CONTENTS

PROFESSOR
ANDRZEJ J. CHODUBSKI

An outstanding humanist, political scientist, unforgettable lecturer and friend

Professor Andrzej Jan Chodubski, a political scientist and historian, was associated with the University of Gdańsk for over 40 years. He was a great specialist in the methodology of social and humanistic research, problems of civilization and the history of international relations. He was an author of over 1200 publications, including 28 monographs and many articles, a thesis supervisor of 33 doctoral theses, reviewer of dozens of Ph.D. theses, involved in professorship proceedings, founder and Editor-in-Chief of *Civilization and Politics*, and a member on the scientific councils of many journals. He became a member of the Polish Association of Political Science in 1977, and a member of the Political Science Committee of the Polish Academy of Sciences in 1999.

Professor Andrzej Chodubski was an outstanding figure in the Political Science community, supporting the research and organizational initiatives of many academic institutions. He participated in many national and international conferences, and taught classes in methodology for students, doctoral students and faculty members. He won a number of awards including the Heart for Hearts medal from the National Education Commission for promoting Poland, and the Irene and Franciszek Skowyr Scientific Award. In May 2017, the Senate of the University of Łódź awarded him with the *Universitatis Lodziensis Amico* Medal of Honour.

One of the research areas which was also important to Professor Chodubski was the Baltic Sea Region and especially the city of Gdańsk. He was a member of the scientific council of the Committee of Baltic and Nordic Area Studies at the University of Łódź and showed many young researchers, including contributors of this volume, great support. We will always remember his tremendous dedication, openness and kindness.

"NORTHERN EUROPE. NEW POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL TRENDS"

Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak

Introduction

The Nordic countries stand out thanks to a unique set of shared attributes: respect for democratic traditions, social inclusion, equality, solidarity, transparency, regard for the natural environment and mutual trust. These countries have consistently been placed at the top of international rankings that assess the rule of law, protection of human rights, wealth, innovation, gender equality , and the quality of public services. Compared to other parts of the world, Northern Europe – defined as Norden: Denmark, Finland, Island, Norway and Sweden – is a region of peace and stability. To use the term coined by Karl Deutsch, it is a genuine security community – a community of values shared by governments, institutions, organisations and citizens.

Broadly speaking, Nordic countries also share a common economic model and are similar in terms of social structure. Free market capitalism functions within a comprehensive, universal welfare state, financed by heavy taxes and balanced by collective bargaining with trade unions, NGOs and local communities. The Nordic model relies on the active participation of the state in all significant areas. This solution has deep historical roots and is based on profound parliamentary traditions and egalitarian inclusion of all social classes and groups. As a result, the relationship between the people and the state can be described as close, positive and cooperative.

However, in recent years Northern Europe has also witnessed new, surprising and sometimes controversial processes determined

mainly by external factors. In the last decade of the twentieth century, Nordic countries faced serious economic challenges that undermined the welfare model and brought on serious social consequences. In addition, due to convergence with the EU and the USA, they went through the financial crisis of 2008, which brought particularly severe political and economic repercussions for Iceland. The recent immigration crisis has been answered with restrictive measures and austerity policies, which highlighted the deficiencies of integration schemes which the Nordic countries had been so proud of.

Furthermore, radical populism has gained meaningful political representation in the region. The Danish People's Party, the Finns Party and the Sweden Democrats differ in terms of their historical background, but converge in terms of their socio-economic centrist ideology and socio-cultural authoritarian style; the Progress Party in Norway can be situated in between the populist radical right and more traditional strains of conservatism. All of the above have recently emerged as either the second or third largest party in their respective parliaments, and in Finland and Norway have been invited to form a coalition government.

Considering all these new phenomena, this special issue aims to examine the present shape and meaning of Nordic values and to see whether internal and external factors could significantly influence these values in the future.

The first contribution of this volume evaluates the strengths of the Nordic model of co-operation, which is unique on a global scale. According to Joanna Grzela, mutual trust is what enables Nordic countries to communicate effectively and to achieve common goals in a wide range of areas including social care, economy, ecology, global and regional security, humanitarian aid and relations with international organisations such as the UN, the EU and NATO. The institutionalisation of contacts through international bodies such as the Nordic Council and long-lasting sector initiatives have created close formal and informal bonds between the collaborating countries. The author points out that while the Nordic nations share a common heritage and comparable beliefs and values, their views, priorities and interests do not always align. The geographic location and history of each individual Nordic country is reflected in varying opinions its inhabitants hold on European integration, the role of the Baltic Sea, the Arctic region and security policies. These differences do not seem to impede co-operation – on the contrary, they rather enhance it, in the spirit of pragmatism and reconciliation. The author

concludes that the Nordic model can be applied to local collaboration in other regions of the world – for example, in the Balkans.

Magdalena Tomala discusses the European Union's relations with Greenland. Until the recent referendum in the United Kingdom, this island has been the only territory to opt out from European integration. Greenland left the EEC in 1985 after it had acquired significant autonomy from Denmark. This withdrawal reduced the European Community's territory by half, but in other respects did not pose a serious challenge to a united Europe. However, as the author points out, the EU has been increasingly interested in building a closer relationship with Greenland due to its natural resources and general strategic importance. The EU's slow and bureaucratic approaches are however countered by efficient Asian – most prominently Chinese – diplomacies. The case of Greenland can serve as a lesson for Europeans and a test of the EU's efficiency in the race for Arctic resources. At the same time – considering current separatist trends emerging across Europe – it may be interesting to treat it as a case study of a territory which had left the Community.

Another issue vital for the region is migration and adequate refugee and asylum policies. Europe is now experiencing one of the most severe humanitarian crises in its post-war history; this situation challenges the entire axiology of European integration. Many European countries are changing their immigration policies in the direction of extended control, limiting financial support and restricting the possibilities of settlement. Sweden is an interesting subject for case studies of European attitudes towards newcomers. In the last few decades it has been perceived as one of the most tolerant and inviting countries on the whole continent, accommodating – proportionally to its population – four times more refugees than Germany and Great Britain combined. This approach, however, was not entirely aligned with social attitudes. Anna Kobierecka elaborates on the multicultural policy of Sweden, particularly in the aftermath of the terrorist attack on Charlie Hebdo in Paris. The article demonstrates that perceptions of immigrants in Sweden are changing – the shifting levels of support for political parties and growing numbers of cases of racial and cultural persecution prove that this is indeed the case. The attack on the French magazine and similar extreme events have been a catalyst for in-depth discussion about the successes and failures of multiculturalism, the roots of terrorism and the means to counter it.

In the next contribution, Agata Włodarska-Frykowska assesses the migration processes in contemporary Estonia, a country sharing many characteristics with the Nordic states. The author underlines that the transition and subsequent radical change of migratory patterns had a major impact on social changes in the region. In the case of three Baltic republics – Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – the issue of migration is closely connected to the ethnic structure of these countries. The communist period has left its mark: significant Russian minorities live in all three Baltic states. In Estonia, this minority forms almost a third of the overall population. The official status of this group finally met European Union standards in 2008, but in reality its members still face workplace and linguistic discrimination. New migration movements are mostly connected with Estonian membership in the EU and reached their peak in 2006. An observation important in the present context is that the Estonians are not keen on receiving new immigrants or new migration movements; this can be traced back to historical factors and the relatively small size of the country.

The problem of ethnic minorities is also discussed by Agnieszka Szpak. The author examines the concept of human security and the threats to human security in the Arctic, with a special focus on the Sami people – a group that has been neglected and deprived of political agency. With the emergence and development of the concept of human security – which includes environmental protection, the preservation of culture and cultural identity, and granting autonomy and self-governance to indigenous peoples – their status has changed fundamentally.

The editor of this volume, Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak, contributes to the discussion with her article analysing the model of oil and gas management in Norway, which has become one of the most important exporters of hydrocarbons in the world. This undeniable success was possible largely thanks to adopting a very sustainable and consistent approach to managing natural resources. Norway's energy policy is built around the state playing a central role, yet provides attractive options for commercial initiatives and competition. The main aim behind state management of the sector was to preserve resources and wealth not just for the present, but also future generations. In addition, the policy-making, commercial, and regulatory areas of the sector have been separated, and all political forces refrained from interference. Norway has clearly managed to combine the liberalisation of its economy – which

followed global trends – with a strong and proactive state, which is a typically Nordic solution.

Looking at a different set of economic challenges, Agnieszka Legutko verifies whether Icelandic strategies applied to overcome financial breakdown could become a panacea for similar future crises. She discovers that the choices made by the Icelandic government were suitable and progressive, but could only be put into practice in that specific economic and social background. Legutko demonstrates that this dynamic, developed and globalised economy had suffered from the international financial crisis of 2008 because of its high dependence on market fluctuations – typical for small countries – but also because of the deregulation of the banking system following the privatisation of the largest Icelandic banks. Measures taken against the financial crisis that brought Iceland to the edge of bankruptcy were impressive and included placing banks under state control, controlling capital flows and consolidating public finances. These radical moves were followed by social turmoil and a total rearrangement of the Icelandic political scene, but brought about a complete economic recovery.

The final article examines the sports diplomacy of Norway. Michał Kobierecki explores Norwegian public diplomacy and attributes its extraordinary success to finding a suitable niche and prioritising target audiences. For decades, the public image of Norway has been that of an honest peace broker, generous aid donor, and dedicated supporter of democracy. Norwegian diplomats promote the country as a humanitarian superpower and draw attention to living in harmony with nature, social equality and internationalist adventures. Sports diplomacy has been an interesting element of this national branding strategy that influenced the perceptions of Norway in the international community.

This volume is also the first publication by a new research team launched at the Faculty of International and Political Studies, focusing on the Baltic-Nordic area and headed by Katarzyna Dośpiał-Borysiak. The goal of this multi-disciplinary group of scholars, consisting of political scientists, sociologists, linguists, and economists is to offer a new quality of research arising from the wide spectrum of perspectives coming from both Polish and international academic institutions. This volume – the team's first collective effort – will certainly offer interesting insights into new dynamics in Northern Europe seen from various perspectives and initiate a wider discussion around the stability of political and social structures in the region.

Joanna Grzela*

NORDIC MODEL OF SUBREGIONAL CO-OPERATION

ABSTRACT: Nordic co-operation is renowned throughout the world and perceived as the collaboration of a group of countries which are similar in their views and activities. The main pillars of the Nordic model of co-operation are the tradition of constitutional principles, activity of public movements and organisations, freedom of speech, equality, solidarity, and respect for the natural environment. In connection with labour and entrepreneurship, these elements are the features of a society which favours efficiency, a sense of security and balance between an individual and a group. Currently, the collaboration is a complex process, including many national, governmental and institutional connections which form the "Nordic family".

KEYWORDS: Nordic countries, sub-regional co-operation, areas of co-operation

Introduction

The Nordic countries, due to their co-operation, have taken many breakthrough steps and have rapidly reached the level which the European Union has been trying to achieve since the beginning of its existence. Nowadays, although they are not significant players on the international arena, they are important partners for a number of countries including the United States[1]. Their

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[1] In September 2013, the US President Barack Obama paid his first official visit to Sweden. Obama held bilateral talks with Prime Minister Fredrik Reinfeldt and met the heads of other Nordic governments. The talks mostly concerned economic issues, a joint engagement in human rights protection, climate protection as well as the problems of international policy and security. In a joint

collaboration takes many institutional forms and initiatives. The Nordic countries seek common solutions for the problems which are not limited by national borders or challenges of the contemporary world i.e. economic crisis, climate change, natural environment and human rights protection, and maintaining security. They hold the leadership position in the area of modern climate solutions, energy technologies and, moreover, in the conservation of the natural environment. The countries have pioneered a number of environmental protection areas due to the high level of environmental awareness in society, political engagement regarding the natural environment and solving problems connected with conservation. Nordic co-operation has impressed other European countries with their development of a common market for electricity, and the reduction in the sources of pollution. Since the mid-80s, Scandinavian countries have significantly reduced emissions of pollutants into the atmosphere and water while maintaining the economic growth on a level comparable or even higher than the OECD average. This has made the region the world leader in the area of labelling and clean technologies-Nordic Swan is one of the most renowned Scandinavian brands and at the same time one of the most recognizable eco-labels in Europe.

Scandinavian countries remain the focus of attention for researchers, writers, journalists and experts in various fields. The region has become an important subject of debate as well as scientific and political research. In science, the issue of Nordic co-operation has long been discussed. Foreign sources frequently illustrate the Nordic region in a number of aspects referring to specific policies: social – especially the welfare state, economic – in the context of innovation and competitiveness of the Nordic economies, and security and foreign policies. The history of the region, political systems, the development of institutions and

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statement, the politicians emphasised the importance of co-operation between the USA and the Nordic countries as well as other partners such as the Baltic countries in the area of security and defence. It was announced that the US – Nordic Security Dialogue would be established to discuss international co-operation in the matter of global and regional security. The joint American and Swedish statement also concerned the development of relations between NATO and partner countries (Sweden among others). The importance of the work of the Arctic Council was emphasised and the necessity to increase co-operation in the area of conservation and research into the natural environment of the Arctic as well as an improvement in the living conditions and encouraging sustainable development in the Arctic with respect to indigenous communities.

co-operation are mentioned in many Polish studies concerning Northern Europe. The authors attempt to discover the source of this Nordic political and economic success. In academic literature there are interesting studies and dissertations concerning various aspects of the Northern European countries' co-operation written by W. Anioł, T. Cieślak, R.M. Czarny, Z. Doliwa-Klepacki, M. Grewiński, M. Grzybowski, A. Kubka, K. Musiał, J. Nowiak, W. Nowiak, J. Osiński, B. Piotrowski or J. Symonides.

The author realizes that the illustration of Nordic co-operation is a subject of great importance. It is also recognized that the fact that the complexity of this issue cannot capture its full range of positive and negative aspects. An example of this is the refugee crisis. It is a comprehensive issue, requiring separate studies. However, the author has decided to present this article, believing that it could be a contribution to the discussion centered around the current challenges of regional co-operation between states.

The origin of Nordic community

Scandinavia has not always been a peaceful and quiet region of Europe. The beginning of Nordic co-operation dates back to the nineteenth century when, after a few hundred years of struggle between Sweden and Denmark for the domination in the region – the period is often referred to as the "zigzag relationship" as there were alternating periods of war and solidarity, the gradual reconstruction of ties between the countries commenced (Jałowiecki, 14)[2]. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the parliament and government co-operation – e.g. between the ministers of Social Services was initiated. Many agreements concerning social policy were signed e.g. concerning social insurances, health protection, tax insurances and compensation. The members of parliament used to meet on a regular basis at the conferences of the Scandinavian Inter-Parliamentary Union. In 1919, the NORDEN Association came into being to support co-operation between the Scandinavian countries. After the First World War, the Scandinavian countries worked

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[2] The movement called "Scandinavism" advocating a reunion of Scandinavian countries in a form of a political union began at that time. The 19th century was abundant with agreements and contracts between the Nordic countries, among which there was an agreement of Scandinavian Monetary Union for Denmark, Norway and Sweden.

together within the League of Nations and the International Labour Organization. At that time the Prime Ministers and Ministers of Foreign Affairs used to meet ad hoc to exchange information and work on joint statements to be subsequently presented in the forum of the League of Nations.

The economic crisis brought a tightening of the Nordic relations. In 1930, the countries signed a convention which made it impossible to raise import duties without prior agreement (Marszałek, 197). Moreover, the Ministers of Social Services, Foreign Affairs, Trade, Education and Justice started to meet on a regular basis. The development of co-operation and Nordic integration were strongly emphasised by many associations and non-governmental organizations with the word Nordic in their names[3].

After World War II, despite differences resulting from their political status, the Nordic countries decided to co-operate, mainly in the social, scientific and cultural areas, in a more formal way (Zygierewicz, 1–2). The tightening of relations which took place in the second half of the previous century was inspired by many international committees which still supervise and coordinate them (Doliwa-Klepacki, 334–56). A special role is played by the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers, which are proactive and have become a driving force of the regional integration (Helsinki Treaty). After World War II, they inspired many specialised units of Nordic co-operation to be formed. The oldest ones are the following: the Nordic Committee of Tourism established in 1923, the Nordic Organisation for Scientific Research-Nordforsk established in 1947, the Nordic Liason Committee for Atomic Energy, operating since 1957, the Nordic Industrial Fund, established in 1973, promoting industrial and technological development in Scandinavian countries – since 1989 known as the Nordic Innovation Centre. Other institutions have been established due to the new directions and areas of contacts between the countries. Many of them operate regionally and illustrate that Northern Europe is indeed the region of extensive co-operation. They facilitate collaboration in many areas and are important units of the Nordic Council of Ministers as they implement its priorities (Marszałek, 198).

The Nordic countries have much in common, with similar cultures, religion, language and views concerning social policy.

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[3] In 1963 they formed the League of Nordic Associations whose aim was to support co-operation, cultural and economic integration by promoting the idea among the Nordic nations.

The Passport Union, stability, security and welfare, freedom of speech, solidarity, democracy, language, common culture and values are key ideas which are the result of years of co-operation and trust. These aspects engender a Nordic synergy, defining an open Scandinavian society and have become real assets in global competition.

One of the "trademarks" of Northern countries is the idea and policy of a welfare state (Nowiak *passim*, Daly *passim*, Castells, Himanen *passim*, Edvardsen, Hagtvet *passim*, Anioł *passim*). The Scandinavian model is deeply rooted in the practical co-operation of social partners with one another and with political institutions. Its idea was to minimise conflicts that occurred in the initial period of industrialisation. The region has the potential to become the world leader in innovative solutions in the health and social sectors, especially with the elderly, preventative medicine and gender equality. The view is promoted by the amount of money spent on social insurance, and compliance with the ideas of equality and civil rights. The Scandinavian model of a welfare state is an integral part of a liberal market economy. Scandinavian countries have consistently occupied the top positions in world rankings concerning the standard of living despite the ongoing economic crisis to which they seem to be resilient. This proves that the existence of a good welfare state is possible and, most importantly, that the economy with the elements of state ownership and regulations may be effective and innovative. Moreover, the extensive system of redistribution does not hamper economic development and personal freedom.

The Nordic countries, unlike others, connect a high standard of living with reasonable distribution of income-incomes are usually high and the differences in their levels relatively low in comparison to other OECD countries. The Scandinavian model of a welfare state cannot be "exported" to other countries as it requires a fundamental trust which is unique to the region. According to Christian Bjørnskov, professor at the Department of Economics and Business at the University of Aarhus, the only countries which remain on the same level of trust e.g. Canada and New Zealand may introduce a similar model of the state. He claims: "The welfare state would collapse in a country like Greece, where distrust and corruption are widespread. Countries with low trust levels tend to have more corruption because it's a very human reaction to take as much as you can if you feel that others are doing the same." (qtd in Karkov sciencenordic.com).

The unique model of the Scandinavian welfare state is based on the common culture and values which are even more important nowadays in a global economy. These include democracy, transparency, equality, freedom, social solidarity and security for all, individualism and tolerance. The model promotes social rights and the principle that everyone is entitled to equal access to social and health services, education and culture. It also refers to the social care addressed to the outcasts and vulnerable groups of society. One of the most important obligations of a welfare state is to create opportunities for all to participate in social life and in the decision – making processes of the state.

Scandinavian labour markets also share a number of common features. They can be characterised by a high level of equality, security and consensus, which has had a huge impact on the Nordic welfare that we know today. A large number of the adult population are professionally active. Salaries and work conditions are regulated by group contracts. Trade unions and employers are engaged in creating rules concerning the labour market, which translates into a high rate of employment, and accordingly the low percentage of unemployment.

Table 1. Gini coefficient in the Nordic countries and the EU

Country	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Denmark	..	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.24	0.25	0.25	0.27	0.27	0.28	0.28
Faroe Islands	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Greenland	0.33	0.34	0.34	0.31	0.33	0.33	0.34	0.33	0.33	0.34	..
Finland	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.26	0.25	0.26	0.26
Aland Islands	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
Iceland	..	..	0.24	0.25	0.26	0.28	0.27	0.30	0.26	0.24	0.24
Norway	..	0.27	0.25	0.28	0.31	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.23	0.23
Sweden	0.23	..	0.23	0.23	0.24	0.23	0.24	0.25	0.24	0.24	0.25
EU27	..	..	..	0.29	0.29	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.30	0.31	0.31

Source: "INDIC107: Gini coefficient by reporting country". Web 10 April 2015. <http://norden.statbank.dk/INDIC107>

The high level of welfare and equality in the region, which can be illustrated by Corrado Gini coefficient – see Table 1, in

connection with a highly competitive (Schwab, weforum.org)[4] and flexible economy and high level of active employment especially among women are specific to the Nordic countries, but they are also valuable assets in the increasingly globalised world.

The international public remain interested and poses questions concerning the sources of the Nordic model, which could be an attractive perspective for the Europe of the future. The answer is complex and is the result of many factors. It seems to lie in the pragmatic approach towards the state and its citizens. The countries take pride in the honesty and transparency of their governments which are rigorously evaluated by the voters – in Sweden everyone has access to all official documents and is entitled to control politicians' activity. Citizens pay taxes honestly and act according to the regulations, and the government's decisions are commonly accepted and followed. Scandinavian people do not regard high taxes as an element of oppression, but as their civil obligation. Protestant ethics, social solidarity and a high level of civil honesty – according to the data of *Corruption Perceptions Index 2014*[5], the Nordic countries have the lowest rate of corruption in the world – are the main prerequisites of the positive attitude towards the high costs connected with the implementation of the Nordic welfare state (Osiński, newsweek.pl). The level of employment[6] and flexibility on the labour market are high as is the birth rate[7]. Extensive childcare enables women to reconcile family life with work, therefore, they are able to enter the labour market and be active politically to a larger extent than in other countries. Gender equality is a key element of the Nordic identity and one of the fundamentals of sustainable societies of the North. They are one of the "healthiest" democracies and, though not without problems also connected with extremism, their answers to all forms of political violence are tolerance, freedom of speech and democracy. The Nordic societies possess

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[4] Out of 144 countries, in 2015 the Nordic countries held the following positions: Finland – 4th, Sweden – 10th, Norway – 11th, Denmark – 13th, Iceland – 30th.

[5] Denmark held the 1st position, Finland – 3rd, Sweden – 4th, Norway – 5th, and Iceland – 12th.

[6] According to Eurostat in 2014, in the age group of 20–64 the coefficients were as follows: 75.9% for Denmark, 73.1% for Finland, 83.5% for Iceland, 79.6% for Norway, 80% for Sweden.

[7] In 2014 it was 1.86 in Norway, 1.73 in Denmark, 2.06 in Greenland, 1.73 in Finland, 1.88 in Iceland, 1.88 in Sweden.

two important features i.e. trust in others and belief in individual rights. The efficiency of the Nordic countries results from their positive work ethic. Their priorities are based on a deeply-rooted respect for people and nature thanks to which they have managed to sustain exceptional balance between the economic growth and conservation.

Areas of contacts between the Nordic countries

The North of Europe encompasses the countries which have deeply-rooted democratic traditions and extensive systems of social policy. Historical, cultural and linguistic analogies are the basis for Nordic co-operation, while trans-border mobility and a well-organised labour market help to enhance it. Due to years of co-operation, the level of the Nordic integration is high and concerns both formal and informal contacts between the countries. Currently, the collaboration is a complex process, including many national, governmental and institutional connections which form the "Nordic family". The trust, which has been built in the process, allows the Nordic countries to communicate, which consequently facilitates the exchange of information and common activities in the following areas: social care, economy, ecology, global and regional safety, humanitarian aid, the UN diplomatic activity, and participation in the UN, NATO and EU operations. The united Nordic countries present their interests in the international arena more efficiently without underestimating the role of NATO or the European Union. More importantly, the Nordic ties are strong enough to co-operate though not all of the countries are member states of the EU, not all of them use the Euro as their domestic currency and not all of them are members of NATO.

The Nordic countries co-operate in many different matters. It has a large influence on the dynamics of the regional development, and increases coherence as well as competitiveness. Geographical location, a common attitude towards life and democratic traditions, ethnic, cultural, religious but also political community facilitate the co-operation, which cannot be underestimated due to its scope, the net of contacts, and frequently informal character. Nowadays, it encompasses almost all areas, from taxes and insurances to cultural issues. Culture remains one of the fundamentals of co-operation between the Nordic countries, as for a long time it

has been a platform for a better understanding of neighbouring countries and for promoting common values (Wendt *passim*).

The Nordic Council supports co-operation between the Scandinavian governments and parliaments. It is the body which initiates and advises in the matter of contacts between the countries, especially those which result from agreements between them. Co-operation is coordinated by the Nordic Council of Ministers. Its chairmanship – similarly to the Nordic Council – is a rotating one, lasts for a year and is given over to another state of the region. The presidency undertakes essential initiatives which are to provide dynamics and continuity of contacts. Moreover, it allows particular countries to have influence on the priorities of co-operation.

The Nordic countries are similar in the number of inhabitants, size and power – except for Iceland. Individually, they do not hold a strong position, but acting together in the international arena they can change and push forward their ideas in many structures i.e. the EU, NATO, OSCE or UN. It is crucial that the Nordic co-operation is not an obstacle for other sovereign and democratic countries to participate in similar global and sub-regional processes. On the contrary, participation is the indication of Nordic pragmatism and awareness.

The Nordic Council of Ministers encompasses almost all areas of international relations. Many agreements have been signed to develop co-operation in various fields, including the agreement establishing a common labour market, the agreement concerning the Passport Union, cultural and transport agreement, a convention on conservation, languages and social convention. At the beginning of its activity, the Council established the Legal Committee, whose task was to prepare projects for the Scandinavian countries' legal unification in many areas such as economy, social life or culture, which were consequently sent as recommendations for the countries' governments. They then became the basis for international conventions concluded by the governments and passed by parliaments in the form of internal legal regulations. As far as the economy is concerned, the Council focuses on:

• regional policy – by developing near-border co-operation;
• energy policy – The Nordic Council of Electricity Operators, NORDEL, was founded; the Nordic Energy Research is an institution financing energy research between Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Iceland;

• trade and industrial policy – by developing contacts between the member countries' companies. The Nordic Innovation Centre NICe initiates and finances activities which increase the level of innovation in small and medium enterprises in the Scandinavian countries. Its objective is development without national barriers; the Nordic Project Fund-Nopef is a financing institution operating within the framework of the Nordic Council of Ministers, whose aim is to enhance international competitiveness of small and medium enterprises;

• financial and monetary matters – the countries issue joint statements and present them in the fora of the International Monetary Fund and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development. Nordic financial co-operation was strengthened by establishing the Norex Stock Exchange, a formalised co-operation between the existing stock exchanges. Also the CEOs of stock exchanges in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia have expressed a willingness to join the alliance;

• development of transport and communication – within the Council the countries cooperate on improving public transport, discuss issues of traffic congestion and rational development of communication in the near-border and northern areas.

Moreover, the Scandinavian countries have been obliged to co-operate in the area of:

• law – it focuses on removing unnecessary barriers to cross-border freedom of movement of persons and facilitates contacts between the Nordic countries;

• culture – The Nordic Culture Point, which is an office for cultural programmes, provides information and supports cultural institutions applying for financial grants; the Nordic Information Centre for Media and Communication Research NORDICOM aims at disseminating knowledge about the media and communication in Scandinavian countries; Nordic House in Reykjavik is a cultural institution whose aim is to enhance cultural contacts between Iceland and other Scandinavian countries; the Nordic Institute NIFIN in Finland whose objective is to promote knowledge about the languages and culture of other Scandinavian countries; the Nordic Institute of Greenland-Napa, which supports, stimulates and contributes to the development of cultural life in Greenland with a special emphasis on children and the youth; the Nordic Institute in Åland, whose task is to facilitate the cultural life of its citizens by contacts with other Scandinavian countries and promoting the culture of the Aland Islands in other parts of Scandinavia;

• education – in 2000 the Nordic Council of Ministers introduced the NORDPLUS programme for young people offering them an opportunity to travel and study. The programme offers three types of grants: NORDPLUS – for students, teachers and scientists working at universities and other institutions of higher education; NORDPLUS junior- for students aged 16–19 and their teachers; NORDPLUS mini – for classes aged 13–16 and their teachers. The programme offers financial support in lifelong education for partners from eight Baltic and Scandinavian countries. Its aim is to create a common Baltic-Nordic educational area;

• science – four institutions are worth mentioning: the Nordic Centre for Spatial Development, Scandinavian Institute of Maritime Law, Nordic Institute for Theoretical Physics, and the Nordic Institute of Folklore. Work in the research sector is coordinated by NordForsk, the institution which supports scientists' mobility and creates opportunities to carry out research in other Scandinavian countries. Also the co-operation in the area of education has been developed. The NORDDUNET database was created and a school network ODIN has been connected with the INTERNET within the Nordic educational system. Many educational programmes, scholarships and social programmes have been introduced;

• health and welfare – The Nordic Centre for Welfare and Social Issues has been established. Its aim is to improve the quality of social policy in the Scandinavian countries, support scientific research, create the network of international co-operation; also the Nordic School of Public Health-NHV has been founded, which is an institution for higher education and research into the public health area. The school offers training for medical personnel concerning healthcare in the Scandinavian and neighbouring regions;

• environmental – currently they are leaders in the area of modern climate solutions and energy technologies.

In 2015 Denmark was made responsible for the international co-operation in the Nordic region. Its slogan reads: "Stronger together". The Danish chairmanship has been focused on four issues whose aim is to strengthen the Nordic partnership, i.e.:

• growth and employment – green and sustainable economic growth, an emphasis on innovation and creativity which have a significant impact on creating new workplaces and development of cities;

• welfare – eliminating inequality in healthcare and the labour market, the fight against social dumping, providing education and training for young people which are essential to obtain a market

position, promoting new workplaces and training centres for young people; exchange of experiences in the area of elderly people's rehabilitation, monitoring long-term consequences of sexual assaults and creating a map of threats in this field, promoting business and innovative digital solutions in order to develop a Nordic system of social care which will allow the countries of the region to remain at the forefront of digital technologies;

• enhance knowledge of Scandinavian values by promoting the "Nordic brand" – sustainable development, innovations, climate and environment, renewable energy, education, democracy, transparency, low level of corruption and gender equality are fundamental Nordic values which the neighbouring countries pay attention to especially in periods of financial crises, and which are perceived as a source of inspiration for their own social challenges. Denmark emphasises the need of promoting the assets of the region, and the knowledge of the fundamental values of individual countries;

• the Arctic – Denmark expects the Nordic countries to play an active role in attempts to guarantee sustainable development of the Arctic based on the needs of the local communities. In the "Blue Arctic" programme, the Danish presidency will focus on the ocean which plays a key role in the Arctic transformation. Climate change means melting icecaps, new navigation routes and an increased volume of shipping, which, in turn, will lead to the development of entrepreneurship and most importantly will require security at sea to be improved. The increase in maritime activity means pressure on the marine environment. Protection of biodiversity has become the most important issue. Denmark expects the Nordic countries to join in documenting the research on the Arctic marine environment's reaction to the increase in transport and fisheries. An extensive knowledge about the biodiversity on the ocean floor is essential to manage the fisheries and conservation appropriately. The experience gained in the Arctic might be transferred to other sea regions. ("Growth, welfare and values").

Economic growth, public health, a high level of social security and safe environment are interdependent factors of sustainable development which remains at the centre of attention for the countries of the North. The Nordic countries have common views on key social and economic issues. They aim to promote the principles of sustainable development in the local environment and in a global perspective. They are included in the Strategy of

Sustainable Development concluded in August 2003 ("A Good Life in a Sustainable Nordic Region. Nordic Strategy for Sustainable Development").

The Nordic region is a group of nations with a common heritage. It must be emphasised that there are areas in which they do not possess similar views, priorities and interests. Denmark, Sweden and Finland have common business interests in the Baltic region, whereas Norway and Iceland have always been more West-oriented. Denmark, Sweden and Finland are more focused on their land borders, whereas for Norway the Atlantic Ocean remains a priority for the country. The alliances of the five Nordic countries are different: Norway, Denmark and Iceland belong to NATO, Finland and Sweden want to remain militarily neutral, Sweden, Finland and Denmark are in the European Union, the countries have different currencies with only Finland using the Euro. This fact, however, does not hamper co-operation, but on the contrary, enhances it in every possible area. It is proof of Nordic pragmatism and reconciling seemingly conflicting national interests.

Considering the exceptional proximity of the Nordic countries and their consensus in many areas, developing and extending co-operation seems to be a natural process. Thus, foreign policy and security have become crucial areas of co-operation., which can become an example of "joining and sharing" abilities and possibilities in action. The changes in international policy has led the Scandinavian countries to believe increased regional co-operation is essential. The Nordic region is now less peripheral, thanks to the Arctic which has taken on greater importance due to the natural resources and new navigation routes opened up because of climate change. The region is increasingly used as a corridor between Europe and Asia for sea, air and railway transportation. This, in turn, means that foreign affairs, defence and security have become the most dynamically developing areas of co-operation in Scandinavia. Within the framework of NORDEFCO, the countries have drawn up rules for closer co-operation in the area of defence in every aspect, starting from joint public orders to foreign operations, education and military training.

The Nordic countries have entered a new stage of military co-operation. In April 2015, the defence Ministers of Norway, Sweden, Finland, Iceland and Denmark announced they intended to extend military co-operation to counter the threat from the

Russian Federation in the Ukrainian crisis. They signed an agreement in which they decided on more joint military exercises, sharing data and experiences in combating cyber attacks, industrial co-operation including arms industry and exchange of intelligence data. The ministers expressed the need to be informed about any unauthorized air traffic, activation of an early warning system, reducing the risk of unpredicted situations and misunderstandings (Nybakk norden.org/en).

According to J. Strang, the author of *Nordic Communities. A vision for the future,* intelligent and flexible co-operation based on solid fundamentals of democracy is the best promotion of the Nordic brand. It is commonly agreed that Nordic co-operation must be enhanced, but there is no clear vision. He quotes Stoltenberg whose idea was to co-operate in the area of foreign-and security policy and Wetterberg who intended to create a federal state (norden.org/en/publications). The author states that only close co-operation can develop a strong Nordic community and outlines key proposals for the future that can tighten the relations:

• prioritise specific policy areas by designating them as Nordic Communities (as per the NORDEFCO model in the area of defence);

• make the foreign and defence policies part of official Nordic co-operation;

• the Nordic Council and the Nordic Council of Ministers should be realistic in their relationships with the EU (ensuring EU regulations are implemented in a uniform manner);

• use foreign and defence policies as a model for rationalisation in other sectors;

• counter the democratic deficit in international co-operation by involving non-government organisations in international partnerships;

• hold annual debates on Nordic co-operation in the national parliaments;

• separate the formal and substantive work of the Council of Ministers' Secretariat by creating a separate unit – currently it operates as both the administrative secretariat and as a driving force for new ideas;

• make political parties the main driving force of Nordic co-operation;

• reinforce the Nordic brand by defining objectives, standards and indices in various areas of co-operation;

• enhance opportunities for informal contacts between civil servants;

• invest in knowledge about Scandinavia – by developing co-operation between schools and improving the teaching of history, politics, language and geography of the neighbouring countries and running exchange programmes for teachers and students;

• enhance cultural co-operation and increase the Nordic Cultural Fund's budget.

Conclusion

The main pillars of the Nordic model of co-operation are the tradition of constitutional principles, activity of public movements and organisations, freedom of speech, equality, solidarity and respect for the natural environment. In connection with labour and entrepreneurship, these elements are the features of a society which favours efficiency, the sense of security and balance between an individual and a group. The Scandinavian model assumes that the fundamental value is the respect for diversity. There is common acceptance and political will for close co-operation, which have brought many advantages for the Nordic region in comparison to other parts of Europe. Scandinavian countries occupy top positions in international rankings concerning the equal share of income, competitiveness, innovations, employment policy, equality, gender equality and conservation. For many years they have been considered the most stable in the world. It can be seen in the ranking prepared by the *Fund for Peace*, which takes into consideration economic and social indices, the quality of public services, respect for human rights and the rule of law. In 2014, the top four positions were taken by Finland, Sweden, Denmark and Norway with Iceland in eighth place. The countries' co-operation means not only discussing and implementing the basic Nordic values, but also helps to make them more visible and emphasises the unique character of the Nordic partnership which is beneficial for citizens both in and the outside the region (Nowiak, J. *passim*, Piotrowski *passim,* Bednarczyk et.al 111–32).

Taking into account the above – described characteristics of the Nordic countries and the importance of co-operation, it should be emphasized that the region is not free from imperfections. These include: high taxes and asylum policy. So this is not the end of disagreements in the "Nordic family". Another thing – Denmark, Iceland and Norway are members of NATO and the Swedes and

Finns remain neutral and outside the alliance. These differences between the Nordic countries translate, in turn, to a different perception regarding the direction of the development of the armed forces. This is why it is difficult to predict the future course of military co-operation between them and the scale.

Nordic co-operation is renowned throughout the world and perceived as the collaboration of a group of countries which are similar in their views and activities. It should be an encouragement for other countries and sub-regional structures to establish closer contacts with the region. The example could be the Balkan countries, which seek a model for their contacts in the Northern Europe. The politicians of Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia and Herzegovina admit that their geography, political systems, culture and traditions are similar, therefore, the Nordic model, out of other European models of integration, seems to be the most appropriate. The main area of interest is the improvement of co-operation between the parliaments of the countries, signatories of the Dayton Agreement – which ended the Balkan war, and the use of positive Scandinavian experiences in the areas of interest, as well as creating a system of coordination which could secure the continuity of the contacts.

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THE EUROPEAN UNION'S RELATIONS WITH GREENLAND

ABSTRACT: Greenland has a special relationship with the European Union due to its link with the Kingdom of Denmark – Greenland's mother country. As a result, Greenland shares some parts of the EU's internal market via association agreements. Greenland, has become a meeting place of American, European and Asian interests in the Arctic. It is therefore essential that the EU doesn't lose the North and keeps strengthening its relationship with Greenland. After having focused its attention on the East and the South, it is high time that the European Union looks further North, notably through a more ambitious Arctic Window in its Northern sphere of influence.

KEYWORDS: Greenland, European Union, international relations

Introduction

Currently, twenty-eight countries are part of the European Union (EU). However, the EU's law is not uniformly applied to the territory of all Member States, because some of them have special territories (Ziller, 2007, pp. 51–62). They have special relationships with governments, within which they are located, which in turn implies the need to define their relationship with the EU. Among the countries and territories of the EU, Greenland has a unique status. It is an autonomous part of the Kingdom of Denmark and it is the only one in the history of the organization which decided to leave the Community (Vestergaard, 2013, pp. 1–9).

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Over the centuries, the geostrategic importance of Greenland has changed extensively. Initially, the island did not present any great value. Its role was limited to supply the European market with exotic goods (Brańka, 2013, pp. 467–484). Global warming has led to Greenland's international position coming to the fore. This includes the EU, which until recently had not taken Arctic issues into account. The involvement of the community in this area was determined by geographical factors. Until the mid- 1990s , the only Arctic country of the EU was Denmark – and that was only because of Greenland.

For several years, the status of the island has changed in the international arena. The possibility of exploring Greenland has attracted the attention of several world powers, such as: China, the USA and Russia. One can advance a hypothesis that the activity of the international community in Greenland has made the EU realize the need for a stronger interest in this region (Łuszczuk, 2010, pp. 156–182). Therefore, the purpose of this article is to answer the following questions: Does the EU have the right to speak on matters of the Arctic? What goals does it intend to achieve by working together with Greenland? Is it possible to consider the EU's action to be effective in this area? It seems that in recent years, there is a growing awareness of the importance of Greenland in the EU, although it remains uncertain if this commitment is sufficient.

Greenland – a strategic partner of the European Union

Due to global warming, the melting of the Arctic ice area (Kubiak, 2009, p. 14), and the opportunities of extracting energy, raw materials, and rare earth metals, the international community's interest in the Arctic region is growing. The interests of different countries intersect more and more often in this region. However, the Arctic is one of the last places on Earth whose legal status has not been regulated. Hence, you can observe the intensification of territorial claims, reported by the states – the parties of the Arctic competition – to subordinate these areas. So the question arises about the entities that may lay claim to the Arctic? Does the European Union also have the same rights? The answer to this question is that it is not clear.

There are at least three concepts of the boundaries of the Arctic (Janicki, 2013, pp. 105–107): the Arctic Circle, isotherm

10 degrees Celsius in the month of July, and the extent of the occurrence of trees. In terms of a geo-political view, independently of the aforementioned variants of the boundaries of the Arctic, there are parts that belong to five countries: Russia, Norway, Canada, Denmark and the United States. In turn the isothermal variant should include Iceland. According to the concept utilizing the Arctic Circle, we should also mention Finland and Sweden, but exclude Iceland.

In this context, it is also worth noting the geostrategic importance of Greenland as it is located between North America, Russia and Europe.

From the above, three members of the EU which are also three Arctic countries – Sweden, Denmark and Finland, which can lay claim to this area and two countries (Norway and Iceland), which cooperate with the EU within the framework of the European Economic Area.

It would seem that the natural direction of interest for the EU should be the Arctic, but over the years it remained on the margins of its foreign policy (Tomala, Czarny, 2009). It should be noted that only a part of Finland and Sweden extends into the Arctic Circle. Both of these countries do not have direct access to the Arctic Ocean. On the other hand, Norway borders the Arctic Ocean, but it is not a full member of the EU, and the same applies to Iceland. In fact, only Greenland, which is dependent on the territory of Denmark, gives the EU a mandate to be involved in the affairs of the Arctic.

So why should the EU engage in the issues related to the Arctic Circle? The EU counts itself among the entities that want to take an active part in the discussion on the future of this region (Dośpiał-Borysiak, 2001, p. 1). Reasons for interest in one of the least populated regions of the world should be seen, among others, in the reports of the melting Arctic icecap (Kępka, 2013, pp. 217–218; Kępka, 2009, pp. 116–135; Styszyńska, 2007, pp. 77–91). Changes in the environment of the Arctic imply new ways to use the potential of the island. One of many possibilities is mentioned by K. Kubiak (2011, pp. 105–134) who discusses the emergence of new shipping routes. In the case of Greenland, we are talking about the Northwest Passage, which can be an alternative route in the future to the Panama Canal which is 5000 nautical miles longer. Greenland, due to its strategic location in relation to the Northwest Passage may become an ideal place to create infrastructure for transport

across the Arctic Ocean, such as ports, maritime supervision, and emergency systems (Schymik, 2009, p. 2).

Another reason for the EU's involvement in the Arctic is the issue of exploiting the rich natural resources present in Greenland (Yenikeyeff, Krysiek, 2007; Kijewski, 2009, p. 283), whose exploitation was previously unprofitable. Industrialized countries are now in a really difficult situation due to the lack of elements necessary to create new technologies. For example, nickel batteries are an essential component of mobile phones, laptops and hybrid cars – they need lanthanum, one of the 17 rare earth metals[1] which are only present in Europe in trace amounts. Currently in Europe, there is a lack of as many as 14 critical raw materials essential for the EU's industry, they are also hard to find on other foreign markets. The EU Member States are in a very difficult position because they are dependent on the import of many essential raw materials, and nine of them can be found in the possession of Greenland.

Apart from the above mentioned economic issues, it should also be pointed out that global problems may require the presence of an external institution, such as the European Union. These problems especially affect the sensitive circumpolar ecosystem, including the issues, such as environmental protection of the Arctic, the protection of indigenous peoples, the issues related to global warming, and the conservation of resources. As the Commissioner for External Relations and European Neighborhood Policy, Benita Ferrero-Waldner, noted, "The Arctic is a unique and vulnerable region located in the immediate vicinity of Europe" (EurActiv, 21.11.2008). The development of this region will have significant repercussions for the lives of future generations. Therefore, the EU's actions in this area may be crucial in maintaining a balance between an exploitative policy and the environmental protection of the Arctic.

The status of Greenland – from colonialism to autonomy

The status of Greenland should be considered in the context of its dependence on Denmark. In literature, there are many classifications of dependent territories (Sobczyński, 2006,

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[1] Rare-earth metals are: lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, samarium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, lutetium, scandium and yttrium.

pp. 253–255). We can distinguish five types of dependence, as defined by the degree of relation between the country and metropolises (Bina, 183, pp. 136–137). These are associated countries, protectorates, colonies, overseas territories and special territories.

Referring to history, the first attempts to colonize Greenland, though unsuccessful, took place as early as the 10th century. The term *Colony* is commonly applied to each dependent territory, even though its system and the degree of dependence is not specified (Malendowski, 2000, pp. 176–177). Colonialism means a historical phenomenon involving the mastering and maintaining political and economic control by some countries over others in order to exploit them. Thus the colony is considered to be an integral part of a metropolitan country. According to M. Sobczyński (Sobczyński, 2006, p. 317), a characteristic feature in the colonial system is the lack of representation of a metropolis in Parliament. This type of selfdom in Greenland was associated with the era of the Middle Ages. Then Erik the Red (who was Norman), reached the world's largest island, where the climate at that time was radically different to today's weather conditions. The remaining areas of the island were colonized in subsequent years. The first official mention of Greenland was in 1053, when Pope Leo IX transferred the colonist population of Greenland to the diocese of Bishop Adalbert. In the mid-fourteenth century the Bishop of Bergen – Ivar Bardarson, while visiting the east coast of Greenland, did not meet any colonists. Due to the severe weather conditions, trade with Norway was also declining. The last colonists died out in the second half of the 15th century, which brought the first era of Greenland's colonization by the Europeans to a close. Until now, there has been an ongoing dispute about the cause of the Greenland colonization failure by the Scandinavians. Among many hypotheses, we can list the following: damage to the local environment (mainly arable land), lower and lower temperatures, and an increasing inability to establish good relations with the local people – Inuits.

Then, for about 250 years, Europe's interest in Greenland declined . Attempts to discover the Northwest Passage took place along the coast of Greenland, the Europeans had contacts with the Inuits, but they [contacts] did not have a permanent character and were not associated with a permanent presence on the island. Due to Greenland's coastal waters, whalers from England and Scotland more often visited the island.

The era of Danish rule began in 1721. A Danish–Norwegian expedition led by Hans Egede headed out to Greenland in order to establish contacts with previous colonizers of the island. Although the expedition was unsuccessful, the Danes founded a new colony – Good Hope (Godthåb) – today`s Nuuk. With the start of the colonization of the island, the Danes also started a period of the island's isolation from foreign (not Danish) influence, among others, in trade and settlement. This phase lasted basically until the end of World War II.

After the war, there was no longer a climate conducive to restoring colonial order. The United Nations set itself the objective, among others, which was the full decolonization of the World (The United Nations Charter, Art. 71 point b).

In the UN Charter a term of decolonization appeared which meant the process of liquidation of the colonial system through the granting of sovereignty to dependent territories. Thus began the process of transforming colonies into other forms of political systems whose status bore the hallmarks of a quasi-autonomy and was designed to mask the colonial nature of ruling. Under these provisions on June 5, 1953, Greenland was redefined as a province of Denmark. Therefore Greenlanders sat in the Danish parliament, and all the island's inhabitants were granted almost the same civil rights as native Danes. Also, it is worth mentioning that Denmark has applied a symbolic intimidation against Greenland for years, which has revealed the dynamics of power in social and political life (Lubowicka, 2013, pp. 257–268; Thisted, 2015, pp. 105–120). Despite introducing the same law in both countries, this symbolic intimidation was a tool to manage its colony, which developed in a different way (Tomala, 2015, pp. 461–478).

At this time Denmark became a member of the European Community, and Greenland also became a part of European integration, despite the fact that in the accession referendum the residents of the Island voted against accession to the EU. Initially, Greenland's membership in the EEC was associated with the benefits of an economic nature. The island received support from the EEC to the amount of 10–25 million dollars per year for the modernization of infrastructure and the development of education (L. E. Johansen, 1992, p. 34). It was also supported by grants from the European Investment Bank.

Only on May 1, 1979, did Denmark decide to transform Greenland into an autonomous country, with a full internal self-government, and even partial international powers. The issues

related to defense and finance were at the discretion of Denmark. With these new laws that Greenland received, it decided in February 1982, to change the status of the island within the EU and left the organization. On January 1, 1985 it acquired the status of an associated overseas territory of the EU, although its metropolis remained a member of this organization. Greenland's reason for leaving the EEC was the need to maintain control of its extensive area of fisheries. This move was dictated by the Inuit opposition against the EU's fisheries policy, according to which the Greenland Seas were open to foreign, European fleets. K. Szwed looks at another aspect as to why Greenland left the European structures. They strongly believed that "Membership in the structures of the EEC was treated as a possible threat to the Inuit's ethnic identity" (Szwed, 2013, p. 138; Lubowicka, 2011, pp. 76–82). It was feared that the interests of smaller entities would be ignored. Greenlandic Euroscepticism had its source in cultural, social and economic exploitation (Bourdieu, 1986, pp. 241–258). Greenlander's opposition to such EC actions initiated aspirations for independence from both Denmark and the EU.

Until 1982, Greenland was considered to be an integral part of the EU through Denmark, allowing the EU's vessels to fish in its waters. After Greenland left the EU, the relationship of both parties had to be revised. The document changing the relationship of partners was the Treaty amending the Treaties establishing the European Communities with regard to Greenland, the Treaty of Greenland. It placed great emphasis on the sphere of co-operation and development. In the preamble, there was a reference to "the introduced arrangements for establishing close and lasting links between the Community and Greenland and taking into account the common interests – in particular the needs of Greenland in the field of development". Moreover, the preamble stipulated that while the status of the Overseas Countries and Territories (OCT) should provide an appropriate framework for relations with Greenland, "it should also provide additional, detailed rules in Greenland". The protocol on special arrangements for Greenland, which was attached to the Treaty, emphasized that fishery products from Greenland should be duty free and have unrestricted access to the Community market, provided that the Community was granted satisfactory possibilities for access to the Greenland waters under the Fisheries Agreement.

On February 1, 1985, with the Treaty of the Greenland (signed on March 13, 1984 in Brussels) coming into force, the Island was

granted the status appropriate for an overseas territories associated with the Community. The OCT status was already defined in Art. 133 of the Treaty of Rome, where the goal of the association was to promote economic and social development of countries and territories and to establish close economic relations between them and the Community as a whole. In accordance with the principles set out in the preamble to this Treaty, the association served primarily the interests and prosperity of the inhabitants of these countries and territories in a way that leads them to the economic, social and cultural development, to which they aspire. In the case of the OCT their relationship with the Union was perfunctory, limited only to participation in selected programs. The close relationship with the Member State – in this case with Denmark – gave Greenland's residents the privilege of being a citizen of the EU.

Under the Treaty of Greenland, the provisions of the Treaty of Rome on the OCT were extended to Greenland. In this case Greenland is not a party of the system, as not being a sovereign entity, it is represented by Denmark. The association agreement does not create a separate institutional system which could lead to a mutual dialogue. It grants only unilateral trade preferences for Greenland, incorporating them into the sphere of functioning of the Common Market. Customs duties are introduced on products imported from the Community provided that they are used for development, industrialization and supply Greenland's budget. In other cases, both the Member States of the European Union, as well as the discussed dependent territory apply the rules under which trade takes place within the EU.

Every few years, the EU reviews relations between the EU and Greenland, placing the changes in protocols to the Treaty of Greenland. The protocol, which was in force between 2001 and 2006 was criticized by the EU, as it simultaneously regulated the two issues: the payment of compensation for the use of fishing resources and budgetary support for the island's government. It was pointed out that the EU action is uneconomical because the value of the fishing catches was less than the compensation paid by the EU.

The association was important in the 1950's and early 1960's during the colonial period, but currently it has begun to lose its essence due to global warming and the forecasts for the occurrence of the rare earth metals and energy resources in the area of the island. Thus the EU considered the geostrategic importance of Greenland in its conclusions of February 24, 2003 on the periodical review of

the Fourth Protocol relating to fishing between the European Union and the Government of Denmark and the autonomous government of Greenland, An agreement recognized that there was a need to broaden and strengthen future relations between the EU and Greenland taking into account the importance of fisheries and the need for structural and sectoral reforms in Greenland. After 2006, the Council decided to base the future relationship between the European Union and Greenland on a comprehensive partnership for sustainable development, including specific fisheries agreement, negotiated according to the general principles and rules applicable to such agreements. It may be noted that the Greenland Treaty took a more prominent form after 2006 when the partnership was signed. It is based on historical, political, economic and cultural ties between the two parties. Provisions of the agreement provide for a consistent EU financial assistance (e.g. 38 million in 2008) intended for the development of several Greenlandic sectors, such as scientific research, education, industry and fishing. In return the EU receives permission to extend its rights to fishing in the waters of the island.

The decision of 2006 (2006/526/EC) on the partnership between the EU and Greenland and the Kingdom of Denmark expired on December 31, 2013. There was again the need for an alignment of the bilateral relations so as to promote a stable and favorable a socially inclusive international order, to pursue common global public purposes, and to defend the vital interests of the Union and extend knowledge of the Union in third party countries and Overseas Countries and Territories.

Currently, the specific objectives of the partnership are determined by the Decision of Council of March 14, 2014 (Journal of Laws EU.L.2014.76.1 the Decision of Council 2014/137/EU). Among the top priorities are: support for Greenland – and co-operation with it – to face the biggest challenges, especially the need for sustainable diversification of the economy, the need to increase the skills of its labor force, including scientists, and the need to improve the Greenlandic information systems in the area of information and communication technologies, contribute to increase the potential of Greenland's administrative authorities in the formulation and implementation of national policies, particularly in new areas of mutual interest set out in the program document for sustainable development.

The main areas of co-operation in the framework of the partnership include: education and training, tourism and culture;

natural resources, including the raw materials; energy, climate, environment and biodiversity; Arctic issues; the social sector, labor mobility, social security systems, food safety and food security, innovations and researches in areas, such as energy, climate change, disaster resilience, natural resources, including raw materials, and sustainable management of living resources. The indicative amount for the implementation of this decision in the period between 2014 and 2020 is more than 217 million euro.

Greenland – where the interests of great powers meet

China, Denmark, the USA, Canada, Australia, the UK and the European Union are all interested in Greenland's natural resources. Although it has 9 of the 14 rare metals and crude oil, uranium, gas and gold, the lack of infrastructure, manpower, and financial resources make it impossible to begin extraction. It is difficult to acknowledge that the priority for Greenlanders is to increase the presence of a commonwealth on the Island. Their intentions are contrary to this as they aim to recover Greenland's sovereignty and independence from both Denmark and the EU. As D. Degeorges emphasizes, the biggest challenge for the Greenland nation is "not to become a bad player in the Arctic region" (Degeorges, 2013b). As he points out in order to have all the prerogatives, you cannot have a weak state because the consequences of a poor Greenland policy in the Arctic will be a threat to energy security. To achieve independence, Greenlanders need to build strong state structures and a strong economy, independent from the influence of world powers and multinational corporations (Degeorges, 2013a). The proper selection of the rules governing co-operation with partners is very important here. Interest in Greenland is high, as evidenced by numerous diplomatic meetings conducted by the Greenland authorities. In November 2011, Li Keqiang – then the then Deputy Prime Minister of China had a meeting with Ove Karl Berthelsen, the minister of industry and natural resources. This meeting showed that China was interested in maintaining good relations with Greenland. In April 2012, a similar meeting was held with the participation of South Korea, when the delegation to Greenland was led by the Minister for Lands and Resources, Xu Shaoshi. In June 2013, China's President Hu Jintao arrived for a three-day visit

to Denmark, although apparently the issues of rare earth metals were not discussed. In the reports concerning Hillary Clinton`s visit to Greenland – one of her first questions related to the rare earth metals.

The world's most important politicians now 'beat a path to Greenland's door'. For example, in September 2013, Greenland was visited by the South Korean President, Lee Myung-bak, and the Kores corporation (Korean Resources Corporation) signed an agreement with a local mining company Nuna Minerals on the joint exploitation of rare earth metals (Degeorges, 2013c). It is not surprising that the former Prime Minister of Greenland, K. Kleist, for many years was under pressure from foreign investors and politicians from the European Union, the United States and China. During his years in office more than one hundred mining licenses were granted. The flagship project, which had been previously mentioned, was to launch iron ore mining by the British company London Mining at a cost of 2.3 billion of dollars and export this raw material to China. Two thousand employees ,brought from China, participated in the works near Nuuk fjord. The local community expressed, at this project, their objection in the elections of 2013 because such a large migration meant as much as a four percent increase in the population of Greenland. In addition, the US giant – Alcoa Inc. is planning to open an aluminum factory with thousands of new jobs, but the Americans do not arouse as much cultural concerns as the Chinese who are associated with aggressive investments and economic expansion[2].

The above-mentioned examples prove that the world's great powers , who look to Greenland for resources, are now in competition with the EU. However, the EU itself is not an active entity in the "race for Arctic resources". It was even proved by K. Kleist, who had difficulty to communicate with the European Commission. The so-called memorandum of understanding intended to ensure the European countries access to Greenland's resources linked the organization with Greenland. However, Greenlanders were not satisfied with the protracted negotiations and before the election Kleist had threatened by saying to the EU that the countries of the Old Continent would soon lose the possibility of exploitation of the island's natural resources. As a result of bureaucratic delays at the EU level, Greenland quickly and efficiently concluded a similar

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[2] China is a major supplier of rare earth metals and dictates prices on world markets.

agreement with China. The only thing that the European Union could do in this situation was to claim the limitation of the Chinese presence on the Island (Degeorges, 2012).

The European Union itself, in order to gain access to raw materials of the island, plans to strengthen mutually beneficial co-operation with Greenland, allowing the combining of infrastructure, investment and building potential with the exploration and extraction of raw materials. In June 2012 in Nuuk, a letter of intent for co-operation in this field was signed on behalf of the European Commission. However, this co-operation is slow, bureaucratic – and at the very beginning is not competitive with the Chinese regime, which makes decisions quickly and does not need consultation in the most important matters. In June 2013, the EU Commissioner for Industry, Antonio Tajani, visited Greenland and sought the possibility of using valuable elements for EU companies. China, who is engaged in intensive negotiations, took firm steps. Despite the concerns of the Greenlandic society about the presence of the Chinese on the island, Greenland maintains a close relationship with this great power (EurActiv, 2013). It may be noted that Denmark understands such a Greenland policy. This was illustrated by the joint meeting of the Minister of Greenland and the Ambassador of Denmark in China. On February 17, 2014, the Danish ambassador Erik Vilstrup Lorenzen and Greenland Foreign Minister Kai Holst Andersen in an interview with "China Daily" pointed out that they started talks with two Chinese companies on mining co-operation in Greenland (a copper company from Jiangxi province). Kai Holst Andersen emphasized that if this co-operation was successful, it would be a good starting point for expanding co-operation with other Chinese companies in Greenland. China promised in exchange access to its market for Denmark and Greenland, and scientific research co-operation with the participation of the Kingdom of Denmark and Greenland (Ningzhu). Currently, about 58 percent of companies engaged in mineral exploration in Greenland come from Canada and Australia. The EU companies account for only 15 percent (including Denmark, Germany, the Czech Republic and the United Kingdom). Although European companies have three-quarters of the operating licenses in Greenland, they have only a few concessions for exploration and actually engage in only a few (The United Kingdom, Germany and Denmark have most of these concessions).

Summary

Summing up the considerations on EU – Greenland relationships, we can draw the following conclusions:

1. The EU's focus on the effects of climate change and human activities in the Arctic has come rather late in the day. It was only in 2008, when the European Commission presented interests and objectives pursued by the policy of the European Union, and clarified the systematic and coordinated actions to respond to the challenges posed in this region of the world. Through this message, the EU made the first step in the direction of policy towards the Arctic. As stated in the article, the voice of the EU in this case results from the presence of Denmark in the Community and Greenland being a Danish dependent territory.

2. Greenland has the resources of raw materials, extremely valuable for the world powers, which makes the island a valuable trading partner. Today, there is increasing interest in Greenland showed by countries such as China, Korea, and others, which affects the growth of its international competitiveness. The conclusion is that Greenland knowing that it is at the center of many countries' interest wants to extract the most benefit for itself. Thus there is a change of EU policy in this region aimed at securing the needs of raw materials for Europe.

3. Assessing the resource potential, geologists indicate that one of the world's largest sources of various raw materials is located in Greenland. Due to global warming, access to them will be cheaper and easier – this will consequently allow us to take advantage of the economic development opportunity in Greenland, so that in the future it may become a sovereign state, independent from both Denmark and EU subsidies.

4. One of the major threats facing Greenland is the proper use of its role as a "crude tycoon". The need for diversification of countries investing in Greenland should be also be pointed out. It can be assumed that the major projects in Greenland will be largely financed by Asian countries (the threat of monopolization of rare resource management), and therefore cultural and civilizational threats may emerge. Therefore, there is a need to strengthen Greenland's political relations with the European Union, which is a counterweight to the influence of Asia.

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DISCOURSE ON THE MULTICULTURAL POLICY IN SWEDEN IN LIGHT OF THE CHARLIE HEBDO TERRORIST ATTACK

ABSTRACT: Multicultural policy has recently been undergoing a marked crisis and is subject to wide criticism. In the light of recent terrorist attacks it is often highlighted that the reason for such situations might be too much openness towards foreigners. Most European countries are changing their immigration and integration policies limiting their social security and restricting the possibilities of an influx of immigrants. Sweden, which is perceived as one of the most open and tolerant states in Europe also faces new challenges concerning the future of its multicultural policy. The crisis in tolerance towards foreigners is quite visible and it is obvious that the social moods in this state are evolving. Therefore, the aim of the article is to analyze changes in the attitude towards Swedish immigration and its integration policy in the light of the attack on the *Charlie Hebdo* weekly offices.

KEYWORDS: multiculturalism, multicultural policy, Sweden, immigration, immigration policy, integration policy.

Multiculturalism, multi-ethnicity, and globalization. These are the slogans that have already secured their place in the canon of contemporary international studies discourse. Globalization has caused a broad spectrum of consequences, such as a significant ethnic diversity of contemporary societies and constant growth in cultural diversification. These changes can bring many benefits for contemporary states – enriching cultural dialogue is often highlighted. Unfortunately, together with civilization development and globalization, increased citizen mobility and the growth of interdependences both

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between states and non-state actors, it is hard not to notice the threats that stem from this. Media reporting about terrorist attacks and their attempts force us to focus once again on the possible effective strategies of dealing with the problem of the many threats that derive from an increasingly cultural and ethnic diversity. This not only has an internal dimension, but a broader international context.

Individual countries tackle the inflow of foreigners in significantly different manners, both in the field of legal aspects of crossing the borders (tourism and labour immigration, asylum seekers etc.) and an integration policy concerning such areas as the social security availability for foreigners, employment possibilities, naturalization procedures, language programmes (if such are available), and last but not least, the acceptance of cultural diversity in everyday life. One of the most popular policies that has been implemented is assimilation, which is seen in France and the United Kingdom through their respective multicultural policies. This policy undoubtedly has its advantages and disadvantages. However, in times of recognizing differences between cultures, respecting them and political correctness, multiculturalism seems to be more appropriate and compatible with the newest trends.

The aim of the article is therefore to identify potential changes in the attitude towards Swedish immigration and integration policy in the light of the attacks on the *Charlie Hebdo* weekly offices in Paris. The question is where is the line or border between respecting different cultures, customs and values and at the same time remaining loyal to one's own values and historically constituted laws. Another research question is whether religious radicalization and an increasing number of terrorist attacks from religious extremists influence the future of multiculturalism in Sweden. According to the specific, hybrid character of Swedish multiculturalism, it appears to be that the Swedish policy is directed towards creating such conditions, that will naturally encourage immigrants to integrate on a large scale without any of the characteristics of assimilation.

Sweden at the crossroads – multiculturalism or itegration?

Currently, multiculturalism is an integral part of modern European policy towards immigrants and ethnic minorities. Each country adopts it in a slightly different form. It can be

official policy to recognize minorities and their right to cultivate their mother culture, whereas in other countries it can only be an oppositional demand while fighting for wider immigrant rights (Ålund, Schierup 1). It is important though, that many European countries at least declare their openness to multiculturalism and to immigrants themselves, but at the same time make efforts towards limiting immigration, selecting foreigners who can enter their country and restricting the possibility of unhampered cultivation of their own traditions[1]. It is also worth mentioning that current wide integration programs are very popular so it is hard to discuss multiculturalism in its pure form.

The primary definition of multiculturalism is derived from cultural anthropology. Accordingly, the existing cultural heritage leads to the creation of distinctive groups existing within the receiving society. There is no possibility of reshaping the cultural identity, and culture itself only has static characteristics (Gęsiak, 19). Over time, the perception of culture and multiculturalism has undergone deep changes.

Considering the mobility of people around the world, some questions have been raised concerning the range of states' tolerance towards immigrants' commitment to their cultural identity and heritage. A multicultural policy seemed to be the answer, which relied on respecting all cultural differences deriving from religion, language, traditions, but also respecting ethnic and racial diversity. Multiculturalism also assumes that it is not necessary to renounce one's own cultural identity and assimilate with the receiving society in order to fully participate in daily life (Balicki, Stalker, 254).

Multiculturalism can be perceived in institutional categories, which means that the state creates formal structures, which constitute certain legal borders for ethnic groups to coexist. Such institutionalization is not necessarily an attempt to integrate or assimilate. In a multicultural society, all cultures and value systems can coexist peacefully and each of them can be an added value for a society as a whole (Barska, 14, 32). A society within which there is a balance and mutual understanding between a society's values and those that are fundamental for ethnic minority groups exists will also be called a multicultural society in this article (Ratajczak, 76). Therefore, a basis for multiculturalism

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[1] France can be an example since it forbids the exposition of one's own cultural otherness in the public sphere, inter alia the possibility of wearing burqas, traditional turbans or other religious symbols.

was providing a feeling of dignity resulting in equal treatment and respect for cultural diversities. Such provisions became so popular that it became a demand for equal status for all cultures and value systems (Możejko, 142). It resulted in the development of one's feeling of dignity and increased motivation to be faithful to one's culture and convictions. Extensive migrations, together with the appearance of minorities with their feeling of separate identity resulted in expecting recognition and respect of these differences from the state[2].

Since multiculturalism encompasses many aspects of the political arena and state functioning as well as daily social life, it is extremely hard to clearly define this phenomenon. An element which is often stated in multiculturalism definitions is the co-existence within one society of different cultures and ethnically and religiously different groups (Rokicki, 30–1). Such a definition is rather narrow and concerns only the ideological aspect, without characterizing a specific policy or strategy. Other attempts to define multiculturalism are as follows: *"it is a phenomenon which means the co-existence within a state's territory of two or more groups being different in the meaning of language, beliefs, customs, traditions and social organization systems"* (Paleczny 148) and *"multiculturalism is nowadays a problem of cultural differences within certain, especially multiethnic states which have their own ethnic, religious and sexual minorities who demand their own place in national culture"* (Burszta, 150). The second definition seems to be more precise, since it considers the political aspect – immigrant minorities demand recognition in the state's policy. Therefore, multiculturalism should include legal aspects providing all minorities with their rights together with providing cultural relativism where all cultures contribute to the dominant one (Grzybowski, 42).

The specificity of Swedish multicultural model is significantly derived from a wide range of social care and therefore, in the author's opinion, can be perceived as a hybrid combining both multicultural and integration elements. The Swedish state is based on the equality of every person, including foreigners who are legal

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[2] The main problems deriving from visible cultural diversity that receiving states must deal with according to Bikhu Parekf are Inter alia: female circumcision, ritual animal murders, polygamy, arranged marriages, limited Alcesto certain sport disciplines for Muslim women, marriages among close family, wearing headscarves in public places, Roma and Amish societies not sending children to schools. Parekh, B., *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, Harvard University Press: Harvard 2002, pp. 264–265.

immigrants. Therefore, they are also included in the Swedish social care system. Another characteristic of the Swedish model is the fact, that Sweden's population is rather small. The first immigrants from other Nordic states were welcomed. Carl Ulrik Schierup highlights that Finnish immigrants helped to form multicultural policy in Sweden. As the largest group among immigrants they have preserved close ties with their mother states and had better possibilities of influencing the Swedish government in their struggle for recognition and rights (Schierup, 4–5). A multicultural policy gradually started to evolve towards wider integration strategies including respect for cultural diversities. Specially created state institutions took responsibility for governing the relations between certain cultural and ethnic groups, as well as integration policy (Banaś, 93).

The mentioned above hybrid form of multicultural policy in Sweden is based on both recognition of cultural, linguistic and religious minorities and broad integration strategies. Immigrants can receive extensive assistance from the state after arriving in Sweden without any pressure to assimilate and immigrants have freedom to cultivate their own culture. What is more, foreigners have many opportunities and legal assistance in creating their own organizations, associations, building churches, schools and other cultural centres. It allows the preservation of their own cultures. It is then evident, that the Swedish model combines both multiculturalism and integration which assumes at least some level of dynamics between immigrants and the receiving society. Integration processes make newcomers more similar to the receiving society but at the same time allow for individualism and channels for influencing changes in the receiving society's law and institutional structures (Meien, 4).

Contemporary dimension of multiculturalism in Sweden – what is its future?

The 21st Century without doubt put a great strain on multiculturalism and other strategies towards minorities. The terrorist attacks in New York and Pentagon, in Madrid, London and finally at the Charlie Hebdo offices in Paris led to a crisis in policies towards immigrants and ethnic minorities as well as multiculturalism.

Sweden as a state with significant immigrant groups also engages in the discourse concerning the future of multiculturalism and the growing cultural antagonisms in Europe and around the world. Currently, there is an undergoing visible change in the perception of immigrants in Sweden. It is expressed by change in support for political parties. The Sweden Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) is a party with an anti-immigrant agenda. According to the party, the Swedish cultural identity can be endangered by massive immigration, mainly by creating areas that are predominantly inhabited by foreigners. They have raised financial threats deriving from immigration as well as cultural ones. The Sweden Democrats believe that immigrants are a significant burden on the Swedish budget (Kamali, 148). However, analyses concerning the long-term effects of immigration show that in a longer perspective immigrants can pay more in to the budget than receive (Legrain).

The Sweden Democrats are attracting support. In the 2006 elections, the party did not manage to exceed the electoral threshold, but in 2010 won 20 seats (Statistics Sweden) and their electoral support was 11% (Sweden Democrat thugs). This can suggest that their agenda had become well-known among the electorate and has apparently attracted a significant part of society. In the current parliament, Sweden Democrats holds 49 seats in Riksdag (Statistics Sweden), which means they have become the third political power. Parties[3] with highly anti-immigrant views were until now not significant political players (Lloyd, 88). A rise in the popularity of Sweden Democrats is evidence for a crisis in tolerance in Sweden, and therefore in multiculturalism as well.

The Sweden Democrats is not the only political party that has a strong opinion on immigration to Sweden. The Liberal Party, which is a right-wing opposition party, now is evidently restricting its policy towards foreigners by proposing a change in granting permanent residence status to asylum seekers. The change would assume granting permanent residence after a three-year stay or when the immigrant would be able to provide for themselves

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[3] Another political party that no longer exists was New Democracy (Ny Demokrati) created in 1991. In parliamentary elections in the same year it gained 6% support. It had an anti-immigration and populist character. Westin, Ch., *Reducing Immigration, Reviewing Integration. The Swedish Rimet Report 1995.* CEIFO: Esbruk 1997., p. 9; Andersson, R., Solid, D. *Dispersal policies in Sweden*, [in] *Spreading the "Burden"?: A Review of Policies to Disperse Asylum Seekers and Refugees,* eds. V. Robinson, R. Andersson, S. Musterd. Policy Press: Bristol 2003, p. 81.

financially. There is even a fraction within the Liberal Party that is more restrictive in evaluating immigration policy (Liberals prepare to). Such a split in the party itself but also in the Swedish political scene as a whole can be a consequence of the Charlie Hebdo attack and the general discussion on the future of immigration policy in Sweden. It also shows that it is not only radical parties that have toughened up their agendas, but also rather moderate parties who have changed their opinion on immigration.

The events at the Charlie Hebdo weekly[4] offices led to another wave of discussion on the effectiveness, sense and future of multiculturalism in Sweden. What is more, currently there is significant anxiety about a growing hidden intolerance towards immigrants in Sweden. There have been some cases of racial and cultural persecution, mostly aimed at Muslims[5]. After the Charlie Hebdo attack, the Muslim minority in Sweden is even more worried about its safety. Mohammed Fazlhashemi, professor of Islamic theology and philosophy at Uppsala University admitted that Swedish Muslims have grounds for worrying. He mentioned the earlier incidents inspired by the now defunct New Democracy party. Its xenophobia led to riots in Trollhättan in the 1990s. The role of politicians in Fazlhashemi's opinion is to explicitly show that Sweden is against all expressions of Islamophobia or xenophobia (We shall see).

As evidence for a growing but hidden Islamophobia in Sweden, an interview with the writer Mark Fahmy, who as a child visited his family in Skåne every summer. He highlights that in the past Swedes were more open and helpful for those who looked different, did not know the language or felt lost. Nowadays, it is more common to see Swedes looking in a different way or even disdainfully at foreigners. At the same time, he stresses it is understandable. Sweden for some time has been accepting many refugees and immigrants. Any country that has experienced such a big inflow of foreigners is more vulnerable and probably experiences a certain

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[4] The terrorist attack in Charlie Hebdo was conducted by three terrorists on the 7th of January 2015. 12 people were killed, including two policemen and 11were injured. The terrorists were French, of Algerian origin – brothers Said and Cherif Kouachi and Hamyd Mourad.

[5] In 1993 in Tröllhatten, two Somalis were beaten and a local mosque set on fire. Geddes, A., *The politics of migration and immigration in Europe.* Sage Publications Ltd.: London 2003, p. 111.
In May 2013 riots in Husby took place. The disturbances started after the shooting of an immigrant armed with a machete.

cultural shock. Therefore, Fahmy states that Sweden possibly should limit immigration only to those who are willing to respect Swedish values, democracy and freedom (Cutting immigration could do this). It is a rather radical proposal which is not likely to be fulfilled. Swedish politicians are not willing to discuss immigration problems or to undertake such firm solutions for fear of losing an image of the most tolerant, liberal and open state in Europe. However, it is hard to deny that Sweden is now struggling with an increasing problem of hidden intolerance.

Before the Paris attacks there had been several arson attacks on mosques in Sweden. Other incidents occurred after the Charlie Hebdo tragedy. It is now a real threat that all the terrorist attacks may be used by controversial political parties to incite social unrest, which is already strained. However, in spite of worries about growing xenophobia in Swedish society, public support for victims of Paris attacks is wide. More than 3000 people took part in a rally held several days after the attack. The demonstration focused mainly on the freedom of speech, but it was also an expression of protest against such violence (Stockholm Charlie rally). It shows a significant mobilization of the Swedish society and evident condemnation of terrorism. On the other hand, such a reaction arises from the first shock while reflection and questions about the reasons of such cruelty come later on.

The reaction to the Paris attacks was also expressed by the leading Swedish politicians, inter alia prime minister Stefena Löfven and foreign minister Margot Wallström. Both of them condemned the terrorists and highlighted the aspects of the freedom of speech, which should be defended at all costs (Sweden's PM condemns). Freedom of speech was the aspect, which had gained a lot of attention in the light of terrorist attacks on the satirical weekly. This value has a strong historical fundaments in western and European culture. On the other hand, within immigrant minorities, especially those originating from outside Europe, freedom of speech is frequently set aside. What is more, especially in the case of Islam, religious values are fundamental. It is hard to assess where the line is between maintaining a balance between multiculturalism and respecting other cultures ,and remaining devoted to one's own, often historically founded rights. It is also difficult to define the borders of freedom of speech. Whether it is an unwritten rule or maybe limited by sacred values that should not be mocked.

The Swedish prime minister highlighted a worry that racist incidents can be evidence for the growing intolerance of Swedes,

in spite of polls which show otherwise (Uppsala mosque hits). The media often link this with the growth of support for Sweden Democrats, which in the last elections received 13% support with its intolerance towards foreigners (Are mosque fires). The popularity of such political parties can be perceived as evidence of changing social attitudes. However, at this point it is difficult to assess how significant the impact is of the political party's agenda. As a parliamentary party, it has better opportunities of addressing society and propagating its political views. It is important to remember a much wider context of growing Islamophobia though, such as numerous Islamic based terrorist attacks, which are one of the most important factors in fuelling both the anti-immigration discourse and growing xenophobia.

The Sweden Democrats are widely criticized by the Muslim community in Sweden, mostly due to many controversial public appearances concerning immigration and immigrants. After the Paris attacks one of the party members wrote on his Facebook profile "Peaceful religion showed it's real face". His behavior was frowned upon by the political elites. Veronica Palm, one of the Social Democrats' MPs reported this incident as racial agitation. The MP concerned ,from Sweden Democrats, had earlier controversially stated that Jews living in Sweden will never become Swedish unless they recant their religion (Sweden Democrats defend). Also in his interview for *Dagens Nyheter* he supported special financial support for immigrants willing to leave Sweden (Sweden Democrat: Pay). Other members of the party and at the same its temporary leader – Mattias Karlsson compared Islamization to Nazism (Islamism threat greater). The above examples of politicians' controversial behavior show the radical face of the party itself. It also reveals that the Swedish political scene is diverse. Alongside politicians who condemn terrorist attacks and all expressions of xenophobia, there are also influential politicians with rather radical views.

Increasing xenophobia in Sweden is visible not only in the political arena but also in social media, where several anti-immigration portals targeted against Muslims living in Sweden have been created. On such portals, after the Uppsala, Eslöv and Eskilstuna mosque attacks, many comments praised such racial prosecution. The President of the Swedish Islamic Society, Omar Mustafa, pointed out that in 2014 14 similar incidents had been reported (Sweden's Islamophobia). Media, both traditional and social, have a great impact on shaping people's opinions as well as on intensifying the negative attitude of Swedes against immigrants,

especially Muslims. They are also an easy means of societal manipulation.

The reaction of Muslims in Sweden to the Paris attack is also an interesting aspect. Similarly to the Swedish political scene in its attitude towards immigrants, the Muslim community is internally split. There are rather a few voices praising the terrorists and their actions. Such support is mostly voiced via Facebook or other social media (Swedish Muslims fear). It is though important not to generalize the Muslim community, since its majority is against jihad and its assumptions. An official statement from the biggest Muslim society in Södermalm was issued. It officially condemned terrorist actions. They also called for calm and to not succumb to emotions. What is more, in their statement they highlighted that such actions are contrary to Islam. At the same time their attitude towards Charlie Hebdo is unequivocal – they describe it as offensive and provocative (Swedish Muslims reach). Omar Mustafa described the Paris attacks and mosque arsons as provocative and aimed at intimidating parts of society.

The problem of this Islamophobia and hidden intolerance in Sweden, but also in other countries, can derive from the image of terrorists and terrorism created by media, which often link this phenomenon with Islam and Muslims. However, terrorism is a much wider and complicated phenomenon, which should not only be associated with Muslims. Fundamentalist terrorism or religious terrorism are only one of many types. Generalizing and placing it on an equal footing with Islam is a definite negation of multiculturalism and what it stands for. As long as such an attitude is practiced, multiculturalism will fade. The United Nations, while preparing a report concerning human rights, noticed the deteriorating situation in Sweden. In the report, the problem of increasing Islamophobia and the discrimination of the Roma was highlighted (UN slums Sweden). The Swedish government made reference to the report, naming it a red light that illustrated the real problem of intolerance and discrimination in this country.

The Charlie Hebdo attack contributed to further reflection on counteracting terrorism, but also to a discussion on possible strategies of silencing and limiting tensions between the receiving society and immigrants. The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Anders Ygeman in his interview for The Local, highlighted the need to improve coordination between intelligence services as well as to improve the streamline of information within the European

Union with regard movements of people suspected of terrorist activities. The Minister also admitted that Paris attacks can be used to radicalize the society against immigrants, especially Muslims. From the Swedish government there had been some steps made to provide safety to Muslims. It is mostly based on financial support to cover the costs of the protection of mosques, which are the most probable subjects of attacks. Also adequate measures had been undertaken to increase social awareness among Muslims about the necessity of reporting any expressions of racism or racial persecution (Sweden: We must). It is often stated as a problem that the immigrant communities are afraid to report such incidents.

In the context of European policy on immigration and as a result of the Charlie Hebdo attack, the European Union decided on discussing the introduction of an asylum seekers quota so as to distribute the numbers of incoming refugees more evenly. Recent years have seen numerous refugee waves which have mostly been heading towards Sweden. 9.6 million people live in Sweden and last year more than 33 000 refugees were granted asylum. It means that for every million people Sweden took 3 424 asylum seekers. In comparison, Germany took 589 per one million and Great Britain only 218. In 2015, the number of refugees reached a record number of 163 000, including 51 000 refugees from Syria (Migrationsverket). The European Commission proposed to set a quota for the number of refugees each of the EU states should accept so every country would share in the responsibility for refugees. In accordance with the EC's report, no country should be left alone with migratory pressures. Sweden's Justice and Migration Minister Morgan Johansson voiced his deep support for such a quota system. He pinpointed that for the effectiveness of the Common European Asylum System in the long term it is vital to make refugees distribution more even and fair (Sweden in spotlight). Contrary to Swedish enthusiasm concerning the planned change in the European Union's policy, the new conservative government in Great Britain declared that it would oppose any attempts of changing immigration policy. Hungary also reacted coolly with Hungarian prime minister Viktor Orban calling such a decision "mad and unfair". What is more, Swedish Justice and Migration Minister declared that the EU should also think about introducing a secure channel for refugees to seek protection. Such a lack of protection results in smuggling and unnecessary deaths of refugees trying to cross the Mediterranean

Sea (Savage). All the changes mentioned above are the results of both incidents of refugees smuggling but also are current in the light of Charlie Hebdo attacks. The Common Asylum Policy needs to be more coordinated and rationalized. The next step should be a more thoughtful integration strategy which would allow for the minimizing of the potential cultural clash of the receiving society and accepted refugees.

Summary

In 2010, after the end of the integration strategy lifetime, Swedish government decided on conducting a profound assessment of the integration effects. According to the MIPEX III ranking, Sweden was the most favorable state for foreigners among all those countries examined. Sweden has remained the most favorable state in the field of integration[6]. This high position might stem from integration strategies implemented in past decades. By widening the range of integration strategies, Swedes have gradually moved away from multiculturalism in its purest form. Such interest in integration can be a result of Swedish specificity. It is a large country with a relatively small population. Owing to extensive immigration, especially in bigger cities, the ethnic and cultural diversity has started to be perceived as a threat to the Swedish identity and culture itself. As a result, numerous integration programmes have been introduced, which has allowed for, at least, a partial softening of cultural clashes.

Another important aspect that is a challenge to multicultural policy in Sweden is the growing strength of the anti-immigration political party – The Sweden Democrats which is now the third power in parliament. It means that a further increase in support for this party can be expected with any further immigration and integration policy in favor of assimilation. The Sweden

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[6] MIPEX (Migrants Integration Policy Index) – index that evaluates integration policies of 38 states in Europe and North America. It is made after taking into consideration almost 150 indicators concerning among others mobility on labour market, family reunion policies, education, political participation, long term stays, citizenship, counteracting discrimination. The analysis assesses the range of laws guaranteed to migrants, possibilities and pace of integration. MIPEX III is the third edition of the analysis, which has been published in 2011. The most up to date report has been prepared in 2015. MIPEX. Migrant Integration Policy Index. Web. 14 July 2016. <http://www.mipex.eu/sweden>

Democrats often highlight the fact that assimilation is the only effective way of creating a homogenous and peacefully existing society. Currently such a scenario seems to be unlikely owing to continued strong support for the Social Democrats. This political party, as long as keeps its leading position, will stand for multiculturalism.

In spite of many examples showing growing intolerance and xenophobia in Sweden, and by extension, a crisis in multicultural policy in Sweden, the newest research shows that Swedes' attitude towards immigrants is much more positive than expected. 72% of Swedish society is in favour of immigration from outside the European Union and 82% of immigrants from the European Union area. These results place Sweden in the first place in the Europe. In comparison, in other countries the percentage of positive attitudes towards immigrants did not exceed 48% (in Spain and Croatia). The general outcome for the European Union was not very positive either – 57% of European Union citizens described themselves as negative towards immigration from outside the EU. At the same time, Swedes asked for major threats to the European Union put immigration and climate change in first place (Public Opinion in European Union). Therefore, it is evident that at least statistically Sweden can still be perceived as a tolerant and open state. However, statistics can be misleading and as reality shows, Sweden currently has many problems with tolerance and its multicultural policy. The problem may be hidden intolerance which is impossible to be proved in polls and research. Political decision-makers' willingness to solve the problem and a general positive attitude towards immigration offers hope that Sweden will be able to overcome all the problems with xenophobia and the crisis in multiculturalism.

New threats to internal security resulting from the migration crisis led to the reestablishment of partial border controls in 2015 with this being extended into 2016. What is more, the asylum policy has been restricted as well with more asylum seekers now being denied asylum in Sweden. Changes in policies are accompanied by growing intolerance – supposedly as a result of growing numbers of immigrants, masked men attacked people from immigrant backgrounds in Stockholm at the beginning of 2016. Sweden has not witnessed similar incidents since the 1990s. This could be taken as evidence of a multicultural crisis in Swedish society.

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MIGRATION PROCESSES IN CONTEMPORARY ESTONIA

ABSTRACT: This article examines migration trends in contemporary Estonia, focusing on migrant movements, legal regulations applying to migrants and national policies dealing with migration. Estonia is a multi-ethnic country in which both immigration and emigration occur on a considerable scale; consequently, understanding migration patterns and trends is particularly important. Historical factors have influenced Estonian society in a way which has necessitated the implementation of integration programmes and strategies aimed at social consolidation. The article features an analysis of the main changes in migration movements in Estonia since it gained independence and presents contemporary tendencies.

KEYWORDS: Emigration from Estonia, migration movements, social changes, post-Soviet Estonia, modern Estonian society.

Introduction

The contemporary world seems to have become smaller: the development of modern technologies and new means of international communication shorten the distances between people and nations. These changes create new situations where powerful expressions of inter-culturalization and acculturation create bicultural identity. Migration is one of the key forces shaping these global changes.

Migrations are one of the most important factors that shape and change the social landscape. Contemporary migration trends are caused by a wide variety of social, political and economic challenges:

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one such issue is security, a matter seen as particularly important by diverse global communities. Antrop identified three main forces generating changes in society – accessibility, urbanisation and globalisation (Antrop 2005). Other scholars recognise demography, economy, new technologies, social attitudes, beliefs and behaviours as further social drivers of migration processes. Apart from these considerations, the effects of war, climate change and rapid demographic growth – as well as economic issues – must also be listed as factors influencing the moving of people (Castles 2010). Subject literature does not provide a single common definition of migration; instead, one can distinguish a number of migration patterns or trends emerging from political, economic, social and cultural changes rooted in diverse conflicts taking place in the modern world.

One of these tendencies is the globalisation of migration: immigrants come from a variety of locations all across the globe and these migratory movements critically affect many states; this situation is generated by a very wide spectrum of social and economic issues. Another visible tendency is the acceleration of migratory trends – people migrate more often than they had in the past; this appears to be an inexorable process. The third tendency, called migration differentiation, means that specific countries face specific, differing types of migration, labour market immigration, incoming refugees and permanent settlement. The feminization of migration is another trend, visible in the typology of migratory movements since the 1960s: in the past, only male migrants were thought to play an active role[1]. Yet another tendency is the politicization of migration, which continues to increase and gain importance in the contemporary world as long-term local political relations between states and security issues are affected by various forms of migration. The last modern trend is the proliferation of migration transition: some countries are treated as territories of transit migration, rather than a permanent place to settle down (Castles, Haas, Miller 2013). Varying individual motivations add up to create the present circumstances – a world in which people migrate more than they had in the past. This situation greatly influences the societies and politics of many states.

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[1] Previously, the role of women has frequently been limited to arranging family reunions. This situation has changed and the contemporary realities of migration are not seen as dominated by male family members.

Migrations in the Baltic States

The beginning of the 1990s in Central and Eastern Europe was marked by an extraordinary shift: from a communist regime towards democracy, free market economy and free movement of people and goods. This transition allowed for a complete change of migratory behaviour and had a large impact on social change in the countries of the region. Up until then, all forms of migration had been strictly controlled by the state. The infrequent migrations of people belonging to ethnic minorities or of families allowed to reunite were also under state control. A complex landscape of migrations emerged after 1990. According to Okólski, one can distinguish seven types of migration occurring in the region at the time. The first one is migration for settlement, in which ethnicity plays a significant role. The second one is labour migration; non-settlement migration is defined as the flow of people aiming to develop businesses or to attend professional training or courses. The next type is incomplete, quasi-migration – immigrants belonging to this category do not always fulfil all the conditions set for migrating groups. The next type of migration classified by Okólski is the flow of asylum seekers and refugees, as well as transit migration including instances of human trafficking. The last but not least type is non-migratory mobility, such as tourist visits or the transit of passengers (Okólski 2004).

Out of many factors that determine the character of migration movements, ethnicity is considered to be of particular importance. The Baltic States, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were all influenced by migrations which deeply affected the changes in their population. These three countries had previously been part of the Soviet Union[2] and have never been densely populated. As such, they have become potential locations to settle down, especially for Russian citizens. The decrease in the indigenous population was clearly visible while at the same time these countries, especially Latvia and Estonia, experienced an influx of Russians. The case of Lithuania was different: due to much simpler administrative

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[2] The Baltic States were recognised as independent states in 1918; during the Second World War (in 1940) they were incorporated into the Soviet Empire. Industrialization processes were very strong in this part of Europe after the Second World War, and closely related to the movements of people from many different parts of the Soviet Union to the Baltic States territories. Russian settlers have been very enthusiastic towards staying in these territories.

regulations, all inhabitants were given Lithuanian citizenship without going through extended procedures. Meanwhile, contemporary Estonia and Latvia must deal with a high number of stateless Russian-speaking residents – a result of complex naturalisation regulations in both countries. Latvia has scored lowest on immigrant policy – both in relation to the free labour market and the political participation of citizens (Kowalenko, Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas 2010).

Estonia is thought to be a strongly multi-ethnic country with a considerable flow of migrants. This is strongly connected to the country's historical background – the number of new immigrants is relatively low, yet the nationality of a significant number of people is other than Estonian. Despite there being relatively few new immigrants, migration to Estonia does not seem to be particularly welcome. Estonian History, from the 1940s till the 1990s, still strongly influences social perceptions and attitudes to migrations. The majority of immigrants coming to Estonia today come from the territories of the former Soviet Union. There is also a group of so-called "old immigrants" living in Estonia, who are mostly Russian speakers. Additionally, it has to be underlined that Estonia is a relatively small country with a limited population. The territory of today's Estonia covers a little over 45 000 km² and is inhabited by fewer than 1 300 000 people[3]. Some residents still do not have Estonian citizenship and instead have a stateless status. Most of these people were born on the territory of today's Estonia, and had to build a new relationship with the new state. The number of immigrants in Estonia is not large and immigration seems to be a relatively new phenomenon. Not many people decide to come to Estonia to settle down; those who do are mainly Russians or Fins. There are also immigrants from Ukraine, Germany, Latvia and Lithuania – mostly from countries belonging to the European Union. Refugees and asylum seekers do not form a large group: the Citizenship and Migration Office does not receive any applications for asylum. Estonia is not believed to be a country tolerant towards newcomers, which once again is related to ethnic issues. The one exception is Tallinn where an open attitude towards immigration has been observed even when Estonia still belonged to the Soviet Union (Kowalenko, Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas 2010).

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[3] Estonia covers the territory of 45 226 km² and is inhabited by 1.294.500 permanent residents.

Legal regulations concerning migrants

The issue of equal treatment of people ties into the analysis of migrations. In 2008, the Estonian government adopted the Equal Treatment Act, aligning its regulations with those observed in the European Union. Unfortunately, the protective measures aimed at preventing unequal treatment have not been put into practice. Moreover, the Estonian legislation documents do not define the terms "migrant", "migrant worker" or "seasonal worker"; the option that had been provided was to define the people without citizenship as "strangers". Before joining the EU structures, Estonia had to take some steps towards regulating the status of immigrants living within its borders[4]. It was a decision of high importance to all "old" immigrants, whose command of Estonian in many cases was not good enough to actively participate in social life. These immigrants are mostly Russian speakers, which also influences issues related to their employment. According to national regulations, legal residents can be lawfully employed regardless of their background or religion. However, when applying for public service posts, citizenship and the command of Estonian seem to be essential issues. The Employment Contracts Act came into force on May 1, 2004 and is the main source of regulations on equal treatment of all citizens, whatever their race, ethnicity, age, religion, disability or sexual orientation. In 2008, Riigikog – the Estonian Parliament – adopted a new comprehensive Equal Treatment Act. This document provides a set of measures to prevent discrimination based on ethnicity, race, gender, religion and beliefs, physical and mental disability or sexual orientation. Article 2 of this document regulates the application of these principles in the context of signing an employment contract. Complaints of unequal treatment based on ethnicity are not made very often – in a few recent years the Labour Dispute Committee has not received any unequal treatment complaints. Several issues have, however, been submitted to the Chancellor of Justice, and these mostly concerned unequal treatment due to citizenship and ethnicity.

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[4] The Estonian legal system was strongly influenced by German. The Constitution, from 1992, is the main source of rules in the state. Regarding of the case law as the legal sources of norms is not accepted. Decisions taken by the Supreme Court are introduced as legal and can be treated as considerable extend. Article 123 of the Estonian Constitution clarifies *The Republic of Estonia may not enter into international treaties which are in conflict with the Constitution.*

Linguistic discrimination is still quite noticeable in Estonia. Employers expect a relatively high level of proficiency in Estonian from job seekers. Unemployment statistics have shown that the number of unemployed non-Estonians has been twice as high as the number of unemployed Estonians for many years following Estonian independence. This situation has recently changed. Since 2007, the level of unemployment among non-Estonian males has decreased (Statistics Estonia 2015). On July 1st, 2009, new employment laws were introduced. Unfortunately the labour market in Estonia is still divided and ethnic background is very important for employers. Non-Estonians do not always have the job opportunities available to native Estonians. This seems to be influenced mainly by the level of jobseekers' education. Employees with basic or secondary education are paid rather similarly regardless of their native language and ethnicity. The situation is different at the level of higher education: ethnicity seems to influence the opportunities and non-Estonians are usually offered lower salaries while holding the same positions and responsibilities as native Estonians. The Language Inspectorate investigates all cases of language discrimination and conducts checks across the country (Kowalenko, Kovalenko, Mensah, Leončikas 2010).

Migration policy in Estonia

The scale of migration movements in Estonia is relatively small, and a small number of people choose it as their future place of permanent residence. It should be underlined that the government has not prepared any special programme directed at immigrants staying in Estonia. Since 1995, several strategies have been implemented to aid "old" immigrants who decided to stay in the country after 1991. The first programme, introduced by Rein Taagepera, was designed to help to integrate the Russian-speaking inhabitants with people of Estonian origin. Unfortunately its scope was not very wide; therefore a new, nationwide programme was developed in 2007, to be introduced over a period of seven years. The programme's strategic statement noted that Estonia is a country in which the division of society into distinct groups with differing cultural and linguistic backgrounds is highly visible. The main aim of the programme was to create tools enabling people of different origins to integrate. The programme consisted of three components: a linguistic strategy,

a political and legal strategy and an economic strategy. The first component was aimed at the development of linguistic skills and also covered the issues of cultural diversity and mutual tolerance. The second component was directed at the issue of the requirements of obtaining citizenship and aimed to reduce the number of people waiting to become Estonian citizens. The goal of the last component was to empower the jobseekers regardless of their background and language. Unfortunately the first element of the programme was not carried out on a regional level, which greatly limited its impact. It should be clearly underlined that a regional approach often brings the best results in the area of social integration.

The next five-year integration programme was launched in January 2008. It was the only strategy aimed at migrants living on the territory of Estonia. The main goals of this programme included: adhering to Fundamental European Values in Estonia as a part of the European Union; improving the command of the Estonian language as a tool of communication in public sector; strengthening national identity; inclusive policies for all inhabitants of the country; promoting equal rights and reducing ethnic segregation. The ability to contribute to the development of the country seems to be key in building an equal society where cultural diversity, human rights and peace are fully respected. Ethnic background should never be considered as a barrier for building one state. According to the strategy programme, those points were understood to be the most important (State Programme 'Integration in Estonian Society' 2008)[5].

Today, other programmes are aimed at migrants staying in Estonia; their scope is widely connected with the issues tackled by the earlier programme. Considerable attention is still paid to linguistic issues. The six-year 2009–2015 strategy aimed to strongly aid learning foreign languages and support multilingualism. The document introduces a set of goals for effectively teaching foreign languages. Success in this sphere could enable Estonia to be better connected with the rest of the world. The strategy is inclusive and treats all Estonian inhabitants equally without segregation according to their nationality (The Estonian Foreign Language Strategy 2007)[6].

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[5] State Programme Integration in Estonian Society 2008–2013 was adopted by the Estonian Government in January 2008.

[6] The strategy aims at increasing the motivation for learning foreign languages, underlines different opportunities, intensifies language education in

Integration programmes and strategies in Estonia are based on multicultural approaches. Social harmonization seems to be one of the most desirable features of social consolidation; in such a multicultural society, the preservation of cultural and linguistic heritage and ethnic differences is considered to be a valuable process in which both native Estonians and migrants can equally participate.

To be entirely successful, integration processes should involve two groups representing the social minority and the majority. International law does not clearly define the conditions to be met in order to achieve full social equality. Social discourse and equality play an important role in contemporary democratic states; unfortunately, there are still no normative theories in politics that can adequately answer the question of migrants' protection (Patten, Kymlicka 2003).

Migration movements in Estonia

After Estonia joined the European Union on May 1st, 2004, migration movements have intensified. The people who decided to leave Estonia have chosen to emigrate to countries offering better economic prospects, such as Great Britain, Ireland, Sweden, Norway, Finland and Germany. Emigration to Great Britain and Ireland increased almost eightfold, to Finland almost fivefold, and the rate of emigration to Sweden and Norway doubled. (Diagram 2). On the other hand, emigration to other countries fell – to the USA 1.8 and to Canada more than 2.5 times. In 2000–2006 there was a visible increase of the number of emigrants; in the following years, the rate of migration stabilised and remained at a steady level. In 2014, approximately 4600 people emigrated from the country and at the same time almost 4000 decided to immigrate – the rates of migration were 30% lower comparing to the previous four years (Diagram 1). The majority of people emigrating from Estonia were between 20 and 34 years old; immigrants were aged 24–39. 2015 was the first year in the history of independent Estonia in which the number of immigrants exceeded the number of emigrants. 15 413 people immigrated and 13 003 emigrated from the country. The group which migrates the most is Estonians aged 20 to 39.

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fields of formal and non-formal education, supports a new system of learning foreign languages with highly- trained teachers and educational materials. Those who do not speak Estonian as their first language can study the language as a foreign one and are guaranteed all the proposed aspects.

Diagram 1. Emigration from Estonia between 2000–2014

Source: Statistics Estonia 2015, http://www.stat.ee/en

Diagram 2. Emigration destinations between 2000–2014

Source: Statistics Estonia 2015, http://www.stat.ee/en

Looking at the proportions of men and women deciding to migrate shows that men tend to be more determined to move while women are more likely to stay in new locations for longer periods of time. On January 1st, 2016, the number of Estonian inhabitants was estimated at 1 315 944, which means the overall count had decreased by 2 675 people compared to January 2015.

The data presented above shows that people with primary education are around 1.8 times more likely to emigrate than people educated to a secondary level. Furthermore, university graduates are fifty per cent more likely to migrate than people who graduated from secondary schools. The issue of education influences migration very strongly and consistently, considering the ethnicity of Estonian inhabitants. In short, after Estonia had joined the European Union, the likelihood of migration increased inversely to the level of education.

Another important factor is *the glass ceiling effect*. Young, well-educated people whose origin is other than Estonian do not have the same opportunities to get a well-paid job corresponding to their qualifications as native Estonians do. This situation encourages them to find better career opportunities and higher salaries abroad, often in the countries of Western Europe (Anniste, Tammaru, Pungas, Paas, 2012).

Intense migration movements are hugely influencing Estonia and its labour market. Many skilled workers decide to leave the country because of poor economic prospects. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent rapid economic changes in the region, Estonia has become one of the *Baltic Tigers*, introducing many reforms and Western standards of production. Improved standards of living and foreign investments strengthening the economy were made possible by a *shock therapy* applied by the state. Today, Estonia is struggling with many *push and pull* factors that influence people's decisions about leaving the country (Sippola 2014). For more than 10 years, Estonians have been provided with legal instruments enabling them to seek employment abroad, while the Western European countries have abolished all restrictions limiting free movement. Estonians are thought to be much more optimistic than their neighbours from Latvia and Lithuania, perhaps for reasons related to the country's geographic location. They have always seen their homeland as a post-Soviet Scandinavian country with a strong Finnish influence helping them to cope with post-transition and transformation problems. The population of Estonia has visibly decreased, but emigration is one of many reasons for the underlying social changes.

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HUMAN SECURITY OF THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES IN THE ARCTIC. THE SAMI CASE

ABSTRACT: For many years, indigenous peoples, their rights, culture and identity have been neglected. This depressing statement also refers to the Sami who reside in the Arctic. This paper presents the understanding of the term "indigenous peoples" and a number of their rights, including the right to self-determination. Their implementation is necessary for human security as they empower indigenous peoples to make decisions in matters that affect them. The author examines the concept of human security and the threats to this security in the Arctic in particular to the Sami as well as the most important provisions in international legal documents regarding the rights of indigenous peoples which include references to human security.

KEYWORDS: indigenous peoples, human security, the Arctic, the Sami, self-determination

Introduction

For many years indigenous peoples, their needs, rights, culture and identity have either been neglected or eliminated altogether. This rather depressing statement can also be applied to the Sami in the Arctic. This situation, however, is slowly changing in practice, and on paper, international instruments contain legal provisions ensuring respect for the rights of indigenous people such as *inter alia* the right to self-determination, to have respect for their traditions and customs, cultures and languages, to participate in decision-making on matters that would affect

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their rights, land rights, to improve their social and economic position, and to maintain and develop their traditional knowledge. Many of these rights are guaranteed in the non-binding *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, 2007, (UN GA res. 61/295; hereinafter: *UN Declaration*)) adopted in 2007, and the legally binding *ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries* (The ILO Convention 169 on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries (1989)). The *ILO Convention* aims to protect the rights of indigenous peoples, their way of life and their culture. Its adoption was at that time (in 1989) an improvement on the previous *Convention 107 of 1957 on the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries* which was aimed at the assimilation of indigenous peoples. One may conclude that there are quite progressive legal provisions protecting the indigenous peoples, but unfortunately a law in the books does not always translate into a law that is implemented.

This normative progress should be placed in the context of critical postcolonial discourse. As K. Thisted argues in the context of Greenland,

> "Greenland and Denmark represent a typical (post) colonial landscape in the sense that the relationship, even after the official termination of colonialism was characterized by highly asymmetrical power relations. This applies not least in terms of the power of representation. Politically, the Greenlanders were represented by the Danes – to a certain extent they still are regarding international affairs and matters of security. To the outside world, Greenland is first and foremost known through literary and visual images created from an outside, primarily Danish, perspective" (2012, 280).

For that reason the Inuit were, not so long ago, called 'Eskimos' and the Sami – Lapps. The postcolonial confrontation in Greenland led to Home Rule in 1979 and finally to self-government in 2009 (Thisted, 281). Danish colonialism in Greenland and Greenlandic resistance attracted the attention of the international postcolonial narrative only after the Arctic became important due to competition over oil and gas (Göttsche, 15). There is no clear line dividing Danish imperialism and postcolonialism but "a protracted process that eventually shifts the balance in Greenland from a language of subordination and resistance to a language of governance" (Göttsche, 16). K. Thisted criticizes Denmark's rule in Greenland as part of "a colonial discourse of cultural superiority and the mission

to civilize the colonial subjects" (Göttsche, 16). The necessity to regulate the relations in the Arctic and the far North in the postcolonial era attracted the international community's attention to the issue of human rights and a right to self-determination. These remarks also reflect the Sami situation.

The Sami are an indigenous people living in northern Europe in Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia. Overall there are about 70 000 Sami: 35 000 live in Norway, 17 000 in Sweden, 5 000 in Finland and 2 000 in Russia (Baer, 247). According to other estimates the Sami comprise 80 000 or even 100 000 (Sami in Sweden. Preserving indigenous culture in the Arctic. Facts about Sweden; Fitzmaurice, 77). Most of the Sami live in democratic welfare states (except for Russia) and enjoy the highest quality of life among the world's indigenous peoples . However, this does not mean that their position is ideal or that all of their rights are perfectly respected. Globally indigenous peoples constitute about 370 million individuals , making up about 5 percent of the world population. They live in more than 70 states (UN Resource Kit on Indigenous Peoples' Issues, 10).

Today we are witnessing enormous technological progress which also pertains to medical progress. Social, cultural and economic development is taking place in most regions around the world. Access to food and water and sanitary facilities in the framework of Millennium Development Goals is improving (unfortunately in its statistics and specific indicators MDG's do not include indigenous peoples). Access to education and its quality is also improving. So are we all better off and safer? Are the Sami in the Arctic safe? Is their human security ensured?

The concept of human security in the Arctic includes environmental protection, preservation of culture and cultural identity, as well as the granting and maintaining of autonomy and self-governance of indigenous peoples, which in this case is the Sami. As it will be pointed out, industrialization, climate change and actual and potential economic exploitation of the natural resources in the Arctic pose threats to the Sami livelihoods and traditional lifestyles. As a result, the livelihoods linked to hunting, fishing and reindeer herding are threatened. Hence, their human security is under threat as well.

Section two of this paper will present the understanding of the term "indigenous peoples", and a few remarks on the *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* will be included. Some rights of the indigenous peoples such as the right to self-determination

(with special emphasis on the self-governance and autonomy) and land rights will be examined. Their implementation is necessary to human security as they enable indigenous peoples to make decisions in matters that affect them (in this case the Sami). Section three sketches out the genesis, concept and the main components of this human security. Section four examines the threats to human security in the Arctic with special reference to the Sami. These threats include climate change and ice melting connected with it, rises in temperature, species migration, reindeer husbandry and threats to reindeer grazing areas which are directly linked to threats to the Sami culture and identity, development of oil and gas extraction as well as the possibility of the remilitarization of the Arctic, and nuclear pollution. Finally, section five will list the most important provisions of international legal documents on the rights of indigenous peoples which include references to human security. They are indirect such as the right to self-determination and land rights but their implementation would contribute to the human security of the Sami in the Arctic. Domestic law will be excluded. The aim of the article is to show that the global position of indigenous peoples is getting stronger and international law recognizes this tendency as well as its state of constant development.

Indigenous people

The term "indigenous peoples" has been used to denote distinct peoples who have lived from time immemorial on a certain territory (who are so called 'first people') and who have been pursuing their own concept of development and attempting to maintain their identity, languages, traditional customs, beliefs and values, their lifestyles and control over their lands and natural resources (UN Resource Kit on Indigenous Peoples' Issues, 7). This paper adopts J. M. Cobo's definition of indigenous people:

> "Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now prevailing on those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutions and legal systems" (UN Doc E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7).

The only normative definition of indigenous peoples was formulated in the ILO Convention 169.

In 1994, the UN General Assembly declared the years 1995–2004 the International Decade of the World's Indigenous Peoples (UN GA res. 48/163 of 21 December 1993). The second decade (2005–2015) was a continuation of the first (UN GA res. 59/174 of 20 December 2004). The first decade was supposed to be crowned with the issuance of the UN declaration on indigenous peoples but this happened in the middle of the second decade when in 2007 the *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (hereinafter*: UN Declaration*) was adopted.

The UN Declaration, although non-binding, is still the most important instrument on the rights of indigenous peoples. It affirms that indigenous peoples "contribute to the diversity and richness of civilizations and cultures, which constitute the common heritage of humankind" (preamble). According to the *UN Declaration*, indigenous peoples have a collection of rights: individual rights that persons have as members of the group and collective ones that refer to the group as a whole (such as land rights) (Art. 1 of the *UN Declaration*). Art. 3 refers to the right of self-determination of indigenous peoples which means the ability to freely "determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development". Self-determination is connected to the right to autonomy or self-governance in matters relating to internal and local affairs of indigenous peoples (Art. 4 of the *UN Declaration*). This formula indicates that self-determination should be exercised first of all in the form of autonomy. To make things even clearer the *UN Declaration* contains a clause stating that:

> "Nothing in this Declaration may be interpreted as implying for any State, people, group or person any right to engage in any activity or to perform any act contrary to the Charter of the United Nations or construed as authorizing or encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part, the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent states" (Art. 46).

Many states fear that granting the indigenous peoples the right to self-determination may lead to secession. These fears are however unjustified as indigenous peoples do not want to create a separate State but are able to make free and independent decisions in their own matters (Baer, 257; Okafor, 41–70). Consequently, indigenous peoples have the right to "maintain and strengthen their distinct

political, legal, economic, social and cultural institutions, while retaining their right to participate fully, if they so choose, in the political, economic, social and cultural life of the State" (Art. 5 of the UN Declaration). But as Erica-Irene Daes, the former Chairperson of the UN Working Group on Indigenous Populations stated, "there is no distinction between indigenous and other peoples, save that the indigenous people have not been able to exercise the right to self-determination" (Baer, 255).

The genesis and the concept of human security[8]

Traditionally, security pertained to relations between states and was mainly of a military character. This caused the individual to predominantly have obligations of service towards the State, for example as a member of the army. Threats to security came from other states, for example in the form of external aggression. After the end of the cold war, states became more secure but this did not necessarily extend to their nationals. New threats to their security appeared, threats of non-military character. R. Thakur notices that

> „[t]o many poor people in the world's poorest countries today, the risk of being attacked by terrorists or with weapons of mass destruction is far removed from the pervasive reality of the so-called soft threats – hunger, lack of safe drinking water and sanitation and endemic diseases – that kill millions every year, far more than the so-called 'hard' or 'real' threats to security" (73).

He continues with some shocking statistical data:

> "More than one billion people in the world lack access to clean water and 2.6 billion to sanitation. These deficits could be overcome through a decade-long annual investment of $ 7 billion – less than what Europeans spend on perfume – which would save 4 000 lives each day from the resulting reduced exposure to infectious diseases" (73).

Human security was the answer to new threats and challenges. It places a human being in the centre of debate, analysis, politics and interest. People are important and a State is an instrument of ensuring their welfare. Basic goods protected in the framework

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[8] Parts of this section have been published in: A. Szpak, *Right to the City as a New Paradigm within the Concept of Human Security*, "Polish Political Science Yearbook", (2016) 45, pp. 373–376 and A. Szpak, *Cities and Human Security*, „Toruń International Studies" (2015) 1, pp. 121–124.

of human security including life and personal safety may be threatened not only by an external aggression but also by internal factors. The human security concept is based on the human rights tradition that is supposed to protect the individual from the abuse of their own State and – on the other hand – on the concept of development which envisions a State as a necessary instrument of promoting human security (Thakur, 72).

It is the individual and their collectivities that are the main subjects and at the same time objects of human security. Generally, the object of any security consists of entities or collectivities to whom the security is ensured but which themselves do not undertake independent activities in this regard, whereas the subject of security is treated as an entity or collectivity that undertakes activities in order to ensure its own security (Urbanek, 42). For increasing human security concrete actions must be taken not only by states (which are also subjects of human security as they act in favour of ensuring it for human beings and their collectivities) but also by the individuals themselves and their collectivities. In this regard the latter are also subjects of human security, in actual fact the main one with national and international security instrumental in ensuring human security. The former serves the latter.

The concept of human security has its roots in the United Nations, in the famous president Roosevelt Declaration of 1944 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948. The Universal Declaration states in the preamble that "[…] recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world" (Sustainable Development Goals, 30 December 2015).

This concept first appeared in the 1993 *Human Development Report*. It was included as one of the five pillars of the world order that focused on humanity (2). Then in 1994 *Human Development Report* was published (by UNDP – *United Nations Development Programme*), where the whole concept was developed. The report stated that "[t]he threats to human security are no longer just personal or local or national. They are becoming global: with drugs, AIDS, terrorism, pollution, nuclear proliferation. Global poverty and environmental problems respect no national border. Their grim consequences travel the world" (2). Human security embraces two fundamental components – freedom from fear and freedom from hunger (1994 Human Development Report, 24). Chapter II of the 1994 Human Development Report is entirely devoted

to human security. It claims that „[t]he concept of security has for too long been interpreted narrowly: as the security of a territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust" (22). According to the report the human security concept is characterized by the following features:

1. Human security is a universal concern as it touches people all over the world. It is connected to the fact that threats are also universal as they are common to all people. Such threats include unemployment, drugs, crime, environmental pollution and degradation and human rights violations (22–23);

2. The basic elements of human security are interdependent. It means that when the security of people is endangered in one part of the world, all states and nations may be endangered. The effects of threats to human security in any part of the world may be felt in another. Threats such as hunger, disease, environmental degradation, drug trafficking, terrorism, organized crimes, ethnic conflicts and social disintegration are no longer isolated events and their consequences are transnational. What happens in one state or region may affect the whole world (22–23, von Tigerstrom, *International Law and the Concept of Human Security* 607);

3. It is easier to ensure human security through early prevention than later intervention. It is the expression of the well- known maxim 'Prevention is better than cure' (22–23, von Tigerstrom, *International Law and the Concept of Human Security* 606–607);

4. Human security concentrates on people – on their lives, their functioning in a society, on their autonomy, access to the market and social opportunities. It is also concerned with the state of peace which is a necessary condition for human security (22–23; von Tigerstrom, *International Law and the Concept of Human Security* 606).

Human security contains seven categories: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security (1994 Human Development Report, 24–25). Consequently, human security is understood broadly – in a holistic and integrative manner.

Among the most serious threats to human security in the 21st century that the 1994 *Human Development Report* identifies is unchecked population growth, disparities in economic opportunities, excessive international migration, environmental degradation, drug production and trafficking and international terrorism (34). The remaining threats are direct ones such as criminal violence,

killing women and children, sexual violence, genocide, war crimes, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and small arms and light weapons or anti-personnel mines (they all result in death, injuries and trauma) and indirect ones such as deprivation of the basic needs, for example access to water, food, medical care, education, diseases and low economic growth (Urbanek, 161).

In subsequent years, numerous UN organs, including UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), acted as a forum for debate, expression and promotion of alternative concepts of security. States, as well as international organizations, also participate in this process. UN organs and agendas such as UNHCR and Secretary General took this new concept into account when considering their actions. Hence, the UN became a key instrument for legitimizing the new concept of security (Thakur, 91).

In 2003, the Commission on Human Security published its *Human Security Now* report which defined human security as "to protect the vital core of all human lives in ways that enhance human freedoms and human fulfillment. Human security means protecting fundamental freedoms – freedoms that are the essence of life" (Thakur, 4). On the basis of this one may conclude that human security means living in peace and safety in one's own state, in which people enjoy human rights and fundamental freedoms without suffering any discrimination. People must be able to meet their social needs and realize their plans and aspirations.

In 2004, the concept of human security was given prominence in the *High Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change A more secure world: our shared responsibility*. It mentions human security in different places together with national security. States are treated instrumentally meaning that they should be protected not because they are good by nature but because they are necessary for ensuring respect for human dignity and values as well as for ensuring justice and security for its own citizens (paragraph 30; von Tigerstrom, *Human Security and International Law. Prospects and Problems* 114).

In 2005, the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) also published a report *Common Purpose Towards a More Effective OSCE. Final Report and Recommendations of the Eminent Persons on Strengthening the Effectiveness of the OSCE* where it was stated that "Human security in general, and the security of the individual in particular, are seen as the individual and collective responsibility of all participating States. Human rights and security are inseparable" (point 24). All the aspects and

problems of human rights in the framework of OSCE are identified as having a "human dimension", and respect for human rights is one of the fundamentals of the international order (Kuźniar, 246).

Bearing in mind the above considerations, one should try to define human security. Human security is a state and process that aims to ensure survival and existence and the opportunity of development as well as meeting the most basic needs of humans. This is a process because security is not 'a permanent given', it evolves and fluctuates and constant efforts must be made in order to maintain it. As a concept that should be implemented in practice, human security places human beings and their needs in the centre of its interest and analysis. National and international security are instrumental for human security, thus ensuring the former should ultimately serve people. "The best guarantee of human security is a strong, efficient, effective, but also democratically legitimate state that is respectful of citizens' rights, mindful of its obligations and responsibilities and tolerant of diversity and dissenting voices" (Thakur, 90). For that reason human security should not be regarded as contradicting national security and should not replace it. These two dimensions of security are complementary (Thakur, 89). From the perspective of human security, national security is valuable but treated as one of many tools used for promoting individual's interests (Kutz, 233–234).

Human security clearly embraces human development and this feature constitutes a significant aspect of this concept: firstly the concept is novel as the accent has shifted from national security to the security of individuals and groups representing the individual, and secondly it combines safety with the concept of sustainable development. Because of this, the concept of human security allows for holistic and complex analysis of the situation of the indigenous peoples in the Arctic, especially taking into account the specific security environment, as well as distinct threats to security, mostly of non-military character.

Threats to human security in the Arctic

The Sami in the Arctic suffer from threats to their human security, most of which are caused by climate change. As K. Hossain claims, the major driver for the "rapid transformation of the region" is climate change (496). Climate change, including global warming,

has a huge impact on the ecosystem and way of life of indigenous peoples in the Arctic. According to the *2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment,*

"[…] climate changes are being experienced particularly intensely in the Arctic. The Arctic's average temperature has risen at almost twice the rate as the rest of the world in the past few decades. Widespread melting of glaciers and sea ice and rising permafrost temperatures present additional evidence of intense Arctic warming. These changes in the Arctic provide an early indication of the environmental and societal significance of global warming" (8; for more details see: Goldberg, Badua, 59–76; Koivurova, online).

This may change the conditions that the Arctic species have been accustomed to. A rise in temperatures and a reduction in sea ice will, for example, drastically reduce "the marine habitat for polar bears, ice inhabiting seals and some seabirds, pushing some species toward extinction" (Hossain, 510). Apart from species' migration there is also a risk of local overfishing (as a result of this migration) and – as the number of tourists is growing – also the risk of this growth's negative impact on the environment and sensitive habitats (Jokela, 72). Traditional hunting is becoming more and more difficult as certain species are no longer present in their traditional areas at specific seasons so the hunters must travel and search for them in different areas (Hossain, 514). As K Hossein indicates, "in Northern Norway, local communities traditionally eat sea gull eggs and cod livers, which both carry additional warnings because of their possible containment pollutants" (514). This threatens the traditional way of life and culture of the Sami. As indicated in the report *Arctic security matters* edited by J. Jokela,

"[t]he shifting of animal ranges and migration routes, for example, may affect food sources and livelihoods for many indigenous peoples, with potentially serious consequences for human health, longstanding cultural traditions, and community survival. Indigenous, isolated and rural populations will be particularly vulnerable due to their environmental dependence and existing challenges relating to political and economic marginalisation, health and poverty challenges, and proximity to exposed locations near water bodies" (18).

Hence,

"a disconnection from the traditional land and a distancing from the distinct culture have become a reality in the case of many indigenous communities. Hunting, gathering, trapping and other traditional activities, such as reindeer

herding are in many parts of the Arctic being replaced by modern activities, such as tourism, mining and other industrialized activities. At the same time modern transportation, infrastructure change and state policies have increasingly affected almost all the features of indigenous lifestyles" (Hossain, 515).

All of the above considerations clearly prove that climate change threatens the survival and way of life of the Sami, and as a consequence, their human security. This was confirmed by Arctic coastal States in the *Ilulissat Declaration* adopted by Canada, Denmark, Norway, the Russian Federation and the United States of America on 28 May 2008 where they stressed that "[t]he Arctic Ocean stands at the threshold of significant changes. Climate change and the melting of ice have a potential impact on vulnerable ecosystems, the livelihoods of local inhabitants and indigenous communities, and the potential exploitation of natural resources" (1).

This is connected with the ice melting which may contribute to the exploitation of what have been up to now inaccessible hydrocarbons and minerals. This in turn may lead to serious negative consequences for the Arctic ecosystem, including indigenous communities (Bergh, 1, 5). Extensive economic development in the Arctic may result in higher levels of pollution in this unique environment. Other dangers connected with the higher economic exploitation of the Arctic involve: increased shipping and navigation, increased land transportation connecting the sea ports and an increase in onshore mining activities and the expansion of the extractive industry's activities (Hossain, 211). A report *Arctic security matters* draws attention to another aspect of ice melting: "[l]oss of ice especially interferes with indigenous lifestyles, but rising sea levels threaten cities and harbours as well as villages" (Jokela, 70).

In this context one may notice that human security in the Arctic also embraces environmental security which may be defined as "avoiding or mitigating acts leading to environmental damage or deterioration that could violate the interests of states and their populations, in particular their northern and northern indigenous peoples" (Huebert, Exner-Pirot, Lajeunesse, Gulledge, 2). Ensuring environmental security in the Arctic is extremely important especially taking into account such incidents as the Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010. There are fears of similar threats coming from drilling in the Arctic waters (Huebert, Exner-Pirot, Lajeunesse, Gulledge, 6). For example, mining activities may cause higher emissions of greenhouse gases

and in this way contribute to even faster climate change and ice melting in the Arctic (Hossain, 512). Development of oil and gas extraction is another reason for worries as drilling operations in the ecologically sensitive Arctic waters may cause an oil spill with tremendous consequences to the coastal fishing sector upon which many small communities rely (Graeves, 19). Oil spills in the Arctic waters may also damage or endanger costal habitats and wildlife. Indigenous peoples in the Arctic, the Sami including, are concerned about all the negative consequences for the Arctic ecosystem and their own lifestyle. For example Aili Keskitalo, President of the Sami Parliament in Norway, stated that "[t]he degradation of the environment in Inuit and Saami traditional territories caused by e.g. pollution, non-sustainable natural resource extraction and climate change constitute a great threat to their traditional lifestyles and culture" (Graeves, 16).

Reindeer husbandry is of extreme importance to the Sami as it is their traditional livelihood as well as integral part of their culture. Consequently threats to the reindeer husbandry are considered threats to the Sami culture (Graeves, 15, Bunikowski, online). Sami culture also includes their language and its preservation. All of these elements are necessary components of the indigenous Sami identity. Reindeer herding is also linked to the threats to reindeer grazing areas. Their preservation as such is necessary for reindeer herding. These areas are shrinking because of development of new mines and mining activities, windmill farms and growing concern over the possible impacts of oil and gas extraction development. Moreover, even if despite the protests of indigenous communities of Sami activities such as mining are undertaken, the Sami have no benefits from this (Graeves, 17). The Sami are not against mining in principle but oppose the opening of new mines that may compromise "the continued viability of the reindeer herding industry" (Graeves, 18).

Another threat to human security of the Sami in the Arctic is the possibility of the remilitarization of the Arctic. Analysts claim that generally – despite some disputes between Arctic States – these States cooperate and resolve all their disputes peacefully. However, at the same time the trend toward modernizing military forces present in the Arctic is visible. If one day – hopefully not – co-operation stops or is under strain, the Arctic may turn into a hostile environment (Huebert, Exner-Pirot, Lajeunesse, Gulledge, 3) with the Sami indigenous peoples as its main victims. Consequently, this trend should be stopped and reversed. Still, K. Hossein claims that there is little chance of military confrontation

in the Arctic (Hossain, 505). In principle, individuals may be safe only if their state is secure as "individuals are the ultimate victims of any security threats" (Hossain, 493)[9] but human security in the Arctic is specific and does not fit well into the traditional concepts of security. This is the result of the specific environment comprising most of the Arctic waters. There is another aspect of remilitarization of the Arctic linked to the possibility of nuclear pollution and its negative consequences for the environment as well as human and animal health "as a result of toxic waste and unsafe disposal of obsolete nuclear items, which applies to Russia in particular" (Jokela, 71).

International law on indigenous peoples from the perspective of human security

The *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* contains some provisions that fit into the concept of human security. Its implementation would contribute to the implementation of the latter. At the very beginning, the preamble of the *UN Declaration* mentions that "the demilitarization of the lands and territories of indigenous peoples [contributes] to peace, economic and social progress and development, understanding and friendly relations among nations and peoples of the word" (1–2) and that "the recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples in this declaration will enhance harmonious and cooperative relations between the state and indigenous peoples, based on principles of justice, democracy, respect for human rights, non-discrimination and good faith" (3). These are the very first considerations of the *UN Declaration* which indicate conditions necessary for human security of indigenous peoples in general: demilitarization connected with peace and social and economic development, recognition of the rights of indigenous peoples as a prerequisite to peace and co-operation between States and a more just world.

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[9] The U.S. has its military base in Greenland – Thule Air Base which was established despite protests from the Inuit indigenous people who had to be forcibly relocated from their homes. The base was established without prior consultation with the Inuit – see: K. Christensen, J. Sørensen, *The Forced Relocation of the Indigenous People of Uummannaq, or How to Silence a Minority*, Humanity in Action, available at: https://www.google.pl/search?q=thule+base+gr eenlnad&ie=utf-8&oe=utf-8&gws_rd=cr&ei=TBDtVu-MHYb36AS-rYjwCQ#q=thul e+base+greenland+indigenous+peoples (accessed 28 March2016).

The most relevant Articles in the *UN Declaration* from the point of view of the human security of indigenous peoples in the Arctic are the following:

• Art. 4 on self-determination, autonomy and self-governance (similar provisions may also be found in the 2005 draft *Nordic Sami Convention's* Chapter II on Sami governance and *ILO Convention 169* in Arts. 6–7);

• Art. 8 prohibiting forced assimilation or destruction of the indigenous culture, depriving indigenous peoples of their lands and resources (it reflects the general obligation of addressing grievances of peoples as a lack of such reaction may cause frustration);

• Art. 10 on the prohibition of forced removal from the indigenous territories and relocation without the free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples (similarly as with Art. 8 implementation of this Article will contribute to stability and security in the Arctic);

• Art. 18 and 19 on the rights of indigenous peoples to participation in decision-making in matters that affect their rights, the obligation of States to consult and cooperate with the indigenous peoples in order to obtain their free, prior and informed consent before taking any action affecting them (these provisions are connected to self-determination and reflect the rule "nothing about us without us" and as such should in part prevent activities detrimental to the Arctic environment such as pollution and oil and gas extraction);

• Art. 20 states that "indigenous peoples have the right to maintain and develop their political, economic and social systems or institutions, to be secure in the enjoyment of their own means of subsistence and development, and to engage freely in all their traditional and other economic activities" and expressly pointing to the social and economic security of the indigenous peoples as components of human security. Implementation of this provision will prevent the eradication of traditional economies of indigenous peoples and their customs;

• Art. 21 is directly connected to the previous article as it mentions the right of indigenous peoples to "the improvement of their economic and social conditions, including inter alia, in the areas of education, employment, vocational training and retraining, housing, sanitation, health and social security";

• Art. 23 on the right to development (development is a part of human security. The draft *Nordic Sami Convention* contains Art. 40 on sustainable development. Sustainable development is linked

to the environmental protection and may be regarded as a manner of protecting the Arctic environment against the detrimental impact of industry, especially the extractive industry);

• Arts. 25–26 and 28 which recognize the special meaning of the lands of indigenous peoples and their spiritual relation with the land (for more details see: Graver, Ulfstein, 337–377; Minde, 107–125);

• Art. 30 which generally forbids military activities on indigenous lands (and may be used as an argument against potential militarization of the Arctic);

• Art. 36 which is relevant for the Sami in the Arctic as it recognizes the right of indigenous peoples divided by borders to "maintain and develop contacts, relations and co-operation, including activities for spiritual, cultural, political, economic and social purposes, with their own members as well as other peoples across borders";

• Art. 43 which recognizes the *UN Declaration* as a minimum standard.

The most fundamental prerequisite for human security of the Sami in the Arctic is the right to self-determination. Art. 3 of the *UN Declaration* mentioned above refers to the right of self-determination of indigenous peoples which means the ability to freely "determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development". Self-determination is connected to the right to autonomy or self-governance in matters relating to internal and local affairs of indigenous peoples (Art. 4 of the *UN Declaration*). As already mentioned, this formula indicates that self-determination should be exercised, first of all, in the form of autonomy. Self-determination may be exercised in the external form leading to secession but as M. Fitzmaurice rightly claims, "[e]xternal self-determination is not only secession from a State but also considered to be the right to participate in international organisations and conferences, a treaty-making power" (144). Moreover, as mentioned, indigenous peoples do not intend to secede from their States.

With regard to the right to self-determination in the form of self-governance, the Sami in the Nordic States are represented in their respective states by the Sami Parliaments and also at the regional level in the Arctic Council by six permanent representatives. Sami Parliaments were established in 1989 in Norway, 1995 in Sweden and in 1996 in Finland. Their task is to "promote and support Saami cultural and political rights and development" (Fitzmaurice, 82). As a result, there are institutions

for Sami self-governance, although their functioning is not free from flaws or difficulties (Kuokkanen, 39–62). Moreover, Finland and Sweden have still not ratified the *ILO Convention 169*. Neither has Russia. So far only Norway has ratified the Convention (the list of the ratifications: http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p= NORMLEXPUB:11300:0::NO::P11300_INSTRUMENT_ID:312314).

The Nuuk Conclusions and Recommendations on Indigenous Autonomy and Self-Government of 1991 state that "autonomy is meaningful for indigenous peoples because it is a prerequisite for achieving equality, human dignity, freedom from discrimination and the full enjoyment of all human rights" (art. 4) and further that autonomy is "beneficial to the protection of the natural environment and maintenance of an ecological balance which helps to ensure sustainable development" (Art. 6) (Loukacheva, 14). Autonomy as a form of internal self-determination and self-governance enables the indigenous peoples to participate in public affairs and in the decision-making in matters that affect them. Its implementation is crucial to survival and social, political, economic and cultural development of indigenous peoples (Loukacheva, 14), in other words to their human security.

Autonomy means being able to participate in decision-making in matters that directly affect indigenous peoples and "cultural, political and legislative inclusion of indigenous (the Saami people) into the national system, sufficiently broad to have an impact on the policies of a state" (Fitzmaurice, 147). Many times the *UN Declaration* emphasises the necessity of free, prior and informed consent of the indigenous peoples for actions or enterprises that might affect their rights (Arts. 10, 11 (2), 19, 26 (2), 28 (1), 29 (2), 32 (2) some of which have been mentioned above). These references to free, prior and informed consent are reflections of the possibility of making decisions in matters that affect the Sami, in other words the principle of self-determination and self-governance.

According to N. Loukacheva, autonomy may be characterised by the following features:

"- a strong voluntary will of the population to achieve autonomy;
- existence of particular geographical, demographic or historical factors;
- cultural, linguistic, ethnic distinctiveness;
- the creation of a legislative body elected by local residents in a democratic way and capable of enacting its own legislation; as well as the establishment of an executive body;
- provisions of conditions for economic sustainability and a financial base versus fiscal dependency on central/federal authorities and pragmatic

expectations of future financial independence and liability for managing its own affairs;
- [...] the desire and ability of all residents of the autonomous entity to be a part of existing or building structures and institutions, making them more amenable to peoples' aspirations and needs" (Loukacheva, 20).

As K. Hossain rightly states, "the strengthening of the idea of self-determination will provide the Arctic indigenous peoples with a broader authority to achieve the goal of human security, applicable in this particular regional context" (496). Consequently, the human rights of the Sami and their right to self-determination must be respected in order to reach the state of human security of the Sami in the Arctic. Human security of indigenous peoples in general, and the Sami in particular, embraces health, education, housing, employment, development and environmental protection, protection of traditional values and customs of indigenous peoples (Baer, 249).

Concluding remarks

When implementing human security in the Arctic one must take into account the specificity of the region and its unique ecosystem. The main threats to human security in the Arctic that affect the Sami are not armed conflicts (although the trend toward remilitarization is rather disturbing) or acts of terrorism or organized crime but climate change, pollutants, the impact of the industry on the environment and eradication of traditional economies and customs of indigenous peoples. An adaptation to changing circumstances is necessary but in the end adaptive capabilities may not be sufficient. Climate change may lead to the reduction or even elimination of the existing resources of the indigenous peoples in the Arctic.

For the Sami "human security means protection and preservation of environmental integrity surrounding the lands on which they live. The degradation of the unique Arctic ecosystem provides a major insecurity since the health of the ecosystem is integrally linked to culture on many indigenous peoples in the Arctic" (Hossain, 515). To the Sami it is relevant to have their lands and their traditional use maintained, to preserve and revitalize the Sami culture and language and to maintain political autonomy and self-governance of the Sami. As Erica-Irene Daes indicates:

"Land is not only an economic resource for indigenous peoples. It is also the peoples' library, laboratory and university; land is the repository of all history and scientific knowledge. All that indigenous peoples have been, and all that they know about living well and humanely is embedded in their land and in the stories associated with every feature of the land and landscape" (264–265).

Human security of the Sami in the Arctic requires maintenance of distinct indigenous identity, customs, beliefs and values, languages, control and management of indigenous lands and natural resources (Arctic Human Development Report). It requires a meaningful self-governance of indigenous peoples and human development. As indicated in the *UN Resource Kit on Indigenous Peoples' Issues* "one of the root causes of poverty and marginalization for indigenous peoples is the loss of control over their traditional lands, territories and natural resources. Denying them the right to live on their lands and territories and to manage natural resources in a sustainable manner has resulted in further marginalization and exclusion" (10). As mentioned, international instruments such as the *UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* and the *ILO Convention 169* recognize the strong and even spiritual ties between indigenous peoples and their traditional lands and recognize those peoples' rights to own and control their lands and, with certain restrictions, to use and manage the natural resources on those lands (Arts. 25–26 of the *UN Declaration* and Art. 14 of *ILO Convention 169*). In order to ensure the human security of the Sami, the specificity of the security environment and threats that are distinct from most common and regular threats to human security in the South must be taken into account. Indigenous peoples are distinct groups with special needs, customs and values. Their human security cannot be ensured without respect for these customs and values. It should be stressed once again that the Sami must be able to decide on matters affecting them, especially with reference to their traditional lands and territories.

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MODEL OF STATE MANAGEMENT OF PETROLEUM SECTOR – CASE OF NORWAY

ABSTRACT: The aim of the article is to discuss the Norwegian Model of hydrocarbon management and its impact on building a just and equal society. Since 1972, the model has been based on the separation of policy, commercial, and regulatory functions. Within each area there is state-controlled institution with its own distinct role. This model of separation of duties is however combined with other unique features which cannot be easily copied by other counties. These include a long tradition and high level of democratic co-operation, inter-governmental checks and balances, socio-democratic traditions of strong public involvement, mature institutional capacity (mainly a competent bureaucracy) and highly developed model of co-operation between government, business and research institutions.

KEYWORDS: Norway, oil and gas sector, management

Introduction

The Norwegian Model of government administration of the petroleum sector since 1972 has been based on a separation of policy, commercial, and regulatory functions. Within each area there are state-controlled institutions with their own distinct roles. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is a policy-making body working with the political leadership on setting goals for the sector, making assumptions for the realization of these goals and framing the licensing process. Commercial functions are ceded to the partly

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state-owned company Statoil which carries out operations both in Norway and oversees. All regulatory and technical guidelines are within the competences of the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate with a wide range of duties from setting regulations related to resource management, collecting fees from oil operators and compiling data on all hydrocarbon activities on the Norwegian Continental Shelf.

This model of separation of duties is however combined with other unique features which cannot be easily copied by other counties. These include a long tradition and high level of democratic competition, inter-governmental checks and balances, socio-democratic traditions of strong public involvement in sectors considered to be of strategic importance to the country, mature institutional capacity (mainly a competent bureaucracy) and a highly developed model of co-operation between government, business and research institutions. Taking into account all of these features, the aim of the article is to discuss the Norwegian Model of hydrocarbon management with the main assumption of its uniqueness and distinctiveness from other countries.

The hypothesizes are:

• the model of state management of the petroleum sector in Norway is highly efficient;

• the success of the sector lies in socio-political conditions and properly designed administration model;

• continuity and predictability of the sector results in social and political trust.

Norwegian petroleum history

The history of the Norwegian petroleum sector can unquestionably be called a "success story". It started in the early 1960s of the twentieth century, when the new found optimism regarding the North Sea's petroleum potential was initiated by the gas discovery in Groningen in the Netherlands in 1959. In October 1962, Philips Petroleum sent an offer to the Norwegian authorities, to explore oil in the Norwegian continental shelf which in the long run was an attempt to acquire exclusive rights. The Norwegian government refused to sign over the entire shelf to a single company due to the threat of monopolization.

In May 1963, the Government proclaimed sovereignty over the Norwegian continental shelf. The State was the sole landowner, and

only the King (Government) could grant licences for exploration and production. Final agreements with Denmark and the UK to delineate the continental shelf were signed in March 1965 on the basis of the equidistance principle. On 13 April 1965 the first licensing round was announced and 22 production licenses were awarded, covering 78 blocks (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate b, 10).

With the discovery of Ekofisk, 1969 can be considered the start of the petroleum era in Norway which has not experienced any impediments till now. Production from the field started in 1971, and several large discoveries were made in the following years. The exploration started in the North Sea and has gradually moved north as knowledge and capabilities have increased. In 1979, the government decided to open up petroleum activity in the area to the north of the 62nd parallel with exploration was gradually initiated. In the early 1980s, exploration in parts of the Norwegian Sea and Barents Sea began and expanded northwards.

From the very beginning the authorities limited the number of blocks in each licensing round, and the most promising areas were explored first. This led to immense discoveries in large fields such as Ekofisk, Statfjord, Oseberg, Gullfaks and Troll. With growing production in these fields as well as an adequate infrastructure enabling a tie-in of a number of other fields, exports to West European countries developed. Gas pipelines exported hydrocarbons to Belgium, France Germany, and Great Britain. In 1993, production began in the Norwegian Sea, and in 2007 it commenced in the Barents Sea (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate b, 10).

According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, for the last 50 years of exploitation about 47% of the estimated total recoverable resources have been used. In 2015, Norway produced 227.8 Sm³ o.e.[1] of marketable petroleum, which was about 14 % lower than in the record year 2004 but 5 % higher than in 2014. Oil production since 2001 has been in a steady decline but gas production continues to grow. Gas sales totaled 115 billion Sm³ (40 MJ) in 2015, a new record which illustrated the demand for natural gas in many parts of Europe. In 2015, gas accounted for just over 50 % of total production of oil equivalents. Norwegian estimations show that the high level of production will be sustained during the next decades but it still needs to be underlined that the country reached

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[1] Standard cubic meters oil equivalents.

peak production in 2004 with more than 260 million of m³ of oil equivalent (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate a).

Table 1. Historical And Expected Production in Norway, 1971–2021

Source: The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate a

Legal and regulatory framework

The role of petroleum revenues for the last five decades has been strategic for the country mainly due to the sound policies of parties representing different ideological orientations. The whole management of the sector is based on the simple principle to provide a framework for the profitable production of hydrocarbons in the long term. It means that none of the political elites is eligible to rapidly increase production aimed at direct revenues to the state budget.

The basic principle is direct state control of the whole sector and all laws and regulations aim at giving the state a superior and stable position in relation to both private and international players. The Norwegian legal framework around the petroleum sector consists of two laws: the petroleum law, and the petroleum tax law.

Surprisingly, the general principles, dubbed "The 10 Oil Commandments", which underpin the Norwegian oil policy date back to June 14, 1971 when the Standing Committee on Industry submitted a white paper from Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy in the Storting (the Norwegian Parliament). This was a clear

clarification of what was needed to ensure that the oil activities would "benefit the entire nation".

Table 2. "The 10 Oil Commandments"

1. That national supervision and control of all activity on the Norwegian continental shelf must be ensured.
2. That the petroleum discoveries must be exploited in a manner designed to ensure maximum independence for Norway in terms of reliance on others for the supply of crude oil.
3. That new business activity must be developed, based on petroleum.
4. That the development of an oil industry must take place with the necessary consideration for existing commercial activity, as well as for the protection of nature and the environment.
5. That flaring of exploitable gas on the Norwegian continental shelf must only be allowed in limited test periods.
6. That petroleum from the Norwegian continental shelf must, as a main rule, be landed in Norway, with the exception of special cases in which socio-political considerations warrant a different solution.
7. That the State involves itself at all reasonable levels, contributes to coordinating Norwegian interests within the Norwegian petroleum industry, and to developing an integrated Norwegian oil community with both national and international objectives.
8. That a state-owned oil company be established to safeguard the State's commercial interests, and to pursue expedient co-operation with domestic and foreign oil stakeholders.
9. That an activity plan must be adopted for the area north of the 62nd parallel which satisfies the unique socio-political factors associated with that part of the country.
10. That Norwegian petroleum discoveries could present new tasks to Norway's foreign policy.

Source: Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy

Basically, at all stages of production (exploration, development and operations) the greatest possible value for society must be generated. Moreover, the revenues should not only benefit the State but Norwegian society as a whole. Aspects such as health & safety procedures, working environment requirements and environmental concerns must be taken into account throughout the industry. The petroleum sector also correlates it's activities with other sectors in order to avoid the Dutch disease[2].

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[2] Dutch disease – an increase in the economic development of a specific sector (for example natural resources), which causes decline in other sectors (like the manufacturing sector or agriculture).

The state has also decided that the best commercial effects in the petroleum sector can be achieved with a mix of public and private activities with sustained strong state ownership. This model has dominated since the mid-1980s when the conservative prime minister Kåre Willoch decided to ease state control the over sector. The state is responsible for setting a clear and predictable regulatory framework and oil companies and other actors carry the responsibility of exploration, development and production of oil and gas. The aim of this shared system is to find a possible balance between the state's (society) interest and that of commercial actors.

It is the State that has the proprietary right to offshore petroleum deposits on the Norwegian continental shelf. Initially, the State had a 50 per cent ownership interest in each production license, however in 1993, this principle was altered, and now in each individual case an assessment is made as to whether the State will participate and to what extent. The main tool to achieve revenues from the sector is tax policy and regular institutional oversight of resource management. The current ordinary tax rate that companies are subject to (not on oil and gas fields) is 25%, which aims at ensuring value creation for society. In 2015 alone, tax revenues from petroleum activities were about NOK 104 billion (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate c).

The petroleum companies are obliged to obtain official approvals and permits for all phases of the petroleum activities (award of exploration and production licenses, acquisition of seismic data and exploration drilling, development and operation, and plans for field cessation).

The Petroleum Act of 29 November 1996 gives the general legal basis for the Norwegian petroleum activities, which are based on the licensing system (*Act 29 November 1996 No. 72 relating to petroleum activities*). Licenses are granted for the exploration, production and transport of petroleum, however the area of interest must first be opened for petroleum activities. An impact assessment of the Ministry of Petroleum and Energy includes factors such as environmental, financial, and social impacts (*Act 29 November 1996 No. 72 relating to petroleum activities*, Chapter 3). Each year, the Norwegian Government opens a licensing round – a certain number of blocks for which production licenses are available. The criteria for procurement are announced, non-discriminatory, objective, and relevant. It is important to stress that a license grants companies exclusive rights to surveys, exploration drilling and

production of petroleum within the covered geographical area and that the petroleum that is produced belongs to the licensee.

Table 3. Net Government Cash Flow from Petroleum Activities, 1971–2017

Source: Norwegian Petroleum Directorate c

Norwegian petroleum activities are also regulated by the European Union (EU) law, and the World Trade Organization agreements. The laws and directives that stem from the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement have a special position, as they are both national and international laws. The rules from the EEA have become part of Norwegian law, but are overseen by both the EFTA surveillance agency and the national courts. The most important EEA laws, apart from the general rules of the free movement of capital, persons, goods and services, require specific regulation on competition, non-discriminatory regulation, and direct state support. There are several EU/EEA directives that have had an immense impact on the Norwegian petroleum sector, notably *Directive 92/22/EF 30 May 1994* that regulates the conditions for hydrocarbon exploration, *the Gas Market Directive,* or *Directive 98/30EF, 22 June 1998 – Concerning rules for the internal market for natural gas.*

Organization of the state agencies

The main body responsible for framework regulations considering the petroleum sector is the Storting. All major development projects and changes in fundamental principles are deliberated in the Storting. Moreover, the parliament uses its legislative powers to shape laws and procedures connected with all stages of production and can review the Government and public sector activities in the area. Over the course of decades, a multi-party consensus has been made over the main directions and goals of the petroleum sector, and even though the composition of the parliament changes over time, the framework for activities is stable and predictable. This political agreement creates long-lasting comfortable conditions for both national and international investors aiming to be engaged long-term on the Norwegian continental shelf.

The main body of management of the shelf lies with the government which holds executive powers over petroleum policy. Due to the rapidity of the sector's impact both on the economy and society, the government is supported by several ministries, directorates, supervisory authorities and state-owned companies. The Ministry of Petroleum and Energy is responsible for the efficient and environment-friendly management of Norway's energy resources through a coordinated and integrated energy policy. The ministry also manages the public's ownership interests in state companies Gassco AS, Petoro AS, Statoil AS and the State's Direct Financial Interest. The subordinated and advisory body of the ministry is the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate, which is responsible for direct petroleum management in the area of exploration and production on the shelf. It has a wide range of competences including adaptation of regulations and other legislative solutions. The taxation system for the petroleum sector is governed by the Ministry of Finance *via* the Petroleum Tax Office. The office is responsible, on the one hand, for the assessment of the government tax proposals, and, on the other, for the collection of taxes. The Ministry of Finance also controls the Government Pension Fund Global which is the state fund that internationally invests revenues from the petroleum sector. The working environment, safety, and the sector's emergency preparedness are supervised by the Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs. The technical and operational aspects are covered by the Petroleum Safety Authority. Other ministries involved in petroleum

policies are: the Ministry of Transportation and Communications – responsible for oil spill preparedness, the Ministry of Climate and Environment – safeguarding the external environment and the Ministry of Trade, Industry and Fisheries, consulted on how the activities of the petroleum sector will influence other sectors, mainly fisheries (Norwegian Petroleum Directorate d).

State companies responsible for the petroleum sector

The Norwegian state has also decided that petroleum activities should be operated by state-owned enterprises, which gives controlling powers but also allows for long-term planning and investment. At the very start of petroleum activities in the early 1970s , political elites decided that the most competitive system and the highest level of competence of a young sector could be achieved by creating three Norwegian oil companies: a fully state-owned company – Statoil, one semi-private company – Norsk Hydro – and one fully private company – Saga. All were created in 1972 on the basis of political will. However, in 1999 Norsk Hydro acquired Saga Petroleum and in 2007 Statoil and Hydro were merged into one company (Olsen, 640).

The position of Statoil was initially never questioned, as from 1973 to 1985 the government awarded Statoil 50% or more of Norway's petroleum development licenses. As Nelsen recognizes, "Few Norwegians questioned the need for the state to play a strong role in the economy, particularly in the petroleum sector, but many non-socialist politicians, and other supporters of private interests on the Norwegian shelf advocated trimming Statoil's considerable financial and political power" (323). In the mid-1980s, due to political tensions caused by the high cash flows of Statoil, the company's ownership was splitt in two, with approximately 20% retained by Statoil itself, and the rest given to the State's Direct Financial Interest (SDFI) which is a portfolio of the Norwegian government's directly owned exploration and production licenses for oil and natural gas on the Norwegian continental shelf. In 2001, this solution was no longer adequate as Statoil was partially privatized and so a new state-owned management company Petoro was created to manage SDFI.

Presently, Statoil remains the most influential operator on the Norwegian continental shelf, holding 60% of the total

production. The company is listed on the Oslo and New York stock exchanges with 67 per cent of the shares still belonging to the Norwegian state. It is one of the most important petroleum companies in the world with projects in around 40 countries (Gordon, Stenvoll, 30–33).

Apart from a single state company operating fields, an important element of efforts to achieve the greatest possible value from the extraction of Norwegian petroleum resources is the efficient system for transporting oil and gas from the fields. In contrast to oil and gas fields operated by different companies, the gas transport infrastructure is under state monopoly. The authorities have a duty to ensure that in general the gas transport system is cost-effective and integrated, transport capacity is available for all interested players, and tariffs for access are low enough to avoid unnecessary costs for producers.

The transportation system of the gas from the Norwegian Continental Shelf to other European countries is operated by Gassco. This enterprise is wholly owned by the Norwegian State. It was established in 2001 as a result of an extensive reorganization of the Norwegian oil and gas sector (till 2001, the transport of gas was provided by a number of companies). Gassco is a neutral and independent operator ensuring that all users of the gas transport system have equal opportunities, both as regards utilization of the system and consideration of capacity increases.

Gassco's responsibilities include all activities connected with the transport of gas from the fields to the receiving terminals (also as an operator for terminals in Dunkerque –France, Zeebrugge – Belgium, Emden and Dornum – Germany), including planning, monitoring, co-ordinating and administering. It plays two various general roles called 'special operatorship' and 'normal operatorship'. The former includes the responsibilities Gassco is directly assigned under the Petroleum Act and other regulations. These include developing new infrastructure, administering system capacity and coordinating and managing gas streams through the pipeline network to markets. The latter means running the infrastructure in accordance with the normative requirements mainly included in the Petroleum Act and other health& safety and environment legislation.

The role of system operator and the actor with the best overview of the system, makes Gassco responsible for further developing an integrated Norwegian gas infrastructure. It gives advice to the government when new, major development projects are being

evaluated and also when interactions between new and existing infrastructure are assessed.

The gas transportation system, that is to say pipelines and terminals, is mainly owned by the Gassled partnership which came into force on January 1, 2003. This joint venture integrated all of Norway's gas transport systems and serves as the formal owner of the Norwegian gas transport infrastructure. Gassled's owners as of December 9, 2015 are Petoro SA 46%, Solveig Gas Norway AS 25%, Njord Gas Infrastucture AS 8%, and other companies (see Gassco). Gassled encompasses all gas facilities that are currently in use or are planned to be used to any significant degree by third parties. In addition, new pipelines and transport-related facilities are to be included in the venture from the time they are put to use by third parties, and are thus part of the central upstream gas transportation system. Surprisingly, it has no regular employees and is organized through various committees with specific assignments.

All commercial aspects of the State's Direct Financial Interest assets have, since 2001, been managed by Petoro AS on behalf of the state and at the state's expense and risk. This state-owned enterprise's objective is to create the highest possible financial value from the state's petroleum portfolio on the basis of sound business principles (it is not an operator). The company's ability to generate income is closely related to its ability to collaborate with and influence operators and other partners, as Petoro has the same rights and obligations as the other licensees on the NCS. It's role of identifying opportunities for boosting value creation also makes Petoro active in relation to the supplies industry, technology groups, the government and society as a whole.

The effectiveness of the Norwegian model

Undoubtedly, the real potential of the hydrocarbon management model of Norway can be best analyzed through the perspective of its economic and social consequences. In the course of last few decades, Norway's hydrocarbon production has been highly important for the creation of the Norwegian welfare state and has been the main driving force behind the economic success of this relatively small Nordic state.

First, the Norwegian petroleum industry has managed to create ripple effects both locally and regionally, from the southern provinces of Rogaland County, with Stavanger as a Statoil hometown, to the most northern areas of the Barents Sea. The industry is an employee for a substantial segment of the Norwegian population as oil companies and supply companies create about 150 000 jobs. However, taking into account the effect of the petroleum industry's demand on the overall economy, the actual number of people connected with the sector may increase by 100 000. All activities on the Norwegian continental shelf are also subject to strict requirements as regards to health & safety and the external environment, making Norwegian oil and gas as clean and safe as possible. Undoubtedly, the industry has been the most important factor in contributing to the sustainable development of the whole country.

Professional, prospective, predictable and sustainable management of petroleum industry has transformed Norway into an important, international energy player. In 2015, ccording to the International Energy Agency (13), Norway was the third largest global net gas exporter with 107 bcm (after Russia – 179 bcm, and Qatar – 119 bcm) and covers more than 20% of the EU's demand gas, competing with the Russian Federation for the top position. It was also the 15th largest oil producer in 2014 with 1904 thousands of barrels per day (US Energy Information Agency).

The petroleum industry in Norway's ranks at the very top in terms of value creation, state revenues and export value. In 2015, the sector witnessed relatively weaker results, which were mainly caused by the low prices of oil and gas on international markets. In 2015, total revenue from the sector amounted to about 20 per cent of the state's total revenues, which was 9% less than in 2013. The sector's share of GDP also dropped from 21.5% in 2013 to 15% in 2015, and its share of total exports shrunk by 10% from 48.9% (The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate e).

Despite some periodic drops, petroleum revenues has been the main impetus for the Norwegian economy and wealth. All income produced by the sector is deposited in the Government Pension Fund – Global founded in 1990 (till January 2006 – the *Petroleum Fund of Norway*, commonly referred to as the Oil Fund (Norwegian: *Oljefondet*). The Petroleum Fund was established to avoid the overheating of the economy, and the possibility of Dutch Disease, to counter the effects of the forthcoming decline in income and to smooth out the effects of oil

prices fluctuations (Holden). The fund's direct income is generated mainly from taxes of companies, payments for license to explore, the State's Direct Financial Interest and dividends from the partly state-owned Statoil. The fund invests its assets internationally in stocks, bonds and properties. As of 29 March 2016, its value was NOK 7138 bln (Norges Bank) meaning that the Norwegian state can be a net creditor for many developing countries, and the largest stock owner in Europe[3].

Table 4. Macroeconomic Indicators for the Petroleum Sector, 1971–2017

Source: The Norwegian Petroleum Directorate e

The immense wealth accumulated in the fund gives grounds to many political debates over such issues as the risk of investments in international stock portfolio, increase of direct spending of revenues within annual budgets, and an ethical framework for investments. First and second issues appear periodically dependent on the political climate, but there seem to be a consensus that first, financial risk is a natural outcome of a liberal economy and real gains can be achieved by participating in the market, and second

[3] The Fund's total market value is permanently updated and visible on the webpage of the Norwegian Bank.

spending more money (supported by the Progress Party) can be dangerous for economic reasons.

In the case of third issue, all axiological problems connected with the fund's assets are regulated by the Council on Ethics which is responsible for giving guidelines for fair, socially and environmentally friendly investments. According to the council's regulations, the pension fund "shall not invest in companies which themselves or through entities they control: produce weapons that violate fundamental humanitarian principles through their normal use; produce tobacco; sell weapons or military material to states that are subject to investment restrictions on government bonds (Council on Ethics). Generally, all companies may be put under observation or be excluded if they contribute to or are responsible for: serious or systematic human rights violations, such as murder, torture, deprivation of liberty, forced labour and the worst forms of child labour; serious violations of the rights of individuals in situations of war or conflict; severe environmental damage; acts or omissions that on an aggregate company level lead to unacceptable greenhouse gas emissions; gross corruption other particularly serious violations of fundamental ethical norms (Council on Ethics).

Most recently, on May 25, 2015 as a proof of their serious attitude towards the mitigation of green gasses emissions, a historical decision was taken by all Norwegian parliamentary parties to divest the pensions fund's assets from mining companies and coal power producers. This can affect more than 120 companies across the world and would be the largest ever fossil fuel divestment with immense international effects (Carrington). It proves that indirectly Norwegian management of its oil and gas sector, which is based on commercial but also on axiological directives, has a more far-reaching global impact than one which is exclusively connected to the sales of hydrocarbons.

Conclusions

The success of the Norwegian Model of hydrocarbons management is based on several factors such as the central role of the state, good interaction between the state authorities, national companies, supplier industry, special interest organizations and the research and development institutions creating networks and

clusters in many parts of the country. It is based on the strict separation of policy, commercial, and regulatory functions with state institutions responsible for different areas. Simultaneously the basic logic behind this is that private elements are essential to competitiveness so that the state cannot be an omnipotent actor. What is most important is that the sector is not vulnerable to current political pressures, as there is a wide political consensus that wealth should be sustained for future generations. The result is that the Norwegian petroleum sector can be called professional, predictable, prospective, and profitable.

The final question is whether the Norwegian Model is applicable in other oil-exporting countries, can this type of administrative design be successful in other political settings. All over new petroleum frontiers this model is being examined by governments in Africa and Latin America with the aim of achieving good governance combined with heavy exploration and nascent production (Al-Kashim). According to research of Mark Thurber et. al. this model, based on separation of different functions, can be applied only with regard to political and institutional context (12). Most of countries with oil and gas sector like Brazil, Mexico, Nigeria, Algeria, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, Angola, Russia or Venezuela do not have strong institutional capacity and competitive political systems to copy all aspects or Norwegian system. In such cases it is more effective to create one all-purpose administrative tool than the system of multiple bodies checking and balancing euch other. What Norwegian Model also cherish is a long time perspective and wealth of the whole nation, both of which are unfamiliar for these countries. As a conclusion one may say that the Norwegian Model of hydrocarbon management, although very efficient, is not a kind of universal design. It has grown and matured in special political, social and economic setting which is quite unique and distant from political culture of many countries.

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ICELAND'S FINANCIAL CRISIS IN 2008.
POLITICAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES

ABSTRACT: The author analyzes the successful strategy of overcoming financial breakdown in the case study of Iceland. The aim of the article is to verify a hypothesis that the Icelandic model could become a panacea for future crises? A document analysis method is applied to present essential indicators such as GDP and trade balance. With the use of a source analysis method, the collapse of the financial sector is determined as the main cause of the slump. The systematization of crisis events is introduced and deepened by the social and political situation. Changes in the state's condition after the crash are provided and future forecasts about economic development are discussed. As a summing up, the author disapproves of the hypothesis that the Icelandic model of overcoming the financial breakdown as a panacea for future crises, pointing out that it is only applicable for specific cases and cannot be seen as a magical remedy for every kind of crisis.

KEYWORDS: Iceland, small state economy, Icelandic crisis causes, Icelandic crisis 2008, Icelandic banking system, Icelandic EU accession.

Introduction

According to the Oxford dictionary a crisis is "a time of great danger, difficulty or confusion when problems must be solved or important decisions must be made". S. Miklaszewski defines a financial crisis as sudden changes in financial markets connected with liquidity shortage of entities, insolvency of participants and state intervention in economic processes. As W. Nawrot points out due

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to globalization, which is defined as dynamic development not only of societies but also technology, the face of financial markets change as well. On the one hand, it is a modern, cross border system creating unlimited opportunities for all participants of markets. On the other, this system is incredibly vulnerable to diverse slump occurrences. In the globalized world, a domino effect can take hold – the fast transmission of crises to markets, especially financial ones. The last financial crash stressed the growing role of the global market and demand mobility in the international view (Mitręga-Niestrój, 159).

The global financial crisis, which began in USA in 2007, is one of the biggest breakdowns in the world economic history and is often compared to the Great Depression of the 1930s. This breakdown was not merely an issue that influenced markets and financial institutions. In fact, it threatened the real economy of the whole world and "particularly affected the banking sector, crucial for the proper functioning of individual countries as well as international systems. Therefore this crisis had extremely negative consequences for entrepreneurships and households" (Mitręga-Niestrój, 160).

In literature one can find many descriptions of the Icelandic strategy of overcoming the crisis, which are presented by many authors as a magical cure, and the Icelandic government's intervention is widely regarded as successful, not only for the economic development of the state, but also (and most importantly) for Icelandic citizens. Very often it is contrasted with the case of Greece. The author, using the method of literature analysis, both Polish and foreign, and the monographic method, appraises the causes and timeline of the Icelandic crash and creates a forecast for futures situations in Iceland. The document analysis method, using data from *Hagstofa Íslands*, is applied to present essential economic indicators before the crisis and provide forecasts. The aim of the following article is to verify the hypothesis that the Icelandic model can be a panacea for crises for other countries.

General characteristics of the Icelandic state

Iceland is a country between Europe and North America. The current population is 329 000 people, which with an area of 103 5000 km^2 has a density of 3.19 person per km^2. The capital region (*Garðabær, Hafnarfjorður, Kópavogur, Mosfellsbær* and *Reykjavík*) is inhabited by more than 1/3 of the country's entire population. In

Iceland there are only 30 cities with over 1000 inhabitants (the second biggest is Akureyri on the North of the island, with a population of almost 20 000). The main natural resources are geothermal energy, water and aluminum. Manufacturing represents 36% of exports. One of the biggest economic sectors is aluminum smelting in 3 aluminum plants: *Straumsvik* (1969), *Grundartangi* (1998), and *Reyðarfjörður* (April 2008). The base of the Icelandic economy is the fishing industry – catches exceed 13 000 tons per year. Only after the crisis did the role of tourism grow significantly. Current statistics show that 70% of citizens are employed in tourism and this sector generates more than 23% of export income (Tourism in Iceland 2). Iceland was visited by almost 1,792,200 people in 2016[1], (it's 2017!!)

The Icelandic banking sector, crucial in the context of the events in 2008, is led by the Central Bank (*Seðlabanki Íslands)* that was established in 1961. *Seðlabanki* is in charge of the monetary policy implementation in Iceland as well as:
  • promoting an efficient and safe financial system;
  • issuance of notes and coins;
  • regulating interest rates;
  • maintaining and managing the foreign exchange reserves.

Apart from *Seðlabanki*in Iceland there are three main banks (names before crisis in brackets):
  • *New Landsbanki (Landsbanki),*
  • *Arion Bank (Kaupthing bank),*
  • *Islandsbanki (Glitinir).*

The Icelandic stock market has operated since 1985, with ICEX15 as its main index.

Before the crisis, Iceland could pride itself on a significant inflow of foreign capital (direct and portfolio investment). In the period between 2000–2004, the value of foreign direct investments (FDI) was 2–3% of GDP, and in 2007 the FDI was 33% of GDP (Wajda-Lichy 192). That phenomenon was connected with the privatization process in the banking sector that started in 2000 as well as the effective promotion of Iceland as a financial center with a cornerstone of the three biggest commercial banks (*Glitnir, Landsbanki* and *Kaupthing Bank*). The strategy of the financial sector's expansion has been implemented since 2007.

From the beginning of the 21st century, Icelandic economy was transformed into one that was dynamic, developed and globalized.

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[1] https://www.ferdamalastofa.is/static/files/ferdamalastofa/Frettamyndir/2017/juli/tourism-in-iceland-2017-9.pdf

At the beginning of the decade, growth in its current account balance was mainly due to the construction of an aluminum plant in *Reyðarfjörður*. The role of exports was gradually growing and in 2007 they exceeded imports by over 25% (Figure 1).

Figure 1. Exports and imports between 2004–2014 (million ISK)

|	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Export	202373	194355,3	242740	305095,8	466859,5	500854,5	561032,2	620127,4	633029,1	610691,6	590501,7
Import	240160	288894,8	401201,5	397241,1	473524,7	410574,8	440820,9	522985,3	555695,4	541361,9	586251,8
Balance of trade	-37787	-94539,5	-158461,5	-92145,3	-6665,2	90279,7	120211,2	97142,1	77333,7	69329,7	4249,9

Source: Own elaboration, data: http://www.hagstofa.is/

Figure 2. Exports between 2004–2013

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013
EEA	158370,5	150248,6	181970,3	239116,4	376063	418346,9	458939	512894,5	495807,5	482961
Other European countries	8796	8906,9	15086,8	13903,9	18789,1	19711	32838,8	35562,4	50535,8	46457,1
USA	18769	16299,2	26131,3	16049,7	25720,1	19402,9	25429	22959,1	28338,1	28667,3
Japan	6076,7	6262,1	5019,2	12775,6	20453	9304,5	14283,4	15443,3	12925,1	11442,1
Other countries	10360,9	12638,5	14532,3	23250,1	25834,5	34089,3	29541,9	33268,2	45422,6	41164,1

Source: Own elaboration, data: http://www.hagstofa.is/

Markets, where most of the goods and services were exported from Iceland, were (and still are) countries participating in The European Economic Area (EEA). At the beginning of the decade, the second biggest market was the USA. After the financial crisis this has changed. Other European countries became the second biggest market. Recently this pattern of growth has been noticed in non-European markets possibly because of the poor economic situation in Western countries (Figure 2).

The estimates above clearly indicate an intensive development of the Icelandic economy at the beginning of the 21st century. In 2004, economic growth. The average level of income per capita (ppp) was far higher than the average in the Eurozone.

Figure 3. Inflation rate 2004–2014

	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014
Inflation (CPI)	3,2	4	6,8	5	12,4	12	5,4	4	5,2	3,9	2

Source: Own elaboration, data: http://www.hagstofa.is/

In 2001, *Seðlabanki* had introduced an inflation target of 2.5% (with a range of 1.5%), that proved to be a sufficient method to limit inflation. It dropped from 6% in 2001 to 2% in 2003 (Figure 3). In the following years inflation started to grow again and from 2005 was above the inflation target. This caused *Seðlabanki* to raise interest rates. As a result, the inflow of foreign capital grew and was not a sufficient tool to reduce demand. A simultaneous reduction in taxes fuelled inflationary pressures.

Iceland before the crisis was characterized with a low unemployment rate (Figure 4). Between 2006–2008 it was between 1–1.6%. A jump in unemployment in 2009 (up to 6.5%) was observed due to the economic crisis. By 2014 this rate had dropped significantly and was only 3.6% and in July 2017 it hit the lowest – 1%.

Figure 4. Unemployment rate between 2004–2014

Year	Value
2014	3,6
	4,4
2012	5,8
	7,4
2010	8,1
	8
2008	1,6
	1
2006	1,3
	2,1
2004	3,1

Source: Own elaboration, data: http://www.hagstofa.is/

Causes of the Icelandic crisis

In 2008, the Icelandic economy was the first in the European system to be severely undermined by the financial crisis. Iceland represents a group of small states as well as small open economy – countries that are highly dependent on exports and imports of goods, that is more vulnerable than most to market fluctuations. Small state economies put pressure on specializations and economy of scale, to be able to compete in the international market. This usually leads to the export of one or two types of products. As Baldur Thorhallsson (2013) suggests that due to these factors smalls states are generally on the front line of these crises.

The case of the Icelandic economy, that is dependent on the export of fish products, fits perfectly into the small state scenario during a recession. After the privatization of three of the biggest banks in 2004, the Icelandic banking sector expanded by over 900% of GDP and led to higher levels of exposure to global market fluctuations.

Because Iceland was the clearest example of a country prevailing over the financial crash, many authors have scrutinized this example. I. Skibińska-Fabrowska (531–532) sums up the causes of the crisis' outbreak presented by both Polish and foreign authors. M. Budyta-Budzyńska sees excessive investments financed by foreign credits in the construction and energy sectors and the consequences of economic reforms in the 1990s. Bank privatization had induced its managers to seek opportunities of return (and profit) abroad. Meanwhile the domestic market was flooded with consumption loans that led to over-indebtedness and dynamic growth in consumption.

L. Kurkliński (2010) seeks the causes of the crisis in the banking sector deregulation that happened after the privatization of the biggest Icelandic banks. This allowed for the combining of investment, corporate and commercial banking. K. Pruchnik (2012) debates that it was not the liberal reforms but the malfunctioning of public institutions, mainly *Seðlabanki* and financial supervision which were the causes that led the whole country to the brink of bankruptcy. Ingimundur Fridriksson (2009) draws attention to exceptionally favorable conditions in the global financial markets at the beginning of the 21st century. Freedom to provide services abroad that was used by Icelandic banks, which willingly combined high liquidity in the global market with extra-ordinary low interest rates as well as high ratings of countries, had made these credit sources seem almost limitless. A. C. Sibert (2011) presents an interesting notion emphasizing the excessive penetration ratio of banking in Iceland while having its own currency, making the country vulnerable to a run on the banks (understood as uncontrolled withdrawal of deposits and suddenly cut off from financing sources).

Initial signs of the recession in Iceland were visible in the years before 2008. The earliest signs of the collapse were already seen in 2003 during the construction of the *Reyðarfjörður* aluminum plan. This investment equaled 1/3 of Icelandic GDP and led to significant growth in the current account deficit. In 2003, three of the biggest Icelandic banks were privatized. After this *Landsbanki, Glitnir* and *Kaupthing* started extensive international expansions. Most of their securities were investments in US securities and funds. In 2004, banks assets equaled 100% of Iceland GDP, as Danielsson (26) shows in 2007 it was more than 900%, making Iceland exposed to unfavorable tendencies in financial markets. Manipulation of interest rates as well as a lack of control of the banking sector and internal irregularities and fraud led to the inevitable collapse of the Icelandic banking system. The last cause of Icelandic breakdown was the lowering taxes in 2007 that resulted in a rise in salaries that led to an increase in disposable income for households. A growth in consumption was observed, followed by inflationary pressures with the current account deficit rising to 25% of GDP.

A direct cause, or maybe even the first stage of the crash, was the loss of capacity to refinance short-term liabilities by *Glitnir, Landsbankinn* and *Kaupthing. Landsbanki* and *Kaupthing*'s liquidity was lost due to a run on foreign branches of these banks. On 6th October 2008, the Prime Minister of Iceland threw Icelandic society into shock when three weeks after the collapse of Lehman

Brothers he announced that the three biggest banks were no longer able to finance their liabilities.

4. Crisis timeline.

3rd **October 2008** the European Central Bank makes a margin call of 400 million to Landsbanki. Even though this decision is taken quickly, it has a strong psychological impact on the British branch of the bank where panic spreads (Decyzja Urzędu Nadzoru EFTA nr 290/12/COL z dnia 11 lipca 2012 r).

6th **October** *Alþingi* passed emergency legislation (Emergency Act No 125/2008) enabling the government to intervene extensively in Iceland's financial system. *Fjármálaeftirlitið* (FME – Financial Supervisory Authority) is given power to take control over the financial institution and disposal of its assets. It became clear that Icelandic banks are no longer able to finance its short-term liabilities.

29th **September** the nationalization of *Glitnir* is announced in an attempt to stop the bank from sharing the same fate as *Landsbanki* and *Kaupthing* (**7**th **October**). The last step that finally plunges the entire Icelandic financial system into meltdown was the British government's decision to pass anti-terrorism legislation to freeze *Kaupthing* assets as an answer to the Icelandic banks' insolvency.

9th **October** the last and the worst effect happens. The Icelandic stock market is suspended and re-opens five days later (**14**th **October**). The new session sees a fall of 70% on the ICEX15 index.

15th **October** *Seðlabanki* cuts the interest rate from a record high of 15.5% to 3.5%. Initial estimates states that British tax-payers might have lost close to £1 billion. The Icelandic state is on the edge of bankruptcy. Icelandic government turns to IMF to get loan for saving the state.

20th **November** the International Monetary Fund approves a $ 2.1 billion loan for Iceland. Iceland becomes the first Western European nation to receive an IMF loan since 1976.

The social situation

The reaction of Icelandic society is no less important than the dramatic market changes in the state. Just before the crisis, Icelanders were probably even more in debt than US citizens. The

American lifestyle was highly influential in Iceland, especially "life on credit". Icelanders had bought not only houses and cars on credit, but also computers and other home appliances. It would not be an exaggeration to say that every single Icelandic person has taken out a loan at least once in their lives, but most citizens had been indebted to Icelandic banks when they collapsed. Part of society also owned both deposits and savings accounts, since Icelandic banks offered highly competitive interest rates. Due to the depreciation of the Króna, Icelanders had lost up to 70% of their savings.

Citizens felt the crisis on many levels: "the withdraw of money and foreign transfers were restricted, the prices of import goods doubled. Before the crash Icelanders had taken out loans for houses, cars and other luxury goods with basically no limits. Then they started to have trouble paying off the loans, especially with the highest installments in foreign currency loans" (Budyta – Budzyńska, 98). Before the crisis, Icelanders followed the ruling party's (Sjálfstæðisflokkurinn) doctrine that made them believe that it is time to use years of hard work and bring puritan austerity to a close. The ruling party persuaded people that it was the perfect moment to build a house, buy a better car or spend their winter holidays in warmer climes. Obviously, all this could be done with credit that was available to everyone (Przemiany polityczne na Islandii w warunkach kryzysu bankowego i gospodarczego, 19).

The sudden devaluation of the Króna and higher repayments were beyond most Icelanders' financial capabilities. Moreover, the anger of people rose along with the behavior of the government especially the Prime Minister Geir Haarde and the head of *Seðlabanki* Davíð Oddsson, who were well-known for financial embezzlement on a grand scale as well as enormous estates. They simply belittled the social issues to care only about their own business[2]. Demonstrations had already begun in 2008 but by January 2009 even larger protests known as 'the pots and pan revolution' were taking place[3].

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[2] Kamil Pruchnik calls such a phenomenon crony capitalism, pointing out that disordered privatization process had been held. Power and governance in the biggest companies went into the hands of influential businessmen closely connected with the government. Such a situation led to business depending on the goodwill of the government (e.g issuing licenses, tax refunds and tax exemptions or public auctions on favorable conditions) and not to free market competition.

[3] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sbVml3P4FBY

Starting from 20[th]January 2009, thousands of people protested in the main square in Reykjavik, just in front of the *Alþingi* building. At this point it seems important to emphasize that the previous demonstration in Iceland had taken place in 1949 while discussing Icelandic membership in NATO[4].

Protesters wanted the government to step down and set up a new election date. Clashes with police took place, along with the use of tear gas and the arrest of demonstrators (Icelandic protesters demanded the government step down). In the end the protesters won – on 26th January Prime Minister Geir Haarde announced his resignation along with the whole government and set up a new election date for 25[th]April 2009. The new Prime Minister of the temporary government was Jóhanna Sigurdardottr (Samfylkingin).

Emerging from the crisis

The most important decision (supported by citizens), both from an economic and social perspective, was not to save banks by all means and not to use quantitative easing, but letting the banks fall. This saved the whole country from the situation that was observed in Greece and Spain. Such a decision put the whole country on the edge of bankruptcy, yet as the years after have shown, the risk was worth taking. Lowering interest rates as well as a devaluation of the Króna by up to 70% (1 euro = 90 ISK before the crisis, at its lowest, the exchange rate of the Króna equaled 1 EUR = 340 ISK, the current exchange rate is 1 EUR = 124 ISK) was possible due to the fact that Iceland is neither a member of the Eurozone nor a big state. The exchange rate of the Króna is now under restricted control. Of course such a decrease of the country's currency value that is so dependent on foreign markets pushed the inflation rate up to a peak of 18% in 2009. Between 2009–2010 it was necessary to limit the rise in salaries (Islandia kpi z Europy). Due to such a drastic devaluation of the Króna, living conditions in Iceland became more difficult as prices went up, yet it also resulted in the

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[4] One can surely say that protests or demonstrations in Iceland was seen as absolutely the last resort in the average citizen's view. The decision of so many people to protest shows how desperate the nation was during the crisis especially concerning the ruling elites and government behavior.

recovery of the economy mostly based on export and helped in developing a relatively new branch – tourism. Healthy sectors of Icelandic economy were able to help the whole country recover and rebuild the economic potential with the favorable conditions of global markets. More and more tourists started to visit Iceland which was undoubtedly a positive driving force of the post-crisis economy. The fact that the liabilities of three biggest Icelandic banks were 75% denominated in foreign currencies prevented the government from paying off all deposits, since their value greatly exceeded the value of the Guaranty Fund and official reserve assets of *Seðlabanki* (Wajda-Lichy, 199).

In this regard, international aid – such as the loan from the IMF (2.1 billion dollars), also Polish participation (200 millions) for foreign reserve assets and the enormous help from the Nordic countries was indispensable and allowed a substantial amount of money to be pumped into the Icelandic financial system (Background information on Nordic loans to Iceland). Help from the IMF was strictly connected with the reconstruction of the entire financial system of the country that after significant changes had to focus mainly on the internal market. Controlled flow of capital was introduced and became a tool to diminish the effects of the crisis. New banks were established to replace collapsed ones – *New Landsbanki, Arion Banki* and *Islands Banki.* Moreover, a commission to administer the insolvency assets of previous banks was created. The issue of debts of foreign branches was far more complicated.

Icesave

Icesave was a product of *Landsbanki* between 2006–2008 for both the British and the Netherlands market that offered saving accounts on very favourable conditions (Figure 5). In Britain there were three types of accounts: immediate – access saving accounts, ISA and fixed rate bonds. The interest rate of these accounts was more than 6%, making it one of the best offers for clients in Britain between 2006–2007. At the time of its collapse, Icesave handled more than 300 000 clients in the UK, whose total value of deposits was around 5 billion dollars.

Figure 5. Conditions of Icesave accounts in Great Britain

Immediate-access savings account	ISA	FIxed rate savings account
High interest rate – **6.30% AER***	High fixed interest rate – up to **6.76% AER***	High interest rate – **6.10% AER* (variable)** – what's more, the tax man won't get a penny of your interest
We guarantee the AER will beat Base Rate* by at least 0.25% until 1 October 2009 and at least match Base Rate until 1 October 2011	Save a lump sum for 6 months, 1, 2 or 3 years	We guarantee the AER will beat Base Rate* by at least 0.30% until 31 January 2011 and at least match Base Rate until 31 January 2013
No notice period for withdrawals	Interest rate fixed for the term of the account	No notice period for withdrawals
No penalties for withdrawals	Choose when you receive your interest	No notice period for withdrawals
Choose to receive your interest monthly or annually	Save from just £1,000	Choose to receive your interest monthly or annually
Start saving with just £250	No withdrawals or additional deposits can be made during the term	Start saving with just £1,000 and save up to £3,000 each tax year

Source: Own elaboration, data: http://web.archive.org/web/20080202162406/
www.icesave.co.uk/ savingsrange.html-

Alþingi created the *Icesave bill 1* in 2009. It anticipated returning the money to the governments of Britain and the Netherlands, which paid their citizens compensation money (almost 3.9 billion EUR deposited in Icelandic bank). The act was positively voted in *Alþingi* and signed by President Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson in September 2009, yet neither Britain nor the Netherlands agreed to this because of the condition that put a time clause on repayment until 2024 when any remaining liabilities would be automatically cancelled. The second proposal was put forward by the UK and the Netherlands (*Icesave bill 2),* where the condition of the time clause was removed.

Alþingi accepted the bill, yet the President vetoed[5] it leading to a referendum. More than 90% of the voters were against the solution proposed in *bill 2*. The next agreement (*Icesave bill 3*) with the UK and the Netherlands was not signed until December 2010. The new agreement granted favorable repayment terms. The most important change was the lower interest burden. In February 2011, *Alþingi* ratified the agreement, yet once again it was vetoed by the President ,resulting yet again in another referendum in April 2011 (Budyta-Budzyńska, 101). Once again Icelanders voted against the bill, assuming the next generations of tax payers would be burdened with repayments, when they believed the crisis was a result of bad governance in the banking system and of leading politicians. Because of a lack of an agreement, the case was addressed at the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Court. After *Landsbanki* collapsed, the governments of countries not only demanded the return of receivables for their citizens, but also made the Icelandic State Treasury responsible. Iceland presented a position that during the crisis in 2008,the government did its utmost to make sure that all deposits were returned. "This was made possible by changing the ranking of such claims in the case of the winding up of the banks, securing distributions ahead of general unsecured creditors. This has proven to be a necessary and successful measure as the UK and the Netherlands have already received approximately 50% of their total claims and stand to be paid in full" (Judgment in the Icesave court case due on January 28). The EFTA Court ruling on Icesave, on 28th January 2013, rejected all claims by the EFTA Surveillance Authority. The Court rejected the claim that Iceland has breached the Deposit Guarantee Directive or had discriminated against depositors contrary to EEA law.

Quoting professor Hannes Hólmsteinn Gissurarsson, a lecturer of political science on Háskóli Islands, the only method to overcome the crisis that a small country such as Iceland could afford to fight on their own (Kryzys? Islandia nie ratowała banków, ale uciekła przed widmem Unii). One has to emphasize

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[5] Ólafur Ragnar Grímsson was the first president in history, who used his veto power against an act accepted in *Alþingi*. The veto against Icesave bill was the second ever case in Icelandic state history. This shows how important this decision was for the whole society. See more: Pascale J., Olafur Ragnar Grimsson re-elected for a 5th mandate as Head of State in Iceland, 4 May 2015, http://www.robert-schuman.eu/en/eem/1315-olafur-ragnar-grimsson-re-elected-for-a-5th-mandate-as-head-of-state-in-iceland

the incredible ability of Icelanders to adapt. This ability was created during centuries of fighting in a harsh climate as well as foreign governance over the island from the 12th century to the 1940s. The qualities of Icelanders such as a national unity against injustice, seen during the years of Danish rule, significantly contributed to the success of Iceland during the later crisis. The nation stood together against corrupt officials, politicians and bankers[6].

Summary and predictions

The case of Iceland is often cited as a fortunate overcoming of the financial crisis. It is hard to deny that in comparison with other countries such as Greece, the Icelandic model (Figure 6) was a successful solution. From the perspective of seven years since the recession began in Iceland, the steps taken by *Seðlabanki* and the Icelandic government can be judged as a success. The controversial decision of letting the banks' collapse and to be later taken over by the state as well as the use of macroeconomic tools to achieve positive, yet long-term benefits, turned out to be a good remedy for the crisis.

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[6] After the crisis many preventive proposals were considered e.g. changing currency (Canadian dollars or euros without joining the EU). The crises revived ongoing discussions about the need of EU membership. The government led by Prime Minister Jóhanna Sigurðardóttir proposed accession to the EU structures. (See more: Legutko A., Europejski wymiar polityki Islandii „Zeszyty Naukowe Skandynawistyki", vol. 3, 2014). On 23rd June 2009 Minister of Foreign Affairs Óskar Skarphéðinsson officially submitted a request to Carl Bildt, President of the EU Council. The case of EU membership after the crisis recovery has become less and less important in public discourse. It seems that after the worst wave of financial crisis had dissipated and the Icelandic economy had started to recover, Icelandic accession to the EU was pushed into the background. In mid-May 2015 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Iceland Gunnar Bragi Sveinsson announced, after consulting with government, that Iceland was no longer interested in becoming a part of the EU. Due to this fact, the government withdrew from accession procedures and requested a suitable act that confirmed the end of the negotiations. The letter was answered by the Latvian Foreign Affairs Ministers, since Latvia held the EU Presidency, and the need of strong co-operation and friendly ties were highlighted (see more: Foreign Ministry: Iceland's EU Application off the Table [2015] 20 May 2015, http://icelandreview.com/news/2015/03/12/foreign-minister-icelands-eu-application-table.

Figure 6. Prevailing over the crisis – the Icelandic Model

Source: Own elaboration

The Icelandic Króna has appreciated, inflation and unemployment rate has dropped and the Icelandic economy once again is developing at a stable pace and enjoys good financial health.

Figure 7. GDP growth prediction between 2015–2019

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
GDP	3,8	3,2	2,8	2,7	2,5

Source: Own elaboration, data: http://www.hagstofa.is/

GDP that in 2009 dropped to -5,1%, in 2014 rose to 1,9%. Unemployment rate that during the crisis was 8%, in 2014 fell to 3.6% and *HagstofaÍslands* forecasts a downward trend in the

following years (Figure 7). The inflation rate which was 12.4% in 2008 declined to 2% in 2014. In a five-year period it should not exceed 3% (Figure 8).

Figure 8. Unemployment rate and inflation rate prediction between 2015–2019

	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019
Inflation	1,7	3	2,8	2,7	2,5
Unemployment rate	3,1	3	2,9	3	3

Source: Own elaboration, data: http://www.hagstofa.is/

It is worth noting that the loan taken from the IMF was repaid before the set deadline. Undoubtedly, the reason of Icelandic prevailing over the crisis was the fact that the country is small. The importance of this factor is rarely mentioned but Thorhallson underlines of the country's small bureaucracy, leading to a shorter decision making process, faster adaptation to changing conditions in the domestic and global economies. The case of Iceland confirms this thesis. The Icelandic economy adapted fast to the low exchange rate of the Króna, using its competitive advantage in exports and the rapid development of the tourism sector. Drastic and risky steps, including control of capital and the refusal of refunding foreign liabilities, in the Icelandic case was dictated by the enormous scale of obligations that significantly surpassed the financial capabilities of such a small economy. The banking sector just before the crisis exceeded 900% of the state's GDP. One of the reasons, apart from being a small state, that makes the Icelandic strategy unsuitable for other counties was that the depreciation of the exchange rate is impossible to use in the case of the Eurozone countries which do not operate their own currency and carry on commercial activity mostly with other countries of the European Monetary Union. A drop in the value of the Króna has had an impact on the dynamic development of healthy economic sectors such as tourism and exports, allowing Iceland

to rapidly overcome the crisis. The solution that was implemented in Iceland in 2008 and 2009 can hardly be seen as a new model to be used in different countries. Such radical moves would not be possible in countries of higher populations and geographical sizes, or which have more developed economic branches, and finally, which are part of the EU, and especially the Eurozone.

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SPORTS DIPLOMACY OF NORWAY

ABSTRACT: Norway is perceived as a country with a clear international identity. The aim of the article is to investigate the sports diplomacy of Norway and to examine its influence on the international brand of this country. The author will define the term "sports diplomacy" and attempt to outline the strategy of Norway's public diplomacy; an analysis of the methods used in Norwegian sports diplomacy will follow. The main hypothesis of this paper is that sports diplomacy only plays a subsidiary role in Norwegian nation branding.

KEYWORDS: Sports diplomacy, public diplomacy, nation branding, international image of Norway

Introduction

The aim of this article is to investigate the sports diplomacy of Norway. The definition of sports diplomacy will be discussed below, but in short, the term refers to using sport as a means to achieve diplomatic or foreign policy goals. One of these objectives is to influence the international image of a country, which aligns sports diplomacy with public diplomacy. Therefore, before analysing particular examples of Norway's sports diplomacy, the article examines its public diplomacy strategies in order to place sports within the wider context of Norway's international image promoted by the Norwegian government and Norway's international brand.

This study will also define the ways in which Norway pursues sports diplomacy and examine the impact of sport on its

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international brand. The main hypothesis to be validated is that sports diplomacy plays only a subsidiary role in shaping the international image of Norway.

The following analysis is a case study presenting various examples of particular methods applied by Norwegian authorities. The main focal points of this analysis are: sports development aid, organising sports events, and supporting the performance of Norwegian athletes in international sport, particularly winter sports.

The author of this paper decided to focus on Norway as this country is an extraordinary example of success in public diplomacy. It is a small state located far from the heart of Europe, which does not belong to the European Union and whose inhabitants speak a language fairly unknown outside its borders. Despite that, it has built a remarkable presence on the international stage thanks to finding a suitable niche and prioritizing target audiences (Ritto). For this reason, its public diplomacy strategy has been the subject of a number of studies. However, researchers haven't so far analysed sport as a dimension of Norway's public diplomacy, and this article is an attempt to fill this gap.

Norway's International Brand. Current perception

Norway's population in 2014 was approximately 5.1 million, which ranked the country 117th worldwide (Countries in the world (ranked by 2014 population). Despite this, the state is rated surprisingly highly in global brand rankings. In 2014 it was ranked 13th out of 50 in the prestigious Anholt-GfK Nation Brands Index, which measures countries' global influence (Norway's International Image "Strong and Stable"). In the Future Brand Index 2014 – a listing of the world's leading country brands – Norway is ranked 6th out of 75 (Future Brand launches the Country Brand Index 2014–15). Both indexes were primarily based on public opinion surveys undertaken worldwide. Those figures indicate that the global position of Norway's international brand and image is very high in spite of the size of its population.

Experts on international branding argue that Norway has relatively limited assets – given its population, it can be categorised as a small country. Moreover, as mentioned above, it is located far from the centres of global or European politics, and Norwegian is not a language spoken worldwide. Norway is, however, a very wealthy

country: according to the International Monetary Fund, ranking second in the world after Luxembourg in Gross Domestic Product per capita, which in 2014 was 97,013 USD (World GDP (nominal) per capita Ranking 2015). Nevertheless, economic status is not regarded as a key factor of soft power and should not hugely affect the global brand of a state or its public diplomacy. In the past, the country derived its standing from its strategic location in the Cold War context. In the rearranged international arena that emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Norway had to look for other ways to distinguish itself from other countries (Bátora, 16).

Despite all this, Norway gained international recognition thanks to prioritising targets and concentrating on one strong message – presenting itself as a powerful supporter of world peace. Experts have underlined that this strategy allowed Norway to achieve international visibility that exceeds its resources. Norway's international reputation as an honest broker of peace is a result of numerous international mediations undertaken by the country's officials (Leonard, Stead, Smewing 9, 53). Because of this positive reputation, Norwegian peacekeepers have generally received a warm welcome in the countries they visited, which further strengthened this perception (Henrikson, 72).

As regards Norway's international image, apart from peacekeeping, it is best known as a generous donor of aid to poor countries. It is also generally respected for its international fleet, high standards of safety, cleanliness, and benefits from the generally positive image of Scandinavia. On the other hand, continued involvement in whaling and seal culling works against this positive perception, as it questions the commitment of the Norwegian government to ecology (Henrikson, 68, 79; Leonard, Small, 8). The following sections will analyse Norway's international image within the area of sport.

The definition of sports diplomacy

Firstly, it is worthwhile to clarify the term "sports diplomacy", which is frequently used by scholars, but a number of its definitions can be found in academic literature. Additionally, sports diplomacy has not yet been conceptualized in Poland.

While discussing sports diplomacy, the "ping-pong" diplomacy between the United States and communist China in the early 1970s

is one of the first examples that come to mind. A situation in which sports contacts are used as a convenient opportunity for politicians or diplomats to meet is probably the purest example of sports diplomacy – on such occasions, a sports meeting is used as a direct diplomatic tool and sometimes a driver for political rapprochement. This is just one definition of the term, and a very narrow one; still, some scholars view sports diplomacy in this exact way. According to David Rowe, sports diplomacy is a fairly safe and mild means of "making friends" and defusing conflicts (115), whereas Jacquie L'Etang believes that governments use sport to communicate a wish to enhance current relations (81).

The majority of scholars prefer a somewhat wider definition of sports diplomacy. According to Anurag Saxena, "sports diplomacy" applies when sport is used as a tool to enhance – or, sometimes, aggravate – diplomatic relations between two parties. A similar view is held by many other researchers, including Ellis Cashmore (349–50). This understanding of sports diplomacy obviously encompasses the one mentioned above, but introduces a second aspect – drawing attention to problematic relations. The two main methods of exposing international conflict in the context of sport are sports boycott and sports isolation. A sports boycott happens when a state, a group of states, a political leader, or individual athletes refuse to participate in a sports event, usually for political reasons. Most boycotts are directed against the host of the event or the sports organisation. Sports isolation encompasses activities aimed at preventing a particular, contested country from participating in international sports competitions – for example, by denying visas to athletes heading to sports events taking place in a given country.

The above are the most common ways to describe sports diplomacy which focus on states as participants. These two definitions, particularly the second one, are clearly correct, but they seem to overlook some important dimensions of sports diplomacy. A situation not taken into account is sports diplomacy pursued by non-state actors – international governing bodies such as the International Olympic Committee or the FIFA. Due to their role, in some situations they function as regular diplomatic actors, negotiating with states or recognising new countries (Murray, Pigman, 1099).

Yet another way to define sports diplomacy is to view it as an important tool for shaping the international brand of a state. This can be achieved, among others, by organising sports events or

ensuring good performance in international sports competitions. As far as hosting sports events is concerned, the Summer and Winter Olympic Games and the world and European football championships – the so-called mega-events – play the most significant role because of their popularity and scale. However, even minor events may be of substantial diplomatic value. Similarly, winning medals in international sport matters in terms of a state's international brand – results in sport are a factor in international indexes of soft power (McClory, 7) and are believed to influence the global perception of countries (The Anholt-GfK Roper Nation Brands Index). However, just by participating in a sports event, regardless of winning medals, a small country can enhance its brand; this is especially true of new countries that have not yet earned universal recognition.

In the context of nation branding, sports diplomacy can also include activities targeted on one or more selected countries. Countries may establish bilateral sports contacts, which can include setting up training meetings with skilled coaches and athletes, supporting the development of a particular sport in a given country, or sending globally recognized athletes to other countries. The last of these methods is very successfully applied by the United States thanks to the development of programs such as American Public Diplomacy Envoys, in which sports celebrities are sent overseas to promote America and its values (Sports and Public Diplomacy Envoys 2005–2013, United States of America Congressional Record 25790, Johns, 3).

Sports diplomacy is usually treated as a form of public diplomacy; Beata Ociepka believes, for instance, that sport has a substantial role in public diplomacy as it can be used to strengthen a country's international position (13). It is hard to disagree with this view: public diplomacy can be defined as communicating an international actor's policies to citizens of foreign countries with the help of foreign ministers, non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations using media broadcasts, conferences, events, collaborative projects, cultural exchanges, student exchanges and so on (Pamment, 1). Such activities are obviously meant either to promote a positive image of a country or to send specific messages. Public diplomacy is deeply bound to soft power – according to Joseph Nye, a state can achieve its goals without resorting to coercive methods, but instead by influencing others and leading them in the desired direction (5). Both public

diplomacy and sports diplomacy are, to a certain degree, means of wielding soft power.

Considering all of the above, sports diplomacy can be described as a form of public diplomacy that treats sport as an arena of diplomatic activity. Consequently, many countries pursue sports diplomacy within a wider strategy of public diplomacy. This is also true of Norway, and therefore this paper will analyse its sports diplomacy in relation to overall public diplomacy goals and strategies.

Norwegian strategy of public diplomacy

Public diplomacy is particularly important for small and medium-sized countries; Norway definitely belongs to this group, especially considering its population. Public diplomacy offers these countries an opportunity to gain influence and shape their international brand beyond the limited hard power resources. Their major objective is to be internationally recognised for selected accomplishments (Bátora, 1, 6). Therefore international visibility is the key objective. Insufficient recognition by the international public is a frequent problem faced by smaller states, and generating outside interest should be their priority.

The above principles of public diplomacy certainly apply to Norway. Unlike larger states such as the United Kingdom, the United States or China, Norway does not aim to modify its public image, but to increase its international visibility, which is limited by factors such as: small population; relative political, geographical and cultural isolation, linguistic constraints and few universally recognisable iconic figures (Leonard, Small, 1–2, 24). These issues apply to Scandinavia in general.

Small states are sometimes advised to pursue "niche diplomacy", that is, to specialise and focus on a selected area of public diplomacy instead of trying to act effectively in every sphere, which is more than their resources allow. Norway, an affluent country, could emphasise its wealth and high standards of living (even if wealth is not always regarded as an element of soft power). Instead, Norwegians decided to focus on promoting other aspects of the country's identity. The theme of peace appears to be Norway's niche of choice. The goal was to be seen as "The International Capital of Peace" – the Norwegian government earned this title by hosting the Nobel Peace Prize ceremonies, participating in the Oslo peace

process and many other international engagements. Some scholars have called this set of activities "the Norway Model" (Moore, Niche diplomacy: a key for smaller states to become visible?).

Norway can be regarded as an example of successfully exploiting a niche, but its well-planned and coordinated public diplomacy strategy is not oriented exclusively on peace. Efforts to formulate a comprehensive strategy began in 2003. Three separate strategies were developed to boost product advantage, national branding and Scandinavian branding (Leonard, Small, 8).

Following that, a more uniform strategy was developed. The country's efforts to establish a strong brand were directed at presenting Norway in the light of four key themes: as a humanitarian superpower, as a place that allows for living in harmony with nature, as an equal community and as the home of internationalist adventures. The first theme concentrated on Norway's extensive engagement in development aid and peace processes worldwide. The second drew attention to progressive environmental policies, while the third highlighted the low level of economic inequality in Norway – one of the richest countries in the world. The theme of internationalist adventure referred to many famous Norwegian adventurers, as well as to sport – Norwegians are believed to have invented skiing and base jumping; Norwegian athletes have won many medals in Winter Olympic Games; the country is also renowned for its pioneers of polar exploration (Leonard, Small, 3–4, 41). This strategy was targeted at six key countries: United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan and Russia (Leonard, Stead, Smewing, 170–171). In terms of methods, the execution of this strategy encompassed supporting networking across borders, arranging royal visits, drawing attention to outstanding Norwegian thinkers and artists – such as Henrik Ibsen or Edvard Munch – and recipients of the Peace Nobel Prize or organising major events (Leonard, Stead, Smewing 173–74). While focusing on Norway's commitment to global peace as its most distinctive characteristic, the initial strategies did not overlook other areas of public diplomacy, which can be regarded as niches.

In time, the public diplomacy strategy of Norway began to evolve. The Norwegian Public Diplomacy Forum was founded in 2007 by Foreign Minister Jonas Gahr Støre; its function was to prepare and develop specific strategies aimed at strengthening international communication. Shortly afterwards, in 2008, a pilot project oriented at "strengthening 'communication bridges' between Norway and the rest of the world" was initiated. It proved to be successful, and a more

comprehensive program titled 'Strategy 2013' soon followed. Specific goals of this scheme were adjusted annually (Smith). The strategy was prepared in collaboration with the Foreign Policy Centre in London and discussed in a series of seminars attended by selected representatives of government and non-governmental agencies, as well as journalists, scholars and businessmen (Gilboa).

After the 'Strategy 2013' program was completed, another adjustment was made to Norway's public diplomacy strategy. Most importantly, key elements of the desired international perception of Norway have been changed, and in 2013, concentrated on "nature and value creation" and "equal opportunities brought on by sustainable living, culture and welfare state". The first one referred mostly to natural landscapes and resources (as well as advanced technology), whereas the second stressed democratic values and a healthy balance between work, family and leisure (Norway's image abroad – a shared responsibility). This represents a slight change compared to the previous strategies: a smaller degree of emphasis was placed on sport as a driver of the state's international brand; this contrasts with the earlier strategies which stressed presenting Norway as the home of many winter sports and the birthplace of great adventurers.

Sports diplomacy in Norway

As demonstrated above, Norwegian public diplomacy is highly developed. Like many other countries, Norway conducts its sports diplomacy within a wider strategy of public diplomacy, even if sport has not always been included into the key strategies. A brief overview of Norway's public diplomacy strategies suggests that sport may play a small role in shaping the country's brand and increasing its visibility. The following section contains an analysis of several examples of utilising sport to enhance Norway's international brand and reach other public diplomacy objectives.

Sports development aid

Earlier sections of this article listed the main means of conducting sports diplomacy. One of them concerned helping other countries in the area of sport, for instance by providing training

or equipment. Such activities have often been undertaken by the United States. Basketball coaches are often sent to countries where this typically American sport is gaining popularity but needs support (Rough, 285). Activities like these can be classified as development aid – a typical method of pursuing public diplomacy in general.

Not surprisingly, Norway – a country that wishes to be associated with peace and equality – is active in this field. Sport may serve as an important tool for reaching development goals, especially facilitating peace and reconciliation. Norwegian strategic documents describe sport as a "driving force for development" that can promote social integration, dialogue and tolerance – a "school for democracy". In the area of sports development aid, sport for all is the main focus (Strategy for Norway's culture and sports co-operation with countries in the South, 37, 39). Norway has initiated co-operation programs with developing countries focusing on this area. Their objective is to encourage long-term competence-building in developing countries (Johnson, cover). Norway has been providing sports development aid to poorer countries since the 1980s, long before adopting official public or sports diplomacy strategies (Eichberg; Darnell, 8).

As regards practical matters, Norway allocates prominent amounts of money to support sports activities in the Global South – for example, in 2003, 23 million NOK. The funds are distributed both by the Norwegian authorities and non-governmental organisations, with priority given to the government. The most important NGOs that participate in the aid programs are the Norwegian Olympic Committee, the Confederation of Sports (NIF), the Football Association of Norway (NFF), the Right to Play, and the Kicking AIDS Out Network (Strategy for Norway's culture and sports co-operation with countries in the South 41, 43). It is typical for Norway's public diplomacy to actively cooperate with NGOs in various fields (Henrikson, 70). The last of the organisations mentioned above – the Kicking Aids Out Network – promotes the awareness of AIDS in Africa through football and is funded by the Norwegian Development Agency (Shearer).

How does development aid affect the international brand of a state? Norway has at least two reasons for spending substantial amounts on aiding the development of sports in struggling countries. The first one is probably to enable other countries to experience the positive role sport can play in various areas. The second is aligned with the overall strategy of Norwegian public

diplomacy – sports development aid promotes Norway's image as a country that comprehensively supports peace. Thus, sports development aid may be seen as complementary to other, more direct activities aimed at presenting Norway as a global peace broker.

Hosting sports events

Organising sports events is probably the most impactful method of enhancing a country's international brand by means of sports diplomacy. It involves spending large amounts of money, but unlike ensuring successful sports results, does not require developing a long-term system of training and support. It is therefore easier to gain international visibility by hosting a sports event – after going through the process of acquiring the rights to host it (even heads of state engage in bidding for sports events – that issue will not be covered in this article).

Norway hosted the Winter Olympic Games twice: in 1952 in Oslo, and in 1994 in Lillehammer. Oslo has applied to host the Winter Olympics once again in 2022, but withdrew its bid due to financial concerns (Abend). No other sports mega events were organised in Norway; the country hosts smaller scale championships and tournaments in less popular sports. The 2016 Youth Olympic Winter Games will take place in Lillehammer (Youth Olympic Games). In respect to sports diplomacy, and even to public diplomacy, the last Olympic Games in Lillehammer have been called "a milestone event". Large sports events, if organised well, engage global audiences in a direct way. The Lillehammer Olympics combined excellent organisation and a fair extent of popular involvement with engaging national stories. A key role was played by the innovative opening ceremony (Leonard, Small, 73). The international media described the Lillehammer Olympics as "one of the most atmospheric and efficient Olympic Games" or "the fairy-tale Games" (Owen).

Sports mega-events increase the visibility of a country thanks to their popularity – a large number of people visit the games, while even more follow them through the media. Well organised events are particularly efficient in making the host not just visible, but visible in a good light. Even though officially the Olympic Games are hosted by cities, in practice states usually

support organising such events and benefit from them in terms of brand.

Norway hosted many elite events, including mega-events such as the Olympic Games, but in the context of sports diplomacy it is worthwhile to discuss a lesser-known event – the annual Norway Cup. This week-long event is the world's second largest youth soccer tournament attended by teams from all over the world (Shearer, U.S. Embassy gets a kick out of Sports Diplomacy). This tournament has run since 1972 and is aimed at young people aged 12 to 19. The organisers sponsor visits of teams from less developed countries (Nygård, 239). In 2012, as many as around 30 000 participants from 52 countries took part in the competition. The aim of the tournament is to "win friends for Norway through sport". The Norwegian Minister of Foreign Affairs said that "the project plays a role in supporting internationalism and co-operation between Norway and for example, Brazil, Kenya, and Palestine". The same objective is pursued by Norwegian sports diplomacy in general, by awarding sports scholarships to international students who can then attend Norwegian universities (Jarvie). This is also designed to allow foreigners to visit and discover Norway and its values – a method frequently used in public diplomacy.

This short overview of sports events hosted by Norway shows that they are treated as means of pursuing sports diplomacy – either to evoke positive emotions towards Norway or to make the country more visible (even if current public diplomacy strategies do not put a large emphasis on sport). The Norway Cup represents an interesting and extraordinary approach to sports diplomacy – each year it brings many young people to the country, allowing them to experience its high standard of living and see its beautiful landscapes.

Sports superiority

Norwegian sports diplomacy can also be analysed from the perspective of its athletes' or clubs' performance. Medals won in international competitions render a country more visible, while news of sports victories can be used for various ends. During the Cold War, sports victories belonged to the arsenal of arguments used to justify the superiority of one superpower over the other. Olympic

medals are also taken into consideration when assessing a nation's soft power. Thus, results in sport matter in sports diplomacy and can influence an international brand.

Norwegian athletes perform very well, particularly considering the country's population. This may not be entirely evident while looking at Summer sports. In the 2012 London Summer Olympics, Norway was ranked 35th with two gold, one silver and one bronze medal (Medal table), while four years earlier – in Beijing – Norwegians won three gold, five silver and one bronze medal; Norway was ranked 22nd in the medal table (Beijing 2008 Medal Table). These results are good for any country whose population is comparable to that of Norway, but quite modest in comparison to Norway's achievements in Winter sports. During the 2014 Olympics in Sochi, Norway was only surpassed by Russia; Norwegian athletes won eleven gold, five silver and ten bronze medals (Sochi 2014 Medal Table); four years earlier in Vancouver Norway came fourth, with nine gold, eight silver and six bronze medals (Sport Vancouver 2010). Ever since the first Olympic Winter Games, Norwegian athletes have always performed very well in Winter sports. Interestingly, Norwegian athletes have often competed against opponents coming from countries that had an entirely different approach to sport and which focused on versatility rather than specialization (John, Allen, 82).

Norway's remarkable performance in sport are a result of a specific policy carried out by the government. As early as the 1980s, following a period of relatively poor achievements in elite sport, a program called 'Project 88' was introduced. This special scheme for elite sport – called 'The Norwegian Model' – relied on sports federations learning from each other. The program did not initially bring the expected results, so it was extended and an elite sports organisation – Olympiatoppen – was founded. This organisation had significant resources at its disposal and worked to support Norwegian sports (Goksøyr, Hanstad, 35–7). This has led to an outstanding improvement in Norway's results since 1992 (Augestad, Bergsgard, 195). Thus, Norwegian achievements in sport, especially the winter disciplines, are a result of a well-thought out strategy. This success naturally has benefits in terms of an international brand for the previously mentioned reasons. To conclude, Norway has achieved success in the field of sports diplomacy.

Conclusions

Norway has achieved great success in shaping its international brand despite relatively limited assets in terms of soft power and a small population. Skilful prioritisation and fitting into a suitable niche has allowed this country to become a model of successful public diplomacy.

Sports diplomacy is a subcategory of public diplomacy. Norway developed and then adjusted a strategy of public diplomacy which now predominantly focuses on promoting peace, democratic values, sustainable living and Norwegian natural resources. The initial strategies emphasised sport as an element of nation branding, but at present sport is not seen as one of the key factors shaping the international visibility and image of Norway. Nevertheless, the country pursues a number of policies that can be regarded as sports diplomacy and that, at least indirectly, support Norway's brand. These activities have been carried out in three main areas – supplying poor countries with sports development aid, hosting sports events and maintaining superiority in international sport. Norway has proved successful in all three.

Despite its success in sports diplomacy, Norway's international image is predominantly shaped by other factors discussed above, and sports diplomacy plays a subsidiary role in Norwegian nation branding. However, this role should not be underestimated – the objectives of sports diplomacy extend beyond associating a country with sports results or promoting Norway as a sporting country. The Norway Cup discussed in the article serves as an opportunity to invite visitors from all around the world, enabling them to experience the country and its values, thus enhancing its international brand.

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REVIEW ARTICLE

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EUROPEAN IDENTITY AND TURKEY'S QUEST FOR THE EU MEMBERSHIP

ABSTRACT: In the post-Single European Act period, debates around European identity have intensified, particularly in the context of EU enlargement. The EU's move to being a supranational political entity in the past two decades has caused serious concerns in some sections of the elite and people across the EU member states. While French and Dutch rejections of the constitutional treaty set an important milestone, Turkey's quest for the EU membership has complicated to a great extent controversies on European identity. The reviewed books here contribute to efforts to understand the extent to which European identity and Turkey's bid for the EU membership has entangled. It is more likely to witness debates around both European identity and Turkey's candidacy for the Union for many years to come; therefore, these books will more likely remain relevant for the academic and policy circles.

**Selcen Oner, *Turkey and the European Union: The Question of European Identity* (MD: Lexington Books, 2011).
Senem Aydin-Duzgit, *Constructions of European Identity: Debates and Discourses on Turkey and the EU* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).**

Identity has received an increasing amount of attention in the post-Cold War theory and practice of International Relations (IR). Dominant theories in the field, namely realism, neorealism,

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and neoliberalism, have largely ignored identity in explaining foreign policies of states. After the peaceful collapse of the Cold War, these theories have been severely criticized by alternative explanations, which have attributed great importance to identity. Among these alternatives, constructivism has underlined norms, ideas, culture, and identity while post-structuralism has most emphasized discourse and language. Meanwhile, 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks have further intensified debates around religion and identity in both the policy and academic world. Turkey as a country combining predominantly Muslim population, secular state, and Western legal system earned official candidate status for the EU membership in December 1999, and started the accession negotiations in September 2005. The 9/11 attacks and Turkey's accession negotiations have generated controversial policy debates in the EU member states, especially in those having a large amount of Muslim populations. Particularly notable in this context, questioning Turkey's 'Europeanness' has entangled to a great extent debates around European identity. As Turkey's ongoing quest for joining the EU seems to continue many years if not decades, this entanglement will remain an important topic for both policy debates and academic studies.

Examining the linkage between European identity and Turkey-EU relations, two issues should be highlighted. First, there is no fixed definition of 'European identity', and it is shaped by both bottom up and top down level dynamics.[1] Second, European response to Turkey's membership application at fair, objective grounds will shape at large the construction process of its identity. Among the three books reviewed here, *Turkey and the European Union: The Question of European Identity* and *Constructions of European Identity: Debates and Discourses on Turkey and the EU* bring several insights for in-depth analysis of the link between Turkey's bid for the EU membership and the construction process of European identity.

Turkey and the European Union is composed of three parts/ nineteen chapters in addition to the introductory and conclusion chapters. The first part examines two major issues. The first three chapters here deal with evolution of the idea of Europe and construction of European identity throughout history. Particularly notable, the author underlines that multiple notions of Europe and

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[1] For top down and bottom up conceptions of European identity, see Checkel and Katzenstein 2009, Preface and Introduction.

its boundaries have always been existed, and contested with each other in the past. Chapters 4 to 6 in this part of the book look at European identity in terms of social constructivism. This theory holds that European identity is not a fixed phenomenon, and it is up to change and re-constructions through social interactions. In this sense, a fundamental distinction occurs between constructivist and essentialist notions of collective identity.

The second part examines how the identity of EU has come out over time in the context of civic and cultural understandings of Europe. While the right Members of European Parliament (MEP), the author contends, have mostly cultural basis of European identity, the left MEPs are mostly oriented to civic notions (p. 141). Moreover, the second part includes chapters on the role of EU institutions in the construction of European identity. In this regard, the author argues that the Commission, the Parliament, and the Court of Justice have played the major role in this process. Here, several citations from interviews made with the Commission officials and Parliamentarians also take place. Another important theme in the second part is about the existence of gap between the elites and the general people in terms of support for the EU, and European identity.

The third and last part of the book has chapters in regard to the role of European identity in Turkey-EU relations, the European elites and public views on Turkey's EU membership, compatibility of Islam and European identity, the impact of Turkey-EU relations on the construction of European identity, and the comparison of EU relations with Turkey with the Central and Eastern European (CEE) enlargement countries on the basis of identity debates. In those chapters, the author uses interviews made with the MEPs and the Commission officials in addition to Eurobarometer poll results. A few remarkable arguments could be noted here: (i) Turkey's Europeanness has been widely questioned among the European elites, (ii) Turkey does not have a favorable support level for the EU membership unlike the CEE countries, (iii) the left side of political spectrum gives more support for Turkey's membership as compared to the right, and (iv) perceptions of European identity on the basis of culture, geography and history generate unfavorable attitudes to Turkey's EU membership in contrast to the notion of EU as a political project.

Senem Aydin-Duzgit's work, *Constructions of European Identity*, puts forward a highly critical tone in assessing European discourses on Turkey. In doing so, the book follows post-structuralist theory

by applying the qualitative method of Critical Discourse Analysis. The author argues that political discourse does have a constitutive impact, not a causal relationship, on the making of foreign policy. So, discourse should be taken seriously in order to understand European/EU treatment of Turkish bid for the membership. In examining European discourses on Turkey, the study looks at four ways in which Europe(s) are constructed and Turkey is represented both positively and negatively in each of four ways: Europe as a security community, Europe as an upholder of democratic values, Europe as a political project, and Europe as a cultural project. To lay out these various discourses, the study benefits from a notable primary data: 29 interviews conducted with the MEPs, 19 interviews with officials of the Commission and 36 interviews with the members of parliaments in the three EU member states (France, Germany, and Britain). The interviews were made between October 2006 and September 2008. In addition, it uses the Commission speeches and the European Parliament debates.

In the first realm, Turkey has been considered as a panacea for the clash of civilizations, a strategic asset and a potential security threat for Europe. These views have found supporters across the Commission, Parliament, and the three EU member state parliaments. The author notes that British MPs gives lesser reference to Turkey as a threat as compared to French and German MPs. In the second discourse (Europe as an upholder of democratic values), Turkey has been posed as a statically undemocratic country and a country capable of democratic change. While the right MEPs, French and German MPs have had the first discourse in general, the left MEPs, French and German MPs along with the Commission and British MPs have followed the second, the positive one.

The third discourse involves the portrayal of Europe as a political project, which has elements of well-functioning institutions, solid budget, and pooled sovereignty (p. 99). In this area, the book discusses two representations of Turkey: as a potential political threat and an entity adaptable to the European political project. The threat discourse has mostly been related to Turkey's population and misperception that the country has a monolithic national identity. The discourse of adaptability, the author notes, has found most support among the European Commission and British MPs, who have a notion of EU as a loose political project. The last discourse is about culture, and that raised the most controversy across the EU institutions and the EU member states in regard to Turkey's potential EU membership. On the negative side, Turkey

is considered as a diluter of coherent European cultural space. On the positive side, Turkey's EU membership is taken as an important contribution to cultural diversity in Europe. The author argues that the right MEPs, French and German MPs give support the first line while left-wing and liberal MEPs, French and German MPs, some sections of British MPs, and the Commission do have mostly the latter, positive discourse.

Turkey and the European Union: The Question of European Identity and *Constructions of European Identity: Debates and Discourses on Turkey and the EU* has many similarities. First of all, both of them argue against essentialist notions of European identity by documenting different conceptions of Europe and the EU among the European elites. The existence of multiple views of Europe/ EU has then gone hand in hand with various positions taken towards Turkey's bid for the EU membership. Interviews, which were conducted with the EU Commission Officials, the Members of European Parliament, and the Members of the Parliament in the three key EU members (France, Germany and the UK) enable Oner 2011 and Aydin-Duzgit 2012 to have a solid basis for the argument that European identity is not fixed rather it is open to multiple constructions. Second, both books rely on doctoral dissertations written at Marmara University, Istanbul (Oner) and the Free University of Brussels (Aydin-Duzgit). In addition, both studies can be located in similar literatures: identity in IR, European identity, the EU, and Turkey-EU relations. Finally, both works contribute to academic and policy studies in these subject areas.

Despite these similarities, each of the two books has also comparative strengths vis-à-vis another. Aydin-Duzgit conducted more interviews (84) than Oner (29). In addition, Aydin-Duzgit's interview portfolio is more diverse than Oner through the inclusion of interviews with the Members of Parliament in Britain, France and Germany. In terms of other primary data that these books used, Aydin-Duzgit 2012 benefits from debates in national countries and speeches in the European Commission while Oner 2011 does so surveys (*Eurobarometer* and *European Elites Survey*) and a few numbers of statements and declarations. Information about all these primary data can be found in the appendix and bibliography sections of these books. Oner 2011's relative strength over Aydin-Duzgit 2012 stems from its attention to European public opinion with the inclusion of Eurobarometer poll results. Oner uses these surveys to show how European people have views on European identity and Turkey's bid for the EU membership. Therefore, in

contrast to Aydin-Duzgit, 2012, Oner 2011 goes beyond European elite views of European identity and Turkey with the inclusion of European public opinion.

There are three major weaknesses in Oner 2011. First, the study uses social constructivism a driving theoretical framework yet it could have a better discussion of constructivism with regard to identity. Second, the number of interviews could be more (23 MEPs and only 6 European Commission officials) to document better the existence of different notions of European identity across European elites. Third, the book could have a better organization by merging short chapters.[2] For Aydin-Duzgit 2012, one can note its lack of linkage between European elite discourse and public opinion as a major limitation. The author successfully criticizes misperceptions and prejudices that the European elites have in regard to Turkey. However, these elite views cannot be separated from European public images. For example, members of parliament in the EU member states could be responsive to public anxiety towards Turkey so elite views need to be considered in the context of public images. In addition, this book selected three key EU member states for discourse analysis. One can raise a question that if there is any important variation across other twenty-five EU member countries in terms of European identity and views on Turkey's bid for the EU membership. The question could also be an important area for further research.

Despite the above mentioned limitations, *Turkey and the European Union: The Question of European Identity* and *Constructions of European Identity: Debates and Discourses on Turkey and the EU* make important contributions to studies on European/EU identity as well as on Turkey-EU relations. Findings in these books, particularly the existence of various conceptions of Europe and EU within and across the EU institutions and national parliaments of the EU member states give a solid support to notion that European identity is not a fixed phenomenon and open to multiple ways of reconstructions.

In accordance with those variations, there is no single 'European' view of Turkey's bid for the EU membership. An important finding in Aydin-Duzgit 2012 is that British MPs

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[2] The average length of chapters is ten pages; 220-page book is composed nineteen chapters in addition to the introductory and conclusion chapters. Many chapters are long less than ten pages while one chapter (ch. 5) is only two pages.

and the European Commissioners have much more favorable attitudes towards Turkey's bid for the EU membership while the German MPs, French MPs along with the right-wing MEPs follow negative conceptions of Turkey. Moreover, Oner 2011 notes that the 2006 European Elites Survey study showed that 75% of the MEPs from the leftist parties considered Turkey's membership as a 'good thing' while only 24% of the MEPs from the right wing parties followed such a positive view. Different attitudes towards Turkey's membership within the EU institutions and across the right-left political spectrum, as noted in these two books, generate important policy consequences. An important policy implication of these findings for Turkey is that she can attempt to change negative 'European' views on behalf of her prospect of full EU membership although it does not mean that that task is an easy one if one considers cultural conceptions of Europe have strong basis among the Europe's political right.

Unlike the 1999–2004 momentum, Turkey–EU relations have had stagnant nature in the past decade. The Helsinki European Council summit in December 1999 decided for Turkey's official EU candidate status, and then Turkey undertook comprehensive political and economic reforms in order to comply with the Copenhagen criteria. In December 2005, the Copenhagen European Council summit gave a historic decision that Turkey fulfilled the criteria to start the accession negotiations. On October 3 2005, the EU opened the negotiations but the negotiation process has developed very slowly. In the 2005–2015 period, 14 of 35 negotiation chapters opened, only one chapter was provisionally closed, eight chapters were blocked by the European Council (December 2006), five chapters were blocked by France (June 2007; block on one chapter removed in December 2014), and six chapters were blocked by the Republic of Cyprus (December 2009). In the 2009–2015 period, only four chapters were opened for negotiations. A key problem in that stagnancy has been Turkey's rejection of recognizing the government of Cyprus and to open its ports to trade from Cyprus. However, both Turkey and the EU also have had reluctant positions towards each other beyond the decades-long Cyprus conflict. On the Turkish side, the governing Justice and Development Party (ruling since November 2002) has not prioritized the EU accession process in the country's foreign policy agenda although it was very successful to undertake significant political reforms in the 2002–2004 period. On the EU side, Turkey's large population and its proximity to conflict-ridden Middle East have

resulted in serious anxiety across a considerable part of people and political leaders in the EU member countries. Particularly notable, Turkey's Ottoman past and predominantly Muslim population, despite its secular political regime and legal system, have been the key part of that public and elite level European concerns. As a result, identity aspect cannot be separated from reasons behind the ongoing deadlock in the Turkey–EU relations. For this reason, the reviewed books here are very helpful to understand the ongoing deadlock, which seems to continue in years to come.

Persistence of national identities in Europe

Beginning with the Single European Act (SEA) and the Maastricht Treaty, European integration has taken an important departure to move from the customs union to economic and political union in the past three decades. In contrast to the elite driven character of the integration until the SEA, it has become more controversial for people in the EU member countries. This should not be unexpected since the post Maastricht EU has touched more on daily lives of common people, for example, through the use of common currency and free movement of people across national borders (Kaelble 2009, 195). Although people in the EU member states have provided an increasing amount of support for common European policies in many areas, affiliation with national identities have remained more stronger than affiliation with so-called 'European identity'. According to 2010 Eurobarometer survey, only 12.7% of the people in EU countries see themselves primarily as 'European' while 46% of them prefer first national identity and 43% go along with both European and national identities. Eurobarometer and European Value surveys showed that support for European identity at public level has remained quite stable in the 1990s and 2000s despite the fact that European integration has experienced a significant amount of deepening (Fligstein et al 2012, 110; Caporaso and Kim 2008, 25). An important implication of the persistence of national identities in European countries is the existence of widespread Euroscepticism and public concerns towards the enlargement and immigration. In this context, Turkey's prospect for the EU membership has also been an important source of anxiety for people in several EU countries including France, Germany, Netherlands and Austria, where significant populations of Turkish immigrants live.

Turkey has an important disadvantage for being 'radical other' for a large amount people in the EU countries in contrast to the Central and Eastern European countries who joined in the 2004 enlargement. The difference stems from Turkey's history. The Crusades and the Ottoman expansion in the Balkans and the Eastern Europe have shaped the construction of European identity in history (Strath 2002, 391–93; Morozov and Rumelili 2012, 35). As a result, cultural and ethnic images of European identity across the European elites and people generate negative views of Turkey's bid for the EU membership as documented in Aydin-Duzgit 2012 and Oner 2011. Moreover, civic/political conceptions of European identity are relatively more open to multiculturalism in Europe; accordingly, they reproduce more favorable attitudes for Turkey's EU membership. On the other hand, as seen in these two books, there are various conceptions of European identity and Turkey's membership across the EU institutions and national parliaments of the key EU member countries. An important area for further research is to examine other EU member states in regard to how they take on European identity and Turkey. In addition, another research needs to be undertaken to assess if there is any notable difference in affiliations with European identity and attitudes towards Turkey's EU membership over time.

A common theme in Aydin-Duzgit 2012 and Oner 2011 is the existence of various conceptions of European identity. As suggested before, national identities have remained quite powerful while European integration has experienced unprecedented levels of deepening after the SEA and Maastricht Treaty. Then, one needs to examine the way in which European identity has been shaped and constructed. In this regard, two major dynamics should be noticed: top down and bottom up constructions of European identity (Checkel and Katzenstein 2009, xi). On the one hand, the EU institutions and the key EU leaders have shaped it through institutional mechanisms, official documents and policies. For example, the 1973 Copenhagen Declaration employed first time 'European identity' in the EU history while the Maastricht Treaty put forward 'European citizenship'. The European Commission organizes programs to raise awareness of European identity, especially among young people. At the national level, political leaders including the members of parliaments in the EU countries can shape public discourse with their own images of European identity. In this regard, findings from the elite interviews made by Aydin-Duzgit and Oner are very helpful to see how the political elite

have varying views of European identity. On the other hand, bottom up side for the construction of European identity has been largely missed in these works. Immigration, 'war on terror', and economic crises have been the key dynamics to shape public attitudes towards national and European identities in the 2000s and 2010s (Fligstein et al 2012, 107). The 2014–2015 migrant crisis, the Al Qaeda and the ISIS terrorist attacks in multiple European cities, the long-standing European financial crisis have influenced to a great extent public consciousness of self-other relations in regard to the way how they consider Muslim immigrants/refugees in their home countries and Turkey's bid for the EU membership. Henceforth, the political elite, unexpectedly, should have been responsive to public anxiety with the Muslim migrants and Turkey's prospect for the EU membership. One could expect that increasing amount of Muslim migrants, rising levels of unemployment due to financial crises, and continuing terrorist attacks in European cities would create backlash among European populations towards Muslims and prospects for Turkey's EU membership. Accordingly, the political elite in the EU member countries would have more negative views for Turkey's accession into the EU.

Conclusion

The post-Single European Treaty (1986–87) period has witnessed unprecedented level of deepening for European integration. The European Community was transformed into the Union with the Maastricht Treaty, and the ensuing European Treaties (Amsterdam, Nice and Lisbon) gave impetus for the realization of political union. Yet, the failed Constitutional Treaty demonstrated that the European project has stayed short of a fully supranational or federal entity. The Union has had some supranational features, particularly with the European Court of Justice rulings over the national courts in some issue areas. In addition, the Union has now twenty eight member states while it had only twelve members in 1986. In other words, the European integration project has witnessed both extraordinary levels of deepening and widening in the past three decades. However, as suggested above, affiliations with national identities in the EU member countries have continued to remain strong while preference of 'European identity' as the primary point of affiliation has only stayed at around 12%. Turkey's bid for the EU

membership in that context, then, has resulted in important levels of concerns across the European political elites and people in the EU member countries. The issue was at an important part of the constitutional referendum debates in France and Netherlands. As the reviewed books in this article have documented, the EU elite and politicians in the three key EU members (Germany, France and the UK) do not hold same conceptions of European identity and Turkey's membership; rather, various orientations exist in that area. In other EU member states, further studies could find a similar variation across different political parties.

Turkey's prospect of EU membership in the near future does not seem very good. The Cyprus conflict, the enlargement fatigue, Turkey's large population could be considered as important factors for that low prospect. Yet, political will on both the Turkish and the European side should also be suggested as a key part of this process. In this regard, Turkey's unique identity in contrast to the 2004, 2007 and 2013 enlargement countries has also affected the ongoing deadlock between Turkey and the EU. Identity issue seems to remain a key part of Turkey-EU relations. The reviewed books here make an important contribution to understand various positions and discourses around European identity, and then the implications of that multiplicity on taking positions for and against Turkey's EU membership.

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