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to President Trump's Foreign Policy:
The First Two Years

edited by Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska,
Magdalena Marczuk-Karbownik, Karol Żakowski

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TYPESETTING

AGENT PR

COVER DESIGN

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www.wydawnictwo.uni.lodz.pl

e-mail: ksiegarnia@uni.lodz.pl

tel. +48 42 665 58 63

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Introduction

International Responses to President Trump's Foreign Policy: The First Two Years

Joanna Ciesielska-Klikowska

University of Lodz
Faculty of International and Political Studies
Department of Asian Studies
e-mail: joanna.ciesielska@uni.lodz.pl

Magdalena Marczuk-Karbownik

University of Lodz
Faculty of International and Political Studies
Department of American Studies and Mass Media
e-mail: magdalena.marczuk@uni.lodz.pl

Karol Żakowski

University of Lodz
Faculty of International and Political Studies
Department of Asian Studies
e-mail: karol.zakowski@uni.lodz.pl

Donald Trump's victory in presidential election in November 2016 signified a profound shift in US foreign policy. The new American president was a supporter of renegotiation of the existing international deals, such as North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) with Canada and Mexico, as well as abolition of those that had not been yet ratified, such as Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) with 11 Asia-Pacific countries. On the one hand, he criticized Japan, South Korea, and NATO countries in Europe for insufficient contribution to the maintenance of American military bases on their territories, and on the other hand, he lauded President Vladimir Putin despite Russian annexation of Crimea. Trump's populist, illiberal, isolationist and anti-immigration slogans strikingly contrasted with the diplomatic line of both his predecessor Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton who until the last moment seemed to have the best chances to win the electoral race. The unexpected result of presidential election forced equally US allies and rivals to amend their plans, strategies and policies connected with their relations with Washington.

This volume contains a range of articles that analyze different dimensions of international reaction to the election of Donald Trump as American president. Articles are structured into three thematic blocks. The first block is devoted to US approach towards global challenges. Andrzej Mania and Tomasz Pugaczewicz examine the opinions of American power elites on the changes in US foreign policy under the Trump administration. They indicate that while the liberals and realists differ over the level of faith in the durability of the liberal international order, they mostly agree that the US has to adapt its foreign policy to the increase in power of non-democratic states. Michał Zaremba analyzes Donald Trump's political declarations on official development assistance. He concludes that the new American president's pragmatism, skepticism and distrust regarding assistance policy may lead to redirection of assistance funds to national projects. Grzegorz Nycz examines the Trump administration's ballistic missile defense (BMD) policy. He stresses that the increased defense budget spending may lead to further enhancement of leakproof missile interception, which is vital for political mitigation of potential conflicts related to such states equipped with nuclear weapons as North Korea. Bohdan Szklarski and Piotr Iłowski, in turn, analyze the changes in Polish–American relations since the election of Donald Trump as US president. They indicate that lack of sufficient coordination and planning in Warsaw's foreign policy may disturb cooperation with Washington.

The second thematic block tackles relations between the US and three selected countries in the Asia–Pacific: Japan, North Korea and Australia. Karol Żakowski describes the process of adaptation of Japan's foreign policy to new international conditions after Donald Trump's election as US president. He concludes that while US withdrawal from "Pivot to Asia" and TPP initiatives was detrimental to Tokyo's diplomatic line, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō tried to exploit, though without

great success, Trump's assertive posture against North Korea and China, as well as his softer stance towards Russia. Joanna Beczkowska analyzes the role of "war of words" between Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un in escalation of the Korean crisis in 2017. According to her, the inconsistency of Washington's approach towards Pyongyang could have been used by North Korea to "examine" the acceptable extent of provocation against the US. Mieczysław Sprengel, in turn, compares US–Australian relations before and after the election of Donald Trump as American president. He stresses that while President Trump remained in close contact with Australian leaders, he did not sufficiently take into account the political needs of Canberra.

The third thematic block is devoted to examination of various dimensions of rivalry between the US and China. Mateusz Chatys analyzes the role of the American factor in relations between Singapore and China. He concludes that US withdrawal from TPP runs counter to Singapore's and ASEAN's strategy of neutralizing the growing power of China. Przemysław Ciborek examines cooperation between China and Russia against the international initiatives of Donald Trump. He stresses that Russia, as the weaker player, is an instrument for China in dethroning the US as a global economic power. Paweł Jaskuła, in turn, analyzes the trade war waged on China by the Trump administration. He comes to a conclusion that due to strong economic interdependence between both countries, it is difficult to assess which side would suffer more from the prolonged confrontation.

In the last thematic block there are miscellaneous articles referring to various themes connected with international studies. Boryana Aleksandrova examines three versions of current territorial fragmentation or connectivity – deterritorialization, extraterritorialization and reterritorialization. The article highlights the role of states played in an era of global interconnectedness and underlines ambiguity of this problem. The text by Kassaye Deyassa aims at examining whether the welfare and social policy ideas that characterize Chinese aid in Africa are influencing traditional donors and becoming global. Kardo Karim Rached Mohammad touches upon the issue of conflicts in the Middle East and emphasizes an internal conflict which should be researched and examined. The last article in this part, written by Jarosław Sadłocha, aims at giving a short analysis of a few approaches of the theory of international relations to defining interests and correlating the interpretations of national interests of the Russian Federation. The author discusses Russia's interests in connection with the annexation of the Crimea and Russia's actions towards Ukraine.

The volume is supplemented with the review of Joseph S. Nye's book *Is the American Century Over?* by Monir Hossain Moni.

As the US remains the main political, economic and military power in the world, strategies of other countries usually are to some extent dependent on the ideological leanings, reliance on domestic interest groups, or even personalities of American

Introduction

presidents. The editors hope that the diversity of articles in this volume will enable complex and comprehensive examination of international reactions to President Trump's foreign policy initiatives in the first two years of his presidency.

*

At this point, the editors would like to thank the authors of all articles, whose effort has contributed to this publication that is an important input in an interdisciplinary debate on international relations in which the United States plays a leading role.

PART I

**THE US RESPONSE TOWARDS GLOBAL
CHALLENGES**

Confronting the International Order: Changes in US Foreign Policy from the Perspective of American Power Elites

Andrzej Mania

Jagiellonian University
Institute of Political Science and International Relations
e-mail: andrzej.mania@uj.edu.pl

Tomasz Pugacewicz

Jagiellonian University
Institute of Political Science and International Relations
e-mail: tomasz.pugacewicz@uj.edu.pl

Abstract

The aim of this article is to present the most important voices on the role of the US in the international order during Donald Trump's presidency in the debate held in the *Foreign Affairs*. The authors assume that *Foreign Affairs* expresses the opinions of the most crucial organisation bringing together the elites of American foreign affairs – the Council on Foreign Relations. The paper proposes a hypothesis according to which there is a difference of opinion due to the adopted theoretical perspective regarding Trump's role in the destruction of the liberal international order among the American power elites, even though they agree that the ideological conflict between democratic and authoritarian countries around the world is escalating.

Keywords: United States, international order, Donald Trump, Foreign Affairs, Council on Foreign Relations, US power elite, international relations theories, ideological rivalry, Russia, China.

Introduction

The aim of the paper is to present the most important voices on the role of the US in the international order during Donald Trump's presidency in the debate held in the *Foreign Affairs* bimonthly journal. The authors assume that *Foreign Affairs* expresses the opinions of the most important organisation bringing together the elites of American foreign affairs – the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). In consequence, the discussion held in the journal reflected the debate among the US power elites. The present paper poses a hypothesis that there is a difference of opinion due to the adopted theoretical perspective regarding Trump's role in the destruction of the liberal international order among the American power elites, even though they agree that the ideological conflict between democratic and authoritarian countries is escalating. The research strategy rests with the case study approach, within which qualitative text analysis serves as a data collection method.

The *Foreign Affairs* journal and the Council on Foreign Relations

The Council on Foreign Relations was formally established in 1921 as a fusion of two communities: an informal club, operating in New York that brought together over 100 wealthy American entrepreneurs and lawyers since 1918, and *The Inquiry* think tank established in 1917 by President Th. Woodrow Wilson as a foreign affairs advisory body. The members of *The Inquiry* took active part in the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 (Grose, 1–9; Mania, 159–176)¹.

To this day, CFR maintains its hybrid nature. On one hand, it is an elite membership organisation encompassing over 5000 of “the most prominent leaders in the foreign policy arena, including top government officials, renowned scholars, business executives, acclaimed journalists, prominent lawyers, and distinguished non-profit professionals” (Individual Membership). The members must have US citizenship, meet multiple criteria, and pay annual fees between approximately USD 300 and 4000 (Annual Membership Dues). However, the membership fees constitute only 10% of its income, which was USD 69 million in 2017. Its main sources are interest on capital, donations, *Foreign Affairs* activity, external grants, and corporate memberships (Funding). The president of CFR for the last sixteen years has

¹ CFR published its history twice: *The Council on Foreign Relations*; Grose. See also: Schulzinger. CFR's influence on the US foreign policy was thoroughly analysed twice: Parmar; Wala 1994 (it is a translation of Wala 1990). See also papers on CFR relations with business written from the leftist point of view: Shoup and Minter; Shoup 2015.

been Richard N. Haass, former Policy Planning Staff head in the Department of State during George W. Bush's presidency (Richard N. Haass).

On the other hand, CFR continues its analytical activity by conducting the *David Rockefeller Studies Program*. Currently, CFR employs temporarily or permanently 70 experts (Think Tank). The results of their work are available at <https://www.cfr.org/think-tank>, a website independent from the journal's website. The financing of the aforementioned programme relies mainly on interest on capital, grants from foundations, and corporate payments. In 2017, its budget was almost USD 14 million (Funding). Since 2009, the head of this section of CFR has been James M. Lindsay – a recognised scholar with experience in managing think tanks and former employee of the National Security Council (NSC) (James M. Lindsay).

According to the complex ranking carried out by James G. McGann (University of Pennsylvania), in 2017, the Council on Foreign Relations was the eighth most influential think tank in the US (McGann 2018, 62, 75, 96, 110, and 173). It is usually classified as a centrist think tank (McGann 2005, 12; Trimbath, 41; Think Tanks), but some consider it liberal (Trimbath, 41).

Two years after its establishment, the Council on Foreign Relations started publishing the *Foreign Affairs* journal, first as a quarterly, and currently as a bimonthly (History). Longer texts appear in the printed version, whereas the shorter ones are available at www.foreignaffairs.com (Submissions). Since 2010, the editor in chief has been Gideon Rose, working in the journal since 2000, previously a lecturer and NSC employee (Staff).

In mid-2017, it had over 210 thousand paid subscriptions, while its circulation was over 350 thousand copies. The number of newsletter subscribers was similar – 340 thousand, and its website had almost one million of unique users a month (Circulation). Despite the fact that the papers published in *Foreign Affairs* are not reviewed in the typical manner and lack some characteristics of academic papers, such as footnotes, the journal has the Impact Factor of 2.536 (as of 2016) and is the seventh most often quoted among the 86 International Relations journals in the world. In the prestigious survey Teaching, Research & International Policy (TRIP) from 2014, approx. 800 scholars considered *Foreign Affairs* the second most important journal of the discipline (List the four journals...). In the post-Cold War period, the journal was sometimes (e.g., in 2006) even considered the most influential in the US (Foreign Affairs Again...).

This paper assumes that the texts published in *Foreign Affairs* reflect the perspective of CFR, which is representative for (centrist or centrist-liberal) foreign affairs elites of the US. This approach builds on the idea of epistemic communities, encompassing governmental and non-governmental institutions, that are specialised in a particular sector of public policy (Abelson, 27–28)². It is worth noting that

² More on foreign policy from the domestic perspective (including think tanks) – see: Pugacewicz.

this is only one of many ways of seeing the role of think tanks in a state, because, according to the leading expert in the field, D. Abelson (20–29), they can be also considered as (1) a type of interest group fighting for impact with other groups (e.g. chambers of commerce); (2) an instrument for pursuing the interests of power elites on whose funds think tanks depend; (3) a group of people only those of whom who were employed, at the request of those in power, have any meaning in the political system³.

Trump and the (liberal) international order in *Foreign Affairs*

The subject of the analysis are articles from twelve issues of *Foreign Affairs* published between the official nomination of D. Trump on the Republican Party convention (September/October 2016) and the submission of this paper (July/August 2018)⁴.

In the first two issues, there were no texts directly referring to the role of the US under the leadership of Donald Trump in the international order. However, four papers presented the stances of people responsible for shaping the US foreign policy (Joseph Biden, John Kerry, Ashton Carter, and Martin Dempsey). The authors decided to analyse Biden's statements, as they were the most closely related to the subject of the paper.

Joseph R. Biden (46–58) presented not only the perception of the role of the US in the international order as of the end of the second term of Barack Obama, but also some suggestions for the new president. He emphasised that together with President Obama, they had assumed that the American leadership in the world was based on dynamic economy, military potential, and universal values. However, not only the domestic potential, but also the network of alliances with other countries and the international order based on particular rules and institutions turned out to be decisive. Vice-president Biden underlined that the USA had built the world order after the Second World War and were likely to keep leading it in the twenty first century. Nevertheless, he also cautioned: "If the next administration chooses to turn inward, it could very well squander the hard-earned program we've made not just over the past seven and half years but also over the past seven decades".

He advised the new president that the US should engage on both sides of the Pacific Ocean, as many issues required it. He pointed out domestic and trans-national problems in South America and key allies on the other side of the Pacific Ocean:

³ See also the author's opinion on lack of theoretical studies on the role of think tanks in the decision-making process (Abelson, 13–14).

⁴ The papers on international order that were published only at the websites www.foreignaffairs.com or <https://www.cfr.org/think-tank> are excluded from the analysis. See e.g. Mazarr 2018.

Australia, Philippines, Japan, and South Korea. At the same time, relations with China and members of Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) should be developed. The defence of the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) should be a priority, because it encompasses twelve economies constituting 30% of global trade, 40% of global GDP, and 50% of projected global growth. Biden recommended maintaining proper relations with China while taking a firm position on human rights, intellectual property protection, and freedom of navigation. In case of Russia, he opted for deterrent policy with possibility of tactical cooperation. He insisted on maintaining the sanctions introduced after the annexation of Crimea. He also recommended taking interest in the security of Poland and Baltic states. At the same time, he emphasised the need of international cooperation concerning environment protection threats, malware, and extremist ideologies. To sum up, Biden strongly recommended an active international policy.

The first issue of *Foreign Affairs* in 2017 was titled *Out of Order? The Future of the International System* and consisted of six papers on international order (Rose, C9; Haass 2017a, 2–9; Nye, 10–16; Niblett, 17–24; Mazarr 2017, 25–32; Feigenbaum, 33–40; Schake, 41–46). Among them, Joseph S. Nye's paper is the most related to the analysed problems.

Professor Nye (author of *Is the American Century Over?*) recognised the threats emerging from the fact that the US – despite their military, economic, and soft power potential – may abandon these resources and stop maintaining the existing international order. Such populist statements were heard during the presidential campaign, based on the conviction of white Trump voters that in thirty years, they would not be the majority in the U.S. anymore. In this and similar populist statements, the end of the globalist era and the beginning of the upcoming chaos are observed. It is hard to conclude much from election's rhetoric, but criticism towards TPP and Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) emerged.

However according to Nye, it did not mean the return of the protectionism of the 1930s. Opinion polls conducted by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs in 2016 showed that 65% of Americans considered globalisation favourable for the USA despite the fear of job losses. Moreover, Pew Survey indicated that 51% of Americans thought that immigrants strengthened the US. As a result, it could be concluded that the existing order was not doomed.

Nye wondered what the US, spending approx. 4% of their GDP on defence and foreign affairs, representing half the amount spent during the Cold War, could do about it. It is still an enormous potential allowing also for the activity outside the country. However, the society is not in favour of interventions and significant involvement in international matters. This is the era of terrorism and migration crisis, which worries US citizens much more. Nevertheless, there are regions such as the Middle East, where US involvement is unavoidable. Due to its potential, the United States must cooperate with other states and international organisations.

It has to be clearly stated that “Leadership is not the same as domination” and that cooperation with others with the objective of maintaining the order is now more important than it used to be⁵.

In 2017, in the March/April issue of “International Affairs”, two papers on the international order in general (by Walter Russell Mead and Stewart M. Patrick) and several on important elements of this order (among other things, on the relations between USA and Russia, China, North Korea, or world economy) were published (Mead, 2–7; Patrick, 52–57; Rumer et al., 12–19; Shirk, 20–27; Lind, 74–82; Delury, 46–51). The authors decided to further analyse two general texts and the articles on Russia and China.

The appointment of President Trump made multiple analysts face his point of view and, in consequence, the US policy regarding the most important issues. The topic of the clash of American populism and liberal world order was present already during the elections, as Professor Mead noted. He referred to his own concept of four historical traditions present over the years in the US foreign policy. He points out that there has been no such a fundamental debate on foreign policy referring to historical divisions since Franklin D. Roosevelt.

His first two concepts assumed the functioning of the US in the centre of the world order. The so-called *Hamiltonians* believed that the duty of the US was to replace the United Kingdom as world’s leader defining the directions of the world order. As a result, the US were obliged to deter the USSR and when it fell, promote the liberal order, mostly in economy. The *Wilsonians* also believed in world order, as it was in line with US interests, but focused on values, not on economy. Given the weakness of many countries, they started promoting human rights, democratic order, and the rule of law. Some of them, the so-called liberal institutionalists, focused on international organisations and were in favour of increased integration. What is important, both fractions opted for world order.

However, nationalistic voices advocating lack of involvement in nation building and – in a sense – turning away from the world grew louder and louder. In consequence, two other approaches – Jeffersonian and Jacksonian – returned to favour. The *Jeffersonians*, including contemporary realists, assumed that reducing American involvement would reduce costs and risk in foreign policy. They limited the US interests to the narrow economic aspect. The libertarians, taking an extreme position, looked for supporters on the left, which opposed interventions and wanted to reduce arms expenditure, calling the authorities to focus on internal affairs. During the presidential campaign, Senator Rand Paul from Kentucky and Senator Ted Cruz from Texas adopted this position.

However, Trump sniffed the wind better. He assumed that the USA citizens did not expect Jeffersonian minimalism, but rather Jacksonian populist nationalism.

⁵ See also the following monographs: Lieber; Cohen 2016; Haass, 2017b.

The Jacksonian populism barely focuses on foreign policy, seeing many threats inside the community, for example in the rule of weak and non-patriotic elites taking the side of “African Americans, Hispanics, women, the LGBTQ community, Native Americans, Muslim Americans”. For such voters, the right to bear arms and hostility towards integration and political correctness are the key values. The *Jacksonians* are not satisfied with the US foreign policy and do not accept trade agreements, which they consider unfavourable. This attitude reflects judgments rooted in intuition and populist prejudices rather than knowledge of politics. In case of foreign policy, the main factor is nationalism. Such voters assumed that Trump was on their side.

Another article from *Foreign Affairs* is *stricte* about Trump’s approach to the world order (Patrick, 52–57). Since F. D. Roosevelt, the US has declared in diverse ways their involvement in the world order and have been a global leader. According to Patrick, Trump announces that foreign policy will be nationalist and focused on the defence of US interests. However, Trump has not presented any vision of the new order. He will not take into account the consequences for the world order in his actions concerning foreign and economic policy. He announces reconsideration of existing alliances, trade agreements, introducing barriers in the trade with China, withdrawal from the Paris climate pact, and rejection of the settlement of Iranian nuclear programme. As a result, some countries – forming diverse coalitions – will oppose such policy, which may be unfavourable for the US. Other countries will adapt, seeing no other choice than maintaining relations with the US. Each of these attitudes will affect the forming international order, or rather disorder.

Patrick argues, that observing the world and the worsening situation provides clear data on an obvious change in the international order in terms of geopolitics, economy, and climate change.

In terms of geopolitics, the US have been in the position to manage the system through military dominance strengthened by locating the armed forces in many regions of the world, providing the nuclear umbrella, and treaty commitments to defend the allies from aggression. Trump may infringe it, as he undermines the credibility of such solutions. Many states will start securing themselves through other configurations letting the US know and demanding more autonomy. For Europe, this attitude will weaken the transatlantic links, lead to the need to increase own arms, and to constant balance between the US and Russia, whereas Baltic states may face the threat or need of Finlandisation.

In terms of economy, Trump wants to overthrow or significantly reshape NAFTA, as well as undertake actions against TTP. WTO practice will become protectionist. Asian partners will start joining alternative structures, such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) and contesting American leadership in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. G-20 will become more important than G-7.

The difference of opinions can be observed also in environment protection. Trump does not consider the planned climate-related restrictions relevant despite the fact that the majority of countries are ready to support them.

According to Patrick, it is a paradox that Trump announced that the objective would be to reduce the dependence and risk for the US from the world in terms of politics and economy, but the side effect of such actions may be limiting the potential and weakening the position of the US.

In the same issue of the journal, an article by three analysts on one particular question of the contemporary international order – the relations between the US and the Russian Federation – was published (Rumer et al., 12–19). The authors reminded about the poor state of these relations due to the annexation of Crimea, war in Eastern Ukraine, and Russian policy in Syria. At the same time, Russia states it takes all these steps to defend itself from US and NATO aggression. These analysts recommended to Trump's administration the adoption of five guidelines concerning Russia: (1) clearly commit to help NATO allies through, among other things, expanding own potential and pressure on increased armament of NATO members; (2) remind Russia about the Helsinki Accords of 1975 and the Paris Charter of 1990 on the recognition of borders; even though the return of Crimea to Ukraine is unlikely, it has to be demanded and the sanctions kept; (3) engage in regions bordering Russia to support them; (4) support Ukraine and its reforms together with NATO; and (5) support democracy in Russia and former Soviet states.

US policy towards China became the net focus of interests of *Foreign Affairs* (Shirk, 20–27, see also: Lind, 74–82), which cited the opinions that in thirty years, Chinese economy would be bigger than the American one, and it already had an advantage in international trade. China is indeed able to deal with huge social and economic problems, as proven during the crisis in 2008. China acts confidently, has protectionist policy, demands modern technologies from the Western world, while maintaining restrictions for foreign business within its borders and taking control of the areas on the South China Sea against the maritime law, refusing arbitration. Taking the above into consideration, the U.S. should: (1) maintain the network of alliances in Asia, particularly with Japan and South Korea; (2) stop China's actions constituting a direct threat to the USA (e.g. concerning discrimination of importers); (3) reach out to social groups such as businesspersons, as they can lobby opening up the economy in China; (4) maintain relationships with representatives of important Chinese institutions and build their trust; (5) prevent anti-Chinese attitudes in the US; and (6) clearly express the expectation of support from China.

The May/June 2017 issue of *Foreign Affairs* included two papers on international order (by G. John Ikenberry (2–9), and Jeff D. Colgan and Robert J. Keohane (26–44) and one piece by Matthew Kroenig (30–34) on selection of personnel in Trump's administration.

In his paper, Professor Ikenberry states that the fall of the liberal order should be due to the actions of hostile powers and democratic states should unite to protect it (Ikenberry, 2–9, see also: Colgan and Keohane, 36–44). However, the state that created this order now devastates it. Trump is against the post-war system, trade, multilateralism, environment protection, and human rights in many aspects. The dominant slogan is *America First*. Trump believes that his predecessors made “horrible deals” and the US are surrounded by Islamic terrorism, immigrants, and crime, which have to be resisted. The challenge thrown by Trump at the liberal order is particularly dangerous, as it is built on lack of respect for the standards of liberal democracy (e.g. courts).

For the liberal order to survive, the world has to unite, and the Prime Minister of Japan together with the German Chancellor should play a major role in it. It is not easy, as this order is already compromised and weakened. Trump’s disregard for US achievements in creating the order based on multiple alliances and the UN after the Second World War makes it even more difficult. Trump sees international affairs as transactions. Someone gains and someone loses in a particular deal. He does not see the logic of interdependence. Small victories in particular deals do not create a safe order. If the US abandon the current order, diverse configurations supporting or destroying it will emerge, and China will fill the gap.

Professor Ikenberry states that not everyone in Trump’s administration attacks the international system. For example, in the economic aspect, a part of Trump’s administrations is aware of the threats due to Trump’s lack of faith in free trade, cultivated in the US since the Reciprocal Trade Agreement Act of 1934 and later within WTO. Trump is in favour of mercantilist approach and “win or lose” system, so he withdraws from TPP and wants to renegotiate NAFTA. He considers the EU a German tool “to beat the United States on trade”.

Many politicians are concerned about his attitude towards multilateral rules and institutions, which were created and supported mainly by the US (i.e., UN, IMF, international arms control regime, and human rights conventions). Trump does not show any respect for these rules. He rejects the assumption, present in the US foreign policy since Wilson, that the community of liberal democracies may exist and cooperate guaranteeing order.

Ikenberry concludes that defending the order is the rational thing to do. Therefore, attempts to convince Trump that his *America First* policy is misguided are necessary and Prime Minister Abe together with Chancellor Merkel must maintain the existing order until the end of Trump’s government.

Trump’s supporters also write about forming administration and policy in *Foreign Affairs*. One of them is Kroenig (30–34). He quotes Henry Kissinger, who considers Trump’s administration “an extraordinary opportunity” for American foreign policy. According to Kroenig, the world after Obama’s presidency is more dangerous than it was in 2009. China increases its armaments, North Korea

has 21 nuclear warheads, and the Middle East is disintegrating due to ISIS actions. Trump's somewhat unsuccessful start may later help US regain its position in the world, as he employed the "best and brightest", such as James Mattis and H.R. McMaster mentioned above. Moreover, former CEO of ExxonMobil, Rex Tillerson, was appointed Secretary of State, Mike Pence vice-president, Nikki Haley ambassador with the UN, Dan Coates director of national intelligence, and Mike Pompeo director of the CIA. They form a very valuable team. Steve Bannon, whose qualifications are dubious, was fired.

Moreover, Kroenig rejects the accusations that the slogan *America First* practically brings an end to American leadership. He states that it is not true, as Trump's administration is very active in domestic policy, which guarantees international success. The exchange turnover value and the budget of the Department of Defence are increasing. Relations with Japan are good and relations with NATO, which is no longer considered obsolete, are improving. Trump conducts harsh policy towards Russia, appointing Fiona Hill from Brookings Institution Senior Director for European and Russian Affairs of the NSC. He struggles to improve the conditions of American trade, believing that "free trade has to be fair trade".

In the next issue of *Foreign Affairs* (July/August 2017), two papers on Trump's foreign policy – by Richard N. Haass and Elliott Abrams – were published (Haass 2017c, 2–9; Abrams, 10–16).

In the discussion about the directions of foreign policy, the statement of the aforementioned CFR president is particularly important (Haass 2017c, 2–9). Contrary to Kroenig, Haass believes that Trump forms his team exceptionally slowly and formally delays the declaration of the directions of foreign policy. As a result, many decisions are made in passing.

Haass states that Trump was right that the development of North Korean nuclear potential was the greatest threat and that the current sanction system did not work. Therefore, the president has three options: acceptance, military intervention, and creative diplomacy. Acceptance will not assure safety for the US. Even if North Korea does not attack, it may pass the weapons to other and cause South Korea and Japan to build their nuclear potentials. Military intervention may be either preventive (moving deliberately to destroy a gathering threat) or preemptive (moving quickly to head off and immediate one). It means that North Korea would directly attack a part of the territory of South Korea, which surely prefers to avoid it. The least attractive option is left – negotiations. How to do it? In two stages. First, there should be a temporary agreement on suspending nuclear and missile programmes. The second stage should consist of an agreement to reduce and fully eliminate the programmes.

Haass recommends approaching the question of Taiwan, South China Sea, etc. with caution in relations with China in order not to expose American interests. Under the new circumstances, the US should be ready to raise the issues of monetary

manipulation, governmental subsidies, and intellectual property theft. Simultaneously, they should act in support of extending TPP rather than against it.

According to the head of CFR, the US should assume that even though EU is not perfect, it is the source of stability and welfare, so they should support integration.

In Haass's opinion, using the so-called super bomb to attack Syria in response to the biological weapon attack was a correct reaction. Turkey is an ally, but not a real partner because of its authoritarian order and treatment of Kurds despite their support in the war against ISIS. The agreement with Iran is not perfect, but it is fortunate that the president did not reject it, as it would mean losing control over Iran. Now, the US have to demand full compliance with it. He also suggested that the US should not engage too much in conflicts involving Saudi Arabia. It seems that neither Palestine nor Israel are likely to seek an agreement. The US should act with caution in order not to worsen the situation and should not move the embassy to Jerusalem.

Years ago, George W. Bush asked whether China was ready to act as a "responsible stakeholder" in the international system. The head of the CFR thinks we may now ask the same question about America.

Trump declared that the US would not engage in the affairs of other countries. It is understandable, but burdensome, as seen in the instances of "careless tyrants", such as leaders of Egypt, Philippines, or Turkey. Finally, the president should understand that whatever he says about American institutions, judiciary, Congress, or media, is heard in the world and can affect the respect towards the US and may encourage some to challenge the rule of checks and balances.

Haass believes that Trump should reduce and change the rhetoric regarding trade. Technological innovations are much more responsible for job losses in the US than trade or off-shoring, so protectionism will only encourage others to introduce it too and will make the situation on the US labour market worse. Business security training programmes, plans for workers losing their jobs, and domestic investments need improvements and development.

Haass argues that in terms of climate protection, the lack of acceptance of the fact that climate change is due to human activity is incomprehensible. The multilateral agreement not affecting the sovereignty of the US that has been established in Paris has to be accepted.

The head of the CFR points out that Trump's erroneous concept of administration forming is due to his lack of understanding of its complexity. As a result, many positions are vacant or temporarily delegated to officers. The president prefers an informal decision-making process rather than relying on formal structure of the NSC in foreign and security affairs. Trump boasts about his predilection for shocking people with the unexpected and a general unpredictability; this may work on tactical level, but does not contribute to achieving strategic goals. Maintaining

uncertainty makes sense in case of enemies, but not friends and allies. The Twitter diplomacy intensifies this impression.

According to Haass, breaching the existing order the US benefit from is unreasonable. The existing international order is in crisis and many of its elements require modernising and replenishment in terms of globalisation effects. The strategic goal of the American policy should be protection and adaptation, not destruction.

In Haass's eyes, the slogan *America First*⁶ is unfortunate, as it suggests downsizing the activities of American foreign policy and lack of wider perspective. The President seems to agree with many Americans for whom the expenditures on foreign affairs are too high and at the expense of their own country. For the allies, it means that they are not in the centre of American strategy. Actions aiming at targeting American patriotism at maintaining the global leadership are necessary.

The paper on the directions of administration policy by Abrams, who is an analyst and politician associated with the current administration, seems interesting (Abrams, 10–16)⁷. Abrams admitted that Trump's first statements and actions seemed unpredictable and inconsistent. There were no new mid-level appointments, but it does not make Trump's administration revolutionary. During a certain period, many were concerned that it would be a "Bannonite administration" or "Breitbart presidency". It was due to the appointment of Steve Bannon as a NSC Principal Committee member. He inspired to an extent the indiscretions such as the harsh words about NATO and slow rearmament of Europe, the gesture towards Taiwan that infuriated China, the defence of Putin followed by the question to the Americans "What, you think our country's so innocent?". However, the president gradually abandoned such actions: he expressed a different opinion on NATO, criticised Russia, and Mike Flynn was ousted from his post of National Security Advisor. Finally, Trump appointed respected generals, Mattis, Kelly, McMaster, and Tillerson to high-level positions. Pompeo, a Harvard graduate, became the director of the CIA. In the context of the critique of Trump, using the so-called super-bomb in Syria to defend justice and international standards and not the American world was surprising. It was meant to defend human rights, not democracy, as this administration is against nations building. On the other hand, human rights were not mentioned in front of President Xi Jinping, which is not unusual for the US in relations with states they want to cooperate with (e.g. Reagan acted the same way in front of President Ferdinand Marcos in 1982).

The next three issues of *Foreign Affairs* (October/November 2017–January/February 2018) did not feature any paper on Trump's foreign policy in the context of international order, apart from Andrew J. Bacevich's text on the concepts of

⁶ See a critical analysis of the use of this term in American tradition: Bacevich, 57–67.

⁷ The author of this paper was appointed deputy secretary of state by R. Tillerson.

American exceptionalness (Bacevich, 57–67). Only in the subsequent issue (March/April 2018) titled *Letting Go*, Trump's actions in foreign policy up to date and their influence on the international order were summarised (Rose 2018, C9). Three papers by Eliot A. Cohen (2018, 2–9), Jake Sullivan (10–19), and Barry R. Posen (20–27) were particularly important.

The first of the aforementioned scholars, a recognised military historian and author of the book *The Big Stick: the Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force*, stated that Trump's rhetoric after the swearing in was not far from his nationalist populism of his campaign. However, his actions are an unpredictable version of the traditional policy of the Republican Party, as proven by increased expenses on armaments, readiness to use the armed force, or support for the allies.

Cohen emphasizes that the lack of significant negative consequences of Trump's policy for the US is not a result of wise decisions, but sheer luck, as there has been no domestic crisis or attack on an ally. It is due to the deliberation of the members of Congress, judges, and federal officers, who act in accordance with the consensus elaborated in the US after the Second World War. It is possible, because Trump installed his people on only 40% of high-level positions during the first year of his presidency.

According to Cohen, this situation cannot last indefinitely, as the establishment may no longer be able to hinder Trump or one of the crises may intensify. *A fortiori* that “the Trump administration has not solved any of the problems it inherited”. Each of these creases may aggravate in 2018, whereby the position of the US on the international level is worse in terms of dealing with them than a year earlier. The danger is also that the aggravation of one crisis will make the enemies of the US try to push their interests through in the remaining regions.

On the other hand, Sullivan (10–19), former head of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State, stated that the growing number of states undermining the liberal international order had been emphasised and that the position of the US as its guarantor decreased in relation to the remaining participants. The emergence of a new order or an era of chaos were expected. However, it turned out that “rumors of the international order's demise have been greatly exaggerated”, as it can resist even the adverse actions of its very architect and leader. It is due to the fact that other states benefit from the existing order and want to maintain its fundamentals. At the same time, the US took steps to make the rules of the international order more flexible encouraging the creation of regional rules based on voluntary approach. This, however, does not alter the fact that the existing order cannot be maintained without some corrections due to the increasing challenges and expectations of the emerging powers. The fate of the aforementioned order depend on whether Trump will be elected for the second term.

Posen (20–17) indicated that, despite the promises made during his presidential campaign, Trump did not put the US on the track of isolationism and rejection of

the existing international order. In fact, he actively involves the US, in particular its armed forces, in international matters. As a result, the new president, just like his predecessors, wants to maintain military and economic dominance in the world. However, he rejected its liberal model – he does not support multilateral institutions fostering common values or promote democracy among other states. Thus, Posen concludes that Trump turned out to be in favour of the US hegemony, but not its liberal kind.

The May/June 2018 issue of *Foreign Affairs* brought one paper about the international order. Its authors, Yascha Mounk and Roberto Stefan Foa (29–36), pointed out that the dominance of democratic states was coming to an end after a century. So far, democracy has been attractive not only because of political ideas, but also because of material success of free market economy accompanying it. However, the importance of military and economic power of democratic states is currently decreasing for the benefit of non-democratic states developing state capitalism. In 2018, for the first time in 100 years, the share of world GDP of democratic states is below 50% and will decrease to approximately one third during the next decade. Non-democratic states, although in the early 1990s, they produced only 12% of world GDP, are now responsible for 33% of it (a similar situation could be observed in the 1930s). If the current trends persist, within the next five years, the share of world GDP of non-democratic states will become larger than the share of democracies. As a result, democracy becomes less attractive economically, while authoritarian soft power and the ability of non-democratic states to interfere with internal affairs of the democracies are increasing. If economic development does not lead to democratisation of non-democratic states, the era of dominance of democracy will end with the times of ideological rivalry.

Finally, three papers on international order appeared in the July/August 2018 issue.

In his paper written from the realist point of view, Stephen Kotkin (10–15) stated that the so-called liberal international order was a form of organising and expanding the US zone of influence to assure their domination in the world. Although the sphere of influence was not motivated by altruism, but in the US' own interest, “voluntary alliances, multilateral institutions, and free trade” replaced the alternative of direct subordination. Military and economic domination of the US made building such an order easier.

However, the current position of the US in the world is limited due to two crises. Firstly, the power of the US is decreasing, which reduces their ability to maintain the international order it forced through. The increase of power of China and Russia leads to the increase of soft power of their economic model and their dedication to building their own zones of influence based on their own international order rules. Secondly, the US have a dysfunctional domestic political system within which the elites aspire to promote globalisation in the world, which provides profits

to domestic economic hubs and leads to the development of world economy (including, paradoxically, political rivals) in general, but at the same time contributes to the crisis of domestic economic peripheries, which makes them more likely to support economic nationalism⁸.

Daniel Deudney and already mentioned Ikenberry (16–24) wrote their paper from the perspective of the liberal theory. They emphasise that even though anti-liberal tendencies on the domestic (shift away from democracy because of growing disproportions of income) and international (increase of power of non-democratic China and Russia, abdication of the UK and US) levels are increasing, they are optimistic about the future. Firstly, they believe that only democracy is able to solve the modern problems and the rising ideological rivalry will enforce the reforms aimed at increasing solidarity in democratic states. Secondly, only international institutions formed within the liberal international order are able to ensure security and stable development of states in the world of growing interdependence. They derive their value from the fact that those institutions are “Westphalian, in that they are designed merely to solve problems of sovereign states, whether they be democratic or authoritarian”.

At the same time, the authors point out to the limited extent of Trump’s destructive actions aimed at international institutions of the liberal international order. Firstly, in some areas, “despite Trump’s relentless demeaning of the international order, he has sometimes acted in ways that fulfil, rather than challenge, the traditional American role in it” (e.g. sanctioning Syria for chemical weapons). Secondly, challenging US membership in organisations such as NATO and WTO faces resistance of domestic interest groups whose long-term interests are related with these institutions. As a result, Trump’s actions “... have generated a great deal of anxiety and uncertainty, but their actual effect is less threatening – more a revisiting of bargains than a pulling down of the order itself”. Thirdly, in cases where Trump’s actions breach the liberal order, other states are committed to sustaining it (e.g. after the US withdrawal from the TTP, it was signed nevertheless).

The last paper from this issue was written by Graham Allison (124–133) who states that the concept of liberal international rules-based order is based on three elements: (1) “that the liberal order has been the principal cause of the so-called long peace among great powers for the past seven decades”; (2) “that constructing this order has been the main driver of US engagement in the world over that period”; and (3) “that US President Donald Trump is the primary threat to the liberal order – and thus to world peace”. According to Allison, each of these statements is false, because: (1) for the last 70 years, peace has been the result of the Cold War balance of powers between the US and USSR and, later, the post-Cold War military

⁸ See our previous observation on uneven distribution of profits from globalisation in American society: Mania and Pugacewicz, 247–259.

dominance of the US; (2) the current international order is a result of the US pursuit of their own objectives, because they did not hesitate to break the rules of the order to defend these objectives; (3) “although Trump is undermining key elements of the current order, he is far from the biggest threat to global stability”, because the decrease of the power of the US in the world and the increase of the power of China and Russia are a much bigger threat.

From this point of view, Allison does not consider Trump to be the cause of the breach of international order, but a symptom of the crisis of American political elite, which is unable to provide the conditions for the development of democracy in the US. In consequence, American authorities should focus on creating appropriate conditions for the development of domestic democratic institutions and limit the involvement on the international level, because “it will be enough to sustain a world order ‘safe for diversity’ – liberal and illiberal alike”.

Conclusions

To conclude, at the beginning of the first year of Trump’s presidency, positive opinions of the previous administration and recommendations to maintain the liberal international order prevailed in *Foreign Affairs*. Simultaneously, analysed authors expressed concerns that the declarations of the new president suggested challenging the current position of the US in the world order.

In the context of Trump’s actions, the assessment of the existing international order in the discussed papers varied depending on the position regarding the theory of international relations.

The liberals pointed out that democracy was the only system able to solve the contemporary problems and the liberal international order defined as cooperation within international organisations was the only warranty that there would not be a global catastrophe due to increasing interdependence. They emphasised that Trump challenged the assumptions of the liberal international order only partially, as the opponents of his policy were present on the level of both international system and domestic political system. At the same time, they indicated that the new president aimed at building an international order assuring the US freedom of decision and more accepting towards non-democratic entities.

On the other hand, the realists have less faith in the durability of the liberal international order. They believe that also non-democratic states are able to solve contemporary problems and take care of economic development. They consider the liberal international order merely a form of the American sphere of influence, the extent of which is set by military and economic power of the United States. The increase of power of non-democratic states will lead to formation of their own zones of influence based on the rules of international order they push through.

Regardless of their theoretical stance, the authors of the analysed articles mostly agree that the upcoming years will see a heightened rivalry between democratic and non-democratic ideologies. It is a result of the increase of power of non-democratic states, including their soft power, and the decline of the importance of democratic countries. Therefore, the US have to get used to living in a world of diverse systems. The future of democratic states does not rely on the promotion of democracy outside their borders, but on the ability of the elites of already democratic states to rebuild the bases assuring the stability of their own systems (e.g. economic solidarity).

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Andrzej Mania – Professor title awarded by the President of Poland in 1993. Since 1997, Professor at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations and head of the Chair of Diplomatic History and International Politics. Simultaneously, since 1994, head of the Chair of American Studies. Between 2008 and 2016, Vice-Rector for Educational Affairs of the Jagiellonian University. Member of the Steering Committee of the International Research University Network (2008–2012). Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund of the Tokyo Foundation at the Jagiellonian University. Fellow or visiting professor in more than ten foreign institutions, including Norwegian Nobel Institute in Oslo, Kennan Institute of Advanced Russian Studies in Washington and the University of Rochester. Authored or co-authored ten books, including *The Department of State 1789–1939* (Jagiellonian University Press, Krakow 2011). Editor of another six books. Member of the Lions Club International (Krakow Stare Miasto).

Tomasz Pugacewicz – PhD, Assistant Professor at the Jagiellonian University in Kraków. The theoretical aspects of his PhD dissertation were published in the monograph *Teorie polityki zagranicznej. Perspektywa amerykańskiej analizy polityki zagranicznej [Theories of Foreign Policy. American FPA Perspective]* (Jagiellonian University Press, Kraków 2017). During his internships abroad, he was a visiting researcher at the Johns Hopkins University, the State University of New

York, and the Heidelberg University. In 2018, he received a grant from the Polish National Science Centre for the project titled “Between Center and Periphery: A Comparison of Ludwik Ehrlich’s Theoretical Concepts with American-British International Relations in the First Half of the Twenty Century”. Holder of several scholarships, e.g. the scholarship of the Copernicus Society in America. In 2015, he participated in the Ideas Lab – the Young Professionals Programme at the Chancellery of the President of the Republic of Poland.

President Trump's Declarations on Official Development Assistance: A Change of Policy?

Michał Zaremba

University of Łódź
Faculty of Economics and Sociology
Institute of Economics
Department of Development Economics
e-mail: michal.zaremba@uni.lodz.pl

Abstract

For years official development assistance (ODA) has been one of the most important forms of financial assistance provided to developing countries by highly developed countries. Despite the controversy over the effectiveness of assistance, it has become a permanent element of the international aid system. With the election of Donald Trump and one of the key slogans of his campaign – *America first* – the political climate around official development assistance is changing. The aim of the article is to analyze the role of official development assistance in political declarations of the current president of the United States.

Keywords: official development assistance, USA, Donald Trump, international political economy.

Introduction

During its existence, the official development assistance (ODA) system has become one of the most important tools for supporting developing countries in overcoming development problems and helping them to enter a sustainable and balanced path of growth and socio-economic development. Traditionally, the role of donors was restricted to the so-called rich North, which meant Western European countries, the USA and Canada, as those countries largely shaped and implemented development policy that supported poor developing countries.

With the election of Donald Trump and one of the key slogans of his campaign – *America first* – the political climate around official development assistance is changing. The aim of the article is to analyze the role and importance of official development assistance in political declarations of the current president of the United States. The article presents briefly the characteristics of official development assistance and then the characteristics of selected announcements of changes in the US foreign economic policy. In the last part a critical analyses of Trump's statements regarding official development assistance will be conducted.

International development assistance system

One of the most important problems of the modern world is the problem of global imbalances in the level of socio-economic development of individual regions, which potentially represents a significant prerequisite for the emerging of new conflicts. For this reason, development assistance plays an important role in the world and has been a subject of profound research in the social sciences.

Reasoning for development assistance was justified in the development models created after World War II. According to the theory, each monetary unit of an exogenous character increases the beneficiary savings resources that could be spent on investment. The best known is model proposed by Roy F. Harrod and Evsey D. Domar, who relied on these assumptions. Hollis B. Chenery and Allan M. Strout, basing on their model, created so called two-gap model, which justifies the role of development assistance as a stimulus for economic development. This model, despite the criticism, is still treated as a justification for the development assistance and the global assistance system (Easterly, *Can Foreign Aid Buy Growth?*, 32–33).

Development assistance can also be seen as a political instrument in the post-colonial system, allowing or sustaining strategic control on the developing countries, which was particularly evident during the Cold War (Véron, 7). This problem is still important, as many studies consistently show that the non-formal determinants, like former colonial ties, the method of voting in the UN or the historical and geostrategic considerations, are often the main determinant of assistance (Easterly,

Are Aid Agencies Improving, 646–651; Noorbakhsh, Paloni, 928; Mawdsley, 502–503; Hansen, Tarp, 375–398).

Researchers distinguish two groups of factors determining aid: non-political and political (Round, Odedokun, 302–303). The first group includes:

- level of income per capita;
- business cycle phase;
- the level of budgetary expenditure and the budget deficit;
- peer pressure (*the herd effect*) – the amount of development assistance depends on the amount of assistance granted by other donors;
- level of social protection in domestic politics – the lower it is, the less altruism is expected;
- size of the state, geopolitics and geoeconomics associated with the country;
- other temporary factors.

Political determinants include:

- the ideological orientation of the donor;
- the constitutional independence of decision-makers;
- the balance of power in the government, determining the situation in the country.

Since 2005, the total amount of assistance was more than \$ 100 billion per year, what more the “traditional” donor countries (the so-called Rich North) have been followed by Arab donors (Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates) and the countries referred to as the “new” donors: China, Brazil, India, South Africa and Russia. Each group of donors has its own rules, but the most formal form of assistance has been developed by OECD countries within the official development assistance framework.

The official development assistance (ODA) is understood as donations and loans provided to developing countries by official government institutions of donor countries or international organizations supporting economic development and prosperity in these countries. Loans are counted as official development assistance only if they include a donation of at least 25% of the value of the assistance. List of assistant recipient countries is periodically revised in accordance to the classification of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD (*DAC Statistical...*, 11; Deszczyński, 79, 84–87; Bagiński, Kowalska, 89–92). In order to classify resources as ODA, following conditions must be fulfilled:

- they are provided by the official sector of the state (government or local authorities);
- the aim of transferred funds is socio-economic development;
- they have a preferential character, which is manifested among other in donation component;
- the transfer recipient (beneficiary country) is listed on the DAC List of ODA Recipients.

Overall development assistance to developing countries increased over time, becoming an important component of international politics countries known as Global North (Table 1).

Table 1. Value of ODA for certain highly developed countries in 2017

Country	Value of assistance (billions of USD)	Share of total assistance (%)
Australia	3 025	2,12
Austria	1 583	1,11
Belgium	2 306	1,62
Canada	3 962	2,78
Czech Republic	261	0,18
Denmark	2 372	1,66
Finland	1 057	0,74
France	9 501	6,66
Germany	24 670	17,30
Greece	264	0,19
Hungary	155	0,11
Iceland	50	0,04
Ireland	802	0,56
Italy	4 856	3,40
Japan	10 368	7,27
Luxemburg	384	0,27
The Netherlands	4 988	3,50
New Zealand	438	0,31
Norway	4 352	3,05
Poland	603	0,42
Portugal	340	0,24
Republic of Korea	1 965	1,38
Slovakia	107	0,08
Slovenia	80	0,06
Spain	4 096	2,87
Sweden	4 870	3,41
Switzerland	3 563	2,50
The United Kingdom	18 013	12,63
The USA	33 589	23,55
Total	142 619	100

Source: Based on *International Development Statistics* (IDS) online databases <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/data.htm>

Objectives of the assistance changed during the time in accordance to the doctrine of economic development and political situation in the world. Depending on the recommendations, the countries spend assistance on poverty reduction, sustainable development or increasing the commercial potential recipient. Later, the list of objectives was enriched with promoting gender equality, empowerment of women, conflict prevention, and more recently, improving the quality of governance. In addition, the DAC recommends non-repayable assistance as the basis for the functioning of development aid (Nowak, 460).

Changes in US foreign economic policy – the era of *Trumponomics*?

The candidate Trump and the President-elect Trump, aroused both interest and controversy from the very beginning, becoming the subject of broad analyzes. One of the most important research areas is the issue of economic policy conducted by the new president.

The declarations and the steps already taken in the field of economic policy are collectively referred to as *Trumponomics*, evoking a clear association with Ronald Reagan's *Reaganomics*. Undoubtedly, the most important axis around which economic policy is being built is the slogan *America first*, which at least declaratively means a desire to revise the current model of world trade and globalization. Concrete actions, if they are taken, may mean above all the renegotiation of trade agreements and the use of tariff instruments in trade policy, and hence the return, at least to some extent, of protectionist and mercantilist practices. Obviously, this would affect mainly Asian countries (primarily China), which financially and commercially want to dominate the USA. However, it is not certain how, in which form and when this policy could be applied. It should be borne in mind that Trump's foreign economic policy will reflect his own attitudes in national politics. The existing declarations and actions indicate that the focus is on reducing tax burdens, primarily for enterprises, reducing administrative and legal requirements and simplifying them, as well as government infrastructure investments. The question to what extent the policy will actually be implemented remains a matter of debate, even though it was an important element of the election campaign and Trump's declarations.

Trump is not against free trade as such, but opposes multilateral trade agreements. Both the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) would not have any chance of success in the proposed form. It is worth noting that both Trump and Clinton opposed the TPP evoking negative impact on the US labor market. As Patten noted: "The case for tearing up free-trade agreements and aborting negotiations for new ones is premised

on the belief that globalization is the reason for rising income inequality, which has left the American working class economically marooned” (Patten). By withdrawing from multilateral trade treaties or changing them, Trump strives to protect jobs in the American industry, and more generally: to stop negative trends as a result of changes in global order. Politically speaking, the rejection of a free trade agreement makes sense in domestic policy for at least two reasons. First, it would help Trump politically destroy the legacy of Obama’s administration in terms of free trade, and secondly and more importantly: Trump can strengthen his political power, appealing to, at least, some of Bernie Sanders’ supporters who as a candidate also raised issues related to the American labor market.

The problem is that Trump’s free trade paradigm is ideologically closer to the mercantilist understanding of international trade than to the realities of a globalized world. In fact, Trump categorically expresses its opposition to globalization in its current form: “No country has ever prospered that failed to put its own interests first. Both our friends and our enemies put their countries above ours and we, while being fair to them, must start doing the same. We will no longer surrender this country or its people to the false song of globalism. The nation-state remains the true foundation for happiness and harmony. I am skeptical of international unions that tie us up and bring America down and will never enter” (Trump). Trump has repeatedly stated that the US political elite consistently implements the globalization policy that has enabled the transfer of jobs, capital and technology to other countries. Trump’s opposition to globalization is emphasized by his view that international institutions such as the World Trade Organization, NATO or the UN that set, in his view, unacceptable restrictions on the American policy (Shuster 2016).

Trump is not only skeptical about globalization (at least in its present form), but at the same time is particularly focused on the thesis that political and economic power of the state has been weakened by non-state forces, such as large international corporations that are transferring their activities to developing countries, which results in an increase in unemployment in developed economies. Societies in developed countries have negative views on economic, political and cultural globalization, which corresponds with Trump’s populist rhetoric known under political slogan *Make America Great Again*.

In summary, in the case of Trump, we have revolutionary announcements, largely questioning the current political and economic consensus. Trump as a realistic, not idealistic neo-mercantilist captured the real dissatisfaction of the electorate sense of wrong and injustice. Nevertheless, the final, real decisions must pass the entire parliamentary procedure. But the Congress likewise the whole country, is very divided. In addition, the fact that Trump has no political experience means that the situation is uncertain and we might experience many odd decisions regarding foreign and domestic policies.

Official development assistance in political statements of Donald Trump

It is worth noting that the US is in absolute terms the largest donor of foreign aid in the world (Figure 1). Trump's views on trade and globalization give insight into how his administration may understand the role of foreign assistance.




Fig. 1. Value of US official development assistance in 1960–2015 in fixed prices from 2015
Source: Based on: *International Development Statistics* (IDS) online databases <http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/data.htm>

In Trump's thinking, foreign assistance is not a "different kind", but a complementary element of foreign trade policy, part of the overall economic program. Trump formulated a foreign aid program according to a new, protectionist key, stating: "The most important difference between our plan and our opponent is that our plan will put America first. Americanism, not globalism, will become our credo... the Americans will be the first again". (Smith). In addition, he declared that: "It is necessary to invest in our infrastructure and stop sending foreign aid to countries that hate us and use this money to rebuild our tunnels, roads, bridges and schools" (Tyson).

If such announcements were to come true, this could mean the end of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and development policies that currently exist. The heart of the matter is that Trump treats spending money to help developing countries legitimate if it is to provide the US with commercial or security-related benefits. In other words, the current development assistance

provided by the USA in the form of official development assistance did not make the US safer or richer. More specifically, Trump expressed his opposition to development aid because it does not succeed and does not meet the expectations of the USA.

Perhaps the most likely change in Trump's administration will be the increase in the conditions for receiving development funds and linking them with international trade. It would mean significant and fundamental changes in foreign assistance policy. This seems to reflect the appeal of Republicans who opt for reducing the funding of the Department of State, diplomacy and foreign assistance and reducing involvement in humanitarian operations around the world (McKnight Nichols). It is not clear to what extent the development assistance based on *Trumponomics* will aim at a real fight against poverty. It is possible that ultimately reducing poverty in developing countries receiving assistance directly or indirectly from the US will be a side effect rather than a planned goal.

Under the *America First* concept, drastic cuts are planned regarding programs for developing countries, as well as integrating USAID with the Department of State. Funds for these purposes in 2018 would be reduced by over 1/3. In addition, the budget documents assume redirecting funding from development assistance to programs closely related to the goals of national security. In the justification of his decision, the Trump administration writes about providing more effective actions through reorganization and consolidation to enable effective diplomacy and development. Suggested proposals are aimed at a reconstruction of the federal budget and they would be the subject of long-term consultations and arrangements between the administration and both chambers of Congress (Harris, Gramer, Tamkin).

In conclusion, it should be stated that in Donald Trump's announcements, the question of development aid for developing countries is primarily considered in the context of foreign policy as such. Trump's skepticism towards the present world order and more or less open criticism of the adopted model of globalization and world trade clearly affects the problem of development assistance. The assistance will most likely go to countries that can help the US protect itself against terrorism and those countries that provide commercial benefits to the US economy. It is obvious that not all aid for poor countries can be considered "good" for the United States and their development.

Conclusions

Development assistance is one of the most important forms of assistance to developing countries. Traditionally, the role of donors was restricted to the rich countries of the West, especially former colonizers and the USA, as the most important country in contemporary political and economic relations.

The election of Donald Trump for the presidential office and his declarations promise major changes in the current model of broadly defined foreign policy – also in the area of development assistance for developing countries. Taking into account the declarations and announcements of the current president, major changes and revisions to the current aid model can be expected. Trump referred them as an ineffective instrument that does not live up to expectations. According to the president's logic, the US must redirect these funds to national projects. The future of the assistance is therefore uncertain.

In any case, US changes in official assistance policy will have a significant impact on the functioning of global development assistance. According to the announcements of the current president, one can expect a greater pragmatism, skepticism and distrust regarding assistance policy. Considering the overall policy, one can certainly expect significant changes, which, as a last resort, may completely change the nature of development aid.

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Michał Zaremba, MA – assistant at the Department of Development Economics of the University of Lodz. Research interests focus on the development problems of Asian countries, with a special focus on India and China. In his doctoral dissertation, he examines the role of market mechanisms and state tools in India's economic development since its independence in 1947. Author of many articles and participant of numerous conferences. Member of Polish Economic Association and Polish Association for International Studies.

Donald Trump's Administration Confronting Missile Defence: Key Challenges and Probabilistic Overview

Grzegorz Nycz

Pedagogical University of Cracow
e-mail: grzegorz.nycz@up.krakow.pl

Abstract

The text describes main US missile defence efforts in the first years of D. Trump's administration. The analysis of current aspects of BMD (Ballistic Missile Defence) deployments is enhanced by probability analysis examining missile defence reliability. Donald Trump took office in the time of increased military competition between the West and Russia and a dangerous regional crisis related to North Korean nuclear arsenal and its ballistic tests. BMD appeared to bring additional chances to US deterrence options in regional scale, allowing more successful first strike or active defence posture. Notably, D. Trump's administration managed to raise defence expenditures including BMD spending.

Keywords: Donald Trump's administration's security policy, missile defence, probabilistic analysis.

Introduction

The progress of US missile defence since the Cold War

The text focuses on the development of US ballistic missile defence (BMD)¹ and the significance of regional missile defence cooperation relying on US technologies and leadership (to include the South Korean and Polish perspective). The text aims also to address the Trump administration's policies towards missile threats in the context of technology development and new challenges in the international environment, i.e. dangerous nuclear and ballistic programs of Pyongyang, which created a threat of a regional WMD conflict.

The increased US investments of the 1980s within Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) brought a concept of an orbital missile defence system, which in a longer perspective would provide a shelter against a massive strategic nuclear strike. In 1989, the US gave up on deploying the SDI, focusing instead on a narrower missile defence system. Alternatives subsequently emerged. The George H. W. Bush administration advocated for Global Protection against Limited Strikes (GPALS) while Bill Clinton modified the design to introduce National Missile Defence (NMD) without space-based interceptors (Baucom, *The Rise and Fall of Brilliant Pebbles*, 164–65; Baucom, *US Missile Defense Program 1944–1994*, 27; Dabrowski, 15). In December 2001 the G. W. Bush administration decided to withdraw from an Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) treaty of 1972 in a new security environment after September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Bush jr. administration plan of additional sites of a Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) in Eastern Europe (in Poland and Czech Republic) was abandoned by Barack Obama administration in 2009, which reduced earlier plans of GMD deployment in Europe to Aegis Ashore bases in Romania and Poland. Notably, New START agreements signed by the US and Russia in Prague in 2010 were leading to a limitation of deployed strategic warheads of both sides to the level of 1550 for each signatory, on all three legs of strategic triad altogether (DoS b).

The twenty first century's US missile defence was formed on the bases of a long-range intercontinental component (GMD), middle-range naval defence Aegis and terminal stage intercept systems, i.e. upper tier Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and lower tier Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC). The budget appropriations for Missile Defense Agency (MDA), including the preceding

¹ Among the bibliography of BMD-oriented research it is worth to note the works of Stephen Cimbala, Andrew Futter, Donald Baucom, Reuben Steff, Ernest Yanarella, Scott McMahon, Dean Wilkening, George Lewis, Catherine Kelleher and Peter Dombrowski, Theodore Postol, James Lebovic, Michael J. Armstrong, as well as (among Polish scholars) of Marek Czajkowski and Tomasz Pugaciewicz, a. o. (Cimbala; Futter; Baucom; Steff; Yanarella; McMahon; Wilkening; Lewis; Kelleher; Dombrowski; Postol; Lebovic; Armstrong; Czajkowski; Pugaciewicz).

institutions reached since 1985 to 2017 USD 190 bn (MDA a). After the US left the ABM treaty, MDA received increased funding to the level of circa USD 8 bn annually. The latest progress of intercontinental GMD included the first successful test intercept of an ICBM target on May 30, 2017 (MDA News).

Donald J. Trump and missile defence's budget

President Donald Trump (promising more funds for stronger BMD, among other Reaganite themes of his presidency) managed to support increased defence budget, growing since he won the race to the White House. Defence expenditures of Trump administration were raised from the level of USD 598.7 bn (USD 593.4 bn in 2016) to USD 643.3 bn in 2018 estimate and USD 688.6 bn in 2019 plan (The White House Office of Management and Budget, 58). The overall MDA funding in 2018–2022 perspective was enlarged from USD 40.9 bn (2018) to USD 47.7 bn in 2019 (MDA b, see table 1).

The total 2019 BMD funding grew to USD 11.5 bn through Congressional action in March 2018 (Judson). MDA's budget in 2018–2023 timeframe plans covered mostly research expenditures on the level of USD 6 bn (see table 1). Those expenses supposed to be a technological hedge against enemy's ICBM (and other ballistic, WMD carriers) progress, as in the case of North Korea. Importantly, 2019 funding was supposed to help to increase GBI number by 20 to 64 due to North Korean proliferation dangers (The White House a 37). Missile defence programs accounted for 5% of 2019 defence modernization programs i.e. USD 236.7 bn (Comptroller 1).

Table 1. MDA funding 2018–2023 USD millions

Year	2018	2019	2020	2021	2022	2023	Overall
Operations & maintenance	504.1	496.0	502.7	535.4	525.7	567.8	3131.7
Procurement	2417.5	2432.0	1945.1	1669.8	1294.9	1486.4	11245.7
Research, development, evaluation	6798.2	6777.3	6868.5	6878.6	6815.4	6665.0	40803.0
Constructions	203.0	206.2	52.2	178.0	647.5	190.8	1477.7
Overall funding	9922.8	9911.5	9368.5	9261.8	9283.5	8910.0	56658.1

Source: MDA b.




Chart 1. MDA funding in 2018–2023 perspective
 Source: MDA b.

MDA director Samuel Greaves in April 2018 justified further increased MDA funding mostly by North Korean threat (Greaves, 1). New technological challenges for US BMD included supersonic-hypersonic cruise missiles launched by rockets, and hypersonic gliders (Greaves, 1). The most important tests planned by MDA in 2019 were European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) phase 3 capabilities and salvo test of GMD (Greaves, 8). Polish Aegis Ashore base built since 2016 was to be delivered by 2020 delayed by two years “due to unsatisfactory rate of construction progress”, with a capacity to launch SM-3 Block II, scheduled for deployment in the operational Romanian base (Greaves, 26, 30–31). BMD technology improvements included multi-object kill vehicle (MOKV) for GMD (a program cancelled by Obama administration and reinvigorated after five years) aimed to place more intercepting vehicles in one interceptor to engage more targets (Greaves, 37).

Missile defence in US national security policy under D. Trump

Key security documents of Trump administration explained the significance of BMD in the light of North Korean threat, as well as Russia’s and China’s ballistic-nuclear advances. Trump administration’s National Security Strategy (NSS) of 2017 mentioned advanced missile proliferation with an eye on North Korea and Iran among main challenges, countered by a new-layered missile defence system developed to protect US homeland (NSS, 3–4, 8, 26). A US BMD response to missile threats from Russia and China (potentially highly dangerous for US command centres and critical infrastructure) was to be limited by requirements of maintaining strategic stability between Washington, Moscow

and Beijing (NSS, 3–4, 8, 26). National Defense Strategy (NDS) of 2018 distinguished among key international security challenges the ballistic threat of revisionist powers and rogue regimes, such as North Korea and Iran, contained by layered and area BMD (NDS, 2, 6). NDS called for enhanced capabilities of the Joint Force in integrating air and missile defence to counter mobile platforms and an improvement of close combat skills adapted to difficult terrain (NDS, 2, 6).

Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of 2018 mentioned that Russia was modernizing its older nuclear-tipped BMD and introducing newly designed systems in the field while Russia's political pressure was undermining US missile defence efforts (NPR, 9). Similarly, as NPR stated, China hugely increased its BMD by a future GMD system testing and planned sea-based midcourse and area systems (NPR, 11). US BMD capacities were to strengthen extended deterrence by damage limiting scenarios, introduced among other non-nuclear (conventional deterrence) measures (NPR, 23). In the North Korean case, missile defence in allied cooperation could support first strike options aimed to downgrade Pyongyang's missile attack before it was able to engage targets i.e. "prior to launch" (NPR, 33). Advances in missile defence technologies used by competing powers were justifying further modernization of US strategic triad, including the replacement of Ohio SSBN class (by Columbia class) and Minuteman III ICBM (NPR, 45).

Steps towards Patriot BMD in Poland

The 2015 Patriot contract with Poland, announced after the public offering was won by Raytheon, included the purchase of US equipment worth USD 2.5 bn within the broader expenses of USD 5 bn on Wisła air and missile defence system, being a part of 10-year program of Polish Armed Forces modernization worth USD 45 bn (DoS a). According to the Polish Ministry of National Defence (MON) the basic task of Polish Patriot would be to counter Russian Iskander (optionally nuclear-tipped) short-range missiles (MON b). Due to Memorandum of Understanding announced in July 2017, the PAC-3 delivery to Poland would begin in 2022, so the missiles could reach operational ability in 2023 (MON c). In November 2017 Defence Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) announced the approval of Secretary of State to sell to Poland PAC-3 systems (DSCA; Stone). The agreement between Poland and US on Patriot delivery was signed on March 28, 2018. The value of the contract was USD 4.75 bn (the negotiated price was reaching even USD 10.5 bn due to technological requirements) for two batteries with 16 launchers and 208 missiles scheduled on 2022, to be operationally ready between 2023–2024 (MON a; US Embassy). Among

the controversial issues remained combat effectiveness of PAC units (while its tests results showed 86–88% reliability). Since the Kuwait war, when the US attempted to upgrade Patriot quickly from air defence weapons to missile defence capacity (to hit Al-Hussein missiles reaching a speed of up to 2200 metres per second) the effectiveness of PAC was put in doubt (McMahon, 297). T. Postol (170) critically claimed that real-time PAC performance at the time was much lower than the official government records.

North Korean crisis

In the time of Pyongyang's dangerous thermonuclear and ICBM tests, Donald Trump's administration took a difficult attempt to increase pressure on North Korea by stricter sanctions along with broader defence ties with Seoul (including THAAD deployments) and Tokyo, threatened by Pyongyang's aggressive proliferation policies. The analysed scenarios included even a first strike against North Korean nuclear facilities while the US kept all military options opened.

Key North Korean missile accomplishments by 2017 from MDA's perspective included launches of Hwasong-14 ICBM and Hwasong-15 ICBM, as well as Hwasong-12 IRBM (Greaves, 4). The deployment of THAAD battery in South Korea, operational since 2017, was to support the layered missile defence in the region, earlier based on Aegis and PAC (US Army; Choon). Due to US assessments, the sharp PRC's criticism of THAAD in South Korea was based on Beijing's view that the system was de facto aimed at Chinese strategic capacities (Meick, Salidjanova, 3).

Importantly, THAAD battery deployed in Seongju country with a 200 km range could not intercept all missiles attacking South Korea, including those targeting Seoul, as well as in the case of salvo multiple short-range missile attacks, potentially countered by Patriot and Aegis engagement (Kang). High THAAD reliability according to RAND expert was needed due to the threat posed by North Korean NoDong and medium range Musudan missiles (Bennett).

As Scott Sagan (73) noted, US intelligence data showed that by November 2017 North Korean regime gathered an arsenal of 60 nuclear warheads (while its ability to install them on missiles capable of reaching continental US was questioned) and "window of opportunity" for effective pre-emptive strike stopping Pyongyang's nuclear armaments should be seen as closed.

Ground-breaking compromise on the prospects of the denuclearization after the long crisis appeared possible due to the spirit of Pyongchang Olympics, which opened path to détente. Notably, South Korea's Moon Jae-in skilful diplomacy and surprising Kim Jong-un's willingness to compromise, led to breakthrough declaration on demilitarizing the North's nuclear program, delivered on April

27, 2018 in Panmunjeom (KOCIS). Notably the June 12, 2018 Singapore summit (Trump-Kim) confirmed the Inter-Korean Panmunjeom declaration on complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (The White House b).

BMD test results and probability analysis

In March 2018 the overall test reliability of U.S. BMD reached 81.4%, for all elements effective in 83 out of 102 intercept attempts since 2001 (MDA c). By May 2017 the results of US BMD brought 76 successful intercepts in 93 attempts, including all elements of future layered missile defence system since 2001. The overall test reliability in trials of all components (by mid-2017) reached 81.7%, whereas without PAC-3 (0.862 reliable) the reliability of other components stood at 0.797 including 0.833 for Aegis, 0.55 for GMD and 100% for THAAD (MDA c).² Only PAC interceptors were combat proven. By mid-2018 PAC-3 effectiveness was raised to 88%, i.e. 30 successes in 34 attempts (MDA d).

Dean Wilkening explained – in reference to J. Bernoulli binomial distribution – the probability P(x) of defeating the BMD by x number of incoming warheads by an equation:

$$P(x) = \binom{W}{x} q^x (1 - q)^{W-x} = \binom{W}{x} (1 - K_w)^x (K_w)^{W-x} = \frac{W!}{x! (W - x)!} (1 - K_w)^x K_w^{W-x}$$

where K_w meant the (single) probability of detection and interception of an incoming warhead by an interceptor, W stood for the amount of attacking warheads, in the case of defeating all warheads (and $x = 0$) $P(0) = (K_w)^W$ (Wilkening, 187–188).

Table 2. The probability of defeating the missile defence by from 0 to 5 warheads in Bernoulli distribution for interceptors' SSKP = 82% and a simultaneous attack of 5 warheads (under the conditions of Dean Wilkening's model)

x	0	1	2	3	4	5
P(x)	0.371	0.407	0.179	0.039	0.004	0.0002

Source: own counting (using Microsoft Excel) according to an equation

$P(x) = \frac{W!}{x! (W - x)!} (1 - K_w)^x K_w^{W-x}$ based on Dean Wilkening model of Bernoulli distribution (Wilkening, 187–188).

² BMD without GMD was 0,869 effective by May 2017 (Ibidem).




Chart 2. The probability of defeating the missile defence by from 0 to 5 warheads in Bernoulli distribution for interceptors' SSKP = 82% and a simultaneous attack of 5 warheads
Source: as above.

The table and chart show the probability of defeating the BMD by a given amount of attacking warheads (from 0 to 5) when 5 warheads attack and Single Shot Kill Probability (SSKP), i.e. the likelihood of interception of a single attacking warhead by a single defending missile, reaches 82%. In this case the highest probability 0.41 (41%) is attributed to the outcome of one warhead breaking through the defences, slightly smaller (37%) chances are attributed to a full (leakproof) interception, i.e. 0 warheads would defeat the defence.

Laura Grego, George N. Lewis, David Wright (1, 5) referring to earlier Dean Wilkening's model of intercept probability explained the lowering chances of intercept with the increasing number of incoming warheads through an equation:

$$1 - P(0) = 1 - p^n$$

where n stands for the number of incoming warheads and p for a SSKP (interception probability), the right side of an equation shows the probability that at least one of the incoming warheads would defeat the BMD, e.g. for SSKP = 95% the non-leakproof probability for the attack of 5 warheads reached 0.23 i.e. $1 - 0.95^5$.

Table 3. Test effects of interception (interceptors' SSKP = 82%) of 5 warheads (salvo), the probabilities of defeating the BMD by from 0 to 5 warheads

distribution	x - warheads	0	1	2	3	4	5
Bernoulli	P(x)	0.371	0.407	0.179	0.039	0.004	0.0002
Poisson	P(x)	0.407	0.366	0.165	0.049	0.011	0.002

Source: own counting (using Microsoft Excel) according to an equation

$$P(x) = \frac{W!}{x!(W-x)!} (1 - K_w)^x K_w^{W-x}$$

based on Dean Wilkening model of Bernoulli distribution (187-188) and

(Poisson distribution), $P(x) = \frac{\lambda^k}{k!} e^{-\lambda}$

The comparison of Bernoulli and Poisson distribution was introduced after Janina Jóźwiak and Jarosław Podgórski (137-139).




Chart 3. Test effects of interception (interceptors' SSKP = 82%) of 5 warheads (salvo fired), the probabilities of defeating the BMD by from 0 to 5 warheads
 Source: own counting based on Wilkening model of Bernoulli distribution (187-188), including Poisson distribution example of Jóźwiak and Podgórski (137-139).

The probabilities referring to the 0-5 warheads defeating the BMD while 5 warheads attacked and SSKP equalled 82% (close to the mean effectiveness of all US BMD components), signified a small advantage of a probability that one warhead would defeat the defence (over the probability of a leakproof interception) in Bernoulli distribution and slight advantage of a probability of a leakproof interception over a scenario that one warhead would defeat the missile defence system in Poisson distribution.

Table 4. Probabilities that from 0 to 6 (or more) warheads would defeat the BMD in Bernoulli distribution (interceptors' SSKP = 87%) through a simultaneous attack of 5–15 warheads (first row from the top refers to the amount of attacking warheads: 5 to 15; first column from the left refers to the number of warheads defeating the BMD)

war-heads: warheads defeating the BMD (0–6 or more)	overall amount of attacking warheads (5–15)										
	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15
0	0.50	0.43	0.38	0.33	0.29	0.25	0.22	0.19	0.16	0.14	0.12
1	0.37	0.39	0.40	0.39	0.38	0.37	0.36	0.34	0.32	0.30	0.28
2	0.11	0.15	0.18	0.21	0.23	0.25	0.27	0.28	0.29	0.29	0.29
3	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.06	0.08	0.10	0.12	0.14	0.16	0.17	0.19
4	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.08
5	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03
6		0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01

The probability that 7 or more warheads would defeat the BMD were below 1 percent. Source: own counting based on Wilkening model of Bernoulli distribution (187–188).

Table 5. Probabilities that 0–12 warheads would defeat the BMD (interceptors' SSKP = 87%), Bernoulli distribution, for 16–30 attacking warheads (salvo)

warheads defeating the BMD	16	17	18	19	20	21	22	23	24	25	26	27	28	29	30
0	0.11	0.09	0.08	0.07	0.06	0.05	0.05	0.04	0.04	0.03	0.03	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
1	0.26	0.24	0.22	0.20	0.18	0.17	0.15	0.14	0.13	0.11	0.10	0.09	0.08	0.08	0.07
2	0.29	0.28	0.28	0.27	0.26	0.25	0.24	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.19	0.18	0.17	0.16	0.15
3	0.20	0.21	0.22	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.23	0.22	0.21	0.21
4	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.17	0.18	0.19	0.19	0.20	0.20	0.21	0.21	0.21
5	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.09	0.10	0.11	0.12	0.13	0.14	0.15	0.16	0.16
6	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05	0.06	0.07	0.08	0.08	0.09	0.10
7	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.05
8	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.02	0.02	0.02
9	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.01	0.01	0.01

The probabilities of 10 or more warheads defeating the BMD were below 1%.

Table 4 and chart 4 show that for five attacking warheads (and interceptors' SSKP = 87%) chances of a leakproof interception (0 warheads penetrating the defence) stood at 0.50 (50%). There was a 37% probability that one warhead would break through the defence and 11% that two warheads would defeat the defence (table 4, column second from the left, under "5"). The leakproof intercept probability was obviously decreasing when larger number of warheads attacked simultaneously, i.e. leakproof intercept probability fell to 43% in a scenario of a defence against six warheads, while under such conditions the probability of one warhead passing through the defence stood at 39% (table 4, column third from the left, under "6").




Chart 4. Probabilities (in Bernoulli distribution) that from 0 to 15 warheads would defeat the BMD (interceptors' SSKP = 87%) through a salvo attack of from 5 to 15 warheads
Source: as above.

The introduction of additional interceptors could not save the leakproof perspectives under the condition of salvo attack of more than 15 warheads without SSKP improvements, for SSKP at 87% (see table 6, chart 7). It is noteworthy that it may be more effective to increase SSKP than add more missiles to BMD.




Chart 5. Probabilities that 0-12 warheads would defeat the BMD (interceptors' SSKP = 87%) in Bernoulli distribution, for 16-30 warheads (salvo attack)
The probability that 12 or more warheads would defeat the BMD were below 1 percent.
Source: as above.

George N. Lewis explained the layered defence reliability according to the equation showing the probability of a leakproof interception

$$P(o) = 1 - (1 - p)^n$$

where p stood for SSKP and n for the number of layers of BMD system, or interceptors (Lewis, 1418-1438). In this analysis (regarding salvo attacks and additional interceptors) in place of SSKP a probability of leakproof salvo interception was used.




Chart 6. Probability of defeating the BMD (interceptors' SSKP = 87%) by 1 or more warheads for 5-30 warheads (salvo attack)
Source: as above.

Table 6. Effects of using additional interceptors (from 2 to 10 against 1 warhead) against from 5 to 30 warheads (salvo attack). Probabilities (in Bernoulli distribution) of a leakproof interception (o warheads defeat the BMD), for the interceptors' SSKP = 87%

interceptors warheads	2	3	4	5	10
5	0.748	0.874	0.937	0.968	0.999
6	0.679	0.818	0.897	0.942	0.997
7	0.612	0.758	0.850	0.906	0.991
8	0.549	0.697	0.796	0.863	0.981
9	0.490	0.635	0.739	0.814	0.965
10	0.435	0.575	0.681	0.760	0.942
11	0.386	0.518	0.622	0.704	0.912
12	0.341	0.465	0.565	0.647	0.875
13	0.300	0.415	0.511	0.591	0.832
14	0.264	0.369	0.459	0.536	0.785
15	0.232	0.327	0.411	0.484	0.733
16	0.204	0.290	0.366	0.434	0.680
17	0.179	0.256	0.325	0.389	0.626
18	0.156	0.225	0.288	0.346	0.573
19	0.137	0.198	0.255	0.308	0.521
20	0.120	0.174	0.225	0.273	0.471
21	0.104	0.153	0.198	0.241	0.424
22	0.091	0.134	0.174	0.213	0.380
23	0.080	0.117	0.153	0.187	0.340
24	0.069	0.102	0.134	0.165	0.302
25	0.061	0.089	0.117	0.145	0.268
26	0.053	0.078	0.103	0.127	0.238
27	0.046	0.068	0.090	0.111	0.210
28	0.040	0.060	0.079	0.097	0.185
29	0.035	0.052	0.069	0.085	0.163
30	0.030	0.045	0.060	0.074	0.143

Source: own counting based on Dean Wilkening (187-188) model and $P(0) = 1 - (1 - p)^n$ according to George N. Lewis (1418-1438) model.




Chart 7. Effects of additional interceptors (from 2 to 25 against 1 warhead) when 5–30 warheads attack: probability of a leakproof interception, SSKP = 87%
 Source: as above.

Table 7. Effects of additional interceptors (from 2 to 10 against 1 warhead) when 5–30 warheads attack: probabilities (in Bernoulli distribution) of a leakproof interception for interceptors' SSKP = 93%

warheads	2	3	4	5	10
5	0.907	0.972	0.991	0.997	1.000
6	0.875	0.956	0.984	0.995	1.000
7	0.841	0.937	0.975	0.990	1.000
8	0.806	0.915	0.962	0.983	1.000
9	0.770	0.890	0.947	0.975	0.999
10	0.734	0.863	0.929	0.963	0.999
11	0.698	0.834	0.909	0.950	0.997
12	0.662	0.803	0.886	0.934	0.996
13	0.627	0.772	0.861	0.915	0.993
14	0.593	0.740	0.834	0.894	0.989
15	0.560	0.708	0.806	0.872	0.984
16	0.528	0.676	0.777	0.847	0.977
17	0.498	0.644	0.748	0.821	0.968
18	0.468	0.612	0.717	0.794	0.958
19	0.440	0.581	0.687	0.766	0.945
20	0.414	0.551	0.656	0.737	0.931

Table 7 (cont.)

warheads	2	3	4	5	10
21	0.388	0.521	0.626	0.707	0.914
22	0.364	0.493	0.596	0.678	0.896
23	0.341	0.465	0.566	0.648	0.876
24	0.320	0.439	0.537	0.618	0.854
25	0.299	0.414	0.509	0.589	0.831
26	0.280	0.389	0.482	0.560	0.807
27	0.262	0.366	0.455	0.532	0.781
28	0.245	0.344	0.430	0.505	0.755
29	0.229	0.323	0.405	0.478	0.727
30	0.214	0.303	0.382	0.452	0.700

Source: as above.




Chart 8. Effects of additional interceptors (from 2 to 25 against 1 warhead) when 5–30 warheads attack simultaneously: probabilities of a leakproof interception for interceptors' SSKP = 93%
Source: as above.

The included tables and charts show the necessity of SSKP improvement (more important than plain adding more BMD missiles) to provide for a leakproof intercept chances in multiple warheads salvo attacks. The probability analysis proves that even a (costly) engagement of 5 and more interceptors against each of salvo attacking warheads for SSKP below 90% could not secure a leakproof interception (important against WMD threats). As the presented case of 87%-high SSKP (close to PAC-3) shows, even too costly and unrealistic engagement of 10 interceptors against each attacking warhead would not bring a leakproof interception when

more than 20 warheads attack simultaneously. In this example the rise of SSKP from 87% to 93% could improve the leakproof chances intercept higher than proportionally (to SSKP increase). At SSKP level equalling 93% a hypothetical use of 5 interceptors against each of the warheads attacking simultaneously (a salvo) could provide for a 45% probability of a leakproof interception in a scenario of a defence against 30 warheads incoming simultaneously while at the SSKP level equalling 87% the leakproof intercept chances in an analogous case reached only 7%, i.e. 6 percentage points SSKP increase (from 87 to 93) raised leakproof intercept probability by 38 percentage points.

Conclusion

By the time of Donald Trump's first years in office, the US BMD progress opened a perspective of a low-leaking defence, reaching a reliability above 80%, towards the 90% level. Nonetheless, the nuclear dimension of threats posed by contemporary dictatorships, most visible in the case of North Korea, led to a verification of predictions of missile defence effectiveness to focus on the chances of leakproof performance (highly important in the case of WMD-tipped warheads). Therefore, the abilities of political mitigation of emerging conflicts related to rogue states equipped with nuclear weapons appear to be conditioned by the capacity of the leading peacekeeper to provide for a leakproof interception. The official state-of-the-arts of BMD technology available by 2017–2018 could bring the partial perspective of terminal leakproof defence through THAAD (with its perfect test results, but no combat experience). Present-day PAC performance still needs to be improved to rely on such an interceptor to provide for a leakproof scenario in the future. The development of GMD' SSKP to high-level performance appears to be more difficult and costly, while it would require a maturing technology of multiple-object kill vehicle, among others, to create future perspective of a defence against decoys released with warheads (MIRV) using low number of GBI's. The present development of Aegis system (after Barack Obama administration cancelled its intercontinental stage) still could not fill a dangerous gap in BMD systems of the US and its allies, weakened in an important dimension by relatively low test results of midcourse defence segment.

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Grzegorz Nycz – PhD, adjunct professor at the Pedagogical University of Cracow's Institute of Political Science. Graduated from Jagiellonian University and Cracow University of Economics. Ryoichi Sasakawa Young Leaders Fellowship Fund Fellow 2007/2008. His research refers to US security and foreign policy, with a special focus on nuclear deterrence and ballistic missile defense postures. His recent publications include a monography on strategic balance and US national security policy since 1945 to 2015 (published by Pedagogical University of Cracow in 2016) and articles related to ballistic missile defense investments, as well as US military-political engagements in Eastern Europe, Middle East and East Asia in the time of the "New Cold War" between Russia and the West.

Searching for Solid Ground in Polish-American Relations in the Second Year of the Trump Administration

Bohdan Szklarski

University of Warsaw
American Studies Center
e-mail: bohdan.szklarski@uw.edu.pl

Piotr Ilowski

Polish Academy of Sciences
Institute of Political Studies
e-mail: piotr.ilowski@wp.pl

Abstract

Since the beginning of the Trump Administration, analysts of American foreign policy have observed several changes in the style substance and style of Washington's international behavior with regard to both foes and friends. President Trump in his rhetoric (including social media communication) and style represent a disturbing discontinuity, especially for allies that undermines the stability of American international commitments. American allies are forced to develop new strategies for managing this new risk in relations with Washington. This paper examines the tactics employed by the government in Warsaw in that regard.

Keywords: policy style, uncertainty, risk management, continuity, bilateralism, special relations, alliance, Donald Trump.

Introduction: the stage is set for new understanding of allied relations

In the first almost two years of Donald Trump administration's relations with Warsaw, we could observe a number of tendencies, which can be epitomized as a departure from structural asymmetry (based on long term commitments, shared interests and axiological proximity) in favor of transactional asymmetry (based on calculation of costs and benefits spruced with symbolic reiterations of traditional bonds). Trends that have appeared or have been strengthened since January 20, 2017 on the American side are: * the emergence of pragmatism, * searching for extemporaneous balance of benefits, * disclosure of links between foreign and domestic policy, * intention to view the relations in the broader context of relations with Russia and with the EU; on the Polish side we witness: * increased attention seeking, * emphasizing long term rules and institutional ties, * seeking recognition, * searching for bilateral usefulness to the US outside of multilateral relations. What is clearly visible on the Polish side is the fear of devaluation of relationship with Poland which reflects the increased level of risks in allied relations that the Trump administration has brought to all its partnerships. This article describes how a junior partner in an alliance tries to comprehend and deal with the new uncertainties in search of ensured security.

This picture has captured attention of serious analysts as well as a multitude of casual observers of international politics: President Donald Trump comfortably sitting behind a huge desk in the Oval office, signing some document and next to him is Polish President Andrzej Duda, standing and leaning over some documents which he is also signing on the corner of President Trump's desk. For seasoned followers of politics hardly ever does one come across an image so well representing asymmetry in relations between two partners. Saturday Night Live would not have come up with a better depiction of a master king treating his partner as a vassal. When one adds to the picture the actual offer made by President Duda in that meeting to actually pay \$2.0 billion for American security guarantees to Poland in the form of a permanent military base on the Polish soil, the irony turns to serious concern. It raises a legitimate question as to the degree of risks permeating the Polish-American relations.

The accumulation of new emotions and viewpoints makes the period between 2017 and 2018 a time of intensive asymmetry of relationship in the context of increased risk and poorly concealed anxiety regarding the continuity and quality of the bilateral relations. We can talk about changing the formula of "partnership utility", in perceiving the benefits and costs associated with maintaining alliance at the previous level. The strategic and axiological model of seeing the world propagated by its predecessors is being replaced by transactional, bilateral and business-like cost balancing way of evaluating relations with allies. A change

in the philosophy of international relations in Washington and the definition of US presence and leadership in the world means that Poland's role and its policy are assessed there to a much lesser extent through the prism of a long term partner, or even a "Trojan horse" of America in the European Union and other international organizations (Zajac, 53).

Questioning the value of bilateral relations means that Trump allies, to whom Poland would like to count, have to prove their usefulness and their (potential) value to Washington. They had to do this more often than in the previous US administrations which seemed to understand that in allied relations, asymmetry is a natural state. By making a much larger contribution to the relationship, the United States as a stronger partner, only expects readiness for verbal support at a declarative level from a smaller partner. That is why, the new philosophy of Donald Trump's politics has cast doubt on how much such support will be considered sufficient. He introduced uncertainty to allied relations, by opening a discussion about the nature of mutual obligations and benefits. This is a new quality that has replaced previous, routines and automatism, which were the foundation of a friendly asymmetry during their predecessors' administrations. Current American allies do not know for sure how much to invest and what will be considered as "sufficient involvement". In other words, they are less sure what is an adequate manifestation of loyalty to the United States these days. Therefore, they are looking for a new ways of managing uncertainty or even risk in the bilateral relations with Washington.

Paradoxically, many US allies such as Poland wanted to tighten their relations with the United States as a guarantee of security. Poland pursued such dual course: collective security guarantees under NATO and bilateral additional assurances by way of "special relations" with Washington (similar to London), which was supposed to not only increase prestige internationally and within EU structures, but also give Warsaw an additional reassurance (Kiwierska, 68). However, it was believed that Polish-American relations, before 2017, are stable and the contribution to the alliance does not affect the level of the US commitment. It was believed that America understands that in the relations of non-confrontational asymmetry it bears a greater material (military) burden than a smaller partner whose contribution to the relationship often consists of verbal support and declarations of willingness to promote the "shared interests". This imbalance legitimized American leading role and enabled it to take for granted the support of a permanent group of allies "through thick and thin".

Those allies believed that the United States could test this support only occasionally (by allies: participation in joint international missions, voting in international organizations, sharing intelligence, import of American goods and technology, or procurement of American weapons). It was because of the fact that Washington was to be guided not only by the economic and political benefits but also by the symbolic and axiological dimension of partnership.

In the last two years, messages coming from the White House cast doubt on this axiological approach to balancing the relationship. From January 2017, the Trump administration constantly reminded that it expects more than a declarative contribution to alliances. Washington is trying to change its ongoing policy of multilateralism and cooperation within international organizations. It prefers bilateral relations (which countries such as Poland desire) where, it can impose more tangible balanced contribution. In other words, Trump expects his allies to show more of their usability and loyalty to the US. In this sense Polish and American approaches are compatible.

However, if the allies are not sufficiently involved in mutual relations, they are threatened with repercussions. This is a new quality for those countries that have not previously heard, or refused to hear, about the possible reassessment of US commitments (Beaumont). One of the examples of a possible change in the relationship was the controversial law of Poland's Institute of National Remembrance (IPN). In January 2018, the State Department openly announced its dissatisfaction with the Polish law which, if implemented, could have introduced nationalistic filters and censorship on the freedom of research on Holocaust. Washington said in not too subtle words, that in such case the United States was ready to reconsider the nature of mutual relations (Świerczyński). Such an open declaration of dissatisfaction and the threat of devaluation of the Polish situation shocked the Polish authorities and caused them to withdraw from this law by changing most controversial parts of the act in less than six months. This situation showed that good relations with the United States are not unconditional and can change rapidly which undermines the current assumptions of Polish diplomacy and national security. This open conflict forces the analysis of the compensation tactics that can be implemented to minimize the risk in asymmetrical alliance relations between Poland and the US, which is the purpose of this article.

For Poland, located in the center of Europe with historically troubled relations with its neighbors (Russia and Prussia/Germany), the search for support for its sovereignty through the establishment of lasting allied relations with a stronger protector is not an unknown experience. After the Second World War, Poland found itself in the so-called "Eastern bloc," whose protector was not chosen but imposed by force. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 did not eliminate the historically shaped concern about understanding international policy in Central and Eastern Europe as a fight for the sphere of influence. That is why, the Polish authorities tried to adapt to this situation by finding themselves in the structures of two institutions: the European Union and NATO. These "new protectors" were to be the foundation for the security of Poland and other Central European countries (in the economic dimension – the EU, and the political and military – NATO). It is worth noting that in Poland NATO is seen as an intermediary institution in providing US security guarantees. For Poland the United States were seen as a new protector that was

chosen, not imposed. Seeking extraordinary and unilateral assurances of “security and friendship” directly from the US became an additional *raison d’etat* for all Polish governments, irrespective of their ideological orientation.

American security assurance for Poland was never seriously challenged in public discourse either. Only certain minor left-wing groups treated this situation at the beginning of transformation as a dictum resulting from the no-alternative of that “choice” of the path to development even though together with the guarantees of security came the introduction of liberal capitalism in the form of a “shock therapy” (Szymański, 133). On the other hand, right-wing nationalistic parties despite their attachment to “Polish sovereignty” did not question the American patronage (and liberal capitalism which came in a package) mainly due to possible danger coming from Russia. Being caught up geopolitically between Germany and Russia throughout ages Poland used to consider security as a formidable interest, an absolute priority. Therefore, despite some minor criticisms, overwhelming elite consensus as to the general predicaments of the Polish geopolitical situation during the last thirty years after Poland regained its sovereignty, results in limited public discussions on the foreign policy strategies among key domestic actors (Bieńczyk-Missala, 103). The diversity in academic analyses seems to be only somewhat greater (Kuźniar; Zięba). Today in the era of heightened populism, the same concerns mitigate Polish Euroskeptics.

It seems that acceptance for replacing the Russian for American and the European Union “protectorate” is unequivocal. Polls strongly confirm these perceptions both at the level of elites and average citizens (Stone). This cultural and historical context of foreign policy is an important factor shaping Polish reactions to what flows across the Atlantic from January 20, 2017. President Trump, like his predecessors, must be aware of this predicament for when he addresses Poles he skillfully continues to touch the right buttons of pride and sense of historical mission and exceptionalism.

Poland has “invested” in the United States as the main partner in the international arena, especially in the sphere of security. The result of this decision are attempts to bring its own interests closer to the US. It should be noted that the situation when such a strategic foreign policy decision is made is not anything extraordinary for countries entering a new path of development. The situation of Poland can be compared with the one in which Mexico found itself after the First World War when it entered the path of democracy. The strategic choice was the decision how the weaker state should define its relations with a stronger neighbor. One way was to have similar policy like other Latin American countries and follow an anti-American and nationalist course. Another option was to accept asymmetrical relations with the US and seek a lasting economic and political arrangement. It was this latter way that the authorities in Mexico chose and accepted “peripheral utilitarianism” (Łaciński, 133–134). The final stage of entering this agreement for Mexico was

the signing of North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994. As a result of this an informal and lasting agreement was reached between the elites of both countries. This “ideological agreement” is shared by all entities on both sides of the border, or at least it was before Donald Trump was in the Oval Office.

However, the main difference between Poland and Mexico lies in the fact that the latter is in the traditional American sphere of influence, and Poland is located many thousands of kilometers from the US. What is more, Mexico does not have any traditional rival or enemy at its borders... other than the US. NATO was perceived by such states as Poland as an extension of the American border in close proximity to Central Europe. That was why the authorities in Warsaw have made efforts to enter this zone since the very beginning of the transformation. Currently, the Polish *raison d'état* is to cultivate in Washington the conviction that Central Europe is the space where America has vital interests. The decision to export LNG appeared quite conveniently almost simultaneously with the arrival of a transactionist and deal oriented president in the White House.

Thirty years ago, it was easier to convince the United States to become more involved in Central Europe because it was in the line with Cold War logic. Washington treated it as a “spoil” taken from the enemy (Moscow) (Zachara, 1). Today, almost three decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, it is more difficult to justify permanent presence of the Americans in Poland and in the region. The key for a smaller partner is to create and provide the Americans with narrative that could include the right combination of axiological and material incentives. What's more, this “justification” must resonate in Washington so that they do not begin to question the legitimacy of maintaining its permanent military and political presence in the region. At the moment Poland pursues this effort along two lines: by offering itself as a trade partner for the LNG long term export deal and by signing multi-million military contracts for anti-aircraft Patriot missile systems. Both tactics provide president Trump with what he likes most: a tangible investment into alliance.

The quality and intensity of relations between America and Central Europe depend on two considerations: one is the state of affairs between Washington and Moscow, and the other, quite unexpectedly, the state of relations with the EU. That latter dimension for decades used to be noncontroversial. NATO and EU relations could be treated jointly as both dimensions define context for relations with Europe that for decades have been a foundation of trans-Atlantic alliance. Today's “differences of opinion” with regard to trade issues, NATO article 5 interpretations, and lower than 2% GDP levels of security expenditures have devalued trans-Atlanticism from a “taken from granted” to “debatable” status.

With regard to the US-Russia relations the Polish calculations are steady. If the relations become “warmer” and Russia is seen as a potential partner responsible for the fate of the world, then the US perception of threats coming from Moscow,

becomes lesser (Tamkin). Warsaw sees any “reset” between the White House and the Kremlin as potential risk in relations with the US, because they pose a danger of “rationalization of security” in the thinking of American elites. Such transactionism reduces the role of cultural factors (the community of democratic states) and historical past (United States always supported Poland: 14 Wilson points, post-war relief effort, alliance in the Second World War, 10 million Poles in the USA, support for Solidarity movement) in mutual relations and turns their automatism into a rational calculation of profits and losses. Noticeable improvements in Russo-American relations weaken the American resolve to regard Eastern Europe as crucial to American security.

The weakening role of axiological factors is very dangerous for smaller partner, because it introduces the threat of reducing the certainty of the allied reaction on the American side. That is why, possible rapprochement between Moscow and Washington has always been met with anxiety in Warsaw. The examples of politics which were observed with concern by Poland were: Clinton project “Partnership for Peace”, Bush who noticed “soul in Putin’s eyes” and then during Obama presidency when Hillary Clinton and Sergey Lavrov pressed the red reset button. Trump’s campaign declarations about the desire to reexamine the US-Russian relations did not please Warsaw either.

Reducing automatism leads to rationalize relations, which contributes to the assessment of their quality from the perspective of costs and benefits. This is based on the transactionalism and bilateralism proclaimed by Donald Trump. Understanding partner relations in such manner favors to seek alliance’s support on the basis of common interests. This approach is not unusual but in asymmetry between countries, it is difficult to balance the contribution of both partners to the alliance. This situation is not possible due to potential inequality and a different scale of involvement in mutual and global affairs. Both partners know it, so the declaration of “balance” as outcome on the part of the patron signifies willingness to downgrade of relations and sends a signal that the patron does not care about this relationship with weaker partner. Asymmetry should be understood as an objective fact and as a certain state of consciousness (Szklarski, 11). Therefore, both sides should develop such solutions that the consequences of this inequality could not make the patron feel used, and the perception of being useless did not appear on the side of the smaller partner.

In the asymmetric alliance, the value of a weaker country is naturally limited. Stronger side in this arrangement must take the responsibility for this imbalance expressed in material cost, provided services and trade imbalance. Shared axiological dimension makes it easier for a (willing) patron to justify to its citizens partners’ disproportions in material contributions to the alliance. However, the cost of a weaker side in alliance is the loss of its freedom to decide about their politics and the perception of dependency on the international arena, meaning

the inability to take a position contrary to the will of the patron. The Polish contribution to the asymmetric alliance with the US for example, included acceptance of the loss of sovereignty in favor of the patron, when it demanded contribution which potentially carried significant moral and legal penalty (secret CIA prison in Stare Kiejkuty). A side effect of being perceived by others as a state that always supports its patron is the label of an American “Trojan horse” in the European Union. Poland seemed to be willing to pay that symbolic price when during discussions in 2017 about EU needing to build up its military potential, Warsaw openly suggested that the military equipment procured for that purpose should come from the United States (Emmot).

US view of the World

In the United States, we are dealing with a “paradox of indifference” which is caused by American electorate. On the one hand, Americans attach little importance to foreign policy in the election act, even if the international situation should require it (Nincic, 139–140). On the other hand, Washington is perceived by US citizens as a “shining city on the hill”, which is even obliged to spread and support the values of the American Creed all over the world (Manifest Destiny). Therefore, a smaller ally must define its interests and position in relation to the American, to give Washington room for maneuver, that is, to justify its policy in a country such as Poland in the light of values accepted by public opinion in the US. The foreign policy of the United States is governed by hard interests when there is a complicated situation in places little known to American public. However, in the rhetorical layer compliance with the Creedal values determines the acceptance of US foreign policy. Without this axiological legitimization, politics loses the status of a moral mission (Smith, 5).

The key role in directing US foreign policy, by constitutional design, is played by the president. His rights arise from the constitutional powers as the head of state reinforced by the US Supreme Court interpretations, the tradition established in everyday practice and the domination of the White House in public discourse (Fisher, 149–150). The language that American elite uses is simple and descriptions of the international situation is also accessible to an average voter (Burleigh). This can help a citizen to understand American arguments and actions. The consequence of this is often black and white and simplified image of the world and foreign policy necessary to control it. The perception of asymmetry and its impact on the positions and behaviors of partners in the alliance are an important element of the elite’s thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. The next part of this study is devoted to these issues.

When we look at Polish attitudes towards America through the prism of actions and rhetoric of the political elites, experts, and major media then we can draw

conclusions that the Polish *raison d'état* since 1989 is the desire to please Washington and entangle it in the Polish interests. The effect of this tactic is to root Poland in the American minds as a stable and close ally deserving support. This tendency sometimes can even look caricatural. How else could be called lobbying in the European Union for the funds allocated for the development of modern military technologies to be spent on the purchase of American armaments as a part of building the European military structures (Wyborcza)? There is even a desperate desire to embroil Washington on the European continent as much as possible with the help of transfer of material resources (long term LNG deals, military equipment purchases, land grants for military installations). This policy fits in Trump's philosophy of transactional view of the world in which US engagement is incommensurate with the benefits they gain from the relationship. In the scientific literature, such an activity falls into the list of behaviors referred to as "bandwagoning" (Walt, 15) or "clientelism" (Sylvan, Majeski, 7).

The history of Polish-American relations is full of actions initiated by both parties, proving the actual cooperation and the will to perpetuate it. Examples of this type of policy, on the part of the US were: a stabilization fund for the Polish currency in the amount of 200 billion dollars, debt reduction by 70%, reduction of the debt of the Paris Club (commercial banks) by 50%, military cooperation, military education (Polish soldiers at American military colleges), regular CIA contacts with Polish intelligence, F16 rental to Polish air force before their purchase, support for Polish diplomatic efforts during the establishment of relations with united Germany, including support for confirmation of the border on the Odra and Nysa Łużycka rivers, investments in the Polish arms industry (helicopters), installation of elements of the missile defense system in Poland, rotational dislocation of American military units as a part of NATO – east flank reinforcement and recent permission to sell one of the most modern version of the Patriot missile system to Poland (Onet). On the level of everyday cooperation in the military field there are many projects on a smaller scale that consolidate the regularity of positive relations between Warsaw and Washington (The White House Office of the Press Secretary).

Poland has always supported the US on the international arena when they needed such backup at the UN or in the EU. What is more significant, Polish "investments" in the durability of relations with the US included burdensome and sometimes questionable actions such as: the participation in two interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq, post-war stabilization activities in both of these countries, providing access to the territory of Poland for anti-terrorist activities (the previously mentioned prison in Stare Kiejkuty), diplomatic support on international forums (EU–negotiations on proposed trade agreement – TTIP, UN–support for US recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel) and acquisition of American weapons (F-16 fighter aircraft, Bell helicopters, Patriot missile system and possible

purchase of HIMARS anti-aircraft missile system). Generally, Poland articulated skepticism when it was desired and demonstrated support when it was called on by the US. Warsaw extremely rarely criticized Washington's foreign policy. One of the most distinct example was an open letter written by 8 leaders of Central and Eastern Europe who reminded President Obama that Russia is conducting a revisionist policy aimed at recreating its sphere of influence in the region (Poprzeczny). However, when the government in Warsaw explicitly undermined the principles of liberal democracy and separation of powers, the United States started to condemn those changes in Poland. Doubt expressed by State Department spokesman and US ambassador was met in Warsaw with surprise and fear. The primary anxiety is the possible loss of the fundamental principle of Polish foreign policy, which for nearly 30 years has been looking for the closest ties with the US in order to entangle them into Polish security (Gazeta.pl).

The *raison d'état* in Polish-American relations has been to explore the opportunities/situations to publicly show mutual contribution to the alliance. The institutionalization of relations on many levels and in many policy dimensions supported by appropriate rhetoric emphasizing the mutual usefulness and durability of affairs contributes to this type of relationship (Kozłowski, 90–91). It seemed that both sides understood the foundation of their relations in this way and that it was inviolable.

At the same time, Washington and Warsaw have left themselves leeway to act on non-key issues. Poland wanted such freedom in contacts with its neighbors, especially Lithuania and Ukraine and above all in relations with the EU institutions. The Americans understood those actions and agreed on them until they did not affect their interests in the region. One of the example was the case with Polish support for the Ukrainian Revolution in 2014. According to Grzegorz Kozłowski, a longtime director of the Department of the Americas in the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it seemed that as part of the obvious structural asymmetry in Warsaw-Washington relations, the Americans accepted a declarative assumption of equality of partners with unequal potentials (Kozłowski, 85). The Americans tried to protect their relations with Poland and perhaps they behaved too restrained, not wanting to give the impression of being a new hegemon who replaced the Soviet Union.

Year 2017 and 2018 brought Washington's decisive and critical reaction to undermining the liberal constitutional principles. This is a proof that the time has come to communicate to the Polish partner the limits of freedom that the patron is willing to tolerate. From the reaction of the USA, it seems that Poland has exceeded the scope of "consent to disagreement" (Kupiecki, 64–65). In such situations, as in patronage relations, Washington without hesitation speaks about the internal policy of the client, considering it as a form of reminding of the character of entanglements resulting from structural asymmetry. The delimitation of the sphere of

non-disruptive disagreement is never spelled out clearly. Good partners should be able to understand and respect their limitations almost intuitively.

According to Robert Kupiecki, a former Polish ambassador in the USA, “asymmetry is the reconciliation of dependencies” where both parties, in fear of losing the room for maneuver, are working together for the sake of an agreement (Kupiecki, 63). Therefore, latest disagreement on the Washington-Warsaw line is the moment of “harmonizing the balance.” Poland needs to choose the right tactic to overcome the risk of Washington being ready to lower the level of current relations or even change the partner. Good relationships contain mechanisms to remove misunderstandings and now there is a need to test them.

It is unfortunate that problems between Washington and Poland are happening in the last two years because current administration in the White House has new approach to foreign policy and is ready to revise commitments in line with isolationistic and nativistic philosophy. Furthermore, more signals came from the State Department, an institution that was considered to be the guardian of continuity and institution that was reducing tensions in American foreign policy in the face of the uncertainty of the White House’s attitudes (Pffiffner). A question arises as to whether the degree of institutionalization and the diversity of forms of cooperation and communication routes between Warsaw and Washington will be a sufficient barrier to prevent the redefinition of mutual perceptions? This is a problem for both sides because in the asymmetric allied relationship, the rules developed by partners are a value in itself (Kupiecki, 64–65). They give these relations predictable character and protection against undesirable change. In the light of the above mentioned inclination to weaken the rules of alliance articulated by the White House, the reprimand delivered by the Department of State i.e. the institution which represents stability, moderation, and continuity in American foreign policy acquires added weight.

There would be nothing worse for Poland than agreeing to “settle” relations with the US on transactional terms according to material measures. The momentary advantage for the US to export LNG and sell missiles and helicopters to Poland would not be able to balance asymmetries in the long run. If Polish authorities allow for business-like transactionism to become a backbone of the Polish-American relations, then they will be exposed to uncertainty as soon as the balance of relations in Washington is calculated in a way that is unsatisfactory for them. In addition, Poland has little influence on how Washington measures “balance.” According to the theory of allied relations, automatism limits the room for maneuver and strengthens the bond between allies, and selective choice weakens ties and trusts. Selectivity leads to transactional relations and to thinking about the “shareholder return” from investments in Poland.

The regularity and intensity of Polish-American relations in recent years has been the key to their quality. Problems are prevented and neutralized from being

perpetuated by regularity. Routinisation of relationships, multiplicity of dialogue channels (political and expert) make it easier to solve problems. For Poland in transatlantic relations it is important to base them on a mix of ideals and interests shared by both sides of the alliance. This is due to the fact that American policy is based on values that legitimize its policy. Poland must maintain a sense of community of values with America, so that Washington would maintain strong ties with Warsaw for idealistic reasons especially with the Trump administration.

Andrzej Dybczyński draws attention to the temporal dimension in allied relations, where alliances are formed “towards the future” (Dybczyński, *Sojusze międzynarodowe*, 15). In addition, he quotes Sabrotsky, who gives staggering statistics that 75% of alliances are not fulfilled (Dybczyński, *Zarządzanie sojuszem asymetrycznym. Relacje Polska – USA*, 39). The vast majority of these “betrayals” are committed by a stronger partner. Therefore, for Poland, there are important recommendations that can be summarized as follows: firstly, a certain state of entanglement in US interests is a natural state and must be accepted as a necessary evil. Secondly, searching for alternative, unconventional solutions that would supposedly reduce asymmetry is a waste of time. Poland can neither reduce the conflict with the enemy, Russia, nor develop allied alternatives and it also has no effect on the range of interests that connect them with the US. The only thing it can do is to increase its military potential but this solution requires a long-term program and substantial resources that Poland simply does not have. Therefore, the only way for Poland is to constantly monitor American engagement and react immediately to any signs of change in its character. Currently, Polish policy towards the US may be difficult because Donald Trump does not seem to have long-term political strategies in the Central and Eastern European region and his policies are guided only by a narrowly understood interest, mostly economic, not by ideals.

On two occasions the Trump administration expressed more vocal endorsement of democratic values: once in Hungary in defense of freedom of academic research when it came to the defense of the Central European University funded by George Soros, and second time in Poland in defense of freedom of media when American owned TVN network was attacked by the conservative government. One might say, that both interventions were not axiological but economic in nature. Washington propped up American owned businesses against conservative nationalistic governments attempting to regulate their activities.

Measures employed as management of uncertainty

Uncertainty management can be difficult as it requires a wide range of multidirectional activities. In the final part of the text we discuss the range of tactics available for risk management in asymmetrical allied relations. It is extremely important

to look at them through the prism of the historical and cultural context of the Polish-American relations outlined above. The typology was based on the analysis of behavior, decisions, policy papers, press releases, statements, and documents of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense as they were reported by the media.

The “Polish typology” may be used in comparative analyses as it comprises most often utilized risk management measures adopted by junior partners in asymmetrical relations with the USA. It consists of options available to smaller partners in asymmetrical allied relations, which they can use to minimize the risk resulting from the unpredictability of Washington’s actions and declarations. The following list contains actions as well as verbal declarations that have been divided into two categories depending on the level of submission to the patron and the degree of creativity in the search for alternatives to passivity. It must be remembered that the usability of these activities is in any case dependent on the situation in which they are undertaken.

Table 1. Typology of ways to manage risk used by a weaker partner as part of asymmetric alliance relations with the US

RISK MANAGEMENT TACTICS IN ASYMMETRICAL ALLIANCES – THE CASE OF POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS		Action taken by Poland
A. subordination – loyalty		
1	waiting for an explanation from Washington	√
2	making yourself useful in essential matters signaled by Washington	
3	supporting the controversial actions of the Trump administration	√
4	creating a common axiological space	√
5	verbal support for US policy	√
6	avoiding taking a position on contentious issues from the US, when this does not apply to your own priorities	
7	denying the existence of contentious issues	√
8	showing willingness to submit to the will of the US	
9	supporting slogans about “special relations” with the US	√
10	seeking to confirm US interest in Poland, and then overinterpreting it as an expression of American involvement	
11	interpreting the words of the White House so that they would serve Polish interests – creating an illusion of support	√
12	an attempt to persuade Washington to recognize Polish interests	
13	acceptance of the new level of risk in mutual relations	√

Table 1 (cont.)

RISK MANAGEMENT TACTICS IN ASYMMETRICAL ALLIANCES - THE CASE OF POLISH-AMERICAN RELATIONS		Action taken by Poland
B. adaptation - creativity		
14	continuation of existing activities without changes	√
15	creating independent spheres from the USA	
16	adapting your own interests to avoid conflict with American interests	
17	formulating several priority expectations in relation to the US, i.e. simplifying the hierarchy of own interests	
18	support for American allies	√
19	building your own security resources to compensate for sense of uncertainty	√
20	building bridges (access) to actors in Washington other than the White House (Congress, Department of State, Pentagon, lobbies, ...)	√
21	participation in international cooperation initiatives	√
22	searching for alternative bilateral relations	
23	search for support from American allies	
24	starting a dispute with Washington	
25	abandoning Washington	

Source: typology based on Author's own analyses

The methods of risk management in the asymmetric alliance include two types of actions: subordination or adjustment. Actions from both categories are undertaken with the intention not to disturb the perception that security continues to be provided by the patron at previous level. Activities in the category of “subordination” is primarily a response to what Washington is doing. Therefore weaker countries like Poland are willing to accept American leadership. They have to comprehend the American view of the world and their own political actions must be in line with expectations of Washington. Activities in the “adaptation” category are more creative and express the desire to redefine their own priorities, agreeing on common fields of action and thinking, as well as indicate the search for opportunities to influence Washington policy through other actors on the domestic and international scene. There is also the option of confronting or replacing the patron or even abandoning it. All these possibilities have to compensate for the threat of US policy which undermine the stability of allied relations.

Conclusions or lessons learned(?)

The above table shows that the Polish authorities have taken a number of actions from both categories, with the majority of activities from the “subordination” category. However, there is a lack of sufficient discussion among Polish political elites about the *raison d'état* and priorities in international politics. What is more, there is no sufficient planning and coordination in the implementation of foreign policy. One example was the “Polish-American economic summit” which took place at the beginning of 2018 in Florida, which should become one of the most important topics in the Polish media and in bilateral relations, but this did not happen. It was because of the fact that at the same time the Polish parliament passed a controversial law (previously mentioned IPN law) that banned any criticism of Polish society's behavior towards the Jews during the Holocaust (Wrona). It invoked concerns about freedom of speech, scientific research and caused widespread criticism in Israel and in the United States. Instead of dealing with economic relations and possibility of new fields of cooperation, the media were dominated by discussions about the past. All the expected benefits from the economic summit were overshadowed by the conflict over interpretations of history and civil rights. The good relations with Israel were weakened, which is the key ally of the USA. The American Jewish lobby was also antagonized and there was an immediate strong reaction in Washington. This verbal disapproval contained something that for the smaller ally in the asymmetrical relationship has to awake the greatest anxiety – publicly questioning the validity of the alliance.

The events from the turn of January and February 2018 could have been mitigated if there were more stable authorities in Washington and Warsaw. The new philosophy of Donald Trump *America First* carries the threat of isolationism and nativism. In addition, bilateralism and transactionalism characterize the weakening of the importance of ideological and valuable dimensions of foreign policy. There is a real possibility that in a situation of tensions, the US will take the opportunity to bring relations with Warsaw to a lower rank.

Recent amendments to the Holocaust law in June 2018 which resulted in the improvement of relations with Israel, together with the signing of a deal to purchase Patriot missiles seem to have terminated the dry spell in Poland's relations with the US. Evidence of this came in the form of an official visit of President of Poland, Andrzej Duda in Washington in September 2018. Yet it is far too early to say that the axiological bond and automatism have returned.

Politics of Poland and other American allied countries in the Central and Eastern Europe region show that the increase in uncertainty about the stability and level of the cooperation with the US causes them to comply with all real or imagined US expectations. The proof for that in case of Poland, is the choice of tactic that minimize the risk of weakening the security provided by the United States.

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Bohdan Szklarski – an Associate Professor of Political Science, Graduate of the English Institute, Warsaw University and the Department of Political Science, Northeastern University, Boston. In his almost 30 years of teaching he has taught at numerous American and Polish Universities. He served as a director of the American Studies Center, Warsaw University in years 2012–2016. Now he is a head of the Center for the Study of Leadership there. He also lectures at the *Collegium Civitas* a college of social sciences where for over 10 years he served as a Chair of the Department of Political Science. Prof. Szklarski’s research interests include: American Presidency, political leadership, American political culture and institutions, comparative politics, political communication and political anthropology. He frequently appears as a commentator on American and Polish political events in the media. Privately a happy family man and a golden retriever and NFL fan.

Piotr Iłowski – PhD student at the Institute of Political Studies at Polish Academy of Science (PAN), graduated from International Relations at Collegium Civitas. He is now studying American Studies at the University of Warsaw. He completed internship at the Center for Eastern Studies (OSW Poland). He wrote in *Nowastrategia.pl*, Centrum Schumpetera and in *Bliskiwschod.pl*. He was interested with the problems of the Middle East, the situation of Turkey and the relationship of the United States in this region. Currently, he deals with the problems of populism, their historical sources as well as the political, social and foreign policy of the United States.

PART II

**ASIA-PACIFIC IN THE US FOREIGN
POLICY**

Revision of Japan's Foreign Policy After Donald Trump's Electoral Victory

Karol Żakowski

University of Lodz
Faculty of International and Political Studies
Department of Asian Studies
e-mail: karol.zakowski@uni.lodz.pl

Abstract

The article analyzes the process of modification of Japan's foreign policy after Donald Trump's election as US president. As short- and middle-range aims of Japan's diplomatic strategy were outlined with expectation of victory of Hillary Clinton, Tokyo was forced to abruptly change its policy. Relying on the neoclassical realist theory, the article examines the complex interaction between the external factors, such as security threats from North Korea or China, and domestic factors both in Japan and the US, that is personal, institutional, societal and economic determinants. It is argued that while it was strategic convergence between Tokyo and Washington that enabled relatively smooth cooperation between Prime Minister Abe and President Trump, internal factors, such as right-wing credentials of both decision makers, distorted and to some extent facilitated this process.

Keywords: Japan, foreign policy, Donald Trump, Japan–US relations.

Introduction

The aim of the article is to analyze the process of adaptation of Japan's foreign policy after election of Donald Trump as US president. Due to the importance of the US as the main ally and trade partner of Japan, presidential elections in this country have frequently exerted influence not only on relations between Tokyo and Washington, but also on wider initiatives of Japan on the international scene. Because short- and middle-term aims of Japan's foreign policy were formulated with expectation of victory of Hillary Clinton, the surprising result of election compelled Tokyo to implement abrupt changes in the diplomatic line. They concerned particularly the plans of economic liberalization through accession to the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), but also to some extent the problem of nuclear armaments of North Korea, relations with Russia and China, or the question of the status of American military bases in Japan. The article examines how Prime Minister Abe Shinzō established contact with the president-elect as well as how he tried to persuade Trump to mitigate the difference of interests in the spheres of security policy and economy.

The analysis relies on the neoclassical realist interpretation of foreign policy making. As stressed by Gideon Rose (158), the structure of the international system delineates the limits of rational decisions by statespersons, but "the translation of capabilities into national behavior is often rough and capricious over the short and medium term." The article examines the complex interaction between the external stimuli, such as security threats from North Korea or China, and domestic factors both in Japan and the US, that is personal, institutional, societal and economic determinants. It is argued that while it was strategic convergence between Tokyo and Washington that enabled relatively smooth cooperation between Prime Minister Abe and Donald Trump, internal factors, such as right-wing credentials of both decision makers, distorted and to some extent facilitated this process.

Japan's policy towards the US at the end of the Obama administration

After Liberal Democratic Party's (LDP) return to power in December 2012, Prime Minister Abe Shinzō put much effort into restoring cordial relations with the US, which had been wavered under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government. In 2009 Prime Minister Hatoyama Yukio, who ousted the LDP from power, announced his intention to renegotiate the conditions of relocation of the US military base Futenma. According to the agreement from 2006, Futenma was to be moved from the city of Nago to the Henoko coast in the northern part of

Okinawa.¹ As Hatoyama had promised during electoral campaign that he would force the Obama administration to relocate this controversial base outside of the island, he felt pressure from the public to try to persuade Washington to concession on this matter. Eventually, Americans remained unyielding and in May 2010 Hatoyama had to agree to the previous conditions. However, the eight months of difficult negotiations contributed to the weakening of mutual trust between both allies. Apart from the Futenma issue, Washington felt suspicious about Hatoyama's plans to create East Asian Community and his statements that Japan should not be overly reliant on the US. All these factors contributed to creation of a cool atmosphere in Japan–US relations under the Hatoyama government. Although Prime Ministers Kan Naoto (2010–2011) and Noda Yoshihiko (2011–2012) managed to “normalize” bilateral contacts, Washington remained less confident in the DPJ's than LDP's eagerness to promote mutual alliance. Moreover, disorder during the Fukushima crisis in March 2011 made the Obama administration believe that Japanese authorities were hiding from the US crucial information on the scale of the nuclear disaster that followed the Great East Japan Earthquake.² As a result, strengthening the alliance with Washington became a priority for the LDP after electoral victory.

What is important, Prime Minister Abe perceived policy towards the US as a part of a wider strategy of containing the rising Chinese power in East Asia. In 2010 and 2012 Tokyo became involved in two intense diplomatic crises with Beijing over the territorial dispute in the East China Sea.³ Abe used this opportunity to decisively criticize the DPJ for being excessively soft towards China as well as for alienating Japan from its only ally, the US. As soon as he returned to power, he started promoting institutionalization of the network of US alliances in the Asia-Pacific. In December 2012 he announced the concept of a geopolitical “Asia's democratic security diamond” composed of Japan, India, Australia, and the US state of Hawaii. According to Abe, these four actors were predestined to protect the maritime commons between the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific against China's growing ambitions of regional hegemony (Abe).

¹ As Marine Corps Air Station Futenma, situated in the middle of the city, constitutes a constant nuisance for local inhabitants. The negotiations on its relocation started after an incident of rape of a 12-year old Japanese committed by two US servicemen in 1995.

² On March 11, 2011, Japan was hit by a large-scale earthquake and a tsunami that caused massive damage in the Tōhoku region, including radioactive leakage in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant. The Japanese government was overwhelmed with the emergency situation, which led to organizational chaos in countering the crisis. See: Zakowski, 140–153.

³ In September 2010 a Chinese trawler collided near the disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands with a Japanese Coast Guard patrol vessel. In order to force Japan to release the fishing boat's captain, China resorted to many controversial measures, such as stopping export of rare earth metals. In September 2012, in turn, the Noda administration nationalized three islands of the disputed archipelago, which provoked massive anti-Japanese demonstrations in China.

In order to demonstrate that Japan was ready to assume greater responsibility for maintaining regional stability, Abe implemented profound changes in security policy. In December 2013 he announced the National Security Strategy that introduced the concept of “Proactive Contribution to Peace” (*sekkyokuteki heiwashugi*). The new strategy was based on the plan to enhance Japan’s deterrence capabilities, strengthen alliance with the US, and promote such values as freedom of the seas (Cabinet Secretariat). In July 2014, in turn, the cabinet issued a revolutionary decision that changed interpretation of the Constitution to allow participation in collective self-defense initiatives. Moreover, in April 2015 the new regulation was reflected in the Guidelines for Japan–US Defense Cooperation which not only made the alliance more equal, but also lifted geographical limitation that had been included in the guidelines from 1997 (Ministry of Defense). All these decisions were fully consistent with the “Pivot to Asia” strategy that had been announced by US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in October 2011. After all, the Obama administration’s East Asia policy put emphasis on such elements vital for Abe as adapting alliances to the changing international environment, enhancing the defense capabilities of regional allies, or protecting freedom of navigation (Clinton).

While the LDP administration’s security policy was in line with the US grand strategy, Abe failed to establish a close relationship with President Obama. After assuming office, Abe wanted to choose the US as the first target of his visit abroad in order to deliver a speech in the Congress. However, due to problems with adjusting dates, the American side refused, and instead in January 2013 Abe was forced to pay a visit to Southeast Asian countries. What further exacerbated trust between Abe and Obama was the fact that when in August 2013 the Bashar al-Assad regime used chemical weapon during civil war in Syria, the Japanese government refused to support American military intervention without sound proofs of al-Assad’s responsibility. Moreover, in December 2013 Washington used exceptionally strong words of “disappointment” to condemn Abe’s visit to the controversial Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo that commemorates Japanese war dead, including class-A war criminals who were executed in 1948 (Yamaguchi, *Sōri*, 189–214).

It took long time for Abe to approach Obama personally. To that end, the Japanese prime minister had to partly sacrifice his own nationalist convictions. Most importantly, despite his previous opposition against the Kōno Statement and the Murayama Statement, after assuming power he abandoned the plan of retracting both documents. The former was an explicit apology for forceful recruitment of sexual slaves (so-called “comfort women”) before 1945 by the Japanese Imperial Army, issued by Chief Cabinet Secretary Kōno Yōhei in 1993. In 2014 the Abe cabinet examined the decision-making process on the drafting of the statement, but eventually Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide confirmed that Japan upheld and did not intend to revise the document. The latter were apologies addressed to all victims of Japanese territorial expansionism, offered by the Socialist Prime

Minister Murayama Tomiichi in 1995. In August 2015 Abe issued a new statement that contained, although in an indirect form, all key expressions from the Murayama Statement, such as “aggression,” “apology” and “colonial rule.” Perhaps thanks to this accommodative posture on history issues, Abe was eventually allowed to deliver a speech in the US Congress in April 2015, and he even managed to persuade President Obama to pay a historic visit to Hiroshima in May 2016.

Abe invested much effort also in establishing personal connection with Hillary Clinton who was considered as the strongest candidate in American presidential race. For the Japanese government, Clinton, as the person behind such initiatives as “Pivot to Asia”, seemed to guarantee stability in bilateral relations. During his visit to the US in September 2016, Abe personally met with Hillary Clinton, while the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) managed to arrange a meeting only with one of Donald Trump's associates, future Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross. Until the presidential election day, MOFA bureaucrats were convinced that Trump would lose, so they neglected building personal ties with his camp. For that reason, immediately after the surprising result of election on November 8, 2016, Abe ordered his entourage to arrange a meeting with the president-elect (Yamaguchi, *Antō*, 37–50).

In order to establish initial contact with Donald Trump, Abe relied on assistance from two subordinates – Ambassador to the US Sasae Ken'ichirō and Prime Minister's Special Advisor in Charge of Foreign Affairs Kawai Katsuyuki. Sasae was one of few MOFA bureaucrats who put some effort into approaching Trump's entourage, especially his daughter Ivanka Trump and her husband Jared Kushner, during the electoral campaign. It is through this connection that Sasae managed to persuade Trump to meet with Abe immediately after the election. Kawai, in turn, was sent by Abe to Washington to prepare the ground for the upcoming visit. In order to gain information about Trump, Kawai met with 19 officials and experts from the Congress, CIA, different departments, conservative think tanks, as well as the army. Thanks to this “reconnaissance” Abe became familiar not only with the president-elect's policy agenda, but also with his personal preferences. According to Kawai's report, it seemed that Trump liked three things: his own family, patriotism, and golf. Eventually, the president-elect agreed to meet the Japanese prime minister in New York on November 17, 2016, only nine days after election. Abe gave him a luxurious golf club as a present and reminded him that Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (Abe's grandfather) had played golf with President Dwight Eisenhower in 1957, which was considered at that time as a breakthrough in promotion of bilateral friendship (Yamaguchi, *Antō*, 51–66). Since then, Abe used every opportunity to play a round of golf whenever meeting Trump.

As outlined above, despite the fact that Abe implemented revolutionary changes in security policy that responded to long-lasting American pressures, his right-wing credentials alienated him from the Democratic US president. Obama's liberal

ideological leaning made it difficult for the conservative Japanese prime minister to establish with him a close interpersonal relationship based on mutual trust. While Donald Trump's election posed a challenge to Japanese diplomacy, Abe reacted quickly by attempting to enter into better contact with Trump than with Obama. After all, Trump's controversial anti-immigration and anti-feminist posture seemed to guarantee that the Republican government would not be as sensitive as the Democratic administration against Abe's right-wing initiatives in Japan.⁴ Tokyo's efforts focused on assuaging Trump's anti-Japanese slogans that were used during the electoral campaign, adapting to the new US administration's economic policy agenda, as well as exploiting the shift to the right in US security policy.

Assuaging Donald Trump's anti-Japanese posture

One of Trump's declarations that particularly touched the Japanese government was his statement regarding the costs of maintaining American military bases abroad. During a debate of Republican candidates in the primaries for the presidential election in Houston in February 2016, Trump criticized Japan, South Korea and Germany for their insufficient contribution to the maintenance of US military bases on their territories. As Japan covered 75% of the costs of hosting US bases, compared to 40% covered by South Korea and only 32.6% covered by Germany, MOFA bureaucrats felt offended by this statement. In order to assuage Trump's criticism, Ambassador Sasae contacted Senator Jeff Sessions who was Trump's advisor on foreign and security policy. Sasae explained that for the US the cost of maintaining bases in Japan was lower than the one of facilities on American territory, and that these bases served not only protection of Japan, but also fulfillment of American security policy in the whole Asia-Pacific region up to the Middle East. It seems that these arguments met with understanding, as in his subsequent statements Donald Trump lessened criticism towards Japan in comparison with other allies (Yamaguchi, *Antō*, 40–45).

Abe referred to the problem of bases during his first meeting with the president-elect in November 2016. Provided with hard data from his administrative staff, Japanese prime minister explained that only 7% of American soldiers stationed in Japan belonged to land forces, while they constituted 70% of those hosted by South Korea. It meant that while the US army on Korean Peninsula was tasked mainly with protection of the Republic of Korea from North Korean invasion, the air forces, navy and marines stationed in Japan could be easily dispatched to intervene in different parts of the world (Yamaguchi, *Antō*, 63–64). Persuasion by Abe

⁴ Donald Trump decided to build a wall on the border with Mexico and he issued an executive order that refused entry to the US by the citizens of seven Muslim countries. During the electoral campaign he was accused by several women of sexual assault.

proved successful. During his visit to Japan at the beginning of February 2017, US Defense Secretary James Mattis stated that “Japan has been a model of cost sharing” that can be “an example for other nations to follow” and he expressed his satisfaction with an increase in budget spending for defense by Japan (US Department of Defense). Moreover, one week later in Washington President Trump himself thanked Prime Minister Abe for hosting American military bases and he called the bilateral alliance “the cornerstone of peace and stability in the Pacific region” (AP and Stars and Stripes).

What helped Abe in assuaging US's criticism regarding cost sharing was the fact that Prime Minister Abe put much effort in resolving the Futenma problem. As was already mentioned, according to the agreement from 2006, which was reconfirmed by the Hatoyama government in 2010, the controversial base was to be relocated to the Henoko coast. Still, this plan encountered strong opposition from Okinawan NGOs and local authorities. Immediately after assuming office, Abe, with the help from Chief Cabinet Secretary Suga Yoshihide, invested much energy in pushing forward the base's relocation. As early as in December 2013, Okinawa Prefecture Governor Nakaima Hirokazu eventually authorized construction of the new base (Yamaguchi, *Sōri*, 195–196). Nevertheless, Onaga Takeshi, who was elected as Okinawa governor in 2014, revoked the land reclamation permit that was necessary to continue construction works. Situation deteriorated in spring 2016, after a rape and murder committed by a US serviceman on a Japanese woman. Despite these problems, the Abe administration was determined to push Futenma relocation forward.

The personal relationship between Abe Shinzō and Donald Trump proved helpful in assuaging the new American president's initial anti-Japanese posture. Thanks to persuasion from Tokyo and the efforts for relocation of Futenma, Washington to some extent toned down its demand for an increase in Japan's contribution for maintenance of US military bases.

Adapting to the change

While Abe managed to persuade Trump not to put pressure on Japan regarding financing of military bases, he was unable to change the new president's mind on accession to the TPP. This free trade agreement was signed in February 2016 by Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the US, and Vietnam. The most controversial issue during negotiations was Washington's insistence on protection of American automobile industry and Tokyo's unwillingness to remove all barriers on import of agricultural products. Due to the pressure from car producers, during the electoral campaign Donald Trump clearly stated that he would abandon the controversial agreement and he

repeatedly criticized Japan for the trade imbalance. For example, during a speech in Nebraska in May 2016 he called for introduction of a 38% tariff on Japanese cars – the same as Japan maintained on American beef (Yamaguchi, *Antō*, 64).

Abe, in turn, had put much effort into achieving a compromise on TPP with the Obama administration and was determined to protect the agreement. For the Japanese prime minister, TPP not only would provide access to the American market, but it would also solidify US influence in the Asia-Pacific region as a counterbalance against the rising China. For that reason, Abe pushed ratification of TPP forward in December 2016, even after Trump's victory in presidential election.

The problem of TPP was high on the agenda of the first unofficial meeting between both leaders in November 2016. In order to persuade Trump to ratify TPP, Abe cited hard data concerning US–Japan trade exchange. He argued that as many as 3.85 million out of 6.57 million Japanese cars sold in the US in 2015 were produced in the factories situated in the US. Furthermore, in many cases Japanese cars were manufactured to a greater extent from the components originating from the US than their American counterparts. As a result, Japanese companies created new workplaces rather than deprived Americans of their jobs. In addition, Abe emphasized that TPP would not only contribute to economic growth in all member countries in the middle and long term, but it should also be treated as an important instrument for building a new US-centered order in East Asia against the China threat (Yamaguchi, *Antō*, 64–66).

Despite persuasion by Abe, the decision to abandon the TPP treaty was one of the first made by Trump after assuming office in January 2017. As commented by the president: “We’re going to stop the ridiculous trade deals that have taken everybody out of our country and taken companies out of our country, and it’s going to be reversed” (Baker). On the other hand, Trump did not exclude negotiation of bilateral trade deals with individual countries. From that moment on, Japan’s foreign policy regarding the defunct TPP focused on two issues: negotiation of a potential agreement with the US alone, as well as examining the possibility of continuing the TPP initiative without Washington.

In order to deepen bilateral economic exchange, Abe and Trump decided to initiate the US–Japan Economic Dialogue in February 2017 in Washington. The Dialogue was indeed launched by Japanese Deputy Prime Minister Asō Tarō and American Vice President Mike Pence in Tokyo in mid-April 2017. Both sides agreed to structure negotiations “along three policy pillars: Common Strategy on Trade and Investment Rules/Issues; Cooperation in Economic and Structural Policies; and Sectoral Cooperation” (Executive Office of the President). Nevertheless, the talks turned out to be more difficult than anticipated. During the second round of the Dialogue in Washington in mid-October 2017, Asō and Pence made only slight progress. Within the first pillar, they decided to lift restrictions on persimmons from Japan and on potatoes from Idaho, to streamline noise and emissions

testing procedures for American car exports, ensure transparency and fairness in Japanese system for geographical indications as well as regarding reimbursement policies related to innovation in life sciences. Within the second pillar, both sides confirmed their intention to cooperate on global challenges in the spheres of economy and finance, as well as to promote sustainable development. Regarding the last pillar, they only stated that they would “deepen discussions in areas such as (1) cooperation in the transportation infrastructure sector, including measures to deal with infrastructure deterioration and the development of high-speed rail, increased investment and promotion of quality infrastructure through infrastructure development in third countries; (2) energy ties, including liquefied natural gas, civil nuclear energy and energy infrastructure; (3) leveling the global playing field; (4) cooperation in the digital economy; and (5) inclusive workforce participation, including women’s economic participation” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Second Round of the Japan-US Economic Dialogue between Deputy Prime Minister Aso and Vice President Pence of the United States of America”). It was evident that Japan would not cede easily to American pressure. When in early November 2017 President Trump, during his visit to Japan, once again called for “free, fair, and reciprocal” trade with that country, he was answered by Vice Premier Asō who clarified that Tokyo would not enter into a free trade agreement with Washington to resolve the problem of trade imbalance in bilateral relations (NBC Universal Media).

Trade talks between Japan and the US accelerated under American pressure in 2018. In January 2018 the Trump administration started trade war with China by imposing tariffs on solar panels and washing machines. Succeeding protectionist decisions of the US government were detrimental also to the Japanese economy. In March 2018 Washington set import tariffs of 10% for aluminum and 25% on steel, which met with protests from Tokyo. In September 2018 President Trump deplored the US trade deficit with Japan and mentioned a possibility of introducing a 25% tariff on Japanese cars. In addition, in an interview to the *Wall Street Journal* he said that Washington’s relations with the Japanese were very good, but “that will end as soon as I tell them how much they have to pay” (AFP-JIJI). Having no other choice, during a summit meeting with the US president on September 26, 2018, Prime Minister Abe issued a Joint Statement in which he agreed to “enter into negotiations, following the completion of necessary domestic procedures, for a Japan–United States Trade Agreement on goods, as well as on other key areas including services, that can produce early achievements” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement of the United States and Japan”).

In parallel, Japan started talks on continuation of the TPP without US participation. The main problem was to elaborate an easy way for suspending those provisions from the previous treaty that had been introduced to please the US without having to start negotiations from scratch. At the same time, it was in the interest

of the Abe administration to leave the door open for the US's potential accession in the future. In the absence of the US, it is Japan who became the largest economy among the participants, and thus Tokyo was expected to play a leading role. A preliminary draft of the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership was announced by 11 states, dubbed by Prime Minister Abe "Ocean's Eleven," during APEC summit in Da Nang in mid-November 2017. As stressed by Japanese Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō, the new deal would "serve as a foundation for building a broader free-trade area" in Asia-Pacific (Stevenson and Rich). TPP-11 agreement was signed in March 2018 in Santiago de Chile and ratified by Japan in July 2018.

As a new trade policy constituted a vital component of Donald Trump's electoral promises, Prime Minister Abe was unable to persuade the American president to concessions regarding withdrawal from TPP. Instead, it is Washington who put pressure on Tokyo to redress trade imbalance. Japan adapted to these challenges by renegotiating TPP without US's participation and by agreeing to initiate negotiations on Trade Agreement on goods with the US.

Exploiting the change

While Donald Trump's stance on US bases in Japan or TPP ran counter to Japanese interests, his posture towards North Korea, China and Russia seemed to be in line with the foreign policy of the Abe administration. Since the beginning of his political career, Abe was a supporter of an assertive policy towards North Korea, based on deterrence rather than persuasion. However, as the most serious regional threat he perceived the rapidly growing power of China whose GDP exceeded Japan's in 2010 and by 2016 became more than twice larger. Russia, in turn, was treated by Abe as one of potential partners in counterweighing the PRC's ambitions. For that reason, the Japanese government welcomed Trump's statements on the necessity of displaying a tougher stance towards North Korea and China, as well as his presumably pro-Russian leaning.

During the presidential campaign Donald Trump criticized the "Pivot to Asia" strategy because it had been drafted by his rival, Hillary Clinton. On the other hand, the new president agreed with the aims of this initiative, while condemning the inconsistency in its implementation. In November 2016 Alexander Gray and Peter Navarro, two influential advisors to Trump, published an article in *Foreign Policy*, in which they criticized Obama's decision to cut expenses on US military, especially navy that was necessary to counterbalance Chinese influence. As they summarized, the "pivot has (...) turned out to be an imprudent case of talking loudly but carrying a small stick, one that has led to more, not less, aggression and instability in the region" (Gray and Navarro). Such statements made Prime Minister

Abe believe that President Trump would be even more assertive in responding to Chinese provocative moves in the region than the Obama administration.

Tokyo did not have to wait long for the first diplomatic clash between the president-elect and Beijing. At the beginning of December 2016 Trump broke a taboo and as the first American president since 1979 spoke over the phone with Republic of China President Tsai Ying-wen. Answering to protests from the PRC, Trump criticized China on Twitter for devaluing their currency, taxing American products, and building “a massive military complex in the middle of the South China Sea” (Flores). What is important, at the beginning of February 2017 Abe received a courtesy call from the new US Defense Secretary James Mattis who confirmed that the Senkaku Islands, which are disputed between Japan and China, fell within the scope of the Japan–US Security Treaty, and that Washington opposed any unilateral action aimed at undermining Japan’s administration over the archipelago (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Prime Minister Abe Receives a Courtesy Call from US Defense Secretary Mattis”). One week later, during Abe’s first visit to the US since assuming office by Trump, both leaders issued a Joint Statement, in which they agreed to “deepen cooperation to safeguard the peace and stability of the East China Sea,” “oppose any attempt to assert maritime claims through the use of intimidation, coercion or force,” as well as “call on countries concerned to avoid actions that would escalate tensions in the South China Sea” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Joint Statement”).

Paradoxically, while on the one hand the Sino-American trade war facilitated counterbalancing growing regional and global ambitions of China, on the other hand it created an opportunity for Japan to ameliorate relations with the PRC. In the face of economic problems, Beijing became more willing to deepen economic cooperation with Tokyo regardless of political disputes in bilateral relations. In October 2018, Abe paid the first visit to China by a Japanese prime minister in almost seven years, excluding attendance at various multilateral forums. He signed with President Xi Jinping as many as 12 international agreements and memoranda, which symbolized the progress in Sino-Japanese rapprochement (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Prime Minister Abe Visits China”).

Japan–US cooperation regarding the North Korean problem was initially even more explicit than regarding China. After a round of golf between Abe and Trump in Mar-A-Lago in Palm Beach in mid-November 2017, both leaders jointly criticized North Korean missile test in the Sea of Japan. During the press conference American president stressed: “I just want everybody to understand and fully know that the United States of America stands behind Japan, its great ally, 100%” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-US Joint Press Conference”). Both leaders remained in telephone contact during the subsequent North Korean ballistic missile launches in the following months. During G7 summit in Italian Taormina in May 2017, Abe and Trump agreed “to put pressure on North Korea rather than to have

dialogue with it,” as well as to “take concrete actions to enhance the Japan–US defense posture and capacity in order to deter North Korea’s threat” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-US Summit Meeting,” May 26, 2017). They also strengthened cooperation with Seoul regarding relations with Pyongyang and held Japan–US–ROK Trilateral Summits during G20 meeting in Hamburg in early July 2017 and during the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly in New York in late September 2017. Cooperation between Tokyo and Washington regarding regional security intensified even further after Pyongyang’s provocative moves in the summer 2017: the first North Korean intercontinental ballistic missile test in July, launching of missiles that flew over Hokkaido in August and September, as well as North Korea’s first hydrogen bomb test in early September. In New York in late September 2017 Abe expressed his gratitude to Trump for US’s strong posture against North Korea and for mentioning the issue of Yokota Megumi – a Japanese schoolgirl kidnapped by North Korean spies in the late 1970s – in the remarks to the UN General Assembly. Most importantly, the two leaders “confirmed that the US commitment to defend Japan through the full range of US military capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, is unwavering, and that Japan and the United States are 100% together” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-US Summit Meeting,” September 21, 2017).

Taking into account Trump’s anti-North Korean posture, Tokyo was put in an awkward position when in March 2018 the American president announced that he was envisaging holding a meeting with Kim Jong-un, without having consulted Japan on this move. When Abe visited the US in mid-April 2018, he received a promise from Trump that he would raise the issue of abductions similar to Yokota’s during the historical summit (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-US Summit Meeting,” April 18, 2018). Having no other choice, Tokyo started responding to the sudden shift in US’s policy by searching rapprochement with Pyongyang. During his speech at the UN General Assembly in New York in late September 2018, Abe admitted he was ready to meet with Kim Jong-un. At the same time, Japanese Foreign Minister Kōno Tarō told to his North Korean counterpart Ri Yong-ho that Japan was willing to resolve the issues of North Korean missile and nuclear programs as well as abductions in a comprehensive manner (Kiyomiya).

While Japan generally displayed an assertive policy towards Beijing and Pyongyang, partnership with Russia was a part of Abe’s strategy of encircling and containing China. In April 2013 in Moscow he announced with President Vladimir Putin the intention to strengthen economic exchange, re-commence talks on the territorial issue (Northern Territories / South Kuril Islands), as well as initiate regular exchange between foreign and defense ministers of both countries (so-called 2+2). Nevertheless, after annexation of Crimea in March 2014, Abe was persuaded by the Obama administration to introduce economic sanctions against Russia. Still, behind the scenes the Japanese government gave signals that it would not

like the Ukrainian crisis to interrupt cooperation with Moscow. Abe frequently sent special emissaries to Russia, such as National Security Advisor Yachi Shōtarō in May 2014 or former Prime Minister Mori Yoshirō in September 2014, who continued secret negotiations (Tōgō, 186–234). Under these circumstances, Donald Trump's conciliatory gestures towards Vladimir Putin during the electoral campaign were rather welcomed by Tokyo.⁵ After assuming office, the new American president toned down his pro-Russian attitude, but he still sympathized with Moscow to a much greater extent than his predecessor. During G7 summit in La Malbaie in June 2018 he even called for re-admittance of Russia to G7/G8 (Borger and Perkins).

During his first meeting with the US president-elect in November 2016, Abe tried to convince Trump that Russia constituted a much less grave danger for the international community than China, both in terms of economic and military potentials. He also argued that Japan could not remain conflicted with both of these powers at the same time (Yamaguchi, *Antō*, 62–63). Paradoxically, however, the immediate impact of Trump's election on Japan's policy towards Russia was rather detrimental. Abe wanted to exploit the fact that Russia suffered from economic crisis and international isolation, and for that reason Putin was more willing to concessions on the territorial dispute for a financial contribution from Japan. However, the US president-elect's seemingly pro-Russian posture diluted the significance of Tokyo's accommodating policy towards Moscow. Japanese prime minister had high expectations regarding President Putin's visit to Tokyo in December 2016, but they did not materialize.

On the other hand, thanks to Trump's more accommodating stance towards Russia, Abe gained a free hand in intensifying relations with Moscow. In 2017 he visited Russia twice – in April and September. What is important, in March 2017 both sides held Foreign and Defense Ministerial Consultation (so-called 2+2) that had been shelved after annexation of Crimea (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-Russia Foreign and Defence Ministerial Consultation (‘2+2’ Ministerial Meeting”). In 2018 Abe once more visited Russia two times – in May and September. During the Eastern Economic Forum in Vladivostok in September 2018, he agreed with President Putin to implement five joint economic projects in the Northern Territories (South Kuril Islands) (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Japan-Russia Summit Meeting”). All these meetings were aimed at preparing the ground for the resolution of the territorial issue.

Trump's election as US president was interpreted by Tokyo not only as a threat, but also as an opportunity. The new administration's anti-Chinese and anti-North Korean attitude, as well as its pro-Russian leaning, seemed to be in line with Abe's international strategy. Nevertheless, while Tokyo to some extent exploited US's

⁵ Trump praised Putin many times. See: Kaczynski, Massie and McDermott.

hawkish posture, sudden shifts in Donald Trump's security policy constituted a challenge to Japanese decision makers. For that reason, Abe had to display some flexibility in deepening economic cooperation with China or toning down hard-power-like measures against North Korea.

Conclusion

Domestic factors, both in Japan and the US, were of importance in establishing Japan's policy towards the US at the beginning of Donald Trump's term in office. Regardless of the US national interests that compelled the Obama administration to counterbalance Chinese influence through the "Pivot to Asia" and TPP initiatives, the Trump government decided to withdraw from both of these strategic policies. Instead, Washington put pressure on Tokyo and other partner states, demanding from them greater contribution to the alliance.

Prime Minister Abe was fast in reacting to the alternation of power in the US. He mobilized his administrative staff to gain direct access to Donald Trump and his family, thus convincing the president-elect to agree to a private meeting only few days after election. This interpersonal connection helped Abe in assuaging Washington's criticism regarding the problem of financing US military bases in Japan, but it proved insufficient to persuade Trump to continue the TPP initiative. As predicted by neoclassical realism, the domestic-level intervening variables only temporarily destabilized Japan's policy towards the US. Instead of dwelling on the TPP failure, Abe adapted to the change by negotiating a watered-down version of the agreement. Furthermore, he focused on exploiting those elements of Trump's security policy that were beneficial to Japan – especially the assertive posture against North Korea and China, as well as softer stance towards Russia. However, the unpredictability of Trump's policy, especially towards North Korea, to some extent undermined the significance of cooperation between Tokyo and Washington. Therefore, while the surprising result of presidential election in the US did not change the basic vector of Japanese foreign policy, it did influence the pace and intensity of various international initiatives.

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Karol Żakowski – PhD (2010) and habilitation (2016) in political science, is an Associate Professor at the Department of Asian Studies, Faculty of International and Political Studies, University of Lodz. He was a visiting scholar at the Kwansai Gakuin University (2008–2009), Keio University (2012–2013, Japan Foundation Japanese Studies Fellowship) and the National Graduate Institute for Policy Studies in Tokyo (2016), as well as a participant of a Japanese language course in the Japan Foundation Japanese Language Institute, Kansai (2006), and an internship in the Japanese Diet (2009). He is a member of Nihon Seiji Gakkai (Japanese Political Science Association), Association for Asian Studies, International Political Science Association, European Association for Japanese Studies, and British Association for Japanese Studies. His recent monographs include: *Decision-Making Reform in Japan: The DPJ's Failed Attempt at a Politician-Led Government* (Routledge 2015) and *Japan's Foreign Policy Making: Central Government Reforms, Decision-Making Processes, and Diplomacy* (co-authored with Beata Bochorodycz and Marcin Socha, Springer 2018).

Korean Crisis and a War of Words

Joanna Beczkowska

University of Lodz
Faculty of International and Political Studies
Department of Asian Studies
e-mail: joanna.beczowska@uni.lodz.pl

Abstract

In 2017, Korean crisis escalated as Donald Trump began “war of words” with DPRK’s chairman Kim Jong-un. Each threat both leaders made might eventually be understood by the other party as a declaration of war. Donald Trump wanted to “clean up the mess” left by previous US administrations and solve the problem of North Korean nuclear program. However, his actions were inconsistent: he threatened in a very North Korean way “total destruction” only to emphasize later that it was not a “preferred option.” This article explores how “war of words” was a significant cause of the escalation of the Korean crisis.

Keywords: North Korea, Korean Peninsula, Donald Trump, Kim Jong-un, nuclear crisis, USA-North Korea relations.

Introduction

The first year of Donald Trump's presidency coincided with the significant progress in the development of North Korea's nuclear program. In the New Year's address, the North Korean leader Kim Jong-un declared that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has "entered the final stage of preparation for the test launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile" (2017 New Year's Address). Donald Trump, who in the same month was to be sworn in as president of the United States, via Twitter assured that "it won't happen!" (@realDonaldTrump). A few months later, the North Korean media announced that a successful test of ballistic missile which can "reach anywhere in the world" was carried out. This event, however, was not the beginning of recent Korean crisis but the result of the growing tension on the Korean Peninsula. One of the major reasons for the increase in tension in 2017 was none other than Donald Trump and his war of words against North Korean leader.

This article aims to show how Trump's policy affected the escalation of tension on the Korean Peninsula in 2017. The problem of North Korea's nuclear and missile armaments may be one of the most important challenges of Trump's foreign policy. The American president has repeatedly promised to "clean up the mess" left by his predecessors. However, in 2017 Donald Trump was far from solving the problem of DPRK's denuclearization at the negotiating table: his threatening policy turned into a war of words which could very easily become armed conflict. The tension between Washington and Pyongyang also limited the possibilities of South Korean President Moon Jae-in who together with the liberal Democratic Party replaced the conservative Park Geun-hye government. The new South Korean administration faced the difficult task of balancing between the expectations of the international community (sanctions of the United Nations Security Council towards North Korea), the alliance with Washington, and the desire to improve inter-Korean relations.

The leading figures of the Korean crisis – Donald Trump and Kim Jong-un – aroused among the international community concerns due to their unpredictability. Although the American president blamed only the North Korean side for contributing to the escalation of the conflict, this article proves that growing tension on the Korean Peninsula was in fact the combination of Trump's incoherent strategy and aggressive rhetoric with the rapid development of nuclear weapon by DPRK.

United States-North Korea relations

Relations between the United States and North Korea are characterized by uncertain advances towards denuclearization that ended with deadlock and crisis. Pyongyang for years has been blackmailing the international community with the threat of using

nuclear weapons, from time to time signalling readiness to sit at the negotiating table. In this way, the North Korean regime has often avoided strong reprisals from the American side. The strategy of DPRK led by Kim Il-sung and Kim Jong-il consisted of making promises to the United States and international community in the moments of danger – such as collapse of the Soviet Union: the most important ally of North Korea – to abandon nuclear weapon only to blur them later during negotiation process with Washington (Courmont, 59). On the other hand, the United States undertook various political actions in response to threats from North Korean proliferation. These include military cooperation with allies in the region (Japan, South Korea), extensive sanctions and non-proliferation mechanisms such as export controls. In addition, Washington has been involved in diplomatic initiatives that offered North Korea humanitarian aid and some concessions in exchange for abandoning the nuclear program. The North Korean strategy can be well illustrated by regime's policy in the 1990s. In 1985, Pyongyang signed the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, however the process of negotiations with the international community did not truly begin until the Soviet Union's collapse. Kim Il-sung and then Kim Jong-il used apparent openness to achieve their own goals. After each progress in the negotiations, there was always a step back. And so North Korea did not comply with the guidelines of the International Atomic Energy Commission, demanding that the United States first withdrew its tactical nuclear weapons from South Korea. In 1991, President George Bush supported the gradual withdrawal of American forces from Asia, including tactical nuclear weapons. Following Bush's example, South Korean President Roh Tae-woo announced the Declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, which was then signed by both Koreas. Only two years later North Korea rejected one of the important points of inter-Korean agreement: declaration on mutual control of both countries. Pyongyang again resorted to blackmail and threatened to withdraw from the non-proliferation treaty, demanding a security guarantee from the United States. After obtaining it, Kim Il-sung agreed to the inspection but only under his conditions. In 1994, his successor, Kim Jong-il, seemed to finally end negotiations with Washington by agreeing to close the nuclear program. In return he demanded large compensation from United States. However, instead of solving nuclear crisis, this was the beginning of using by DPRK strategy of making the promises of ending nuclear armaments in exchange for financial gain.

The North Korean leaders proved to be great manipulators. The main goal of the North Korean regime was and is to survive. Without the support of traditional allies North Korea decided to bet on nuclear weapons to effectively deter enemies. The example of US-North Korean relations under the Bush administration shows how efficiently the regime has used the strategy of threats intertwined with apparent openness to negotiations. Moreover, North Korea finally managed to blame in the eyes of international community the US for the impasse in the negotiations. Pyongyang has repeatedly invoked (and still is) that insufficient security guarantees

from Washington are the sole reason which does not allow the final closure of the nuclear program issue.

Interestingly, the escalations of tensions in the Korean Peninsula, which usually turned into a dangerous crisis, were often actually caused by the United States. The coming to power of the Republicans and the terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 greatly affected the deterioration of the Washington-Pyongyang relations. In the US government, the position of hard-line supporters who advocated a confrontational attitude towards North Korea was strengthened (Courmont, 71). President George W. Bush continued to attack Kim Jong-il, calling him names like “spoiled child” or “pygmy” (an allusion to Kim’s short height). Moreover, American president also condemned the peaceful efforts of Kim Dae-jung, whose “sunshine policy” improved relations on the Korean peninsula. The aggressive rhetoric of the American president probably influenced the increase in North Korean radicalism. When Washington came up with the idea of a military solution to the problem of North Korean nuclear weapon, Pyongyang had no other choice but to strongly manifest its power: in 2003 DPRK announced withdrawal from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, and a few months later officially admitted to possessing a nuclear weapon. The six-party talks ended with a stalemate, for which the North Korean side could again blame the United States. George W. Bush included DPRK along Iran and Iraq in “axis of evil.” This term was used by Bush administration in place of “rogue state” to describe governments that developed weapons of mass destruction and sponsored terrorism. Concept turned out to be very controversial: the United States used it as justification of war on terrorism while critics saw it rather as justification of imperialism and propaganda tool. Armed intervention in Iraq proved the failure of “axis of evil” concept that no longer could be efficiently used against North Korea.

Return of Democrats to power and the election of Barack Obama as a new president brought back policy of “engagement” instead of confrontation. Obama, unlike previous American leaders, realized that Kim Jong-il is not a madman but a rational strategist. The solution to the problem of North Korean nuclear weapon should lie in understanding the interests of Pyongyang, not intimidation of regime. Obama also called for the extension of the dialogue to other issues instead of focusing only on denuclearization. However, Obama administration policy was too passive to solve the problem and, after attack on the island of Yeonpyeong, Pyongyang only intensified various provocations.

The end of the era of strategic patience

Donald Trump’s rise to power coincided with the final stage of consolidation of power by the son of Kim Jong-il. Kim Jong-un like Trump appears to be an unpredictable politician. Despite the tightening of sanctions and the threat of armed

intervention by the United States, North Korea carried out further rocket and nuclear tests. However, the intense development of the nuclear program and the purges among the party elites were, first and foremost, important for Kim's internal policy: he had to strengthen his position as the undisputed leader. In a sense, Trump faced a similar task: he had to prove his greatness as a president. The solution to this could be resolving the problem that previous American leaders dealt with without much luck.

After rising to power, Donald Trump announced the end of the era of "strategic patience." He declared that, unlike his predecessors, he would solve the North Korean problem once and for all. However, instead of offering a coherent strategy, Trump got into a word skirmish with the North Korean leader and his associates from time to time had to assure the international community that the conflict should be resolved first by peaceful means. The escalation of tension between Washington and Pyongyang took place in April 2017. North Korea launched a mid-range ballistic missile towards the Sea of Japan. Two days later Trump manifested his strength by launching a missile attack in Syria. The USS Carl Vinson aircraft carrier was then directed towards the Korean Peninsula. This was allegedly the result of a communication error. The commemoration of the 85th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army which was accompanied by demonstration of military manoeuvres also contributed to the increase in tension. Moreover, the US missile system THAAD was installed in South Korea. In July, North Korea conducted an intercontinental ballistic missile test and then threatened to attack the American military base on the island of Guam. At that time, threats were often exchanged between the leaders of both countries.

The situation seemed dangerous. When George W. Bush insulted Kim Jong-il, the North Korean leader did not turn to an exchange of insults. Kim Jong-un, on the other hand, did not remain indifferent to Donald Trump's threats. It was feared that being provoked, young leader of North Korea would reach for nuclear weapons. According to Korean Central News Agency, before launching an intercontinental missile Kim said that "American bastards" would not be happy with such a gift on 4th of July (qtd. in *A gift for American bastards*). In August, the UN Security Council imposed new sanctions on Pyongyang. UN sanctions aimed at the economy of this isolated country are major obstacle for regime. Kim had to respond to it and the aim of his attack was again the United States which was to "pay for its crimes". The escalation of the war of words took place during the aggressive speech of Donald Trump at the UN General Assembly meeting. Then Donald Trump promised to "completely destroy North Korea" (*Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly*). Although this statement could have been read as a declaration of war, the North Korean regime decided to apply its strategy of threatening and withdrawing from them when situation becomes too dangerous. Kim Jong-un announced that he would not make

the promised attack on Guam but instead wait to see the “foolish and stupid conduct of the Yankees” (qtd. in *North Korea backs off Guam threat*). All responsibility for a possible further escalation of the Korean crisis was dropped on the American side. The North Korean leader called by Trump a “madman” was to advise the United States to “think rationally and make a precise decision to avoid humiliation” (qtd. in *North Korea backs off Guam threat*).

In this war of words, the rhetoric of Donald Trump is surprising. Using social media, the American president posted many statements that were far from diplomatic correctness. In response to the threat of attack on Guam, a statement appeared in the media that the next provocations “will be met with fire and fury like the world has never seen.” These words, though spoken in the style of the North Korean regime, were said by Donald Trump (qtd. in *Trump says North Korea will be met with ‘fire and fury’*). Those words may sound familiar, as DPRK many times threatened to turn South Korea into a “sea of fire.” The next tweets of the American president about the increase of the nuclear arsenal and the statement that “there will never be a time that we are not the most powerful nation in the world!!” also sound like heard in North Korean propaganda speeches (@realDonaldTrump). The statements of both leaders adopted a very similar tone. However, what is characteristic of the North Korean regime is seen as the failure of American diplomacy. Donald Trump lowered himself to the “level” of his opponent, thus losing the skirmish with him at the beginning. When Donald Trump called Kim “a rocket man on a suicide mission” and threatened to completely destroy North Korea, if he was forced to do so (*Remarks by President Trump to the 72nd Session of the United Nations General Assembly*), Pyongyang responded by saying “a frightened dog barks louder” (qtd. in *North Korea: Kim Jong-un’s statement about ‘deranged dotard’ Donald Trump*). Kim Jong-un realized that the tougher Trump’s rhetoric, the smaller the threat. Donald Trump’s words could also be used against the United States, indicating that it is Trump, not Kim, who is a greater threat to peace in the Korean Peninsula.

Are all options for North Korea actually on the table?

The most important issue related to the war on words is the question of whether it can turn into a military battle. After Donald Trump’s speech at the UN General Assembly, his spokesperson Sarah Huckabee Sanders assured that the United States did not declare war on North Korea (qtd. in *North Korea v Donald Trump war of words: a most dangerous game*). But how could the regime in Pyongyang understand threats such as “total destruction”? The American president gave Kim an argument for the further development of the nuclear program to defend the country. North Korean leadership also realizes that a preventive USA attack is unlikely, and

Trump's threats are nothing more than words. DPRK has been playing this game with Washington for years and perfectly knows when it can afford to threaten, and when it is time to reduce provocations. More than two decades of Washington–Pyongyang relations after the end of the Cold War shows that the United States will not start a war if North Korea does not attack directly. In 2010, a former US military pilot confessed that Richard Nixon was considering dropping the atomic bomb at Pyongyang, but he never decided to take this step. When the North Korean torpedo sank the South Korean Cheonan corvette, Barack Obama directed military ships and planes toward the Korean Peninsula, but he did not strike. Both politicians were praised for their restraint towards North Korea. All states involved in this conflict: the United States, North and South Korea, Russia, China and Japan want to avoid the outbreak of a new war on the Korean Peninsula. For years, the main goal of the North Korean regime is – as mentioned – survival, and the nuclear arsenal is to be the guarantor. The North Korean weapon thus acts as a deterrent and is not offensive. The United States, on the other hand, realizes that an attack on the regime would pose a threat to South Korea and Japan, if not to the Americans themselves, and would mean huge losses in people. China would also like to avoid a war: not only because the collapse of the Kim Jong-un regime would mean a huge influx of refugees, but also because of the possibility of the US and South Korean troops stationing close to China's borders.

Rhetoric of both Trump and Kim is full of hidden “ifs.” It is true that all the options are on the table but that does not mean they will ever be used. Trump threatens with total destruction again and again, immediately adding that this is not the preferred option. North Korea continues its tactics of intimidating with nuclear weapons in response to American threats, at the same time presenting its arsenal as a legitimate means of defence, not an attack. In the entire Korean crisis, Donald Trump remained the biggest unknown. One day on Twitter he could say that his patience was over, and Pyongyang's threats were enough to decide to wipe this country off the face of the earth, just to praise Kim Jong-un the other day. Even the closest advisors of the American president were not sure whether this was part of strategy to intimidate Kim or just the emotional explosion of Trump (*North Korea v Donald Trump war of words: a most dangerous game*).

Kim Jong-un, on the other hand, continued the policy of provocation while not exceeding the limit of provoking armed conflict with Washington and Seoul. DPRK has an undeniable advantage in the form of nuclear weapons. A weapon of this type has a special status: as no other is raising such fear as the prospect of destroying mankind. The international community, which is often lead by the United States must face the threat of its use even if it is only hypothetical. Therefore, the United States decided to invade Iraq on the pretext of eliminating the weapons of mass destruction which allegedly was in the possession of the regime of Saddam Hussein and never took steps towards North Korea which is openly manifesting its nuclear

potential. Washington was sure that Iraq would not respond with a nuclear attack. Even if the Kims are bluffing and their rockets are not capable of transferring the appropriate nuclear warheads, this possibility exists: if not now, then in the future. That is the reason why Donald Trump despite threatening to put all options on the table is unable to use them without jeopardizing the lives of many US, South Korean or Japanese citizens.

Trump Scarier Than Kim

Due to its location and relations, South Korea must participate in the conflict between Washington and Pyongyang. Seoul which is located not far from the border with North Korea would easily become a target in the event of a war. However, living in constant feeling of danger from North Korean side over time turned into a habit. Many South Koreans admitted that they actually are more afraid of the American president than the leaders of the North Korean regime. According to some Koreans, Donald Trump is responsible for the escalation of tension on the Korean Peninsula. The unpredictability of the American president and his hasty statements may lead North Korea to attack. According to the South Koreans, Kim Jong-un “says something crazy that he is going to do but he has never done anything,” while Donald Trump “by his action” can provoke the young leader (qtd. in *Trump might start a war*). South Koreans are afraid that the American president trying to prove something to the world and confirm his authority only increases tension on the Korean Peninsula instead of solving the problem of North Korean nuclear program. Relations with Washington under the leadership of Donald Trump seem problematic not only for the enemy North Korea but also for the American allies like South Korea. In 2017, the conservative administration of Park Geun-hye was replaced by the social-liberal Democratic Party and Moon Jae-in who is influenced by his mentor Roh Moo-hyun. Roh continued Kim Dae-jung’s “sunshine policy” and was known for his anti-American attitude (Manyin, 9–10). However, Moon Jae-in in 2017, when North Korea was rapidly developing its nuclear program, could not easily follow footsteps of “sunshine policy” and thus proposed “two-track approach.” This strategy means striving to resume dialogue with Pyongyang and establish humanitarian cooperation while respecting the sanctions of the UN Security Council. In addition to the Security Council sanctions, cooperation activities with Pyongyang have been limited for Seoul by the alliance with the United States. The foreign policy of Donald Trump “America First” was a challenge for Moon Jae-in. Renegotiation of the free trade agreement, the demand to cover most of the costs of implementing and servicing the THAAD missile system, and above all the escalation of the Korean crisis by threats of using military power contributed to the growth of anti-American sentiments in South Korea. At the same time, the administration of Moon

Jae-in was aware of the importance of an alliance with the United States which is a guarantee of security. That is why Seoul supports American sanctions and participates in joint military manoeuvres even though such actions always raise objections from the North Korean side. Even the achievement of the inter-Korean negotiations on the Olympic Games was partly attributed to Trump by the South Korean government. It was hoped that in this way Trump would not “interfere,” which would contribute to the de-escalation of the crisis.

Conclusion – Defeat of Trump

Kim Jong-un was the winner of war of words in 2017. Although North Korea was significantly weakened by the international sanctions of the UN Security Council, it managed to accelerate the development of the nuclear and missile programs. At the beginning of the year, Donald Trump assured that he would not allow Pyongyang to create a nuclear weapon that can reach the United States. If you believe the assurances of the North Korean side, however, Trump did not manage to stop the technological progress of Pyongyang. Tests of a ballistic missile with an intercontinental range should be evidence of that. Moreover, the American president provided the regime with the necessary arguments for propaganda inside and outside the country. The biggest threat to North Korea is actually self-destruction. However, Trump’s “fire and rage” rhetoric has only strengthened Kim Jong-un’s position within the state. The threat from the United States justified the spending on nuclear program.

Barack Obama’s policy of “strategic patience” did not work but Donald Trump has not offered a more effective strategy. Taking over the rhetoric from Pyongyang, the American president wanted to “tame” North Korea with fire. However, these threats were empty, and Kim Jong-un could further develop its weapons program. At the moment of the escalation of the conflict, it was feared that Trump’s threats would be understood as a declaration of war. In such an atmosphere, joint military manoeuvres of the United States and allies near the Korean Peninsula could be easily read by Pyongyang as an imminent threat.

Trump’s administration policy towards North Korea turned out to be inconsistent. When Donald Trump threatened “total destruction,” Secretary of State Rex Tillerson and Secretary of Defence James Mattis assured that Washington’s goal was not war but diplomatic solution. This incoherence could have been used by Kim to “examine” how much he could afford in provoking the United States. This combination of Washington’s vague policy, the escalation of tension and the possibility of Kim “crossing the border” posed a threat of armed conflict. Although in early 2018 the tension on the Korean Peninsula was reduced by the participation of North Korea in the Winter Olympics, the threat of armed conflict still exists.

Was the beginning of 2018 the end of Korean crisis? In his New Year's address Kim Jong-un announced his will to improve relations with South Korea. At the same time, he did not forget to add that there is a "nuclear button" on his desk that can be pressed at any moment. In January 2018, eyes of the international community focused on photos of ministers of both Koreas who sat down in demilitarized zone to talk about the participation of North Korea in the Winter Olympic Games organized by South Korea. However, this does not mean the end of the crisis: it is a well-known scheme of North Korean activities – after the escalation of tension there is an apparent openness to dialogue. The efforts of the South Korean President Moon Jae-in who strives to maintain this dialogue mean little because two factors that have had an impact on the crisis that began in 2017 – North Korean regime sense of being in danger and Donald Trump – still play a major role on Korean Peninsula. At any moment of deadlock in negotiations, a new war (of words) between Trump and Kim can break out.

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Joanna Beczkowska – a junior research fellow at Center for Asian Affairs and PhD student at the Department of Asia Studies as part of the Interdisciplinary Humanist Doctoral Studies at the University of Lodz. She is a graduate of the Faculty of Philology (cultural studies, specialty film studies) and the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz (international relations). Her research interests include issues related to politics, society and culture of South Korea and inter-Korean relations.

Political Relations of Australia with the United States: 2000–2017

Mieczysław Sprengel

Collegium Iuridicum Novum
Faculty of Law and Administration
e-mail: sprengel@interia.pl

Abstract

Relations between Australia and the United States have developed for long time notably during World War II. Over the following decades, cooperation has become more intense as Australians adopt many cultural patterns from the Americans. Australia declared and supported US presidents in military operations, which is why some have called Australia, America's sheriff for working to stabilize this part of the world. One cannot overlook the personal arrangements between leaders that help shape the dynamic of deepening the mutual relations these two nations. Donald Trump's personal interactions' with the Prime Ministers of Australia play a significant role in this regard.

Keywords: Australia, United States America, Japan, political relations.

Introduction

In order to analyze the political relations between Australia and the United States in the years 2000–2017, one must at least reach out and outline the changes that have occurred on the political scene in the world after the Second World War.

After the Second World War, Americans wanted to obtain comprehensive military-administrative control in Japan. In this way, a barrier was created against the expanding communist regime. After a longer stay of US troops in the territory of the Japanese state, General Douglas MacArthur in a New Year's speech on January 1, 1950, stated that: "Japan may establish a defensive alliance and join the UN, or rely on US troops for self-defense" (Wilanowski, 264). At the end of World War II, the United States themselves proposed the creation of a system of international economic organizations that would help in the reconstruction of destroyed countries after the war. Another role of these organizations was to improve the functioning of links between different countries.

Representatives of the Australian government believed that the contribution of their army to defeating the enemy should guarantee their status at the table during the peace conference. In fact, Australia was removed from the most important negotiations in Cairo, Yalta and Potsdam. Peace agreements were concluded in such a way as to ensure control of the world, above all the United States, Great Britain and the USSR. "The Canberra Times" reported that after short visits of Prime Minister Joseph Benedict Chifley in the United Kingdom, Japan and the USA, Australia proceeded to secure itself in the event of another war (Industrial expansion plans. The Canberra Times 1).

Australia was dissatisfied with the actions of the United Kingdom, which took action with the United States to cooperate more closely in Europe. In this situation, in January 1944, it signed an ANZAC defense pact with New Zealand – without any consultation or informing the British side of this fact. As a result of signing this document, Australia considered itself as a defender of the British civilization in the Pacific. Despite British promises, Australia was not invited to San Francisco for a ministerial conference in April 1945. It was also surprising for Australian leaders that the conditions for capitulation agreed at the Potsdam conference at the end of July 1945 were learned from the press. As a result, the Australians protested and did not send any delegation to the Japanese surrender ceremony that took place on September 2, 1945 in the Gulf of Tokyo. At that time, only symbolically, Australia had to be represented by Great Britain. In contrast, Australians directly with the Americans demanded the signing of capitulation documents and the acceptance of the full composition of the Council of Foreign Ministers for the Pacific and the Far East. Minister Herbert Evatt issued a letter to the British Government on August 9, 1945, in which he stressed the indifference of Great Britain and demanded that Australia should be granted full negotiation status. The English did

not respond to the letter – subsequently the political dialogue between the two countries began in the press (Meaney, 6–9). Against this background, relations with the United Kingdom gradually faded and the United States became a new partner.

New partner of Australia: United States

Unquestionably, an important partner of Australia was the United States. Its meaning is described by Edward Halizak in the following words: “The American doctrine of containment in the Asia-Pacific region is often assessed from the point of view of the lost Vietnam war. Without diminishing this fact, it should be noted that throughout the Cold War period, the US remained the main guarantor of Western interests in the region, as evidenced by the fact of direct involvement in two regional armed conflicts (Korea and Vietnam) (Halizak, 137)”.

The greatest achievements of the “containment doctrine” emerged in the economic sphere. As already mentioned, ensuring the security of Japan and Taiwan and South Korea gave them opportunities for rapid development. In addition, American investments and easy access of these countries to the US market stimulated economic development. The growing importance of American economic interests in foreign policy towards the Asia-Pacific region was marked in the 1970s, when the first trade disputes with Japan and later with other countries appeared. At this point, politicians and business circles understood that the region’s economy could compete with the US economy. In the late 1970s, US policy changed in the approach to the institutionalized form of regional economic cooperation. Senator John Glenn, chairman of the Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, contributed to this. Glenn has dealt with the possibilities of developing regional economic cooperation since 1978. At the request of the Congress, professors Peter Drysdale and Hugh Patrick prepared a report in which they pointed out the need to set up an organization called the Organization for Pacific Trade and Development (OPTAD), modeled on the OECD.

Already in the early 1980s, US trade with the Asia-Pacific region matched commercial trade with European countries. In connection with the economic ties of the United States with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region, the approach of American diplomacy to these countries changed. Edward Halizak wrote that it was not possible to treat these countries only in terms of defense against communism (Halizak, 139). The deterrence strategy was no longer valid, but new economic challenges arose. In the face of these events, a new strategy was created in which the US found itself in the region on the principle of an important member in the political and strategic structure of the region. The US presence was supposed to be economic, political and culturally civilizational. The interest of the United States

in the Asia-Pacific region in a different dimension than just military has brought about the elevation of this region. It became an area for American investments and exports, which generated profits for both sides.

Time to fight terrorism together

In the Asia-Pacific region, apart from economic issues, political problems were very important. There has not always been a political unanimity of states in the context of common interests, but in opposing terrorism many states showed solidarity.

A month before the terrorist attack in the United States, in August 2001, Prime Minister John Howard visited Japan, where he held talks with members of the Japanese government and the private sector. They talked about bilateral relations with Japanese Prime Minister Koizumi and Foreign Minister Makiko Tanaka. These talks were aimed at calming Japanese partners after the talks of the Australian side (Defense Minister Peter Reith and Foreign Minister Alexander Downer) with the American side (Secretary of State Colin Powell and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Pacific Commander in the Pacific Admiral Dennis Blair) on building a new defense forum. As a result of publicizing the whole case by journalists, the Australian government had to calm down not only Japan and South Korea, but also suspicious China. During this visit, Howard assured Japan that he was not building an exclusive US–Australian bloc.

During the terrorist attack on New York and Washington, Prime Minister Howard paid an official visit to the United States. In contrast to not very pleasant contacts with President Bill Clinton, Howard had a good relationship with George W. Bush. During a visit in 2001, he was warmly welcomed by President Bush and other government officials, including US Secretary of State Powell and Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld. Howard's words of friendship with the United States were immediately put to the test. The September 11, 2001 events in New York set Australia in the face of US obligations under the ANZUS agreement. After Howard's return to Australia, in his decisions the parliament referred to the ANZUS treaty signed 50 years earlier, which was used in 2001 for the first time in the activities of Australia for the United States. The attack of troops on Iraq without the international involvement of UN forces caused a wave of protests in Australian cities, similar to the Vietnam War (Eccleston 4). Prime Minister Howard hoped that the consequences of a terrorist attack on the United States would be serious and would trigger further threat. Despite the two-party support in the Australian parliament, Howard cautiously spoke about expanding cooperation with the US and counteracting terrorism.

The threat of terrorism at the beginning of the 21st century has caused drastic changes in international politics in terms of security. The dynamics of

Australian-American relations after 2001 was also linked to these events. Without taking into account the military dominance of the US in the world, radical terrorist groups began to operate across state borders. NATO's offer of military assistance in the fight against terrorists was rejected by Washington. The United States feared that multilateral NATO troops could delay US operations. Therefore, the American side was reluctant to accept support in military activities. However, Washington accepted the help of two permanent allies: Great Britain and Australia. After 10 days from October 7, 2001, i.e. from the action initiated against the Taliban, President Bush accepted Australian commitments to expose 1,550 soldiers to military operations. Howard informed Australian general Peter Cosgrove that he was authorized to act as part of American and coalition forces a coalition American action to disarm Iraq. Australian assistance was also focused on the deployment of Special Air Service (SAS) – where the Australian legion numbered 150 people. In this way, Australia joined the United Kingdom and the United States in a pre-emptive attack against the Taliban.

In addition to Australia's involvement in Iraq from the end of 2001, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) was represented in military operations in Afghanistan, Kyrgyzstan and the Gulf in a number of 850 to 1,300 soldiers. At the end of 2002, Australia withdrew its SAS legion from Afghanistan, which numbered 150 people. The legion was withdrawn despite evidence of increasing violence.

Australian journalist Michael Duffy claimed that Australia's support in the war against terrorism had not been great so far. He wrote that most of the hard work of Howard was left to American and British soldiers. Prime Minister John Howard was aware of this criticism and concerns about the Pentagon in relation to limited support from Australia. The Australian prime minister explained that its troops were involved at this time in other extraordinary coalition operations in East Timor and the Solomon Islands. At that time, Australian forces also participated in secret operations in the Middle East. Howard's government was reluctant to acknowledge a small contribution to the reconstruction and security of Afghanistan (Gurry, 227–229).

Australia as a “deputy sheriff”

A new impulse for action for Australia were the Bali bomb attacks. After September 11, 2001, the next largest terrorist act occurred in Bali – October 12, 2002, when the bombs exploded at the Sari Nightclub in Kuta Beach. At that time, 202 tourists died, including 88 Australians and 15 Japanese. The terrorist attacks also affected Australia's as an American ally. In addition, the domestic crisis in the Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea and, to a lesser extent, Nauru, brought serious challenges to the Australian government. Canberra's foreign policy was now even

more involved in the intervention. Howard's government stood out with its determination to support the US in the fight against terrorism (Serafin, 587). A few years before 2002, it was maliciously said that Australia was a "sheriff deputy," that is, the United States in the region, but since 2002, the parties have fully supported the fight against terrorism. Canberra has become the main ally supporting the peace process since 2002 (O'Keefe, 131).

Despite Australia's commitment to the cause, the Australian newspaper *The Sydney Morning Herald* on September 11, 2003, commented on the American war on terror as unsuccessful and unstable world peace. Apart from international comments, Howard admitted that the Taliban war did not bring the desired effect, on the contrary, it intensified the aggression of the opponent. Howard thought that the war would not last long and would not have occupation. There have been tensions based on these and other facts between Australia and the United States. Bush also admitted after three years from September 11, 2001 that he could wait for the end of the war on terror and added: "I do not think we can win" (Bell, 31).

In spite of some misunderstandings, Howard's government defended from the middle of 2002 the position of the United States on a pre-emptive attack on Iraq. Australian officials shared the view that one should not wait for a terrorist attack, but attack beforehand. In recognition of the position of Australia and the significance of the ANZUS pact, Prime Minister Howard was invited to give a speech at the United States Congress on June 12, 2002. During his speech, among others he said: "America has no better friend anywhere than in Australia." In spite of his support for the United States, Howard in September 2002 inquired in earnest what weapons were used and which (WMD) Iraq had. Assistance to the United States was expressed in the solidarity of Australian troops in the war with the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and in the work of secret Australian services in Pakistan. As a result of the special work of the military groups, it was discovered that in January 2002, al-Qaeda operating units in Southeast Asia were planning a terrorist attack in Singapore (Bell, 33).

In addition to Howard, full support for the Bush administration was given by Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi. However, unlike the Australian side, which was bound by the ANZUS pact, the Japanese side was limited in its assistance to the United States by article 9 of the Japanese constitution. Koizumi took advantage of the Japanese's concerns about hostile North Korea and public support for the US and wanted to revise the constitution. However, it was not possible to change the constitution beyond the creation of a parliamentary committee in this matter. On December 11, 2001, the law on international peace was amended, which allowed the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (SDF) to participate in UN peacekeeping.

As a result of terrorist attacks, not only did the contacts between Australia and the United States strengthen, but also even more with Japan. At the turn of

April and May 2002 in Australia, Prime Minister of Japan, Junichiro Koizumi, paid a visit to Australia. During the visit, among others, security issues were discussed. The terrorist attack on Bali strengthened Australia's position on the American attack on Iraq. The Australian government stressed that international legal norms do not keep pace in solving the threats to the modern world from terrorism (Sydney Morning Herald...). After some time, Howard unofficially admitted that without the UN's approval, such an action could not have majority support in Australia. In this situation, the Prime Minister of Australia sought to maintain a balance between support for the US and national unrest, resulting from the war against Iraq.

After September 11, 2001, international and regional communities had to determine on security. These issues concerned the United States and Australia as much as possible. Canberra, which had been interested in economic relations so far, had to agree and start cooperating in the field of regional security in the 21st century. The White House played a central role in the area of security. Although the role of Australia in the region was significant due to the alliance with the United States, Canberra acted as a representative and as if it was an "agent" of America. In addition, the Australian Prime Ministers by engaging with Washington in the war against Afghanistan and Iraq and getting access to intelligence materials, gained a significant position in this regard. Relations between Australian Prime Minister Howard and President Bush were very correct and close at this time. Washington demanded close cooperation from its allies, sometimes omitting the UN (Bajkowski, *Premier leci do Londynu*, 4). Australia had no influence on the decisions taken in 2002 by the United States regarding the attack on Iraq.

The United States were more important than the UN, which Canberra does not have much impact on. Therefore, it should be assumed that Howard's first visit to Europe in 2002, since he was Prime Minister of Australia, concerned among others the presentation of argumentation for the acceptance by the European Union's member states of the foreign policy of American President Bush (Bajkowski, *Emisariusz Busha?*, 6). As a result of this attitude, Howard was called the "American sheriff" (Bajkowski, *Forum Pacyfiku*, 6). Despite the Australian involvement, Prime Minister Howard hoped that he would not come to war with Iraq and called on Bush to extend the inspection period in Iraq (Bajkowski, *Stanowisko Howarda*, 6). In addition, the mood in Australia was clearly opposed to the beginning of the Iraq war. In Australia, there had not been such big demonstrations since the Vietnam War (Bajkowski, *Masowe demonstracje*, 6). In total, over one million people demonstrated. Washington, on the other hand, adopted the supremacy of common supranational interests. There was no doubt that the strict political and defense links between Australia and America were an objective geopolitical necessity (Bajkowski, *Spotkanie w Waszyngtonie*, 6). Additionally in the context of the threat of weapons of mass destruction, particularly in South-East Asia, Australia was

convinced of maintaining good relations with Asia-Pacific countries (Bajkowski, *Trzy zasadnicze tezy*, 6).

In the face of terrorism, Australia was interested in security and closer cooperation with Washington. Talks were held in the triangle Australia, Japan, and the United States. Particularly, changes began quickly during Prime Minister Koizumi's reign.

In October 2003, the UN Security Council on the basis of Resolution 1511, recognized the multinational military formation as a stabilization mission. In this situation, operations carried out in Iraq took on a slightly different character, status and support by public opinion in Australia. Howard confirmed then that he would not take troops from Iraq until the task was completed (Sydney Morning Herald...). Despite this declaration, Australia's contribution to the occupation and reconstruction of Iraq was relatively small. Howard did not accept Bush's proposal of April 2003 to intensify the deployment of Australian troops in Iraq (Kitney). The Australian involvement was significantly exceeded not only by the United Kingdom, but also countries such as Italy, Poland, the Netherlands, Bulgaria and Denmark. In mid-July 2003, the Australian forces numbered 1370 soldiers. In September 2005, 450 additional soldiers were sent to protect the Japanese forces carrying out humanitarian work in the Al-Muthanna province. The involvement of Australian soldiers was less risky than the American and British ones. All in all, the US administration appreciated Australia's involvement in the process of entering Iraq. Howard himself was worried about Australia's security in the future, since he became a visible ally of the United States. Similarly, most Australians believed that a nation engaged in a mission in Iraq was at the same time a likely target for terrorists. The Australian Parliament justified the engagement of Australian troops to US operations in Iraq as a necessary decision to maintain the alliance with the United States. Critics of Australian involvement believed that the entry of Australian troops was unfounded and unnecessary. The alleged arsenal of weapons, in fact, did not exist.

Actions against terrorism were also discussed on September 21–22, 2005 in Washington with the participation of the American side. The meeting was attended by Henry Crumpton – representative of the US State Department for terrorism, Tadamichi Yamamoto – representative of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, and Les Luck – Australian ambassador responsible for combating terrorism. During the talks, the situation of international terrorism and means of combating it was discussed. The security issue was also discussed at a meeting in Tokyo on October 23–24, 2005. At that time, the Japanese side was represented by Tsuneo Nishida (Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs for administrative affairs), US side by Nicholas Burns (Undersecretary of State for Political Affairs) and Australian side by Michael L'Estrange (secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade) (Mofa).

Another very important security meeting took place on March 18, 2006 in Sydney. The Foreign Minister of Japan Aso came to Australia. In a joint statement,

Alexander Downer and Taro Aso announced a “partnership” between Australia and Japan based on democratic values, respect, friendship and common strategies. The meeting on security was held with the participation of the US party, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. The meeting stressed the important role of the three states in maintaining global security, Australia, Japan and the United States. It was decided to build new relations between the countries, creating the “Building a Comprehensive Strategic Relationship.” It was decided to strengthen the tripartite cooperation in the field of information exchange and evaluation of international and regional security problems. It should be emphasized that the tripartite dialogue between the US, Japan and Australia, which began at a higher state level in 2002, expressed the determination of these states to protect common strategic interests in promoting peace and stability in Asia-Pacific region. Minister Downer declared that construction of comprehensive strategic relations began. In addition, the Prime Ministers have set up the creation of various information exchange programs by 2006 (Mofa).

Since the 2003 agreement on combating terrorism, the most important element in addition to commercial matters were tripartite meetings of representatives of the US, Australian and Japanese authorities. The then Australian Ambassador to Japan, Tom Schieffer, stated in an interview given in early December 2005 that the joint work of the Japanese and Australians regarding security in the region was very important (“US keen on Japanese ties with Australia”, *The Australian*. 2005). Security issues were presented by both countries at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).

In addition to the Iraq issue between Australia and the United States, representatives discussed free trade, signing an agreement in August 2004, to be in effect beginning January 1, 2005. Mark Vaile, the Australian Trade Minister, treated this agreement as the commercial equivalent of the ANZUS Treaty. Some commentators even claimed that this agreement is a reward for the devoted service of Australian troops in Iraq. Minister Downer caused confusion in Washington when, during a visit to Beijing in 2004, he said that the terms of the ANZUS Treaty did not oblige Australia to help the United States in the event of a conflict over Taiwan. In addition, Howard stated that China could also purchase Australian uranium as long as it would be used for peaceful purposes (Blumenthal). The Howard government assumed that China would not threaten world security. In this matter, however, the United States was more cautious. Howard, however, felt that his policy had demonstrated the ability to maintain balance in relations with Asian neighbors and China, while simultaneously working closely with the United States (Shanahan).

The close relations between Australia and Japan also influenced Asia’s integration to a large extent. Joint actions have contributed to ensuring peace and stability in the region. The conference also highlighted the importance of the new Trilateral Strategic Dialogue (TSD) signed with the United States on March 18, 2006 (Mofa).

The visit of US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice in March 2006 in Sydney mainly concerned tripartite talks, which were to ensure that China's rapid development and the rise of China's economic, political and military power would not be a "negative but positive factor" (Shanahan). The United States have seen China as a strategic threat and an economic competitor. Therefore, they attempted quickly to establish a tripartite pact aimed at stopping China and forcing them to accept American political and economic domination. This change in US foreign policy was unfavorable for Australia, and in particular for Prime Minister Howard, because as a result of good contacts with China, Australia gained economically. tripartite strategic dialogue

Australia's relations with India were another important aspect of Australia's foreign policy. This is why the visit of John Howard to India, after the visit of Bush and secretary Condoleezza Rice in 2006, was closely watched by Australian society. During the visit to India, the American side fully accepted India's possession of nuclear weapons and the expansion of nuclear industry. (Bajkowski, *Wizyta sekretarz Condolezzy Rice*, 6). It seemed strange that India could benefit from this without joining the international NPT (Non-Proliferation Treaty) (Bajkowski, *Wizyta sekretarz Condolezzy Rice*, 6). This was positive news for Australia due to the fact that Australian energy resources (uranium ore, natural gas, oil and coal) could be sold to India. However, the deterioration of US-Chinese relations and Rice's emphasis on non-compliance with human rights in China adversely affected Australian-Chinese relations. Despite Australian decisions that were not entirely favorable for America, Australia remained a loyal ally of the United States. Australia did not take part in the campaign to stop China from violating human rights, because relations with China for the Australian economy were very important. The importance of these relations was just as important for Australia as maintaining good relations with the US (Bajkowski, *Howard w Chinach*, 6).

The role of Australia as a sheriff for the US is part of the United States' strategy to stop China. Australia's role in Afghanistan and Iraq is part of this strategy and this is how it should be read. The military intervention of Australia in relation to its northern neighbors, including Indonesia and Papua New Guinea, and part of the Western Pacific should be read as a stage of war against terror or against drug smuggling and smuggling of people and as part of the struggle for freedom and democracy in the region (Paul 2012). That is why Australia is seriously involved in armaments, which is recorded in the 2009 Defence White Paper White Defense Defensive Australia Paper in the Asia Century Force 2030. Defense White Paper mentions China as a potential enemy. Consequently, the Australian document calls for a doubling of the sea fleet resources and the purchase of about 100 fighters from the United States. The intention of Defense White Paper was also to strengthen the military equipment and equipment of great importance to fight in the event of a war accident in Asia (Paul 2012).

Against this background, military and intelligence relations with the United States have improved. As a result, weapons and technology resources have been released that may flow from USA to Australia. Cooperation was also aimed at militarizing space and Australia's playing an important role in the US missile program. In connection with the above, Australia has a military communication center in Pine Gap and Jindalee, where very efficient and large-scale radars are placed. These locations also serve US and British intelligence to exchange information on the location of missiles constructed in the Asia-Pacific region. It may be interesting to note that the communication center in Pine Gap in central Australia is served by persons employed under a contract with the CIA. They control flights of possible missiles and provide information on their possible detention or destruction. This center is also observing operations carried out with American drones in Afghanistan, Pakistan and other parts of the region (Department of Defence).

Another form of cooperation are American military bases in Australia – in this way modern technology is combined with combat skills. According to Philip Dorling of the Australian Defense Force Academy, it is currently impossible for Australia to be a completely neutral state if the United States is involved in any war. Another American base located in Exmouth, Western Australia is supposed to spy on Chinese satellites. In this way, all Australian military operations are coordinated with the US (Department of Defence).

The relations between Australia and the United States have been formalized under the ANZUS Treaty and the Free Trade Agreement between Australia and the United States. According to a BBC World Service survey from 2014, 44% of Australians had a generally positive view of the United States and a 46% negative attitude. There is no other similar research available from that time relating to Australia on the American side but in 2012, according to the US report “Global Leadership” 55% of Australians have confirmed the leadership of the United States in today's world, 21% denied it and 24% were uncertain. In another survey from 2016, 60% of Australians supported US leadership. In the following year 2017, a survey conducted by the Lowy Institute showed that 77% consider the United States as a country important from the point of view of security. However, recently during the presidency of Donald Trump, New Zealand is considered to be the best friend, not Australia. Research from 2018 also showed that 70% of Australians believe that the current President Donald Trump does not act responsibly, only 30% thought that he could ensure security. For comparison, Barack Obama enjoyed great trust from society in terms of security (Lewis).

The new chapter of the relationship between Australia and the United States opened with the new President in the White House from 2017. Immediately after the swearing-in of President Trump there were negative comments in Australia, some even alarming. Donald Trump, also to confirm his credibility, started his earlier announced controversial policy. He started with forbidding immigration of

refugees to the USA from Syria and also all people from Iraq, Sudan, Libia, Somalia and Yemen (Bajkowski, *Nowa era w USA*, 6). In this context there was a talk with the Prime Minister of Australia. One of the most important conversations was of Trump with Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull. Donald Trump had different telephone conversation with European leaders as well, but this conversation lasted 25 minutes (Bajkowski, *Nowa era w USA*, 6).

The main subject concerned economic immigrants who for three years were in two places in Nauru and Manus Island. As agreed with President Barak Obama, the United States pledged to accept 1,250 people from this group of 2000. However, President Trump opposed and believed that this was inconsistent with his adopted policy. He said that more and more bombers and terrorists could come out of these people, he believed that the United States had become “a rubbish dump”. Prime Minister Turnbull explained that people arriving by boat were to be sent back. In the initial phase of the conversation Trump stated that Turnbull is: “You are worse than I am”. (Lewis). Trump did not accept these 1250 people. There seemed to be a big difference between Trump’s policy and the policy of vice-president Mike Pence and former President Obama concerning immigration (Zurcher).

In July 2017 President Trump met Prime – Minister Turnbull at a G-20 meeting in Hamburg where they had a successful talk. Due to Washington’s new policy, not only the relationship with the USA was important but also with China. Therefore the USA asked Australia in 2016 to choose if cooperation with China was more important or cooperation with the USA (Trans-Pacific Partnership TPP) (Bajkowski, *Obrady G-20*, 6). In this situation it seems that Australia will support, without participation of the USA, the Chinese regional economic–trade partnership “Asia-Pacific”, (John Moll). Observers say that this will only strengthen China and increase Australian export to China (Bajkowski, *Wizyta premiera ChRL*, 6).

In 2018, Prime Minister Trump’s visit to Australia was initially planned in connection with Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation in Papua New Guinea on 17 and 18 November 2018, however, it did not come to fruition.

The planned meeting may take place before the summit in the following cities: Sydney, Canberra and Cairns. President Trump would also be in Brisbane. That would be Trump’s first visit as a president in Australia (The Australian).

One of the purposes of this visit, among others is the case of filling the position of the US ambassador in Australia. It is speculated that the future ambassador in Australia may become the head of the White House staff John Kelly – general United States Marine Corps). From 2012 to 2016 he dealt with the leadership of the Southern Command in Florida, and in 2003 he was appointed a Marine Colonel promoted to the rank of Brigadier General (Kelly).

Rumors say John Kelly would leave the White House in the coming months, but nothing is certain. White House spokeswoman Sarah Huckabee-Sanders spoke

about Kelly's candidacy that they are "fake news." Australia still has no ambassador from the United States since John Berry left this position in October 2016 during the term of Barack Obama. One of the candidates was Commander Harry Harris but in April 2018 he became an ambassador in North Korea and was deeply involved in talks on the denuclearization of the region (Kehoe). Also one of the candidates for this position was the Republican Senator Bob Corker, who in May 2018 rejected the proposal to become the US ambassador in Canberra (Zengelere). A serious candidate for this position is Charge d'Affaires James Carouso. Carouso has good contacts with high officials in Canberra and at the same time with the government of the former Australian Prime Minister Turnbull (Kehoe).

In the context of this article, attention has been paid to mutual visits since the beginning of 2000. And so, John Howard in 2000–2006 made eight visits to the United States, the first visit was combined with visits to Japan. And the third one was during the attack on the World Trade Center in New York. Howard's successor, Kevin Rudd, visited Washington twice in 2008–2009, and Prime Minister Julia Gillard was three times in the United States in the years 2011–2012. Tony Abbott was once in Washington with President Obama in 2014. By contrast, Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull has been three times in the United States since 2016 (Wikipedia). In the last visit in Washington the now ex Prime – Minister Turnbull was in February 2018. The delegation consisted of political leaders and business people. It was important for the economic and political strategy for the coming years in Australia (Bajkowski, *Komentarz E. Bajkowski*, 6).

Donald Trump often took part in international summits ASEM in Tokyo, Seoul, Beijing and Manila. The personal meetings with Prime -Minister Turnbull and Foreign Minister Julie Bishop were good (Bajkowski, *Międzynarodowe szczyty i konsultacje*, 6). Canberra had many achievements Trump declared that Australia will be one of the three countries which export steel and aluminum which will not have to pay high duty 25% for steel and less duty for aluminum (Bajkowski, *USA dwa pomyslnie wydarzenia*, 6). To sum up the governing period of Trump during the governing by Turnbull was successful in spite of certain unpredictability of the American President.

Conclusions

It should be emphasized that Australia supports the US policy, and its visible sign is the provision of an Australian contingent, territorial waters and airspace for the military needs of the United States. Among other things, it is not only about security, but about controlling China. Since the Second World War, cooperation and interdependence between Australia and the United States have tightened. Relations with the United Kingdom gradually became looser, also because England

has entered European structures. The 21st century and events related to terrorism have further influenced the exchange of information and commitment to the fight against terrorism. American influence is a decisive factor for Australia's identity and policy. As for Trump's policy towards Australia, it should be emphasized that it does not differ significantly from the main policy direction of the US President. Trump wants to make his country independent, but he forgets about strong economic ties and other close partners. On the other hand, in close relationships, Trump is directly in contact with the Australian leaders, but the translation of this proximity is already worse. The United States for Trump is a lot of trouble and is not a full partner as it was before, where presidents adhered to standards and rules that take into account the needs of the partner. To help with problems with immigrants or fill the US ambassador in Australia.

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Mieczysław Sprengel – professor at the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznań, employed at the Faculty of Law and Administration. He received his doctorate based upon his work *Polish emigration to Australia in the years 1980–2000*. He was promoted academically at SGH Warsaw School of Economics in Warsaw in 2013 upon his scientific achievements and publications. He is a member of the Cracow Asia and Pacific Association. He has visited Australia for scientific purposes many times. In his research work he focuses on international economy, international relations and social-economic problems in the countries of Asia and Pacific. Another point of his interest is the economic and political history of Australia and the question of emigration. He has written many scientific articles, doctorates reviews and a few monographs.

PART III

**NEW CHAPTER IN US-CHINA
RELATIONS**

Relations Between Singapore and the People's Republic of China in the Light of Donald Trump's New Southeast Asia Policy

Mateusz Chatys

University of Lodz
Faculty of International and Political Studies
Department of Asian Studies
e-mail: mateusz.chatys@uni.lodz.pl

Abstract

The aim of the article is to analyze the relationship between Singapore and the People's Republic of China in the light of the current policy of the President of the United States Donald Trump. The point of reference for the presented analysis is the foreign policy of the former President Barack Obama, based on the strategy known as "pivot to Asia" – the strategic turnabout of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region. One of its main objectives was the signing of a multilateral agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), bringing together 12 countries. The main subject of the present analysis is to examine the impact of Donald Trump's decision of January 2017 to withdraw from the TPP trade agreement on the relations between the remaining signatories of the agreement, as well as to examine Beijing's actions, which may seek to increase its sphere of influence in Asia through the breakdown of TPP. The main part of the research is focused on the triangle politics concept in international politics, which will include China, Singapore and the United States. Besides the two largest economic powers, Singapore is included because of its membership in the TPP and ASEAN, and due to its strong economy and its population (predominantly) of Chinese origin it can be viewed as the "fifth column" or may otherwise play a role in the Greater China concept.

Keywords: China, USA, Singapore, Southeast Asia, pivot to Asia, Donald Trump, Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN).

Introduction

The aim of the article is to discuss and analyze the relationship between Singapore and the People's Republic of China in the light of the policy of the President of the United States Donald Trump. The point of reference for this analysis is the foreign policy of former President Barack Obama, based on the strategy known as *Pivot to Asia* – the strategic return of the United States to the Asia-Pacific region. One of its main elements was the signing of a multilateral agreement on the establishment of a free trade zone on October 5, 2015, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), bringing together 12 countries. Therefore, the main subject of the analysis is to examine what impact Donald Trump's decision to withdraw from the TPP in January 2017 is going to have on the relations between the remaining signatories of the agreement, as well to examine Beijing's own policy.

In this article, I present the following research hypothesis: the withdrawal of the US from the TPP, as well as the way in which Donald Trump chooses to neutralize a nuclear threat from North Korea, is being used by the Chinese authorities to increase China's sphere of economic and military influence in the South East Asia region.

The decision of the United States to exit from the Trans-Pacific Partnership undoubtedly testifies to its increasing economic protectionism, which results in the withdrawal from multilateral agreements in favor of a greater number of bilateral agreements. In addition, tensions between Washington and Pyongyang may result in a shrinking of American economic activity in the Asia region in favor of an increased military presence. Of course, the last US-North Korea summit in Singapore in June 2018 has stabilized relations between the states, but there is still a long way to go before friendly relations between the two countries can be established.

The main part of the research is based on the triangle politics concept in international politics, which will include China, Singapore and the United States. In addition to the two greatest economic powers, there is also Singapore. It is a member of both the TPP and ASEAN, and due to its strong economy and predominantly Chinese population it can be described as the fifth column or the next component of Greater China. On the basis of the theoretical part thus formulated, a comparative analysis of mutual relations between these countries will be presented, which in turn will allow conclusions to be drawn regarding the future of the TPP as well as the outlook for economic dominance in Asia in the coming years.

Donald Trump's new policy characteristics

During the presidential campaign for the highest office in the US between Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump many controversial declarations were made. To a large extent, they were related to the future US foreign policy, in which the Asia region

was supposed to play a dominant role. One of the main demands of the Republican Party candidate was the withdrawal of the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, which he believed would provide greater security for American economy and workplaces. An additional electoral advantage of this promise was the discrediting of foreign policy led by then-President Barack Obama, member of the same political party as Hillary Clinton, who was Obama's first Secretary of State from 2009 to 2013. Moreover, she was the main architect of the US foreign policy in Asia.

Views presented by Donald Trump regarding the TPP were widely supported by the American citizens. At the same time, they caused a great concern among Asian countries, especially those less economically developed or with less military potential. In contrast to the foreign policy of President Obama, who early during his term was being described as "the first American president of the Pacific Ocean." During his first visit to Tokyo in 2009, he focused on the greater involvement of the US in the Asia-Pacific region. From this moment, the term *pivot to Asia* gained currency in American foreign policy, although it was first used by Hillary Clinton in her article titled *America's Pacific Century*, published in "Foreign Policy" in 2011 (Clinton). Paradoxically, despite significant ideological differences between Trump and Obama, their actions at the beginning of their respective terms are comparable. When President Obama took office on January 20, 2009, he declared his intention to limit US activity in the Middle East, on which the foreign policy of George W. Bush's administration was largely focused.

The most important project within the framework of *pivot to Asia* was the creation of a regional, multilateral economic agreement aimed at balancing the Chinese influence (in the era of rapid economic development) in South East Asia. Especially since as of 2009 the United States had Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) signed with only two countries of the Asia-Pacific region, namely Singapore (6.05.2003) and Australia (18.05.2004). The TPP consisted of 12 countries: Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, the United States and Vietnam. Talks on its creation began already in 2008 (George W. Bush initiated the first negotiations on the multilateral format of economic cooperation close to the end of his term, but it is Barack Obama who is considered as the author of this initiative). However, on January 23, 2017 (only three days after he was sworn into office), Donald Trump signed a decree on the withdrawal of the US from the TPP. His main arguments for leaving the treaty were:

- protecting workplaces in the US,
- stopping the outflow of capital from the state,
- inflow of cheaper and often subsidized goods from Asia while maintaining barriers to US export,
- the possibility of China's interference in the US market via TPP countries,
- the threat of manipulation of the Japanese currency (Allison, 7).

Trump therefore claimed that bilateral agreements with individual countries in the region would be better for the state's investment needs, while protecting the internal market against the negative aspects related to cooperation with eastern partners (e.g., dumping). During the election campaign, this kind of protectionist rhetoric gave Trump considerable public support. However, the biggest surprise was that Hillary Clinton, who had significantly contributed to the establishment of the TPP as the Secretary of State at the beginning of negotiations, began to change her position during the campaign, then claiming that she was willing to withdraw from the partnership if it posed a threat to American jobs or proved to have a negative impact on wages. Of course, it is necessary to take political declarations with a grain of salt, especially those made during the election campaign. The leaders of the Asian region were aware of this and, nevertheless, remained more confident in the cooperation with the Democratic candidate (China being an obvious exception), whom they saw as more predictable. This situation is well demonstrated by the drop of key indices immediately after the election results were announced: Japanese Nikkei 225 lost 5.4%, Hang Seng in Hong Kong dropped by 2.2%, Shanghai Composite by 0.6%, Australian ASX by 1.9% and South Korean Kospi by 2.7% (US Election 2016: Asia markets jolted by Trump win, 2016).

Considering the culture of the Far East, both candidates were negatively perceived in terms of the image of the United States as a state. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was mainly an American initiative, which is why America's withdrawal from it during the final phase of the arrangements and the sudden change of Hillary Clinton's opinion were perceived by some partners as a kind of *loss of face*. Naturally, this aspect probably will not have a noticeable impact on trade relations or political relations with the US, because it is a superpower with a strong economy that is needed by other countries in economic development, but China will certainly use it to further its own propaganda and promote solutions such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).

Donald Trump is aware of Asia's growing role in the global market – not only due to the rising power of China, but also to such countries as Singapore, which have a huge economic potential. Additionally, unresolved disputes in the South China Sea,¹ missile tests and the nuclear threat from North Korea, as well as a treaty on mutual cooperation and security with Japan require a military presence in the region. Due to all these factors, in November 2017 Donald Trump undertook one of the longest presidential trips to Asia in many years. In 12 days, he visited five

¹ Disputes concern the archipelago of the Spratly Islands, to which China, Philippines, Brunei, Vietnam and Malaysia stake claim, as well as the archipelago of the Paracel Islands, claimed by China, Vietnam and Taiwan. Most of them are controlled by the PRC, due to the gradual occupation due to the "salami slicing" strategy and the "cabbage" strategy. These policies consist in gradually taking control of subsequent islands and atolls, as well as effectively blocking other ships' access to the islands.

countries (Japan, South Korea, China, Vietnam and the Philippines), taking part in the APEC summit at Danang and the 31st ASEAN Summit in Manila, during which Singapore officially took over the presidency of ASEAN for one-year term in 2018 (previously this function was performed by the Philippines). According to the official statement, as a result of delays related to organizational work, President Trump did not take part in the 12th East Asia Summit, in which the United States was represented by Secretary of State Rex Tillerson (Holland). Thereafter it was easy to conclude that the countries of Southeast Asia (ASEAN) are of secondary importance in American politics. The next summit took place in November 2018 in Singapore and, the US were represented by the Vice-President Mike Pence. The East Asian Summit is an extremely important platform for international dialogue, in which 18 national leaders take part (aside from the US, representatives of China and Singapore also participate)². Since 2005 the biggest beneficiaries of the summit have been countries with the least military and economic potential, as the forum offers them a platform to speak on key issues related to regional security, and be heard by the superpowers (Bisley, 1–3). From the perspective of developing countries, stability in the region is a crucial factor, which enables sustainable economic progress.

One of the main reasons for Donald Trump's long journey to Asia was, in a way, to compensate countries involved in the Trans-Pacific Partnership for withdrawing from the treaty. Furthermore, the visit was intended to dispel all doubts regarding the *America first* political strategy,³ which caused concern not only about economic protectionism, but also about the future of American military bases and US military involvement in Asia. This was connected with the statements of the Republican president regarding the need to focus on the US internal situation. In his opinion, allies of the US should devote more resources to their defense capabilities, if they expect to see America's cooperation on the same level in this area. Besides the military bases in Japan and South Korea, Americans are also present in the Philippines and in Thailand. Singapore does not host US bases as such, but under an agreement signed in 1990, the US Navy can use Singapore's ports, and there is a logistics unit on site (Factsheet – The Strategic Framework Agreement, 2005). In the era of threats from North Korea, both Japan and South Korea have received strong support and assurance that in case of aggression by Kim Jong Un, American armed forces will be involved. However,

2 Apart from such superpowers as China, USA, Russia or India, the summit also included countries like Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Laos, Burma, Thailand, Cambodia, Philippines, Singapore and Vietnam.

3 Donald Trump first used this phrase in March 2016 in an interview for The New York Times, when he answered a question about his views on isolationism. He stated then that he is not an advocate of isolationism, but America is the most important ("I'm not isolationist, but I am 'America First'"). This slogan arouses much controversy due to the fact that in 1940 the organization The America First Committee opposed the participation of American troops in World War II and was critical of President Roosevelt and his administration (Calamur 2017).

strained relations with the North Korean regime have somehow overshadowed disputes in the South China Sea that have remained unresolved for 60 years. For instance, despite the fact that the Philippines reported the issue of disputed islands with China to the Permanent Court of Arbitration, and a verdict was issued in July 2016 in favor of the Philippines, China still controls most of the South China Sea and its natural resources. Chinese government at the very beginning of the trial announced that it would not recognize any decision issued by this authority, and thus would continue to exercise control over the acquired area along the demarcation line (the so-called nine-dash line), designated in 1947 by the Chinese authorities (Perlez).

President Trump, during his last visit to Vietnam, which is also one of the parties to the conflict over the islands, announced that he would participate in mediations on disputed territories. Given that these matters have not been resolved for so many years, it is obvious that mediation probably will not be enough to resolve such a complex situation. Especially as China, under the pretext of developing a Code of Conduct⁴ in South China Sea, continues establishing new artificial islands and erects military installations on them. It could thus reasonably be assumed that the limited American involvement in this matter is the result of arrangements with China, which, in exchange for influence in the South China Sea, will exert more pressure and strictly follow the embargo imposed on the North Korean regime.

Careful analysis of the ASEAN leaders' summit in Manila makes clear that the current US president's approach to human rights is radically different from that of his predecessor. This is evidenced by Trump's meeting with the President of the Philippines, Rodrigo Duterte, who is known for his radical views, as well as his strong-minded fight against drug-related crimes in the country. Donald Trump focused on enhancing bilateral relations between the two states, completely ignoring the internal situation in the Philippines. China may see this as a signal that it can act more decisively not only in internal matters, but also outside the state, for example on the South China Sea. What is more, other countries in the region may become radicalized, such as Cambodia, where Prime Minister Hun Sen, through the Supreme Court, dissolved the largest opposition party (Cambodia National Rescue Party) in order to secure a win in parliamentary elections in July 2018 (Holmes). Cambodia's ruling Cambodian People's Party (CPP) won all 125 parliamentary seats in a national election. Due to these circumstances, Chinese sphere of influence in such areas as military (military bases in the South China Sea), ideology (communism in Cambodia) and economy (the "Belt and Road" initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership) is free to spread throughout Asia.

⁴ Work on the document began in 1990, but the Declaration on the Proceedings in the South China Sea between China and ASEAN, signed in 2002, was not legally binding. Since then, negotiations on the final version of this document have been held at the ASEAN + China summits, but Chinese government has so far been successful in drawing out the work. (YingHui 2017).

Political and economic relations in the triangle China, Singapore, the United States

The concept of a strategic triangle, which is a tool for analyzing the relations between the three actors, was first introduced by Lowell Dittmer in his scientific article published in *World Politics*, entitled “The Strategic Triangle: An Elementary Game-Theoretical Analysis.” In his deliberations Dittmer presented three types of relationships: a romantic triangle, a stable marriage, and a strategic triangle (Basaldú, 4). The first two examples describe the cooperation between three entities depending on their relationship. That is why a romantic triangle occurs when two entities, individually, have a good relationship with the third one, but they cannot agree among themselves. In the second case, there are good relations between the first two entities, but they do not have a good relation with third one. According to Herbert Ellison, the strategic triangle concept is a kind of game, which takes place between three actors who adapt their actions to specific situations. This kind of dynamics can be observed among China, the US and Singapore (Woo, 34–36). These tripartite relations are determined to a large extent by bilateral relations between each of the parties, as well as the conditions of the environment within in which they operate.

The normalization of relations between Beijing and Washington has a long history, beginning with the 1972 visit of President Richard Nixon to China. Since then, ideological competition has turned into economic rivalry due to economic reforms implemented by Deng Xiaoping. It should not come as a surprise that most of the accusations against China have economic background. The most important of them include the manipulation of the national currency (yuan), the inflow of state-subsidized goods, which leads to price dumping, intellectual property theft and illegal economic immigration. During the presidential campaign, Donald Trump announced that he would make every effort to create a better environment for American entrepreneurs at home, to encourage them to bring their factories back from China to the United States. He even declared the implementation of 45% duty on goods imported from China. These statements were the first signs of an upcoming trade war between the two largest economies in the world, which we can now observe. Already as a president elect, Donald Trump caused a diplomatic scandal at the beginning of December 2016, due to a telephone conversation with Tsai Ing-wen, acting president of Taiwan at the time (Blanchard)⁵.

After Trump was sworn in, North Korea increased its military activity, which led to the softening of Trump’s rhetoric towards China, while awaiting Beijing’s greater

⁵ It was the first such conversation since 1979, when President Jimmy Carter suspended formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan.

commitment to compliance with sanctions (especially oil) imposed by the UN Security Council under the regime of Kim Jong Un. Trump's visit to Beijing showed a completely different face than the one he used during the presidential campaign. Apart from image-related issues, there are also measurable effects of this trip, for example in the form of trade agreements valued at \$250 billion and concerning such products as integrated circuits, jet engines and car parts (US and China sign trade deals worth \$250bn on Trump trip as he vows to change 'unfair' relationship, 2017). Such agreements are very much needed by the US economy, since the trade balance with China has been negative for the last several years. As the data provided by the Census office shows, in 2017 the deficit amounted to \$344 billion so there was an improvement compared to 2016 (Trade in Goods with China 2017). In addition, according to data from October 2017, US debt to China is \$1.2 trillion, which is about 19% from \$6.3 trillion in Treasury bills and bonds held by foreign countries (Mullen). This is also to Beijing's advantage, because it can threaten the US government that through the sudden sale of a large debt package will cause inflation to rise, and thus slow down economic development.

Considering the bilateral relations, leaving the TPP by the United States should have a long-term positive impact on the relations between the two powers. Barack Obama did not hide the fact that development of the partnership was largely determined by China's growing potential in the region, and its most important task was to counterbalance these influences, especially since they are systematically increased thanks to the implementation of the projects included in "One Belt One Road" initiative, announced by Xi Jinping in September 2013. It includes the New Silk Road and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which are land and maritime transport routes, aimed at the development of infrastructure and logistics between China, Africa and Europe, in order to improve economic and cultural cooperation (*Belt and Road Basics*).

Singapore gained independence in 1965 and established formal diplomatic relations with the United States a year later. Thanks to the fast signing of the bilateral free trade agreement in 2003, the dynamic development of Singapore was possible, whose GDP per capita at the beginning was less than \$320, while in March 2017 it amounted to \$60 thousand (Zhou). According to a report published by The Heritage Foundation, it enjoys the highest economic freedom index (Miller, 4), thanks to which many multinational corporations have their branches here, which generates a large amount of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI). The biggest source of FDIs in Singapore is the United States. In addition, they come fifth in terms of export and third in terms of import, which results in a negative trade balance for an Asian country amounting to \$8 billion (*Singapore: Trade Statistics*).

The large number of investments and the growing economy are the reason why in Singapore there are ports with the highest traffic volume, therefore the sea transport routes in the South China Sea are of great strategic importance for this

country. In turn, the decreasing US involvement in the region may lead to the country's dependence on Chinese influence related to the control of the entire basin. Of course, the US Navy also operates there, for example within a program Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP), but the effectiveness of China's strategies, as well as the threat posed by North Korea, make this problem unresolved (Gady). The US and Singapore are also signatories of bilateral agreements in the field of military cooperation. The last one was signed in December 2015 (Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement) and concerns military, strategic and technological cooperation as well as combating unconventional threats, including piracy and international terrorism (*Defense Cooperation*).

Leaving TPP by the United States has led to regional imbalances. Then, absence of the greatest power in a multilateral initiative of this kind will prevent it from fulfilling its most important function, which was to balance the Chinese influence. Originally, all members of the partnership represented 40% of global GDP and 20% of trade volume, but the US accounted for 69% of the GDP of the entire group. Thus, regardless of whether or not the other 11 countries come to an agreement, the main beneficiary of Donald Trump's decision is China. The breakthrough moment for the future of the partnership will come in at the beginning of 2019, because at that time final arrangements are supposed to be agreed upon regarding the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP). In November 2018 Vietnam's lawmaking body, the National Assembly ratified a landmark 11-country deal CPTPP, which makes Vietnam the seventh country after Australia, Canada, Japan, Singapore, Mexico and New Zealand who accepted the terms of this free trade agreement (Vu).

After all, the comment by Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong regarding changes in the TPP is very accurate: "It doesn't mean that the existing trade stops, it doesn't mean that investment flows are abandoned" (Chadran). Singapore has been in good relations with the USA for over 50 years and, in addition, it has entered into an Economic Partnership Agreement with Japan and Australia, as well as FTAs with South Korea and New Zealand, which are the most significant TPP members in economic terms (*Singapore Free Trade Agreements*). Donald Trump's decision to abandon the partnership will negatively affect the least-developed countries (Vietnam, Brunei, Malaysia), and thus it is very likely that Chinese influence, due to various kinds of non-returnable loans and preferential credit lines for infrastructure investments, will have a major impact not only on economic progress, but also on social anxieties in certain countries, which is an important factor for any government trying to stay in power.

Relations between China and Singapore predate even the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949, because many Chinese fled the unstable situation on the continent to what was then a British colony. This is the main reason why the vast majority of Singaporeans are ethnically Chinese (*Population Trends*).

The other reason for Chinese ethnic domination may be the use of the so-called fifth column strategy, which dates back to the Spanish Civil War in the early 20th century (*Britannica*). It consisted in placing spies in the enemy camp, whose main task was spreading propaganda and conducting espionage. A new variant of this strategy has been applied on a large scale by Beijing in Taiwan and Hong Kong (just before the British colony was handed over to the Chinese authorities), in order to expand its influence. According to many regional leaders and researchers, this strategy was also applied in Singapore. This is one reason why Lee Kuan Yew, the first prime minister of Singapore, during his first visit to China in 1976 conducted talks in English to prove to the international community that the country he was representing was independent and free of Chinese influence (Nahui).

Due to the fact that Singapore is located on the South China Sea, and its economy is based largely on trade with China, it should not be surprising that they are both the largest export and import partner (*Singapore: Trade Statistics*). According to 2017 data, Singapore is China's ninth largest trading partner, which is an impressive result if we consider the country's relatively small area. Both parties have also signed a Free Trade Agreement on October 28, 2008, which complements the similar China-ASEAN agreement from November 2002. Due to the transparency of the legal system and high economic freedom, Singapore is the second, just after Hong Kong, source of direct foreign investment in China, which is third in terms of the largest recipients of FDI (*China: Foreign Investment*). Singapore has actively supported the "One Belt, One Road" initiative from the very moment of its announcement, and from December 2015 it has been part of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), established to expand infrastructure in the Asia-Pacific region. Economic data shows a very large degree of dependence between these countries, and the withdrawal of the US from the TPP may only cause an increase in Chinese influence. Geographical proximity, cultural similarities, the development of advanced technologies, and huge financial outlays may completely subordinate Singapore to the government in Beijing. The South China Sea is a crucial element in the region from the point of view of strategy and of relations between China and Singapore. Through this body of water over 30% of world goods are transported, valued at \$5.3 trillion. The most important of them are, of course, energy resources (Fisxer). Securing the transport of crude oil within this basin is part of China's strategic security, because as much as 82% of this raw material is delivered by sea (Hsu). The resolution of the conflict over the disputed areas is additionally hampered by large deposits of energy resources in the seabed. According to estimates, there are 11 billion barrels of oil and 190 trillion cubic feet of natural gas below the sea floor, and under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea from 1982, each country has the right to extract resources from its exclusive economic zone, which extends 200 nautical miles from its coast (*Contested areas of South China Sea likely have few conventional oil and gas resources*). As a result of the lack of unanimity

among the ASEAN countries, especially the parties involved in the conflict, and as a result of the passive attitude of the US administration, which focuses on controlling the situation on the Korean peninsula, China will gradually strengthen its presence in the South China Sea. Moreover, thanks to the efficiency of foreign policy, which involves prolonging working process on the Code of Conduct through long negotiations with each party individually, Beijing will not allow for full integration within the ASEAN, which will help China consolidate its power in the region.

As a result of the uncertain future of the TPP, Singapore is likely to intensify its activity in an alternative form, initiated by the ASEAN, namely the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), comprised of 16 countries.⁶ The first idea of the RCEP appeared in November 2011 and, similarly to the TPP, it is a multilateral agreement aimed at facilitating trade between countries. Partnership members represent 39% of global GDP and 3.4 billion of population, but due to large disparities in economic development between members it will be very difficult to work out a set of universal principles. The biggest advantage of this type of multilateral agreement will be the avoidance of the noodle bowl or spaghetti bowl effect, which is the disorganization caused by the large number of bilateral agreements and large amount of different commercial regulations (Ordinario). Furthermore, the long-term effect of the RCEP will be the acceleration of the global economy, which will benefit all countries. Compared to TPP, formal requirements related to accession to RCEP are much less restrictive (e.g. legal regulations regarding the protection of intellectual property), which is both an advantage and a disadvantage of this format. This smoothes the way for potential new members wishing to join the partnership, but current members, concerned about allowing undesirable countries into their market, may not be working diligently enough towards reaching a final agreement. As in the case of the TPP, the decisive period for the RCEP will be 2019. During the November 2018 ASEAN Summit in Singapore the 2nd RCEP Summit also took place, where Chinese Prime Minister, Li Keqiang confirmed that free trade agreement is ready in 80% and the rest of details will be agreed by the end of 2019.

Conclusion

Relations between China and Singapore will depend heavily on the relationship between China and ASEAN, because Singapore is holding the presidency of this organization in 2018. This is a perfect example of a country where the influences of the West and the East on a country clash. Until now, the authorities have

⁶ Among the RCEP members there are 10 ASEAN countries and 6 largest economies of the region, which include: China, India, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand.

managed to maintain harmony between these two extremely different worldviews. Economic data proves that both China and the United States play an important role in the economy of Singapore. What is more, both English and Chinese (Mandarin) are official languages in Singapore, which is a perfect proof of the city's pragmatic attitude towards international relations. However, the policy of Donald Trump is largely focused on the internal situation in his own country, which is the main reason why the US withdrew from the TPP. Despite the DPRK–USA Singapore Summit, the North Korean nuclear threat still exists and may lead to a disruption of this balance in China's favor. Kim Jong Un has to prove through his decision-making that the process of denuclearization is accompanied by real actions that will reduce the arsenal of weapons of mass destruction. All in all, the Trans-Pacific Partnership without the participation of the United States is unable to meet its original purpose, namely to neutralize the significant Chinese influence in Asia.

The prominent politician Lee Kuan Yew in his book published in 2013 stated that the United States should have set up a multilateral partnership such as the TPP 30 years earlier in order to neutralize the growing power of China (Allison, 7). A statement like this indicates that Asian countries are aware of the threat posed by the strengthening position of China, while the policy of Donald Trump works in favor of the authorities in Beijing and facilitates this task. Likewise, economic protectionism may lead to a slowdown in the global economy, which will eventually come to affect the American citizens as well, and basing economic cooperation on bilateral trade agreements will contribute to the disorganization of trade due to the spaghetti bowl effect. On the other hand, China will be able to effectively use its influence to shape the RCEP in order to provide its economy with the best conditions for sustainable development. Finally, good economic relations with Singapore, which holds the presidency of ASEAN and chaired the leaders' summit in November 2018, was used by China to promote RCEP initiative and final version of Code of Conduct which will be developed by 2022.

The nuclear threat on the Korean Peninsula also favors China's policy, because in its shadow they can continue their work on artificial islands in the South China Sea. They do not feel any clear opposition from the United States, which at the moment is more concerned with the strict observance of denuclearization process and organization of the next summit. The history of the 60-year conflict shows that the other parties involved in the dispute over the islands are not able to work out a common position within ASEAN, and force China to finally complete its work on the Code of Conduct. It seemed that the Philippines that held the presidency in ASEAN in 2017 could use the favorable verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration for this purpose. Thus, it gives a clear message to Beijing to continue pursuing policies towards each country whose main goal is to prevent the unification of the association. Each exemption from declarations made by Kim Jong

Un on the denuclearization of North Korea may result in increased military engagement of the United States in Asia, but it will probably be concentrated only in the vicinity of Japan. The risk of any actions by the US Navy in the South China Sea will be effectively prevented by the cabbage strategy⁷ used by China. However, it is very likely that other countries from this region will not approve of an increased US presence in South China Sea, fearing further escalation of the conflict.

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⁷ Cabbage strategy is being described as way to block the access to contested area at sea by surrounding it with many boats – fishermen, fishing administration ships, marine surveillance ships, navy warships etc.

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Mateusz Chatys

Mateusz Chatys – graduate of the Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz, Oriental specialty. Student of third-degree studies in political sciences at the Department of East Asia, Faculty of International and Political Studies at the University of Lodz. Active member of the Student Scientific Circle of East Asia and the Pacific, as well as scholarship holder of the EU Window Chinese Government Scholarship program in China at Hainan University in 2015. Leader of the volunteer team during the first edition of summer school for students from China, *Understanding Poland: Economy, Society and Science* in Lodz in 2017.

A New Alliance against the US? Sino-Russian Relations in Response to Trump's Redefined Foreign Policy Priorities

Przemysław Ciborek

University of Łódź
Faculty of International and Political Studies
Department of East Asian Studies
e-mail: przemyslaw.ciborek@uni.lodz.pl

Abstract

The current state of bilateral relations between the Russian Federation and the People's Republic of China is described by many international relations experts as the best in history. After taking the president office by Donald Trump, the bilateral relations between America and abovementioned powers are cooling down. Current foreign policy of the People's Republic of China and the Russian Federation focuses on holding a common position in the international political arena, which is in fact an attempt to counterweight political influence of the US administration and their allies. The dimension of the strategic partnership between China and Russia is also determining the mutual economic dependence, which is now crucial for both powers to build a strong position on the international forum. In addition, Russia is one of the crucial partners for the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – by many recognized as the Chinese attempt to break the American economic domination. The collisional course of the American foreign policy towards Russia and China forces the latter to look for Central and Eastern European allies as well as to gain influence in the region of Central Asia which is leading to a constant increase in tensions between China and Russia.

Keywords: China, Russia, USA, Donald Trump, Barack Obama, Vladimir Putin, Xi Jinping, bilateral relations, Pivot to Asia, economic protectionism, economic sanctions

Obama's "Pivot to Asia" versus Trump's conservative policy

After Barack Obama took an office in 2009, it became clear that the withdrawal of the US Army from the Middle East would take place over the course of the next months. As a counterbalance to these activities, the president's administration focused on increasing its political and economic presence in the Asia-Pacific region. The motivation for this action has been the aggregation of four key factors (Manyin, 2): 1) the elimination of US military presence in Iraq and Afghanistan; 2) growing economic importance of the Asia-Pacific area (PRC, ASEAN); 3) the growing military capabilities of the People's Liberation Army and the growing tension on the South China Sea; 4) cuts in federal spending on military, which has raised concerns about US meeting commitments to the region¹.

"Pivot to Asia" during the Barack's Obama presidency assumed six key objectives², whose fulfillment was to result in strengthening the US bilateral alliances in the region, primarily with long-term allies like Japan and the Philippines. The main problem with regard to the implementation of those objectives – considered not only in terms of rhetoric but also real actions – was the beginning of President Obama's so-called "Asian Tour" starting from his visit to Japan and the ending in the Philippines, was the agreement allowing the US military presence in the region to be increased. Shortly thereafter, many experts categorized the agreement as an attempt to counterbalance the growing military potential of the PRC in the region. A few days later, these allegations were expressly rejected by the American president. "Pivot to Asia" during the Obama's presidency – despite economic and diplomatic efforts – did not reach intended effects. The manifestation of the US military power in the countries of the Southeast Asia consistently

1 On the basis of the Security Treaty between the United States and Japan, signed on August 8, 1951 in San Francisco. According to Art. 1 – the government of Japan will make its territory available to create an overseas base for the American army. Japan with accordance to the Article 9 of the national constitution renounces use of the military aggression as a mean of resolving international disputes and in order to implement this plan, does not maintain armed forces on its territory. In this context, the treaty of August 8, 1951 should be interpreted as an American protectorate over military security and the sovereignty of Japan.

2 Strengthening bilateral relations with US long-term allies in the region: Japan, South Korea, Australia, Philippines and Thailand; 2) improvement of bilateral relations with the emerging Asian economic powers: China, India, Indonesia, Singapore, New Zealand, Malaysia, Mongolia, Vietnam and Brunei; 3) political involvement in multilateral organizations operating in Southeast Asia: Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC); 4) increase in economic exchange and investments in the region through the development of Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP); 5) increasing the presence and military activity in the region of Southeast Asia; 6) promoting democracy and defending human rights in the region of Southeast Asia.

antagonized China, which treated the growth of the US military presence as an attempt to violate their vital military and economic interests, which ultimately led to a slow erosion of bilateral relations between Beijing and Washington (Anderson, Parker, 11–12).

When comparing the presidency of Barack Obama with that of Donald Trump regarding relations with the Far East, it should be noted that their quality was a subject of further erosion. The president elect immediately after the publication of the presidential election results in December 2016 committed a diplomatic scandal, accepting a telephone conversation with the Republic Of China President, Tsai Ing-wen. Breaking the decades-long rule on Taiwan's non-recognition policy was only the tip of the iceberg, because shortly after this event, Trump questioned the legitimacy of the "One China" policy, accusing the Chinese government of manipulating the Chinese currency afterwards. In addition, during the election campaign, Donald Trump criticized the presence of US troops stationing in Japan and South Korea, claiming that this is unprofitable and if interested parties do not start to participate more actively in the cost of maintaining the US Army missions, the American government should consider a withdrawal of its troops (Wright). During Xi-Trump phone conversation held on February 9, 2017, there was an unexpected turn of events, because the American president assured his Chinese counterpart about respecting the "One China" policy, eventually leading to the meeting of two leaders on April 7, 2017. The April meeting at Mar-a-Lago led to the promotion of the development of mutual trade and investment and the implementation of the "100-Day Action Plan," which assumed increased exports of American goods to China in order to overcome the deficit in bilateral trade with the PRC (Bartsch, 116–117).

There was a strong need of normalization of Russian-American bilateral relations during Obama's presidency. As it turned out, after the meetings of the heads of diplomacy – Hilary Clinton and Sergei Lavrov in March 2009, the Russian Federation has definitely benefited from the reset in bilateral relations. The withdrawal of American troops from the Central Asia region, agreement on the reduction of strategic nuclear arsenals (START, February 2011) and cooperation of the American ExxonMobil and Rosneft on the use of the Arctic shelf in Russia for the price of political agreement with regard to the third round of sanctions in the UN Security Council which were aimed at the Russian ally – Iran³, after couple of years proved to be beneficial for a country then ruled by Dmitry Medvedev. A significant deterioration of US-Russia relations took place after the presidential election in 2012 in Russia, when Vladimir Putin came to power in 2012. The Russian president shortly after the election refused to participate in the G8 summit at Camp

³ An agreement between USA and Russia (2010) on air operations in Teheran, Iran. Sanctions did not affect bilateral relations between Iran and Russia. Ultimately, sanctions began to be successively abrogated by Resolution 2231 of the UNSC of 22 July 2015.

David, which in the rematch led to Obama's absence at the APEC summit in Vladivostok (Menkiszak, 39). The next crisis in bilateral relations was related to the person of Edward Snowden who in June 2013 unmasked the activities of American intelligence related to Russia. Diplomatic relations deteriorated even further after the Russian annexation of the Crimean peninsula in March 2014, which resulted in the imposition of economic sanctions from the US and the EU on Russia.

The opportunity to improve bilateral relations was expected after the election of Donald Trump as the 45th President of the United States of America, but on April 7, 2017 Trump decided to strike at the Syrian airbase Shayrat after the attack on civilians in Khan Shaykhun. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson said at the time that "Russia has not fulfilled its commitment since 2013, so either it was complicit in the attacks or is incompetent in its ability to comply with the contract."⁴ There were voices among Russian society and media that Trump has committed an act of betrayal on Russia (Rutland, 53). On August 2, 2017, Trump signed the law on tightening sanctions against Russia due to the Russian interference in the 2016 US elections. Imposed sanctions resulted in Moscow's reaction to reduce the number of employees of US diplomatic missions in Russia (Rampton, Zengerle).

Sino-Russian relations before the Donald Trump presidency

There was a noticeable turn towards the East in Russia's foreign policy over the last decade since the APEC summit in Vladivostok, which took place in September 2012. At the time, the main motivation of the Russian Federation government was the development of the eastern territories of the country based on economic cooperation with China, Japan and South Korea. It was the part of the existing federal program "Far East Development Strategy," which is to be evaluated by 2025. Cooperation with Asian countries was also intended to balance economic dependence on contacts with the European Union countries. Sino-Russian relations were also improved after the introduction of Belt and Road initiative by PRC Chairman Xi Jinping back in 2013. Russia has become the most important partner on the land section of this initiative due to its geographical location. The key factor for China in this matter was political stability of Russia as well as the friendly relations of Xi Jinping with Vladimir Putin.

A turning point in Sino-Russian relations was the Ukrainian crisis, where the return to the Far East development strategy was to compensate for the losses incurred as a result of the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia by the Western coalition. The economic impacts on Russian society probably exceeded the estimates

⁴ The commitment concerned the destruction of the Syrian chemical arsenal.

of native experts, so the Russian government decided to stress further cooperation towards Asian countries. During the Russia-ASEAN summit in Sochi in 2016, Russian government proposed the establishment of a free trade zone between the Eurasian Economic Union and the ASEAN. Russian plan did not meet with the enthusiasm of the countries concerned and although it was not definitively rejected, the political price borne by the Russian government included the support of ASEAN states regarding the situation in the South China Sea, which significantly harmed the interest and policy of the PRC in the region. To ease the tension between Moscow and Beijing with regard to Russian Support of ASEAN countries with regard to South China Sea, joint military exercises were held in the East China Sea near Diaoyu/Senkaku islands disputed between China and Japan. At that time, it raised the concerns of ASEAN member states regarding the further development of the Sino-Russian naval program.

A Chinese-Russian alliance during the Donald Trump presidency

Strengthening economic cooperation between China and Russia was a response to the signals sent by Donald Trump in early 2017, which has resulted in further deterioration of trade exchange of China and Russia with the US. *America First* policy pushed by the US president involved imports reduction and rebuilding of the country's industrial base by providing tax incentives for domestic entrepreneurs with strong anti-China rhetoric presented during the presidential campaign, which is characteristic for the economic protectionism (Polietyka Insight, *Co przyniesie prezydentura Trumpa?*).

On January, 2017 the World Economic Forum in Davos was held. During the absence of the US administration as well as the German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Francois Hollande, the president of the PRC, Xi Jinping was the one who stood up for capitalism. During his speech, he emphasized that "striving for protectionism is like closing yourself in a dark room. Although wind and rain will not get inside, so will light and air. Therefore, no one will come out victorious from trade wars" (Kowalski). This kind of a message was meant to be an allusion to planned US development strategy.

Xi Jinping's visit to Moscow on July 3-4, 2017 was also a clear signal before the G20 summit held later that month in Hamburg, Germany. As expected, the Sino-Russian political and economic alliance influenced the position taken by both sides. China and Russia became the target of the American administration, which in the words of Rex Tillerson clearly expressed its disapproval on North Korea issue, blaming China and Russia for stagnation and the lack of decisive action to resolve the conflict.

The People's Republic of China and its government have been trying to limit US military and political presence in the region for decades. During the very first day in office, Donald Trump facilitated this task of the current PRC administration by implementing the announced US withdrawal from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP). TPP was a pillar of Barack Obama's policy, but according to the new president, the agreement was classified in terms of a catastrophe that devastated the American economy. On January 23, 2017, Prime Minister of Australia announced that China could consider taking the place of US in TPP (Ashraf). China was not interested in such proposition and consistently promoted its own initiative – Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In addition, Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo stated that TPP without the US was losing its importance and it did not make any sense to continue it.

When analyzing the economic dimension of Sino-Russian cooperation, it should be noted that Russia is only the 10th trading partner of the People's Republic of China (2016). The value of exchange between countries for 2016 valued USD 66 billion (ICT Trade Map). What is worth mentioning, this value is almost ten times lower than the value of the China–US trade exchange in the same period. The Russians owe their position almost exclusively to the export of fossil fuels to China. The relatively low value of bilateral exchange prompted the leaders of both countries to intensify economic cooperation. On July 4, 2017, Xi and Putin announced the creation of an investment fund in the amount of USD 10 billion and establishment of an innovation fund in the amount of USD 850 billion to improve trade routes at the Sino-Russian border crossing points. On August 2, 2017, the head of the Ministry of Development of the Russian Federation, Maksim Oreshkin stated that in 2017 trade turnover had risen by 37% by that date, while further growth in economic exchange was being hampered by infrastructural obstacles. Projection of trade value for that time until the end of 2017 was about to reach unprecedented USD 80 billion. Russian government-backed Rosneft showed its determination in this matter, doubling the export of oil barrels to the level of 600,000 per day by the end of 2018, thus ignoring the export limits imposed by the OPEC. In November 2017, Vladimir Putin announced to the public that the real value of the Sino-Russian exchange should reach USD 66 billion, and therefore it should remain at the level from 2016. Taking into the account the increased export activity of the Russian Federation regarding the supply of fossil fuels, it should result in a rapid increase in terms of the value of trade. Relatively low value of the Russian export resulted from the decline in oil and gas prices on the global market, caused indirectly by the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia (О́сродек Спра́в Азја́тыкких У́Л). The Sino-Russian trade exchange was also the subject of stimulation under international agreements and organizations, including BRICS. The financial institution of this organization, i.e. New Development Bank approved a loan

of USD 1.4 billion, where in Russia these funds would be used in full to invest in infrastructure (Financial Express).

In the field of military cooperation, joint military operations of China and Russia are permanently inscribed in the calendar of both ministries since the rise of the tensions between Moscow and Washington in 2012. Intensification of joint military projects took place after the publication of the Belt and Road initiative and both countries supported their efforts in international fora, for example on conflicts in Syria and North Korea. An example of such activities are joint exercises in the Sea of Okhotsk within 100 miles from the border with North Korea. Joint exercises of China and Russia navy in the face of the Korean crisis had a specific effect. Above all, it was a clear message addressed to the international opinion with exemplary economic and political cooperation, which further confirms the common position on the current international challenges in the UN Security Council. Secondly, it was the call of the United States to limit its military influence in the region of Southeast Asia, primarily in the context of joint military exercises between the US and South Korea armies. It was also a demonstration of the strength and the momentum of the Chinese Navy. In the context of the July's 2017 Sino-Russian exercises in the Baltic Sea (Higgins), the long-term geopolitical plans of the PRC are referred to the region of Europe and it is clear that these plans would be implemented with Russian participation. In return, Russian decision-makers expected support from Chinese activities in Ukraine, while in the face of a vital Chinese interest in Ukraine as part of the Belt and Road initiative, Chinese administration was using a skillful diplomatic language, which does not condemn or strongly support any of the parties to the conflict, calling only for solving the issues with accordance to international law (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN).

Defining the main goals of China's foreign policy in the context of Russia, the energy needs of the Middle Kingdom are at the forefront. On a global scale, over the last decade, energy demand has increased by 20%, while in China alone there was an increase of 220%. The Chinese have mercilessly used the imposition of economic sanctions on Russia, resulting in a fall in prices of fossil fuels, concluding further contracts under attractive conditions. Since March 2017, Russia is the largest supplier of crude oil to China. The volume of exports is 1.3 million barrels per day. In September 2017, a 14% minority stake in Rosneft was taken over by CEFC China Energy (Huaxin) for USD 9.1bn (Reuters, Rosneft board approves oil deal with China's CEFC), and there is a plan of launching the Power of Siberia pipeline, which completion is scheduled to 2019, where the Russian giant Gazprom is required to sign 30-year gas supply contract for the state-owned China National Petroleum Corporation (Graeber).

Another strategic goal of the Chinese administration is to include the Eurasian Economic Union in the Belt and Road initiative, by creating a free trade zone with

China. Implementation of the Chinese plan would definitely improve the process of certification and customs clearance of goods exported towards Western Europe, on the other hand, depriving EAEU of the main source of the financing, ultimately marginalizing its international importance, which is contrary to the interests of the Russian government.

Chinese officials are also striving to change the character of the functioning of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, which until now was a function of co-operation on the security of the countries in the region. The creation of duty-free transit corridors is also planned here, which would make the Chinese initiative more attractive internationally. However, during the SCO summit in June 2017, the conflict of interests between Russia and China once again became apparent. Despite joining the long-term ally of China – Pakistan, Beijing may lose influence within the organization itself and among the EAEU countries. The reason for this is the simultaneous accession of India to the organization, which, according to Russia, may limit Chinese influence in Central Asia. Moreover, given the unresolved territorial disputes between India and Pakistan, there is a possible escalation of the conflict, which may lead to the split of two blocs within the organization itself, whose political leaders would probably be Russia and China.

The Chinese attempt to dethrone the US as a global economic power – with the political support of Moscow – also has a pragmatic dimension, an example of which is the attempt to internationalize the Chinese currency. Establishment of Chinese financial institutions, including the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank is to compete with the Western-dominated capital of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank or the Asian Development Bank, or in the worst case it is to be an alternative to them. On November 1, 2017, Chinese Prime Minister Li Keqiang met with his Russian counterpart Dmitry Medvedev with regard to the merger of the payment systems dominating in the country, Chinese Union-Pay and the Russian Mir Card, to limit the dominance of the American Visa and MasterCard systems (Daly).

Conclusions

The Russian Federation, as a country with lower economic and demographic potential, is exposed to the necessity of accepting Chinese hegemony in the region. Economic sanctions forced Russia to direct its supply of raw materials to China. The diversification of fossil fuel sources by the People's Republic of China may deprive Russia of its most important asset. This is indirectly linked to Russia's loss of its dominant influence in the Central Asian region, because at present the country does not have the investment capital that is being sought by members of the Commonwealth of Independent States. Chinese oil corporations have already begun

exploiting resource deposits in the region, and with the weakening political and economic influence, Russia will probably be forced to accept the Chinese economic and political supremacy in the region. Also, changing the nature of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization's operation towards creating an economic union may lead Russia to even greater economic problems not only in the context of trade with China, but also with other countries in the region.

Diplomatic discrepancies may also have a potential impact on long-term cooperation. China in its own interest has given up its strong reaction to the conflict in Ukraine and Russian involvement in Syria, but it is against China's principle of respecting territorial integrity and non-interference in the internal policies of third countries (Baggiani). Similar friction may be caused by an increase in the volume of Russian arms sales to the countries of Southeast Asia (in particular Vietnam, the Philippines and Malaysia) in the context of supporting different actors of the conflict in the South China Sea. Rise of the tensions can be also caused by lack of agreement on the development of international organizations' forums, including previously mentioned Shanghai Cooperation Organization or the lack of consensus on the establishment of a free trade zone in the Eurasian Economic Union relations with China. Another threat in Sino-Russian relations may also be the growing interest of China in the development of political, military and economic relations with the countries of 16+1 format as well as with Belarus and Ukraine, which a few decades ago was the exclusive sphere of influence of the USSR.

The problems in the Sino-Russian relations may also be caused by the further military cooperation of the Russian and Belarusian armies, giving the example of Zapad 2017 military drill project in September 2017, openly called the largest military exercises since the Cold War era (Walker). Despite the assurances of Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Maria Zakharova that "Russia does not carry out military exercises or other joint activities that could lead to erosion of bilateral relations with any of the countries," maintaining this format of cooperation may in the long term negatively affect the future of relations between the great powers, namely Russia and China (Marin, 17).

For the arguments mentioned above, there are many limitations of the development of Sino-Russian bilateral relations mainly due to progressive economic asymmetry, which at some point may awaken Russian national pride as a political and military power. China is well aware of the weakening Russia's economic potential, exploiting it in increased exports of fossil fuels as well as technologically and militarily. Reports from August, 2017 suggest that Russia started cooperation with China on space exploration as well as the creation of new satellite system projects (Russia Today). The cooperation contracted for four years, the beginning of which starts in 2018, will probably result in the leaks of Russian technologies and their further independent development in the PRC.

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Przemysław Ciborek – PhD candidate at the Department of East Asian Studies, Faculty of International and Political Studies of University of Lodz. He obtained a one-year Chinese language course scholarship at Tianjin University of Science and Technology, China (2015). Former intern of the Embassy of the Republic of Poland in Beijing at the Political, Consular and Agricultural Section (2015). Organizer and coordinator of Summer School Project *Understanding Poland, Economy, Society and Science* for students from China (2018). Since 2016, he serves as the junior analyst at the Center For Asian Affairs of University of Lodz. His scientific research mainly focuses on Chinese foreign policy towards Central and Eastern Europe with a special regard to Chinese investment policy towards Balkan Peninsula countries.

The Redefinition of Foreign Policy of the United States since Trump's Election: The Case of Trade War with China

Paweł Jaskuła

University of Business and Economics in Poznań
Faculty of International Business and Economics
Department of International Economics
e-mail: pawel.jaskula@ue.poznan.pl

Abstract

The main aim of this text is to present economic relations between China and the US today. The election of Donald Trump in 2016, significantly redefined American trade policy toward China. Despite the first months of his presidency, which promised an efficient, long-term cooperation between Beijing and Washington, incumbent president decided to implement severe restriction on the trade with China at the beginning of 2018. However, the announced imposition of tariffs on almost all goods coming from this country could interfere with the growth of the single states and the economy of the whole country in the future. Therefore the text is aimed to investigate the dependency of selected states on the inflows of Chinese investments since 2010. Finally, it is necessary to examine the phenomenon of the trade war, which has begun in July 2018, and assess its impact on the growth of both countries.

Keywords: Trade War, China, USA, Trump, Florida, Louisiana, Kentucky, Foreign Policy, Global Economy

Introduction

There are no doubts that the last presidential election in the US brought an unexpected result. Its winner, Donald J. Trump, famous multibillionaire, and celebrity, got famous during his campaign due to controversial views, which were far away from political correctness, and a sharp tongue. Taking into account only the case of multilateral economic relationships at that time, Trump has been persistently charging developing countries that are still responsible for vast part of American import of unprocessed goods. An example of this populist rhetoric can be seen in his speech at a rally in Fort Wayne, Indiana. Speaking about the balance of payment of the US, Trump accused China of “raping” his country with its trade policies. (Diamond: Trump can’t continue to allow China to rape our country).

His populist slogans such as *America First* or *Make America Great Again* found its audience, mainly among the citizens of the states with the lowest average income. Nonetheless, it is hard to say if Trump will be able to implement restrictive constraints for overseas products. On one hand, he was considered, at the Election Day, to be the successor of Reagan’s way of thinking regarding foreign affairs. On the other hand, Wynne (The Security Risks of a Trade War With China) has already presented in his articles a rich amount of data that show the protectionist side of Trump’s administration. First sanctions were imposed on Chinese goods at the beginning of 2018. According to Haas, Jacobs, and Helmore (the US imposes sanctions on China, stocking fears of trade war), the information about the continuity of restrictive policy in the statement to Beijing, appeared three months later. Blyth even described in the article for *Foreign Affairs* (Global Trumpism) his anxiety and concern related to the future of the US, writing: “The era of neoliberalism is over. The era of neonationalism has just begun.” Blyth’s words found its support, among others, in the British magazine *The Economists*, which tried to argue Trump’s fascination with authoritarian leaders such as Erdogan, Putin or Xi Jinping.

China quietly accepted the American election results, despite Trump’s aggressive rhetoric during the presidential race, where he repeated a deep unwillingness to cooperate with Beijing, this kind of reaction is understandable if we take into account the fact that from the beginning of his candidacy Trump has been downplaying the presence of the American army in Asia. For China, which is currently putting into effect the transcontinental project “Silk Road”, American passiveness in the region would be an opportunity to gain domination there. Moreover, having a well-diversified economy and a more wealthy society every year, China has become, according to deLisle, more independent from the inflows of foreign capital (Red State China? Why China (Sort of) Likes Trump). Furthermore, China is nowadays the most influential investor in Asia, and one of the economic leaders in the world.

The main assumption of this article is to present the shape of bilateral economic relationships between China and the US nowadays. Trump has been consequently trying to execute his political agenda, even though much of it seemed to be impossible to achieve in the first days after the election. One of his first strategic decisions for the future co-operation with China was choosing Terry Branstad for the position of the US ambassador in Beijing. Citing Basu: "Branstad, until the nomination well-known as the many years' governor of Iowa, has had a friendly relationship with the Chinese president, Xi Jinping, for over 30 years" (China's Xi Jinping keeps Iowa close to his heart).

The paper is structured as follows. Based on the preceding paragraphs, the focus of this article seeks: (a) to redefine the economic relationship between Washington and Beijing; (b) discuss the role of the trade exchange between China and the US; (c) offer a prediction related to the implementation of trade restraints on imported goods announced by Trump's administration; and finally (d) offer some possible impacts of a trade war on bilateral economic relations, while noting how this might affect the growth of each nation separately. The final section concludes the paper by giving some final remarks.

Redefinition of the American Trade Policy toward China

With regard to the content of Trump's speeches before his election, there are no doubts that the new political approach towards China is an essential point in his international policy. According to Umehara (The Election of Donald Trump to the next President and the Response of China. In uncertainties after the unusual presidential election), Trump's declarations pertained to the imposition of high tariffs on Chinese import, and the allegations regarding artificially decreased exchange rate of the *renminbi* did not affect Chinese officials. Firstly, Trump's chances before the vote results announcement were meager. Moreover, the possible win of his counter candidate, Hilary Clinton, who has been fighting for the dispersion of American model of development all across the world for decades, could be found by Beijing as an even worse result, as reported by Tiezzi (Why China Dreads a Hilary Presidency). Tyler (Hilary Clinton, In China, Details Abuse of Women) believes that Hilary's distinct way of thinking related to the issues of equal human rights all across the world is far away from the values commonly promoted among the Chinese nation. Therefore eventual triumph of the liberal Democrats in the US could have had a negative impact on the perpetuating position of China not only on its continent, but also globally. To cite Whittel: "Clinton, who was recognized by Beijing as the natural heir of Barack Obama's administration officially declared

her support for the Pivot to Asia” (Obamacare i Pivot na Pacyfik, czyli 8 lat rządów Baracka Obamy w USA [Podsumowanie]).

Taking into consideration only the first phase of Trump’s presidency, there are some contradictions between the announced approach towards China and the reality. After the first turbulent months since Trump’s moving into the White House, his rhetoric significantly changed from the beginning of 2017. Trump, in agreement with Swaine (Chinese Views on the Trump Administration’s Asia Policy) got in touch with Xi Jinping just a few days after his election, on 8th November 2016, whereas the official congratulatory letter was sent from Beijing to Washington six days later. Xi expressed there his hope for a successful cooperation between the countries and the further development of mutual relations. Not long after that, freshly chosen Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, during his visit in the capital of China, did the same. In his speech, he referred to the words of Chinese President and emphasized that the newly-formed administration is ready for tightening bilateral collaboration in various areas.

At the beginning of December 2016 a telephone conversation between the president-elect Trump and the president of Taiwan, Tsai Ing-Wen was held. As a result, likelihood of a removal of the previously applied policy towards Taiwan and the Peoples Republic of China (“One China Policy”) appeared. That misunderstanding was ignored in the Mainland China and explained by the local state media as “a lack of experience of the new American President regarding foreign policy,” as stated in Turner’s text (*The United States and China: Raptures and Realignments in Trump’s First Six Months*). In the following months an improvement of mutual partnership could be observed. From time to time Trump still had some unusual performances, but their overtone was gradually becoming lighter.

In the first days of February 2017 the first longer direct talk between the leaders of the US and China took place. As its consequence, two months later an official meeting at Trump’s residence in Florida was held. Summit lasted two days (April 6–7, 2017) and was acknowledged by both sides, in agreement with Nakamura and Rauhala (the US and China end summit with 100-days plan to boost trade and co-operation), as decisive for the future development of mutual relations. Nonetheless, to cite Turner again, global political experts evaluated the expertise of American diplomacy there very critically. They concluded, indeed, that the summit was the turning point of the expected pattern and direction of cooperation between Beijing and Washington. However, China has decidedly taken a role of the leader in this competition.

As a result of the negotiations in Mar-a-Lago, according to Heatley (What’s in the US-China 100 Day Plan?), China obliged to partly open its financial sector to the inflow of the American investments in chosen areas (for instance electronic payments). Moreover, at the same time, Chinese officials declared their readiness to purchase American gas. Notwithstanding, there is no doubts that China has also

achieved its political goals. The main economic advantage for China was the removal of limits on the sale of processed poultry in the US territory. Additionally, the White House pledged to send its representation to the "One Belt, One Road" Forum which was held in May 2017 and was devoted to the development of the "New Silk Road" in coming years. In Beijing, as stated in Graceffo's text (China-US Trade the 100 days Plan, So Far (June 2017)) this decision was considered as an official acknowledgment of the project by the US and an indirect approval of the rising power of China in Asia.

The abovementioned facts gave rise to the 100 days plan, which turned out to have been the first step in the process of redefinition of the mutual relationship between the two countries. Its main principle, according to Galbraith and Patton (US-China Trade talks sputtering at the 100-day deadline) was to bolster American export to China with the expected result that the US trade deficit would decrease. Its negative value has still amounted to above \$200 billion since 2005 (Holmes, 2). Regrettably, to cite an analysis prepared by Jacob Parker, the representative of US-China Business Council in Beijing, the activities performed by the American government were insufficient to resolve this obstacle.

Therefore, the long-term consensus was elusive. In June 2017, Wilbur Ross, along with the Secretary of the Treasury, Steve Mnuchin, publicly reported their dissatisfaction in respect of Chinese reluctance in the active application of the arrangements established in Mar-a-Lago. To cite Heatley (After 100 Days and Much Hype, US-China Talks Fall Flat), Mnuchin directly demanded to equalize the rights for American enterprises which are vigorously operating in China with the Chinese ones which are successfully working on the American market. Mnuchin's speech could be recognized today as the first announcement of the introduction of the Customs Tariffs on Chinese goods imported into the US. In the following weeks, after Wilbur's and Mnuchin's speech, China stayed passive and did not seriously change its approach towards the new economic conditions agreed in Mar-a-Lago. These actions predominantly because of its grudge against the limitation of export to the US, which was acknowledged by Washington as the essential part of the redefined mutual relationships. As a consequence, a ponderable cut of the American trade deficit was not possible to achieve. Moreover, during the execution of the 100-days plan, the liberalization of the access to the Chinese financial market was not given to the extent agreed upon during negotiations.

There are no doubts that the Chinese economy has been facing a distinct transformation in the last years. The progressive approach of rapid liberalization, well-known in the case of China since 1978, is currently being replaced by the state-oriented policy of nationalization of the domestic economy. This strategy could be explained as a reaction to the significant economic slowdown which began in China in 2014. Annual growth at the level of 10% (Charting China's Economy: 10 Years Under Wu), gained by China in the first decade of the 21st century primarily due

to its accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, has decreased in the second decade almost twofold to 6%. Nowadays, despite its open market orientation over the last 35 years, China is still a rather closed economy. Selected industries are still absolutely overwhelmed by the state. The privatization of state enterprises, liberalization of the capital markets or the full release of the *renminbi* are the main challenges for the local ruling power in the following years. Admittedly, the crucial structural reforms have been promised by the incumbent president for years (Bulloch, A Progress Report of China's Third Plenum Reform). However, the date of their implementation is not precise. The modern economic policy of China was the main point of the 3rd Plenum what took place in 2013. In the established then 13th consecutive 5-year plan, the role of the government in the development of the country remains of utmost importance.

Notwithstanding, private enterprises gained equal rights with the state ones. However, the authorities have not still decided to open up the strategic industries to foreign companies. To state in consonance with Huang (Party's third plenum pledges 'decisive role' for markets in China's economy), the crucial role in those is still being played by the state's conglomerate whose existence, according to Jakóbowski (*Dług, giełda i przedsiębiorstwa państwowe. Źródła chaosu na chińskich rynkach finansowych*), highly depend on governmental bailouts. As a consequence, it has a negative impact on their competitiveness in comparison to the global leaders in the businesses permanently closed for the inflow of foreign capital. As an example, we can present the case of the financial industry. Whether either the Chinese economy's growth has measurably slowed down (GDP Growth: World Bank) or the amount of foreign direct investments has dropped (Foreign Direct Investment: World Bank), the strategy implemented by Chinese authorities in 2013 comes across as ineffective (Bulloch, On Liberal Reform, China is at a Crossroad).

The fall of the concept of the new beginning in mutual relations between Washington and Beijing, which was shaped and promoted by the American diplomacy, emphasized its inability to successfully enforce its assumptions. The fact is that after the Mar-a-Lago summit there seemed to emerge a real opportunity for the American goods and services to break into the Chinese market. Nonetheless, reality turned out more unpredictable than the Republicans had anticipated at the beginning of Trump's office (Gillespie, US trade deficit with China and Mexico is growing). Looking back, a more balanced trade exchange with the US and a significant cut in its deficit have always been out of the Chinese interest. At the same time, the American side officially declared its support for the Chinese project of "One Belt One Road". Considering this fact, it is clear that China achieved far more through the Mar-a-Lago Summit than the US. After having obtained the American approval for the further strengthening of its position in Asia, Beijing announced to continue with an implementation of further constraints related to the domestic economic freedom.

Conforming to Yoon (Here's who wins with the new US-China trade deals), some of constraints China decided to apply until the end of 2017. As examples, it is worth to mention about the coercive limits with respect to the access to the information from abroad. Another one is related to the leeway in the Chinese market for foreigners. Currently, if foreign businesses want to maintain their past position there, they are forced to transfer developed technologies which are crucial for the up-to-date improvement of the local manufacturing industries to China. These restrictions are especially painful for the several states for whom China is the main commercial outlet. There is more about this phenomenon in the next chapter.

The contribution of China in the trade exchange of selected States

In this part of this text, I would like to present the political and economic factors of Trump's victory during the last election. Moreover, it is necessary to explain the possible impact of tariffs restriction regarding Chinese goods on a trade exchange between selected states and China. Trump, pending his campaign, was announcing massive support for the American producers. Setter (10 poorest states in America in 2016) believes that the Republican's rhetoric, strongly rooted in the patriotic slogans, helped gaining support in 9 out of 10 states with the lowest GDP per capita in the US. The only exception was New Mexico where 48% of the entire population is represented by the Mexicans (New Mexico Population 2017).

Trump's approach convinced the older part of the American society as well. Moreover, 53% of the older part of the population (over 45 years old) believed in Trump's vision of the near future of the US. As a result, Democrats lost two key states in which they had obtained the endorsement of local inhabitants in the previous elections, namely Florida and Pennsylvania. The other states which decided to advocate Republicans instead of Democrats, in contrary to the previous election, are: Ohio (Walton, Lowther, Stylianou, Mpini, Ashton, Ewer, Reed, Huynh, Qurashi: US election 2016: Trump victory in maps), Michigan, Wisconsin, and Iowa¹. The pro-conservative movement was driven mainly by the white, non-educated part of the general public. There are no doubts that Trump owes his victory to the Americans who were dissatisfied with the post-recession reality, the dropping role of the US in the world, or the massive widespread of illegal immigrants within the country. Therefore, it looks like Trump has succeeded in the election either thanks to the well-conducted campaign or the systematically dropping living standard of the significant part of the Americans after 2008.

¹ Own study based on the data from *New York Times* and Politico.com.

Taking into consideration Trump's electorate, it is crucial to assess the real impact of the imposition of tariffs on its living conditions. On the one hand, the reduction in the number of imported goods would positively influence the jobs creation driven by the local entrepreneurs. Moreover, the redistribution of national income probably would be more effective. According to the ING, the imposition of additional tariffs on the imported products (45% on the Chinese ones and 35% on the Mexican) would have the negative impact on the growth of the American GDP. This forecast reflects that the increase of domestic production would be able to cover only 28% of the ensuing shortages. As a consequence, the American economy would shrink by 0.77%. What is more, the price for imported goods would become higher at 15% in just 2 years. Leering and Carnell (Trump and Trade...Threats or all-out trade war?) computed the joint cost of the tariffs imposition as follows: 0.28% (the growth of the American GDP generated as a result of the increase of the national production) -1.05% (the negative impact of the imposition of tariffs). Therefore 0.28%-1.05% equals -0.77% of the generated loss.

In 2018, after the first episode of the trade war and afterward the first impositions of trade limitations on Chinese products, it is discernible that Beijing does not intend to stay passive in this conflict. It is necessary to assess how strongly depended on the transactions with China, the chosen states indeed are. Hence, I would suggest to examine the real influence of China on the trade structure of 3 selected states which are the sample for this study. I have decided to extract them according to the consecutive categories: the state with the lowest GDP per capita (Louisiana), the state with the high proportion of the white citizens (Kentucky) and the state where Republicans seized the advocacy of residents at the cost of Democrats (Florida).

Louisiana

As stated by Setter, Louisiana is the state with the lowest yearly income per household, assessed for \$40 300 and the population of 4.68 million inhabitants (Louisiana Population 2017). The unemployment rate was 4.9% in 2017. In the last five years, inflows of Chinese capital have had the significant impact on the shape of the local labor market. In 2014, the very first Chinese foreign direct investment arose there. One of the leading China's chemical companies, Shandong Yuhuang Capital Co. Ltd. decided to make a \$1.85 billion capital investment in a world-scale methanol manufacturing complex on the Mississippi River in St. James Parish (Governor Jindal And Shandong Yuhuang Chemical Chairman Jinshu Wang Highlight Ground-breaking For \$1.85 Billion Methanol Project in Louisiana).

Chinese enterprise promised to create 400 new direct jobs, with an average annual salary of \$85 000 plus benefits. Furthermore, Louisiana Economic Development evaluates the project will generate almost 2400 new indirect jobs. At peak

building activity, around 2100 constructors should find temporary engagement. The initial phase of the investment has run in May 2018. The construction of the first methanol plant is planned to be completed by the first quarter of 2020. To cite Opportunity to Louisiana: to ensure the project, this state granted the company a stimulus package that includes two performance-based gifts: “9.5 million to be paid over five years beginning in 2017 to offset infrastructure costs of the project and \$1.75 million to be paid over 10 years to partially cover the costs of necessary riverfront access and development.” The end of the operation, conforming to Brelsdorf (Yuhuang Chemical lets a contract for Louisiana methanol complex) is scheduled by 2024. Another example of Chinese investor in this state is Wanhua Industrial Group, one of the global leaders in the production of polyurethane. This company decided to invest \$1.12 billion in the US. According to Liu (Chinese Chemical Firm Invests \$1 Billion in Louisiana Plant), around 1100 workers ought to find employment there.

The Governor of Louisiana, John Bel Edwards, published that China was the very first trade partner for his state in 2016. In addition, this state was the third largest recipient of Chinese direct investments in the nation. To cite Xiao and Yu'an (Louisiana loads up on China trade), its export amounted \$8 billion, and the trade volume increased from \$7.5 billion in 2015 to \$9.1 billion a year later. At the same time, state had a positive balance of payment with China, mainly because of Chinese demand on its agricultural products (accumulated value of almost \$7 billion). Moreover, there still exists an absorptive market for the ore or copper from Louisiana. Despite the tensions which have been growing for a quite some time, along the line of contact between Washington and Beijing, a strong likelihood of continuation of tightening relations between Louisiana and China still exists. Since April 2014, Chinese enterprises obtained an option for negotiating the agreements with American suppliers of a liquefied natural gas. Louisiana, which has plentiful resources of this fossil fuel hopes to attract further Chinese investments related to this industry.

Kentucky

Kentucky is one of the most ethnically homogenous states in the US. Over 87% of its inhabitants are the members of the white population, mainly belonging to a working-class (Kentucky Population 2017). It is also one of the poorest parts of the US with an annual average income calculated at \$42 800 (only slightly over Louisiana). The unemployment rate in 2017 was 6.2% (Setter).

An activity of Chinese investments has gradually arisen in Kentucky since 2012. Conforming to Sloan (Kentucky's first major Chinese investment to be Lexington factory), Shandong Borun Industrial Processing Equipment, working within the mining industry, decided to take over the Birtley Industrial Processing.

The value of the deal had amounted to \$15 million and created around 50 new jobs (Zhou: Birtley first Chinese Investment in Kentucky). Just after the transaction, this newly-formed enterprise launched a strengthened cooperation with the scientists from the Universities of Georgia and Alabama. As a result, the company was able to produce very advanced solutions related to the protection of the natural environment in a very brief time, with China as its principal beneficiary. The other instance of an economic partnership between Kentucky and China is an opening of the R&D center by Midea Group. It is currently the world's biggest producer of the air-conditioners and white goods. According to Finley (Appliance maker to establish an R&D center in Louisville), the amount of the deal accounted \$10 million. Despite the low sums of Chinese investments in Kentucky, in comparison to ones described in the case of Louisiana, positive trend in the fruitful collaboration between Chinese business and the American science is visible. The export of advanced goods from the US to China has been rising in its effect.

In 2016, two American companies were acquired by Chinese capital. First of them was Lexmark which was taken over by Zhuhai Seine Technology and Legen for \$3.4 Billion (Wang: Apex Changes From Foe to Suitor With \$3.6 Billion Lexmark Deal). However, one of the most surprising deals in the modern history of the US could have been found the sale of located in Louisville appliance unit by GE Electric to Qingdao Haier Co. Ltd. (Mann: How many Chinese companies operate in Kentucky?). Furthermore, the Chinese brand gained the right to use GE's logo on its products for the next 40 years. At this point, it is necessary to weigh the production capabilities of GE against the Qingdao ones. According to Mann (GE confirms a \$5.4 billion deal on appliance unit), in 2014, the Chinese producer was sixfold more efficient than American. The dependence of the US and Kentucky on the positive business relations with China is even stronger. Ford plans to relocate its production of Focus entirely to China until 2019. The main reason for this decision, according to Durbin (Ford Focus: Made in China), is the consecutive decline in demand for the small cars in the US. Thanks to that, Ford will save around \$500 million. Additionally, it is worth to mention that Buick and Cadillac have already transferred their plants to China in 2015 and 2016. However, Ford is out to spend \$900 million on the new factory in Louisville that will provide employment for around 1000 new workers.

Florida

This state is a slightly different example than the two analysed above. First of all, because it is the top destination for retired people who constitute 15% of the entire population there. Secondly, it is one of the most developed academic hubs in the US, which hosts students from all across the world. Last but not least, Florida is still a famous tourist destination, visited by around 100 million people every year.

The average annual income of the household in Florida is \$50,860 when the median for the US is \$57,617 (Florida Household Income). The unemployment rate is 3.6% that is one of the lowest results in the US (Economy at a Glance). Florida is also the third most populous state in the US, with the number of inhabitants of 21.31 million (over 20% of them speaks Spanish every day) (Florida Population 2018).

The introduction of an impost on the Chinese commodities seemed to be a direct way to a nationwide price hike. Florida is the biggest importer of Chinese goods on the national scale and the third largest individual trade partner for China (State Imports for Florida). In accordance with Dotson (Enterprise Florida Opens Business Development Offices in China), in 2014 the federal authorities of State decided to run the offices of the Enterprise Florida Agency in Shanghai and Hong Kong. Its main tasks were the development of mutual business relations and the successful attraction of Chinese capital inflows to the state. In the meanwhile, Florida has become the first receiver of Chinese freightage in the US expressed in capacity. It was made possible by the successful cooperation between the Port of Miami and located in the radius of 30 miles, Port of Everglades. That process was driven mainly by the investments in the development of local logistics for a sum of around \$850 million.

As claimed by Ottley (Miami real estate likely to be increasingly attractive to buyers from China), Florida has been considered recently as the profitable place for Chinese investors as well. The prices of real estates are relatively low compared to the New York, Shanghai or Hong-Kong (Stinson: Xi Jinping Heads to Florida as Chinese Investment Booms). The most recognizable are China City Construction and Hong Kong's Swire Properties. A fortiori, more and more Chinese citizens are thinking about the permanent immigration. Model of the American lifestyle, which has been successfully promoted for decades around the world, draws today mainly the attention of Chinese who are getting wealthier. It is said that about 340 million of them would have been retired until 2030. Another type of investment is the purchase of the flats for the further subtenant or for children who are studying there (four reasons why Florida is the next big thing for Chinese buyers).

However, at the beginning of 2018, the enthusiasm among Chinese investors slightly diminished. It was the result of Trump's declaration about the indispensable implementation of the restrictive law relevant to the constraints for the non-American purchasers of the real estate in the US (Kallergis, Chinese investors picks up another South Florida property). Like I tried to prove above, any active interference of Trump's administration in the bilateral economic relations between chosen states and China seem to have no positive effects on both sides. Moreover, I think that Chinese investments are the only solution for the sustainable development of the single states and the entire country, in many industries (US-China Business Council, 2-3).

The effects of the trade war nowadays

In the middle of July 2017, an unofficial trade war began between Washington and Beijing. The mutual relations have been consistently worsening, what resulted in the imposition of the first indirect economic customs on China at the beginning of 2018. According to Iyengar (US-China trade battle: How we got there), the firsts factual constraints against China were implemented by the US within the solar industry. Trump's administration announced then a 30% tariff on imported solar panels, which mainly come from China in the case of the US, and starting from 20% taxes on residential washing machines. On 9th March 2018, Trump taxed steel imports at 25% and imported aluminum at 10%. Finally, only Canada and Mexico, the members of NAFTA, obtained exemptions from these taxes.

Since the very first days of April 2018, the conflict escalated. China decided then to hit back. Beijing implemented tariffs on US imports worth in total around \$3 billion, including 15% duty on 120 American products containing fruits, nuts, wine, and steel pipes and a 25% tax on eight others, like recycled aluminum and pork (Shane, China fires back, announcing tariffs on US planes, cars, and soybeans). The day after, Washington targeted in retaliation another \$50 billion in Chinese goods (25% tax on almost 1300 items), most of them from the aerospace, machinery, and medical industries. The Chinese answer was swift. On 4th April 2018, Beijing published the list of further 106 American products affected by the implementation of a new set of tariffs (25% tax of the total amount of \$50 billion). It included aircraft and automobiles as well as soybeans and chemicals.

The second wave of the trade war appeared at the beginning of July 2018. To cite the Telegraph (Donald Trump imposes first tariffs on China and threatens to target almost all \$500 billion Chinese import), "Trump decided to hit in Chinese economy again, with 25% duties on a total amount of 34 billion. They involved Chinese machinery, electronics and high-tech equipment, including autos, computers hard drives and LEDs." One month later, according to the report of Donnan and Hornby (China hits back at 'trade bullying' Trump), China acting in retaliation, targeted US farm and energy export, containing soybeans, a top export of US states that supported current president, and crude oil. The implications of the trade war are the most painful for the governments and multinational corporations across the world. The conflict is regularly fanning by Trump who has announced in July 2018 an extension of levies to \$500 billion, which is almost equal to the whole trade exchange between China and the US in 2017 (\$505,5 billion).

The new approach of the US is currently redefining the global economic reality, which dramatically changed after the accession of China to the World Trade Organization in 2001. In the meanwhile, this country has become the very first exporter in the world being responsible for 20% of global sales today. In the opinion of Bouoiyour and Selmi (Political elections and uncertainty – Are BRICS market

equally exposed to Trump's agenda?), the imposition of the tariffs could sharply threaten the Chinese economy in the future because its long-term growth has based on export for the last 35 years. Therefore, the limited access to the American market could be another drawback for the stunting growth of the Chinese economy since 2010.

What is more, looking at the rapidly changing structure of Chinese export in the last decades, dominated by the advanced technologies today, the American market seems to be the perfect and in fact the only, outlet for it. Furthermore, a lot of the factories operating today in China were set up by the American corporations. Hence the imposition of the tariffs hurts indirectly American economy as well. The trade war will probably have a negative impact on the liberalization of the Chinese internal market that consistently has been becoming more and more open for foreign businesses. As an example, it is worth to mention the case of the Free Trade Zone opened in Shanghai in 2013 and the ones in Fujian, Guangdong, and Tianjin ran in 2015. Another effort made by the Chinese government toward the liberalization of the business conditions was the recurrent publication of the negative list. Foreign investors could have found the liberalized areas for their activities there (Daojiong, 12–13).

As stated by Chipman Koty and Qian (China's New FTZ Negative List Removes Restrictions on Foreign Investment), only between 2015 and 2017 over 20 industries were freed up (in total 95 since 2013). Among them, it is necessary to emphasize those the most important for the US: pharmaceutical, insurance, transport or financial ones. Taking into account the growth of GDP of the abovementioned zones, their results were much higher than in the case of the rest of the country. Shanghai, mainly focused on the cooperation with global corporation customers, has grown by 14.2%. Zone in Fujian, which has been responsible for the improvement of mutual trade relations with Taiwan, has augmented by 8.2%. Nonetheless, the most astonishing results achieved zones in Guangdong (30.8%) and Tianjin (20.8%). On the authority of Shira & Associates (Investing in China's Free Trade Zone), the first one emerged to tighten its partnership with Hong Kong and Macau, whereas the second one supported the development of the northeast provinces of China.

Above-described points clearly state the positive change in Chinese business cooperation within the global environment. On the one hand, Trump's accusations regarding Chinese theft of American intellectual property have their business case. In last decades, Asian competitors have become the real threat for the American producers. It became possible thanks to the strict protectionist policies that have been consistently implemented by the Asian authorities since the end of World War II. Moreover, according to Bernard Chan (A US–China trade war would benefit no one, least of all Americans), deviation from the existing economic order in the world would have either very negative consequences for relations between

Washington and Beijing or, perhaps, the global economy as a whole. Since the beginning of the 21st century, the emerging economies have shortened their distance to the developed ones mainly because of globalization, the phenomenon negated by Trump. China could be considered as the best example of its positive influence on the rise of a standard of living in the world. 40 years after the implementation of Deng Xiaoping's reforms, this country has efficiently transfigured from the first global producer of the base goods into the uttermost consumer therein.

It is worth investigating the American industries for whom China seems to be the main outlet. In the first place appears the revenue generated by the American movies in China. In 2016 they earned \$6.7 billion there, which makes China the second largest market for the productions directed in the US. Ye (Here are the American companies most at risk in a trade war with China) discloses the fact that 75% of the whole income remains in China. As another example aircraft industry could be mentioned. It is said that Chinese Airlines would like to purchase around 6800 new American planes in the following 20 years. The total cost of those transactions is assessed today for \$1 trillion. Furthermore, in that time their production will reassure around 150 000 workplaces in the US. According to Fernholz (If US trade with China is so unfair, why is GM the best-selling car there?) the automotive industry would also get hurt by the constraints arising from the imposition of import duties since both Ford and General Motors earned around \$5.4 billion in China in 2016 alone.

To show one more element of interdependence between China and the US, it would be worthwhile to compare the structure of consumer demand in both countries. Since the second decade of the 21st century, Chinese consumers have begun spending on the consumers' goods in total as much as the Americans. The most significant growth was observed between 2007 and 2016 when a retail sale was growing there on average by 15.4% annually. For comparison, in the US this growth was modest, at only 2.5% (Shen, 22). In 2009, China became the largest market for passenger cars in the world with the sale of almost 24 million yearly. In 2012 the Chinese market turned out to be the biggest outlet for the mobile phones. Apple alone has been selling there about 50 million of mobile phones since then (Morrison, 10).

This phenomenon could be explained by the fact that the Chinese middle class overcame the American one in 2015. Nowadays, around 110 million Chinese citizens belong to the middle class that is larger by 18 million people than the American one. Therefore, the demand for the American services in China is consistently growing that makes the ultimately positive outcome of the American balance of services (Morrison, 11–13). Its aggregated surplus for tourism amounts \$25 billion in 2015. Only in 2014, 273 000 new workplaces in the US were opened thanks to the increasing export of services to China. If the companies like Google or Facebook had been allowed to enter the Chinese market, this number could be even more imposing (Shen, 25–30).

The past experiences of the trade wars around the world portray mainly negative consequences for the affected countries. Japan provides a significant example. After rapid development during the 1950s and 1960s, this country reached the level of the developed economy in 1967. One of the most important economic partners for Tokyo, since the end of World War II, was the US. Nevertheless, local authorities decided to implement quantitative constraints on the most exported items there since 1977. Among them, it is necessary to distinguish cars, TVs or steel. In 1985 an agreement, well known today as Plaza Accord, was signed (Shen, Luk, 2–4). As the result, the Japanese currency (Yen) sharply appreciated overnight, from 250 to 160 per dollar. Such an abrupt appreciation either went into the burst of a speculative bubble on the real estate market or a decline in domestic export. Japan has fallen into the trap of weak growth in the late 1980s, which has its consequences to this day.

The above-described scenario is hardly possible in the case of China. However, still worsening trade relations with the US could interfere with the development of the global economy as a whole. Taking into consideration that around 20% of the export of the world is generated by China alone, and the fact that the US is its priority outlet, it is quite difficult to anticipate that present trade conflict on the line between Beijing and Washington will be profitable for one side or the other. On the contrary, the American business is aggrieved as well. China is presently, as I proved earlier in this text by numerous examples, either a significant investor in the US or one of the largest recipients of the American goods. Any difficulties imposed by Trump's administration on the mutual business relations with China, seem to be out of its interest.

Conclusions

It is more than two years since the election of Trump. Although the first year of his office was assessed by Cohen as fortunate (Trump's Lucky Year), his consistent pursuing to tightening of restriction toward China apparently brings expected results today. Trump used to be mercurial at the beginning of his presidency. Initially, he was accusing China of raping the American economy by the flood of cheap Chinese products. In the meanwhile, he was able to find president Xi Jinping as his personal friend and a strategic ally. As a result of these contradictions, throughout the first phase of redefining these bilateral relations (until the middle of 2017), China gained politically much more than the US. As discussed in section (a), Washington decided to lend its support for the concept of the Silk Road. This volatile rhetoric led to a weakening of the image of the American diplomacy therein. Nonetheless, later events have shown Trump's tenacity to keep following his harsh policy toward China.

It should be born in mind that Trump had no political experience before his unsuspected choice for the president of the country. Notwithstanding, some of his early decisions looked more as an effect of business negotiations instead of the execution of assumptions on which was based past foreign policy of the US. Trade with China has declined significantly for many states within the US due to this new approach. It is necessary to emphasize that many American enterprises obtained significant financial support from Chinese investors right after the crisis of 2008. As a result, rather than the diminishing amount of workplaces, new ones, mainly dedicated to the American citizens, emerged. A similar phenomenon was observed within the real estate industry, consistently fueled by the investments carried out by the Chinese middle class.

The role of China for the sustainable growth of the global economy is so essential that an intentional avoiding of the trade exchange with this country by the US could have a negative impact for its development in the following years. As argued in section (b), there has already appeared fruitful cooperation between Chinese business and the American academic institutions (the interwoven case of Midea Group and the Universities of Alabama and Georgia). Nonetheless, China will never become the developed economy without liberalizing access to its financial markets for foreign capital more than ever before. They are still inadequately linked to the flows of world capital compared to the current position of the country in the world. Moreover, there is a great necessity for the discontinuation of promoting of state enterprises by the Chinese authorities because of an absence of tangible results and the overwhelming financial effort for the state budget.

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Paweł Jaskuła – PhD candidate at the University of Business and Economics in Poznań, completed Master Degree at the University of Business and Economics in Poznań and his undergraduate studies at the University of Adam Mickiewicz in Poznań. He started his doctoral studies in 2016. He is a member of the Department of International Economy on the Faculty of International Business and Economics. His research interest lie in the area of specifics of growth of developing countries, theories of economic growth, innovative enterprises within BRIC countries and the economic cooperation between developed and developing countries.

PART IV

MISCELLANEOUS

Territorial Manifestations in Times of Globalization: Implications for State-Centrism in International Relations¹

Boryana Aleksandrova

Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”

Faculty of Law

Department of International Law and International Relations

e-mail: borjana_alexandrova@hotmail.com

Abstract

Globalization challenges the state-centric realist view of space and authority within International Relations. Using multifaceted concepts of territoriality and non-territoriality, this article goes into three versions of current territorial fragmentation or connectivity – deterritorialization, extraterritorialization and reterritorialization. They are to enable us to reveal the proliferation of globally relevant social and power dynamics above, below and within the state domain. At the same time, they are to illuminate the ambivalent role of states played in an era of global interconnectedness.

Keywords: globalization, territory, territoriality, realism, state-centrism, transnational, deterritorialization, extraterritorialization, reterritorialization.

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Introduction

According to the still prevailing realist approach (Dunne and Schmidt) in the field of International Relations (IR) the national state has been understood as the primary actor on the world scene. Respectively, it has been theorized as a unitary political formation unaffected in its domestic juridical and power competences (Scholte, 20) and exercising control over a single physical territory. The conduct of international relations, in turn, has been conceived of in terms of state-centric geographical spaces and rules and logics (Stefanov, 18). The *realpolitik* interests and balancing of states against other states have thus long preoccupied the followers of realism (Grieco; Mingst, 70–79).

Today globalization questions the practicability and normativity of homogeneous state-oriented analytical constructs, in general, and their monolithic territorial epistemology (Jones, 241) in particular for the explanation of (inter)national life. Moreover, globalization “has a profound effect on the concept of physical territory as an organizing principle for social, cultural, economic, or political relations” (Ku and Yoo, 212). In fact, we are witnessing divergent expressions of territoriality and non-territoriality – see below – corresponding to different moments of state or non-state hegemonies, contestations and historical transformations. As a result, a lot of globally relevant developments are detected to occur across, within or independently, albeit not necessarily unrelatedly, of the territorial borders of state control.

This article outlines three versions of current territorial fragmentation or connectivity specifically revealing fractures in the Westphalian reading of the state’s functioning – deterritorialization, extraterritorialization, reterritorialization. It constitutes an attempt to capture the complexities of contemporary power relations and further the discussion on the consequences of globalization for the operation of national states since the dawn of the 1980s within IR. As such, the manuscript is interested in illuminating globalization as a historical challenge to the fundamental premises of realism. Why does the realist conception of the territorial state turn out to be insufficient to comprehend existent mechanisms of power and counter-power on various levels? How is the role of states to be looked upon in relation to globalization?

At the same time, this *exposé* does not pretend for exhaustion. It centers first and foremost on the territorial connotations of the problematic. It is considered beyond its scope to go deeper and broader into the wholesale IR debate between positivist and postpositivist theories on the topic. Nevertheless, the proposed considerations are thought to provide an impetus for further critical examination of one of the most dominant discourses in IR, that of the state and of state power, with regard to human existence and emancipation (Booth *qtd.* in Buzan and Hansen, 206). Drawing inspiration from anthropology (Follis), cultural studies (Appadurai;

Deleuze and Guattari), geography (Scott) and sociology (Bauman; Beck; Castells, Eisenstadt; Sassen) for its methodology and conclusions, the article also strives to underline the need for more interdisciplinarity in the field of IR.

(Non-)Territoriality versus Westphalian Territory

Globalization appears as a process of “deepening, acceleration, and territorial extension of cross-border transactions in various areas of present life – economy, ecology, media, culture, social domain” (Menzel, 226). It has profoundly transformed modern societies and world order (Held et al., 7) through numerous embodiments of social connectivity and division, on the one hand, and of the interweaving between the two dynamics, on the other. Respectively, it has provoked numerous (inter)governmental and non-governmental, institutionalized and non-institutionalized agendas and discourses competing for presence or supremacy within and beyond states. As such, globalization poses a serious methodological dilemma for realism and its view of geopolitics predominantly as “a one-sided concern for the physical/military control of space” (Scott, 234), the latter interpreted by means of the Westphalian category of nonporous “state territory”. This dilemma can be resolved by drawing on multivalent space conceptions, such as “territoriality” and “non-territoriality”.

Leaning on Saskia Sassen (2006), the concept of “territoriality” can be referred to as the accumulation of potential for political influence based on the intertwining of multiple components – territory, authority, juridical rights, norms, technology, etc. Territoriality adopts “specific contents, shapes, and interdependences in each historical formation” (4). Correspondingly, the condition of “non-territoriality” can be understood to stem from a similar complex assemblage “detached from geographic territory but developed through the capabilities entailed by territoriality” (416). Therefore global geography is to be reconstructed by means of different territorial and non-territorial “assemblages on a global, national and sub-national level” (406), at least partially interpenetrating each other.

Notably, the spatial perspectives of territoriality and non-territoriality do not cast away states as irrelevant “world-cultural” terrains of authority and ruling capacities (Meyer et al., 157). Even more so, certain human activities remain primarily determined by national incentives (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Speaking about the era of globalization, the notions of territoriality and non-territoriality are to serve us to investigate the relation between states and many other actors and factors on the (inter)national scene today –international organizations, supranational institutions, NGOs, social movements, identity politics, international law, human rights law, global capital and its organizational infrastructure, transnational crime and terrorism, etc. – in a more flexible and precise way. Indeed, state policies

and institutions have been cultivating or accommodating significant elements of territorial fluidity. In this sense, three instantiations of (non-)territoriality will be operationalized in what follows. The three of them coexist, replenish or contend against each other in parallel.

Deterritorialization

Earlier employed as a term by Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1983) in their work on social and human reproduction in capitalism, in the framework of the methodology of (non-)territoriality, chosen in this article, the condition of “deterritorialization” relates to processes, structures and dynamics that, at least partly, transpire the realist ontology of state behavior. Seen in light of the IR, “it is no longer self-evident that nation-states can be described as ‘self-sufficient schemes for all the essential purposes of human life’ in the context of the spread and intensification of social relations across borders” (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy). Two of the most salient empirical instances of deterritorialization manifest themselves in the shape of global governance institutionalizations and the formation of digitally activated information, capital, image and social flows of trans-local significance since the beginning of the 1980s. Remarkably, institutionalizations of global governance have evolved on a governmental and non-governmental level – sometimes altering, sometimes outweighing national prerogatives.

Some thirty years after the end of the Second World War many intergovernmental and nongovernmental agencies started undergoing changes that gradually turned them into platforms of global governance (Varwick; Clark). Currently they are capable of adopting self-oriented working agendas, of maintaining self-fulfilling normative discourses and of developing self-sanctioned practical and/or legal tools. However, these instantiations of deterritorialization are not to be defined as completed or external to the states in an ultimate manner. At this historical moment their relevance for international relations is increasingly deriving from their direct or indirect effect on the domestic political, economic, social and cultural life of states. Furthermore, the endogenous organizational coherence of states has been modified due to the autonomous activation of regulatory agencies within their administrative apparatuses (Jayasuriya, 426). A significant number of ministerial sections, central banks, etc. have been growing into mediators between the global and the national. They are correlating directly with similar counterparts on a governmental and non-governmental level – international financial institutions, consulting groups, stock exchanges, UN, etc. Concurrently, we see a process of “nationalization of international law” (Slaughter qtd. in. Jayasuriya, 440). Instead of replacing the state, international institutions and transnational networks rely on these new forms of “complex

sovereignty” (426). By the same token, some forms of intertwining between state, inter-state and non-state rationalities seem to estrange citizens and their expectations (Crouch; Leggewi).

Two examples of governmental deterritorialization are the IMF and the WB. Both institutions came into being in 1944 in order to balance trade and financial deficits among industrialized states. While later expanding their lending to poor countries, their assistance became cumulatively disengaged from the idea of “securing political support for the donor countries” (Lundenstad, 258). In return their policies have been synchronizing more and more with the performance of global corporate bond markets (Stiglitz, *Inequality*, 213). Since the end of the 1960s, the WB has engaged international private creditors in order to increase its capital, and the IMF began conditioning its loan guarantees on opening the recipient state’s financial markets. This came along with an ideological shift in the management circles of the two bodies known as the “Washington consensus” – the preference for imposing deregulation, privatization and social restrictions on the part of indebted countries. From institutions adjusting inter-state trade and financial issues the IMF and the WB converted to quasi-autonomous regulators of national macroeconomic and social policies (Sassen, 152; Stiglitz, *Discontents*, 231–232) – at times potentiating the power of certain governmental elites, at times diminishing the position of others.

Analogously, under the banner of the doctrine “responsibility to protect” the UN Security Council is competent to initiate a military intervention in a state, without its permission, as long as it is not able or willing to manage genocidal conflicts within its national borders (ICISS; Weiss et al.). Further on, the UN Secretary General, the Executive Secretary of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and other environmental agencies are being instrumental for validating the climate discourse as a global normative stance. Finally, the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court nominally extends over all party nationals.

The same concerns the rise of non-governmental institutionalizations of deterritorialization. The World Economic Forum counts among the most powerful ones. Its membership encompasses some of the world’s most influential global economic and financial players. Governmental officials, well-positioned international figures, academic affiliates and NGOs attend the annual gatherings of the Forum in Davos, where global or regional matters are discussed. Transnational forums of experts like the annual Munich Security Conference serve as a focal point for the political, corporate, military and academic elites. All these instances of non-governmental deterritorialization differ from the normative and historical essence of traditional mechanisms for democratic participation of citizens within states but can influence the parameters of their existence. Similarly, the reactions of credit rating agencies like Standard&Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch to the results of national elections or other domestic affairs are functioning more and more as a paper for voters’ future and well-being.

Deterritorialization gets also fostered via a range of flows “of trillions of dollars, of information, of technology, of organizational interaction, of images, sounds, and symbols, mobilized under the combined effect of the communication technology and historical social processes” (Castells, *Network Society*, 401). The stream of transactions on the world stock markets, corporate tax heavens, global media channels, global elites of mobility (Bauman, 22–30) or global networks of human, arms and drugs trafficking belong to “the space of flows”. Those flows penetrate and surpass the economic, cultural and political spaces demarcated by national borders. New patterns of social and economic flexibilities as well as hierarchies and asymmetries are getting underway. New coalitions between transnational and domestic political actors are forged (Cohen and Rai; Rosenau; Ghimire), repeatedly beyond electoral attendance both on the Left and on the Right (e.g. citizens’ action committees, lobby groups, social movements, neighborhood vigilante patrols, etc.). The ideological and symbolic appeal of the national and revolutionary state’s dominant models is waning at least partly (Eisenstadt).

Extraterritorialization

In order to countervail global challenges states also incline to extraterritorialize the satisfaction of their needs or their power grip. Hereby the concept of “extraterritorialization” incorporates all those political, diplomatic, administrative, economic, financial, police or military measures taken by governments for the purpose of strengthening their capabilities beyond their immediate jurisdiction. Extraterritorialization is an older form of instantiation of state territoriality but acquires new meanings in a global context and causes new effects, respectively, even to the extent of “denationalizing rather than producing an extension of national territorial authority” (Sassen, 419). Nowadays extraterritorialization takes place under multilayer social, economic, political, ecological and cultural circumstances that are difficult to reduce to rigid state space categories. Hence, it can be deciphered as a form of unilateral state regulation with manifold global implications. Current governmental policies in the area of migration and land use overseas as well as variable state regional undertakings can be traced to the evolution of globalization.

Meanwhile, the topic of migration occupies a substantive place in foreign and domestic affairs (Bardarov; IOM). Extraterritorialization in this sphere of state action implies projecting one-dimensional nationally underpinned standards over the existence and legal status of foreign citizens – outside and inside the officially designated frontiers of that state. In recent years it has confirmed itself as a tenacious endeavor for many governments to enact strict migration regimes with regard to certain categories of foreign persons and to coordinate them with

other partners. In times of mutually interweaving natural and man-made pathologies (Follis, 118) with global repercussions, ambivalent classifications of migration and asylum statuses are being introduced to the benefit of well-educated, young, financially reliable and economically competitive individuals (Castells, *Network Society*, 132–133).

Gray zones of utilitarian or essentialist classifications of “suitable” and “unsuitable”, “legal” and “illegal”, “documented” and “undocumented” or ethnically and culturally “related” migrants and asylum-seekers come into being (Aleksandrova “Security in Times of Migration”, “Europäische Dilemmata”). At the same time the exploitation of migrants’ labor worldwide is on the rise (Taran and Geronimi, 3–4). National territories are being vigorously equipped with fortified state-of-the-art border installations (Brown). Border technology is being reinforced along the US-Mexican border, a new fortified fence was built on the land border between Greece and Turkey, a wall between Kenya and Somalia is being raised, etc. The number of detention centers for asylum- or economic residence-seekers, including children and minors, is on the rise (Nethery and Silverman; UNHCR).

States display resoluteness to fund detention facilities for immigrants on neighboring territories. For example, under the so-called Australian Pacific Solution asylum-seekers are transferred to imprisonment centers in Nauru and Papua New Guinea after having reached the territory of Australia (Australian Human Rights Commission). The EU has been pursuing arrangements with its bordering countries (Ukraine, Serbia, Turkey) and Mediterranean neighbors (Libya, Morocco, Tunisia, Algeria and partly Egypt) for the interception, detention and processing of the cases of asylum-seekers on their respective territories (Global Detention Project). Malaysia is demonstrating an unwillingness to legalize the presence of tens of thousands of asylum-seekers from Myanmar, that have left their country in the last 50 years due to the rule of a military junta. Border patrolling is being carried out in extra-territorial waters. Trans-regional police cooperation on the selective prevention of migration is expanding. Ultimately, these policies are leading to the collective criminalization of whole groups of the world population. They are being dispossessed of their right to freedom of movement, of their right to subsistence, and of their right to security.

Simultaneously, states or state-sponsored corporations practice extraterritorialization while competing for global land resources – through land-renting and land-purchase, through subsidization of agricultural production and trade or through speculation with food prices (Le Monde Diplomatique, 18–19). In light of the climate change, the intensified production of biofuel, the financialization of land and food acquisition, and the forecasts for world population growth to 9 billion in 2050 mostly in developing countries, the worldwide demand increases for land for agriculture and stock breeding (Deininger and Byerlee; Kress; Borrás et al.). Eventually, wasteful irrigation systems, ongoing inter-state

water conflicts and water waste in industry are diminishing the possibilities for adequate land use as well – to the detriment of the most needy population. Among land-renting and land-purchasing countries, China, Japan, South Korea and Saudi Arabia come to the fore. Ethiopia, Thailand, Russia, Brazil, Ukraine, Cameroon, Laos and the Philippines, on the other hand, rank among the land-leasing states (Land Matrix).

Similarly, many of the regional undertakings of states nowadays can be deemed as symptomatic for extraterritorialization under the banner of globalization. Both the Association Agreement negotiations between the EU and Ukraine and the Russian reaction to its expected signing since the end of 2013 are to be realized (and were overtly presented as such by Brussels and Moscow) as an aspiration towards gaining a competitive advantage on the global market. Substantially, the age of globality is an era of economically driven regional integration. Parallel to the enlargement of the European internal market, a series of accords lowering intra-regional tariffs and trade barriers are spreading all over the continents. A number of regional formations are established or upgraded, e.g. the common market MERCOSUR in Latin America, the free trade area within ASEAN, NAFTA and its expansion CAFTA to five Central American countries (Guatemala, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and Nicaragua) and the Dominican Republic, ECOWAS, AEC, etc. Apart from global resources' direct utilization and commercialization, states frequently invest in regional cooperation in the name of "global security". A whole range of open and undercover, legal and illegal, trans-border coordination activities among military and secret services are to be mentioned in this respect.

Reterritorialization

Another expression of territoriality is the phenomenon of reterritorialization. Going back to Deleuze and Guattari, "reterritorialization" in the perspective of IR can be articulated as an effort of "ancillary apparatuses, such as government bureaucracies and the forces of law and order" (35) as well as various social and political groups at a sub- and transnational level to reinstall homogeneous practices, norms and imaginaries in spaces which have previously been deterritorialized. Following David Newman, reterritorialization "involves both a *process* through which 'territorial configurations of power are continually ordered and reordered' as well as a continuous *practice* of differentiating and defining borders between societies according to specific criteria" (Newman qtd. in Scott, 235). It is a "constant process of reflecting group interests and identities against those of other groups in the world and through this reflection deriving principles for strategic action" (Scott, 235) by means of "ideology, discourses, political

institutions, attitudes and agency” (Scott and Matzeit qtd. in Scott, 235). “These neoterritorialities are often artificial, residual, archaic; but they are archaisms having a perfectly current function, of sectioning off, of reintroducing code fragments, resuscitating old codes, inventing pseudo codes or jargons” (Deleuze and Guattari, 257).

An exemplary illustration of reterritorialization appears in the shape of refocusing formal and informal political discourses and practices upon the role of ethnic identity and demographics for the existence of a particular national population against the backdrop of constantly changing global social interrelationships. In that logic states reorganize their initiatives in appeal to – the wealthiest part of – the respective diaspora, consisting of “complex postnational social formations” (Appadurai, 254), or reinvigorate their projections over extraterritorial communities dubbed as historically belonging to the “ethnic composition” of the nation. The year 2000 saw the foundation of the State Agency for the Bulgarians Abroad. Its self-formulated priorities unequivocally refer to the unity of the so-called Bulgarian communities abroad, the educational advertising among the coming generation and the reincorporation of the qualified young Bulgarian migrants into the economic and political life of the country (State Agency). Since 2000 the Bulgarian government has been supporting the initiative “The Bulgarian Easter” in order to attract young Bulgarian professionals from abroad. The position of a Minister for the Bulgarians Abroad was created between 2009 and 2011. In 2012 the Ministry of Economic Affairs of the German State of Bavaria brought into existence the initiative “Return to Bavaria”. The latter was meant to reinforce the pool of globally competitive professionals in Germany. Accordingly, the NGO “German Scholars Organization” was instructed to approach German university graduates overseas and support them on their return back to the country (Wisdorff). Without neglecting the long-standing geopolitical and geocultural traditions in states’ policies of migration, the reterritorializing effect of these policies in the era of intensifying globalization is not to be underestimated.

On the other hand, different varieties of group autonomies, identities and collective rights are being reconstructed or reinvented (Eisenstadt). This development, in concurrence with central authorities’ proneness to delegate certain prerogatives to local administrations for dealing with global challenges (Castells, *Identity*, 242), accounts for the reemergence of the minority problematic (Eisenstadt). In addition reterritorialization is gaining a foothold in the face of increasing anti-migrant moods from South Africa through Thailand, Malaysia and Russia to the EU members. Ultimately, its repercussions are to be retraced in the signaled motivations and power claims of sprouting terrorist organizations that have been joining the global flows of information, technology, finances and social exchange since the beginning of the twenty-first century.

Conclusion

Globalization is shaking the historical underpinnings and, for that matter, the social and normative substantiations of existing state-centric territorial orders of power. Respectively, the rigid state-related notion of territory of realism turns out to be inapt to encompass current spatial complexities. Alternatively, the more differentiated cross-cut conceptions of territoriality and non-territoriality, as introduced earlier in this manuscript, can be used to overcome those epistemological gaps.

Put into this perspective, globalization brings with it a multiplicity of governmental and non-governmental, formal and informal, public, private and public-private territorialities or non-territorialities. A number of forces now combine to decouple “the political” from the categorical framework of the national state, even “from the standard roles associated with political and non-political actions” (Beck, 38). These (non-)territorialities can be regrouped under three main headings, viz. deterritorialization, extraterritorialization and reterritorialization. Deterritorialization finds its embodiment, among other things, in the consolidation of inter-governmental and non-governmental institutionalizations of global governance. It is also an expression of the formation of technologically moved flows of capital, information, migration, trafficking, weapons, etc. as well as the insertion of states’ political, organizational and legislative spaces by these flows. Concurrently, governments are extraterritorializing their capacities for meeting globally related interests beyond their own jurisdictions. Reterritorialization, on its part, yields the proclivity of states or, respectively, sub- and transnational formations to reintroduce elements of Westphalian order in spaces having been disaggregated erstwhile by the power of the flexible transterritorial flows.

Yet, in their majority, all these manifold territorial manifestations are still relating to the attributes of state power and organization. States are not disappearing completely from the international scene. Although some of their rationalities are retaining their Westphalian character, there is a strong tendency that the purpose and meaning of national governance is “being reconstituted and restructured in response to the growing complexity in a more interconnected world” (Rosenau qtd. in Held et al., 9) as well. As it was discussed above, states represent one of the many terrains of global life while continuously interacting with other international actors and factors. In reality, measured in the categories of (non-)territoriality, they function as an important agent for the evolution of globalization and its technological, economic, social and political inequalities among the world populations. This conclusion is to enable us to reveal the ambiguous role played by states in the face of globalization.

Such kind of interpretations should lead us beyond the dualistic inquiry of globalization as a phenomenon “outside of the state” resulting in “more or less sovereignty”. Indeed, although state territory still matters, the geography of world politics is now no longer reducible to fixed border constellations (Rosenau, 85–86).

At the very least, firm steps should be undertaken to analyze the international relations as inter-societal (Czempiel, 7) and the international politics – as transnational as well, beyond the monolithic parameters of realism.

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Boryana Aleksandrova

Boryana Aleksandrova – PhD (University of Münster, Germany, 2008); Senior Assistant-Professor in International Relations, Sofia University “St. Kliment Ohridski”, Bulgaria (2010–2018); Interdisciplinary Research Colloquium “Border Studies and Critical Migration Research”, Interdisciplinary Research Center “Border Crossings – Crossing Borders”, Humboldt University of Berlin (2018–); current research interests: theory of international relations, globalization, war and peace, international politics; teaching: university course “Globalization and International Relations”; seminars on Theory of International Relations, Theory of Foreign Policy, Theory of International Negotiations; introductory seminar on International Relations for students of law.

Does China's Aid in Africa Affect Traditional Donors?

Kassaye Deyassa

University of Bergen, Norway
Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities
Global Development
e-mail: Kassaye.Deyassa@student.uib.no

Abstract

China's role as an emerging aid provider and the concept of a social plan in Africa has led to polarised responses in the West. Several say that this "productivist" strategy is much less determined by the concepts of citizenship, legal, social rights, and much more regarding building functions. The purpose of this study is to examine whether the welfare and social policy ideas that characterize Chinese aid in Africa are influencing traditional donors and becoming global. The article utilised a qualitative study that has two main components. First, a comprehensive content analysis of over 50 key Sino-African, Chinese and Western policy documents from 2000 (since cooperation between Beijing and African countries first became institutionalised). Second, there were semi-structured interviews with Chinese, African and Western stakeholders in Addis Ababa, (Ethiopia), who was directly involved in the relationship between China and Africa and related development issues. The result of documentation and interview analyses show that there are currently significant differences between Chinese and Western approaches. China has made much stronger and more explicit links between development aid and economic activity than most Western donors. The aid is usually implemented through specific projects rather than broader programs or policies.

Keywords: Africa, China, OECD-DAC, South-South cooperation

Introduction

This article looks at whether the welfare, as well as social plan concepts that define Chinese aid in Africa, are affecting typical contributors and ending up being international. There is proof that the social measurements of China-African advancement participation step past the pro-poor redistributive standard presently promoted by Western benefactors (Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender 2013). However, little systematic attention has been given to considerate. China's role as a source of normative innovation in international social development, shows how does China help or normalise interpretations about the purpose of social policy in international development?

The current appearance of Chinese aid as well as welfare support in Africa became new area for research study of worldwide social policy, to an understanding of the methods which policy procedures and end results in developing nations are formed by globalization procedures (Anon 2009; Anon 2007; Gumede 2018). Just as the social aid arrangements in China are undergoing a profound change, socio-political engagement is outside the country's borders. Chinese participation on the African continent has expanded dramatically over the last years. Although China's trade and economic interests in the region have attracted the most attention, interest in Sino-African cooperation now includes development and social assistance. The Chinese government has invested \$198 million in external aid in Africa in 1998. By 2007, the Chinese government had \$1.4 billion in project assistance. China's foreign aid was estimated at \$2.5 billion in 2009 (Samy 2010). Although the relationship between Sino and Africa is not a new phenomenon, this South-South cooperation is broader in scope and qualitatively different from the previous engagement (Asche 2009).

Chinese aid in Africa gives a new impetus to the study of global social policy to understand how political and globalisation processes (Anon 2009; Gumede 2018). In advanced welfare economies, analysis has traditionally focused the dynamics of social policy. The truth is that international organisations are a leading and comprehensive measurement of the social schedule in establishing nations is greatly undeniable. Because of this, it is more interesting how certain agencies understand and define development as a political problem, as their perspective forms the basis for their recommendations (Schemeil et al. 2013).

Literature review

Theoretical approach

It is well known that the current explosion in the number of public and private actors involved in international development issues has implications for the dissemination and outcome of political and social policies worldwide (Jean-Michel and Ray 2010). Using a constructivist framework, this analysis captures how the Chinese

government interprets its role and purpose as a global social actor alongside Western-oriented models and ideas. A constructivist approach views intersubjective knowledge and ideas as a constitutive effect on social reality and its evolution... [and] explains why people have certain norms, identities, and understandings of cause and effect, and thus the origin of interests (Hopf 1998).

Contrary to the theory of rational choice, constructivism considers not only policy analysis as a function of effectiveness or instrument choice, but as a result of a social discourse that uses language as a means of disseminating and institutionalising ideas (Hopf 1998). Language legitimises certain goals, actors and ideas and restricts the choice of alternative policy options. In this sense, language aligns political action with common purposes. It not only describes reality but also contributes to its design (Polat, 2011) and “discourse also becomes a source of change” (Hopf 1998). This research has attempted to analyse this discursive level through semi-structured interviews and policy documents. The approach has created the transformations within Chinese cooperation and the various factors that cause the dissemination of social policy ideas between China and traditional donors from the actors.

Development aid paradigms: western approaches of the poor to the development of developing countries

Since the 1940s, when western development aid was institutionalised in multilateral and bilateral fora, Western concepts of social policy and development have constantly been changing and changing. Until the 1970s, although Western authorities emphasised production, scientific evidence and major investment in infrastructure construction, the installation of electricity and technology (Golley 2011), poverty reduction was still an explicit goal of the political effort. A global pendulum of the neoliberal intellectual pendulum in the 1980s prompted major donor agencies to move from direct poverty reduction measures to broader economic strategies. The rules on the market economy, the repayment of the state and the use of private mechanisms and voluntary organisations for the allocation of social and social services were mainly required during this period. Washington's consensus policy mantra of privatisation, deregulation, and trade liberalisation prevailed over economic reforms that dominated public debt and inflation. The role of social policy has been considered financially insurmountable, socially stigmatising and ultimately undermining economic growth in general. It was argued that public social spending suppressed the informal mechanisms of social security and favoured perverse incentives and dependence on unsustainable distributions (Mooij 2009).

Nonetheless, because the late 1990s, the dominating viewpoint of destitution decrease methods in Western growth companies has moved in a different instruction, and some would undoubtedly say outstanding (Lacayo 2016), Especially the striking

was the fast increase of social protection on the growth program. The acknowledgement that social security is necessary to accomplishing growth, as well as financial development, has resulted in a new vocabulary of “for the poor” and “transformative” social plans (Gumede 2018). A new focus is put clearly on the battle against poverty and also the targeted positioning of socially interested treatments on the poorest.

Regardless of ideological fights within and between growth companies, a critical strategy highlighting threat monitoring as well as effectiveness and even campaigning for method stressing legal, social rights as well as social justice. There is some agreement that severe poverty, as well as inequality, need to resolve if growth targets are to be fulfilled clearly – which redistributive social security treatments are vital in this effort. Social pensions, conditional remittances, public investments in childcare and development programs for children, food aid and action programs are part of the new poor social policies (Ahmad 2013; Alexia Delclaux Gaytán de Ayala 2015; Duncan 2014). The OECD-DAC Forum, Poverty Reduction Network, underlines the new consensus that rapid and sustained poverty reduction requires poor poverty and the role of social policy for growth, especially in reducing and improving human capital can be overlooked (OECD 2009).

In this context, China’s new approach to development is not least due to its tremendous achievements in fighting poverty within its borders and the need to understand what works. However, there is also the awareness that Chinese aid in Africa appears to be mediated under other normative conditions, institutional actors and political mechanisms than is traditional with traditional donors (Asche 2009). The Chinese approach seems to be rooted, above all, in a broader developmental development model, which is now characteristic of the social systems of some developing countries (Midgley 2005; Yeh 2018). Conceptually, between a liberal open economy and a centrally planned economy, this model undoubtedly offers a special fourth world of prosperity in development. Common features are low public spending – strong residual elements in programs; a central role for the family; a regulatory and useful purpose for the state; and limited commitment to the idea of wealth as a civil right (Knight 2014; Yeh 2018; Goodman et al. 1998).

Perhaps most importantly for our analysis, this fourth development regime has been characterised as a “Productivist” (Emery 2018), in which social policy is subordinate to the overarching economic goal of growth and is typically used as a tool to strengthen economic policy to reach the goal. Trends in the social sector in China have been very much in line with the classical development model in recent years, and interventions foreshadowed a productivist investment strategy, including the promotion of education and the promotion of entrepreneurship and the creation of entrepreneurship jobs.

Current trends in Western development institutions seem to be different, while disputes over the extent to which the Washington consensus is obsolete, an in-depth look at the political discourse of international aid agencies over the last decade shows

that Western donors have apparently gone beyond the brutal neoliberal provision of welfare and structural adjustment (Duncan 2014; Ahmad 2013; Pempel 2000) argue: The other side of the coin of the globalization of social policy is the socialization of world politics. The main topics of the agenda at intergovernmental meetings are now essentially social (environmental) issues. There is clear evidence that the turn of the century represented a crucial moment for worldwide socio-political discourses and the emergence of a more holistic definition of development as a transformation process that far practice economic growth goes beyond. This new understanding of the determinants of development was most clearly expressed in the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) and in the formal statements of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which argued that poverty reduction itself is the key to broader economic growth and several Professionals – weak targeted social policies. This understanding is different from what is currently supported by China, although the ultimate goals may be the same.

Therefore, the emergence of this new “South-South” dynamic attracts more interest (Lafargue 2009). In particular, the question was asked as to whether China, as an emerging world power, will gradually adapt to the dominant international development norms and ideas, or instead challenge the current systems and try to exert their influence on their transformation (Reilly 2012). Within Western discourse, there has been a tendency to gauge China’s compliance with OECD hegemonic DAC standards, which is gradually becoming a normative (Mardell 2018; Reilly 2012). Traditional donors have made considerable efforts to involve China in institutionalised cooperation processes (Dreher et al, 2013). There is no doubt that mutual learning takes place and some elements of the Chinese development aid model have been influenced by the coexistence of Western models (Kjøllesdal and Welle-Strand 2010). Although the opposite may be the case (Asche 2009; Saavedra 2007), a remarkably small empirical study has been conducted on China’s potential influence on socio-political thinking and practices of traditional Western donors. Few scholars have examined China’s role as a potential norm maker (Reilly 2012) or Game Changer (Economy 2010), which may influence and redefine dominating and legitimised norms.

China’s rise as a new global actor and exporter of its approach in other developing countries has potential relevance to our theoretical understanding of global social policy, and many interesting questions arise. Is there a new and pronounced Chinese developmental approach now and does it affect the policies of traditional Western donors? If so, in which direction and why? Does it also challenge the traditional analysis of the conditions, processes and policies of social policy design in developing countries? What does it mean for analysis that has for decades highlighted Western institutions as an essential determinant of social policy in developing countries? To explore these issues, this study examines the ideas and activities of Chinese aid to the African continent and the possible spread of policies between powerful international development institutions.

Methodology

This qualitative study has two main components, both undertaken between 2017 and 2018. First, a comprehensive content analysis of over 50 key Sino-African, Chinese and Western policy documents from 2000 (since cooperation between Beijing and African countries first became institutionalised then). The texts include China's 2006 African Policy, and the four Political Declarations and five Action Plans produced in the five meetings of the Forum of China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) since its creation in 2000. The Western documents comprise national aid policies and policy statements on China–Africa cooperation from OECD-DAC members.

Second, there were semi-structured interviews with Chinese, African and Western stakeholders in Addis Ababa, (Ethiopia), who were directly involved in the relationship between China and Africa and related development issues. These included: civil servants, political advisors and representatives of various Chinese and Africa's diplomats, agencies, research centres and civil society organizations; African Ambassadors to AU (African Union) from nations officially working with China and represented in Addis Ababa; and bilateral and multilateral donors from the Western OECD-DAC, the EU Commission and UN agencies, development banks and international financial institutions in Addis Ababa.

Specific thematic guides were developed for each group of respondents, although the issues raised were similar across groups. The guides were semi-structured, although the questions were as broad and open as possible to enable dynamic and comprehensive learning about topics. The discussion aimed to gain a comprehensive understanding of China's development assistance to Africa in Africa. political learning between Chinese and Western donors in support of social development; and China's influence on Western socio-political considerations and practices. In several cases, the information provided was classified as sensitive and confidentiality was requested. All respondents have ensured privacy. For this reason, a list of institutional connections is provided instead of the names of respondents.

All 49 African embassies with representatives in Addis Ababa and the Addis Ababa offices of OECD-DAC members were identified and systematically contacted. Nine African countries agreed to participate in the study. As with African respondents, the sample of OECD-DAC members participating in the survey was a self-selected group. Nineteen representatives from 12 country members said they had knowledge or interest in Sino-African cooperation and agreed to an interview.

The sample reflected broad interest and commitment to the topics. Some countries have already supported concrete Sino-African co-operation initiatives, while other countries have shown little tangible activity outside the general discussion.

All representatives and multilateral organisations were also systematically contacted and interviewed by representatives of the United Nations, the European Union, a development bank and an international financial institution. In each case, the representatives of the agency or the representatives of Sino-African, international development or South-South initiatives was interviewed.

The selection of Chinese respondents followed a different process. Unlike respondents from Africa and the West, not all potential respondents could be identified due to a lack of accessible information. The contact details of potential interviewees were in many cases not publicly available, and information was collected through a snowball method of personal and professional contacts as well as recommendations from other interviewees.

This article presents the results of interviews with Chinese, African and Western officials, with members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) as Western Representatives. The OECD-DAC was chosen for this first analysis as it plays a significant and essential role in coordinating aid policy and practice. Their member countries account for about 90% of the world's bilateral ODA (Official Development Assistance). It has probably achieved an earlier and higher profile of the role of social policy in a developmental context than its counterparts in Washington and the United Nations (Anon 2007). The 1997 Report on Progress Indicators and Development Goals were later adopted as Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Necessary for this analysis is that China is not a member of the OECD-DAC, and members' reactions to China's development activities in Africa are known to be very different. Unlike China as an emerging development aid actor, throughout the article, the author refers to OECD-DAC respondents as traditional or Western donors. For reasons of confidentiality, individual DAC member states are identified only by country size.

Findings

Chinese and Western approach to social assistance: ideas, institutions and instruments

Documentation and interview analyses show that there are currently significant differences between Chinese and Western approaches. China has made much stronger and more explicit links between development aid and economic activity than most Western donors. The aid is usually implemented through specific projects rather than broader programs or policies. Unlike traditional donors, Chinese aid is usually provided in the form of Chinese workers who build roads or hospitals instead of providing financial resources. Although some attention is devoted to human

resource development and capacity building through scholarships and training, Beijing still prefers large infrastructure projects such as hospitals, government agencies, railways and power plants. By contrast, the current focus of much Western aid concerns poverty reduction and inequality (particularly gender inequality), better governance and institutional capacity building.

At the institutional level, while priority has been given to providing social assistance through bilateral mechanisms, the China-Africa Cooperation Forum has been created as a platform for collective consultation and dialogue between the Chinese Government and African countries and for formalising long-term relationships. While the added value of Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) beyond its symbolism has been called into question (Du Plessis 2014), Chinese and African partners continue to use FOCAC summits to rethink current arrangements, identify new resources and modalities of cooperation, and negotiate new aid pledges.

Regarding political instruments, the author also found a disagreement between East and West. Targeted interventions in favour of the poor, such as transfer of cash, food or assets or targeted social services, are mostly non-existent in the Chinese aid packages in Africa, and most of the Chinese government's efforts do not support social policy support aimed at income poverty and social exclusion. The documents refer to the need to achieve a fairer and fairer international order, rather than taking targeted interventions aimed at disadvantaged groups. Therefore, development interventions are aimed at improving the social well-being of the entire population and not of individual members. By contrast, and with few exceptions, Western donor agencies are tackling the vulnerabilities of the poor and the poor by strengthening social assistance programs and facilities (Ahmad 2013).

However, even in the education and health sectors the author observes differences in approaches. Traditional donor activity is mostly guided by the MDGs of universal access to primary education; reduction of under-5 and maternal mortality rates; and the halting and reversal of HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases. Interventions for the benefit of children and school seeking programs (Darrow 2012), or in health, to improve access to health services through more systems-wide solutions search Improved public health systems and free commission or health insurance schemes.

“... The focus is on universal coverage. Obtaining funds through the required upfront payment is the most efficient and equitable basis for increasing population coverage” (WHO 2010)

In contrast, China's educational assistance focuses more on tertiary education, such as the construction of universities and the granting of scholarships to African students to complete vocational and technical training at Chinese universities. Similarly, China directly provides healthcare services through the construction of hospitals, health centres and the provision of medical teams. While

the focus of Western donors appears to focus on a poverty-oriented approach that emphasises redistribution, equality, and human and social rights, China's strategy underlines instrumental motivations. "Health aid that is provided by MOH is around 80% for African countries. ... Most health cooperation has focused at the implementation level rather than at the policy level. We have been sending medical teams according to agreements ... and we are sending more doctors" (Government Official, Chinese Diplomat in Addis Ababa). Most importantly, the findings here show that China's engagement in Africa has changed the way in which social development issues are and how social policy is justified. Documents and interviews repeatedly show that China's aid, trade and investment for Africa are intertwined in an integrated package and cannot be easily separated. Respondents from AU not only argued that social and economic developments are inextricably linked, but that economic growth is a prerequisite for social progress. "The first stage should be economic development and later social development. If not, you do not have credibility" (Researcher and Policy Adviser, AU).

It was confident that economic development should be a priority in the development process and that further successes would follow, notably through rapid and unrivalled economic growth and poverty reduction in China itself. "With limited resources, you could not push forward all those sectors, economic, political, social ... at the same time ... or chaos will happen. That is the case in a lot of developing countries in Africa, Latin America, even Asian countries. ... You can only do things one by one. You cannot do all the things at the same time" (Researcher and Policy Adviser, AU).

After all, unlike its western colleagues, Chinese policy supports the idea of unconditional development aid and is less concerned with promoting domestic policy change and promoting democracy in the recipient countries. In several documents most clearly stated in the Beijing Declaration (2000), diversity and respect for differences between nations are promoted. Countries that differ in social systems, development stages, historical and cultural backgrounds and values have the right to choose their approaches and models to promote and protect human rights in their own countries (Beijing Declaration 2000). Therefore, Beijing does not require political changes from the recipient states, and the approach allows recipients to implement their internal social policies "The Chinese mode of providing aid has a different nature from the West. ... It is based on mutual help and South-South cooperation, no political conditions and respect for sovereignty. There is no interference in internal political affairs and aid is provided only at the request of the recipients based on mutual benefit and common interests" (African Development Bank). This condition is of crucial importance to both Chinese and African recipients, meaning that China is ready to work with an African country, regardless of internal governance or political conditions.

How far is China's model of aid to Africa impacting Western welfare and social policy ideas?

The traditional donors surveyed have recognised that China's influence at the institutional level is now crucial, affecting not only the national development aid agencies of the OECD-DAC members but also broader international bodies. Unexpectedly, many have welcomed China's influential role in current relief architecture as it has created a more balanced international order: "China is stronger than ever before. I am happy about it. I think we are having closer cooperation, in all topics. China is increasing its power, and the power of the US is decreasing. I think there are important changes in the aid architecture in the world" (United Nations Economic Commission for Africa). Interest in promoting cooperation with Sino-African engagement has been highlighted in several official documents and policy statements by the OECD-DAC. One example, the new OECD-DAC Enhanced Engagement initiative 10, aims to foster the direct and active participation of China and other emerging economies in the work of the Organization's principal organs, including in committees, regular economic surveys and compliance instruments OECD, integration into OECD statistical reporting and information systems and policy-specific peer reviews. Of course, the response of Western interviewees to Sino-African engagement was not uniform, and China's new presence in Africa did not appear to have a significant impact on some smaller bilateral agencies: "what China does is not much different for us as a donor than how we look at other big donors ... it does not really change much except that there is an additional donor somehow" (OECD-DAC). Nevertheless, among OECD-DAC interviewees more generally, the common message was that China's expanding role in development assistance was registering an impact among their institutions and generating some reflection and reappraisal of their current practices and approaches: "I think it has raised some self-criticism among Western donors. Are we too slow? Are we putting too many conditions? Are we preparing our programmes too long so that the development goes ahead of the programmes? Chinese aid is known to be quick and that ... has influenced the agenda" (OECD-DAC). Although they have been demonised as a new coloniser in many Western media and public debate (Anon 2008, 2017), respondents admitted that discussions about China in international organisations are becoming less polarised and differentiated. There was a pragmatic assumption that future development aid systems would undoubtedly include perspectives from the South and especially from China. Overall, this was considered positive: "... when we do a post-MDG review, Chinese views will be quite important. So, these emerging powers will take over the leadership. I would say that is a fantastic direction ... you know if the MDGs were set in the year 2000, by the Europeans mostly, the post-MDGs framework and the targets associated should be set by the South" (OECD-DAC). The official

statement adopted at the fourth Top Level Efficiency Forum on Busan will likely continue, showing whether traditional donors are expressly prepared to cooperate (i.e. not be obliged) with developing countries in their aid operations. North-South cooperation agrees with policies and responsibilities). Nature, modalities and obligations that apply to South-South cooperation are different from North-South collaboration. ... The principles, commitments and actions agreed in the Busan document are a voluntary reference for South-South partners.

Despite these attempts by the West to involve China in global cooperation, China is reluctant to participate fully. Following the Paris and Accra meetings, the Busan Forum should create a "Global Partnership for Effective Development Cooperation" aimed at building a common global front in support of "BRICs". However, the Chinese government, followed by Brazil and India, initially did not support this partnership and chose to stay out of the frame. China's reluctance to participate in a common framework has raised concerns in aid campaigns, which believe that this situation could undermine the current commitments to transparency, a rights-based approach and democratic ownership, and the legitimacy of the Parisian Consensus, which was adopted before the role of new donors, further weakens as China was obvious.

Despite firm promises and efforts to increase assistance, interviewees and documents indicated that aid has come to a halt in sub-Saharan Africa (Darrow 2012). Many forecasts predict that the effects of the global economic crisis after 2008 will increase pressure on Western institutions due to liquidity constraints, which are now being scrutinised to justify spending decisions by domestic voters. In this context, the crisis is paradoxically opening up new opportunities for China. Respondents noted that China's growing aid, trade and investment are of significant and symbolic importance to African countries, as many Western donors reduced their contributions to development assistance. Respondents also commented that the economic downturn had deprived the MDG framework as inadequate of meeting the challenges of the new international environment. In addition to the Chinese money, the new initiatives and orientations of China, as well as other cooperation initiatives of African countries supported by BRICS countries, are increasingly appreciated: "...the economic crisis has also created new opportunities for investment and the Chinese presence in Africa. It is more and more difficult for countries which are facing the crisis to have to live up to their engagements in the field of aid, so China, in this context, is even more appreciated" (OECD-DAC). In addition, interviewees reflected on the fact that the economic downturn had exposed the MDG framework as being inadequate to address the challenges of the new international environment.

In addition to Chinese money, the new initiatives and orientation of China as well as other cooperation initiatives supported by BRICS countries have also therefore become increasingly appreciated by African countries: "The global downturn has caused us to think twice about our results frameworks. ... It is outdated.

... Now, everybody is looking to China. China is, you know, the 21st century success story. ... Interestingly, I think the international crisis has given more legitimacy, more impetus, to South–South learning than ever before. It has created, you know, a real sense of legitimacy for China’s role. Whether or not you call this the Beijing Consensus, I mean there is something very interesting happening here. It is very much the future” (OECD-DAC).

Regarding China’s direct impact on the activities of Western donors, the primary example was the question of infrastructure and the balance between hardware (physical infrastructure and technology) and software (human development, skills and capacity building). According to many respondents, the fact that China is so actively involved in promoting infrastructure projects on the continent has led to discussions about the role of infrastructure, which is back on the agenda of Western donors: “It is probably fair to say that China’s emphasis upon supporting infrastructure ... as a driver of development, has caused organizations like X [development agency of OECD-DAC member] to re-evaluate the priority towards infrastructure ... you can see it happening – this year there was an agreement for X to allocate quite considerable resources to this. ... So, has X done this as a [direct] result of learning from China? Well, maybe that is debatable, but I think that no doubt, China has had an impact on the way organizations like X think about those type of things” (OECD-DAC).

Recent data on development spending support internal debates on the importance of the hardware development elements described here. The role of infrastructure through scepticism has led to a significant reduction in donor spending from almost 40% of total bilateral ODA over the period 1995/1996 to less than 20% in 2002–2003 (Rodrik 2007). However, gross disbursements of DDA economic infrastructure to all developing countries increased from \$8.1 billion in 2005 to \$14.8 billion in 2011 (current prices) (Darrow 2012). For example, the British government has recently doubled its aid spending on African economic infrastructure from \$61.1 million in 2005 to \$289 million in 2011 (OECD). A recent parliamentary report from the United Kingdom (18 March 2011) identifies the lack of functioning infrastructure as a constraint on growth. Foreign Minister of International Development (DFID) comments underscore support for infrastructure and growth as part of UK development aid strategy.

“We support developing countries as they identify and attempt to tackle the barriers to growth. This might mean ... developing the physical infrastructure by which supplies, and goods can be transported, the communications infrastructure through which information can be disseminated” (UK development aid).

In many ways, the discussion on the role of infrastructure was just one aspect of a broader debate on the optimal relationship between economic and social policies. And here, too, the author found evidence of how China’s own development experience and its role in Africa seemed to influence western thinking about the relationship between economic growth and development. Overall, most of the Chinese

experience in Africa was positive. Surprisingly, in the face of today's social protection strategies, some Western organisations have emphasised that they support China's priority on economic growth rather than social spending. The importance of investing in China's involvement in Africa has led traditional debtors to debates about development drivers, and the tensions between social investment and a perspective of social rights have been apparent.

Finally, regarding the conditionality of aid, it should be noted that Western responses to the Chinese approach were relatively relaxed and undisturbed. The Chinese model that aid should not be made conditional upon the recipient countries adopting policies or reforms was not considered a threat to Western development aid in Africa. More importantly, there is some evidence that the problem of conditionality has been re-examined under the new approach of China and translated into concrete changes in the practices of some Western institutions.

Discussion

It is striking that Chinese development aid policy is currently somewhat different from the political discourse of traditional Western donors in moving toward an expanded role for targeted, redistributive social spending for the poor. It is important not to overestimate the discrepancy as the Chinese approach to social development is not static, and China's ideas and practices are changing and evolving. It is undoubtedly true that China is increasingly attaching more importance development elements, such as capacity building, both domestically and internationally. Similarly, there is some evidence of the possibility that China's norms are changing as a result of increased interaction with Western institutions (e.g., China has sent delegates as observers to the DAC meetings) and therefore, some convergence in the future. Further research is needed to analyse to what extent a change is the result of increased political dialogue in China and the learning or outcome of China's own development experience.

However, despite this qualification, this study shows that China's understanding of the social dimensions of development differs from the current Western approach to tools and mechanisms, and perhaps more importantly, to the problem definition and objectives of social assistance. Beijing seems to be guided by a social development approach that creates stronger links between the economic and social dimensions of development. It is embedded in a rationale stating that poverty reduction and social development are ultimately ensured through productive activities that contribute to economic development and employment opportunities. Therefore, a separate and unique role for social policy is mostly superfluous. While it is true that other OECD-DAC members, such as Japan and South Korea, also sign an in-country development aid model in their capacity as OECD-DAC members,

they expressly support the organisation's principles and approach the ODA guide to others Developing countries (Urbina-Ferretjans and Surender 2013). However, China has not joined this donor group and its specificity is gaining importance as an alternative approach to international development assistance.

These studies indicate that China's approach to the African continent has a clear impact on Western ideas and activities at various levels, and that new discourses on socio-political support for Africa are emerging. Although this is still at a very early stage and the author is not suggesting an imminent radical paradigm shift, some of the OECD-DAC members seem to be somewhat receptive to the Chinese approach, and there are even signs that changes in thinking and behaviour are occurring in progress in practice. It is striking that, as Kjollesdal and Welle-Strand (2010) has argued earlier, the process of transferring China from China to the West is less a direct attack and more a silent revolution. There was little evidence that traditional financiers felt that China was openly challenging their models or even trying to replace them. Instead, China merely provided an alternative approach to aid recipients, putting competitive pressure on the international aid system and forcing traditional donors to either justify or revise their approach.

Leading the way is a small group of pioneering countries that not only officially recognised and welcomed China's engagement in Africa but were the avant-garde in establishing formal cooperation with the Chinese government on African development issues. These nations are generally large and influential players on an international level and in most cases have a colonial past with Africa. The political dialogue included regular meetings with senior Chinese officials discussing general development issues. Cooperation has also been developed at technical or work level, using permanent committees, research studies and other capacity-building and knowledge-sharing initiatives. There is also an increasing number of concrete joint projects.

At the center, it may perhaps be the largest group of countries interested in exploring mechanisms of dialogue and cooperation with China, but which are still developing such mechanisms. These countries recently launched missions in Beijing to explore cooperation opportunities, including possible joint pilot initiatives. For this analysis, they have, above all, established active contacts with the pioneering Western donors in order to find out their institutional mechanisms and key areas of cooperation. On the path and development of pioneer donors, this group is now showing clear signs of setting up similar mechanisms.

Conclusion

This article examined whether social and socio-political ideas that characterize Chinese aid in Africa affect traditional donors and become global. There is evidence that the social dimension of Sino-African Development Cooperation goes

beyond the redistributive principle for the poor currently advocated by Western donors. This qualitative study comprises two main components, both of which were conducted between 2017 and 2018. First, a comprehensive content analysis of more than 50 key Sino-African, Chinese and Western policy documents from 2000 was used to record a data half-year. Structured elite interviews were conducted.

It seems China's influence was not uniform in the traditional donor community, but the actors take the lead, albeit relatively few, but are the most influential within the international development community and are carefully watched, followed and supported by OECD-DAC members. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the new developments initiated by the Agency's international pioneers are likely to be a new emerging trend. Since the conditions and processes of social policy design in developing countries are so closely linked with the ideas of international development institutions (if not predetermined), and a possible change in the direction of travel of the ideas and activities of this community requires close coordination analysis and evaluation.

At present, several voices in the West call for increased participation by China (and the emerging powers more generally) in multilateral development fora. However, it is necessary to dissolve the views of the different constituencies. Our research shows that the responses were not homogenous and that the implications between the OECD-DAC members that form a continuum are not consistent. However, it is possible to identify some clusters of countries by their openness to Sino-African engagement and their mode of political participation.

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Kassaye Deyassa is studying Global Development at the University of Bergen and working as a consultant at Hordaland County. He has MSc in Environmental and Energy Management from the University of Twente, The Netherlands.

Shia Armed Groups and the Future of Iraq

Kardo Rached

University of Human Development
College of Law and Politics
Sulaymaniyah, Iraq
e-mail: kardo.rached@uhd.edu.iq

Ahmed Omar Bali

University of Human Development
e-mail: abdullah@uhd.edu.iq

Abstract

The rising and acceleration of the Shia armed group in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and Lebanon require a deep understanding of the root of the multi-dimensional conflicts in the Middle East. An appropriate and sufficient approach to the research about these militias will be from an internal conflict rather than an external conflict. The legitimization for the existence of the majority of these militias if not all of them is to fight and struggle against an entity which is the Sunni sect, in this case, that will assimilate them not integrate them peacefully.

Keywords: Iraq, Iran, Shia armed groups, Sectarian division, ISIS, New Middle East and Religious violence

In this article, we try to identify the impact of the Shia militias in Iraq on the formation of the future of this country. We maintain that these armed groups will be a destabilizing factor for Iraq and its neighbors, and they will worsen and deepen the sectarian division in the Middle East.

We assess these different groups from different perspectives, for example, using the Weberian theory that the state is the only entity that has a monopoly of violence, Ariel Ahram's model of state-sponsored and government-sponsored militias, and finally the devolution of violence to these armed groups.

Introduction

In this paper, we will introduce the political situation in Iraq since the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) took over the second most populated city, Mosul, in 2014. It is important to highlight that the main purpose of this paper is to investigate the impact of the Shia militias on the formation of the future of Iraq and peaceful coexistence within Iraqi society.

Following the collapse of the Iraqi regime in 2003, the American and British forces faced multiple problems, such as security issues, gaps in the system, and a lack of fundamental services such as water and electricity. The White House decided to send their strongman Paul Bremer as their military representative to serve as the leader of the coalition in Iraq, Bremer's role was to create a new Iraqi regime based on the American perspective. The main idea of Bremer's plan was to reform a new Iraq under the concept of "ethnic power sharing". From this point on, Iraq has been divided into three main sects: Kurds, Sunni, and Shia. The re-creation process of the new Iraqi political system has resulted in the sectarianism found in Iraqi society since 2003.

The first step in this direction started with the so-called Iraqi governing council (Majlis Alhukem) replacing Saddam Hussein's government. Majles Hukem consisted of representatives from the main Iraqi ethnic groups, and the intention was to create a roadmap for a new constitution and the formation of a new government. Ironically, many members of the Majles Hukm had only returned to Iraq with the American and British forces and were unpopular among the majority of Iraqi society. Through the Majlis Hukm, Shia politicians could impose their conditions on the others. In the beginning, they were able to achieve an agreement with the Kurds regarding the senior positions in the Iraqi government. For example, the Shias should be given the prime minister's position because they were/are the majority, but the Kurds could receive the president's position. The division of the highly important positions between the two groups left the Sunnis feeling excluded from the political process. Therefore, the majority of the Sunnis chose to support the rebel groups against the coalition forces and the Iraqi government. The development of sectarianism

in Iraqi society became the basis for the reconstruction of state institutions, and this had been reflected in all the state apparatus. For example, the new Iraqi military and the intelligence agency were under control of the Shia, and the country's foreign affairs were in the hands of the Kurds.

The turning point for Iraqi society was June 10, 2014, when ISIS took control of the second largest city in Iraq, Mosul. The Iraqi government lost the majority of its Sunni cities and population to ISIS. Moreover, the Iraqi military lost its willingness to fight in many Sunni areas because the population did not consider the Shia soldiers to be a national army. This new phase of political turbulence and the expansion of violence started when the Iraqi army lost its moral in the fight against ISIS fighters. This resulted in calling for the organization of the Shia people into the so-called People's Mobilization Forces (PMF), in Arabic the Hashed Shabi, against ISIS.

Historical review of the state-creation in Iraq

The process of state-building in Iraq has a long and complicated history. The first phase of the state-building process in Iraq is going back to the British occupation of the Wulyat of Baghdad during the First World War. Under the British occupation, the state building process was started and intensified. The British tried to form Iraq in accordance with their interest. Their first step in this direction was the integration of the 3 Wulyat (Wulyat Baghdad, Mousel, Basra) into one state under the King Faisal authority. They supported king Faisal financially and politically in order to consolidate and concentrate power in his hand. Both British and the king faced multiples problems in their effort to frame the Iraqi society and its state. According to Charles Tripp, it was in British interest to institutionalize the new Iraqi state. On the one hand, they could by institutionalization process dominate the Iraqi society and through it, they would absorb the power in hands of King.

On the other hand, they could also avoid blaming of the direct rule as it was the main reason for the many revolts against them during the transition power to King Faisal. Administratively, the new Iraqi state was born but it experienced challenging time by time. The Iraqi monarchy rule was continued until 1958. During these years the Iraqi political system and society formed 12 times Parliament. But it didn't help to cement democracy into Iraq. In opposite to that, it enriched the tribalism and conservatism because the most of the candidates were elected to Parliament labeled as landowners, tribals, and religious leaders. The state building process in Iraq since the First World War came as a result of intervention from an external power which created a weak and unstable state.

The second phase of the state rebuilding process started after a military coup against the Iraqi royal rule. The military – Arab nationalism came to power in 1958 and abolished the monarchy in Iraq forever. The coalition of Arab socialism

– nationalism with military root, cooperated to rebuild the Iraq state in the direction that the Arab race superiority became a cornerstone for a new Iraq. The post-Monarch Iraq described as a single party rule. It makes the new Iraq a state with intra-ethnic conflict. The eruption of the ethnic conflict and the systematical suppression of minority such as Kurds reflected in the mind and behavior of the state. It puts Iraq into security dilemma.

The third phase of this process begins with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Since the Iraqi defeated in Kuwait in 1990 and the UN decision of the economic and military sanction against the Saddam regime, the Iraqi state's institutions met unbearable requirements from its citizens. Politically and economically the Iraqi state was unable to fulfill its functional responsibilities. It changed the image of the Iraqi state from the defender of the Arabs against the Persians to be a weak state that was unable to defend itself. The Iraqi state could survive the pressure and requirements from the international community for delivering its nuclear weapons until 2003 but before this time, the Iraqi state could never come back to its earlier form as a realistic state, that fought against the Iranian regime during 8 years. And beside it, the Iraqi regime didn't accept the Kurdish guerrilla's challenge against its monopoly over violence. it started a comprehensive military campaign against them in the north. Until 2003 the Iraqi state was seen as a weak state that was more close to collapse.

The Iraqi state in post-2003 is a difficult and complex entity. The regime changing in Iraq by US and UK in 2003 meant the new process for the rebuilding and recreating a new Iraq, was started and based on the basis of ethnic power-sharing. Despite numerous problems that faced the post-Saddam government in Baghdad, it continued until the dramatically and catastrophically defeat of the Iraqi army and security institutions in many Sunni cities against ISIS in 2014. From that perspective, the Iraqi army and its security institutions lost its capacity and ability to fight. It forced the former Iraqi government to ask Shia cleric Ali Sistani to make a Fatwa and calling the young Shia in the whole Iraq to fight against ISIS under the authority of the popular mobilization forces (MPF). That made it possible and legitimate for the creation and spreading non-state armed Shia groups in Iraq. By controlling the state institutions, (MPF) became an important umbrella for the most Shia political parties and now through joining the (MPF), the Shia politicians provide a popular support among Iraqi Shia.

An overview of the Popular Mobilization Forces

According to al-hashed.net which is an official website for the PMF, the structure of it consists of the following:

PMF has a leader with a deputy chairman (Alhaj Abu Mahdi Almuhandis) then the sixteen directorates linked to the deputy chairman.

These directorates include the following:

1. Directorate Inspector General;
2. Directorate of Administration;
3. Directorate of Finance;
4. Directorate of Planning;
5. Directorate of Operations;
6. Directorate of Logistics Support;
7. Directorate of Information;
8. Directorate of ideological guidance;
9. Directorate of Medicine;
10. Directorate of Training;
11. Directorate of Central Security;
12. Directorate of Packing;
13. Directorate of martyrs and wounded;
14. Directorate of Military Engineering;
15. Directorate of Communications;
16. Directorate of Intelligence;
17. Artillery Battalion;
18. Armored Corps Battalion;
19. Tank Battalion;
20. Bridges of Popular Forces.

The Directorate of ideological guidance takes care of the guiding of the Mujahideen and mobilizes them with true jihadist concepts and building the mujahideen in a religious and doctrinal construction. It is sending students from Hawza al-elmyia (an Islamic Shia school from Najaf in Iraq and Qum in Iran) into the front lines in the battlefields. They are responsible for the following issues:

1. The ideal religious preparation of the Mujahideen.
2. Raise the cultural and religious level of the Mujahideen.
3. Increase awareness and insight of the Mujahideen.
4. Raise the morale and jihad of the Mujahideen

Problem statement

According to Weberian theory, the monopoly of violence is held by the state, but what if the state is unable to protect itself from an internal threat? Since 2014, the Iraqi state has been defined as a state that is unable to fight and control the threat that from ISIS. It opened the door for the creation and spread of militias in order to fight the ISIS hazard. Now, these armed groups are acting as state representatives, and to a great extent, they challenge Prime Minister Haider Abdi's cabinet administratively and military.

Research questions

The research questions will be designed theoretically:

1. What is the impact of religious militias, such as Hashed Shabi in Iraq, on the future form of the state?
2. Will the Shia armed groups be a destabilizing factor for Iraq and its neighbors?

Purpose of the study

In this study, we will focus on the implications of the Shia armed groups for the political situation in the Middle East, especially in Iraq. There is a relationship between non-state armed groups, the violent conflict and political stability. To prove this triangular relationship, we will look at the political situation in Iraq after ISIS. The rise of Shia groups during the last three years made the political situation in Iraq more complicated and unpredictable. The last three years have proven that these Shia armed groups have an overwhelming impact on socio-political stability not only for Iraq but also for its neighbors such as Syria. Therefore, the main focus here will be on the future of the political system in Iraq in light of these armed groups' activities and operations around the country.

Research methods

The methodology of this research project is theoretical. This research will adopt a theory of violence devolution and a theory of state/government militias. This will enable the researcher to explore what role or how much impact PMF will have in the process of state rebuilding in Iraq in the post-ISIS era.

The reason for the existence of the militias

The non-state armed groups and its reintegration into a national army is an interdisciplinary study that focuses on this process from different perspectives and different times. Historically the rise of non-state armed groups originated from the state's struggle for monopolizing and consolidating of power, and beside it to secure as much territory as they could (Tilly). The creation of the modern state after the ending of the second world war results in a situation that many European countries become institutionalized and established democracy (Dahm). From that point, the army became depoliticized and came under the legislative branches which it reconstructed and re-designated the army under the name national army

with the responsibility for the country's border protection. The history of non-state armed groups in the Middle East has had another role and function other than it has had in past in the pre-modern European. Ending of the colonization in the Middle East during the late 50th shot a new phase for the creation of the nation-state. Most of the Arab state formed and developed into the so-called post-colonial. The distinguishing feature of the Arab post-colonial states is a consolidation of power and the struggle for the centralization. for example, post-colonial Iraqi state faced a tough rebel from its Kurds and by the time when the state became more and more Sunni sect-centric the Shia also marginalized.

According to Richard Jackson, insecurity in a weak state is one of the reasons for the creation of militias. The majority of Middle East states were defined as weak states, and the common characteristic among them is the insecurity challenge. Buzan claims that there are three elements central to the existence of a strong state:

1. The idea of the state;
2. Institutional capacity;
3. A physical base.

For Buzan, the idea of the state is essential to having a peaceful society, and he claims that society will reach a consensus regarding the state and identify with it. In the case of Iraq, it is difficult to find a broad and appropriate social consensus regarding the Iraqi state. For example, after the collapse of Saddam's regime, the majority of the Sunni boycotted the political process under the observation of the US. This led to resistance against both the Iraqi state and the US presence and finally led to the creation of Sunni insurgents.

A measurement and identification of the insecurity in weak states is that they are to a high degree more vulnerable to internal threats than to external threats. The Sunni insurgents and their disagreement with the Iraqi state exemplify the most difficult internal threat against the Iraqi state. Another perspective regarding the creation of the militias is from Max Weber. The Weberian theory is based on the assumption that the state is the only entity that has a monopoly of violence: "Weberian concept of the state, which views the state as a monolithic entity and as the only beholder of the monopoly of violence" (Balcells).

When the Iraqi state's establishments were unable to protect its internal and external security, then the existence of the militia became a natural consequence: "...Weberian accounts of militias as constitutive of state failure" (Carey).

For example, consider Lebanon when it became classified as a failed state. Consequently, militias such as the Hezbollah act as a state and present themselves as an alternative to the state. In so doing, they addressed many issues such as providing jobs by investing their money in small industries and offering free healthcare for poor people. The real cause of the existence of militias in Middle Eastern societies is the states' weakness and lack of legitimacy.

Post-Saddam Era and the Shia revival

After the collapse of the Iraqi regime in 2003, the Americans decided to recreate a new regime on the basis of so-called “ethnic power sharing”: Establishing a governmental system that can accommodate Iraq’s different ethnic and religious groups (Brancati).

This meant that the Kurds, the Sunnis, and the Shias should participate in ruling the country. The Iraqi governing council (IGC), which was established three months after the occupation of Baghdad, was based on this principle. The IGC consisted of 25 members, and its ethnic and religious breakdown included 13 Shias, five Sunnis, five Kurds (also Sunnis), one Turkman and an Assyrian (Evans). On June 1, 2004, the IGC dissolved after the creation of the new Iraq interim government (IIG) as a caretaker government to govern Iraq until the drafting of the new constitution. The Iraqi transitional government replaced the IIG from May 3, 2005, until May 20, 2006, and it arranged an election to choose the national assembly on January 30, 2005. This assembly drafted a permanent constitution, which was then submitted for approval by the Iraqi people in a general referendum. The new constitution was approved, and the Iraqi legislative authority was vested in two bodies: the Council of Representatives and the Council of Union. The post-Saddam period may be described as a rising of the Shia sect in Iraq and, at the same time, the exclusion of the Sunnis. The turning point for the Shia revival began with Said Ali Al-Sistani’s (the most influential and famous Shia cleric) call for the Shias’ active participation in the first parliamentary election in 2005. The majority of the Shia political parties combined themselves into a block to participate in that election with the aim of winning as many seats as possible – which they succeeded in doing (Cockburn). Even the majority of the Iraqi transnational government were Shias, and its prime minister was Ibrahim Jafari (a Shia politician), though this did not mean a return to stability for Iraq. This was because the majority of the Sunnis felt excluded and blamed for Saddam’s brutal policy in Iraq, and this pushed the Sunnis to cooperate with terrorist groups such as Al-Qaida to fight against both the Americans in Iraq and the Iraqi government. Iraqi society under Jafari’s cabinet faced a terrible period, and there was high level of sectarian conflict. The instability in Iraq continued until an unknown Shia politician (Nouri Al-Maliki) came into power. In an article published in Washington Post in 2014, Ali Khedery, an American Special Assistant to the US Ambassador and a Senior Adviser in Iraq (2003–2009), explained the process of choosing of Al-Maliki for the role of replacement for Jafari. According to Khedery, Al-Maliki was unknown to the former American Ambassador (Zalmay Khalilzad) and to most Iraqi people, but Khalilzad, after recommendations from Khedery and Jeffrey Beals, a former American diplomat, succeeded in garnering support among Iraqi leaders for giving Al-Maliki the position of prime minister (Khedery). On May 20, 2006, Al-Maliki became prime minister for Iraq and stayed

in power until 2014. In the next part of this article, I will highlight the sectarian policy that was used by Al-Maliki during his eight years as prime minister against the majority of Sunnis in cities such as Anbar, Salahadin, Tikrit, and Mosul.

Al-Maliki's sectarian policy as a root cause of ISIS

Nouri Al-Maliki could, with support from the US, Kurds, Sistani, and Iran, return stability to the majority of Iraq. It was part of his political program to disarm Sunni and Shia militias in Baghdad, which he succeeded in doing.

Al-Maliki said Iraqi society must be cleansed of terrorism, the government must be rid of 'administrative corruption' and factional militias must be disarmed. "We must also address the issue of government centrality and the centrality of the armed forces and that weapons must only be in the hands of the government and the people must be disarmed," he said.

He said that "no militia in Iraq can share authority with the government's armed forces" (Tures).

During his first term (2006–2010), Prime Minister Al-Maliki centralized power into his own hands and succeeded in transforming Iraq to single-party rule, and the majority of Shias supported his policy against the Sunnis. Ultimately, this resulted in the ethnic cleansing of Sunnis, especially in Baghdad, for example: Baghdad went from some 45% Sunni in 2003 to only 25% Sunni by the end of 2007. Al-Maliki's sectarianism led to the transformation of Baghdad into a largely Shiite city (Cole).

The Shia monopoly corrupted the police, military, and court institutions. These institutions allowed only for candidates adhering to Shia principles and, especially during the Al-Maliki period, these candidates had to also be loyal to his party. Consequently, Sunnis were excluded from these establishments. In Sunni-dominated cities such as Al-Anbar, Al-Salahadin, and Mosul, people considered the police and court institutions to be a tool in the hands of Shias to eliminate Sunnis. This was the main cause of the dramatic seizure of power of these cities by ISIS, and the Sunnis observed their chance to get rid of the Shia tyranny. At this point, Iraq entered a new phase in which large parts of Sunni cities were under ISIS control, and the police and army were powerless to fight back.

One of the most important tasks of the nation-state from its beginnings was to protect its internal and external security. The same idea exists in the new modern nation-state: "The differentiation between internal and external security, and between police and military, has been a core principle of the modern nation-state" (Lutterbeck).

Internal security is the responsibility of the police, but external security is a task for the military. This does not, however, mean that the state should only protect its external security using its own military. Many countries today do not protect their external security with a national military, and, instead, they tend to outsource it. The idea of outsourcing national security has attracted democratic states such as the USA and the UK. The US government has contracted with many private American military companies and security consulting firms, such as Blackwater, to provide security for their representatives in foreign countries (Hamilton).

Considering Iraq's internal and external security, it was difficult to see who was responsible for protecting the country's internal security due to the misuse of the security institutions. Under the former Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki, both the police and army were controlled by his Shia party, and all top positions in the defense system were directly affiliated with Al-Maliki.

John Kerry's plan for Iraq

After the unexpected collapse of the Iraqi military system in 2014, Sistani issued a fatwa for the Shia population to defend their city against ISIS. This fatwa transformed Shia identity toward a feeling of greater commitment to their sect than to their nation and generated a renewed desire among them for revenge. Simultaneously, the Iranian regime welcomed Sistani's fatwa, supplying the Iraqi government with intelligence and providing Hashed Shabi with training and new weapons. After the creation of Hashed Shabi, the Iraqi army's role changed from defending the country from any threat against its sovereignty to supporting and assisting the Shia militia. In contrast to Sistani's fatwa, and to get Sunnis involved in the war against ISIS, the US foreign minister John Kerry came up with a new idea, using a "National Guard" as part of the US plan for fighting against ISIS in Iraq:

...On Wednesday, Mr. Kerry held a whirlwind series of meetings in Baghdad with Haider al-Abadi, the new Iraqi prime minister, and other top Iraqi officials. Afterward, Mr. Kerry told reporters that Iraqi leaders had made sufficient political progress toward forming an inclusive government to warrant further cooperation with Iraq against ISIS, including efforts to help train Iraqi security forces. "We stand by Iraq as it continues to build a government that meets the needs of each of Iraq's diverse communities, Mr. Kerry said.

Mr. Kerry hailed the Iraqis' decision to create new National Guard units that would be recruited locally and given the main responsibility for security in their home areas. "The United States is prepared to provide technical advice and assistance in order to help the Iraqis move this very important initiative forward", Mr. Kerry said (Gordon).

The same idea/plan was used by Americans in 2006–2009 when they organized Sunni tribes in the Sunni-dominated cities under the so-called *Al-Sahawat* movement (Awakening Councils) to fight against *Al-Qaida*. In contrast to the *Al-Sahawat*, the National Guard should be an inclusive entity with representation from among all Iraqi ethnicities. The National Guard in Iraq represents the US strategy to combat ISIS and then reconstruct Iraq's security sector.

The main goals of the National Guard were the following:

1. The National Guard should replace the Iraqi army institution, and it should protect Iraq from sectarian divisions.
2. Kurdish fighters (*Peshmerga*) should also integrate at this time within the National Guard because they were well-trained in comparison with Sunni and Shia fighters.
3. The integration of the Sunnis into the National Guard was one of the most important goals because, first, the Sunnis did not feel that they were allowed sufficient participation in the national army and the institution was used by Nouri Al-Maliki over 2006–2014 to consolidate his power. Second, this would eliminate the excuse used by ISIS that they were fighting for Sunnis' rights and their future in Iraq.

US officials said al-Abadi had promised to create a national guard of local fighters to secure Iraq's 18 provinces – each run by a governor. That would ensure that the Iraqi army and its mostly Shia force would not be in charge of security in Sunni regions. That would bring salaried jobs, government pensions and other benefits to areas of Iraq neglected during Al-Maliki's eight years in power and which proved a fertile breeding ground for Isis (Tran).

The Iraqi Parliament passed a new law establishing the National Guard, though this has not yet been approved because of the impossibility of gaining broad agreement between different fractions. There are many critics of the National Guard because, on the one hand, it gives legal permission to create a militia for each one of Iraq's 18 provinces and, on the other, it would militarize the whole of Iraqi society.

The criteria for militias (PMF as a militia)

In this section, the so-called Hashed-Alshabi and the proposal for a National Guard are evaluated according to militia criteria. "...it can describe anything between a dozen individuals armed with hunting rifles, to a force of millions equipped as well as a professional army" (Hawn).

The above definition is one of the broadest explanations of the militia and, to some extent, it is difficult to use it to identify Hashed Al-shabi. Therefore, I think it is necessary to have another and more limited definition of militia. For an academic approach, Saeid Golkar's identification is used (Golkar):

1. Maintaining local defense.
2. Upholding law and order.
3. Violating human rights and fostering insecurity.
4. Controlling security in weak states.
5. Recruiting members from local communities.

The Shia militias can be identified by all these criteria. After the sudden collapse of Iraqi security in 2014, many cities of Iraq were in need of protection. Therefore, young men with access to guns organized themselves and took control of their communities. The militias in Iraq not only protected their cities but also began to attack other cities in revenge. For example, Shia groups such as the League of the Righteous, after they conquered the city of Tikrit, began to loot and kill the survivors. In addition, it is crucial to categorize these Iraqi militias in order to reveal to which militia type they belong. According to Ariel Ahram's book (Balcells) there are five types of militias, and they have a deep impact on the peaceful coexistence of society:

Table 1.

Militia-Types
Quasi-Official Militias
State-Sponsored Militias
Paramilitaries
Warlords
Pro-Government Militias (Carey, 4-6)

The Shia militias in Iraq can be seen as pro-government. This is because groups, such as Bader, League of the Righteous, Hezbollah in Iraq, and Sadr, were financed by the central government in Bagdad, show their loyalty to the central government, and coordinate their actions with the government. The coordination with the Iraqi government came about following a push from the US, as the leader of coalition forces against ISIS in Iraq. The coalition forces were concerned about the Shia militias' activities in the Sunni areas and their behavior toward the Sunni population. In addition to this, the US showed their concern with Iranian involvement and Iran's influence on these militias.

Finally, this argument underlines that the groups (Bader, League of the Righteous, Hezbollah in Iraq, Sadr) could be identified as pro-government with reference to the classification below by Sabine Carey, Neil Mitchell and Will Lowe:

1. is identified as pro-government or sponsored by the government (national or subnational);
2. is identified as not being part of the regular security forces;
3. is armed;
4. has some level of organization (Carey, 249–258).

13. The Iraqi state as a hybrid state

According to many political scientists, such as Joakim Ekman, Jean-François Gagné, and Leonardo Morlino, the hybrid state is a phenomenon where the state is trapped between two structures: one is a non-democratic framework and the second is democratic (Ekman, 7–31). The state's institutions have difficulty adopting democratic behaviors because of their authoritarian background. The legitimacy of the state is not wholly lacking; rather, its legitimacy is acquired and exploited in dubious ways and often remains contested (Hague, 83–99). This is one of the most important drivers of the creation of militias in many Middle Eastern countries, including Iraq, Syria, Libya, Lebanon, and Yemen. According to Joakim Ekman, states that fit the hybrid regime profile can be identified based on the following characteristics (Ekman, 7–31):

1. Elections that are not too flawed and that have the potential to make a difference;
2. Significant levels of corruption, particularly in the judicial and electoral areas;
3. A lack of vital components of democratic quality, such as checks and balances and government accountability;
4. A problematic press freedom situation, typically including incumbents' desire to control the media, particularly television;
5. A poor civil liberties situation, including limits on the freedom of expression and the freedom to form organizations and trade unions; and
6. A problematic rule of law situation, including a lack of judicial independence.

In addition, Amin Massoud, a Tunisian researcher, emphasizes four components that result in a hybrid state (Massoud):

1. The militias replace the military system.
2. Central government consists of sectarian cantons.
3. The legislative system is more than customary laws and less than constitutional provisions.
4. The political class (in power and the opposition alike) is made up of more than the advocates of communities and less than modern state builders and owners of institutional reform projects.

Iraq has transformed into a hybrid state because the central government in Baghdad was dominated by the Shia party. This means that the majority of Sunnis and Kurds did not see the central government as a cohesive national government, and many parts of this government's institutions such as the police, courts and the military therefore lacked legitimacy. When citizens lose their trust in the integrity of state institutions, they try to find alternatives. The Kurds have their own almost

independent state, and they do not have strong ties to Baghdad. The Sunnis had already organized their tribal committee, which worked as a microgovernment in their areas before ISIS appeared in Mosul and Al-Anbar. The process of dividing Iraq is as likely to occur today as it has in past. The catalyst behind this process is the Shia militias that fight against ISIS. These militias have a legitimate right to use force against those they identify as Sunni, or at least the Sunni majority. In the following section, the focus will be on the criteria for creating a militia and evaluating the Shia's militia as a threat to peaceful coexistence.

The war for geographical expansion

According to an article from the Al-Rawabet Center for Research and Strategic Studies located in Amman, Jordan, there are approximately 67 armed Shia groups, and they operate in different regions of Iraq and in Syria. Each has its own name, leader, territory and religious marja (authority).

Table 2. Factions of The People's Mobilization Forces in Iraq and Syria (Rawabet Research and Strategic Studies Center 2016)

T	The name	Leader	Working yard	Religious Marja (authority)
1	Saraya Al-salam / Sadrist	Kazem Hussein Al-Issawi	Iraq / Samarra sector - Qayyarah	Iraq: Mohammed Sadiq al-Sadr, Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
2	Badr-Corps-military wing the Badr Organization	Hadi al-Ameri	Iraq - Salahuddin sector, Diyala, Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
3	Kata'ib Iraqi Hezbollah	Jaafar al-Ghanemi	Iraq - Sector of Anbar, Salah al-Din / Nukhayib	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
4	Asa'ib Ahl-Haq	Qais al-Khazali	Iraq - Sector of Salah al-Din / Nukhayib, Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
5	Kata'ib Sayyid al-Shuhada	Hashim Banyan ul-Awliya: Abu Alaa	Iraq - Sector Baghdad belt, Salah al-Din	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei
6	Kata'ib Hezbollah Al-Nujaba	Akram Abbas, al-Kaabi	Iraq - Sector of Baghdad belt, Syria	Iran: Ayatollah Khamenei

For the rest of the figure, please see the supplemental pages.

As we can see from the table 2, these Iraqi Shia militias have been used in the regional conflict and are now fighting to gain as much territory as possible. For example, groups such as the League of Righteous People (Asa'ib Ahl al-Haq), also known as the Khazali network, have their field of operation in the city of Duz (also spelled as Tuz Khurma and Tuz Khormato or just Khurmatu) is the central city of Tooz District in Saladin Province, Iraq, located 55 miles south of Kirkuk and the majority of its population are Kurds (Sunnis) and the minority are Turkmen (Shia). This group has been involved in heavy fighting against the Peshmerga (Kurdish fighters) and many from both sides have been killed. The presence of the Khazali group in Duz was not to fight ISIS, since the city was protected by Peshmerga and ISIS was not present. Instead, the overall aim of the Khazali group was (and still is) to dominate more areas. Their different fields of operation provide significant evidence of their struggles for more land and more control. Another aspect of these groups is that the majority of them have the current Iranian supreme leader and Muslim cleric Ayatollah Khamenei as their religious authority, meaning that they are unconditionally loyal to him. In other words, they are part of the Iranian policy in the Middle East, and they are now part of the proxy war in the region¹. They have been supported by external regimes such as Iran, which means they are directly under the influence of Iranian policies, and they will be working in favor of Iran's betterment. Finally, Shia fighters have been part of the war in Syria, and some of them have been killed. The intervention of the Shiite militias in the Syrian conflict is considered to be the most dangerous transformation. During this transformation process, these groups have evolved from being local militias to being a regional militia and finally to being mercenaries, which means they can be used in any conflict in the Islamic world, such as in Syria, Yemen and, most likely, in Bahrain.

Conclusion

The sectarian policy of the Shia politicians has been supported by the majority of the Shia and by religious clerics such as Al-Sistani. This policy is believed to be the root of the creation of ISIS in the Sunni cities and is why the Sunni supported ISIS against the central government in Baghdad. The future of Iraq is still unclear, and the political process is moving toward a division of the country into three parts, which will be one of the best options. The Shia political parties are not willing to share power with the Sunnis and Kurds, and the Shia still insist on their unconditional right to rule as they want. The Iraqi population is facing two choices; one choice is to have approximately 40% of Iraq's territory controlled by ISIS, and

¹ *Middle East Eye Staff*. Militias 'greater threat' to Iraq's unity than Islamic State: Petraeus. News, The Middle East Eye. 2015. <http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/militias-greater-threat-iraqs-unity-islamic-state-petraeus-1595509838>

the second choice is to accept the existence of Shia militias. The concept and feeling of a unified national government have almost vanished. The Shia militias are now acting as the legitimate institution, and their capability to run the government is limited due to their lack of legitimacy. However, after defeat of ISIS by the people's mobilization force in Mosul and the change in the control of this city, these Shia armed groups will not accept any power that tries to push them out of the Iraqi political system. According to al-monitor, a series of secret meetings have been held between the people's mobilization force's representative and a diplomatic delegation from the West attempting to better understand these armed groups and their plan for the future of Iraq (Aziz). These groups have already started reorganizing themselves into a political party with the aim of participating in the next election, which will be in 2018.

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Kardo Rached is a lecturer at University of Human Development – Kurdistan Region of Iraq. He has published various articles and his research field covers the political systems of the Middle East and the role of the non-state actors in Middle East society.

Ahmed Omar Bali is lecturer at University of Human Development – Kurdistan Region of Iraq. Dr. Bali has got his PhD from Sheffield University and his research area includes public diplomacy and soft power's role in the Middle East politics.

Heterogeneity of the Notion of Interest in Accordance with the International Relations Theory: A Study of Russia's National Interests

Jarosław Sadłocha

University of Wrocław
Institute of International Studies
e-mail: jsadlocha@wp.pl

Abstract

The category of a national interest is one of the most popular notions used in international relations. It has a polysemic character and is differently interpreted by various scientific perspectives. The purpose of this article is to provide a brief analysis of selected approaches of the theory of international relations to defining interests and correlating the interpretations of national interests of the Russian Federation performed on their bases. The choice of case study concerning the foreign policy of the Russian Federation is not accidental because in countries aspiring to gain world power the concept of national interest is raised while explaining the motives of decisions taken by their leaders exceptionally often. In this article, Russia's interests will be discussed in reference to the annexation of the Crimea and Russia's actions towards Ukraine. Those events vividly show the specificity of defining the national interests, based on one hand on the pursue to being a powerhouse and understanding the interests in the category of power and, on the other hand, resulting from the political identity of Russian elites. As a result, an assessment of the scientific utility of selected theoretical paradigms and their use in the analyses of Russia's foreign policy will be outlined.

Keywords: national interest, theory of international relations, Russia's foreign policy, the annexation of the Crimea.

The category of interest plays a role of an analytical tool in the international relations theory, representing potential or real objectives and purposes of the actors of the international relations arena¹. It has a polysemic character and is differently defined, explained and interpreted by various research perspectives. In literature devoted to the science of international relations, the category of interest appears while analysing various social phenomena related to the problem of articulation of one's objectives, needs and values by the international relations actors. The researchers, however, often define the notion of 'interest' cursorily, frequently treating it as obvious and assuming it does not require further conceptualization.

The purpose of this article is to conduct a brief synthesis of selected approaches of the international relations theory to defining the 'interest', and to correlate the resulting interpretations of the interests of the Russian Federation. The choice of the case study concerning the foreign policy of the Russian Federation is not accidental. In countries aiming at the great power status, the concept of national interest is raised while explaining the motives of decisions taken by their leaders exceptionally often. In the recent few years, Russia has made a number of aggressive moves (starting with the war in Georgia, the annexation of the Crimea, the war in Donbass and the military intervention in Syria) explaining the turn of its foreign policy by a reference to the protection of its basic national interests. Examining the historical analogy concerning the basic objectives of the foreign policy of the House of Romanov and later the USSR, one might ask whether Russia has its enduring and long-ago defined national interests or whether they change along with the identity of the Russian country? Do the national interests in the context mentioned above constitute objective norms determining the actions of the country in international relations? Do they carry values related to the identity of the country and its citizens, or do they merely constitute political metaphors used by the policymakers in the current political discourse?

Correlating two such wide problems as the theoretical analysis of the category of interest in international relations and the question of Russia's foreign policy requires condensing and selecting theoretical problems and defining the range of the case study. Therefore, this article will be limited to indicating the utility of given theoretical approaches, narrowing the questions of defining its national interests by Russia to the context of its actions towards Ukraine, the annexation of the Crimea and the international reactions to these events which clearly show the changes in defining Russia's national interests and its conflict of interests with western countries.

The article will start with a realist comprehension of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the context of the annexation of the Crimea, which then

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will be confronted with the perspective of the liberal interpretation of the approach of the West towards Russia's actions. This will, on one hand, show the traditional way of perceiving international relations and, at the same time, show the positivist understanding of the category of national interests. The second part of the article will start with a constructivist ponderation on the importance of national interests, as exemplified by the influence of identity and ideation factors on Russia's foreign policy. Then, based on conventional and critical constructivism, the conflict of interests of Russia and Ukraine at the time of social protests in Ukraine in 2013 and the problem of defining Russia's interests in relation to the annexation of the Crimea will be analysed.

The realist category of the interest in the foreign policy of the Russian Federation

Realism, one of the most influential currents in the international relations theory, next to the category of sovereignty and country's power places the notion of the national interest in the centre of its ponderations. Despite the enormous diversity of this paradigm, each of its variations considers the fact of having and realizing their own interests by given countries as an almost constitutive rule. Moreover, most of the theoretical assumptions of realism is constructed in a way which enables objective and rational research on the clashing interests of countries in international relations.

Hans J. Morgenthau, a leading representative of realism, in his work *Politics Among Nations* initiated thinking about interests as objective and definable states which subdue to rational assessment and verification by scientific tools of political realism (Morgenthau, 4–15). According to Morgenthau, a national interest is a category which is closely related to the notion of power: what we define as power is operationalized in practical political actions considered as national interests.

Therefore, in the concept mentioned above it is not possible to speak of interests without exploring the category of power. In the view of Hans Morgenthau, the notion of power has a relational character and is defined as control of a man over a man, embracing any social relations. Transferring it from the level of an individual to international relations, the power of a country can be measured only by comparing it to the power of another country. Determining national interests will in this context serve gaining this power and advantage over other subjects. Power may therefore serve the function of an independent variable and countries' interests will depend on their character and specificity. What is more, in this context power is treated as a sum of certain resources that can be measured and named².

² One must remember, though, that numerous opponents of this approach emphasize that the above interpretation simplifies realism to one of the forms of materialism, and the international

Based on the assumptions mentioned above, realists could describe the Russian Federation as a perfect example of a country whose interest could be understood as pursuit of power. Yevgeni Primakov already in 1996 claimed that Russia was still a great power and its foreign policy should reflect this status. The Russian politician expressed himself in the spirits of the best tradition of Realpolitik: “Russia doesn’t have permanent enemies, but it does have permanent interests” (Primakov).

Vladimir Putin is driven by a similar way of thinking in constructing Russia’s foreign policy. He realizes the consciously set objectives and, so far, has not suffered great losses apart from the consequences related to economic sanctions imposed by the West (Kelly, de Carbonnel). Among Russia’s success there are: taking complete control over Chechnya, gaining dominion over the South Ossetia and Abkhazia after victorious war with Georgia in 2008, diplomatic victory over the United States in relation to the plans of solving the political situation in Syria, the annexation of the Crimea and freezing the conflicts in the Eastern Ukraine. In the light of realism, all those actions are very specific and objective purposes which are to bring back Russia’s political and territorial influence from the times of the USSR. In this sense, they reflect timeless interests abidingly ascribed to the Russian Federation.

Combining a political and economic blackmail (e.g. gas blackmail) with a direct use of military force, Russia is building its position in the international relations, showing the international public opinion how little power any normative restrictions and the activity of organizations and institutions protecting those standards do in fact have. The foreign policy doctrine used by Vladimir Putin reflects the thesis propagated by another representative of realism, Edward Carr, who claimed that the international order is essentially based on the distribution of strength and power (Carr, 76–80). Just like western countries are trying to implement certain rules and norms regulating the international relations in accordance with their own rules and values, so does Russia selectively choose the ones which serve its best interests at a given time, thus justifying the legitimacy of the actions taken (e.g., protection of the Russian population or the alleged breaking human rights by actions in Ossetia, Georgia etc.) and ignoring others which could turn out to be limiting in this specific situation.

According to realists, any international guarantees are valid only when they are reflected in the distribution of the countries’ power. If the countries in charge of those rules are not interested in holding the subjects who break them responsible, the treaties themselves do not have any validity, just like in the case of the Budapest Memorandum from 1994 in which the United States, Great Britain and Russia guaranteed the territorial integrity of Ukraine in exchange for Ukraine’s removing nuclear weapon from its territory.

relations to a fight for natural resources. More: Michael Williams, *The Realist Tradition and Limits of International Relations*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 109.

Neorealists, though, would present a slightly different view on the way Russia views its national interests. One of the basic differences between classical realism and neorealism is the level of the analysis of international relations (Singer). Transferring the attention from the level of countries to the level of the international structure conditions the perception of the notion of interests. Kenneth Waltz, the creator and the most significant representative of structural realism, claims that the actions of given countries depend on their role, position and political system. The fact whether a country neighbours with powerhouses, middle or weak countries will condition its targets, and, as consequence, its actions (Waltz, 78–81). The international structure determines whether a country's purpose is fighting for its position, maintaining the status quo or minimizing negative effects of the policy of more powerful countries. Maximizing one's interests by a given country will never be achieved in 100% because they may be incompatible with the interests of other subjects in the structure and, as a result, may be changed. Therefore, countries' policymakers should always account the features of the international structures to which they belong and take into consideration a real potential of one's country, its power of thrusting its interests and correlate them with the interests of other subjects in the structure.

Contrary to the classical realism which considers the pursue to maximize one's power to be the fundamental objective realized by countries of national interests, neorealism believes that the realization of this objective is of secondary importance next to ensuring existence and continuance of the country (Burchill, 42–49). Comparing this approach to Morgenthau's views, it may be concluded that survival is an objective interest. Other types of interests are a bit more relative to neorealists and dependant on external factors such as the structure of the international system and the actions of other countries (Donnelly, 31).

Russia's policy is based on rational calculation of interests and actions of other subjects of international relations, which is in accordance with neorealists. If Russia notices political weakness of the European Union and the United States of America, which was proven e.g. by a complete failure of the American policy in Syria, it strives to use the situations coming its way to realize its own objectives. Even the most controversial decisions concerning the war with Georgia or the annexation of the Crimea could be interpreted from a realist point of view as a rational calculation of possible gains and losses. If further calculations of Russian authorities concerning further annexations (from the western point of view) or protecting the already existing (from Russia's point of view) area of influence or even annexation of further territories, such as Eastern Ukraine or Moldova brought about similar conclusions, following the logic described above further revisions would not be out of the question. Therefore, appropriate reactions of other countries to Russia's actions may play an important role in limiting Russia's feeling of impunity resulting from its actions. In accordance with the realist logic, western countries

support Ukraine for similar reasons to Russia – they also aim at extending their areas of influence. In the early 1990s Russia similarly interpreted NATO's willingness to include countries from East-Central Europe, which was one of the reasons why they opposed the possibility of placing American military bases in Poland and Romania.

After the annexation of the Crimea, in his speech to the duma Vladimir Putin said that Russia was not causing any disturbance in the international order, but merely protecting its national interests. It was the West that was causing disturbance through its actions against Russia, Ukraine and European-Asian integration (Putin, 18.03.2014). By saying so, the Russian president adumbrated the area of influence of his country, indicating time that protection of the country is of a defensive and existential character for the functioning of Russia in international relations. Sergey Karaganov held similar views; he considered Russia's victory in the war with Georgia in 2008 to be a demonstration of power to protect one's fundamental interests against Russia's rivals, i.e. preventing the extension of NATO (Karaganov).

However, according to neorealists, countries cannot afford to freely maximize their power due to structural limitations resulting from interests of other subjects. Therefore, in Russia's interest it is to skilfully balance on the border of possibilities of realizing their strategic plans and probing how much they afford without taking potential political or economic consequences and it is doing quite well in this matter. The example of Russia may also indicate that some countries may afford much more than others when it comes to breaking the international law. The regimes of Saddam Husain or Mu'ammar al-Kaddafi were punished relatively quickly, however, they were much weaker in their political range and military force than Russia and they constituted a very important area for western countries from the point of view of oil resources. Thanks to the authoritarian system of power built by Putin (enhancing taking national decisions), appropriate economic situation in the primary products markets (enabling economic power), military force and economic dependencies, any fight with Russia, even only in the economic field, would be related to great costs for its potential opponents. The structural position raised by Kenneth Waltz, possessed by Russia, allows the country to realize the political objectives it has set within the area of its influence without any fear.

The problem of motivation of a country's policymakers or the subjective perception of a country's power is presented by the representatives of neoclassical realism, i.e. William C. Wohlforth and Randall Schweller. Although this view was no revelation since it was proclaimed by some constructivists, postmodernists and researchers of political psychology, in the light of the realist thought it caused a stronger emphasis on the role of non-materialistic factors in shaping international relations (such as e.g. awareness). Wohlforth used this concept to explain the actions of the United States and the USSR at the time of the Cold War. In his

opinion, the perception of power of those two powerhouses then was often inadequate in relation to their real potentials (Wohlforth, 301–302). The way politicians understand power, both in relation to their own country and other subjects, is not a simple transfer of statistical data from a given period but result from the influence of historical and social convictions, which definitely brings neoclassical realism and constructivism closer.

In *Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler's Strategy of World Conquest* Randall Schweller proposes a concept of combination of interests with relative potentials of the countries, which he calls a theory of balance of interests, to be a method of explaining actions of countries in the international relations. According to the author, this concept is to explain types of actions taken by countries depending on their relative potentials of acting on the international arena. Those actions are influenced by a relative strength of the country (military strength, industrial strength and demographic potential), motivation of policymakers, relations with other subjects and their attitudes towards international order (Schweller, 190–191).

On the bases of the theory of balance of interests by Randall Schweller one may come to a conclusion that Russia, thanks to its relative power, appropriate motivation of its main policymaker and ambivalent attitude towards the international law, may be treated as a country with all the attributes allowing for a limited revisionist foreign policy (Schweller, 18–24). In case of Russia, of great significance was appropriate economic situation, prices of fuels (ensuring a better economic situation), determination and political ambitions of Vladimir Putin. The president of Russia often emphasizes in his statements that the fall of the USSR was one of the greatest geo-political catastrophes of the 20th century (Putin, 25.04.2005). It is also worth to notice that in accordance with the theory of balance of interests, the casus of Russia may in further perspective become a dangerous precedence constituting an example the strategic plans of other subjects of a similar position, such as e.g. China in relation to its territorial expansions on the South China Sea.

In turn, according to the theory of Robert Gilpin, pursuit of complete gain is not what constitutes an exclusive interest of each country; it is also maximizing available strategies of actions (Gilpin, 61). Thanks to the quick pace of taking decisions and using diversified political strategies, starting with conciliation methods to immediate use of force, Russia may be considered a country that is exceptionally ready to react in any situation of a change of a system. It may cause a far-reaching caution of its geopolitical rivals, particularly if they are not ready themselves to react immediately and adequately to the specificity of a given international situation. On the other hand, neorealism would also emphasize that Russia must remember that if it does cross a certain border of tolerance in its foreign policy, its actions will sooner or later be counteracted. Much less that its real potential departs from the power represented by the USSR in the utmost period of the Cold War.

Apart from emphasizing the role of non-materialistic factors in formulating national interests, representatives of the neoclassical realism also suggest that while defining their interests, the countries do not separate their egoistic actions based on rivalry (e.g. in order to ensure safety or basic strategic interests) from actions based on cooperation with other subjects which also bring them some gains of political or economic nature (Lobell, Ripsman, Taliaferro, 30). This logic well describes the way of functioning of Russian foreign policy towards the West, which Russian researchers describe as simultaneous partnership and rivalry (Tsygankov 2010, 43–51; Bordachev 2008). As Elena Kropatcheva points out, most Russian analysts perceive international relations very pragmatically and are much closer to the realist option of perceiving the notion of national interest (Kropatcheva, 33–34). Referring to the question of cooperation, they present a view that Russia consciously and rationally chooses the fields in which the international cooperation is in accordance with materialistically perceived national interest and rejects all those areas in which the cooperation is not beneficial. This can be illustrated by the 18-year-long endeavour to join the WTO. It is also worth to mention Russia's participation in the international area of fighting terrorism and the solidarity with western countries after the 9/11.

According to the logic of Russian realists, its fundamental interest is to strengthen the country's potential with simultaneous eviscerating the power of other countries (Bogaturov). This, in turn, is closely related to Russia's aspirations to being perceived as one of the greatest powerhouses in the world, a belief expressed not only by the most important politicians, but also by majority of the society (Areshev, 128–142). The problem of the role of identity in the way the Russians perceive their interests and the social discourse in this area is shaped will be covered in the further part of this article which is devoted to the constructivist approach.

Liberal understanding of interests and the attitudes of western countries towards Russian policy

To present the differences in perceiving the category of a national interest between the widely understood realism and liberalism in a possibly brief manner, it is worth to refer to the reaction of western countries to Russia's actions towards the annexation of the Crimea and the war in the Eastern Ukraine. One can find there both references to the interwar idealism and to modern interpretations of understanding interests in international relations by representatives of neoliberalism.

Taking a close look at the reaction of the United States and member countries of the European Union and NATO towards Russia's aggressive policy – be it in the context of the war with Georgia in 2008 or the annexation of the Crimea in 2014 – one may conclude that many commentators contrasted the safeguard

behaviour of the West with the aggressive and uncompromising attitude of Russia, characterised by 19th-century-like pragmatism in the style of *Realpolitik*. Those differences are explained in an interesting manner by almost forgotten nowadays idealism represented by, among others, Norman Angell, the Nobel Peace Prize laureate who might interpret Vladimir Putin's attitude as an obsolete state of mind perceiving international relations as an arena of a constant rivalry in a binary game. Angell believed that such an attitude should be condemned from the level of the international community and under no account should be followed because it may only lead to increasing rivalry, arms race and further to wars. From this perspective liberalism emphasizes that Russia's actions are not compliant with the international law and will have negative impact on its image and credibility as a partner in international relations. However, they should be counteracted in a thoughtful manner so that Russia could see that its actions are condemned and not approved of by the international community; on the other hand, though, those reactions should be compliant with the international law, so that they do not contribute to the escalation of conflicts which, as neoliberalism points out, would be unbeneficial for the interest of any party from both the political and economic point of view³. Therefore, from the position of neoliberalism one may emphasize the significance of multilateral solutions brought with the use of any means of solving conflicts, i.e. negotiations or – if they are not successful – political or economic sanctions, and as a last resort of military intervention.

The reaction of western countries seems to be compliant with the main idea of neoliberalism. They focused on one hand on condemning Vladimir Putin's policy, imposing visa and economic sanctions and, on the other hand, they are aware of the number of economic relations they have with Russia and breaking them does not lie in their best interest. That is why the greatest economic partners of Russia from the European Union, such as Germany, consider the idea of imposing economic sanctions as a last resort and do not even consider any military intervention. Neoliberalism also shows the difference in the general understanding of the interests by the greatest countries of the European Union and Russia. In accordance with the neo-realist logic, Russia calculates its own gains as relative towards the power and potential actions of other subjects, which causes distrust towards the intentions of others and cooperation with them. In the light of neoliberal thoughts, countries such as Germany, France or Great Britain perceive gains as absolute values and

³ It is worth to mention a range of neoliberal concepts viewing the problem of shaping a country's national interests through the prism of international cooperation, such as institutionalism and the model of a complex interdependence by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, as well as the concept of the international regime by John G. Ruggie. More: Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence*. New York, 2001; John G. Ruggie, *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. London, 1998.

strive to neutralize impending conflicts by any means to maintain the cooperation that generates their gains.

Neoliberalism also emphasizes that economic cooperation is not possible without achieving the state of stability and complacency, therefore, it may be presumed that countries of the European Union will be forced to introduce adequate political solutions such as common energy policy tools (to prevent gas blackmail), institutional help for Ukraine and other European countries potentially facing the threat of Russia's actions and – finally – finding a new form of dialogue with Russia. Although it seems to be necessary from the strategic point of view of consistent functioning of the European Union, it may be very hard to achieve. The differences of interests of given member countries almost paralyse taking any firm decisions. In accordance with the concept of countries' preferences, postulated by intergovernmental liberalism of Andrew Moravcsik, the attitudes of member countries of the European Union may be interpreted as a rational calculation of gains and losses on every level of articulation and aggregation of their interests (Moravcsik, 517–519). This calculation depends both on conscious needs of the subjects, their profit and loss accounts and their decision-making conditioning. The countries of the European Union must take into account both the position of the influential internal groups of interest (international corporations, occupational groups, non-governmental organizations etc.) which may be interested in maintaining a stable level of trade with Russia and the voice of the society which, depending on the historical and geographical specificity of a particular country, may consider lack of condemnation of Russia and any other Union's reactions related to it in a negative manner or, just the opposite, be entirely indifferent towards those events and not support any radical actions.

It should be mentioned here that Russian researchers of international relations believe that the West did not use the exceptional opportunity to include Russia in the multilateral international order which it approved of through building close political and economic relations, which appeared in the 1990s. As Alexei Arbatov points out, western countries indeed used the period of Russia's political and economic weakness under the cover of cooperation in order to interfere in its affairs and limit its areas of influence (e.g. extension of NATO and EU). That is why Russia has currently a pragmatic attitude towards lofty ideas hidden under the term 'international cooperation' (Tsygankov, 43–51; Arbatov). What is more, in Russia's policy one may observe ideas borrowed from liberal logic, e.g. creating its own networks of economic dependencies (e.g. creation of the Eurasian Economic Union) which are used by them in an instrumental manner. However, also in this range a fuller outline of the problem may be seen only after referring to the problem of identity and values standing behind the "international communities" built by Russia.

Constructivist perception of Russia's national interests

Why in the recent few years have we been witnessing such a rapid political turn of Russia on the international arena? After the fall of the USRR and the political and economic crisis which Russia suffered in the 1990s, does its leader redefine its fundamental strategic objectives again? The realist perspective cannot provide a full answer to this question because it does not deal with the problem of identity and non-materialistic factors in the process of constructing national interests deep enough. It also has problems explaining the impact of reason of the change of motivation which drive the policymakers while determining national interests and the rapid increase of significance of cultural and identity factors in the social discourse.

According to Alexander Wendt, until recently the problem of national interests has been wrongly treated in the theory of international relations as a domain ascribed to solely the interests of realism. The materialistic view on the process of shaping of the interests done with the use of the distribution of potential and power of the subjects and referring to the human nature, as proposed by this paradigm, is not full because it omits social aspects of constructing interests. Wendt believes that countries do not have a universal "portfolio" including a catalogue of all cognitively available interests on the bases of which they take decisions, as it could arise from the neo-realist analyses, but they make their decisions on the bases of individual features of their own identity and the social context of decision making (Wendt 1992, 398). Interests, although they take into consideration and refer to material features of the human nature, are largely of a character of ideation, i.e. are constituted by culture and social ideas (Wendt 1999, 113–119).

In accordance with Wendt's conventional constructivism, interests are cognitive patterns which enable identification of objects satisfying one's needs. Those patterns refer to convictions and "structures of knowledge" about the world of a given subject. They serve those subjects to identify themselves (in the form of identity) and interpret their actions and objectives in given situations which require their activity. Defining one's interests is closely related to the subject's identity. According to Wendt, identity is shaped dynamically both by internal factors such as socially-cultural conditioning and by mutual interactions with other countries and historical experiences in this range. Countries may have many identities contributing to their images, which are shaped depending on the type of relations, functions and social statuses held by them (Wendt 1999, 224–234). Such an assumption is to cause a conclusion that countries can identify their own interests variously depending on the context and character of a given issue and factors of the character of ideation play an important part in this process.

According to Andrey Makarychev, Putin's administration, driven by such objectives as restoring Russia's historical territories and protecting

Russian-speaking population is indeed driven by factors of character of ideation and not merely by calculation policy (Makarychev 2014, 181–199). Andrei Tsygankov is of a similar opinion, as while analysing the contemporary foreign policy of Russia he points how the perception of interests in the foreign policy of Russia has changed, starting with the administration of Boris Yeltsin and its orientation towards integration with western countries to the assertive and pragmatic attitude of president Putin (Tsygankov, 226–231). Tsygankov points at two fundamental national interests of Russia in international relations: balancing hegemonic aspirations of the United States and integrating the whole territory included in the former USSR. As the researcher believes, the first objective requires constructing coalition with other countries of similar interests, while the latter is related to recreating and protecting the former areas of influence belonging to Russia (Tsygankov, 236–243).

Subordinating the post-soviet territories to Russia is also taking place by the concept “*Russkij mir*”. According to the interpretation of administration of Vladimir Putin, it is an equivalent of the community of people who speak Russian, identify with the Orthodox religion and culture and refer to common values and historical heritage. At the same time, it refers to a wider political community having relations with the culture and identity of the former USSR. This concept is reflected in Russia’s National Security Strategy to 2020, in which Russia defines the Russian-speaking areas of the former USSR as “Near abroad”, considering them their vested interest (*Strategiya natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Federatsii do 2020 goda*). The fight for the rights for Russia and Russians on this territory is a derivative of not only rational geo-political calculations, but it largely results from the features of current identity of the Russians, their ambitions and powerhouse resentments.

The problem of identity in many constructivist works is closely related to the impact of cultural and normative aspects of the articulation of interests which appear both on the level of analyses of political and social cultures of given countries and their societies, and in reference to the structure of the international system. An example of such an analysis is, among others, *Social Construction of International Politics* by Ted Hopf. The researcher realizes there a practical dimension of research on the relations of interests, identity and social culture on the example of an analysis of the political discourse of the USSR from 1955 and the Russian Federation from 1999, indicating the similarities and differences between the discourses devoted to Russia’s interests in both mentioned time periods (Hopf 1999).

In the context of an analysis of Russian national interests, an exceptionally inspiring research perspective constitutes aspirational constructivism by Anne Clunan. The researcher expands the perspective of constructivism by interdisciplinary research on the identity of countries taking into consideration, among others, the role of historical tradition in a given country, tools of social psychology

and sociology. She criticizes both realists and other constructivists for exaggerated attachment to presentism, marginalizing the impact of historical aspirations and the significance of domestic policy in the process of constructing national interests (Clunan 2009, 4–8). Similar arguments are presented by Andrei Tsygankov who claims that realism and liberalism are ethnocentric in the sense that they do not understand the cultural and civilizational specificity of Russia and in the field of western type of thinking about e.g. rationalism they strive to interpret the political motivations of Russia (Tsygankov, 14).

Representatives of constructivism, such as Anna Clunan, Beom-Shik Shin, Andrei Tsygankov or Ted Hopf, pondering over the national interests of Russia notice that various groups of Russian elites in various time periods emphasized a slightly different way of thinking about foreign policy of this country⁴. The category of the national interest constitutes a derivative resulting from the discourses functioning in the given period within a society and its elites. Those discourses may compete or complete one another, having different power of political influence which depends on their popularity in the circles of power. In case of Russia, all the researchers mentioned above consistently claim that currently the most common national interest shared by majority of the elites is maintaining the international position and prestige by Russia. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the crisis of the 1990s, Russian elites believe that their country should regain its due international position.

The opinions mentioned above are corroborated by cyclical research conducted by Hamilton College on a group of representatives of the Russian elites which in 2016 showed an increase in radicalization of the Russians in the recent few years. Most of the subjects (over 82%) believed that Moscow's national interest should be realized through actions of expansive character. Importantly, a significant increase (by 32%) of the followers of revisionist policy took place directly after the outbreak of the conflict between Russia and Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea. Another exceptionally interesting result of the research was showing the attitude of the Russian elites to the fact whether the military force of economic potential decides currently about the position of a given country in the international policy. Only in 1993 almost 90% of the interviewees believed that the economy was of an utmost importance. Currently 52% of the interviewees believes in the primacy of the military potential, while only 46.5% of the subjects tested believes that the economic position is the most important (Hamilton College Levitt Poll, *The Russian Elite 2016*). Similar conclusions can be drawn from Russian polls conducted by Levada's Centre, in which 68% of the Russians in 2015 considered their country to be

⁴ More: Beom Shik Shin. *Russia's Perspectives on International Politics: A Comparison of Liberalist, Realist and Geopolitical Paradigms*, "Acta Slavica Iaponica", no. (26) (2007), pp. 1–24; Ted Hopf, *Crimea is ours: A discursive history*, "International Relations", no. 30(2) (2016), pp. 227–255; Anne Clunan, *op. cit.*, s. 76–79; Andrei Tsygankov, *op. cit.*, s. 182–183.

a powerhouse, while still in 1999 only 31% of the respondents believed so (Levada Center Poll, *Russia's role in the world*).

On the bases of this view, the annexation of the Crimea and the war in the Eastern Ukraine suits the expectations of the Russian elites in terms of their interpretation of the interest of their country. The trend described above also indicates that currently majority of the Russian elites perceives international relations in the style of the 19th century, while the society of western countries mostly look at the world in the postmodern formula with a weakening sovereignty of countries, increasing process of globalization, and the values excluding the hard way of solving conflicts. This in turn causes that differences in the interpretation of the surrounding social world and further may lead to increasing misunderstanding and feeling of alienation. Therefore, when western countries imposed economic sanctions on Russia, most of the society (66%) was not afraid of international alienation of Russia. They considered this form of an attack for their beliefs and values and, therefore, required a more outright and harsh reaction of the authorities to the restriction from the USA, supporting among others the embargo imposed by Russia on western aliment (78%) (Levada Center Poll, *Sankcii: ocenki i ożydaniija*).

Ann Clunan indicates that the fall of the Soviet Union was the main cause of the crisis of the national identity and low self-esteem of the Russians. The researcher points out that in the 1990s in Russia appeared five different self-images competing with one another: western self-image, statist self-image, national restorationist self-image, neo-communist self-image and slavophile self-image. Each one of them referred to slightly different historical traditions and emphasized a different catalogue of values and identity while defining the fundamental interests which Russia should pursue. Thanks to the success and the increasing popularity of Putin's administration, the statist self-image referring to the powerhouse tradition of the Russian country and the necessity of restoring its dominance and leadership in the countries belonging to the former USSR turned out to be victorious (Clunan 2009, 60–66). This approach in Putin's mouth emphasizes among others the civilizational individuality of Russia, faith in its greatness and historical belongings, the role of patriotism, solidarity and social unity of the Russians.

The role of the symbols and the significance of the elements of the language in the examination of the discourse are developed by the linguistic constructivism. Its representative, Jutta Weldes, presents national interests as a function of an intersubjective representation of social views. They embrace social perception of a country's identity, its internal and external surroundings, including the interests of other subjects and the relations between those factors which altogether constitute parts of the "linguistic image" of the political beliefs concerning priorities of the country's activity (Weldes, 13–15).

According to Weldes, the social representations constitute a simplified image of collective communication about certain problems or subjects which are attributed some symbolic meaning with the use of certain parts of speech or literary devices. According to the researcher, this type of communication techniques not only function in the dimension of a propaganda, but in time become a natural part of the image of the social world (Weldes, 97–107).

This logic also seems to be very adequate in case of the public discourse of Russia. References to historical tradition, devotions and greatness of the Russian nation throughout the centuries, emphasized by Russian politicians, not only result from their identity, but also constitute an element of the political game they play, aiming at increasing their social popularity. Also, the tools themselves in the form of certain rhetorical figures influence the process of shaping of the collective image of identity of the contemporary Russians. Most often exploited rhetorical phrases acquire in this process certain linguistic connotations and in the long-term perspective become a part of the social understating of reality. This way, e.g. the negative colouring of the word NATO in the rhetoric of the leaders of the USSR still influence the Russian's society perception of this organization as aggressive and expansionist.

Starting from 2013, Vladimir Putin often refers to the role of spiritual and cultural values in the process of shaping the identity and strengthening national unity of the Russians (Slobodchikoff, Douglas, 28–36). Also, in official documents such as „National Security Strategy 2015” one can find direct references to spiritual values, patriotism and respect for tradition which constitute the foundations of the Russian manner of perceiving the world and defining its national interests (Russian National Security Strategy 2015). Russia, understood as one of the highest values for its citizens, has a responsibility of taking care of the interests of the Russian-speaking population in other countries. At the same time, on the bases of this interpretation one can contrast positive interests of Russia resulting from its “spiritual values” with the expansionist interests of the West that is devoid of those values.

An exceptionally spectacular example of a symbolic performance was the inauguration of the 4th tenure of Vladimir Putin's presidency. Built not only by linguistic tools, but also by nonverbal elements, his swearing-in took place in the atmosphere of affluence and wealth alluding to the tradition of the Tzarist Russia. These trappings emphasized not only the political power of Russia's president, but also to show the society the expected power and prestige of the country and its president, the contemporary equivalent of the most remarkable Russian leaders once admired by the world. In his speech the president emphasized that after the political difficulties Russia experienced in the 1990s, it is currently “being reborn like phoenix from ashes” and its due prestige would be restored (Putin, 7.05.2018).

Constructivism and the social protests in Ukraine and the annexation of the Crimea

Analysing the problem of the annexation of the Crimea by Russia in 2014, constructivism would pay attention to the role of identity and cultural and normative factors in the process of constructing various interests of Ukraine and Russia. Looking at the specificity of the identity of the society of contemporary Ukraine, one may easily notice a significant division of the citizens into two internally diversified social groups. One of them is the group of Ukrainians originating most often from the western and central part of this country, identifying with their country, their language and culture. The other group are the Ukrainians or the Russians who have Ukrainian citizenship, who are attached to the Russian language and the soviet identity and culture. Those two groups, thought, are separated by the language and culture, but also by completely different political attitudes related to perception of such problems as democracy, freedom or geopolitical leaning. While the first group of the Ukrainians is much more open to the western culture, its values and political system, the other group openly supports political and economic integration with Russia and is sceptic towards widely understood integration of Ukraine with the West, in many cases feeling a great sentiment to the times when Ukraine was part of the USSR (Kapuśniak).

The Orange Revolution from the turn of the year 2004 and 2005 for the first time showed the world how great a role those identity differences between Ukrainians play. Euromaidan at the turn of the year 2013 and 2014 was a kind of repetition of those protests, being directed against the rule of Viktor Yanukovich. The main cause of the protests was social dissatisfaction related to the delay of signing the associational agreement with the European Union by the president. As a result, the rule of the pro-Russian Yanukovich was overthrown, which Russia treated as an unlawful action and a political blow against its geopolitical interests and political values, which was in some part shared by the Russians living in Ukraine and was extremely visible in the Crimea. Realism would explain this situation in the category of a conscious game of interest of the Ukrainian opposition relating the country's objectives with the West and Russia that, at any cost, wanted to keep Ukraine in its area of influence and then, after the overthrow of Yanukovich, destabilize the country by the annexation of the Crimea. However, this approach does not explain where these interests result from and how they are constructed socially (Sadłocha, 173–174).

From the materialist point of view – which professes both realism and neoliberalism – it may seem that it is not beneficial for Ukraine to start a conflict with Russia with which it has numerous economic interests, and which offered a loan amounting to 15 million dollars in exchange for not signing the associational deal

with the European Union and declared lowering the gas prices, which would be very beneficial for Ukraine in relation to the budgetary difficulties. However, the Ukrainian society protesting in Euromaidan chose opening the country to the West, both in the literal meaning of initiation the European integration as in the sense of introducing western political standards. The social choice of Europe made by the Ukrainians, despite being aware of uncertain and significantly delayed chances for accession to the European Union, may show both normative and cultural strength of the Community's influence and prove the dynamics of shaping the identity and social attitudes related to them which influence defining the interests by a society.

With reference to Russia, the political identity of the Russian elites outlined above – with Vladimir Putin in charge – best defines the reasons of taking the decision of the annexation of the Crimea. Taking the Crimea over from Ukraine, from the materialist point of view may seem an endeavour considered at least risky because it means a range of structural expenses related to adjusting this area to functioning within the Russian Federation (Wierzbowska-Miazga). However, it may remain unassessed from the point of view of shaping the internal identity of the Russian society whose old splendour and prestige of the former USSR is being restored. These arguments were also manifested in the attitude of the Russians living in the Crimea themselves who perceived Russia as a chance for a better life that they experienced during the Soviet times.

Among the aspect emphasized by constructivism there is also the influence of normative structures on the actions of countries in international relations. In case of the aggressive Russian policy towards Georgia or Ukraine it might seem that constructivist theses have rather small analytical translation and Russia did not care much about the opinion of the international community. However, the regime of Vladimir Putin was trying to keep up appearances which would decrease the perception of the Russian identity as an aggressor, initiating – unlawful, but seemingly normatively justified – a referendum on the annexation of the Crimea with the presence of “friendly” international observers, or in the context of the war with Georgia in 2008, proposing the presence of the representatives of the EU and the OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe) in Abkhazia and Ossetia.

The abovementioned initiatives may be criticized for being undertaken only with the purpose of keeping a seeming lawfulness of the already undertaken by Russia unlawful actions and for serving the internal legitimization of those actions. Therefore, constructivist might emphasize that if the international community did not react to breaking the international law, as a result of decreasing the normative credibility of Russia, other countries will change their perception of the country and will influence shaping their relations in the future (Finnemore). On the other hand, Russia skilfully used in its argumentation the casus of the independence of Kosovo in 2008, showing that it is driven by similar normative standards to western countries which ignored the opposition of Serbia in case of Kosovo (Jusufaj).

Critical constructivism and linguistic constructivism emphasize the roles of symbols and metaphors which are used by the country's policymakers in their political rhetoric, creating certain truths about the world commonly accepted by the society, which are to reflect their own point of view. Therefore, their spreading constitutes an important interest for the politicians seeing internal and international acceptance of the undertaken actions. The fight for the truth, as proclaimed by postmodernists, serves the role of not only propaganda, instrumentally used for the needs of explaining one's actions, but indeed creates an individualistic system of power and dominance, manipulating the social perception of the world and indirectly the process of shaping the identity of the society's interests. In the context of the discussed policy of Russia towards Ukraine, one may notice two antagonistic discourses of truth which treat these problems differently: a western perspective, expressed by the Ukrainian authorities, the countries of the European Union and the United States, compliant with the values and liberal norms resulting from them normative and moral condemnation of the aggressive actions of Russia and the unlawfulness of the annexation of the Crimea; and Russia's position explaining the legitimacy and lawfulness of its policy.

The clash of the points mentioned above may resemble the ideological conflict of the Cold War in which both parties incompatibly interpreted the political events in the whole world. Rhetorical techniques of Vladimir Putin and his co-workers refer to the language of the leaders of the USSR, particularly when calling the Ukrainian opposition 'fascists', and the protests in Euromaidan and the overthrow of president Yanukovich 'acts of violence and chaos' which were to be 'steered top-down' with the use of e.g. Poland and were not to have a wider acceptance among the Ukrainian society. In the opposition to this, Russia was only aiming to protect the Russian-speaking population in the Eastern regions of Ukraine and the Crimea from the danger. In his solemn speech, Putin argued that the referendum in the Crimea and its annexation were legal and compliant with the international norms and supported by historical respect they were to result from, claiming that the Crimea had always been a part of Russia and was abidingly inscribed in Russia's national identity (Putin, 7.05.2018). The manipulations described above were expressed in the atmosphere of common euphoria of the residents of the Crimea.

Vladimir Putin since 2013 had been talking about a common historical root of those two countries in shape of Kiev Ruthenia and the cultural proximity of those two nations. The president's statements may have suggested that Ukraine and Belarus constitute one of the most important elements being a part of the "Russian world" and it is Russia's duty to maintain close relations with it (Putin, 28.07.2015).

A similar narration concerned the annexation of the Crimea. In 2014, in his proclamation to Russia's Federal Assembly, Putin said "for Russia, the Crimea has

an enormous civilizational and sacred significance, just like the Temple Mount in Jerusalem for the believers of Islam Judaism” (Putin, 28.07.2015). This statement refers to the fact that in 988 prince Vladimir the Great was baptised in Chersonesos. Calling the Crimea civilizational root of Russia may be considered an audacious rhetorical manipulation serving the purpose of explaining the undisputed relations of the Crimea and history of Russia. His annexation of the Crimea was to be understood as restoring a natural state because handing the Crimea over to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev in 1954 was unlawful in Putin’s opinion. However, Putin also referred to other symbolic elements connecting the Crimea and the history of Russia, i.e. the Crimean war, graves of the Russian soldiers or the Black Sea Fleet (Putin, 28.07.2015).

It is worth to mention here another historical example referring to the Crimea and the “identity” policy of the USSR. In 1944, by virtue of the decision of Stalin, all the Crimean Tatars inhabiting the peninsula incessantly since the 13th century displaced. Along with the deportation, most of the traces of the culture of the Tatars was destroyed. Material culture, architecture, cemeteries, even natural elements of the landscape such as cypress, the tree characteristic for the Crimea, were all being destroyed (Chazbijewicz). The actions of the USSR were then aiming at redefining the identity of the whole peninsula. That suggests the role of the identity in the political process of controlling the society was understood as early as then.

In the opposition to the Russian rhetoric, the discourse in western countries emphasized the territorial integrity of Ukraine. In his speeches, Barack Obama emphasized the invalidity of the referendum in the Crimea which was only an excuse to its annexation by Russia, condemned Russia’s intervention on the territory of Ukraine as not compliant with the international law, threatening with consequences in form of sanctions which would be increasing along with the escalation of Russia’s actions (Gostkiewicz). While the position of western leaders referred to the idea of international law and, in their opinion, commonly accepted rules that should be followed in international relations, the Russian discourse deconstructs the existence of such truths, mocking them and demonstrating the validity of the old rule according to which it is the winners who write history. As reported by *New York Times*, Angela Merkel was to say after a conversation with Vladimir Putin concerning the situation in the Crimea that she “was not sure whether he had not lost his touch with reality” and that he “was in a different world” (Baker). Although the Germans quickly denied this information, they illustrate the shock of clashing with the western point of view on the contemporary international relations with the position of Russia, seemingly irrational and contrary to the liberal vision of truth. In this situation realists would indicate that Putin is not detached from the reality, but that he shows the world how illusory the reality in which the West believes is. Publicists and researchers sympathising with this diagnosis call the perception of the countries of the European Union ‘postmodernist philosophy’ which

is to express, among others, pacifism, overly attachment to the problems of cultural liberalization, the cult of human rights and belief in the universality of the order built after the fall of the Cold War and its liberal rules, contrasting it with the harsh reality of the Russian realism in which what prevails is power (Wielomski).

Interestingly, from the perspective of the logic of postmodernism it is Vladimir Putin who might appear to be a master of creating freely chosen truths and their casual serving to the world. Taking into consideration Russia's position, the addressees of those messages must consider them seriously, which constitutes the existence of those manipulation in the international public opinion. The president of Russia consciously uses even the most absurd theses to show its power not only over the situation in the Crimea, but also its normative assessment. This logic is illustrated by words from the novel by Fyodor Dostoevsky *Notes from Underground*: "two plus two are five". In this novel, Dostoevsky contrasts an ideally functioning society based on the rules of reason with an irrational contestation of this harmony by individuals who reject this order only to show the strength of their own will. According the Alexander Shea, Putin's rhetoric takes form of postmodernist authoritarianism whose aim is to undermine the equity of western thinking and its moral monopoly for setting the truths of humanitarianism, human rights and standards of other countries' actions (Shea). Postmodernists would emphasize that even if Russia's president does realize that his arguments do not convince western leaders, the sole consciousness of the fact that he can manipulate the facts which will be repeated in the whole world indicates the range of the power of his discourse which goes beyond the material potential of the annexation of the Crimea.

Conclusions

The notion of an interest and its interpretation constitute a linguistic instrument of constructing a certain image of international relations by given paradigms. It is not possible to indicate which approach to understanding the national interest has the greatest analytical value. A realist perspective finds itself well in the context of looking for objective national interests in the anarchistic environment, but it cannot fully explain the social and cultural aspects of shaping of the national interests. With the use of realism, it is easy to explain the motivations of countries that, in their actions or strategies of foreign policy, concentrate on the cult of strength and egoistic pursuit of increasing one's power and security. Such subjects may perceive international relations to be an arena of a constant rivalry oriented at increasing one's political and economic gains achieved at the cost of other subjects, e.g. as a result of a fight with other countries, but also participation in various institutions and forms of international cooperation used by them for their instrumental aims of foreign policy.

As some observers of international relations suggest, the case of the discussed policy done by the regime of Putin should create awareness of the significance of traditional theories explaining specific problems of international relations. According to Robert Murray, current policy of Russia indicates that we “are not living in the post-sovereign world where countries do not attack other countries, and the complex of co-dependencies and economic relations do not prevent them from strategic thinking resembling the times of the Cold War” (Murray).

According to John Vasquez, realism can explain almost every event within countries’ foreign policies but does it “post factum” (Vasquez). Not knowing the results of countries’ actions, it is hard to make solid judgements on their compliance with objectively understood national interests. It may also refer to neoliberalism that, better than neorealism, explains those interests in the context of the existence of international cooperation, but just like neorealism it is subjected to harsh criticism from post-positivist approaches for its objectivity, rationality and materialism. Moreover, the positivist theories largely reflect the manner of thinking about the world of western researchers that not always is identified with the logic expressed by other civilizational circles (Sadłocha, 203–204).

The post-positivist theories construct an objective, rational and materialist dimension of presenting the interests in international relations. This view is well expressed by Robert Cox, a leading representative of the critical theory: “a theory always serves someone or something” (Cox). All theories of international relations are shaped in a given time space and political and axiological contexts which determine the knowledge of the world and the analytical assumptions expressed by researchers. In this light, neutrally expressed idea of national interests is only a reflection of subjective knowledge and values of a given subject, all of which may have a specific intentional load. According to Cox, both realism and neoliberalism as so deeply rooted in the international order and the manner of thinking of the developed western countries that they consciously or unconsciously sanction and justify the status quo and support the interests of the political elites which take profits from it. We should ponder on the fact whether this logic may be adequately used also e.g. in particular analyses of the discourse devoted to national interests conducted by researchers related to the post-positivist approaches. The trends indicated by them, related to defining national interests, also are not detached from the worldview and identity of the researcher. That is why we cannot exclude that to some extent they may contest some political order and serve hardening another order through emphasizing particular elements of the political discourse and marginalizing others (Sadłocha, 203–204).

The post-positivist theories only to some extent consider how interests are constructed and what their relation to values and identity of the subjects that formulate them is. The discussed case of Russia has shown that understanding the non-materialist factors, the role of culture and identity may lead to a complete

misunderstanding of the motivations of a country's actions in international relations, its motivation of the process of defining of national interests. As suggests constructivism, with the use of the mechanisms of examining social discourses, analysing rhetorical figures of the most important politicians, references to polls and the use of deconstruction we may understand the way the national interests are articulated better.

The tradition of Russia's building a strong and expansionist country goes back to the times of Peter the Great and despite the passage of time and the political changes it still creates Russian national identity, perception of the national interests and defining of the objectives of the foreign policy. Perhaps the elements of the *Realpolitik* policy have become a constant element of the identity of Russian leaders, and social expectations towards the greatness of the Russian country and its prestige in the world have shaped the current identity of the Russian society. This would mean that in case of Russia one cannot with an absolute power counteract the materialist understanding of national interests, so close to the classical realists, with the constructivist approach. The proximity of materialism and ideation factors have been covered by R.B. Hall, among others (Hall). In order to understand Russia's policy well, it is imperative to take a look at it from those two perspectives.

The pursuit of conscious discussion of the wide spectrum of international relations, embracing various scientific points of view, one must remember about the relativity of the category of interest. Interests are situated in the social world and always refer to relation of one subject with another, both in the area of internal policy and in the international relations. It must be emphasized that those relations may be interpreted from various points of view. Particular paradigms, due to the variety of their ontological assumptions and the specificity of the interest of researchers, have a diversified power of explanation of interests in relation to various problems. Therefore, holistic approach to the analysis of international relations widens the horizon of research and allows scholars to observe the complexity of perception of an interest in international relations, facilitating the choice of selected interpretations to the specificity of a particular problem (Sadłocha, 207–208).

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Jarosław Sadłocha – a PhD in social sciences, graduate of the University of Wrocław. Author of the publication *Critical Analysis of the Category of Interest in the Theory of International Relations* and co-author of *The Nobel Prize as a Symbol of Global Norms and Social Ideas*. Scientific interests: theory of international relations, national security, category of interest.

Book Review

**Joseph S. Nye, Jr., *Is the American Century Over?*
(Global Futures Series), Cambridge and Massachusetts:
Polity Press, 2015, 146 pp. + vii**

Monir Hossain Moni

Research Professor and Head
Program on Japan & Global Affairs
Division of Asia & Globalized World
Bangladesh Asia Institute for Global Studies (BAIGS)
Dhaka, Bangladesh
e-mail: moni@baigs-edu.net

I am ecstatic that it is a felicitous happenstance for me to review this book authored by Joseph Nye, a distinguished service professor and former dean of the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University who was ranked by his own institution's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs as the world's sixth most influential international relations (IR) scholar and 'No. 1' with respect to his epoch-making works' implication on United States (US) foreign policymaking paradigm over many years. In fact, I have recently completed one of my research projects concentrated on Japan by using a widely quoted and increasingly popular (despite receiving some defamatory remarks) concept of 'soft power' for which Nye is actually the originator. Without any limitation, I can send my best wishes to Nye for this book with its timeliness and importance. Nevertheless, while a reviewer in an effort of the volume's commercial advertisement makes much of it "The future of American power is the great question of our century. No-one is better equipped than Joe Nye to answer it", this project neither met my scholarly inquest up to a pleasing level nor filled my enjoyment to the brim. Honestly, the research's concluding findings

made me disconsolate due to a number of reasons. As the sole founder and creator of the Dhaka-based Bangladesh Asia Institute for Global Studies (BAIGS), which has already proved itself as the best knowledgebase on current global studies by making a truly great difference in the academic world, I championed by numerous international recognition scholarly and research awards (including the two most illustrious prizes named differently after Japan's former prime ministers Masayoshi Ohira and Yasuhiro Nakasone) wish to openly challenge Joseph Nye's book in its each and every side.

First of all, coming across that the volume's two chapters out of its seven chapters have interrogation marks, its main title (*Is the American Century Over?*) itself puts a question sign. But if it can adequately be answered by either 'yes' or 'no', why is there a necessity for realizing this book publication project? Anyway, when Nye (a US national) adopts the following 'forceful argument' made by another analyst in the concluding chapter "the United States is only at the beginning of its power. The twenty-first century will be the American century" (p. 113), it goes against his 'hopeful forecast' in a succeeding paragraph as follows "the American century is likely to continue for a number of decades at the very least" (p. 127). To be more specific, the two locutions (ie, 'the entire twenty-first century' and 'a number of decades') are directly antithetical. Contrastingly also, voluminous publications on the 'Asian century' owing to Asia's not only growing clouts but also shining values are nowadays being produced in which observant researchers feasibly envision that the 21st century will belong to Asia. By documenting the interrelated dimensions of American political, economic, social and cultural declining trends both locally and globally in 'absolute' terms, many US academics themselves have also reckoned that the 'American century' together with '*Pax Americana*' (Latin for 'American Peace') has already come to an end, although the US has been the globe's sole superpower since the fall of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1991. Conjointly, Nye believes that they have yet entered a 'post-American world'. In opposition to such a presumption, a fairly good number of international thinkers (including Americans) arguably point to the fact that the world with the 'rise of the rest' has by this time turned to multipolarity from unipolarity. Moreover, as the book's first paragraph of first chapter evidences: "In recent years, polls showed that in 15 of 22 countries surveyed, most respondents said that China either will replace or has already replaced the United States as the world's leading power" (p. 1), this statement contrarily answers its only question, making Nye's focal claim fallible. For Nye's better enlightenment, John Hay, US Secretary of State (from 1898 to 1905) more than a century as a period of 100 years ago prognosticated that the '21st century' will be the 'Pacific century' by and large to which the whole of North America was included. This means that it will not merely be the 'American century'.

Now, I like to confer my 'counter arguments' to Nye's 'cardinal arguments' adduced in his (this) 'so-called' cogent thesis. First, Nye recaps that America's three

astounding capabilities (military muscle, economic affluence and soft power) will continue to subside any new challenger (such predominantly as China) to his country. But it would have been engrossing and meaningful for the most curious and highbrow readers if he had more factually answered the following three questions respectively to these three efficacies of his country: (1) Why have the American armed forces occupied or boomed so many countries throughout the world (particularly Muslim nations) during many decades when war crimes violently committed by them have gone against universal human rights, peace and humanity to a large extent? (2) How can the US get rid of such severe socioeconomic drawbacks as widening income inequality, poverty and unemployment in addition to its political stalemate that are negatively affecting on the consummation of the ordinary people's necessities and gratifications of Nye's nation? (3) What is the true claim of Joseph Nye who himself has authored the article (titled *The Decline of America's Soft Power: Why Washington Should Worry*. "Foreign Affairs", May/June 2004), granted that his country has recently strived to revitalize its soft power as a core tool of public diplomacy?

With special emphasis on the third point, as Nye comments in the concluding chapter's last paragraph "Now, with slightly less preponderance and a much complex world, the United States will need to make smart strategic choices both at home and abroad if it wishes to maintain its position" (pp. 126–127), I am really in a puzzle over why and how he can offer such a suggestion by augmenting the concept of 'smart power' for which Nye is also the creator. More explicitly, as I have given a hint about it in my review's beginning part, Nye, incompatible with his non-academic positions as an ex-assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs and chairman of the National Intelligence Council of the US, is not only the 'acclaimed mastermind' but also the 'long promoter' of the idea of genuinely attractive 'soft power' by virtue of cultural assets for influence and moral principles for persuasion (as against the theory of the most undesirable 'hard power' as military coercion for brutalities and economic compulsion for provocations) through which any state can win hearts and minds of foreign publics by communicating with them in today's world of power struggles. But regretfully, his proposal on 'smart power', which is a tailored synthesis of both hard power and soft power or the precise mixture of the two depending on circumstances, with his judgment that it might be a mistake to rely on soft power alone. Anyway, such 'smart power' approach unusually undermines his standalone and lofty cultural 'soft power' notion. As we are informed, the Bush administration neglected the relevance of soft power and wasted its advantages in a foolish and reckless manner. As a matter of fact, its ostensible modern-day crusade against Islam and Muslims in Iraq has indeed helped promote the 'Bush hatred' in other world regions when making America the most hated nation on earth, though America is loved by a few countries until now. Additionally, Washington allegedly exploits its smart power as a part of the Obama

administration's 2012 'Pivot to East Asia' regional strategy simply for pursuing self-interests. In sum, the majority of the globe's poor countries (mostly in Africa), which feel deprived of the opportunities of globalization indiscriminately managed by the club of a very few powerful nations, will of course not be interested at all in 'military hegemony', 'economic selfishness' and 'cultural expansion' pursued by any unipolar superpower or great power in the guise of its self-controlled centennial period. That is to ask: Whether, what or how will the self-proclaimed century (American or Chinese) make sense for the poorest of the poor in our today's real and complex world that is unstable, vulnerable and deteriorating?

Sometimes, boastful and extravagant protestations or promises beyond an author's capacity clearly misguide the common readers, leave a candid reviewer be. It is also the case for Nye. In any event, I do not desperately consider that it should be any of the following four questions posed by Nye: Whether will China as a nimbly rising rival replace America as the world's leading nation? Whether will the 'American century' ultimately be eroded by the 'Chinese century'? Whether will these two monsters (both militarily and economically) engage in a fight with each other for global supremacy? Whether is Europe doomed to fail to understand that the 19th century was the 'British century'? In this connection, Nye completely overlooks some of his country's think tanks' prognosis about the 'Indian century'. In any case, I see in my mind's eye that the prime concern must be whether, why, how and when we could create a more inclusive and empowered regimen of global governance for a decorative and harmonious world order amid an entangled interplay of political chicaneries and economic magnetisms. From this viewpoint, it should be stressed that while 'the world without America' is a fallacious perception, the world needs America and vice versa America needs the world, meaning that any country (including the US) alone cannot solve the planet's most pressing human security issues, or address the internationally agreed Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) effectuated from 2016 by the United Nations (UN) in particular. In place of the volume's long list of further readings, I expected some realistic solutions on such topical problems from this globally renowned scholar, especially because this book has come to light from Polity's 'Global Futures Series'. Instead, Nye has developed his book's introductory chapter with a lengthy story of when the American century began, how it was created and why their country has incredibly been able to keep possession of its leadership and dominance worldwide during the last half of the 20th century. It sounds a too historical narrative and much discussed subject on the myth of 'American exceptionalism'. Therefore, this repetition might easily make this study's readers (mainly those who have anti-American sentiment) lackluster. More to the point, reading that a 24-page chapter titled "Absolute Decline: Is America like Rome?" (Chapter 5) has insanely been incorporated for this project, nothing is essentially contemplated about the 'Asian century' attributable to Asia's growing socio-cultural values as well as politico-economic powers even

with strategic military rivalries that is the most enticing title of burgeoning literatures on Asian/global studies nowadays, as I pronounced before.

Similarly, many famous predictions were proven to be totally false. For example, as Nye himself remarks, Harvard professor Ezra Vogel published (in 1979) *Japan as Number One: Lessons for America* (later translated into Japanese), an all-time best-selling book that celebrated Japan's rise fuelled by manufacturing daily necessities to help Japan to become the world's 2nd largest economy. Though the country was advancing incrementally and a mood of sunny optimism prevailed at that time, now there exists a commonsense among many Japanese in Japan that their country is crumbling and thus it would be unprepared for shouldering heavy duty at the global stage any longer. While Vogel's volume seems controversial, this Western author is still upbeat on Japan's future. Cheerfully, as per some surveys, Japan will still be in the list of 'Top 10 Superpowers' of the world in 2050 as well. Furthermore, most Japanese manifestly view that America as their closest and prolonged ally in the framework of the US-Japan strategic alliance is in a downturn and thus a far-reaching threat to the security of their nation. At the same time, anxieties about non-assurance on military logistic services from America's unswervingly subservient partner as a reportedly long stagnant economy apart from Tokyo's security policy shift as a blare to forge ties with East Asia are being acutely felt in Washington. But Nye has pretty well forgotten this crucial aspect, condemning that he in this book gives only a 4-page coverage on Japan in contrast to a 25-page separate chapter on China, which mostly reads descriptive.

Relevantly also, there is probably none other than Nye himself who strongly criticized the deficit but push of Beijing's soft power at odds with this country's hard power consisting of both military strengths and economic incentives. But he is overwhelmed with the prospect of a century to be ruled by China. Rather, he should have unfolded that this neighboring country of Japan has for a long time been the 2nd biggest recipient of Tokyo's generous official development assistance (ODA). Beyond this massive contributory support for the Chinese industrialization (but unfortunately military modernization) process and even though China has surpassed Japan as the globe's 2nd biggest economy in 2010, China remains lower-ranking than Japan in the matters of world famous multinational business conglomerates, technological innovations and its numerous more and more vibrant non-state actors. In fact, Nye dismissed Japan's soft power as negligible in the early 1990s. But he diverted himself later by providing his firmly held opinion in 2012 that one should not doubt the persistence of Japan's cultural uniqueness. He continued that though Japan's story was still lousy, this nation because of its distinctive and proactive 'pacifist constitution' and 'non-nuclear principles' compared to his own country (the US) almost looks like a 'role model'. However, it has not become clear from Nye's book how China that is still a trivial donor and accordingly struggling to assume its leadership positions in both regional and multilateral organizations

will soon exceed Japan's 'kudos' (ie, praise and honor) this nation has already received for its outstanding achievements for these domains. Although he traditionally foresees that China would automatically attain a superpower status and China's dramatic transformations (both internal and external) will ultimately impact the US and the American century insisted by him, he does not suppose that China might head toward Japanese-style 'lost decades' of financial sluggishness.

Nye finally declares that the American century due to the extraordinary period of his nation's pre-eminence in the arenas of both global geopolitics and international contribution is still not over, having an impression that the US is somehow an exceptional country in the world worthy of widespread admiration. But he avoids saying that his homeland is growingly and loathingly treated as a 'world policeman' as pointed out before. Also, its global public goods basically in the form of foreign aid to the developing countries aside from its billion dollars trade in weapons to autocrats worldwide are seen from the perspective of America's own national gains. Moreover, perceiving that Nye is even now lucidly dreaming of a 'continual' American century, the most extreme reality is that several of its parallels and competitors are coming up. Anyway, Nye rightly warns that the status of America as the only superpower in the post-Cold War international system might seriously be toughened by its own domestic weaknesses and uneasiness 'relative' to the belief that the 21st century in the command of a booming Asia as a world power or the potential of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) as a group of rapidly emerging market economies will perilously take America out of the global scene. Hence, this American citizen recommends that the US should have some pragmatic ideas on how to exert its historically elevated 'leadership' (unlike 'hegemony' or 'domination'), Washington must need to give practical responses to Beijing's proactive strategies as well as the country would have to listen for getting others to enlist in a multipolar world order with the spread of global geographical balance-of-power politics thanks to today's high-tech society.

On these grounds, it will not be excessive and irrelevant to raise a question whether President Barack Obama's 2008 'Change We Can Believe In' rallying cry in the final campaign pitch has eventually brought any amazing change to America domestically let alone internationally. In the same way, the political slogan 'Make America Great Again' of Donald Trump's 2016 presidential campaign, which was trademarked the Ronald Reagan's campaign of 1980, apparently illustrates that America has over the decades lost its greatness. According to a Connecticut (US)-based Quinnipiac University National poll, there is a deep well of dissatisfaction and pessimism among American voters who say that the US has lost its identity, they are falling behind financially, their beliefs and values are under attack, and public officials do not care what they think. So, some of my blunt but logical questions to Nye and all Americans as follows: (1) Will the American leaders really be able to revitalize 'American exceptionalism' (ie, their historical reputation, social

justice, cultural diversity, political decency as well as economic luxuriance) of which they are so proud always? (2) Will their nation be sincere and responsible enough to correct its image and revamp its stature in the global community and society so that it not only can consolidate its place in a new multipolar world but also can adaptively work with it? (3) Will the United States, as Joseph Nye has advocated over a long period of time, be destined and entitled in the genuine sensitivity to serve as a constructive and distinctive exemplar for our degrading humanity in the new centennial world? In essence, it will be wise and better for Nye and his nation to acknowledge the physical existence of a post-American world, and act in accordance with the changing multipolar global governance architecture.

To recapitulate, the book's core question (as its title stands) itself is quite contradictory, and Nye, who is regarded as an 'epitome' for other IR scholars in the US and overseas, seems less self-confident to persuasively prove his self-anticipated case. Rather, it is the book that will help more familiarize the term 'Chinese century' with the involved parties. Certainly, Nye's 'we versus they' schism or 'West versus East' chasm in the volume will also contribute further to the fractions in midst of the global power shift. More outwardly, some ideal researchers might look upon Nye as a person who is America's one-sided 'propaganda prompter' and one who does not mind to distract his academic theorizations or noble visions only for the sake of his personal rewards or his nation's benefits. In other words, I am afraid whether some scholars would unenthusiastically behave toward Nye's 'big talk' as his country's 'grandiose rhetoric'. To tell the truth, this publication suffers from its narrowly specified purpose with a substandard and tendentious title. In addition to Nye's contradictory standpoints, wrong predictions and inevitable omissions, the study at the same time lacks methodical approaches, viable insights and unavoidable suggestions. Moreover, discovering that there are some imperfections in the contents and indispositions in the frame of references, the volume is bereft of reference works in the non-English (particularly Chinese and Japanese) languages. In short, this book is not an outcome of a so punctilious and excellent research with truly intellectual dissension, engaging style and exciting taste.

Notwithstanding all of my carping but candid criticisms, I am quite sure that this close-packed but originally written piece (in contrast to other books on this similar theme) accomplished by Joseph Nye might still be of seduction especially for US political leaders as well as this country's local policy makers aside from global strategic planners. As an independent but unprejudiced reviewer of this book with its need for our time, I take a scope to sketch my own constructive and indispensable foresight by reflecting the benevolent feelings of all ethically minded and peace loving people throughout the world as follows: "The 19th century experienced the birth of modern science. But the two world wars have turned the 20th century into the worst ever. By learning lessons from the past centuries, we all world citizens together in the 21st century should robustly and earnestly affirm the judgment

in the sanctity and dignity of each and every human's life regardless of region, religion or race, and thus start our globally networked actions right now for our ever unstable and risk prone humanity's prosperous and successful future". Indeed, I publish to create values needed distinctly for peace of insecure humankind, not generally for promotion of academic rank.

Monir Hossain Moni

Monir Hossain Moni – A double masters earned from University of Dhaka and Hitotsubashi University as well as a Waseda University-awarded doctorate degree holder, Monir Hossain Moni is currently a Research Professor and Head for the Program on Japan & Global Affairs under the Division of Asia & Globalized World for which he is also assuming his responsibility as Director of the Dhaka-based Bangladesh Asia Institute for Global Studies BAIGS, a unique, modern, evolving as well as inspiring 'role model' privately owned independent think tank beyond national and regional boundaries. Dr Moni's broadly diversified academic expertise area encompasses global multi-disciplinary, cross-comparative and area-specific studies generally on Asia with concentration on Northeast Asia shedding light particularly on Japan as an established power immediately neighbored with China as an emerging power and South Korea as a proactive middle power amid the inter-relational, intra-regional and multilaterally-cooperative strategic, political, economic, social, environmental, cultural and technological aspects of the 21st century's colossal process of globalization as both change-maker and challenge-poser. In line with his prolonged research attentiveness and specialism, he has outstandingly contributed imaginative, authoritative and thus universally effective pieces to the leading journals produced not only by all the higher education world's most prominent publishers but also by many promising presses around Asia and beyond in recent years. This worldwide traveled individual has extensively disseminated his research results as well. A winner of internationally recognized and prestigious prizes named after Japan's two most influential ex-prime ministers (Yasuhiro Nakasone and Masayoshi Ohira), he has actually proved himself as one of the world's top-notch Japan-specialist intellectuals worthy of advanced studies on 'Global Asia'. As the core part of his personal higher education philosophy stands, this earth-beloved, positive-minded and action-sighted affiliate of the global civil society is nobly dedicated to the humanitarian causes. More concretely, Professor Moni attributable to his great effort and energy while managing hectic and precious time always strives to construct a much-needed value for helping build a 'better world' (ie, more poverty-palliated, prosperity-propelled and peace-pivoted humanity) made up of a sustainable future that ignites stability, change and difference in the true sense.