

[DAWID MISZTAL:// THE ANTHROPOLOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE EVOLUTION OF EMPIRICISM]

[ABSTRACT]

[The text examines methodological consequences of anti-metaphysical turn of British empiricism in the field of anthropology. I argue that this shift reinforces anthropology in its descriptive and interdisciplinary form, because destruction of metaphysically grounded subjectivity carried out in the course of evolution of empiricism provides epistemological legitimization of the idea of anthropological research as morally neutral and religiously indifferent procedure. In the final part of the article the difficulties caused by application of this new methodology are emphasized.]

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Introduction

Evolution of empiricism in this work will be understood as simply a train of thought leading from Locke, through Berkeley, to Hume. I assume that without causing any controversy it can be briefly described as a process of reduction of the extent of our knowledge or the content of its objects. In other words, Locke distinguishes three — so to speak — types of the objects of human knowledge, namely impressions and ideas, the self, which both of these belong to (and which is intuitively certain of its own, and of God's existence), and external material objects represented by ideas. Berkeley eliminates one of these types by reducing the world as we know it to impressions and ideas, and the self, which they belong to. The self also remains related to God, since its ideas are means of communication with Him. Hume, however, silences this communication, finally reducing the extent of our knowledge to impressions and ideas only. This makes them represent nothing and belong to nothing, for the self now turns out to be merely the bundle of impressions and ideas. Thus, the common sense vision of the world still evident in Locke's thought falls apart into sequence of fictitiously ordered impressions.

The importance of this train of thought and its final conclusions is hard to overestimate in the context of development of philosophical anthropology. On the one hand, they undoubtedly accelerated this development, especially contributing to those forms of anthropological interest, whose methodological ideal was a description from external points of view (as

opposed to introspective descriptions epistemologically founded in subjectivity). On the other hand, they are certainly burdened with problems, which eventually provoked more — so to speak — existential forms of anthropology, i.e. normative rather than descriptive only. In what follows, I focus on these two aspects. First, I attempt to bring out and emphasize those features of empirical anti-metaphysical turn, which reinforced anthropological discourse in its interdisciplinary and descriptive form. Then, I will reflect on the sources of strength of their influence on the anthropological projects carried out in the second half of the XVIII century. Finally, I examine how they functioned inside these projects and how they were determining the evolution of the very idea of anthropology.

Methodological outcomes of anti-metaphysical turn

As the enlightenment's trust in rationality eventually turned against itself, and the subjectivity was narrowed to a series of random perceptions, the need for a new methodology of anthropological inquiries became evident. The operations of mind, uprooted from their traditional foundation in the rational subject or the self (which was always equipped with some sort of absolute grounding in order to legitimize epistemological value of its ideas), can no longer function neither as a distinctive form of human activity, nor as the most adequate descriptive category of specifically human existence. In this new horizon rational subjectivity appears to be merely a resultant of many different external factors, which are usually impossible for the subject to identify, since mechanisms of their influence remain latent content of consciousness. Hence, the examination of these external factors seems to be more and more important. What can be seen here is one of the key premises of the belief which in its radical form will emerge in XIX century:

The hope of rendering the wholeness of possible experience comprehensible by means of one categorial system fades away. It is replaced by the conception that "adequate ideas" contain hallmarks of truth *sine relatione ad obiectum* (without any link to object), and that it

is the experience that reaffirms the operations of intellect from outside [Saint-Sernin 2001, 197]¹.

If the concept of a knowing subject produced by the evolution of empiricism can be metaphorically depicted as a screening of moving images (symbolizing impressions and ideas) in the absence of a spectator (symbolizing a rational subject, the alleged nest of individual identity, which after all happened to be epistemological fiction), then the general methodological demand stemming from this train of thought is to find an equivalent or a compensation of this absence. Since the “internal observer” (i.e. *Ego*, a clear and distinct internal source of authority, which decides whether representations are true and actions justified) lost its credibility after becoming a mere illusion, it must be replaced by an “external observer” or — considering the whole constellation of man’s live determinants — “external observers” rather. So adapting these external points of view is gradually earning the status of the one and only instrument of examining the human stream of perceptions. And it is believed (or hoped at least) that this instrument will allow philosophers and scholars to discover and to describe complex contingency of human existence. This means, in other words, the postulate of complete reification of human being, of inscribing man’s existence into realm of objects. It is the fundamental requirement that must be fulfilled if anthropological enquiries are to be fruitful in any philosophically or scientifically desirable way. Radical undermining of clearness, distinctness and full accessibility of self’s thoughts, left thinkers and scholars alone with the procedure applied hitherto only to the realm of world identified as external to *Ego*. Due to that, its reification seemed to be the only possible way of examining man’s specific condition. After all, the main premise for dissolving the rational subject or the self in a multitude of perceptions was

¹ This hope, however, did not disappear instantly, nor commonly. Kant, for example, remained its most famous advocate. Nevertheless, according to Saint-Sernin’s interpretation, this hope finally dies in XIX century, which — as Schnädelbach puts it — orders to see Kantian project at this time as “happily overcome error of thought” [Schnädelbach 2001, 40]. All citations form Polish editions translated by D.M.

actually the limitation of what's real only to these perceptions. At the same time, the collection of the latter (or the world revealed by it) was made by means of this very limitation the only field worth of interest. Thus, closing the abyss between the world of objects and the specifically human experience that one has of their very existence, became a necessary starting point of anthropological investigations².

This auto-interpretation of man from empirical stand leads therefore to a peculiar methodological volt. It entails radicalization of the epoch's dominant trends by refuting the concept of using an auto-reflectively based subject as the source of objectivity. Instead it's forcing thinkers to choose many different points of view in order to collect information necessary for producing multi aspect descriptions of human being. This new methodological requirement of adapting to the roles of "external observers" manifests itself in attempts to explain the mystery of man as a variously determined creature (initially mostly biologically, historically, and later also socially and culturally).

What is also worth noting here is that the old abandoned perspective is different from the new one also in terms of the ways it is legitimized. Whereas the former is — metaphorically speaking — sanctioned vertically, the latter is authorized horizontally. What I want to say is that actually the model of explanation dismantled in the enlightenment era (and this process is illustrated precisely by the evolution of empiricism) always amounts to

² Couple of centuries later, Claude Lévi-Strauss, in lapidary way will bring out the logic of this transformations (showing thus how vital and influential they were), when characterizing his own method he'll claim that "the ultimate goal of humanities is not to construe man, but to divide him in order to solve his mystery" [Lévi-Strauss 1969, 370]. Now, relation between general methodological orientation of structuralism and consequences of destruction of subjectivity carried out by empiricism implied here may not seem obvious. Nevertheless, what makes it more credible is that this methodological creed is presented as a conclusion of criticism of "alleged obviousness of Ego" as a possible way of knowing man. For actually — Lévi-Strauss says — this self-obvious Ego is a trap, which renders knowing of man impossible [*Ibidem*, 373].

establishing some hierarchy, which finally refers to some kind of absolute being. And this absolute being sanctions the whole construction (innate idea of perfect being in Cartesian subject, God as a warrant of compatibility of monads' representations in Leibniz *Monadology*, absolute spirit whose activity supports the existence of the world in Berkeley's philosophy — they all serve this purpose). Yet, the explanatory method of capturing examined subject as stuck in a spider's web of various determinants does not imply such a hierarchy. On the contrary, it gives all those types of determinants (and characteristics derived from them as well) the same status. So at least initially, none of them can be privileged whatsoever. All of the possible complexes of contingencies are potentially equally attractive. They are equally demanding of scholars' inquiring interest. From methodological point of view therefore grasping human being as historically determined is of the same importance as approaching the nature of man as a result of — say — social, biological or cultural determinacy. And the source of their legitimacy or — in other words — the reason why they are perceived as equally important is that they are all considered to be constituents of human nature.

This basic methodological orientation is crucial for development of anthropology practiced as descriptive analysis. Moreover, it gives anthropology a truly interdisciplinary character. It is because meeting its requirements means widening and partition of philosophy of man, which must now include many different disciplines. Hence, the latter would now shape anthropological discourse³. The first stages of this process can be seen already in Hume's writings, whose contemporaries considered him as a political and economical thinker, and as a historian rather than as a philosopher. And they did so for a reason. However, what is important here is not the multitude of Hume's interests, but the way he devoted himself to them. Regardless of what fragment of reality would be the current subject of

³ Initially, inscribing human being in sequence of natural determinants dynamically increased the significance of physiology, anatomy and psychology. In XIX century range of disciplines crucial for the face of anthropology includes sociology, political economy, ethnology, and international law [Schrag 1980, 32].

his scrutiny, they all did not fascinate him as such, but mostly as sources of knowledge of human nature⁴. In other words, they function as relatively independent fields of research, which deliver information about various aspects of human life. Indeed, they become a sort of catalogue of descriptions of these aspects. It is particularly evident in his *Natural History of Religion*, where Hume introduces — so to speak — anthropology of religion as a descriptive characteristic of empirically accessible manifestations of religion. Moreover, the crucial feature of this description is that when it refers to internal sensation or so called religious experience it does so not to find the final sanction of religious beliefs, but only to bring out their latent psychological motivation. By doing so, it inscribes them in the realm of external objects (similar methodological instruments can be traced in Hume's writings on ethics).

What begs consideration, however, is the power of influence of this methodological orientation as it is exemplified in Hume's writings, and its ability to inspire. In other words, is it justified to see philosophical tradition, which culminates in Scotsman's work as a sort of catalyst that causes and accelerates the process of eradication of metaphysical premises and their moral consequences from anthropological theories? After all, as for example Lepenies argues, the exclusion of these kinds of contents from intellectual practice is one of the key elements of the vision of the world, which was implicit in the very first stages of development of early modern natural science [Lepenies 1996, 14]. An important constituent of this original model can be extracted already from Descartes' concept of provisional morality. Be it manifestation of methodological conformity, but this procedure neutralizes otherwise paralyzing threat for any action, posed by radical skepticism. What is more important, however, is that it allows to carry out any given

⁴ Later also Kant takes into account this kind of anthropological research, when characterizing what anthropology should be, he mentions natural history, biographies, arts and novels as auxiliary tools of the discipline [Kant 2005, 4]. Interestingly enough, somewhere else but in similar context Kant is more precise and refers to Shakespeare's tragedies, Moliér's comedies, Henry Fielding's novels, and... Hume's "History of England" [Wood 2003, 48].

theoretical project as if it were isolated from any social or moral rules and without questioning their validity in everyday life [*Ibidem*, 16]. And as a consequence of popularization of this procedure of inquiry *sui generis* emancipation is attained:

[I]ndependence from morality — relinquishment of political and moral orientation — indeed became condition of scientific investigations in modern natural science [*Ibidem*, 15].

The source of this independence emerges from a particular way of auto-identification and evaluation of early modern natural science, which is a kind of a synthesis of cognitive claims and relinquishment of orientation in questions of morality and worldviews [*Ibidem*]. Well, the unique legacy of empiricism lies exactly in the reinforcement of epistemological legitimization of this synthesis. In contrast to Descartes, for whom linking cognitive ambitions with resignation from advocating some moral rules is after all authorized by sort of practical wisdom or pragmatic need to work out some efficient principle of action, for Hume and his predecessors this conjunction is based on an original concept of reason and its tasks and competence. Having noticed the abyss between *is/is not* and *ought to/ought not to* and thus denying the possibility of inferring norms from facts [Kutschera 2007, 56], he renders the latter the basic objects of knowledge [Hume 2004, 25]. In this way Hume legitimizes and reinforces conviction about moral neutrality as a rudimentary feature of a scientific method. And so he becomes and advocate for instrumentalization of reason — a tendency which was gaining more and more importance at that time. For the intrinsic correlate of conclusions so radically presented by Hume in his writings is his skeptical distrust in cognitive powers of reason: instead of the ability to reach objective truth and moral good and to be guided by them, he consistently sees an instinctive skill of gathering and processing information [Hume 1896, 98], whose true purpose is only to protect biological existence. According to this view rationality is admittedly capable of creating hierarchy of goals and of determining means of their realization. It cannot, however, absolutely,

axiologically sanction these operations. As far as values are considered, the only legitimization left is the one that refers to subjective preferences. Undoubtedly, this is one of many parts of the transformation described by Max Horkheimer as a process of subjectivization and formalization of *ratio*:

On the basis of subjectivization concept thinking can not be of any help in determining whether given goal is desirable in itself. Acceptance of ideals, criterions of our conduct and our beliefs, leading principles of ethics and politics, all our final decisions are dependent on factors other than reason [Horkheimer 2007, 40].

Reason, as the Greek speculation taught us, is the ability of reaching an absolutely objective realm of thought that in itself is an autonomous reality. These attributes of rationality render it primary to and independent from human practice of thinking, but at the same time they do not preclude any relation between them. And according to this intellectual tradition, there is a relation indeed, because human mind is capable of contemplating and cognizing this absolute objectivity. In this way it can keep discovering (not creating) true structure of reality, and as a result it can properly place man in the wholeness of being, which in turn allows for identifying man's true rights and obligations [*Ibidem*]. For reality is a cosmos — an order, which regularities are compatible with the rules of human thinking. Although modified to some extent, this fundamental conviction was shared both by philosophical and religious intellectual paradigms. It shaped their relations as well: religion and philosophy could disagree as to what are the true sources and credible methods of knowing reality (and moral conclusions they implied), they were unanimous however as far as the aforementioned compatibility is considered, which rendered the knowledge they seek possible at all [*Ibidem*, 47]. Nevertheless, this presupposition was challenged by a new philosophical orientation, and this orientation — Horkheimer concludes — was empiricism⁵.

⁵ Not only empiricism, but also Calvinism Horkheimer holds responsible for this challenging [*Ibidem*, 48].

Methodological consequences of these transformations already have been indicated. The belief that there is only one truth about enquired subject and only one way leading to it was given up, and obviously enough this was an inspiration for searching and discovering alternative ways and new truths. And were they discovered, they could not entail moral conclusions anymore. One of the first consequences of this new situation was gradual legitimization of actual autonomy of disciplines hitherto variously instrumentalized in the field of philosophy. In this context, blending of medical and philosophical discourses is of great importance. Indeed, philosophy expropriated — so to speak — languages of physiology, anatomy and of what would become psychology. Of course, the first and the second were developed relatively independent from philosophy⁶. Nevertheless, they enjoyed “civil rights” in a kingdom of philosophy, where they served as useful descriptive tools. And they were used by almost all great thinkers of XVII and XVIII century, including Descartes, Malebranche, Spinoza, Leibniz, and of course Locke, Berkeley and Hume. Surely, this coexistence was not free from ambiguities. Using metaphors borrowed from physiology or other aforementioned disciplines in philosophical context was a kind of ennoblement for these branches of knowledge, as they could be absolutely sanctioned this indirect way (be it as it may, at least some philosophical theories promised such a sanction). On the other hand, by using their discoveries, philosophy subordinated them and pacified — so to speak — those trends of new

⁶ Flamish scholar Andreas Vesalius already in 1543 initiates early modern anatomy in his work *De humani corporis fabrica*. In 1628 Englishman William Harvey in his *Exercitatio Anatomica de Motu Cordis et Sanguinis in Animalibus* presents holistic description of blood circulation, and between 1757–1766 Swiss biologist publishes eight volumes of his *Elementa Physiologiae Corporis Humani*, where he enclosed all information known at that time about construction and functioning of human organism, thus laying foundations for modern physiology.

Physiological vocabulary used in a field of philosophy had much earlier origin than newest physiological discoveries of that time. Descartes’ mechanistic interpretation of man’s physiology in his *Traité de l’homme* is actually based on anatomical and physiological discoveries of earlier scholars of definitely non-mechanistic orientation [Des Chene 2006, 67].

science, which could undermine its position or decrease its cultural significance by taking away fields of research reserved hitherto for philosophy only. So those trends remained ancillary to specific philosophical projects, which both instrumentalized and authorized them as well. However, the aforeoutlined questioning of the traditional concept of rationality, which served as a natural context for the use of physiological, anatomical and psychological vocabularies, renders them free from this subordination. They gain autonomy, but for the price of absolute certitude of their conclusions.

This mechanism and its consequences for those disciplines and for philosophical anthropology as well, are best seen in a context of Leibniz thesis that laws of nature are manifestations of God's rational actions; they are results of "choice made by the most perfect wisdom," and as such they are neither absolutely necessary, nor completely arbitrary [Des Chene 2006, 93] (for the former contradicts God's freedom, and the latter contradicts God's wisdom). The necessity of laws of nature is a moral one and it "arises from the free choice of wisdom in relation to final causes" [*Ibidem*]. As MacIntyre puts it, "morality did in the eighteenth century, as a matter of historical fact, presuppose something very like the teleological scheme of God (...)" [MacIntyre 2007, 56]. And not only morality, but also knowledge presuppose this scheme, one may be tempted to add, since also laws of nature, i.e. a proper subject of scientific knowledge, are teleologically linked with God. However, rationality and God were finally disconnected and reason instrumentalized in the course of evolution of empiricism (which is perfectly symbolized by subordination of reason to passions in Hume's writings⁷), and thus the dictate of laws of nature was deprived of its moral sanction. And so were the products of new sciences, which tried to discover and examine those laws of nature. Moreover, those results were also deprived of absolute

⁷ "Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions" [Hume 1896, 217]. Such a characteristic of reason serves Hume as an argument for claiming that morality stems from passions rather than reason. Indeed, having reduced reason to function of passions it is impossible to defend a theory that morality has its source in reason, for proving this means proving something opposite at the same time.

certitude. For, the empirical anti-metaphysical turn entails radical reformulation of the idea of knowledge and the concept of science. Already in Locke's writings this idea turns away from certitude and gravitates towards probability. And the development of empiricism not only does not stop this tendency, but it solidifies this new status of knowledge. Hence, this status must be sufficient for all the disciplines or new sciences liberated from the theological corset, because this is exactly the way how the mechanism of gaining this freedom worked.

For a whole group of thinkers it seemed possible to make headway beyond manifestly aporetic metaphysics by recourse to observation and experiment. To do so required a fundamental shift in the notion of what *science* signified, the surrender of the idea of absolute certainty and the acceptance of a contingent, fallible, continuously evolving series of nominal approximations with some less than perfect order of subjective probability. To be sure, one had to surrender certainty. One even had to surrender conceptual determination through grounding definitions. "Nominal essences" would have to make do since the "real essences" behind the actual world — as Locke argued and even Leibniz sometimes conceded — were not likely to become accessible to human understanding. If one made the transition to this "nominal" register, if one were content to settle for what "observation and experience" could document, what one found was not, to be sure, absolute truth, but it could be an intersubjectively confirmable generalization of "law," albeit contingent and fallible [Zammito 2002, 225].

And such a transition was made by a significant part of the intellectual elite of the epoch. But loyalty to the assumptions of empiricism and hope for escaping the problems of metaphysics forced — as you can see — to pay a peculiar tribute. Breaking the chains of theology or metaphysics was synonymous to voluntary devaluation of cognitive claims and restraint from inferring and forcing moral conclusions. Consequently, although reflection deprived of grounding reference and carried out by reason which merely collects perceptions was to generate the knowledge of human nature, it is itself transformed into peculiar collection of more and more fragmentary

grasps — it evolves into knowledge of determined human beings in concrete situations [Wood 2003, 39]⁸. Universal principles of human conduct are now conceived as manifestations of instrumental functioning of reason. Analyzing and describing these manifestations as characterizing human behavior, man's customs and habits, and his religious beliefs, all in a context of hidden biological, psychological, and historical determinants — this is what becomes the procedural norm of anthropology. And since any source of this research data must be purely empirical, and thus material, the whole human existence is gradually incorporated into the latter dimension. In other words, conditions for further dynamic development of anthropology as a discipline defining its subject in the context of mechanistically interpreted nature are created. It can be said therefore, that man's auto-interpretation from empirical stand contributes to the development of philosophical anthropology because:

1. It provides philosophical legitimization for the idea of science as a morally neutral procedure.
2. It designates experiment and observation as methodological grounds for anthropological investigations.
3. This way it completely incorporates human being and its conduct into empirically accessible material dimension.
4. It postulates plurality of points of view as equal strategies of inquiry and description provided that they all remain empirical⁹.

⁸ This impossibility of formulating general characteristic of human nature inspired Kantian project of anthropology. In his "pragmatic point of view," anthropology should be characteristic of the human nature as a whole, and not the random assemblage of partial descriptions of human conduct in specific situations.

⁹ Carsten Zelle suggests following collection of assumptions as fundamental for development of anthropology in XVIII century: 1) empirical orientation, i.e. emphasizing the importance of experiment and observation; 2) reevaluation of sensuality; 3) pragmatic approach; 4) interdisciplinary interest in the "whole man;" 5) more popular, accessible style [Zammito, 25].

Methodology practiced

The influence of this set of assumptions was continuously intensifying in the second half of XVIII century, which can be illustrated by the process of solidifying the idea of anthropology (the way its goal, subject and method were conceived). For example, Johann Gottlob Krüger, one of the prominent figures of the process, in his three volumes *Naturlehre*, published from 1740 (the year Hume's *Treatise...* was published) to 1749 (year after Hume's *Enquiry...*) advocates for a "philosophy of the human body" as the causal explanation of health, and suggests it should be grounded not only in empirical knowledge, but also (and it is tempting to say still) on rational principles. Yet the same author in his *Versuch einer Experimental-Seelenlehre* (published sixteen years after the *Treatise...* and seven years after the *Enquiry...*) argues that philosophical knowledge of the soul needs rigorous experimental methodology based on observation, studies on clinical case histories and brain physiology [Zammito, 21]. His student, Johann August Unzer, tries to reconcile, in a sense, these two programs. There is a kind of correspondence, thus he claims, between every psychic and physical act of human organism [*Ibidem*]. And what is revealed in this attempt is a kind of tension, indeed, a very important one in the context of anthropology and its development. This tension has at least two aspects. The source of the first one is the body and soul dualism of the Cartesian origin (and it is worth noting that its influence is intensified here by the occasionalism and speculations of Spinoza, Leibniz, Locke and Berkeley), which begs consideration in the context of man's complete incorporation in the realm of matter as it is implied by empirical methodology. Because of that, both Krüger and Unzer (and before them La Mettrie for example, reducing psychic phenomena to physiological mechanisms), attempt to neutralize this dualism or rather the problems it poses. The source of the other is the emphasis placed on the interdisciplinarity and religious indifference of anthropological enquiries. Philosophizing physicians of XVIII century, such as aforementioned Krüger, Unzer and La Mettrie, but also Albrecht von Haller and Georg-Ernst Stahl, formulated their theoretical framework with reference to anti-

metaphysical turn of empiricism [Zammito 2002, 243]. And not for all of them was it an easy-going process. For some it was a serious problem to accept all the implications of that shift, especially theological ones. Nevertheless, those of methodological merit were usually welcome in spite of theological doubts, even for the price of aporetic attempts to explain the mysterious relation between body and soul [*Ibidem*]. Hence, the ideas of XVIII century anthropologists are stretched between Stahl's animism and La Mettrie's materialism, with all of them sharing the belief of rudimentary role of experience and observation.

Manifestations of this tension can also be traced in anthropologists' attempts to create experimental psychology by means of linking psychology and physiology, since these projects also aimed at explaining the linkage between body and soul. Unfortunately, their "natural" framework was the concept of instrumental rationality, which simply could not provide any set of criterions to regulate relations between different disciplines held important in the light of these anthropological investigations. And so, those relations were shaped in more or less arbitrary ways. Consequently, the need for some methodological modification became evident. And not any modification, but the one that would warrant new consolidating approach, meaning not only ordering of anthropological disciplines, but also inclusion of moral questions into the realm of inquiry. For that reason, other important figures in history of anthropology, like Karl Wilhelm Friedrich Struve, will emphasize their interest in the *wholeness* of human existence as the essential feature of the discipline. Struve's belief will be adopted by Ernst Platner who will make it an axis of his complex anthropological project [Zammito, 22]. He will publish his *Anthropologie für Ärzte und Weltweise* in 1772, defining the discipline's character for years. Platner divided anthropological field of interest, distinguishing anatomical and physiological science, psychology (interested also in logical and esthetical issues), and finally anthropology conceived as an attempt to synthesize outcomes of the two former branches [*Ibidem*]. Supposedly this synthesis was too an attempt to account for the problematic relation between body and soul. This project, however, could not escape the

fundamental difficulties, since it was still completely inscribed in the aforeoutlined logic of transformation of the idea of scientific methodology and its cognitive pretensions. Platner's very division of anthropology makes it explicit, that solving the mystery of body and soul is to be achieved by means of physiological discourse or physiologically interpreted psychology. It was in accordance with his belief that mind is indeed a system of canals through which "liquid matter" or "vital spirit" flows. This physiological anchorage echoes of anti-metaphysical criticism. It is also an emanation of hope for replacing metaphysical radical dichotomy of body and soul with opposition between physical and moral, and for conceiving the latter as the evolutionary outcome of the former [Zammito 2002, 227]. But this, in fact, was rather obscuring the ontological abyss between mind and body, than finally explaining the relation between them. For, grounding in nature through physiology allowed perceiving physical and moral as two sides of the same coin, thus blurring the difference. And since also materialistic orientation was the inherent component of naturalistic methodology, the opposition of mind and body was soon enough replaced by a one-dimensional category of bodiliness [*Ibidem*, 228]. Therefore, although Platner's program of synthesizing anthropology aimed at elaborating the holistic approach to human nature (which also meant re-inclusion of moral issues into the realm of anthropology), what it offered was, as a matter of fact, a kind of reduction. And so, philosophical anthropology would yet have to wait a while for an attempt to produce a genuinely holistic depiction of human existence. This, however, will require a completely new set of methodological assumptions.

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