its followers in Europe are yet another issue requiring immediate improvement. One step towards this direction is to develop a vocabulary devoid of unnecessary emotional burden allowing for a discussion in which Islam would not be combined with terrorism. Apart from the phrase “Islamic terrorism,” other unwelcome words are: Islamist, “fundamentalist” and “jihad.” Employing the last term in the context of terrorist attacks is particularly insulting for a vast majority of Muslims, for whom the world signifies the Muslim’s struggle with their own internal weaknesses. The Union emphasized that the measures they undertook cannot lead to deepening the divisions (*The European Strategy for Combating*).

In the Union’s strategy, there is a list of factors whose occurrence in community may, although it doesn’t have to, lead to its radicalisation. Among them are: weak or authoritarian governments,

states with a regime transforming towards an incomplete democratic system due to inadequate reforms, rapid, but unsuccessful modernisation, lack of perspectives for the improvement of the economic situation, unsolved internal or external conflicts and an insufficient or inadequate cultural offer or a range of possibilities to gain education by young people in comparison to the needs. The EU emphasizes, that many of those factors do not occur in member states, but they may occur in certain social layers. The list may be expanded with the issue of national minorities identifying themselves with the rest of the nation. There is a widespread consensus that structural factors contributing to the increase of radicalisation in the EU and outside it should be eliminated. Levelling social disproportions and signs of discrimination should be supported with inter-cultural dialogue, exchange of opinions and short-term or long-term integration. Outside the EU borders, good governance, human rights, democracy, education and welfare should be promoted together with contribution to solving conflicts. Political dialogue and support programmes should serve this goal (*The European Union Strategy for Combating*).

Radicalisation of individual representatives of the Muslim community in Europe is a relatively new phenomenon. European locations where this issue is not reported, or areas without considerable Muslim community are also subject to extremist activities in the future. The EU's intention is a multilayer and flexible, adjusted to changing circumstances approach to this issue: maintaining contact with communities of diverse religions and beliefs, comparing domestic experience and creating a correct image of Europe. The EU realises a yearly review of its measures in order to assure flexibility.

The provisions of the Strategy are realised both individually and jointly with the assistance of the European Commission. It has been emphasized that the assistance of non-governmental community in counteracting extremists and disclosure of their offences shall play a key role in the efficiency of the developed plan. The EU focuses on the effort on a national, regional and local level in reference to counteracting radicalisation, because foreign policy and the policy of security and defence is *de facto* developed and realised at those levels. The approach to the issue differs largely from member state to member state. Consequently, the EU Strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment of November 24, 2005 constitutes a foundation of jointly defined causal factors for radicalisation and rules and counteractions

aiming at them. At the same time, it takes into account diversity on national, regional and local levels. Moreover, the Strategy constitutes a platform for communication among member states and the exchange of experience gained at lower levels. The European Commission's support in this scope has the form of transferring financial means for research, organizing conferences, education and inter-cultural activity. It also has a form of control on the EU strategic level. Measures restricted to the EU territory comprise instruments, mechanisms and processes which the Union offers to particular countries or organisations.

In November 2008, the Strategy was updated and in 2009 its detailed Action Plan was too. The document stipulates that member states shall regularly and with a multilayer approach evaluate the threat resulting from the occurring extreme attitudes and they shall share their knowledge in this scope with the other EU member states. Mechanisms allowing for systematic analysis of main factors in radicalisation processes shall be launched. Their goal is to monitor and collect information concerning this phenomenon in the EU and in other regions of the world prone to their occurrence. Various environments liable to the occurrence of radicalisation and connected to its recruitment into terrorist groups shall be subject to identification and systematic analysis.

The Strategy was revised also in May 2013. The updated *EU Strategy for combating radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism* assigns a task to the member states, based on paying particular attention to residences and places frequented by individuals supporting radicalisation. The member states are obliged to exchange information concerning activities of radical religious leaders and individuals or groups undertaking actions stirring up hatred and inciting to committing terrorist offences. A platform for exchange of sensitive information is sought as a means to achieve this goal. Mechanisms of controlling the process of collecting and exchanging the data concerning extremist leaders of extremist communities and their movements inside the EU should be launched. Moreover, EU members are obliged to exchange analytical data in the scope of environments leading to radicalisation and recruitment activity, as well as recent cases of court sentences for terrorist activity with the use of EUROPOL (European Police Office) and EURJUST (European Union's Judicial Cooperation Unit), or through EU INTCEN (EU Intelligence Analysis Centre), depending on the situation. It aims at acceleration of the development of analyses targeting cause examination of the radicalisation phenomenon (*Revised EU Strategy*).

EU Internal Security Strategy in Action

The EU Internal Security Strategy: Five steps towards a more secure Europe for 2011-2014 approved on November 23, 2010 among five strategic goals mentions: Preventing terrorism and addressing radicalisation and recruitment (STEP: 2). A superior task in this area is empowering communities to prevent radicalisation and recruitment of terrorists. The Strategy emphasises that the development and implementation of means aiming at combating radicalisation belongs to the member states, consequently the most important measures should be undertaken at a national and local level, in environments facing the strongest exposure. The document presents three detailed measures:

- the so-called Radicalisation Awareness Network founded in 2011, also called RAN⁴ addressed to individuals and institutions dealing with the radicalisation issue leading to violent extremism and terrorism (the network should comprise users such as security institutions together with social workers, teachers, youth leaders, cultural and religious centres);

- a ministerial conference organized in 2012 on the prevention of radicalisation and recruitment to terrorism where member states were to present lectures on best practices in preventing the ideology of violent extremism;

- drawing up a handbook on measures and experiences in preventing radicalisation (in particular with the use of the Internet), disrupt recruitment channels and the so-called “exit strategy” from extreme attitudes by the Commission in 2013-2014.

The RAN initiative, founded in September 2011, is the most complex initiative of the *The EU Internal Security Strategy* aiming at empowering the role of the community in counteracting radicalisation and recruitment of terrorists. Today, the *Radicalisation Awareness Network*, has over 700 experts and practitioners from all over Europe. Presently, there are nine working groups in its framework:

- RAN POL, developing opportunities for local communities and police institutions in preventing radicalisation through, among

⁴ It is worth noticing, that already in 2008 the Commission founded the European Network of Experts on Radicalisation. The ENER constitutes a platform of exchange of information and comments concerning radicalisation and supports in this scope the policy on the European Union and national level. The ENER network draws up publications, organises seminars and workshops for individuals connected to academia centres and for representatives of governments of European member states and other countries.

others, creating contact lists, organizing workshops, seminars, study visits and spreading good practices.

- RAN VVT – its main task is to present terrorist threats through the experience of terrorism victims, having potential impact on discouraging terrorist activity and increasing awareness.

- RAN@, focuses on the use of the Internet in combating radicalisation leading to extremism and terrorism. Moreover, the group concentrates on “positive” initiatives on the Internet.

- RAN PREVENT focuses on “early intervention” forms both in case of individuals and groups potentially exposed to radicalisation, mainly under 26 years of age. A collection of good practices, examples of intervention and databases are addressed mainly to individuals “operating in the field.”

- RAN DEPARD is concerned by support for people who are “close” to individuals and risk groups (“the first line of risk”) such as probation service, NGOs, police services in local communities. The goal is to strengthen the techniques and methods of work and exchange experience.

- RAN P&P develops means and methods for prison institutions and entities operating in penitentiary institutions (including social benefit organisations) in order to prevent radicalisation of individuals serving their sentences. Moreover, it analyses the issue of “reintegration” of an individual after having served their sentence and the “potential” threat of returning to society, as well as manners of monitoring such an individual.

- RAN HEALTH aims at increasing the awareness concerning the issue of combating extremism and terrorism in the health care sector.

- RAN INT/EXT examines the location and role of diasporas in combating radicalisation of opinions and behaviour inside member states, also in external contacts and enabling training abroad.

- RAN SC that is the Steering Committee, headed by the European Commission, gathering all chairs of the remaining groups and holding regular meetings.

- RAN’s work is addressed mainly to institutions competent for identification of radicalisation and polarisation and providing assistance. Among them, the following may be listed: local authorities, security services, including mainly the police, border guards, schools, universities, social and family assistance institutions, penal institutions, probation service institutions, health care sites and teams assisting under age offenders and institutions combating social pathologies.

The EU Internal Security Strategy was subject to evaluation three times: in 2011, 2013, and 2014. The realisation of the STEP No. 2: empowering communities to prevent radicalisation and recruitment of terrorists for 2010-2014, received very good evaluation of the European Commission.

At the end, it is worth adding, that all the present measures realised for combating radicalisation in the European Union, including measures in the project titled: *Renewed EU Internal Security Strategy* (for 2015-2020) have to be highly coherent with the approach of the European External Action Service, EEAS and the activity of the UE coordinator for combating terrorism. Moreover, those measures are composed in a manner preventing the infringement of fundamental rights and freedoms of the EU citizens stipulated in the Charter of EU fundamental rights, including the freedom of expression and information, freedom to assembly, freedom of association and respect of linguistic, cultural and religious diversity.

Conclusions

The radicalisation of Muslim opinions in the EU, as observed in other Western countries, is subject to possible influence of diversified factors. Among them a set of conditions fostering such processes may be discerned. In general, a conclusion may be drawn, that varied internal factors (individual, personal) and external (the impact of the political, social and economic environment) may make the Muslims follow two main paths of radicalisation:

1. The first, caused by the crisis of an individual's identity, is determined mainly by macro-type factors (integration, economy, diplomacy, culture etc.). The Muslim adopts a beneficial for him manner of perceiving the world (Islamism) which (illusively) guarantees readiness to use solutions to problems (*a solution-providing belief system*). This radicalisation path corresponds to the concept of a phase model. Gradual change of opinion takes place (e.g. compliant to the model by analysts from the New York City Police Department – NYPD: Stage 1; Pre-Radicalisation, Stage 2: Self-Identification, Stage 3: Indoctrination, Stage 4: Jihadization) which may finally lead to an act of violence⁵.

⁵ Authors of the report emphasize the following:

- each of those stages is unique and it has features characteristic only for itself;

2. The second path results from interaction of a series of factors included in the dynamics of social interactions, which may be comprised in the micro-type areas. Here, social norms and pressures, the rules governing given groups or relationships among people may be more important than ideological or opinion issues (Veldhuis, Staun 63-4).

Radicalisation of Muslims in Europe is not always connected to violence, however, this phenomenon in general cannot be considered beneficial from the point of view of internal security of democratic states and the security of the whole EU. An individual or a group undertaking terrorist activity is the final and the most extreme stage of radicalisation. However, the process of radicalisation of opinions triggered by a varied range of factors may be either brought to a halt or reversed (Meines 11).

Identification and strong feeling of religious community with other brothers in faith (*Ummah*) doubtlessly makes a given Muslim more sensitive to the situation of the followers of this religion in other parts of the world. It naturally multiplies the impact of international situations and conflicts connected to Islam on opinions of a given Muslim. A perfect example of such a situation is the mass commitment of citizens of the European Union states in actions (both military and propaganda) of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Bernard Cazeneuve, the French Minister for Interior, in mid-September 2014 confirmed, that around 930 French citizens had joined “jihad” in this region (France24, *France says 930 citizens.*). Moreover, in 2014 other massive numbers of citizens joined ISIS: in Germany – 450 citizens, Belgium – over 300, Sweden – 400 and Great Britain reported a record number estimated at 600-2000 individuals (Radio Free Europe, *Foreign Fighters in...*). Those people, after coming back to Europe, constituted a real threat for the EU due to gained skill and experience. Moreover, there is the risk that they still have strong bonds with extreme organisations and in short time perspective they may constitute logistic support for them and even more, actively participate in the realisation of actions with the

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- not all individuals initiating this process have to undergo all the stages. Many individuals interrupt or withdraw from this process at various levels of progress;
 - despite the fact that this model is sequential, not all individuals follow it with perfectly linear progress;
 - there is considerably large probability that individuals who undergo the whole radicalisation process will be included in planning or realisation of a terrorist act (Silber 6).

use of violence inside the European Union. Further, in the mid-term perspective, they may even become catalysts of a broader terrorist activity.

Preventing the threat in the discussed area is (and probably will continue to be) a very complicated problem for western states due to the fact that motifs of rapid change in personality and radicalisation remain an individual issue. On one hand, there is the need of rapid and efficient counteraction of the risk of terrorist activity, on the other however, methods which are too strict (and additionally publicized by the mass media) may lead to even greater radicalisation of numerous Islam environments in many European Union member states.

It is worth noticing that some researchers examining radicalisation processes indicate certain deficiencies in presently widespread phase models such as the 4-level system developed by analysts from the New York City Police Department (NYPD). According to Tinka Veldhuis and Jørgen Staun from the Dutch Institute of International Relations in Clingendael, phase models cannot distinguish between the specific nature of gradual radicalisation (moving from one stage to another) and the phenomena which occurs suddenly. It concerns cases of individuals, whose opinions quickly become extreme resulting in “immediate” movement to the advanced stage of radicalisation and consecutive commitment of a terrorist act/ or the act of regular violence/ crime (Meines 31-3).

Reducing the risk of radicalisation and home-grown terrorism would require solving a series of long-lasting international conflicts which seems impossible in the foreseeable future. Moreover, spreading radical opinions challenging democratic values could exacerbate the already present conflict between values represented by the western world and the world view of Muslims living in the EU.

There are signals showing that such a threat may become real. In many EU countries there were cases of attempts or real use of violence in reaction to events or communications which were compliant with the set of principles of the civil and democratic society. Among them, there is the assassination of the politician Fortuyn, the film director Theo van Gogh, threats addressed against the member of parliament Geert Wilders in the Netherlands or continuous terrorist acts against the Swedish artist Lars Vilks, the author of the first cartoons of Muhammad in the EU (e.g. the last terrorist attack in Copenhagen – 14.02.2015), as well as against the editorial office of the satirical French newspaper *Charlie Hebdo*

(7.01.2015) publishing articles, among others, about Muslims. It doesn't mean that violent extremism is supported by the majority of Muslims living in the above mentioned countries, but having learned the results of public opinion surveys it is difficult not to notice the Islam followers' hidden consent to the use of violence.

Understanding the full range of factors which may trigger radicalisation of Muslim communities could contribute to a more complex approach to the issue of counteracting terrorism. Undertaking measures aiming at preventing or bringing to a halt the processes of radicalisation among Muslims, which may be connected to the use of violence and increasing resistance to extreme propaganda, may turn out to be critical. In de-radicalisation methods⁶, considering this issue from the point of view of the very Muslims living, residing and working in western societies seems to be worth of attention.

The EU's approach to combating radicalisation assumes, first of all battling terrorism at its roots by developing projects engaging a broader range of social actors and local authorities. Such projects first of all target the following:

- early identification and support of people belonging to high risk groups, particularly strongly open to learning distorted, extreme Islam ideology in order to increase their resistance to such slogans;
- the re-insertion of those individuals who have in an ideological sense “crossed the line,” but have not yet committed a crime (development of the so-called “exit strategy”);
- spreading innovative projects on an international/national/local level, developed by the network of international multidisciplinary experts (e.g. RAN) in order to inhibit the scale of success of violent extreme propaganda in electronic media.

It requires emphasising that the coexistence of various communities, ethnic groups or national groups on one territory seems possible and advantageous from the point of view of socio-cultural values and economic benefits (e.g. new human resources for the “aging population” of the EU member states). However, peaceful coexistence may become real exclusive in case of inhibiting radicalisation of opinions on both sides (first of all Muslims and also

⁶ De-radicalisation signifies both external intervention in the radicalisation process aiming at individual's withdrawing from the path leading to transformation of extreme ideology into a terrorist act and the process of internal transformation of the individual experiencing radicalisation or after the completion of the process which is noticeable first of all in questioning the righteousness or purposefulness of undertaking actions of extreme nature.

indigenous inhabitants of the western countries). A proper diagnosis of factors influencing dangerous radicalisation of opinions would enable to identify and undertake countermeasures for potential terrorist threat from individual perpetrators or a group.

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RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SECURITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN COUNTER-TERRORISM: A CASE OF INTRODUCING BODY SCANNERS IN CIVIL AVIATION

ABSTRACT: Changes in security environment after the end of Cold War and 9/11 have strongly affected our security concepts and paradigms. In the field of counter-terrorism, a serious conceptual and practical debate on the relationship between security and human rights and freedoms has begun. The goal of this paper is to reflect on this complex relationship at the conceptual level and introduce the empirical debate on this relationship in the field of civil aviation (case of introducing body scanners). The paper's results show that the concept of human security usefully integrates the care for human rights and security of individuals. The debate on the potential introduction of body scanners on the European airports was actually a debate on the ways of providing individual human security on the airports with simultaneous concern for other human rights. The output of this debate was a compromise: body scanners can be used at the discretion of individual airports and member states, but are not an obligatory measure on all European airports.

KEY WORDS: counter-terrorism, human security, human rights, balance, terrorism, civil aviation, body scanners

Introduction

Terrorist threat has forced democratic states to act effectively to protect their population, institutions and infrastructure. It however turned out that they have occasionally violated human rights simply by wanting to achieve more security and protection. This is

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why a serious conceptual and practical debate on the relationship between security and human rights and freedoms has begun. The purpose of this paper is to reflect on this complex relationship at the conceptual level, introduce the empirical debate on this relationship in the field of civil aviation and extract some key lessons. The first part of this paper discusses the human security concept as a potential bridge for the security – human rights divide. The second part of this paper is an assessment of the conceptual relationship between security and human rights and the third part practically reflects on this relationship on the case of introducing body scanners in the field of civil aviation.

However, before we address the above mentioned issues, the roots of the human security concept need to be clarified. The concept of human security evolved as a result of the changes in security environment after the end of the Cold War. A combination of many factors led to its formation. A decreased threat of global nuclear war created a cognitive space for non-military threats to be perceived with greater intensity. At the same time, the process of democratization increased the attention to the individual human life and well-being. Consequently, the role of human rights and freedoms and their implementation at the national and international level became much more significant than before. On the other hand, an increasing number of internal violent conflicts erupted in Africa, Asia and Europe (Balkans), leading to huge humanitarian crises, increasing differences in economic development between North and South emerged, terrorism, crime, etc. In such circumstances, the classic concepts of national and international security simply did not reflect the needs. This is why a kind of intellectual “revolution” started, aiming to provide the most appropriate and fitting concept that would make interpretation and analysis of security easier. Neorealist focus on states and military security proved to be too narrow and unfitting. The narrow politico-military strategic studies evolved towards much broader security studies, encompassing also many non-military aspects of security (Ullman; Mathews; Buzan, Waever & de Wilde; Buzan; Buzan, Kelstrup, Lemaitre, Tromer and Waever). Human security was finally conceptualized and presented to the global public in the Human Development Report in 1994. The concept has evolved since then, and today we can observe several definitions and theoretical approaches (Vogrin, Prezelj & Bučar). It is this concept that allows us to study the relationship between the need and right to security in case of terrorism and other human rights.

The Concept of Human Security as a Bridge for Security – Human Rights Divide

The concept of human security focuses on the individual person as a key referent object. The Table 1 shows key differences between human and traditional concepts of security.

Table 1: Basic elements of human security (Bajpai 48).

	Traditional national security	Human security
Security for whom (referent object)	Primarily states	Primarily individuals
Values at stake (security of what values)	Territorial integrity and national independence	Personal safety and individual freedom
Security from what (threats and risks)	Traditional threats (military threats, violence by countries...)	Non-traditional and also traditional threats
Security by what means	Force as the primary instrument of security, to be used unilaterally for a state’s own safety	Force as a secondary instrument, to be used primarily for cosmopolitan ends and collectively; sanctions, human development, and humane governance as key instruments of individual-centered security.
	Balance of power is important; power is equated with military capabilities.	Balance of power is of limited utility; soft power is increasingly important.
	Cooperation between states is tenuous beyond alliance relations.	Cooperation between states, international organizations and NGOs can be effective and sustained.
	Norms and institutions are of limited value, particularly in the security/military sphere.	Norms and institutions matter; democratization and representativeness in institutions enhance their effectiveness.

Table 1 can give us an impression that human security is about to replace the traditional security concept. Yet, Axworthy noted that the concept of human security does not oust or replace the traditional security concept. Both concepts represent rather

different ideas how to respond to existing threats. The basis of the traditional security concept is sovereignty of a state, while the basis of the concept of human security is sovereignty of an individual (Axworthy). We can observe that the right of the state and the right of the individual somehow coexist in the security environment and influence each other. In this respect, both concepts also coexist. Important is that human security is not negating traditional security because it incorporates traditional threats and means. This means that human security is complementing the notion of national and international security by focusing it more on the human component. Today, it has become a fundamental element of the concepts and policies of national, regional and international (and even global) security.

A comparison of different conceptualizations of human security (Vogrin, Prezelj and Bučar) shows that their key referent object is individual, while some concepts also stress the centrality of human communities (e.g. ethnic groups, minorities etc.). The criteria for this selection is the vulnerability of individuals to traditional or non-traditional threats (terrorism in the case of this paper). Further comparison showed that the values most often stated as at stake in human security situations are survival, safety, livelihood, freedom, well-being and dignity. For example, Bajpai stressed that the fundamental values at stake in human security are physical safety and well-being and individual/personal freedom (Bajpai). Human security concepts also reflect a broad spectrum (or an endless spectrum in Oberleitner's terms 13) of mostly non-traditional, but also some traditional, threats to human security. The threat spectrum includes the following threats: economic threats, food threats, health threats, environmental threats, personal threats, community threats, political threats, demographic threats, crime in all forms, including terrorism, natural disasters, violent conflicts and wars, genocide, anti-personnel mines, SALW, etc. Further comparison of understanding of protection means shows that the state actually remains the most important protection subject for most of human security situations. Some human security approaches explicitly and some also implicitly stress the importance of non-governmental and international governmental actors, but the state retained its direct or indirect role. All this means that human security has become an inseparable part of national and international security policy performed by states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations.

The Complex Relationship between Security and Human Rights

The above debate on human security and its content actually opens the question of the relationship between freedom and security. There are two philosophical understandings of this relationship: competitive and mutually supporting. The currently prevailing competitive interpretation posits that these are competing systems, that there is some kind of zero-sum relationship between them and that one needs to choose between security or human rights (security versus human rights). This view is to a large extent stimulated by the intensive violations of human rights by states in the fight against terrorism. On the other hand, some scholars and politicians claimed that this relationship should be understood in a more complementary manner and that there is a mutually supporting relationship. This is not a new thesis, as Benjamin Franklin already took this perspective in 1795. It is surprisingly unknown to the broad public that the Universal Declaration on Human Rights and Freedoms (1948, art. 3) defined security as a human right. It states that everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person. The former UN Secretary General, Kofi Annan, similarly stressed the positive correlation among human rights, security and development in his report *Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All* (Annan). He created a triangle of interconnected elements – security, human rights and development. In his opinion, the notion of larger freedom (that was introduced in his report) encapsulates the idea that development, security and human rights go hand in hand and increasingly reinforce each other. This relationship has only been strengthened in our era of rapid technological advances, increasing economic interdependence, globalization and dramatic geopolitical change. Accordingly, we will not enjoy development without security, we will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without respect for human rights. Unless all these causes are advanced, none will succeed.

Human security concept refers to providing security within the limitations of respect for human rights (Prezelj). Accordingly, the responsible actors (states, international community and NGOs) need to provide human security to the threatened individuals and communities, but this activity needs to be in balance with other human rights. Human right to security needs to be in balance with other human rights. This means that the endeavour for a maximum level

of security should be systemically reduced to the endeavour for a balanced level of security.

However, there are some legal limitations on human rights and freedoms due to predefined interests of national and public security. The National constitutions, the Universal Declaration on Human Rights of 1948, European Convention on Human Rights of 1950, Johannesburg Principles on National Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to Information of 1996 and the Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism of 2002 are documents that approve certain exceptions and situations in which human rights can be legally violated, however they also draw a strict line that cannot be crossed by states in pursuit of security. Key reason for limitation of human rights (other than security) are interests of national and public security, state of war and crisis in which human rights are threatened. The state needs to demonstrate that such limitations are needed, they have to be commensurate with the threat and limited in time. This is the point at which many problems emerge, especially in the effective fight against the terrorism.

The fight against terrorism has become a priority for many European and non-European states and international organisations. The EU wants to create an area of freedom, security and justice and the EU Counter-terrorism Strategy of 2005 is based on the strategic commitment to combat terrorism globally while respecting human rights. But this is a difficult goal in practice, especially when it seems that states seek security against terrorism by excessively limiting other human rights. It is actually easy to identify many cases where human rights were violated by organisations or states wanting to provide a higher level of national security:²

- Heavily militarized counter-terrorism led to military operations against civilians not engaged in war activities (terrorism is predominantly a civilian threat).

- Security services abused vague and differentiated definitions of terrorism.

- Personal data exchange among countries was not always subjected to the high human rights standards, some states have been rendering their suspects to other states where human rights standards were not adequate.

² In our discussion of violations of human rights by counter-terrorism, it needs to be clear that the biggest violation of human rights is actually a terrorist attack. All terrorist attacks with human casualties represent a gross violation of the human right to life.

- Proactive stimulations for committing criminal and terrorist acts were identified.
- Profiling terrorists led sometimes to religious or ethnic discrimination.
- Pre-charge detention periods increased, in the most extreme case (Guantanamo) for an indefinite time period.
- Violence used by states in crisis management operations outside Europe and US has not been subjected to the same limitations as at home.
- The concept of enemy combatant has been misused.
- Guantanamo detention camp proved to be a place where torture was used to extract information from suspects.
- Some terrorist suspects were detained in Europe by the CIA at secret locations, where torture and other illegal practices were most likely used.
- Military commissions (courts) were used to trial civilian detainees, etc.

The Case of Introducing Body Scanners in the Field of Civil Aviation

This section aims to show a complex debate about the relationship between security and human rights in the field of civil aviation. This field has been subjected to serious terrorist threats in the past expressed by several cases of hijacking, bomb attacking, attacking by the use of MANPADS (Man Portable Air Defence Systems) and the unique case of 9/11. The intention to introduce body scanners in some airports to help protect civil aviation from the threat by terrorism has led to serious focused debates about the relationship between security and human rights. This section reflects the arguments for and against the use of body scanners on the European airports. The case study was made based on the collection and analysis of media records on body scanners published since 2008.

After each significant security breach in civil aviation, the security measures were strengthened and, sometimes, new security measures were introduced. Firstly, the passengers had to remove their jackets when passing through the airport security. After the Lockerbie case, there was more screening of hold baggage. After 9/11, the cockpit security improved, after the case of the shoe bomber, Richard Reid, the shoes needed to be removed

and then belts and liquids, etc. A debate on introducing body scanners started in 2009 after the unsuccessful terrorist attempt by Umar Farouk Abdulmutallab. This Nigerian man tried to blow up an airplane flying from Schiphol (Netherlands) on 25 December (Christmas day) as it prepared to land in Detroit (USA). He tried to use the “underpants bomb.” He apparently smuggled the bomb through the airport security in Amsterdam and Lagos where his journey began. He assembled it in the toilet on the aircraft and then tried to set the explosive device in his underwear. To prevent such cases, full body scanners have been introduced and tested in several EU and other airports worldwide (especially in the US). The tests took place before the attempt by Abdulmutallab and later. Body scanner manufacturers claimed they would detect materials of the sort Abdulmutallab allegedly took on to his Northwest Airlines flight, but some experts cautioned that it would depend on a series of factors, not least the vigilance of the scanner operator. Technically, the whole body imaging process allows airport security staff to see beneath the clothing of passengers to ensure travellers are not carrying on their bodies (that is under their clothes) concealed weapons of most types, metal or ceramic knives, explosives, drugs, etc. Within seconds, an X-ray scanner produces a virtual three- or two-dimensional black and white image of the body minus hair or facial features. Where the technology is available, air security officials can pick out individuals to stand in a screening booth while pictures are taken of the person in slightly different positions. Passengers can be selected for scanning randomly or after being pinpointed by other technical or visual means (airport intelligence).

After the case with “underpants bomber,” some European airports introduced these scanners. Immediately after that, a fierce public debate on security benefits and human right concerns started. This section presents some arguments for and against these scanners.

Arguments for Body Scanning. Probably the most common-sense argument for the use of this technology was given by the Italian foreign minister, who simply said that the technology is available and we have to use it. The main argument for the use of body scanners was that they increase security by being able to detect hidden objects not picked up by traditional metal detectors. One manufacturer said that this technology reveals anything concealed on the person: coins in a pocket, trouser studs, metal or ceramic knives, guns, explosives, drugs (Body scanners at Manchester Airport). In

this way, the scanners can complement in a very effective and efficient way the existing security measures at airports (Europe Delays Airport X-ray Eye, 2008). In addition, they would also have the potential to speed up the check-in process, as passengers would not need to be searched by security officials (Europe Eyes airport X-ray Vision; "Naked" Scanner in Airport Trial). Very informative is the case of Manchester airport. Sarah Barrett, head of customer experience at the airport, said most passengers did not like the traditional "pat down" search. At Manchester Airport's Terminal 2, where the machine has been introduced, passengers no longer have to remove their coats, shoes and belts as they go through security checks. She said: "This scanner completely takes away the hassle of needing to undress." She also said that a black-and-white image would only be seen by one officer in a remote location before it was deleted. "The images are not erotic or pornographic and they cannot be stored or captured in any way," she said. Passengers could refuse to be scanned. The radiation levels were "super safe." She also said that the passengers can go through this machine 5,000 times a year each without worrying, because the amount of radiation transmitted is tiny. By replacing the usual "pat down" searches, the airport claimed the technology has cut the average security check from two minutes to 25 seconds. And, unlike normal security checks, passengers are able to keep their jackets, shoes and belts on (Body scanners at Manchester Airport). This scanner completely takes away the hassle of needing to undress (Manchester airport trials naked-image security scans).

The supporters also stressed that there should be no health concern due to the body X-ray scanning. California scientists writing in Archives of Internal Medicine calculated that they contribute under 1% of radiation people are exposed to during a flight. Patrick Mehta and Dr. Rebecca Smith-Bindman, experts in public health and radiology at the University of California, said even the most frequent flyers who clock up 60 hours a week in the air will face only a tiny increase in cancer risk. For example, the scans might cause four extra cancers among a million of these frequent flyers, they say. In comparison, 600 cancers could occur from the radiation received during the flight itself and 400,000 cancers would be expected to occur throughout their lifetime anyway, regardless of their travel exposure. And the threat to children is also low, they say. A recent report from the British Institute of Radiology and the Royal College of Radiologists found the dose from an airport scan is 100,000 times lower than the average annual dose of radiation

we get from natural background radiation and medical sources. Dr. Peter Riley, consultant radiologist and lead author of the report, said the risk was tiny (*Are Airport Body Scanners a Radiation Risk*). The UK Department for Transport also stated that the level of radiation that one usually receive from such a machine is equivalent to what one would naturally receive (from the sun) from two minutes of flying at about 35.000ft. Professor Richard Wakefield, a radiation expert at Manchester University's Dalton Nuclear Institute said that the doses potentially received are "verging on the ridiculous to be worried about them" (Does safer flying mean a risk of radiation?).

In defence against criticism, the supporters frequently stated that the scanners show only an outline of the subject's body, without anatomical detail, and that the images will be deleted after the passenger will be processed.

Arguments against body scanning. Antagonists expressed mainly three kinds of related concerns: violation of privacy as a human right, violation of other human rights and threat to health of passengers. Also concerns about the data protection were raised. The privacy concern is based on the persuasion that body scanning is a "virtual strip search," an offence against human dignity because the machines see people completely naked, with visible breasts, genitals, big or small breasts, breast enlargements, body piercings, etc. This would make people also uncomfortable, embarrassed and even humiliated. Handicaps should be even more affected by exposing their false limbs, colostomy bags, breast implants. In short, the scanners would leave little to the imagination of airport security staff. There was also a concern that scans of celebrities or of people with unusual body profiles could prove as an irresistible pull for some employees, leading to their potential publication on the internet. To some observers it was likely that the bored security staff would be distracted by the sight of an attractive man or woman or a passing celebrity. Special criticism was related to the scanning the bodies of children. This threatens to breach child protection laws which ban the creation of indecent images of children. Any creation of indecent pictures of a child, showing genitalia, is a criminal act, according to the opponents. Also a call for rejection of these measures by the Muslim community was made. Muslim women care very much about hijab and keeping all their body's parts private and unseen. An assumption was made that such measures will prevent many British Muslim women from travelling by the airplanes. These concerns seem to be justified as already two potential abuses of existing body scanners appeared. In one

case, a journalist from a tabloid paper called the airport and asked for some photos of naked girls. In the second case, a security guard was exposed as having abused the technology. A Heathrow Airport security guard was given a police warning after he was allegedly caught staring at images of a female colleague in a body scanner. The antagonists also wanted to have more studies on risks and potential benefits on the table before potentially supporting the body scanners.

Our synthesis of the above debate on the relationship between security and human rights points to several key areas of conflict (see the Table 2).

Table 2: Key arguments for and against introducing body scanners on the European airports.

Security arguments for body scanners	Human rights concerns about body scanners
Improves security on airports	and simultaneously violates human rights
Complements the existing security measures	by violating human rights and creating additional concerns
Speeds up the check-in process	at the expense of other human rights
Manual searches and undressing not needed	But this is still a violation of privacy of passengers (images show too much)
Body scanning is voluntary	This is then a voluntary humiliation, embarrassment and offence against human dignity
Radiation levels are small (safe) for human health	Radiation levels are too high and threaten human health (violation of the right to health)
Details or specifics of the human body are not revealed	Some past cases show that the details were revealed and the right to privacy was violated
Images are deleted after inspection of the operator, the operator is located on a remote location	How can we trust that images will be deleted and not misused?

The evolution of the debate between pros and cons showed that the planners of the use of this technology, airport operators and producers actually tried to meet several concerns by the antagonists. They financed studies in this field, changed technology and related operational procedures. For example, the locations for image reading were separated from the machines, images deleted,

operators trained, etc. However, this was not enough in the eyes of human rights supporters and activists. Consequently, this debate prevented the European Union to introduce a general obligation of body scanning on the airports. The minimal common basic security standards and measures in the EU are determined by two unclassified regulations: Parliament and Council Regulation No. 300/2008 and Commission Regulation No. 185/2010. Detailed measures for the implementation of the common basic standards on aviation security are defined in later document and its amendments. These regulations and related standards do not mention the use of body scanners. This means that they can be used today to improve security on the airports exclusively at the decision of an individual airport and a member state of the EU.

Conclusion

This paper showed that balancing between human rights and security is one of the most important challenges of our societies. Human rights supporters need to understand the importance of security (i. e. the right to live in their terminology) and the security professionals need to understand the importance of human rights and freedoms. History has frequently led to major violations of human rights and related decrease of quality of life by the unrestrained search for 100% security. The past fight against terrorism also reflected some such attempts. Modern democratic states with their principle of division of power are, however, purposely made to retain the basic level of human rights in exchange for perfect (100%) security. This means that strong mutually exclusionist approaches (towards security and human rights) are not beneficial for the future of our societies.

This paper has also shown that the concept of human security usefully integrates the care for human rights of individuals and related security. This concept is complementing the notion of national and international security by focusing it more on the human component. The debate on the potential introduction of body scanners on the European airports was actually a debate on the ways of providing individual human security on the airports with simultaneous concern for other human rights. The output of this debate was a compromise between pros and cons: body scanners can be used at the discretion of individual airports and member states, but are not an obligatory measure to be adopted on all airports.

Our societies will increasingly face similar dilemmas in the field of counter-terrorism as in the case of body scanners. Technology will simultaneously bring new security opportunities and risks for human rights. As a part of preparing for such a future, the concept of human security should be introduced in the educational and training process in the field of security, counter-terrorism and also in the field of human rights. This way the proponents from both sides will have better chances to make compromises for the benefit of our future generations.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Raffaello Pantucci, “*We love death as you love life.*” *Britain’s suburban terrorists.* Hurst & Co, London 2015, p. 377

The activity of Muslim radicals based in UK has been considered as a grave threat to the security not only of Great Britain but other European countries as well. The term “Londonistan” was coined almost two decades ago by the French security services to describe the growing importance of British Islamism. At least by July 2005 Muslim radicals had an opportunity to act pretty freely on British soil, where they managed to establish their networks and widen their influence on the Muslim *ummah* in Europe. As Raff Pantucci claims: “This book aims to understand the extremists’ narrative and its history in the United Kingdom, and peel away some of the complexity around the issue of ‘radicalisation’ by telling the story of Britain’s suburban mujahedeen” (3). It must be said that he keeps his promise throughout his book – it is an important and thorough contribution to the subject – a must read for all interested in the processes of Islamic ‘radicalization’ in Britain and beyond. Though Pantucci has extensive knowledge of the ongoing discussion on ‘theoretical’ aspects of ‘radicalization’, he rightly chooses to focus his attention on historical and demographical backgrounds of UK-based Islamists and to present concrete cases of numerous ‘activists’ forming this violent social movement. Chapter 1 and 2 show the history of Muslim communities in Great Britain and their socialization: Pantucci describes different ‘waves’ of Muslim migration to the UK and the early developments of various Islamic groups and organizations there. In chapter 3 he starts with the detailed description of the ‘Rushdie affair’ as a focal point in the development of Muslim radicals activity in Britain and explains the importance of the war in Bosnia and its impact on global Muslim identity. In this chapter the reader follows the activity of

Hizb ut-Tahrir and Omar Bakri Mohammed, *Supporters of Sharia* and Abu Hamza al-Masri – two prominent figures and the leaders of two most widely known radical Muslim organizations in the UK in the 90s. In the next, 4 chapter, Pantucci discusses the role of Abu Qatada and Abdullah el-Faisal and their influence on Muslim radical circles in UK. In this chapter the reader can trace the links between British ‘suburban mujahedeen’ and people and groups close to 9/11 terrorist attack plotters. In chapter 5, he meticulously presents developments leading to July 7 and 21 terrorists attacks in London – most notably the activity of Omar Khayam and *Operation Crevice*, the activity of Dhiren Barot and *Operation Rhyme*, the activity of Mohammed Siddiq Khan and the ‘7/7’ cell, ending this crucial part with the *Operation Overt*. The last, 6 chapter deals with the next generation of British jihadi fighters, though does not include the most recent ones influenced by ISIS/IS. For sure, every book must end at some point, and the only weakness of this important contribution to the difficult task of understanding British Muslim radicals is that Pantucci does not tell us much about most recent events. Particularly, on the impact of the recently established Islamic State on groups of British Muslim radicals. In *Conclusions* we get the analysis of the influence of Anwar al-Awlaki, though not ISIS/IS and their spin-doctors of death. Perhaps this is going to be a proper subject of his next book?

In any case, *Britain’s Suburban Terrorists* is a concise but at the same time profound and persuasive insight into the world of modern Western jihad, providing important clues on the evolution of this militant global social movement to the interested public. Good job, Raff, tell us more soon ...

Ryszard M. Machnikowski

Jerzy Sobieraj. *Collisions of Conflict. Studies in American History and Culture, 1820-1920.* Peter Lang, Frankfurt am Main: 2014. pp. 149.

Jerzy Sobieraj's newest book *Collisions of Conflict* explores the turbulent decades of the second part of the 19th century and early 20th century, which saw an escalation of many national and social conflicts in the USA: between the North and the South, between the burgeoning West and the East, and between slave-owners and Abolitionists. The study's particular focus is on the Civil War and subsequent inter-racial tensions in the South of the United States. The monograph shows the history of that region from the run-up to the Civil War to the Reconstruction and segregation period. It looks back at these difficult years from the vantage point of our times when despite Barak Obama's first black presidency, race relations in the US are, to say the least, difficult.

In his introduction Prof. Sobieraj mentions some of these difficulties, such as the Supreme Court's controversial decision to strike down Section Four of the Voting Rights Act, giving federal protection to minority voters in states with a track record in discrimination. But this is just one of many challenges that African Americans (and other minorities) have to face today. These minorities are not only at a greater risk of being disenfranchised by their states as a result of declaring Section Four of VRA unconstitutional. Their voting rights are constantly being taken away from them in many other ways. For example, the US is one of few democratic states where a person's civic rights can be taken away for a lifetime if the person committed a crime. It is estimated that 8% of black population has lost the right to vote as a result of felony conviction, as compared to 2% on other racial groups.

The persistent racial inequality is more clearly seen in crime rates and prison rates. Blacks make up 13% of the population but

are more than half of America's homicide victims and culprits. Of 2.3 million people in American penitentiaries, 1 million are blacks. Every 1 in 3 black males is expected to go to prison in his lifetime, and the policing practices make it very easy for black people to find themselves at the receiving end of the law. One of them is "racial profiling" – the practice of drawing suspicion from the skin colour, which means that black teenagers and males are more often detained by the Police and searched. Though it is publically denied, this practice is quite widespread. To cap it all, Police brutality, which has, for some time now, made headlines all over the world, makes racial profiling particularly dangerous phenomenon, as many black individuals, not only men but also women and adolescents, are killed by the Police in the aftermath of intervention. Another source of concern for the black community are the so-called "stand your ground laws" that expand protections for citizens who kill strangers because they feel threatened. The most famous case when these laws were applied was when white George Zimmerman killed the 17-year-old, unarmed black boy Trayvon Martin and was acquitted. After many cases of black people being shot down by the Police during routine patrols, Martin's case was particularly shocking because the death-dealing person was an untrained civilian seeing danger where there was none.

The twin sister of racism is economic deprivation, the so-called opportunity gap and wealth gap. While the black middle class has been steadily growing since the times described in Prof. Sobieraj's book, financial stability still remains out of the reach of a large sector of black population. Since mid-1970s the employment rate for blacks has been roughly double the employment rate for whites. Also, to be wealthy and middle class means two different things for blacks and whites. According to the special issue of *Time* published in the 50th anniversary of the 1963 March on Washington, the median wealth of black families in which the head of household graduated from a college is less than median wealth of a white family, in which the head of the household is a college drop-out. In consequence 85% of black and Latino households have a net worth that fall below the median wealth for white households. *Time* concludes: "closing that gap would require black and Latino households to save 100% of their incomes for 3 consecutive years." The minorities were the hardest struck by the economic crisis that coincided with the beginning of Obama's presidency. From 2007 to 2010, as the Urban Institute reported, black families' wealth fell by 31% whereas white families wealth fell by 11%. The unemployment

rates also grew twice as fast for blacks than for whites. This led Eddie Glaude Jr. the chair of center for African American Studies at Princeton University to comment wryly that the crisis was “a black great Depression.”

Prof. Sobieraj’s study also disputes the view that Barak Obama’s presidency is the “realization of colour blind America” and “the fulfillment of the dream of equality for all people, irrespective of their race.” In his contrary view, this presidency did not put an end to the civil-rights battles or racial conflicts. These conflicts, as he argues, cannot be properly understood without dissecting the history of the Civil War, Reconstruction and segregation.

Chapter I of Prof. Sobieraj’s study: “The Seeds of War: from Missouri Compromise to Secession” presents divergent views on the true reason of the conflict. It focuses, among other things, on the contemporary debates on whether slavery was indeed the root cause of the war. It also sheds light of the growth of Southern separatism sometimes also described as Southern nationalism. It touches upon well known facts, such as Missouri Compromise, the Fugitive Slave Law, the Nebraska Bill and the “bleeding Kansas” episode, all of which were milestones irrevocably leading to the outbreak of the Civil War.

Chapter II – “Fighting Slavery: Various Shades of Abolitionism” – discusses the slave economy as a form of early capitalist enterprise, and presents the development of the Abolitionists movement, which alerted many Americans to the evil of this “peculiar institution.” This chapter deals mostly with white Abolitionists, radicals and gradualists, and various journals they brought out. Only one paragraph mentions black activists such as Frederic Douglass, an advisor to President Lincoln on black matters. Chapter III, “Lincoln and the Civil War,” narrates the history of the conflict and Lincoln’s leadership, which was crucial in bringing the war to conclusion.

This part of the history of the United States is rather well know, therefore I think that the remaining chapters dealing with the adverse consequences of the war, are far more engaging. Chapter V – “The Invisible Empire: the Short Career of the First Ku Klux Klan and its Rebirth,” and Chapter VI – “Years of Shame: Lynching in the United States from 1880s to the Great War,” describe the most tragic and shameful events in the history of racial relations in the South. The early history of the Klan, initially set up as a organization for white entertainment at the expense of superstitious black population, is not so well-known and therefore quite gripping. The same is true about Prof. Sobieraj’s discussion about gendered

character of Southern nationalism and racism, which put white women on the pedestal, exaggerated the sexual prowess of black men and often justified acts of lynching and terror committed on black men with the perpetrators' desire to "protect the honour" of their wives and sisters. The following chapter presents in detail horrendous impact of this pernicious ideology on the KKK terrorist campaign. It also describes the anti-lynching crusade. This chapter contains also some interesting information on the American eugenics movement and its political implementation by Southern politicians, who used it as a justification for limiting the rights of the newly freed black population.

The final chapter of the study titled "Wounded in the House of Friends': Segregation and in the Republic" continues the theme of pseudo-sciences and scientific racism as instrumental in introducing segregation, which as the author contends, was nothing less than "neo-slavery." He discusses segregationist laws and social practices and uses examples from Southern fiction of that period (Thomas Dixon) to illustrate attitudes of the Southern whites. He shows southern commitment to the idea of white supremacy and the fear of africanization through giving the same civic rights to freedmen, miscegenation (sexual relations between people from different races) and interracial marriage. This chapter contains a wonderfully revealing comment of a black woman who explained what Jim Crow laws meant for black people in the South: "Jim Crow was a terrible thing. It was a man making people work to build up a country and saying: 'Don't you dare touch what you've built!'"

This well written book would be even more interesting if it contained more black insights to these "collisions of conflict." The author very rarely mentions black contributions to military and social struggles. There were many black activists, Abolitionist, and intellectuals who deserve to be remembered in any narration about this most calamitous war in the American history, the horrific experience of the repression and continual violence in the Jim Crow era. Black people did not go gently into that good night and their resistance, in my opinion, is particularly worth chronicling, as, more often than not, it has been lost to the modern memory. As the black oppression fades from the view in this study, the reader gets the impression that black people were only passive recipients of violence wreaked by or help provided by the white population. Thus the study seems to bear out the truth encapsulated in one of its mottos (borrowed from J. Toynbee) – "history is something unpleasant that happens to other people." Since black agency and

struggles have been sidelined in this book, one may feel that the Civil War, Reconstruction and segregation were exclusively “unpleasant” things that “happened to” African Americans.

Another minor shortcoming of the book is its Postscriptum, which contains war biographies of canonical authors (again mostly white) and an overview of the fiction on the topic of the Civil War. While I appreciated earlier passages about fictional rendering of the war that illustrated the prevalent mood in the South and provided a more personal outlook on the war, Reconstruction and segregation than the official history, this final section of the study does not seem to be equally effective. The interesting thing about it is the synthesis of the recurrent character types and tropes in the war and post-war fiction. What does not really work well is the catalogue of biographies, which seem to be a bit irrelevant. This really compelling historical narrative would benefit greatly, I think, if Prof. Sobieraj finished it with a discussion of how these painful chapters have born upon the civil-rights struggles of the 20th century and on the contemporary situation of African Americans. We can only hope, that Prof. Sobieraj, who has excellent narrative skills, will address some of these issues in his next monograph, which as this study announces is under way.

Ewa Kołodziejczyk

Literature as a Source of Knowledge. Polish Colonization of the United Kingdom in the light of *Limeys* by Ewa Winnicka

Ewa Winnicka visibly favors a theme of contemporary Polish community in the United Kingdom. Her first book *Londyńczycy*¹ [*Londoners*] tells stories of World War II and post-war exiles who fled the occupied state, and formed a significant political and cultural milieu in England. *Angole*² [*Limeys*] aims to portray the newest economical immigration of Poles legally employed in Britain after 2004. Should there be any convergence between these books, it would be a suggestion that neither the two groups integrate nor they voice common interests together, as if they did not have anything in common. Michał, one of Winnicka's interlocutors concludes:

Bo tak naprawdę to „ekonomiczni” pozwalali się „politycznym” zdefiniować, nie byłoby tych drugich bez istnienia tych pierwszych. Za tą binarną opozycją krył się normatywnie określony platoński świat ducha i materii, dobra i zła. „Polityczni” należeli do pierwszego – stąd napuszona mowa o „ideach,” „misji,” „roli” emigracji, a „ekonomiczni” do drugiego, gdzie brudna materia kojarzyła się z robotnikami, budowlanicami, bluzgiem i pijanym Polakiem w metrze. Termin „polityczny” był więc sposobem odgrodenia się od klas niższych, od ludzi, których stygmatyzowało się jako gorszych [Winnicka 275-276].

[In fact it is „the economical” immigrants who enabled „the political” ones to define themselves, for the latter would not exist without the first. Behind this binary opposition there was a normatively defined Platonic world of spirit and matter, good and bad. “The political” belonged to the first sphere – here from comes pompous rhetoric of “ideas,” “mission,” “role” of emigration, and “the economical” belonged to the other, where dirty matter was associated with physical labour, construction workers, cursing and a drunk Pole in tube. A term “political” served as way of isolation from lower classes, from people who were stigmatized as the worse.]

¹ E. Winnicka, *Londyńczycy*, Wołowiec: Wydawnictwo Czarne 2011.

² E. Winnicka, *Angole*, Wołowiec: Wydawnictwo Czarne 2014.

Due to traditional high interest in literary reportage in Poland, the collection of interviews by Winnicka has enjoyed a relatively close attention of critics and reviewers, and received an extensive electronic media cover. In November 2014, it was chosen the book of the month by the Literary Circle of Radio Krakow. Małgorzata Szejnert recommends it on the publisher's site: „Aktualna, poważna i dowcipna książka reporterska dla wszystkich, zwłaszcza dla tych, którzy wybierają się w drogę” [A topical, serious and witty book for all, especially those who set out]³. Anna Godzińska from *szuflada.net* praises the wide range of the author's interlocutors who explores the social spectrum of Polish immigrants from top to bottom. Juliusz Kurkiewicz writing for “Gazeta Wyborcza” expresses his astonishment by the fact how exotic the British culture is for Poles who tend to underestimate its otherness on the account of superficial perception. Karolina Chłoń from *kulturatka.pl* presents the reportage as well written and captivating. Filip Stringer, an author and a photographer himself, emphasizes a visual value of the book which other critics seemed to overlook:

W środku jednak znajdziemy nie jedną, a dwie niezależne, choć przeplatające się, opowieści. Autorką jednej z nich jest Ewa Winnicka, a drugiej Mariusz Śmiejek. To fotograficzne opowiadanie jest, co niezwykle ważne, skomponowane jak klasyczny fotoreportaż. Nie stanowi jedynie ilustracji do tekstu. Ma swoje zdjęcie na otwarcie, ma wstęp, kulminację i puentę. To autonomiczna, autorska opowieść. [*xiegarnia.pl*]

Inside of the volume we will find not only one, but two separate, however interweaving stories. Ewa Winnicka is the author of one, Mariusz Śmiejek of another. What is really important, is that photographic story has been composed as classical reportage. It does not merely serve as illustration of the text. It has snapshots for opening, introduction, culmination and punch. This is an autonomic, independent narration.

Neither the critics' acclamations quoted by the publisher are binding, nor they should be considered as such in the era of book marketing. What captures our attention is the fact (with the exception of Springer) that they treat the book by Winnicka not merely as a fulfilling literary piece, but as a source of essential knowledge about Polish community in the United Kingdom and the living conditions of Poles there. They simply suggest the book may serve as a guidebook, as it contains practical observations and warnings which may be useful for future immigrants. Such an approach

³ Unless stated otherwise, all translations are mine.

to literature is very old and still has its advocates, especially in Poland, where factual literature has been largely appreciated in the century of two world wars, and the occupation of two totalitarian regimes. Michael Wood inquires:

But does literature offer us knowledge? It certainly represents it, as we have just seen. But a representation is, by definition, not the thing itself, and both literature and knowledge are words worth using carefully. There are all kinds of treasures which are not knowledge, and we should not betray them by giving them the wrong name. (...)

When Dorothy Walsh, in an elegant book called *Literature and Knowledge*, published in 1969, said the worry was old, she meant it went back at least to Plato. When Stathis Gourgouris says it is old, in a recent book called *Does Literature Think?*, he means the same thing. (Wood 2)

Thus the core question that demands a careful consideration is to what extent the book by Winnicka can be treated as a comprehensive source of knowledge about Polish immigrants in the United Kingdom, and whether it creates an image commonly known as truth of literature.

In the years 2013-2014 British media broadly discussed immigrants' influence on the national economy and social structure. These voices varied in arguments, tone and style. The collection of interviews is drafted as a literary response for the media debates. In the introduction to her book Winnicka creates an illusion of synthesizing most prevailing and representative opinions about Polish community, even though it was not the main group of media focus. In a speech convention she seems to briefly summarize views of British journalists:

Ladies and Gentlemen. Ta ziemia przeżyła dotąd tylko jedną podobną inwazję. W XI wieku mieliśmy tu Wilhelma Zdobywcę. W 1066 roku rozegrała się decydująca o losach Wyspy bitwa pod Hastings, po której Normandowie zalali Brytanię.

Potem mieliśmy względny spokój, bo pięćdziesięciu tysięcy hugenotów przybyłych po 1670 roku i może stu tysięcy rosyjskich Żydów osiadłych w latach 1881-1914 nie warto nawet wspominać.

Owszem, XX wiek był dla nas wyzwaniem. Zaczęliśmy mieć tu Szkotów i Irlandczyków, ale właściwie byli oni tak wiele lat częścią Brytanii, że w większości wiedzieli, jak się zachować. Podobnie kolorowi przybysze z zakątków imperium. Wszyscy mogli cieszyć się naszym słynnym w świecie umiłowaniem swobód obywatelskich.

Nic się nie równa podobno dwóch milionom Polaków krążącym w tę i we w tę po okolicach od 2004 roku, ozdobionym garstką Litwinów, Rosjan czy Ukraińców. Podobno zarobiliśmy na nich dwadzieścia dwa miliardy funtów,

podobno wypełnili szczelnie dziury na rynku pracy, ale za to na ulicach tradycyjnie porządnym miast Lancashire czy Lincolnshire trudno usłyszeć język angielski. Wpadniesz do rzeki, zawołasz „help” i nie możesz mieć pewności, że ktoś cię zrozumie. Nie ma najmniejszych wątpliwości, że ta sterowana dyrektywami UE nawałnica zmienia oblicze Brytanii. Jak wygląda nasz kraj po tym najeździe? Co z niego zostanie? (Winnicka 2014, 7-8).

[*Ladies and Gentlemen.* This land survived only one similar invasion so far. In the eleventh century we had William the Conqueror here. In 1066 took place a battle of Hastings that doomed the future of the Island, after which the Normans flooded Britain.

Then we had relative peace, because fifty thousand Huguenots who arrived after 1670, and around hundred thousand Russian Jews who settled down between 1881 and 1914 are not even worth mentioning.

Indeed, the twentieth century was a challenge for us. We started having Scots and Irish here, but they had been actually the part of the UK for so many years that most of them knew how to behave. Similarly, colored newcomers from the Empire's nooks did. Everyone could enjoy our world famous love for civil liberties.

Nothing equals supposedly two million Poles with a handful of Lithuanians, Russians and Ukrainians circulating back and forth all over our surroundings after 2004. Apparently we have earned twenty-two billion pounds of them, and they are said to have filled all holes in the labor market tightly, but it is hard to hear English on the streets of traditionally respectable cities of Lancashire and Lincolnshire. You fall into the river and cry out “help!,” but you cannot be sure that someone will understand. There is no doubt that this onrush controlled by EU directive is changing the face of Britain. How does our country look like after the invasion? What has it been left of it?]

The introduction is followed by a footnote enumerating articles in which Winnicka declares to enroot its message. These are *How the invasion of immigrants into every corner of England has made a mockery of PM's promise to close the door* by Peter Hitchens (“Daily Mail,” March, 31, 2013), *The Polish paradox* (“The Economist,” December, 14, 2013), *Mass immigration has left Britain ‘unrecognisable’ says Nigel Farage* by Christopher Hope (“The Daily Telegraph,” February, 28, 2014). Undoubtedly striking, it sacrifices some of their factual statements and opinions for the sake of a witty opening which shall encourage readers to turn following pages. What did the British journalists listed by Winnicka really intend to say?

It is Peter Hitchens column that provides us with a chart numbering most concentrated waves of immigration into the islands, which Winnicka quotes in her introduction. But this is only a chart, most probably the editor's appendix to the column. It is not accompanied by any sarcastic commentary the Polish author does

herself. Hitchens, whose words about a potential river accident we read in the introduction, gives a nostalgic insight into the sixties, the time of his youthful revolutionary Marxist beliefs, when he supported pro-immigration policy. After more than 50 years he gives credit to his former political opponents:

I have learned since what a spiteful, self-righteous, snobbish and arrogant person I was (and most of my revolutionary comrades were, too). (...) I have felt deeply, hopelessly sorry that I did and said nothing in defense of those whose lives were turned upside down, without their ever being asked, and who were warned very clearly that, if they complained, they would be despised outcasts. And I have spent a great deal of time in the parts of Britain where the revolutionary unintelligentsia don't go. Such people seldom, if ever, visit their own country. Their orbits are in fashionable London zones, and holiday destinations. They are better acquainted with the Apennines of Italy than with the Pennines of their own country.

Having completed this public self-criticism, Hitchens turns to branding hypocrisy of those politicians who owe their seats in Parliament to Muslim voters although they do not share any of their beliefs with their constituents. He concludes: "Once again, revolutionary liberals had formed a cynical alliance to destroy conservative position." The following paragraphs discuss relations of the British with non-European immigrants, especially of Muslim background. As far as "the white-skinned Europeans" are concerned, he points out what differentiates them from the British more than a race: language, customs, attitudes, sense of humour. Hitchens continues:

Rather than them adapting to our way of life, we were adapting to theirs. This wasn't integration. It was a revolution. Yet nobody – especially their elected representatives – would listen to them, because they were assumed to be Powellite bigots, motivated by some sort of unreasoning hatred.

I now believe that the unreasoning hatred comes almost entirely from the liberal Left. Of course, there are still people who harbor stupid racial prejudices. But most of those concerned about immigration are completely innocent of such feelings.

The screaming, spitting intolerance comes from a pampered elite who are ashamed of their own country, despise patriotism in others and feel none themselves. They long for a horrible borderless Utopia in which love of country has vanished, nannies are cheap and other people's wages are low.

Before stigmatizing Hitchens for such approach, one should research any national media to become certain no such discussion is being held in Europe in the era of evolving anti-immigrant movements (see Scheffer 177-185). Hitchens does not call for

closing British borders or implementing any anti-immigration policy. Rather he is calling for closer integration and dialogue: “For if there is to be any hope of harmony in these islands, then it can only come through a great effort to bring us all together, once again, in a shared love for this, the most beautiful and blessed plot of earth on the planet.”

“The Economist’s” article is in turn a research-based description of “the Polish situation” in the United Kingdom in the last decade. The hysterical statements of some conservative MP’s, which is its starting point, are presented merely to be challenged. Here is a handful of conclusions drawn in reference to the Polish immigration:

Britain got younger and better-educated Poles than Germany or America. Many are overqualified for their jobs, and ought to move into more appropriate ones as their English and social networks become stronger. (...) Parts of England and Wales with many east European migrants have seen a drop in property crime and no increase in violence, according to researchers at the LSE and University College London. Recorded crime and anti-social behavior in Corby has fallen by more than half since 2006; in the rest of England and Wales it is down by about a third.

“The Economist” reports a significant increase in good GCSE due to Polish pupils in the years 2008-2013. It also does justice to Polish immigrants who neither live in public-sector housing nor they wait for it nor they claim unemployment benefits – in 2011 the number of jobless Poles was under 20,000. The weekly explains a general mistrust of immigration with the economic crisis that makes everybody less tolerant. The unbiased report of “The Economist” was widely commented and appreciated by the Polish media such as “Gazeta Wyborcza,” “Gazeta Prawna,” “Uważam Rze,” Internet portal Onet.pl and others. All of them presented the article as balanced, factual and Poles friendly. Journalists’ thesis and arguments have also been confirmed by Polish scholars settled down in the United Kingdom whose research focuses on the Polish community after 2004 (see Rabikowska, Metykova).

The article by Christopher Hope presents literally one of the strongest attacks on immigration policy charged by the UKIP leader, Nigel Farage. It was him who claimed Britain was “taken over” by foreigners. It allowed Winnicka to describe Polish immigrants humorously as ‘colonizers’, ‘conquerors’, ‘invaders’, and ‘assailants’ which is a clear allusion to Farage’s rhetoric. This sarcastic strategy is continued in the following chapters unfolding stories of

“a patient, full acceptance and ambitious invader” from the City, “management of the natives,” “problems of colonizers unprepared for their mission,” “happy colonizers,” “difficult colonization areas” etc.

However, the article by Hope does not bring anything new to the discussion about immigration. Hope merely extracts Farage’s strongest statements and combines them into a logical order of quotations. One cannot arrive with any conclusions whether Hope himself does or does not support Farage’s radical beliefs. His digest comes down to diligent presenting current political arguments. Why did Winnicka include his summary into the footnote? It is Farage, not Hope, who is a key person here, as under no circumstances does Hope reveal his attitude either to the new wave of immigration or to Farage’s elucubrations. Thus Winnicka’s strategy of authenticating her introduction by the footnote can be only partially justified. Farage’s strong opinions serve her as catchy rhetorical frame of her own narration. Another way of lending credibility to her story is renouncing a dominant narrative position in favor of her interlocutors. She declares: “Najeżdźcy mówią” [Invaders speak] and maintains a proven method of delta interview [Czapliński, Śliwiński 128], creating an illusion that her informers speak for themselves, as if their selection was not an act of making a literary piece. A reader is suggested he or she may rely on Winnicka’s partners truthfulness to the same extent as she does. The illusion is enhanced by the fact that she does not correct linguistic mistakes of her characters as well as she preserves their individual styles of speaking. Their personal data are authenticated: we learn their first and last names, places in Poland they come from and places in Britain they try to make their living, which tellingly adds to the impression of factuality. We view immigrants of various sexes and genders (one of the characters is a lesbian) and age: the youngest are children of immigrants, the older is 56. They represent unlike social background and status with literally few coming from established Polish families. The majority of the interviewed search for manual jobs, although a director in PricewaterhouseCoopers, a medical doctor, an EU official, a writer, a sculptor, an anthropologist, and a Dominican monk tell their stories as well. Some of them were successful in Poland and go even further abroad, some of them hit the very bottom like Marcin, 43-year-old advertisement professional who ends up in a garbage screening plant. They have assorted education, diversified professional experience and aspirations, sundry personal

motivations, religious attitudes, ethics and ideologies. Their individual stories are both stirring and captivating.

Two issues attract some special attention. First, these are descriptions of English boarding schools turning out to be survivals for students of lower classes. Second, a significant phenomenon of mimicry in relations between Polish employees and their bosses-immigrants themselves from post-colonial countries. The boarding school case demonstrates vividly aggression and disdain of English higher class youngsters towards non-English and even native English students of lower social background. It is expressed either by ultimate lack of interest – the Polish student feels as if he was invisible to them, a charity work, when he is invited to fancy holidays by one of the affluent natives, or simply by aggression, when he is mocked, bullied, and hunt by his persecutors. The community of English boarding schools is inaccessible from the outside, unless some witnesses give their testimonies to the public. Superficially elitist environment accumulates anger and frustration that is not supposed to be revealed officially, so – according to the Freudian rule of suppression – it explodes behind the close door. Stories from the boarding schools are classical examples of what Homi Bhabha named as quasi-colonialism, invisible to the public eye, legitimized by the school authorities. Notwithstanding democratic reforms in recent century and the memory of the post-colonial heritage of the United Kingdom, the British class system remains hermetic and resistant to any waves of immigration.

Immigrant employers relation to their subordinates from outside Britain is a parallel example of suppressed anger. The most cruel and ruthless are those managers coming from colonized countries such as Pakistan and India. Exploited themselves they seem to take a revenge on a European wave of newcomers holding even lower positions in society. This behavior can be easily interpreted in post-colonial categories of mimicry directed against new victims in the act of self-compensation.

Besides these two examples thirty four interviews, however, do not give sufficient insight into more subtle interrelations between Poles themselves and with native English people. Many's the time Winnicka's interlocutors trace conclusions about English people who are difficult to 'read', closed off and hence uneasy to get to know, but their observations are not either elaborated or lack some depth. Through these individual stories general assumptions about constructing Polish identities in the UK can hardly

be made. What are Polish migrants' encounters with other Poles in the process of identification or social distancing? What 'face saving practices' and 'impression management' are taken up in situation of social embarrassment? It is quite obvious that Poles abroad avoid certain Polish people and places to establish their reputations and respectability. Also they take up positions of invisibility to avoid stigmatization. (see Ryan 365-368) Winnicka does not inquire about these practices and what forms they take. She does not ask how men and women preserve ethnic identity either. What is a role of gender in the context of Polish migration? (see Lopez-Rodriguez) How do food rituals enhance preservation of the Polish ethnic identity? (see Rabikowska) If religion is a marker of ethnic identity, how important is it for Poles in the UK? (see Ryan 363-364)

And so the selection of characters and stories Winnicka has gathered in one book turned out unconvincing to many readers familiar with British reality. Whereas the discussion around *Limeys* held by professional actors from the book market emphasized its strengths, anonymous readers who evaluated the book in electronic media also pointed out its weaknesses. In the portal *Lubimy czytać.pl* Witold concludes:

Książka w sumie mnie mocno rozczarowała, a nawet zniesmaczyła. Mam do niej wiele zastrzeżeń. To wszystko jest pokazane w skrajnościach i w sumie całkowicie wypacza obraz Polaków mieszkających na Wyspach – ukazuje ich w typowym krzywym zwierciadle i chyba ma na celu zniechęcenie Polaków do emigracji na Wyspy. Gdyby faktycznie było aż tak źle, jak stara się pokazać autorka – to grubo ponad 1 mln Polaków nie znalazłoby tam drugiej ojczyzny. Co z tymi normalnymi ludźmi i całymi rodzinami, którzy w większości pracują w jakichś fabrykach, na budowach, w hotelach czy barach i mają tzw. godziwą pracę i płacę – przy której stać ich na rodzenie dzieci i życie w godnych warunkach, a nie na skraju ubóstwa i wegetacji, jak w tym rozgrabionym kraju, który nie służy obywatelom w żadnym wypadku.

[In overall the book has disappointed and even disgusted me. I have many objections to it. This is all shown in extremes and entirely distorts the image of Poles living in the UK – it presents them in a typical Lampoon and probably intends to discourage Poles from emigration to the Islands. If it actually was so bad, as the author tries to describe – well over 1 million Poles would not have their second homeland there. How about those normal people and their families, most of whom work in some factories, on construction sites, in hotels and bars, and have a so-called decent work and wages – at which they can afford to bear children and decent living conditions, rather than on the edge of poverty and vegeation, as it is in this plundered country which in no case does serve the public.]

Krzysztof strongly supports this view:

Zgadzam się z opinią o tej książce zamieszczonej przez Witolda. Czegoś zabrakło. Za dużo skrajności, a za mało losów przeciętnych osób. Niewiele też tak naprawdę można się z tej książki dowiedzieć o tytułowych Angolach.

[I agree with the opinion about the book posted by Witold. It lacks something. Too many extremes, not enough of average people. The book does not provide sufficient knowledge about the title Limeys either.]

Filipinka sums up:

Książkę nazwałabym raczej przeciętną. Oceniam ją przez pryzmat własnych doświadczeń emigracyjnych, jak i porównując do świeżo przeczytanej książki S. Aleksijewicz. *Angole* to zbiór opowieści polskich kolonizatorów (czy bardziej agresywnie – najeźdźców) w Wielkiej Brytanii. Jednak tylko kilka historii zasługuje na uwagę, ponieważ oprócz opisanego przez bohatera drogi do sukcesu czy porażki wnoszą jakąś wiedzę, czy ciekawe wnioski na temat polskiej emigracji czy tytułowych Angoli. Reszta jest bezbarwna i płytka i ginie w masie podobnych do siebie życiorysów.

[I would call the book rather average. I value it through my own emigration experience as well as by comparing it to the newly read book by S. Aleksijewich. *Limeys* is a collection of stories by Polish colonizers (or strongly – invaders) in the UK. Yet only several stories deserve attention, as they bring some knowledge or interesting observations about the Polish immigration or the title Limeys besides telling the ways to success or failure of the characters. The rest of them is colorless and shallow, so it gets lost in the great number of similar fates.]

Migotyńka adds:

Bardzo zależało mi, aby tę książkę przeczytać, ponieważ zastanawiamy się z rodziną nad emigracją na Wyspy. Byłam pewna, że w tej książce znajdę informacje, które mi pomogą w podjęciu decyzji i pomogą zrozumieć kulturę Anglików. Nie mogę powiedzieć, że się nie zawiodłam, spodziewałam się czegoś więcej.

Autorka skupiła się na przypadkach skrajnych. Ja wiem, że takie się najlepiej sprzedają, show musi być, bez łzawych i smutnych historii nie ma dobrego reportażu. Z tytułu wносиłam, że książka ma być o mentalności Anglików – niestety, tego w niej bardzo mało. Dużo więcej historii udanych lub nieudanych emigracji.

Znalazłam może trzy informacje, które rzeczywiście mogłyby mi się przydać przy kontaktach z Anglikami. Jak na książkę o takim tytule, słabo. Jeśli zaś chodzi o emigrację i spostrzeżenia naszych rodaków – nie powiem, warto przeczytać, niektóre historie ciekawe, choć często dość mocno jak dla mnie naciągane i podkoloryzowane. Ale wiadomo, tak jak mówiłam – show must go on. Zauważyłam również brzydką tendencję do przedstawiania Anglików tylko w złym świetle, co zapewne ma pomóc Polakom spojrzeć inaczej na emigrację.

Już sam wstęp jest bardzo wymowny i nacechowany negatywnie, co mi się bardzo nie podobało. Przez całą książkę nie znalazłam ani jednej zalety opisującej charakter ludzi urodzonych na Wyspach. Być może mało uważnie czytałam. Ale to także nie świadczy dobrze o książce.

Podsumowując – spodziewałam się więcej i lepiej jakościowo. Wyszło niestety tak sobie. Jestem trochę zaskoczona, ponieważ słyszałam wiele pozytywnych opinii o twórczości autorki, a tu taki klops. Chcę wierzyć, że następne reportaże będą lepsze.

[I really wanted to read this book, because my family considers immigration to the UK. I was sure I would find information which would be helpful in making such a decision and understanding the English culture. I cannot say I am not disappointed, I expected something more.

The author focused on extreme situations. I know they are most marketable, there must be a show, there is no good reportage without maudlin and sad stories. I deduced from the title the book is going to describe English mentality – unfortunately, there is very little about it. It tells more stories of happy or unhappy immigration lives.

I have found approximately three bits of information, which could be really handy when dealing with English people. Very weak for the book with such title. When it comes to immigration and the insights of our folks – I will not deny, they are worth reading, some of them are interesting, however for me they are often quite far-fetched and colorized. But this is obvious, like I said, the show must go on.

I have also noticed quite an ugly tendency to portray the British only in a bad light, which probably should make Poles look at the emigration from a different angle. The introduction itself is very meaningful and negatively marked, which I really did not like. Throughout the book I have not found a single quality in characters of people born in the Island. Maybe I was not careful enough in my reading. But it also does not speak well of the book.

Summing up – I expected more and better quality. Unfortunately it came out like that. I am quite surprised, as I heard a lot of positive opinions about the work of this author, and here such a failure. I want to believe her next reportages will be better.]

The readers reproach Winnicka for victimization of her interlocutors at the expense of the natives as well as tabloidization of the narrative focusing merely on vivid situations, clear cases enabling black and white moral judgments. They are likely to treat the collection of interviews as a source of direct knowledge rather than a literary piece exactly as professional critics did. They hardly appreciate its literary values or search for a more subtle aspect of this narration, commonly known as truth of literature. Wood argues:

Dorothy Walsh concludes that 'literary art, when functioning successfully as literary art, provides knowledge in the form of realization: the lived experience'. This is very well put, and much of what I have to say is merely a gloss on this claim. But literature not only reports on what happens and on what

may happen, it is itself 'a form of lived experience'. We have the direct experience of words behaving and misbehaving. Our reading is an immediate event, like tasting salt or coriander (Wood 8)

Conversely, Winnicka's readers expect, firstly, a vivid image of life engaged with reality in graphic detail in a way probably Aristotle himself did not expect in his mimetic view on visual and literary arts. Secondly, they demand a broader view on average immigrant fates which are less spectacular, but convey more nuanced truths about Polish-British culture clash and so require a more nuanced literary approach to this problem.

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