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Yours faithfully,
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articles

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Where Could Prince Izyaslav Volodymyrovych Escape from Terebovlia in September 1210/1211?

Summary: This paper is an attempt to identify one of the witnesses of executing in 1212 a diploma by the Prince of Kalisz Władysław Odonic for the Prussian bishop Christian with the subsequent granting of the village of Ceków to the bishop. The diploma mentions a certain *Isizlaus* among *alii nobiles*. As we cautiously suggest, that was the son of the former Galician Prince Volodymyr Igorevych – Izyaslav, the Prince of Terebovlia, in the years 1209/1210–1210/1211. After a victorious campaign in August – September 1210/1211 against the Igorids brothers, settled in the Halych land, the Hungarian troops led by Palatine Poth, reinforced by the Kraków, Sandomierz, and Volhynian troops, captured Svyatoslav and Roman Igorids and sold them to the Galician boyars, after which the brothers were hanged together with their families. Unlike the Igorids, Prince Volodymyr and his son Izyaslav managed to escape. While sources do not report anything about Izyaslav for the next few decades, the appearance of the person named *Isizlaus* at the court of Władysław Odonic in 1212 may not be coincidental. We assume that this may have been Prince Izyaslav Volodymyrovych, since Prince Władysław was his uncle 'on the distaff side' according to the genealogical relations with the Galician Rostislavovids.

Keywords: Prince Izyaslav, Halych, Terebovlia, the Rostislavovids, the Igorids, Władysław Odonic, Piasts, XIII century, identification, princely names, Ruthenian-Polish relationships

One of the most significant events in the history of the Halych land at the beginning of the 13th century undoubtedly was – well-known from various historical sources – the large-scale campaign carried out by the Hungarian troops in August – September 1210/1211,

led by the Hungarian palatine Poth with the support of forces belonging to the Prince of Kraków and Sandomierz Leszek the White (Polish: *Leszek Biały*) († 1227) and a number of Volhynian Princes. The aim of this campaign was to smash the forces of the sons of Igor Svyatoslavovych († 1202) – Volodymyr († after 1210/1211), Roman († 1210/1211), and Svyatoslav († 1210/1211) from the ducal centres of Halych, Przemyśl, Zvenyhorod, and Terebovlia.

The historical background of the campaign was the elimination by the Igorids of a significant part of the Galician elites during their last reign in 1209–1210/1211 and the threat posed by the Árpáds striving to gain control over the Halych land. Since 1205/1206, King Andrew II intensely interfered with the internal affairs of the principality of Halych. While ostensibly acting as the patron and protector of the Danylo Romanovych († 1264), the child-prince of Halych and Lodomeria who was brought up and lived at the court of the Árpáds from the Winter of 1206/1207, he was the first Hungarian monarch to use the title 'King of Halych and Lodomeria' (*Galitiae Lodomeriaequae Rex*). The Igorids also recognised the Hungarian dynasty's influence and power in the Halych land and ultimately saw the Hungarian king use his Ruthenian *protégé* against them with the significant military support from Poland and Volhynia – after a group of boyars asked Andrew II to restore Daniel Romanovych as ruler of Halych in 1210 or 1211 Andrew and his allies – Leszek the White of Poland and some Ruthenian princes sent their armies to Halych.

This topic has been well studied by historians in recent decades, generally explaining not only the reasons of this extraordinary campaign but also, most importantly, the mode in which the Galician boyars dealt with the captured Igorids and members of their families, having previously redeemed them from the Hungarian captivity.

Today, it is absolutely clear that princes Roman and Svyatoslav were tortured and hanged with their wives and children.[1] However, in the case of Volodymyr and one of his sons, Izyaslav († after 1254/1255), the 13th-century *Chronicle of Romanids* states that after the family's 'return to the Halych land in 1209/1210 'to Terebovlia' (*да Теребовль*),[2] 'Volodimer [Igorevič] and his son Izjaslav fled from the city and were pursued as far as the Nezda river. On the Nezda Izjaslav fought [his pursuers] and his pack horses were captured'.[3] The river *Нѣзда* is identified with the left branch of Seret River – Hnizna,[4] which is absolutely right because this river is located very close to the residence of Izyaslav – Terebovlia, from where the prince and his father were forced to run away under pressure from the enemy. However, we do not know exactly where they fled to,

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1 See: among the last works: Voloshchuk M. 2007, 105–112; Chebanenko S. 2014. 2(36), 162–181; Knysh Ya. 2017, 117–126.

2 CGV. 2017, 26.

3 'Волѫдимерь бѣжа из Галича | и с[ы]нъ его Изѧславь, и гнаша и до Нѣзды. Изѧслав[ъ] же | бисѧ на мѣсте Нѣзды рѣкы, и ѡт[ъ]аша конѧ ѡт[ъ] него | сѧмныа' CGV. 2017, 38; HC. 1973, 20.

4 CGV. 2017, 38, note 133.

since following his escape from the Halych land, Volodymyr Igorevych altogether vanishes from written records[5] and his son Izyaslav – in whom some scholars would like to see the former prince of Terebovlia and opponent of the Romanids Danylo and Vasylko († 1269) re-appears in the sources between 1235–1254/1255 and is even mentioned as attempting to conquer Halych.[6] However, so far, it has not been possible to fill in the gaps concerning his whereabouts following the events of 1210/1211. However, it seems that many years of our careful search for the Ruthenian settlers in the lands of the Piasts can help to solve this problem.

The fact that a person called *Isizlaus*, i.e., in our opinion – *Изѧславъ* – was mentioned among the individuals who in 1212 witnessed the granting of the village of Ceków[7] to the bishop of Prussia Christian († 1245) by Prince Władysław Odonic from Kalisz († 1239) and later of Pope Honorius III's († 1227) confirmation of the bestowment in 1218 is very interesting – not only in terms for our search of the fugitive princes Volodymyr and Izyaslav but also in the general context of elites' names in medieval Poland.

At first glance, despite the princely origin of the name *Изѧславъ*, there is no reason to consider the person of that name listed among the officials who witnessed the act of executing the diploma by Prince Władysław.[8] Our mysterious *Isizlaus* was recorded as the last person in the category of *alii nobiles*, while the list was opened by three castellans (*Ywanus*, *Ymmizlaus*, and *Petrus*), voivode (*Stephanus*), and dapifer (*Iohannes*).[9]

The interpretation of the name *Isizlaus* from Prince Odonic's diploma raised some doubts among scholars. For instance, Witold Taszycki believed that it was a distorted version of the name 'Idzisław'. However, Taszycki found three spelling versions of this in written records, one from 1212 and one from 1216–1217 (all mentions refer to the person we are interested in) – which all differed in the spelling from the third variant – *Idizlaus.* That is why we are convinced that in the absence of the name *Изѧславъ* in the list of the Polish medieval personal names, Witold Taszycki, the made an unconscious mistake by equating the names *Isizlaus* and *Idizlaus.*[10] We also believe that there could not have been an error in the reproduction of the name, because the original of Prince Odonic's diploma kept in the Königsberg archive, as well as the confirmation from Rome, both mention the name of the witness in the same way – *Isizlaus*.

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5 Voytovich L. 2006, 406–407.

6 The last discussions: Dombrovskiy D. 2015, 731–732. See also the discussion about the participations of Izyaslav in the attempt to get the throne of Halych: Aristov V. 2020, 447–462; Voloshchuk M. 2020b. 41–49.

7 Ceków – village of in the Kalisz region of the Greater Poland Voivodeship, Poland.

8 Litvina A.F., Uspenskiy F.B. 2013. 697–698.

9 CDMP 1. 1877, 74–75, no. 77; See: VMP. 1860, 7–8, no. 16; PU. 1882, 10, no. 14.

10 Taszycki W. 1968, 337.

Also, it seems there is a completely logical explanation for the fact that the said *Isizlaus* was recorded among the members of the court of the Prince of Kalisz. The long-established historical tradition concerning the ancestry of Prince Władysław's mother as the Galician princess *Vysheslava*,[11] who married his father Odon († 1194) sometime between 1184–1187, suggests that the *Isizlaus* mentioned in the discussed records was the son of the former Galician Prince Volodymyr Igorevych, whose brothers Roman and Svyatoslav, as already noted, were captured and executed in September 1210/1211 after a successful large-scale campaign to Halych by the royal forces led by the Hungarian palatine Poth, reinforced by the Kraków, Sandomierz, and Volhynian troops.[12] Vysheslava's father was Yaroslav Volodymyrkovych († 1187), who in *The Tale of Igor's Campaign* is nicknamed *Osmomysl* and whose other daughter Euphrosyne married Igor Svyatoslavovych around 1169, giving birth to a son Volodymyr around 1171. In this case, Prince Władysław Odonic was the cousin of Volodymyr and Izyaslav's uncle (Fig. 1). The lack of a *dux* title in such a case should not necessarily be confusing because sometimes the representatives of the princely families of Rus', who arrived in the lands of the Piasts, were often identified in the sources even without mentioning this designation. For example, the widow of the Prince of Kraków and Sandomierz Leszek the White met on 12 May 1228 in Skarzyszów (now the village of Skaryszew in Radom region, Masovian voivodeship, Poland) *cum filio Romani*. Although there is no hint of his princely status in the document itself,[13] historians have no doubts that it referred to one of the Volhynian Romanids.[14]

Fig. 1. Genealogical connections between the Rostislavovids of Halych and the Piasts of Greater Poland in 12th century. The exemple of Izyaslav

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11 Voloshchuk M. 2019, 118, no. 107–110.

12 From the latest short summaries to the topic, see: Voloshchuk M. 2020a, 127, no. 30–31.

13 KDM. 1886, 39, no. 395.

14 See: Nagirnyj W. 2011, 195; Dąbrowski D. 2012, 147; Holovko O. 2021, 387–388.

As we well know, Prince Volodymyr was not captured in September 1210/1211, but he successfully escaped, although, due to the lack of sources, he never tried to return to Halych. Instead, an attempt to capture the prestigious throne of Halych was made by a certain Izyaslav,[15] whom historians increasingly associate with Prince Volodymyr's surviving son and call him Volodymyr Igorevych.[16]

Therefore, in our opinion, Izyaslav, who was witness to Władysław Odonic's diploma in 1212, can be cautiously identified with a fugitive Halych prince who, unlike his executed uncles and members of their families, managed to find a temporary shelter in the court of his uncle 'on the distaff side', from where, apparently, he later returned to his 'small homeland' in Chernihiv land and participated in the conflicts between the local princes that were taking place in the third decade of the 13th century until the mid-13th century.

It is also worth emphasizing that none of the individuals mentioned in this diploma can be identified as someone who accompanied the Prince of Trembowla in his escape in 1210/1211, not even *castellanus Ywan*. In one of my previously published articles, I provided examples of the use of this name not only in Rus' but also in the lands of the Piasts.[17] This does not mean that Izyaslav went to the court of Władysław Odonic alone. The fact that from the years 1235–1254/1255 there are reports of a significant group of people alongside Izyaslav, of various origins, including Cuman, may attest to this.[18] However, nothing is known about the prince's entourage immediately after the escape from Trembowla.

Iziaslav, alongside Władysław Odonic, was present when the latter made donations to the monasteries in Lubiąż, Przemęt, and Ołobok between 1208 and 1211. These grants were intended to strengthen the Duke of Greater Poland's authority in the northern part of the state. Hence, it is likely that the mention of the Kalisz *castellanus Ywan* (or Iwon, Iwo) in a document from 1212 – the first to hold this office – is significant. It is well known that Władysław considered the Kalisz region his patrimony and defended it in disputes with rivals, especially Henry the Bearded (†1238). In his policy, Duke Władysław was also guided by the principle of populating these lands with both Poles and Germans, and possibly with other settlers as well. It is therefore possible that Władysław Odonic counted on Iziaslav's assistance in carrying out his settlement policy. Unfortunately, this is not confirmed *expressis verbis*.

However, we should accept the possibility of giving a princely name 'Izyaslav' to someone from the noble entourage of Władysław Odonic – a potential descendant

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15 CGV. 2017, 196–198, 202, 358.

16 See: the most argued opinions: Dombrovskiy D. 2015, 731–732, 734–735. It is interesting but we do not see any reasons for the appearance of this Izyaslav in Władysław Odonic's document, indeed, we even do not see any mention of that person in the special monograph dedicated to the prince written by Krzysztof Witkowski (Witkowski K. 2012, 206–211).

17 Voloshchuk M. 2022, 363–364.

18 Jusupović A. 2013, 128–129, 155, 157–159, 170, 220, 224, 260, 291, 300, 302–303.

of the Rurikids, unknown by the dynastic branch and by the name and born from the marriage with an unknown lady from the Prince of Great Poland and Kalisz's mother's court, although the choice of a name not typical for the Galician Rostisla-vovid dynasty looks very strange, adding serious doubt to this potential explanation.

In our case, we also must consider the possibility that the name (*Isizlaus*) mentioned in Prince Władysław Odonic's diploma from 1212 (including the confirmation of 1218) was associated with the cult of Saint Aegidius (*Sanctus Aegidius*, † 720–725), well known in the countries of the Latin West. As Gallus Anonymous noted in the *Gesta Principum Polonorum*, his cult spread in the lands controlled by the Piast dynasty from the end of the 11th century[19] (although Gallus Anonymous does not provide alternative spellings of the Saint's name other than *Egidius*). The pilgrims from Rus' also repeatedly visited his relics in the Saint-Gilles Abbey in Occitania, France, because this place was located on the way to the very popular pilgrimage destination, the Galician town of Santiago de Compostela, where the relics of the Apostle James were kept since the end of the 9th century.[20] There is no doubt that Ruthenian pilgrims travelled to the abbey through the lands of the Piasts, especially Lesser Poland and Silesia. According to W. Taszycki's *Dictionary*, the bearers of the name *Egidius* were noted in the Piasts' charters from the end of the 12th century (the first mention comes from 1189),[21] with the variant *Idzi* (or *Jidzi*, *Idzik*) adapted for the Polish medieval language – from the first quarter of the 13th century.[22] However, the names with the desinence *-slav* that are similar in spelling, as suggested by W. Taszycki, firstly, occur very rarely, and secondly, as we have already indicated above, contain important differences in the details: *Isizlaus* (1212), *Isislaus* (1216–1217), and *Idizlaus* (1249).[23] In our opinion, Taszycki wrongly included all these three names among the varieties of the name *Idzisław*.

Therefore, while we cannot fully dismiss the research doubts about whether Prince Izyaslav Volodymyrovych could really end up at the court of his uncle Prince Władysław Odonic of Kalisz after his escape from Terebovlia following the dramatic events of September 1210/1211 and death of his family, we still, after weighing all the *pro et contra* arguments, are inclined to associate the mysterious *Isizlaus* from Odonic's 1212 diploma with the son of Prince Volodymyr Igorevych.

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19 Gallus. 2003, 105–109, 277.

20 Brun A.–S. 2014, 110–129.

21 Taszycki W. 1968, 336.

22 Taszycki W. 1968, 336–337.

23 Taszycki W. 1968, 337.

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The Mongol Invasion of Hungary in 1241–1242
New Perspective

Summary: The Mongols invaded Hungary in the spring of 1241 and occupied it until the middle of 1242. Recent research has unearthed new data in connection with Hungarian resistance against the Mongols and on the basis of these new observations of historians and archaeologists we can conclude that local resistance was substantially stronger than had been concluded earlier. The Mongols faced serious difficulty in expanding their occupation in Hungary. New light has also been shed on the history of the battle of Muhi, which was the decisive turning point in the Mongolian campaign. Hungarian troops, especially warriors of the military orders (Knights Templar and Knights Hospitaller) caused serious damage to the Mongols, who later regarded this battle as the most difficult one that had been fought against European foes. Western and eastern parts of the country alike put up serious resistance during the months following the battle of Muhi. The Mongols were reluctant to cross the Danube River because formidable Hungarian forces were gathering in Transdanubia (the western part of the country), and when they finally did cross the river in January 1242, they laid waste only to the vicinity of the main roads in those parts of the country. Although the extent of devastation was staggering, the country was able to recover from it in a few years, and would have been ready to face a second Mongol invasion if it had materialised.

Keywords: Mongolian warfare, the battle of Muhi, military orders, local resistance, King Béla IV

In this study I will exclusively focus on the military history of the Mongol invasion of Hungary and Central Europe in 1241 and 1242. This tragic event has always been in the forefront of interest of historians of past centuries, because contemporary people as well as historiographers and historians of later periods sensed the importance of the previously unprecedented nature of this barbaric and brutal aggression, which can

only be compared with that of the Ottomans. Rogerius, archdeacon of Várad (Oradea, Romania), perhaps the richest source of information on the campaign of the Mongols, mentions in his work *Carmen miserabile*[1] that the events he lived through reminded him of the onset of the Last Judgement. Another important narrative source regarding the invasion of the Mongols is the work of Thomas Spalatensis[2] (Split, Croatia), which, although written several years later, was based on eyewitness accounts. Even in the case of the battle of Muhi, though his depiction of the battle itself is to some extent biased against King Béla IV and the Hungarians, it can still be regarded as a reliable source on the battle and succeeding events. Recent research has unearthed a number of important sources, which describe certain – so far either unknown, or deemed not very important – aspects of the Mongol invasion, which together with the results of archaeological excavations shed new light on the history of these eventful years.[3] The latest results of research into the history of the destruction of Hungary by the Mongols are contained in two recent volumes, one of which is part of the latest synthesis on Hungarian military history,[4] and the other is a collection of studies.[5] In this study I will sum up the results of the latest research, consider information preserved in charters,[6] and put forth some of my own observations relating to these events.

After the capture of Kyiv on 6 December 1240, the Mongols began the preparation for their attack on Central Europe. They planned to outflank the Carpathian Basin on both sides. Orda led the right wing, cutting through Poland and Silesia with a view to turn towards the south in Bohemia and attack Austria and north-western Hungary. The left wing, under the leadership of Kadan, attacked southwards planning to break through the passes of the Carpathians from the east and from the south, entering the Carpathian Basin. The center was built up by Batu, who intended to break into Hungary from the north-east through Verecke Pass,[7] where, according to tradition, the forebears of the Hungarians entered the Carpathian Basin at the end of the 9th century. It is not exactly clear why the Mongols chose this plan instead of breaking through Poland towards the Holy Roman Empire. One possible explanation could be the conduct

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1 SRH 2. 1938, 551–588.

2 CFHH 3. 1938, 2232–2244.

3 Two rich collections of sources (in Hungarian translation) and corresponding literature have been published on this topic in the past decades: Katona T. (ed.), 1981 and Nagy B. (ed.), 2003. The latter also contains the most important pieces of literature on the topic.

4 Hermann R. (ed.), 2017. The part on the Mongol invasion is between pages 134–142 and it was written by J.B. Szabó; see also: Laszlovszky J., Pow S., Romhányi B.F., Ferenczi F., Pinke Z. 2018; Maiorov A., Hautala E. (eds), 2021.

5 Szabó B. et al. 2022.

6 Charters relating to the history of medieval Hungary are preserved in the National Archive in Budapest in two collections. Charters surviving in their original forma are contained in the Diplomatic Archive, while charters preserved in other archives, but containing information on Hungarian history have their photocopies in the Diplomatic Film collection. Both collections are available online: https://archives.hungaricana.hu/hu/charters/

7 Hermann R. (ed.), 2017, 137.

of King Béla IV, who, in spite of several alleged threats on behalf of the Mongols, provided shelter for the Cumans, who had been defeated by the Mongols and were regarded by them as their serfs, and also defiantly included the title 'King of Cumania' (*rex Cumanie*) among his other titles. There are two other possible motives as well: firstly, that the Kingdom of Hungary was famous for her richness in all types of resources throughout the Middle Ages, and was regarded as a place where people could live without having to prepare for lack of food or other natural resources,[8] therefore offering invaders a lot of spoils. Secondly, taking this observation into account as well, the Mongols might have wanted to occupy this territory and create a base for further operations against western Europe. If this explanation holds true, the 1241–1242 campaign can be regarded as a huge-scale reconnaissance undertaking, which would also discourage the inhabitants of Hungary from further resistance.

King Béla IV took the Mongolian threat seriously: immediately after receiving news about the capture of Kyiv, he set out to overview the Carpathian passes and ordered them to be blocked with fallen trees and other types of obstacles, so that they could withstand or at least slow down the attack of the Mongols.[9] But he also knew that a passive defence alone could not stop the attacking forces, so he began to mobilise his forces, consisting of three parts. The best equipped and battleworthy element of the Hungarian army were the king's own household warriors together with the Knights Templar and Knights Hospitaller. The second, most numerous, part of the army was provided by the combatants of counties, formerly led by *comites* (heads of counties) but now incorporated into the royal army. The third element was the most heterogeneous one, being composed of the retinues of powerful ecclesiastical and secular lords, the former being the more formidable fighting power.[10] Theoretically, there could have been a fourth possible element of Hungarian military power, which had been planned to be thrown in the *mêlée* against the Mongols: the Cumans, who had found refuge in Hungary from the Mongols. But before the Mongol invasion, however, a serious controversy evolved between the Hungarians and the Cumans, the former accusing the latter of being the scouts of the Mongols; Rogerius details additional conflicts as well.[11] In summary, the Hungarians (according to some pieces of information encouraged by Frederick II of Austria) had killed Kuten, khan of the Cumans,[12] who then turned against the Hungarians and fled to the Balkan Peninsula, looting and pillaging on their way, and even defeating the army of the bishop of the Csanád diocese, who had originally mobilised his forces against the Mongols, but clashed with the raiding Cumans instead.

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8 Kristó G. 2003, 251.

9 CFHH 3. 1938, 2233.

10 Hermann R. (ed.), 2017, 144.

11 SRH 2. 1938, 554–556.

12 Szabó B. et al. 2022, 291–292.

King Béla IV collected his forces in the areas of Székesfehérvár and Esztergom, then moved them to Pest (present-day Budapest) with the intention to operate against the Mongols from there. On 12 March 1241 the Mongols broke through Hungarian defences at Verecke Pass and dealt a devastating blow to the troops of the Hungarian palatine Dénes Tomaj. The palatine himself managed to escape only with great difficulty and arrived in Pest three days later, having galloped day and night.[13] In his wake the first skirmishing Mongol troops arrived at Pest, having looted and burnt down the town of Vác. Although the king, aware of the Mongols' tactic, forbade his troops to engage with them, Archbishop Ugrin of Kalocsa and Frederick of Austria defied the king's orders and clashed with the Mongols. The Mongols feigned retreat, but at a marshland turned against their chasers, and killed many of them with arrows. The archbishop barely managed to escape with his life, but Frederick of Austria killed a Mongol leader in combat[14] and gained much popularity among the Hungarians, though he soon returned to Austria to prepare for the Mongol onslaught.

King Béla IV decided to move his troops towards the main body of the Mongolian army, so he and his units moved eastwards from Pest. The number of his troops is a matter of debate, but according to the latest research the number could not have been more than 20,000–25,000.[15] Mongol skirmishers attacked the marching Hungarians from time to time, but not in great numbers, simply trying to disrupt the march. The Hungarian troops arrived in the vicinity of the Sajó River on 10 April and set up camp. The exact location of the Hungarian camp and the site of the ensuing battle has not yet been identified, but it can probably be located in the general area of the village called Muhi. The place was favourable for defence, because the Sajó River protected the army from a surprise attack, as the Mongols had to either cross the river by the bridge, which could be defended with relatively few forces, or ford the river upstream or downstream, which was not an easy task, as the river might have been swollen at this time in spring. The only disadvantage to the Hungarians was that the forests along the bank of the river covered the movements of the Mongols from the Hungarians, so it was difficult to deduce exactly when and where the Mongols intended to attack.

In the meantime, the Mongol forces attacked on the two flanks of the Carpathian Basin. The northern flank broke through Poland leaving destruction and smouldering ruins in their wake, and on 9 April defeated the Polish-German troops at the battle of Legnica in Silesia. This victory made it possible for them to enter Bohemia and, later, the north-east of Austria. Finally, these troops joined the main army of Batu through north-western Hungary, Vác, and Pest.[16]

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13 Szabó B. et al. 2022, 289.

14 Szabó B. et al. 2022, 290–291.

15 Szabó B. et al. 2022, 293.

16 Hermann R. (ed.), 2017, 140.

Led by Kadan, the southern flank crossed the eastern and southern passes of the Carpathians to south-eastern Transylvania, and on 31 March defeated the Transylvanian Saxons of Radna (Rodna, Romania) and on the same day crushed the army of Pósa, voivode of Transylvania. On 11 April they captured Nagyszeben (Sibiu, Romania), and after massacring the population, marched towards the Great Hungarian Plain in two columns, one along the Maros River and the other through Kolozsvár (Clus-Napoca, Romania) towards Nagyvárad (Oradea, Romania).[17] Rogerius, who escaped from Nagyvárad only just before the Mongols arrived, provides a vivid picture of what happened there and in other settlements besieged by the Mongols: when they finally managed to break into Nagyvárad after a siege of several days, they slaughtered everyone, sparing only a few craftsmen and beautiful women. During the siege they used *baliste* as well, so they were prepared to crush fierce resistance.[18]

On the night of 10 April, King Béla IV's troops received word from a Ruthenian who had escaped from the Mongol camp that the Mongols intended to attack early the next morning. Archbishop Ugrin of Kalocsa and the king's younger brother Kálmán approached the bridge over the Sajó River with their best troops, among them the Knights Templar, and attacked the Mongol forward elements, who had already crossed the bridge in preparation for the attack the next day. The Hungarians managed to defeat these forces, killing 30 Mongolian heavy cavalrymen and their leader, pushing the Mongols back across the river. The Hungarians then left patrols at the beachhead and returned to their camp. However, the Mongols brought forward 7 *baliste* and began throwing heavy stones and a rain of arrows at the troops in the beachhead, forcing them to retreat, leaving a free pass for the Mongols across the bridge. Batu led his main forces to the battle over the bridge, and the Mongol right wing was able to ford the Sajó River; the left wing, however was less successful, and had to prepare makeshift rafts to cross, and so arrived at the site of the battle later, at about 9 o'clock the next morning, 11 April.

In the early morning, the battle began with Mongol archers hurling javelins and fireballs at the Hungarian camp, which had been strengthened by a *Wagenburg* and a wall of shields.[19] According to some historians, because of the surprise nature of the attack we cannot regard the clash as a real battle, since the Hungarians could not even form their army into battle order, the rain of arrows making every move within the camp next to impossible. However, this seems to be an exaggeration, because the Hungarian camp formed about a mile (1.6 km) by mile square, and as the Mongol arrows could be shot approximately 300–400 metres maximum, the entire camp

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17 Hermann R. (ed.), 2017, 140.

18 SRH 2. 1938, 576–580.

19 CFHH 3. 1938, 2234–2236.

could not have been covered by a rain of arrows.[20] The Hungarian troops broke out of the *Wagenburg* several times; the best of them, again led by Archbishop Ugrin of Kalocsa and Prince Kálmán, fought with the Mongols at close quarters, causing them such heavy losses that at one point of the battle, Batu Khan began to contemplate the possibility of a withdrawal, but another leader, Subetei, convinced him to continue the fighting.[21] By midday, more and more Hungarian troops became exhausted and the Mongols used a psychological method of warfare by opening a seemingly safe way for them to escape. In the second half of the day more and more Hungarian troops began fleeing from the battle, though the best remained. When the king realised that the battle was lost, he fled north with his household troops. His soldiers fought heroically as the Mongols gave chase, at least two of them offering the king their own horses to escape.[22] Archbishop Ugrin and Prince Kálmán, both severely wounded, fled west in the direction of Pest. Most of the fleeing warriors were brutally massacred by the Mongols during the chase.[23] According to a balanced and objective estimate, the Hungarians lost about 10,000 men total during the battle and flight.[24]

King Béla IV escaped via the north-western parts of Hungary first to Pozsony (Bratislava, Slovakia), and from there went to Hainburg, Austria at the invitation of prince Frederick of Babenberg. This turned out to be a trap, because the prince robbed the king of all his valuables, and forced him to hand over counties in western Hungary as ransom for his freedom. From there, Béla IV went to Zágráb (Zagreb, Croatia) to organise further resistance.

At Pest, the main army of the Mongols was joined by the forces of their northern and southern wings. They occupied the city, causing heavy loss of life – according to our sources they killed everybody without respect to age or sex.[25]

With this, the Mongol invasion of Hungary came to a halt: they made their next move only in January, 1242, leaving King Béla IV and the Hungarians in the western parts of the realm more than half a year for defensive preparations. Why did they not cross the Danube and finish off further resistance immediately? The sources are silent on this point, but we can attempt an indirect and complex answer to this question. First, we have to bear in mind that the Mongol army had been fighting for a long time from the beginning of the occupation of the Russian principalities and eastern Hungary without a strategic pause to rest and replenish the exhausted units.[26] The Danube formed an obstacle which was relatively difficult to cross, especially when

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20 Katona T. (ed.), 1981, 402.

21 Katona T. (ed.), 1981, 33.

22 HNAB.DA. 70 587; 58 388.

23 CFHH 3. 1938, 2236.

24 Hermann R. (ed.) 2017, 139.

25 CFHH 3. 1938, 2236.

26 Hermann R. (ed.) 2017, 136–137.

the Mongols knew that the Hungarian army still possessed substantial intact forces in Transdanubia, i.e. the western parts of the realm. They probably also knew about a possible crusade against them, which had just been declared and was being organised in Germany.[27] We also have to take into consideration that Mongol troops attempting to occupy northern Austria were driven out of that country by Prince Frederick of Babenberg, who – despite robbing King Béla IV – still put up a fierce resistance against the Mongols, thus preventing the strategic encirclement of Hungary from the west. Perhaps the most serious argument against a quick crossing of the Danube was that resistance in eastern and central Hungary was stronger than the Mongols had expected. According to latest research, strongly supported by archaeological evidence, at several points in the Great Hungarian Plain and Transylvania, village churches were strengthened by ditches and palisades, and people fled to islands in rivers or to mountaintops in Transylvania, where they put up heavy resistance to the Mongols and caused them serious losses, from which the Mongols could only slowly recover.[28]

Because of all these circumstances, the Mongols started the second phase of their campaign only in January 1242, when – even by medieval standards – a very cold and freezing winter had set in. Although the Danube froze over, the Hungarians broke the ice every day to prevent the Mongols from crossing. To determine whether the ice was safe to cross, the Mongols employed a trick: they marched a lot of cattle and horses to the riverbank and left them for three days, seemingly unattended. When the Hungarians crossed over and marched the animals to the other bank, the Mongols realised that the ice was thick enough to carry the weight of horsemen, so they crossed the river themselves, and began the second part of their campaign.[29] In this phase the main strategic aim was not occupation and pillage, but to capture the king. The Mongol leader Kadan and his army chased King Béla IV from Zágráb to Spalato (Split, Croatia), and then on to Trau (Trogir, Croatia). At first the Mongols thought that the king was in the castle of Klissza (Klis, Croatia), and they began a siege, but when they learnt that the king was not there, they abandoned the siege. When Kadan realised that his troops could not cross the muddy waters around Trau (an island at that time) and the Hungarian king fled to another island further away called Čiovo, he gave up the chase. Kadan led his troops through Dalmatia, Bosnia, and Montenegro to Bulgaria, where he joined his forces with the rest of the Mongol army.

While Kadan was chasing the king, the rest of the Mongols were pillaging and looting the western parts of Hungary. They besieged several castles and cities with modest success, only managing to occupy unfortified places. Some castles and cities

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27 Szabó B. et al. 2022, 321–330.

28 SRH 2. 1938, 580–583; Szabó B., János J., Uhrin D. (eds), 2022, 315–320.

29 SRH 2. 1938, 583–584.

managed to defend themselves: although the Mongols broke into the city of Esztergom and killed a lot of people, they were unable to take the castle itself defended by *comes* Simon and his Spanish crossbowmen,[30] though they deployed no less than 30 siege machines, probably trebuchets and *baliste.*[31]

In case of Székesfehérvár, which was surrounded by marshes at the time and could only be approached on a dam, the Italian (Latin, as they were called in medieval Hungary) inhabitants put up a fierce resistance; when a sudden and unexpected thaw melted the ice on the surface of the marshes, it became pointless for the Mongols to continue the siege.

In the spring of 1242 the Mongols withdrew from Hungary; historians have long speculated as to the reason for this move. In December 1241, Ögodei Khan died, and some historians conclude that the Mongolian withdrawal was due to the fact that Batu Khan wanted to participate in the election of the next ruler. However, this was hardly the reason for the withdrawal, as the election took place only in 1246, and Batu did not participate in it. According to other historians, by the spring of 1242, the natural resources of the Carpathian Basin were so overstretched that it could no longer support the Mongol army and especially their many horses. However, probably the most serious argument for retreating from Hungary was the fact that by that time the army was several thousand kilometres away from the centre of the Mongol Empire, and between them there were many unpacified, only partly occupied territories populated by restless serfs, so Batu had to strengthen his hold over these territories in order to solidify his power. One final argument can be added: after leaving Hungary the Mongols went to Bulgaria, and looted and pillaged it in the same way, which shows that the 1241–1242 campaign must be evaluated in a broader perspective: it was not a campaign only against Hungary, but a raid on Central Europe and the Balkan Peninsula as a whole, which further stretched the military resources of the Mongols. It became obvious that the rate of expansion could not be kept to the same pace in Eastern Europe as in Asia.[32]

To summarise the results of the latest research, we must re-evaluate the previously held conclusion that King Béla IV's conduct as the leader of the realm and the performance of the Hungarian military system during the Mongol invasion were complete failures. In fact, the king was aware of the danger caused by the Mongols, consciously prepared for the defence of the country, managed to mobilise a substantial military force, and put up a very serious resistance at the battle of Muhi, causing the Mongols very heavy losses. The Mongols themselves considered this fight the heaviest they had so far encountered. The military orders in particular fought bravely – the Knights

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30 HNAB.DA. 256.

31 SRH 2. 1938, 583–584.

32 Szabó B. et al. 2022, 340–347.

Templar were killed to the last man – but the other Hungarian troops, especially those under the leadership of Archbishop Ugrin of Kalocsa and prince Kálmán, also fought well. Another partially overlooked fact (now brought to the forefront by archaeological evidence) is the spontaneous popular resistance of the common people who prepared makeshift strongholds in defence of their families. Though the Mongols mercilessly crushed these points of resistance one by one, these little strongholds were so numerous that they caused the conquerors serious losses. It also should be stressed that the Mongols were unable to achieve their strategic goal: because they could not capture the king, make him their vassal, or kill him, the country under King Béla IV's leadership was able to rise from her ruins and become strong again. For this reason, Béla IV is regarded, after King Saint Stephen I, as the second founder of Hungary. No less important is the fact that the Mongols could also not annihilate the Hungarian military system. Even while the invasion was ongoing, the Hungarians were able to recapture Győr from the Austrians, maintained heavy resistance in the castles of the western and northern parts of the country, and managed to lead a campaign against the prince of Austria immediately after the Mongols had withdrawn.

Finally let me draw attention to two observations, which have never before been discussed in Hungarian historiography. The first is in connection with the role of Prince Frederick of Babenberg of Austria. The prince is usually portrayed in Hungarian historiography as a negative figure who played a controversial part in the events leading up to the massacre of the Cuman chieftain Kuten and his warriors. After blackmailing King Béla IV in Hainburg after his defeat at Muhi, Frederick occupied some Hungarian counties in the western parts of the realm. But it must be stressed that he contributed to the success of Christian resistance in Austria, and by doing so, he prevented a strategic outflanking of the whole of Hungary. If the Mongols had been able to achieve this, further resistance in the western part of Hungary would probably have collapsed as well, and the effects of the Mongol invasion would have been even more disastrous.

My second observation is in connection with the fact that King Béla IV emerged from the effects of the Mongol invasion unscathed as far as his power is concerned. One of the main reasons the Mongols attacked Hungary was Béla's decision to offer secure shelter for Cuman refugees and convert them to Christianity, and use the title *rex Cumanie* among his other titles. Even after the Mongol invasion, King Béla IV was adamant to continue using the title *rex Cumanie*, declaring to the world that he was uncrushed and would defend his rights at all costs. According to an Armenian source, after more than fifty years the Mongols still remembered how hard they had to fight in Hungary, which is a true praise coming from the enemy.[33]

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33 Hermann R. (ed.), 2017, 142.

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Changing Craft in the Early Renaissance
Florentine Citizens and the Profession of Arms (1427–1430)

Summary: Between the end of the 14th century and the beginning of the 15th century, the Republic of Florence was almost constantly engaged in war. As a result, public debt in a short time increased from 1 million to 3 million florins. The most difficult time for the Republic occurred between the years 1425 and 1433. In this phase, authorities experimented with new forms of taxation to cope with the growing expenses, including the cadaster (*Catasto*) created in 1427, pursuant to which Florentine citizens were forced to list all their assets in addition to other personal information.

Based on the information provided by this document, it has been possible to identify all Florentine citizens who were soldiers at the time. Furthermore, thanks to the data extracted from the accounting records of the Florentine government of 1430, it has been possible to evaluate an interesting change in society: several artisans, of various ages, abandoned their professions to become soldiers. According to the documents, such a choice was seen as a chance to one's economic condition thanks to the considerable wages and good working conditions offered by the Republic compared to those associated with work as artisans.

Keywords: Military labour, Renaissance Florence, Renaissance warfare, Renaissance army, Siege of Lucca

Introduction

Since the middle of the 14th century, the *Comune* of Florence initiated an expansionist policy that, in just over half a century, enabled Florence to subjugate more than two-thirds of present-day Tuscany and an important portion of Romagna. In the first phase, Florence conquered the territory of Mugello, and in the following decades won

dominance over many important towns such as Pescia, Prato, Pistoia, San Gimignano, Volterra, and San Miniato.[1] At the beginning of the 1380s, Florence's influence was extended to Arezzo, Montepulciano, Pisa, and Cortona, followed by the conquest of Porto Pisano and Livorno. The *Comune* of Florence thus became what historiography has referred to as a 'territorial state'.[2]

Florentine expansionism in those years was the cause of a growing concern not only for its neighbours such as Lucca and Siena but also for Milan. As a result, the Florentine Republic became involved in multiple conflicts against the Visconti of Milan, who on the one hand wanted to limit Florence's sphere of influence and on the other intended to expand Milan's own dominions to the south. The first phase of the armed conflict between Florentine and Milanese armies, occurred between 1390 and 1402. While the death of Gian Galeazzo Visconti brought the end to this phase of the conflict, peace did not last long – the wars between Florence and Milan had already resumed by 1423 under the impetus of Filippo Maria Visconti and continued until the middle of the 15th century, involving all the political actors of central and northern Italy.

In April 1428, peace agreements were signed between almost all the political entities that had taken part in the conflict. However, Florence decided to exclude from the treaty the lord of Lucca, Paolo Guinigi, as in the eyes of the Florentines, he was guilty of providing support to Milan despite being formally allied with Florence. Thus, the conflict took a new turn: seeing an opportunity to finally gain dominance over Lucca, Florentine troops laid siege to the city in December 1429.[3] After months of siege, the Lucchese decided to ask the Duke of Milan for help. However, Filippo Maria Visconti could not intervene without breaking the peace with Venice and starting a new war. He therefore decided to lend his support indirectly: he relieved Niccolò Piccinino of his position as captain of the army so that he could be hired by Genoa, which in turn declared war on Florence and went to its aid.[4] On the morning of 2 December 1430, the Florentine army moved onto the meadows between Lucca and the Serchio River while Piccinino's army was on the opposite bank.[5] The Florentine army suffered a major defeat and retreated toward Pisa. Although the siege of Lucca was over, a new war had just begun. In the following months, both Milan and Venice entered the conflict

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1 Florence already had formal control over some of these towns but during this period it consolidated its predominant position in the discussed areas.

2 On the formation of the Florentine territorial state, I refer to the major historiographical publications on this subject: Becker B. 1968; Brucker G.A. 1977; Cohn S.K. Jr. 1999; Fasano Guarini E. 1978; Chittolini G.1979, 225–265; Zorzi A. 2000, 6–31.

3 Bracciolini P. 1476, 165; Montauri P. di T. 1931–1939, 814.

4 Biglia A. 1731, 135–136.

5 Graziani 1850, 346; Bracciolini P. 1476, 170; Stella G. 1730, 1304. The victory on the banks of the Serchio River was greatly celebrated in Lucca, and the occasion was celebrated until the second half of the 18th century. See: Tommasi G. 1847, 203–207. A poem was also composed about Piccinino's exploits, transcribed in: Pellegrini A. 1899, 382–409; Pellegrini A. 1900, 329–357; Pellegrini A. 1901, 230–243 and 686–696; Pellegrini A. 1902, 301–313.

directly, followed by all their allies. In April 1433, after three and a half years of conflict, peace was finally reached. Expenses related to waging war required increasingly more money and thus resulted in the imposition of unprecedented tax burdens, especially in the late 1420s and early 1430s. Interestingly, despite the fact that the war turned out to be the costliest armed conflict of the entire 15th century, leading to levels of fiscal pressure hitherto unheard of, the peace agreements stipulated that all of the stolen territories were to be returned, on pain of exclusion from the treaty.[6]

The Composition of the Ordinary Florentine Army in 1430

In this context of the ongoing war, the organisation of the army and territorial defence became the fundamental matter, as well as one of the main expenses, of the Republic of Florence. By analysing the expenses incurred in 1430 by the *Camera del Comune*, the main office aimed at the administration of state revenues and expenditures, it has been possible to identify the composition of the Florentine army in those years. Thus, the army can be divided into two main parts: the ordinary one – whose main task was defence – and the extraordinary one, composed of mercenaries. In the ordinary army, there were three subgroups: soldiers and constables for life; castellans with their hired men, and finally contingents of men deputed to the surveillance of specific localities of great strategic (both economic and military) importance.

The number of soldiers and constables for life was relatively low: there were 16 soldiers, of whom only 3 were Florentines,[7] and 5 constables, of whom only one was a Florentine citizen.[8] Dependent on the constables were additional troops of soldiers divided between infantrymen (*palvesari* and *balestrieri*) and cavalrymen – 72 men in total. Unfortunately, records do not provide further information on their origins, but in all probability they were inhabitants of the Florentine dominions or citizens of Florence.

The title of soldier and constable for life turns out to be peculiar for two reasons: the first is the great difference in pay compared to other hired men, which could range from a minimum of 4 florins gross per month to a maximum of 100 florins on

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6 Fecini T. 1931–1939, 847; Bracciolini P. 1476, 180.

7 ASFi.CC.SC 214. From Montecchio: Jacopo di Macherone, Lorenzo Neri and Francesco di Zochio, 13v–14r. From San Rufino: Antonio di Cenni nicknamed Caviglia, Verdiano d'Andrea; Domenico di Francesco, 13v–14r. From Usigliano: Bergho di Pasquino, and the son Lorenzo di Bergo di Pasquino, Guido di Cecco, 14r. Da Lugnano, countryside of città di Castello: Nardo di Giovanni and his son Santo di Nardo, 14r. From Settignano: Piero di Francesco del Foresta, 2v. From Bodigliano: Baldino di Lorenzo, 7r. From Firenze: Benedetto di messer Piero Gaetani, his son Giovanni, and relative Galeazzo di Cecco Gaetani, 14v.

8 ASFi.CC.SC 214. Tomaso di Giovanni from Pellegrino, 41r; Jacomello di Martino from Fronzola, 42v. ASFi.CC.SC 219. Benvenuto and Giano di Giusto di Bonacci from Bruscoli, 51v; Cionetto di Salvadore Bastani from Firenze, 43v.

an annual basis.[9] Secondly, the mode of enlistment: the profession was particularly attractive given the high pay, but the methods of entry were very strict. In fact, one could only become a soldier or a constable for life by receiving the title after the death of his father, which was followed by a resolution of the Signoria, or by obtaining such a position because of special merits. We find the latter case documented for Cionetto di Salvatore Bastari, thanks to the memoirs of Francesco di Cino Rinucci. In June 1412, Cionetto was in Bologna where he learned of a possible coup d'état hatched by some members of the Alberti, Ricci, and Strozzi families and other Florentine outsiders, conniving to secretly enter the city with a retinue of armed men for the celebrations of San Barnaba with the aim of killing the priori.[10] Cionetto reported to the authorities what he had learned and – since the danger was thus avoided – he was rewarded with 5 'spears' (or *lance*, was a tactical military unit composed by three horsemen) in his service and a life salary as constable equal to the considerable sum of 5 florins gross per month for him and 14⅓ florins for each lancia.[11] From the cadastral records (*Catasto* of 1427) we learn of another benefit granted to Cionetto as a reward for his services to the Republic, namely that he was to be exempt from all taxation.[12] This privilege was extremely rare given that out of more than 10,171 families, only 8 enjoyed the same benefit.[13]

A final question that needs to be answered concerns the actual tasks fulfilled by the hired men and constables for life. While in the case of constables, the large number of men in their employ indicates to us that in all likelihood they actually performed specific defensive tasks within the city of Florence, in the case of 'soldiers for life', their assignment seems to have been more honorary, i.e., a reward in recognition of their merits rather than an actual responsibility for defensive actions. Thanks to the *Catasto* declarations of the three Florentine citizens of the Gaetani family, we can see that they were well-off. The two brothers, Benedetto and Giovanni di Piero Gaetani, had a combined wealth of more than 7,000 florins each, while Galeazzo had 1,200 florins.[14] The fact that all of them declared an age close to 80, well above the maximum age to be a member of the ordinary Florentine army, testifies to the fact that they were not actively serving in active office.

As regards the fortified localities and the men designated for their protection, Florence's city statutes of 1415 offer considerable information on the 130 *castellanie*

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9 The florin indicated is that of the account used in state accounts, equal to 4 *Lire* (£). 1 £ = 20 *soldi* (*s*); 1 *s* = 12 *denari* (*d*).

10 Rinuccini F. di C.1840, LI.

11 ASFi.CC.SC 214, 43r.

12 ASFi.C 73, 385r.

13 For the family's number in the *Catasto* of 1427 see: Conti E. 1984, 147, 155, 173.

14 ASFi.C 5, 39r; ASFi.C 75, 424r e 430r.

(castles, fortresses, citadels, fortified structures) defending the dominions.[15] These are divided according to their importance into four categories.[16] The superiority of one *castellania* over the others was based on its strategic and economic importance, which was reflected in the records in the form of higher pay to the men delegated to its custody, their number, as well as different ways of electing castellans and tenure of the castellan's office.

To be elected as a castellan, one had to meet five requirements common to all public offices in the Republic of Florence: to be a Florentine citizen, be enrolled in an *Arte* (guild), be of the Guelph party, one's family had to be in good standing with the payment of taxes and, finally, a minimum age was prescribed, which varied depending on the office.[17] According to the usual way of electing officials for Florentine public offices, these were drawn randomly from specific bags containing the names of citizens eligible for that office. In the case of the most important *castellanie*, a vote was followed by the *Signori* and Colleges who could approve or reject the nominations.[18]

The statutes also show us that not all castellanies depended economically on the *Camera del Comune*. Indeed, it is possible to see how some specific offices responsible for defence, such as the *Dieci di Pisa* and the *Sei di Arezzo*, had to use part of their income to maintain the *castellanie* in the territory entrusted to them. In addition to them, some communities were also directly responsible for paying the hired men and castellans, although the latter remained elected by Florence.[19]

This valuable information turns out to be crucial for understanding the small number of *castellanie* mentioned in the Florentine fiscal documentation of 1430, amounting to only 52. Therefore, to count the total expenditure for castellanies and soldiers, as well as their specific number, it is necessary to make a comparison between the outlays of the *Camera del Comune* of 1430 and the information contained within the city statutes of 1415. With regard to hired soldiers, in 1430 we find in the records 80 *palvesari* (infantry with a great shield called a *palvese*), 110 crossbowmen, and 120 infantrymen, for a total gross annual expenditure of £ 42,718.20.[20] To this number, we must add an additional 90 *castellanie* (these had in fact increased since 1415)

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15 The total number of *castellanie* has been revised to Picchianti S. 2022, 7, then reported in Guidi G. 1981, 247–251.

16 SP 3. 1783, 192–211.

17 Zorzi A. 1997, 201.

18 The rules governing the castellans can be found in: SP 3. 1783, 164–192.

19 Picchianti S. 2022, 8–9.

20 When infantrymen without any specialisation were indicated in the records from the discussed period, it meant that the number of crossbowmen and *palvesari* to be hired was at the discretion of the castellan. However, crossbowmen should never have been less than ⅓ of the total. In the event that the castellan preferred to have a greater number of crossbowmen than the established minimum, the total pay to be distributed among the hired men would not have been increased in any case. See: ASFi.SUA.CP 6, 56v.

with 33 *palvesari*, 41 crossbowmen, and 456 infantrymen, for a total gross annual expenditure of £ 65,568.00.

The total expenditure for the maintenance of the *castellanie* thus amounted to 108,286.00 £ gross annually, of which only 40% depended directly on the central coffers of the state. It should be pointed out that although the *Camera del Comune* did not contribute directly to a large part of this expenditure, the fact that other local offices or communities were responsible for raising the necessary money and using it for these purposes directly resulted in a reduction in revenue to the state coffers as well. The decision to fractionalise the economic management of the castellanies thus simply had a functional purpose of faster payment for those in charge but, in fact, did not result in any reduction in spending.

Although we know from the norms on castellans how they were selected only from among Florentine citizens, as for the hired men we know only that these came from the dominions and never from the neighbouring area they would go to oversee. In fact, their names and geographical origin are not indicated within the accounting records of the *Camera del Comune.*[21] Other sources that might have shed light on these professionals, such as lists drawn up at reviews, have not survived to the present day. For this reason, it has not been possible to identify the Florentine citizens who served as hired hands.

The item of expenditure that most directly affected the outlays of the *Camera del Comune* in terms of defence was that of additional hired men allocated to specific fortifications. We find some specific regulations in the already-mentioned Florentine city statutes of 1415. At that time, the *Dieci di Pisa* could in fact hire up to 200 men for the defence of the Pisan citadel alone, in order to make it an impregnable stronghold both from external enemies but especially to defend Florentine supremacy over the city itself.[22] Similar regulations are also found in the rubrics for the *Sei Ufficiali di Arezzo.*[23]

In 1430, there were additional soldiers in 5 specific localities: Cittadella di Pisa and Arezzo, Castello di Cortona, Fortezza di Castrocaro, and Torri di Porto Pisano.

These additional soldiers totalled 475, distributed between the different localities (Table 1). The majority were stationed in Pisa (333 men, a higher number than provided for in the 1415 regulations), which had evidently changed its function and required greater protection. Just as with the *castellanie*'s soldiers, pay varied according to the importance of the locality. Their pay was slightly higher than that of the *castellanie*'s hired men (Table 2). Payments to them were bestowed individually and not

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21 As Pirillo has shown, this rule was already present in the mid-14th century in Florence but also in the Visconti domains at least from the beginning of the 15th century. Pirillo P. 2018, 164; Zambarbieri T. 1988, 111.

22 SP 3. 1783, 117.

23 For example, the hiring of a constable with four infantrymen was envisaged for the castle of Pistoia, as was the case for the castle of San Miniato SP 3. 1783, 90, 102.

through intermediaries as was done through castellans or constables for their men. This form of contract provides more qualitative information, such as the individuals' names and the locations these troops were listed.

Table 1. Additional soldiers for specific locations (1430)

No.	Location	Crossbowmen	*Palvesari*	Total
1	Citadel of Pisa	250	83	333
2	Citadel of Arezzo	36	42	78
3	Cortona	23	2	25
4	Castrocaro	24	1	25
5	Porto Pisano	8	6	14
	Total	**341**	**134**	**475**

Table 2. Remuneration in the defensive field (1430)

No.	Profession	Currency	ƒ	£	s
1	Soldiers and constables for life	gold	–	5→8	
2	Crossbowmen	gold	3 ⅓		
3	*Palvesari*	silver alloy	–	9	10
4	*Lance* (3 horsemen)	gold	14 ⅓	–	
5	Castellans	gold/silver	100→25	225→25	
6	Crossbowmen	silver alloy	–	16→10	
7	*Palvesari*	silver alloy	–	12→8	
8	Infantry	silver alloy	–	10→8	
9	Additional soldiers	–	–	–	
10	Crossbowmen	silver alloy	–	16→12	
11	*Palvesari*	silver alloy	–	14→10	

At Pisa, Castrocaro and Arezzo, a total of 87 Florentine citizens were present, accounting for about 18% of the total number of additional soldiers.[24] There were 57 crossbowmen stationed in the citadel of Pisa, 3 in Castrocaro, and 8 in Arezzo. There were 14 *palvesari* in Pisa and 6 in Arezzo. Most of these were crossbowmen, which was a profession of choice mainly due to the fact that they received on average 25% more salary than a *palvesaro*. As for the location of employment, it is confirmed that most soldiers preferred Pisa, probably again because of the higher pay compared to other locations.

The total expenditure for such hired men turns out to be the highest for the *Camera del Comune* among those for the defence of domains, amounting to 76,454.80 £ gross annually.

Prosopography of the Florentine soldiers in 1427 and comparison with the data of 1430

In order to compare the information gathered so far for 1430 with the situation known for 1427, it will be necessary to refer to the *Catasto* of citizens, which not only provides quantitative data but also allows a precise prosopographical analysis of the military professionals. In the records from 1427, 60 soldiers of the Republic were mentioned (Table 3).[25] Most of those individuals listed in the *Catasto* who stated their place of work were stationed in Pisa (45%), followed by Arezzo (20%), and then Livorno and Cortona (5% and 3%, respectively). An additional 9% guarded other specific locations, while 18% did not mention their postings. On the one hand, the prominence of Pisa and Arezzo is justifiable because of the larger number of hired men present there, but on the other hand, it could have been a specific choice of Florentine citizens attracted by higher earnings than the wages offered in other cities. Most of them lived in the neighbourhood of S. Giovanni (43%), followed by S. Spirito (27%), S. Maria Novella (17%), and finally S. Croce (13%).

In terms of the assets they owned, it is possible to see that almost all of them had private investments, while public investments did not exceed 10%, placing them in the average range of other Florentine craft or construction workers. Half of the residents of S. Spirito and S. Croce neighbourhoods owned private property, while only ⅓ of those in S. Giovanni and ¼ of those in S. Maria Novella owned real estate.

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24 ASFi.CC.SC 214–219.

25 There were also 5 mercenaries and 3 constables. Mercenary soldiers: Mariano di Cioccio, quarter of S. Spirito, Scala (ASFi.C 64, 327r); Agnolo di Leonardo, quarter of S. Maria Novella, Leon Rosso (ASFi.C 76, 243v); Antonio di Monte and Zanobi di Zanobi, quarter of S. Maria Novella, Leon Bianco (ASFi.C 77, 199r–199v and 375r); Piero di Bartolo, quarter of S. Giovanni, Leon d'Oro (ASFi.C 78, 622r). Constables: Iacopo di Mino Malavolti from Siena, quarter of S. Croce, Bue (ASFi.C 69, 588v); Giusto di Giovanni, quarter of S. Maria Novella, Unicorno (ASFi.C. 75, 298r); Mariano di Tommaso Deti, quarter of S. Spirito, Scala (ASFi.C 64, 331v).

Table 3. Soldiers of the republic in 1427 Catasto

F.	cc.	Name	*Gonfalone*	Work Place	Tot. Weath	Tot. Tax. Weath	Age	*Bocche*
Santo Spirito								
64	215v	Agnolo and Giovanni di Piero di Bernardo Paganelli	Scala	Castle of Montecalvoli	218	126	26, 22	6
64	398r	Bernado di Bindo d'Azzolino Viviani	Scala	Fortress (generic)	60	0	38	1
64	273r	Giovanni di Bartolo	Scala	Citadel of Arezzo	117	13	75	7
64	273v	Guasparre di Marco	Scala	Citadel of Pisa	167	119	40	5
65	320r–320v	Domenico di Giovanni Belfardelli	Nicchio	Fortress of St. George	306	229	55	2
65	396r–396v	Meo di Niccolò Falconi	Nicchio	Fortress of Vado	286	161	48	1
65	431r–432r	Rinieri di Ridolfo di Pagolo Lotti	Nicchio	Citadel of Pisa	967	933	35	6
65	435r	Senso d'Antonio	Nicchio	–	32	24	24	3
66	321v	Meo di Salvestro d'Alinari	Ferza	Citadel of Pisa	35	35	25	1
66	337r	Nanni di Stefano	Ferza	Citadel of Pisa	35	14	38	5
66	360r	Piero di Michele di Tano d'Alinari	Ferza	–	36	33	79	1
67	235v–236r	Cecco di Leonardo from Spicchio	Drago	Fortress of Livorno	159	119	37	3
67	290v–230v	Giovanni di Noso Fantoni	Drago	–	374	327	72	7
67	305r–305v	Giovanni di Piero Minucci	Drago	Castle of Bibbona	280	265	45	3
67	436r	Monna Papera widow of Carlo di Domenico	Drago	–	73	9	45	4
67	466r	Vanni di Luca	Drago	Castle of Arezzo	30	20	56	2
Santa Croce								
68	178r	Andrea Martino Totti	Carro	Citadel of Pisa	48	40	44	6
68	180r–180v	Antonio Francesco	Carro	Citadel of Pisa	225	21	55	2
68	296v–	Iacopo di ser Bartolomeo Oradini	Carro	–	1494	393	55	3

Table 3. cont.

F.	cc.	Name	*Gonfalone*	Work Place	Tot. Weath	Tot. Tax. Weath	Age	*Bocche*
68	291v–292r	Tommaso del maestro Piero de Pulci	Carro	Castle of Campiglia	862	825	54	3
69	486r	Bernardo di ser Giovanni Carcherelli	Bue	Citadel of Pisa	44	44	79	1
69	367v	Luca di Iacopo Nelli	Bue	Citadel of Pisa	114	74	45	3
73	319v	Matteo di Zanobi Bartoli	Ruote	–	250	50	25	1
73	263r	Giovanni di Lievo	Ruote	Citadel of Pisa	55	55	79	1
Santa Maria Novella								
75	330r	Lorenzo di Lapo Bernardi	Unicorno	Citadel of Pisa	95	0	40	6
76	328r	Giovanni di Iacopo	Leon Rosso	Citadel of Cortona	163	145	44	12
76	350v	Michele di Baldino	Leon Rosso	Citadel of Arezzo	78	78	55	4
76	350r	Michele di Bartolo	Leon Rosso	Citadel of Pisa	100	100	65	5
76	378r	Piero d'Agnolo	Leon Rosso	Citadel of Pisa	27	27	60	1
76	383v	Salvadore d'Omo	Leon Rosso	Castle of Livorno	50	19	79	1
77	31r	Agnol odi Stefano	Leon Bianco	Citadel of Pisa	35	35	79	1
77	30v	Antonio di Bernardo	Leon Bianco	Citadel of Arezzo	97	34	28	2
77	285r	Iacopo di Benedetto Amieri	Leon Bianco	–	80	24	26	1
77	271v	Iacopo di Iacopo Sozzi	Leon Bianco	Citadel of Arezzo	94	45	49	8
San Giovanni								
78	213r	Andre di Casella	Leon d'Oro	Citadel of Pisa	310	295	79	2
78	250v	Biagio di Vannino	Leon d'Oro	Citadel of Pisa	31	31	30	1
75*	592v	Giorgi odi Bartolomeo	Leon d'Oro	Citadel of Pisa	47	47	79	1
78	572v	Giovanni di Pagoletto	Leon d'Oro	Citadel of Arezzo	131	71	79	1
78	565r	Guardi di Giovanni	Leon d'Oro	Citadel of Pisa	35	29	26	1

Table 3. cont.

F.	CC.	Name	Gonfalone	Work Place	Tot. Weath	Tot. Tax. Weath	Age	Bocche
78	343r–343v	Iacopo di Giovanni de Medici	Leon d'Oro	Castle of Cortona	25	16	64	4
78	361v–362r	Lando d'Antonio dal Pogale della Lugha	Leon d'Oro	–	100	0	65	2
78	386r	Nannino d'Andrea	Leon d'Oro	Citadel of Arezzo	40	15	34	1
78	386r	Niccolò di Giovanni	Leon d'Oro	Citadel of Pisa	30	15	31	1
78	480	Simone e Cristofano di Leonardo Rendinelli	Leon d'Oro	Citadel of Pisa	26	0	25	2
75*	657v	Ugolino d'Uco d'Uco	Leon d'Oro	Citadel of Pisa	500	428	60	7
79	430r	Domanico di Matteo	Drago	Castle of Livorno	39	0	40	5
80	303 v	Chimento d'Andrea	Chiavi	Citadel of Pisa	39	39	50	1
80	319v	Ciatino di Bartolomeo from Gambassi	Chiavi	Citadel of Pisa	376	255	40	4
80	431v	Michele di ser Lolo	Chiavi	Citadel of Pisa	0	0	28	4
80	472r	Nanne di Filippo	Chiavi	–	46	6	48	6
80	523v	Simone di Meo from Vinci	Chiavi	–	142	142	50	1
81	158r	Antonio di Iacopo degli Ubaldini	Vaio	Citadel of Arezzo	40	10	46	8
81	158r	Antonio di Michele	Vaio	–	38	30	79	1
96*	95v	Cecco di Leonardo	Vaio	Citadel of Pisa	104	74	40	3
81	224v	Domenico di Francesco	Vaio	Citadel of Arezzo	42	5	79	1
81	258v–259r	Geri del Sera	Vaio	Citadel of Arezzo	168	146	83	4
96*	132r	Gherardo di Giovanni	Vaio	Citadel of Arezzo	36	36	45	1
81	308v–309v	Mariotto di Lorenzo Brandi	Vaio	Castel of San Chimento	774	585	48	2
96*	105r	Maso di Leonardo from Spicchio	Vaio	Citadel of Pisa	209	118	50	2
81	307r	Matteo di Francesco	Vaio	Citadel of Pisa	140	140	47	2

Source: ASFi, *Catasto*; * ASFi.MCG.CC

Table 4. Artisans who became soldiers of the republic in 1430

F.	cc.	Name	Gonfalone	Profession	Tot. Weath	Tot. Tax. Weath	Age	Bocche
Santo Spirito								
67	379v	Michele e Gherardo di Lazzero	Drago	–	174	145	65	8
Santa Croce								
72	277v	Bernardo d'Antonio	Leon Nero	–	328	164	29	2
73	250r	Filippo di Francesco	Ruote	Shoemaker	–	–	25	3
73	292v–293r	Francesco di Matteo di Palmerino	Ruote	–	325	296	25	7
Santa Maria Novella								
74	130r	Bernardo di ser Michele di Iacopo Tucci	Vipera	–	157	155	26	3
76	344r	Lorenzo di Simone Pacini	Leon Rosso	–	75	75	15	1
77	199r	Antonio di Carlo	Leon Bianco	Shoemaker	850	847	44	2
San Giovanni								
78	226r	Antonio di Nanni	Leon d'Oro	–	–	–	40	5
78	245v	Biagio di Francesco	Leon d'Oro	Broker	–	–	62	2
78	313r–313v	Falco di Bonacorso	Leon d'Oro	Leather seller, saddler	21		60	8
78	319v	Francesco di Cambio	Leon d'Oro	Shoemaker	–	–	21	4
79	562v–563r	Stefano di Piero	Drago	Combed raw wool	–	–	62	2
80	286v	Benedetto d'Agnolo	Chiavi	Shearer	237	237	40	8
80	444v	Matteo di Simone	Chiavi	Cloth bleacher	–	–	43	4
80	478r–475r	Niccolò di Boninsegna	Chiavi	Brick layer	883	873	24	4
80	519r	Simone di Giusto	Chiavi	Carpenter	32	32	22	1

Source: ASFi, *Catasto*

The highest wealth per capita was that of S. Croce residents, more than double that of the runner-up, the S. Spirito neighbourhood. These two, however, are similar in terms of taxable wealth per capita, while the situation remains the same for S. Maria Novella and S. Giovanni. The higher wealth of the inhabitants of S. Croce is perhaps attributable to their higher average age, which was around 54.5 years.

Among the identified soldiers, two declared what profession they held before they changed trades: Domenico di Francesco was formerly an apothecary, and Gherardo di Giovanni was formerly a shoemaker.[26]

Comparing the data of *Camera del Comune* in 1430 with those of the *Catasto* of 1427, we can see, first of all, how the number of Florentine citizens being professional military men increased from 61 to 87, with a percentage increase of about 43%. However, an even more remarkable figure is the number of new soldiers: these constitute 85% of the total Florentine military force. This finding, though, must be contextualised by the limitations of this analysis. As already asserted, we do not have data that could clarify for us the origin of the men hired by the castellanies for defence duties. For this reason, it's possible that the men not present in the records of the *Camera del Comune* but whose declaration to the *Catasto* has been identified, could have been deployed at some. This hypothesis would logically imply that in fact there were many more active soldiers than the Florentine citizens mentioned in the records that year as soldiers of the Republic. Unfortunately, the later *Catasti* records are not helpful in terms of better defining this figure since due to the impoverishment of the population because of the high taxation, many families did not even report their assets to the *Catasto,* declaring themselves 'destitute'. In addition, where such information was provided, we see a significant reduction in financial statements made in individual documents.

For this reason, one of the key questions related to the above-mentioned state of affairs is that concerning the motivations that prompted a considerable number of Florentine citizens to take up the military trade or to change their profession. In order to obtain more information on this socioeconomic aspect, I searched for the names of the new soldiers of the Republic in the *Catasto* of 1427 to determine who these people were. However, this analysis has two main limitations: firstly, a considerable number of homonymous cases did not allow for a better identification of these citizens. Secondly, some of them could have been part of a family (a taxation unit) as minors or simply brothers or other relatives of the head of the family, making their identification almost impossible.

In the face of these difficulties, 16 'new' soldiers were identified with a considerable degree of certainty (Table 4). These are never master artisans who owned a workshop but rather workers employed in manufacturing or construction trades. Among them, we find a fair number of workers in the wool industry. Although wages for this kind

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26 Rispettivamente ASFi.C 81, 224v; ASFi.MCG.CC 96, 132r.

of work were not particularly low on average (Table 5), it should be emphasised that already by the beginning of the 15th century, but especially by the 1420s, the contractual conditions of these salaried workers had changed. In fact, in the early decades of the 15th century, there was a shift from pay on a monthly basis to one based on piecework or, more often, on a daily basis, which consequently created uncertainty about the actual monthly wage that could be received.[27] This could have been one of the reasons that prompted several Florentine citizens to change jobs by embarking on a career as soldiers of the Republic. Indeed, it is noted how most of those individuals identified in the 1427 *Catasto* who became soldiers in 1430 were crossbowmen in Pisa, consequently obtaining a salary that could range from 14–16 £ gross per month. There is also a point to be made that their assignment did not necessarily imply a danger to their own lives, as was the case of mercenary soldiers. During all the years of the War of Lucca, Pisa was never attacked. This implies that the actual need to use weapons was very rare even for internal security tasks within the city.

Table 5. Some monthly remuneration for employees (1421–1430)

Craft	£
Farmhand	9,68
Urban laborer not further identified as to occupation	12,10
Bricklayer	21,78
Carfts in the Art of Wool	**£**
Subjected to the Ciompi	6,33
Apprentice	7,67
Tanner	8,30
Dependent on the Art of Wool	9,33
Worker at a craftsman	10,33
Thread maker	14,00

Source: Franceschi F. 1993, 244 and 251; Tognetti S. 1995, 302–304

27 Franceschi F. 1993, 241–259.

Table 6. Florentine citizens mercenary constables (1427)

F.	cc.	Name	Gonfalone	Profession	Tot. Weath	Tot. Tax. Weath	Age	Bocche
Santo Spirito								
64	331r	Mariano Ciccio	Scala	Mercenary	99	99	40	5
64	327r	Mariano di Tommaso Deti	Scala	Constable	636	389	79	1
Santa Croce								
69	588v	Iacopo di Mino Malavolti da Siena	Bue	Constable	287	0	63	3
Santa Maria Novella								
75	298r	Giusto di Giovanni	Unicorno	Constable	16	0	40	3
76	243v	Agnolo di Leonardo	Leon Rosso	Mercenary	342	320	24	1
77	199r-199v	Antonio di Monte	Leon Bianco	Mercenary	101	101	17	1
77	375	Zanobi di Zanobi	Leon Bianco	Mercenary	0	0	40	3
San Giovanni								
78	622	Piero di Bartolo	Leon d'Oro	Mercenary	636	389	79	1

Source: ASFi, *Catasto*

By comparing the documentation produced by the *Camera del Comune* together with the information contained in the *Catasto* of 1427, we can make another observation about the choice made by Florentine citizens to become soldiers of the Republic rather than mercenaries. Indeed, when we analyse information about Florentine citizens devoted to the mercenary trade, we see that their wealth was equal to or even lower than that of soldiers of the Republic (Table 6). An interesting case is offered by the mercenary captain Mariano di Tommaso Deti. In 1427, at the age of 79, he declared a total wealth of only 247 florins, although in 1430 he was leading 47 crossbowmen and 23 *palvesari*.[28] This example confirms to us that the profession of mercenary may

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28 ASFi.C 64, 331v.; ASFi.CC.SC 219, 50v.

not have been particularly advantageous from an economic point of view, and at the same time certainly posed a greater danger to one's life. This was probably the reason why men who decided to take up a military career may have been more attracted to the safer and more well-paid task of defending a particular locality.

Choosing to become a soldier of the Republic did not even turn out to be such a difficult or expensive operation. According to the regulations, to be enlisted as a crossbowman one had to take a skills test, while in the case of the aspiring *palvesaro* there was no practical test at all.[29] The other essential element was to be equipped with the stipulated armaments: from the defensive point of view a cuirass, plackart, bracers, chainmail sleeves, and a bascinet were required. Offensive armament included both sword and dagger, and in addition a spear for the *palvesaro* and a crossbow with a *crocco* (recharging tool) for the crossbowman.[30] With the exception of the crossbow, which was checked carefully by the officers in charge and was marked whether it was found to be suitable, the other armaments could be purchased used. The total figure for a complete set of secondhand defensive armament could be as little about 11,5 £; the offensive armament used for a *palvesaro* could amount to about 5 £, while for a crossbowman it rose to about 1 £.[31] This expense could therefore have been amortised in a few months of work.

In light of these considerations, it is possible to state how the socioeconomic context of the first decades of the 15th century – on one hand characterised by disadvantageous changes in the contractual types of subordinate workers, and on the other by an unprecedented tax burden – prompted some of the less well-off citizens to take up a military career as soldiers of the Florentine Republic. Thus, the state of near-constant warfare in which Florentine citizens lived during that period paradoxically provided some of them with an opportunity to improve their economic status.

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29 ASFi.SUA.CP 6, 56v–59r.

30 ASFi.SUA.CP 6, 1v–2v.

31 As for the prices of defensive armaments, these were taken from the inventory of goods of the armorer Francesco di ser Andrea di ser Bene, dated 1424 and commented on in Picchianti S. 2017, 13–26. As for the offensive ones, the data were derived from the Republic's expenditures on ammunition ASFi.DB.M 1.

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Military Engineers and Artillery Production in Milan Under the Sforza (1450–1535)
Institutions, Professionalism, Techniques

Summary: The late 15th-century Milanese army boasted an impressive artillery park of several heavy bombards and a multitude of light field artillery pieces. Such war machines were manufactured and operated by the specialised personnel of the 'ducal munitions and public works office', i.e., engineers recruited among both Lombards and foreigners, supervised by a general commissar. Unfortunately, the study of Milanese firearms production and its political and diplomatic implications remain practically uninvestigated among contemporary historians, except for a few important studies from the 19th and 20th centuries.

Thanks to the epistolary documentation contained in the archival series *Ingegneri e architetti*, conserved in the State Archive of Milan, this contribution will focus on providing an overview of the activities of the ammunition office, the professional backgrounds of its engineers and their skill sets, as well as gunmaking processes, production sites, and techniques. Finally, this contribution will stress the impact of artillery production on the Italian and broader European political culture of the time: even in times of peace, the art of gunmaking and its products shaped the diplomatic and economic relations between Italian and other European states, via the constant exchange of specialised gunsmiths and the diffusion of innovative military technology.

Keywords: Milan, Sforza, engineers, firearms, gunpowder, technology, warfare

Introduction

Milanese 15th-century artillery production is a complex topic, since it embraces the history of technology, warfare, political institutions, and economy, encompassing the milieu of the duchy of Milan as a whole. It is useful, therefore, to take a quick, preliminary

glimpse of the sources and the studies available on the matter. The most important nucleus of documents regarding these topics is preserved in the State Archive of Milan, in the fund *Autografi* and in the series *Uomini Celebri dell'Arte*, sub-series *Ingegneri e architetti*, which gathers missives, contracts, estimations, and provisions written or received by Milanese engineers and architects from 1387 to 1882. The majority of this documentation, however, comes from the second half of the 15th century, encompassing the entirety of the Sforza rule.[1] Pertinent documentation is also scattered across the fund *Registri delle Missive*, which contains letters sent and received by the dukes and by ducal officials from 1447 to 1538,[2] as well as in the subseries *Fabbriche di armi, armature e artiglierie* of the aforementioned *Autografi* fund, which contains several interesting documents about weapon manufacture workshops, techniques and strategic material purchases.[3] Unfortunately, however, subsequent archival reorganisations and bombings during WWII disrupted the original order of the Sforza archives.[4] Moreover, there is an absolute lack of material sources: not a single Milanese artillery piece has survived the test of time.

These seem to be the main reasons why Milanese firearm production has been left at the margins of the most recent historiographical enquiries about 15th-century Lombardy. The only extensive works available on this specific topic are those written by Angelo Angelucci and Luca Beltrami between the second half of the 19th century and the second decade of the 20th century.[5] These works, thanks to a wide array of documentary sources, cover topics such as Milanese handgunners (*schioppettieri*) corps, Milanese gunmaking, and the different types of artillery available to the ducal army; however, they suffer from a strong nationalistic bias that sometimes lead to very inaccurate reconstructions, e.g. Angelucci boasts that the arquebus was undoubtedly an Italian invention, while its real origin is unclear.[6]

Most recent historiography, however, can only partially correct these views, since it focuses on the more institutional, less technical aspects of the Milanese military organisation. Nonetheless, works like those by Maria Nadia Covini and Giorgio Chittolini are fundamental in understanding the framework in which the Milanese artillerymen operated: key topics like the structure and financing of the ducal army and the cultural background and the professional behaviour of the ducal officials are deeply discussed in these studies.[7] In 2007, the publication of a biographical dictionary

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1 ASMi.A.UCdA.bb. 81–88.

2 ASMi.V-S.RdM.

3 ASMi.A.A.C.M.

4 For a quick resume of these events, see this page on the website of the State Archive of Milan: https://archiviodistatomilano.cultura.gov.it/as-milano

5 Angelucci A. 1865; Angelucci A. 1869; Beltrami L. 1916.

6 Angelucci A. 1865, 27–28. The words *archibugio* and *arquebus* seem to derive from the German *Hackenbüchse*, see: Hall B.S. 1997, 100.

7 Covini M.N. 1998; Covini M.N. 1993, 60–75; Chittolini G. 1988, 101–133.

dedicated to Milanese engineers contributed to reorganise all the information available about these professionals; but again, this work does not delve into the concrete aspects of weapons production, but instead references back to the classic 19th century works on these matters.[8] There are, however, a few studies that try to focus more on the concrete side of the matter: the studies respectively on Genoese, Venetian, and Ferrarese artillery written by Renato Gianni Ridella,[9] Carlo Beltrame,[10] and Manlio Calegari,[11] as well as the informative papers written by Fabrizio Ansani about the traveling gunmakers active in Florence and Italy.[12] Although these works shed some light on production techniques, the Milanese milieu is left on the margin of their discussions.

The typical profile of a ducal engineer

The production of artillery for the Milanese army was managed by a specialised group of technicians, ducal engineers, who did not focus exclusively on it, but were employed in a plethora of tasks and projects. This social group was made up of people with very diverse professional backgrounds that, thanks to their previously acquired knowledge and their first-hand experience in the field, ended up serving the duke both for military and civilian purposes. From their professional profiles, they can be divided into three groups: the designers of machines for civilian or military purposes (i.e. cranes for construction works, siege machines, etc.), expert managers of construction sites (organising workers, estimating costs, supplying materials and tools, etc.) and, finally, artists (painters, sculptors, chisellers, etc.) who, thanks to their drawing ability and their understanding of mathematics and proportions, became involved in architectural projects (what nowadays we would call civil engineers).[13] The gunmakers themselves had backgrounds in various types of metalworking, such as blacksmithing, tinsmithing, boilermaking, bellfounding, or clockmaking – all these craftsmen would have the right skills and the necessary experience to start a career in the production of heavy, light, and portable firearms.[14]

These pre-acquired skills, however, represented only a starting point: before serving in the Milanese military, these engineers had to endure a period of training in the

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8 Bossi P., Repishti F., Langé S. 2007.

9 Ridella R.G. 2005, 77–134.

10 Beltrame C. 2011, 12–22.

11 Calegari M. 2005, 55–76.

12 Ansani F. 2017a, 148–187; Ansani F. 2021, 3–92; Ansani F. 2017b, 749–789. There is another paper which is more focused on Milan, see: Ansani F. 2019.

13 Covini M.N. 1993, 65–66.

14 Ansani F. 2017a, 155, 161.

field. The reason behind the need of a practical apprenticeship period resided in the fact that gunmaking and the firing of effective artillery volleys were a conglomeration of empirical knowledge achieved through trial and error: these masters did not have a precise or scientific understanding 'of the numerous, complex, critical variables involved in the casting of their guns. Sometimes, failures followed successes. The production of a French cannon, like the casting of a statue or the fabrication of any machinery, required multiple attempts, observation, intuition, and reflection'.[15] Examples of this practice can be found in Milanese sources. For instance, one of the most skilled Milanese engineers, Danese Maineri (†1482), started his career at some time in the 1450s with a training period under his father Zuchino, who served as a military engineer under the duke Filippo Maria Visconti and was confirmed in his position by the new duke Francesco Sforza in 1451.[16] When Zuchino died in 1462, his son replaced him in his service in the 'Office of the Como Canal' (Officium Navigii Cumarum):[17] at this point, D. Maineri had probably already acquired a vast hands-on engineering experience.[18]

Itinerancy was a key characteristic of the Milanese engineers. Their main activities incuded the inspection of ducal fortresses, the estimation of the necessary reparation works and their costs, they were constantly travelling across the duchy; as soon as they finished their job on one site, they could be quickly dispatched to another location and to a different type of work. See, for example, a letter written by Bartolomeo Gadio da Cremona (chief of the ducal engineers) to the duke Galeazzo Maria Sforza, on November 7, 1467:[19] we read that Gadio has been sent to Sesto Calende in order to supervise the construction of a pontoon bridge on the Ticino river and the loading of an ammunition shipment on boats bound for Pavia. He entrusts the first job to three engineers, who estimate to finish the bridge in a little more than a day; in the meantime, the ammunition carriages arrive from Milan and the ammunition – some bombards, stones, wood, and other unmentioned equipment – is unloaded on the banks of the Ticino, near a wharf that Gadio has managed to build while supervising the work of the other three engineers. When the boats arrive, he loads the ammunition on them, and on November 8, 1467, Gadio sails to Pavia, where the shipment is awaited. All this happens while Gadio is ill with fever and aching joints, but he cannot rest – soon after the ammunition is delivered to Pavia, he goes back to his office in Milan to do some paperwork and inform the duke.[20]

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15 Ansani F. 2017b, 779.

16 Covini M.N. 1993, 67; Mancini F. 1975,163; ASMi.V-S.CI. b. 853 (Pavia). August 17, 1472.

17 Engineers can be seen as jacks-of-all-trades: even if they specialised in one or more fields, they had to be able to work on very diverse projects. Being a skilled artilleryman and siege engineer did not prevent D. Maineri from taking care of the hydraulic works on the Como canal.

18 Mancini F. 1975, 163.

19 ASMi.A.A.C.M. b. 88. fasc. 5. November 7, 1467.

20 ASMi.A.A.C.M. b. 88. fasc. 5. November 7, 1467.

Being skilled technicians, but also full-fledged ducal officials, these professionals, in addition to engineering skills, had to possess a certain diplomatic aptitude, to interface efficiently with local communities throughout the dominion. The support of the locals was vital for the duke, especially in remote areas: the horse tax (*tassa dei cavalli*) for the housing of Milanese troops, the provision of workforce and carriages for public works, and the security of the Milanese borders depended on how well the duke – via his officials – managed to gain the favour of these communities by granting them benefits (e.g. tax exemptions) and supporting them in their claims and disputes against local landlords.[21] Regarding public construction works, these communities were not only fundamental in providing workforce and equipment, but also often tried to bend the original planning to their advantage. One such instance happened in Valtellina during the construction of the bridge of Ganda, near Morbegno, between 1488 and 1490. The engineer Giovanni Antonio Amadeo, sent by the duke to define a suitable location for the bridge along the banks of the Adda river, found himself involved in a harsh dispute between the local communities, each vying to have the bridge bulit closest to themselves, in order to take advantage of it for commercial purposes and for the collection of transit duties. Amadeo managed to remain neutral, avoiding any favouritism, without compromising the esteem the locals had for the duke;[22] exhausted by these negotiations, however, Amadeo wrote to his chief Ambrogio Ferrari that 'it took more effort to influence the mind of the men than to lay down the pillars of said bridge'.[23]

Officium munitionum et laboreriorum

As soon as he became duke of Milan, during the first months of 1450, F. Sforza started a massive reorganisation of the Milanese institutions. Mimicking the structure of the companies of adventure he was so familiar with, each task was delegated to faithful officials – chosen among his closest friends and supporters – who could count on a network of collaborators, had large margins of initiative, and had to report periodically to Cicco Simonetta, the personal secretary of the duke.[24] Gabriele and

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21 A military mobilisation plan compiled in 1472 gives an idea of the contribution of local communities to military logistics. The ducal army is said to have been able to field eight heavy bombards, four medium bombards, eight light artillery (*spingarde*), and 100 hand cannons (*schioppetti*), all with their ammunition, powders, and various equipment. To achieve this, the communities of the dominion had to supply 227 carts, 522 pairs of oxen, and 600 herdsmen. See: Covini M.N. 1998, 380–381. For the importance of the collaboration between ducal officials and local communities, see: Chittolini G. 1988, 105–108.

22 Covini M.N. 1993, 63.

23 'Li volle più ingenio a condure la mente deli homine che nonne a mettere zoxo quisti pilloni del dicto ponte'. Schofield R.V., Shells J., Sironi G. 1989,178, n. 200, April 9, 1490.

24 Covini M.N. 1998, 144.

Giovanni da Cernusco, who supervised the activity of the engineers under the Visconti, were confirmed in their ammunition office (*officium munitionum*).[25] However, in 1455, the assignments of this office began to overlap with the work of the new general commissioner of public works (*commissarius generalis super laboreriis*), B. Gadio, who supervised the construction of the Castello di Porta Giovia in Milan; while B. Gadio managed the work and the salaries of the engineers and labourers in his specific construction site, the *officium munitionum* did the same thing with the rest of the personnel dispersed throughout the duchy.[26] By the end of the 1460s, the two offices had completely merged together, coalescing into the *Officium munitionum et laboreriorum*, which was in charge of both the supervision of public works and the management of all the engineers under Milanese service. In 1472, the *officialis munitionum* Filippo Corio, helped by the network of ammunition officials who kept track of the necessities of all the ducal fortresses, handled ammunition purchases and other provisions; B. Gadio, both in person and by correspondance, coordinated the activities of the engineers in accordance with the will of the duke. In addition the office had its own accountant, Francesco Pandolfo, and a partnership with the wheat merchant Gabriele della Croce, who supplied each ducal castle in the dominion with food provisions.[27]

The *officium* was also responsible for the purchase of saltpetre, sulphur, coal, copper, lead, tin, and iron, i.e. key raw materials for gunmaking. In two letters written to the duke between February 1474 and March 1474, B. Gadio tells that F. Corio was sent to Venice, together with a master of saltpetre (*magistro dal salnitrio*),[28] to negotiate with a local merchant the purchase of 2000 *cantari*[29] of saltpetre and a 300-ducats-worth batch of lead suitable for making bullets;[30] we do not know the outcome of these negotiations, but the fact that F. Corio was assisted by Leonardo Botta, one of the Milanese ambassadors in Venice, gives us an idea of the importance of the matters handled by the *officium*.[31] Saltpetre and powder were also regularly bought from Genoa, Asti, Naples, and the Empire: in all these transactions, either B. Gadio or F. Corio was

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25 Covini M.N. 1998, 144.

26 Covini M.N. 1998, 144.

27 Covini M.N. 1998, 144. For the organogram of the *officium* in 1472, *see:* Santoro C. 1948, 119–122.

28 Saltpetre purchases were usually carried out only after the mineral had been tested for its purity and quality. The saltpetre master mentioned here was sent with F. Corio specifically for this purpose. ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 10. February 28 and March 17, 1474.

29 A *cantaro* was a measurement of weight common throughout the 15th century Italian peninsula. In Milan, one *cantaro* was equivalent to 100 Milanese *libbre sottili* (thin pounds), for a total of circa 32,6793 kg. The 2000 *cantari* of saltpetre bought by F. Corio in Venice were therefore equal to 65 358,6 kg, *see:* Frangioni L. 1993, 46–49.

30 ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 10. February 28 and March 17, 1474.

31 ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 10. February 28 and March 17, 1474. *See:* Zapperi R. 1971.

involved, either in person or by means of delegated engineers, from whom they constantly required detailed updates on the negotiations, the quality of the mineral, its price, and the shipments status.[32]

Castles as manufacturing and storing centres

All these materials were safely stored in castles, along with artillery pieces, portable firearms, and various kinds of weaponry and tools. The castles of Milan, Pavia and Cremona were the major ammunition storing centres of the duchy: from their warehouses, necessary goods were supplied to other fortifications.[33] Artillery pieces were stored in dedicated rooms called *bombardere*. For example, in a letter dated May 9, 1472, B. Gadio tells the duke that he made some transportation tests with the disassembled one-year-old bombard *Galeazesca Victoriosa*, which was held in the Castle of Porta Giovia in Milan. Thanks to a decent number of workmen, securing each piece to a sturdy wooden pole mounted on cartwheels, B. Gadio managed to take the *Galeazesca* out of the *bombardera* and moved it to the vast castle gardens, where it underwent maintenance, i.e. the cleaning of the threaded joint between the barrel and the ignition chamber.[34]

As evidenced above, castle gardens were used as testing and shooting grounds. Their size, proximity to the facilities in which artillery was stored, and the fact that they were under the strict control of the duke made castle gardens the ideal place to conduct tests on newly made firearms. In one example, a mortar was put to test in Genoa in the 1470s: the mortar was placed on a proper base in the castle of Luccoli and fired a projectile that, thanks to its parabolic trajectory, fell into the gardens of the nearby fortress of Castelletto.[35] We also have evidence of job interviews conducted by Gadio and other expert Milanese engineers in the garden of the Castle of Porta Giovia in Milan, to hire various foreign engineers into Milanese service.[36]

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32 For Genoa, Asti and the Empire, see: ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 8. December 21, 1471; fasc. 9. February 1, March 31, April 3, October 9, October 20, 1473; fasc. 10. March 21, 1474 and June 14, 1476; fasc. 11. March 27, 1476. For Naples, see: Bianchessi S. 1998, 541–582.

33 Covini M.N. 1998, 149. For example, on December 21, 1471, B. Gadio entrusted F. Corio with the delivery of two mortars, 10 *spingarde*, some *schioppetti,* and a few heavy crossbows – with their respective ammunition and powders – to the fortresses of Genoa: these goods were taken from the Castle of Porta Giovia in Milan and from the castle of Pavia. ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 8. December 21, 1471.

34 ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 8. May 9, 1472.

35 ASMi.A.A.C.M. b. 231. fasc. 5, *Adoardus da Curte ducallis Lucolli castelani* to the duke, date unknown. The castle of Luccoli was situated on the site of the current Villetta Di Negro, while the Castelletto was situated on the current Spianata di Castelletto. For visual reference, *see:* the map by Brusco G. 1789, markers 45 and 59. The shot covered a distance of 0.5 Milanese mile, i.e. 892,405 m.

36 E.g., the job interview of the French artilleryman *Jacomo de Paris*. See: ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 9. April 1, 1473.

Most importantly, however, it was in castles that Milanese artillery pieces were produced. This should not surprise the reader, since it should appear perfectly logical to have production facilities, storing warehouses, and testing grounds all close together. The sources offer multiple attestations of the casting of different artillery pieces; while the most extensively recorded casting is the one of the *Galeazesca Victoriosa* in the castle of Porta Giovia in Milan in 1469–1471, we also have other mentions, e.g. that of a mortar cast and tested in the castle of Luccoli in Genoa, and of a bombard tailpiece made in the castle of Imola.[37]

Manufacturing processes: established theory and fallible praxis

It is vital to stress that 15th-century technological manufacturing was always a compromise between a somewhat established theoretical (but gained through practical trial-and-error processes) base of knowledge and a fallible and not-so-accurate crafting practice.

Practically acquired theory suggested that, compared to iron-forging, bronze-casting was certainly more expensive in the short term[38] but more economically efficient in the long term: unlike iron-forged guns, bronze heavy artillery could be melted down and recast, making it easier and cheaper to repair;[39] bronze artillery was also safer to use and could withstand more powerful powder charges, providing an increased offensive potential.[40] Another advantage was that bronze guns could be made into two, three, or four separate pieces connected by threaded joints, making them easy to disassemble for transportation via oxen carriages or ships.[41] For these reasons, already from the mid-15th century, iron was relegated to the making of lighter artillery pieces, such as *spingarde*, *passavolanti*, and *carbuctane* and portable firearms like *schioppetti* – being smaller, these pieces could maintain a relatively low weight even when fabricated in cast iron, making them cheaper but still easily manageable.[42] All these artillery pieces were tested before firing: three hammer strikes ensured the solidity of the piece.[43] Regarding mathematics and proportions observed during the design of these pieces, the calibre determined the length of the barrel, the necessary amount of powder, and, therefore, the dimensions of the ignition chamber. Small calibre weapons required lead ammunition to obtain a certain offensive power, while larger calibres used stone

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37 For the *Galezesca*, see: ASMi.A.A.C.M. b. 231. fasc. 5. August 27, 1469 and December 18, June 27, August 25, 1471; ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 8. July 1, 1471. For the bombard of Imola, see: ASMi.A.A.C.M. fasc. 5. July 10, 1472.

38 Hall B.S 1997, 92–93.

39 Ansani F. 2017a, 156–157.

40 Hall B.S 1997, 93.

41 Ansani F. 2017a, 155–157.

42 Ansani F. 2017a, 155–157.

43 ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 8. May 22, 1472.

projectiles instead; cast iron shot was a later innovation.[44] Finally, when it comes to gunpowder chemistry, it was assumed – thanks to empirical experiments – that fine powders with a high saltpetre percentage were suitable for light artillery and portable firearms, while coarser, low-saltpetre powders were ideal for heavy bombards.[45]

Real-life praxis, however, was a totally different beast. First, the practical application of theoretical principles depended entirely on the first-hand experience of the individual masters. The fact that each master applied his own practical solutions, techniques, and procedures resulted in a general lack of standardisation both in the manufacturing processes and in the finished artillery pieces: for a Renaissance Italian state, it was common to have several heavy bombards (*bombarde grosse*) of different lengths, calibres, and weights that required different amounts of powder, because their creators followed their own plans, instead of a set, common standard.[46] In the 1470s, the artillery park of the dukes of Milan included heavy bombards of different calibres: two *Ferline* which fired 200-pound stone projectiles, the *Corona* (400-pound projectiles), the *Bissona* and *Liona* (300-pound projectiles), and the enormous *Galeazesca Victoriosa* (570-pound projectiles).[47] This lack of standardisation was not limited to gunmaking but concerned every other aspect of artillery management as well. In June 1472, B. Gadio and Benedetto Ferrini (a Florentine engineer serving the dukes of Milan) had a harsh dispute on the making of artillery carriages: B. Gadio held in high regard the traditional Lombard way of making them with medium-sized wheels – a compromise between ease of unloading and efficiency on difficult terrain – while B. Ferrini insisted that the bigger the wheels, the better; each master believed in his own method, based on practical experience.[48] The empiricism of the methods used in gunmaking often led to unsuccessful results. The calculation of the percentages of tin and copper to achieve a strong bronze alloy, how much material should be put in the furnace, and the evaluation of whether the metal was ready to be cast or not – everything was done by eye and by hands-on experience. But sometimes the eye and experience can be misleading: the casting of the barrel (*tromba*) of the *Galeazesca Victoriosa* required two attempts, due to a disastrous mistake made by the engineer Francesco da Mantova, who misjudged the melting point of the bronze alloy and started pouring it in the mould when it was not yet completely molten.[49] Moreover, there were also important technological limitations that influenced the design and the offensive potential of these weapons, such as the

44 ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 8. May 22, 1472; Hall B.S. 1997, 93–95.

45 Hall B.S 1997, 42–43.

46 Ansani F. 2017a, 157–160.

47 Ansani F. 2017a, 171–172.

48 ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 8. June 7, 1472.

49 ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 8. July 1, 1471.

unreliability of iron casting. In fact, until almost the end of the 15th century, Italian gunmakers had not mastered the knowledge and the techniques used to build furnaces strong enough to efficiently produce cast iron of strength and quality suitable for the making of artillery.[50] But in some areas of the Italian peninsula, such as the Lombard alpine valleys under Milanese and Venetian control, experiments were carried out, thanks to the availability of local craftsmen skilled in the making of suitable blast furnaces and the casting of complex iron works.[51] At the end of the 1480s, Venice tried to standardise artillery pieces made in the foundries of the Brescian valleys and started to make cast-iron cannonballs for the light artillery pieces of the Serenissima.[52] Similarly, in the 1490s, Ludovico Sforza set up foundries in Val d'Ossola to enhance the production of armour pieces and cast-iron artillery.[53] Others tried to pursue these achievements, but ultimately failed because, apart from highly skilled personnel, it was fundamental to work with iron ores of great purity: the duke Ercole d'Este did manage to begin manufacturing cast-iron cannonballs and light artillery in Ferrara, but, even if he hired specialised Lombard personnel, the production was mediocre and discontinuous, since the mineral used was of inferior quality compared to Lombard iron.[54]

Milan, after all, was one of the leading European centres for steelworks, and therefore became a major centre of iron-cast artillery production as well: Milanese masters could count on not only decades of technical know-how thanks to an excellent armour and arms making industry,[55] but also on a constant supply of quality iron ores from the Lombard alpine valleys and copper, tin, and lead from Northern and Central Europe, thanks to the commercial intermediation operated by the Swiss confederation.[56] This is why cast-iron light artillery pieces were ubiquitous in Milan. The industry was so prolific that it not only supportted the internal demand of the ducal army, but also was able to reserve a portion of the production for commercial purposes. Between 1460 and 1479, the marquis of Mantua bought several batches of iron-cast *spingarde* and *schioppetti* (along with armour sets, lances, and other weaponry),[57] while, in 1492, Ferrante of Aragon, king of Naples, bought a significant batch of 1000 iron *spingarde* from the Milanese arsenals.[58] To conclude this

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50 Ansani F. 2017a, 156.

51 Ansani F. 2017a, 156, 178, 180; Ansani F. 2017b, 751, 761, 773.

52 Ansani F. 2021, 288–289.

53 Motta E. 2014, 223.

54 Ansani F. 2021, 289.

55 Montandon G. et al. 1929; Motta E. 1914, 187–232.

56 Soldi Rondinini G. 1978, 426–427.

57 Ansani F. 2019, 2–8.

58 Ansani F. 2017a, 168.

array of Milanese industriousness, the heavy bombard *Liona*, made by Francesco Bianco, was a true exception in the panorama of the heavy artillery of the first half of the 15th century, since it was entirely made of cast iron.[59]

Foreign masters in Milan: international circulation of craftsmen and techniques

In 15th-century Italy, artillery production and gunsmithing were not subject to any sort of military secret, mainly because it would have been practically impossible to prevent the diffusion of knowledge and practical know-how. Like painters, sculptors and mercenary captains, military engineers were always searching for a better patron, a better salary, and lucrative benefits for themselves and their families. This caused intense competition between states, where each power tried to lure expert artillery masters into their service, offering them good salaries, free tools, workshops, accommodation, and so on.[60] In March 1474, B. Gadio sent F. Corio to Venice to convince an artillery master named Francesco (who had served in Milan years before) to return to Milanese service; since the man was absent, F. Corio explained to his wife all the benefits he would obtain: she said her husband would surely accept this good offer as soon as he got home.[61]

The circulation of specialised personnel across the peninsula was intense. The Piedmontese Ferlino da Chieri, before settling in Venice in the 1450s, worked in Savoy and Milan, where he made two heavy bombards, named *Ferline* after himself.[62] The Bolognese Aristotele Fioravanti (†1486), after serving the dukes of Milan and other Italian states, moved to Russia, where he worked as military architect and artillery expert for the tsars.[63]

European masters were active in Italy at the time as well. Guglielmo dello Monaco, a Frenchman, after serving Milan in the 1440s, moved to Naples, where he cast the imponent bombard *Neapolitana* and crafted the bronze doors of the Castel Nuovo, becoming the most prestigious artillery master of the entire Neapolitan kingdom.[64] In the 1490s, L. Sforza hired many German and Swiss mercenary companies, which brought in Lombardy *schioppettieri* and artillery masters from the same regions,

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59 Ansani F. 2017a, 172.

60 Ansani F. 2017a, 166–168.

61 ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 10. March 17, 1474. Unfortunately, the missive does not report the contract offered by F. Corio.

62 Ansani F. 2017a, 172.

63 Ghisetti Giavarina A. 1997.

64 Ansani F. 2017a, 169–170, 177.

thus generating a productive technological exchange with Milanese engineers.[65] Finally, temporary loans were also possible. In 1496, Maximilian King of the Romans loaned his master artilleryman Zohanne Openzeler to L. Sforza: Openzeler stayed in Milan for a few weeks and cast at least four artillery pieces.[66]

Technological exchange between Milan and France is attested by a missive dated 1 April 1473 in which B. Gadio recounts to the duke the exam of a French artilleryman, Jacomo de Paris, who requested to be accepted into Milanese service. Under the keen eye of B. Gadio and other expert engineers, Jacomo was required to hit a 100-foot-distant target with an artillery piece of his own construction. Although he fails, he gets close enough; B. Gadio suggests the duke should hire him and grant him an apprenticeship under an expert master.[67] This document, however, provides other valuable information: the bombard used is a single-piece (and, therefore, muzzle-loading), probably bronze unit, fires a stone projectile of 57 pounds and uses a 7-pound powder charge. Compared with other Milanese bombards, with ammunition poundage ranging from 300 to 570 pounds, this piece seems more akin to the French-style, mobile artillery that would become popular a few years later, first during the Burgundian wars and later during the Italian expedition of Charles VIII.[68] This is just a hypothesis, but it seems very plausible, given the constant commercial and diplomatic connections between Milan and France; in the 1460s, the political relationship between the Sforza and the French crown was so amicable that a Milanese contingent fought for King Louis XI in the War of the Public Weal using the French-style light artillery pieces previously mentioned.[69]

Conclusion:
artillery production as a state-run business

We have seen how artillery was produced, stored, and tested in castles under the control of the duke, overseen by expert engineers who learnt the craft after practical apprenticeships, working under the supervision of the directors of the *officium munitionum et laboreriorum*. The *officium* represented a solid institutional frame, but was quite informal in its management, granting these professionals ample margins of initiative. This informal but solid organisation encouraged experimentation and the pursuit of new techniques and technologies, such as 'alpine-style' iron casting. This constant technological research was also carried out thanks to foreign engineers from both Italy and elsewhere in Europe, who could be hired with long-term contracts or as

65 Ronchi M. 2021, 257–284.

66 ASMi.A.A.C.M. fasc. 5. November 27, 1496.

67 ASMi.A.UcdA. b. 88. fasc. 9. April 1, 1473.

68 Ansani F. 2021, 271–295.

69 Ansani F. 2021, 277.

short-term loans between allied powers. In fact, a strong diplomatic relationship with foreign powers was necessary to have access to skilled professionals and the necessary raw resources (saltpetre, copper, tin, etc.) for gunmaking.

Therefore we can see that the production of artillery in the 15th-century duchy of Milan was a state-run, state-controlled business, since these manufacturing processes were enclosed in the thick network of the ducal political and administrative institutions. Moreover, enormous financial resources were needed to cast and field these artillery pieces, costs that only the duke could afford, thus preventing private actors from taking part in this industry.

Although this conclusion applies to heavy artillery, we have evidence of light artillery escaping the ducal monopoly, thanks to it being cheaper and easier to make: in 1476 Genoa, a ducal artilleryman heard rumours about some bronze *spingarde* being made clandestinely by certain tinsmiths for anti-Milanese rebels.[70]

There is a lot more to research and to say on these topics, but for now we must settle for these few pages, which I hope have provided a quick but satisfying picture of Milanese firearm production in the 15th century.

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Military Migration as a Social Consequence of War
On the Example of the Hvizdets-Obertyn Campaign of 1531[1]

Summary: Since the end of the Middle Ages, most of the wars fought by the Jagiellons were fought by enlisted soldiers, while every year they served in the permanent defence system (Polish: *obrona potoczna*) in the Ruthenian lands. As a result, several thousands, tens of thousands, and sometimes even tens of thousands of men left their place of residence and moved to another area, sometimes hundreds of kilometres away. As their destination was most often the Ruthenian lands, and the largest percentage of recruits with a known territorial affiliation came from Lesser Poland, it can be assumed that the distance oscillated, on average, around 290 km (in a straight line from Kraków to Lviv) and another 225–250 km from Lviv (the traditional place of concentration of troops) to the region of Kamianets-Podilskyi or Medzhybizh, i.e. to the area of fairly frequent military operations.

Thus, the question arises, to what extent the phenomenon of the migration of soldiers (permanent or temporary) is perceptible in the source material? Having the treasury and military registers, it is possible to compile data directly concerning individual soldiers with knowledge about their territorial origin and activity in a specific territory during the war expedition. Given the bulk of the preserved source material, certain exclusions have to be made in this study.

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1 This article was written as part of the project 'Jagiellonian Era and its legacy in the Polish-Lithuanian Union and Commonwealth until 1795. Sources of Polish Military History in the Jagiellonian Age', contract no. 0469/ NPRH5/H30/84/2017, head: Professor Jan Szymczak.

The entirety of the surviving archives requires thorough and lengthy research. Thus, this paper is a test survey, based on sources related to Hetman Jan Tarnowski's Moldavian expedition of 1531. At that time, Tarnowski commanded around six thousand soldiers, which seems to be a sufficiently large research sample. We aim to show the sheer regularity of soldier movements/migrations, especially as this issue is essentially absent from Polish military-historical literature.

The gathering and moving of several thousand soldiers during the summer campaign of 1531 during the war with Moldavia meant not only a certain organisational and logistic effort but also – something that the literature on the subject has so far overlooked – a depletion of the demographic potential in lands other than those affected by the hostilities. Joining the mercenary army meant agreeing to military service for a minimum of a quarter of a year. This three-month period coincides with the indicator for the occurrence of so-called temporary migration.[2] Temporary movement (temporary migration) must last for a minimum of three months and mean an uninterrupted stay outside the place of permanent residence. This period corresponds to the quarterly enlistment of mercenary troops – the time taken to reach the area of the troops' concentration and to return home (if applicable) was not included. Therefore, we can assume that, in fact, the period of absence from the place of usual residence was longer than that.

As the warfare in the period in question was most often conducted in Ruthenian lands, on a general scale it can be assumed that the average recruit, and after the cessation of service, a demobilised soldier, had to travel in a straight line from Kraków to Lviv about 290 km, and then the same distance on his way back.[3] Next, we have to add another 225–250 km from Lviv (a traditional place of concentration of troops) to the area of Kamianets-Podilskyi or Medzhybizh, i.e., to the region of fairly frequent military operations. In total, therefore, on their way to the area of hostilities, the soldiers (counting only from Kraków) had to travel a total distance of about 515–540 km, while their time of service usually began in the vicinity of Lviv, so the first almost 300 km were covered privately, so to speak, and then, after the troops had disbanded, they still had to return home. This time extended the absence of individuals from their place of residence beyond the aforementioned three months. In the case of veterans from Kuyavia, for example, it was extended significantly, taking into consideration the additional distance on the way to the war and the return journey. This is, of course, a very

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2 For more on this subject, see: Kuklo C. 2006, 148–156; Pooley C.G. 2017; Wyżga M. 2018, 13–14.

3 We accept Kraków as an important point of the recruits' route, because the largest percentage of recruits with known territorial affiliation came from Lesser Poland, see: Bołdyrew A. 2011, 131–134. Preliminary studies on mercenary cavalry indicate a similar trend.

generalised approach, because it is impossible to clearly state, based on the surviving source material, what happened to the soldiers after the end of their military service. Their return home remains a matter of probable guesses. There is another aspect of military service in remote Ruthenian lands that cannot be overlooked. To a certain extent, the Jagiellonian army was very diversified, far from being ethnically homogeneous – in the Polish army served representatives of various ethnic groups, cultures and religions, speaking different dialects and languages. There were people of different territorial and social backgrounds and representatives of different professions.

Thus, the question arises, then, to what extent is the indicated phenomenon perceptible in the preserved historical sources? The first category of sources that is associated with research on the organisation of the Polish army during the last Jagiellons' rule are treasury and military registers. This mundane source turns out to be extremely effective in the context of the issues raised in this paper as well. The combination of data on individual soldiers with knowledge about their territorial origin and activity in a specific territory brings surprising results. We have made the following assumption: in the case of establishing the data for verification of the phenomenon of soldiers' mobility, first of all, it is necessary to give up the simple division into cavalry and infantry, due to the specific nature of sources created as a result of the activity of veterans of noble or plebeian origin. The possibility of identifying a soldier as to his social and territorial origin derives not from his membership in a particular military formation but precisely from his social origin. Thus, in the whole army, we can distinguish two basic groups.

The first group consists of the captains (Polish: *rotmistrz*, German: *Rittmeister*) (regardless of whether they served in cavalry or infantry) and the cavalry companions. These military men, usually members of the nobility, are identifiable from the relevant source material. In practical terms, at this stage of research, identification of all captains and cavalry soldiers' place of origin and residence is possible only to a certain extent. The basic data concerning the soldiers of the permanent defence system (Polish: *obrona potoczna*) were compiled by Marek Plewczyński in his own indexes.[4] The problem, however, is that this study is concerned with an *ad hoc*, one-off enlistment, and, as we will show further on, the social substrate in the *ad hoc* expedition overlapped only marginally with the group regularly serving in the permanent defence. In other cases, not included in M. Plewczyński's indices, additional analysis of sources, based on genealogical and economic materials, would be necessary – exceeding the scope of this study and the authors' competences.[5]

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4 Plewczyński M. 2012, 320–420.

5 The most influential families have their monographs (most of them covering the period until the end of the 15th or early 16th century), see: Dworzaczek W. 1971; Dworzaczek W. 1985; Dworzaczek W. 1996; Kurtyka J. 1997; Sperka J. 2001, Czwojdrak B. 2007, Szybkowski S. 2018, and many others. It is worth remembering, however, that in the Crown mercenary army each time there were only a few individuals from these notable families, while hundreds and sometimes

The second group consists of all soldiers of plebeian origin, namely those serving in infantry (in most cases burghers). The source materials associated with the nobility and burghers are definitely different. In the case of the plebeians, their territorial and social origin can be verified on the basis of military-fiscal records, because their names or names and surnames and place of origin were recorded. This is mass material, which largely eliminates the inaccuracies associated with misrepresentations regarding the recording of places of origin, or even deliberate deceptions committed by recruits when stating it. This is because there is always a certain margin of error in quantitative studies to determine certain proportions, which on a general scale has little impact on the final findings.

The choice of the summer campaign of 1531 as the basis for the research survey is associated with the work on a critical edition of part of the inspection registers of the Crown mercenary army during the reign of the last two Jagiellons. As part of this academic project, book 19, containing a list of soldiers serving under Hetman Jan Tarnowski's orders from the end of June to the early autumn of 1531, was prepared for publication.[6] From 22 June, official letters stating enlistment quotas for the mercenary units (Polish: *list przypowiedni*) were issued for the captains (this lasted until July 6: a letter for Captain Stanisław Pierzchnicki). On July 2, the first unit involved in the war with Moldavia was inspected (a thirty-horse-strong unit of cavalry guard under the command of Mikołaj Sieniawski), while the registering of troops was carried out until August 31 (10 days after the battle of Obertyn).[7] The entirety of these records constitutes the source basis for this study. As far as the expedition itself is concerned, it is difficult within the confines of this paper to cite all the basic publications referring to it.[8] However, it should be emphasised that among many studies, only M. Plewczyński made even a limited reference to the matter of the territorial origin of soldiers (captains and companions) in his indices.

Captains and cavalry

In the Hvizdets-Obertyn campaign of 1531, a total of 35 rotas (25 cavalry units and 10 infantry units) were recorded.[9] However, only 34 captains participated in the expedition (Mikołaj Sieniawski commanded the cavalry rota and the aforementioned guard unit). Jointly, they commanded 646 cavalry companions. All captains have been identified

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thousands of soldiers of noble descent came from families of no importance, today difficult to capture and record even in genealogical research.

6 *Rejestry 1531*.

7 Bołdyrew A. 2023.

8 The most important, apart from general textbook studies, include Czołowski A. 1890, 631–662; Górski K. 1894, 560–577; Czołowski A. 1931; Kolankowski L. 1938, 48–85; Spieralski Z. 1958, 74–76, 144–153; Spieralski Z. 1962; Plewczyński M. 1994; Plewczyński M. 2011, 349–393.

9 AGAD. ASK 19.

as regards their origin and place of residence. The area of their current residence in 1531 was not always the same as their place of origin – this discrepancy concerned 11 captains (just over 32%). With the exception of Hieronim Noskowski, who came from Greater Poland and settled in Silesia, Hipolit Młodecki, who came from Lesser Poland and settled in Lithuania, and Walerian Rokitnicki, who came from Mazovia and also settled in Lithuania, the remaining captains moved to the Ruthenian lands: three each from Lesser Poland and Mazovia, and one each from Greater Poland and Silesia. Consequently, in 1531, the captains from other places of origin were residing in the Ruthenian lands (19), Lesser Poland (6), Mazovia (3), the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (3), and Greater Poland, Kuyavia, and Silesia (1 each). The Ruthenian lands therefore had considerable potential to attract military commanders, mainly because of the constant border skirmishes with Moldavia and frequent Tatar attacks. The vast territories of the southeastern borderlands of the kingdom of Poland were sparsely populated but required constant surveillance, if only not to be an easily traversed territory for the enemy (Fig. 1).


Fig. 1. Place of origin and residence of the captains and companions of the Polish army in the Obertyn campaign of 1531 (data compiled by the authors).

It should be noted that although the Ruthenian lands, which most frequently were the arena for hostilities in the first half of the 16th century, were an ideal location not only for conducting military operations but also for training new command personnel, this does not automatically mean that representatives of noble families moving to this area did so solely in connection with their military activities. The decision to settle permanently on the southeastern border of the country could be equally influenced by family and property matters, taking up offices, or completely different reasons; participation in military activity was instead one of the consequences of relocation. However, without additional source studies, it is impossible to determine the mutual proportions and correlations of these causes; nevertheless, this does not change the fact that this was permanent migration. Perhaps the most famous examples are Mikołaj Iskrzycki and Bernard Pretwicz. Iskrzycki, who came from the duchy of Cieszyn, settled permanently at the estate of his wife Katarzyna from Jagielnica in Podolia,[10] while Bernard Pretwicz, also from Silesia (in 1531 he served as a companion in the ten-horse-strong retinue in Mikołaj Sieniawski's rota),[11] in later years the starost of Bar, and then Trembowla, became known as an excellent commander who successfully stopped Tatar attacks. The remaining captains, although permanently linked to other provinces of the kingdom of Poland, remained in the Ruthenian lands for many months out of the year commanding cavalry and infantry units. In addition to the captains, a certain percentage of cavalry companions were also identified (Table 1).

Table 1. Percentage of the identified captains and cavalry companions in the 1531 Obertyn campaign

	Captains	Companions	Total
Total	34	646.00	680.00
Identified	34	107.00	141.00
Percentage	100	16.56	20.74

Source: AGAD. ASK 19; Plewczyński M. 2012, 320–420; Author's calculations

While the identification of the captains was straightforward, it was much more difficult to identify the cavalry companions. Of the 646 cavalry soldiers recorded in the register book, we managed to determine the place of origin and residence of only 107, noting that in as many as 36 cases this information is presumed. This means that these companions did not appear in M. Plewczyński's indexes. Furthermore,

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10 AGAD. ASK 19, 218–221v, see: Spieralski Z. 1962–1964, 171–172; Bołdyrew A. 2016b, 53–65.

11 AGAD. ASK 19, 23, see also: Tomczak A. 1984–1985, 33–435.

the criterion of a companion's surname may be misleading. However, we assume that the person of interest may have been in the family circle of a soldier serving in the permanent defence. Thus, for example, Jan Pomorski, commander of a seven-horse retinue in Mikołaj Orłowski's rota,[12] could have been a cousin of Kacper, Krzysztof, and Mikołaj Pomorski listed in Plewczyński's index. These, in turn, presumably came from and lived in Brześć in the Kuyavia region[13] and so the same origin and place of residence was attributed to Jan though it was not mentioned in the index. The percentage of identified companions is not impressive, as it constitutes only 16.56%. On an absolute scale, this is – as was already mentioned – only 107 people. At the same time, this means that only so many of them appeared in the ranks of the permanent defence, and this in turn proves that the army enlisted *ad hoc* for the Moldavian expedition was based on recruitment among soldiers who did not permanently participate in the battles against the Tatars and Moldavians. As a result, our knowledge of the victors from Hvizdets and Obertyn is very limited. Also unanswered is the question of why experienced cavalry non-commissioned officers were not summoned. One might even risk the hypothesis that perhaps they did not want to accept an *ad hoc* enlistment, were unable to do so, or the constant skirmishes at the border had so severely strained the mobilisation capacity that there was no other choice but to enlist mostly new recruits. The structure of the territorial origin of the companions is also interesting (Table 2).

Despite significant shortcomings in the findings on both the soldiers' origins and residences, it is still possible to draw some preliminary conclusions from the data collected. The values presented in bold script in Table 2 show the cases in which the companions had changed their place of residence. This was proved for Kuyavia, Mazovia, Lesser Poland, Silesia, and Crimea. While the case of Janiczura (most likely a Tatar living in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) commanding a five-horse retinue in Jan Mielecki's rota[14] can be omitted, we should pay special attention to the companions from Mazovia and Lesser Poland. First of all, the population of Lesser Poland was much smaller than that of the Ruthenian lands (8 to 73). Secondly, the Mazovians were a larger group than the soldiers from Lesser Poland. All those who changed their place of residence settled in the Ruthenian lands. As a result, there were 61 identified companions coming from Ruthenia and the total number of Ruthenian residents was 73. This is another indication of the specific situation of the area in question and its impact on the potential taking up of service.

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12 AGAD. ASK 19, 146v.

13 Plewczyński M. 2012, 398.

14 AGAD. ASK 19, 86v.

Table 2. The structure of the territorial origin of the cavalry companions in 1531

Province	Origin		Residence	
	Quantity	Percentage	Quantity	Percentage
Royal Prussia	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
Kuyavia	2	**0.31%**	1	**0.15%**
Greater Poland	8	1.24%	8	1.24%
Mazovia	13	**2.01%**	10	**1.55%**
Lesser Poland	12	**1.86%**	8	**1.24%**
Ruthenian lands	61	<u>9.44%</u>	73	<u>11.30%</u>
Lithuania	5	0.77%	5	0.77%
Silesia	3	**0.46%**	0	**0.00%**
Moldavia	2	0.31%	2	0.31%
Crimea	1	**0.15%**	0	**0.00%**
Unidentified	539	83.44%	539	83.44%
Total	646	100.00%	646	100.00%

Source: AGAD. ASK 19; Plewczyński M. 2012; Author's calculations

Infantry soldiers

A summary of data from the inspection registers of the mercenary army serving under the orders of Jan Tarnowski in the summer of 1531 reveals 1,165 infantry.[15] This discrepancy (in relation to the commonly cited number of about 1,500 soldiers[16]) results from the fact that the figure of 1,500 is in fact the number of military pay rates allocated to the infantry (or what is known as 'full-time status'), while the actual number of soldiers was always less, as some veterans took double pay (*dziesiętnik* or sergeants, pavisiers, standard-bearers). To the detriment of the actual number of infantry rotas, this difference averaged 27.17% in the first half of the 16th century, 18.02% in the decade of 1531–1540, and 22.20% during the Hvizdets-Obertyn campaign alone.[17] In fact, 1,165 infan-

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15 AGAD. ASK 19, 209–229.

16 See: Spieralski Z. 1962, 140.

17 Bołdyrew A. 2011, 86.

try soldiers took part in the expedition, of whom only 641 can be identified as far as the place of origin is concerned. This is mainly due to the fact that in the units commanded by Wojciech Polak from Leśnica and Lambert Gnojeński, the soldiers' place of origin was not recorded at all,[18] while in several other rotas it was recorded inconsistently.

Based on the collected data, it was established that among the 641 identified infantry, 471 were burghers, constituting 73.48% of the total number of identified infantry soldiers. As a side note, it is worth mentioning that for the entire first half of the 16th century, this indicator oscillated at the level of about 60%.[19] The remaining 170 identified infantry soldiers were peasants; 14 came from outside the Crown lands (12 from Bohemia, of which 4 from Silesia) and 2 from Lithuania. Among the 471 burghers, as many as 74 were identified as foreigners (61 from Bohemia, 24 from Silesia, 6 from Lithuania, 4 from the German Reich, and 3 from Hungary). Therefore, there were 397 Crown lands burghers who served in Tarnowski's army in 1531.

At first glance, there is a clear predominance of soldiers coming from the Lesser Poland region (274), who accounted for 69.02% of all identified burghers in the army, and a dominant role of the inhabitants of the Kraków voivodeship (174, i.e. 57.4%). This means that more than half of the identified foot soldiers came from just one voivodeship out of the 20 voivodeships mentioned in the compilation. Ruthenian lands are in second place with 69 soldiers (17.38%).

All veterans included in Table 3 and those whose origin could not be traced to a particular territory left their place of residence and went to war. As a result, they had a passive effect on weakening the population potential and thus the economic potential of their hometowns, while at the same time living in the Ruthenian lands and Pokuttia, changing – at least for a few months – the local demographic and, as one can assume, cultural structure. This second change in particular could have led to the emergence – even in a very rudimentary form – of the so-called cultural diffusion associated with professional military migrations.[20] Moreover, the movement of soldiers, even if temporary, coincided with other processes, such as the migration of inhabitants of the Crown lands to Ruthenian towns, in which in the second half of the 16th century the Polish population constituted up to 10%.[21] Therefore, we can assume that army migrations were one of the many elements that made up the complex picture of internal migration in the Jagiellonian state.[22] To some extent they corresponded to the phenomenon observed in the context of inter-state military migrations, in which

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[18] AGAD. ASK 19, 209–211v (Wojciech Polak of Leśnica); folio. 211v–214 (Lambert Gnojeński).

[19] Bołdyrew A. 2011, 143–152.

[20] Cultural diffusion is mentioned in many contexts as one of the basic phenomena that accompany the meeting of representatives of different communities, see: Nowicka E. 2000, 105–108; Parker C.H. 2010, 111; Fattori N. 2019, 2; Luzzi S. 2022, 53–54.

[21] Kuklo C. 2000, 262; Kuklo C. 2006, 150.

[22] On the importance of migration in the past in research, see: Pooley C.G. 2017.

foreign soldiers were readily accepted first as warriors and military specialists and then as potential settlers.[23] In turn, those who went to war may have been looking not only for an opportunity to earn money, but also for new life perspectives that could change the daily routine of functioning in a thoroughly agricultural society.[24]

Tracing regular movements of the population over several decades is beyond quantification. However, the data in Table A can be partially clarified. This is because all soldier-burghers can be assigned not only to specific provinces and voivodeships but also to the towns (ordered by their size) from which they originated (Table 4). This is where the classification of Crown towns into four categories (I–IV) – within which the first category denoted the largest cities, significant centres of manufacturing and international trade (*civites principales*) – proves extremely helpful.[25] Therefore, knowing the approximate number of inhabitants of the cities from the first category and the average estimated population of the other three categories, it is possible to attempt to combine the data from Table B with these values to determine, at least approximately, what kind of population loss resulted from the recruitment to the mercenary army.

Based on the above-mentioned table we primarily see that the 52 soldiers who came from Kraków constituted the lion's share of the group originating from the cities of category I (62 in total). There is also a noticeable increase in temporary migration from towns of category II and III, i.e., those most numerous in the Crown lands, but at the same time did not have high demographic density. We now assume that towns of particular categories were inhabited by quantifiable groups of people. The above-mentioned 52 infantry soldiers from Kraków, compared to the probable population of this settlement centre (10–20 thousand[26] – for the purpose of this paper we will assume the higher value of 20 thousand), accounted for only 0.26%. In the case of a city of this rank, which attracted a constant stream of new inhabitants, the aforementioned value seems almost negligible. In other words, Kraków could afford to lose approximately 50 men aged 20–59. The situation is slightly different in the case of towns from category II and III, however, from which 68.01% of the infantry soldiers originated. Soldiers came from as many as 88 centres of this size (an average of 3 soldiers per town). Henryk Samsonowicz estimated that these towns had on average about 2,000 (category II), 1,000 (category III), and 400 (category IV) inhabitants each, although it should be noted that these figures are underestimated in the case of towns of category II and overestimated in the case of the two lowest categories.[27]

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23 Bołdyrew A. 2016c, 59–60; Reith R. 2008, 123–142.

24 Ailes M.E. 2002, 1, 24–25, 29; Bołdyrew A. 2016a, 89–93.

25 Samsonowicz H. 1979, 917–931.

26 Samsonowicz H. 1979, 929; Bogucka M., Samsonowicz H. 1986, 119.

27 Samsonowicz H. 1979, 929–930; Bogucka M., Samsonowicz H. 1986, 119–122.

Table 3. Territorial origin of identified infantry soldiers in the 1531 campaign

Province	Voivodeship	Number of soldiers	Total	Percentage
Royal Prussia	Chełmno	1	2	0.50%
	Pomerania	1		
	Warmia	0		
Kuyavia	Brześć	0	2	0.50%
	Inowrocław	2		
Greater Poland	Kalisz	12	31	7.81%
	Łęczyca	7		
	Poznań	7		
	Sieradz	5		
Mazovia	Dobrzyń	0	19	4.79%
	Mazovian	11		
	Płock	1		
	Rawa	7		
Lesser Poland	Kraków	174	274	69.02%
	Lublin	34		
	Sandomierz	66		
Ruthenian lands	Bełz	14	69	17.38%
	Chełm	5		
	Podolia	1		
	Ruthenia	49		
Total		397	397	100.00%

Source: AGAD. ASK 19, 209, 229; Author's calculations

Table 4. Origin of soldiers-burghers in 1538 from towns of four categories

Province	Voivodeship	I category		II category		III category		IV category		Total		Total by Province	
		A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B	A	B
Prussia Royal Prussia	Chełmno Prussia	1	1							1	1	2	2
	Pomerania					1	1			1	1		
	Warmia												
Kuyavia	Brześć											2	2
	Inowrocław			1	1			1	1	2	2		
Greater Poland	Kalisz			8	4	4	3			12	7	31	18
	Łęczyca			4	2	1	1	2	1	7	4		
	Poznań			7	3					7	3		
	Sieradz			4	3	1	1			5	4		
Mazovia	Dobrzyń											19	11
	Mazovian			6	3	4	3	1	1	11	7		
	Płock							1	1	1	1		
	Rawa			6	2			1	1	7	3		
Lesser Poland	Kraków	52	1	55	9	39	14	28	9	174	33	274	67
	Lublin			15	1	10	1	9	3	34	9		
	Sandomierz			18	6	44	16	4	3	66	25		
Ruthenian lands	Bełz					14	1			14	1	69	21
	Chełm			1	1	2	2	2	1	5	4		
	Podolia			1	1					1	1		
	Ruthenia	9	1	9	3	15	6	16	5	49	15		
Total		62	3	135	39	135	49	65	26	397	121	397	**121**

Comment: Column **A** – number of soldiers-burghers; Column **B** – number of towns in the category/categories

Source: AGAD. ASK 19, 209, 229; Author's calculations

From 9 category II towns located in the Kraków voivodeship, 55 soldiers joined the army. Assuming that the towns of category II had an average population of around 2,000 each, it can be considered that these 55 soldiers came from a group of around 24,000 inhabitants, i.e. constituting only a small percentage of the population (0.23%). Although this calculation shows a certain regularity, it is far from average and, on the scale of a town smaller than Kraków or Lviv, does not fully reflect reality, since we must remember that men aged about 20–59 years were only a part of the total number of the 24,000 inhabitants. Unfortunately, there is no data to establish the sex and age structure for the population of a town of this size and thus to quantitatively separate potential recruits.[28] With some reservations, we can assume that in small towns men aged 20–59 years constituted a group of 25.22%.[29] Therefore, in order to obtain the correct estimation of the loss of men joining the army in this case, we must once again recall the data presented in Table 4 quoted earlier in this paper. Thus, soldiers-burghers from category II towns from the Kraków voivodeship accounted for 0.91% of the population. This does not seem like much, but we must remember that the populations of smaller towns also had a lower chance of rebuilding their population potential. Furthermore, such attrition occurred regularly every few years, and so had far-reaching consequences in the long term, especially in category II–IV towns.

In conclusion, we want to emphasise strongly that the estimates presented here are not yet final findings. The values and indicators presented in this paper are the result of a calculation based on several assumptions/parameters. The first assumption is the estimated population size of category II–IV towns, the second is the sex and age structure of the inhabitants of these towns, and the third is the determination of the size of the population of men of working age. In the case of obtaining new premises, each of these three model value variables can be substituted independently of the others, which will also affect the outcome.[30] In this paper, however, we are primarily interested in showing a certain model on the basis of which one can attempt to create a numerical and statistical description of the phenomenon in question.

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28 The best documented and at the same time the closest chronologically data concern only the late 17th century and come from the town and parish of Miasteczko from 1695, see: Borowski S. 1975, 125–198. It remains to be debated to what extent Miasteczko, or also Dobre Miasto analysed by S. Borowski, correspond in size to a 16th-century Crown town of category II. However, more complete data, for example on Wieluń, come from 1791, see: Kuklo C. 1998, 49 *et seq.* Aware of the limitations of relying on such temporally divergent material, we assume that urban communities in the Crown lands in the pre-partition era remained in the first, high-stationary phase of demographic transition, which implies relatively low dynamics of demographic change in the long-term perspective (excluding, of course, local fluctuations, for example during major wars).

29 See: Kuklo C. 1998, 49 *et seq.*

30 For example, slightly different values of individual indicators for establishing the sex and age structure of urban society in the pre-industrial era are given by Coale A.J., Demeny P., Vaughan B. 1983, 105–154 with subsequent discussion, see, *inter alia,* Preston S.H., McDaniel A., Grushka C. 1993, 149–159; Woods R. 2007, 373–399. Another age range (men aged 15–55 years) for similar estimates was also adopted by Bachrach D.S. 2014, 262, see: Bachrach D.S. 2012, 234.

To sum up this thread, it is worth emphasising that the whole process discussed here clearly indicates that the Hvizdets-Obertyn campaign most probably had no major migratory and demographic effects on the society of the kingdom of Poland, although the migration itself (if only temporary) remains a fact. When juxtaposed with the conclusions drawn from a similar analysis based on the enlistment for the Moldavian expedition in 1538, the situation discussed is downright peculiar. In 1538, the distribution and scale of demographic shifts looked much less favourable for all urban centres from which infantry soldiers came.[31]

It should be emphasised that with regard to the year 1531, the differences in the origin of infantry and cavalry soldiers are surprising. While in the case of infantrymen a certain model, common to the discussed era, is reproduced, based on recruits primarily from Lesser Poland and the Ruthenian lands, the cavalry was based mainly on residents of Crown Ruthenia and Mazovia (which had a slight advantage over Lesser Poland). The surprising prominence of Mazovians in the cavalry, since Mazovia was generally poorly represented in the mercenary army, may also be a manifestation of the previously signalled phenomenon – that a significant part of the cavalry soldiers probably did not have any previous connection with the popular defence system. Thus, their enlistment may suggest that Tarnowski's army was gathered in extraordinary conditions and based on new recruits – as if the 'old' officer and non-commissioned officer cadre were unable – or unwilling – take part in the war. In a way, this would correspond to the peculiar over-representation of infantrymen from Lesser Poland and the average presence of soldiers of this formation coming from Ruthenia. Simply put, the rush in which the army was gathered forced the commander to reach for the human resources immediately available. There was no time for long journeys on foot to assembly points. As it turned out, this haste was still insufficient, since the inspection of seven infantry rotas (out of ten) ended on 1 August in Rohatyn, and Zbigniew Słupecki's cavalry regiment (Polish: *hufiec*) took over Pokuttia on 2–4 August. Tarnowski was unable to move the infantry in such a short time (about 105 km in a straight line from Rohatyn to Hvizdets).[32]

Another interesting topic to explore would be the issue of potential links between soldiers and the captains. It can be assumed that most of the soldiers in a rota came from the same land as the captain, and this assumption can be provisionally verified on the basis of the material collected. For this analysis, we selected two rotas, in which the actual identification rate exceeded 80%[33] – the infantry rotas of Feliks Ziemicki (83.33%)

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31 As analysed by the authors of this paper.

32 For more information see: Bołdyrew A. 2023.

33 The actual identification rate means identification not only in terms of a residency of a given town or village, but also the assignment of a settlement centre to a specific land and province. A good example of this distinction is Andrzej Bylicki's rota, in which the identification rate is 81.08% in relation to the town-village division, but the actual identification rate is only 64.86%, because among the soldiers identified in the basic degree 6 came from a place whose location was impossible to determine.

and Hieronim Noskowski (80.70%). In the case of Feliks Ziemicki's rota, 36.11% of the soldiers came from the Ruthenian voivodeship, from which the captain himself came and where he lived. We could assume that there is a consistency here, except that the remaining veterans came from the Poznań, Mazovian, and Płock voivodeships, three Lesser Poland voivodeships and Bohemia, while 6 could not be assigned to any area. This is a rather large and chaotic scattering which, together with the small absolute basis of the calculation, takes away much of the quoted argument in favour of the claim that the captain most often selected his soldiers among his countrymen. In Hieronim Noskowski's rota, 50 soldiers were associated with the Kraków voivodeship (43.86%). This is a much higher rate than in the case of the previous unit. Noskowski, on the other hand, came from the Poznań voivodeship but lived in the area of the duchy of Oświęcim, i.e. – considering its geopolitical situation – in fact in the same region. However, as in the case of Ziemicki, the remaining soldiers came from Greater Poland, Mazovia, the other two Lesser Poland voivodeships, Ruthenian lands and from abroad. This preliminary survey – if one can rely on its results – does not confirm the assumption that the majority of soldiers came from the same land/voivodeship as the captains. In a sense, however, it also does not contradict this supposition, as evidenced by a cursory examination of other units. For example, 35 soldiers (28.23%) in Stanisław Ożarowski's rota (where the actual identification rate is 74.19%) came from the Lublin voivodeship, i.e. the same one from which the commander came and lived. At the same time, as many as 32 soldiers remained unidentified in this unit (25.81%). Thus, their possible identification may completely change the result of the count.

This concluding remark suggests that the assumption that a captain would summon most of his soldiers from among his neighbours is not entirely true. Only further detailed source studies on the structure of the ethnic and territorial origins of the mercenary soldiers of the kingdom of Poland can facilitate our understanding of the conditions of the 16th-century military service itself as a phenomenon, but also of the circumstances associated with it, such as the enlistment process, links between the recruits and their commanders, etc. One of them is undoubtedly the issue of the command and the ranks and therefore, for example, its impact on soldiers' morale, willingness to take on risky challenges and, finally, the ability to maintain discipline during a military action. On the other hand, as if to provide a backdrop to these issues is the question of the movement of the soldiering masses throughout the country, taking into account the network of acquaintances, neighbourhood, and sense of local community, i.e. *de facto* basing the army on close-knit teams who knew each other and had common (not only military) experience, or selecting recruits in a completely random and disorderly manner. Was the sporadic appearance of captains and soldiers from Royal Prussia and the slightly more frequently recorded inhabitants of Kuyavia a result solely of the distance that had to be covered on the way to the inspection site of the troops, or was it rather a lack of interest in the fate of the south-eastern frontiers

of the Crown? How strong, then, was the sense of community and identification with the state among the inhabitants of the Crown lands? These are open questions formed on the basis of an analysis of a certain fragment of the reality of the Jagiellonian monarchy. However, they seem important, especially at a time when the late medieval monarchy was transforming into an early modern one.

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The Social Consequences of the Deportation of Polish Citizens Deep into the USSR in 1940–1941

Summary: As a result of four mass deportations carried out by the NKVD officers in 1940–1941, over 320,000 Polish citizens were deported into the USSR from the eastern territories of the Republic of Poland annexed by Moscow (according to NKVD sources). They were considered to be the most dangerous to the communist regime. At that time, families of military men, foresters, those arrested or held in prisoner-of-war camps, and war refugees (mainly Jews) who refused to accept USSR citizenship, as well as the families of participants in the 'counter-revolutionary Ukrainian and Polish nationalist organisations' were resettled in cattle railway cars.

The journey to exile lasted 2–4 weeks. People were settled in the northern regions of the European part of Russia, in the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. There, they performed very hard physical work in the logging of forests, in mines, agriculture, and construction – in a harsh climate, without training, without knowledge of the local language, without the right tools, without holidays, and without proper medical care and medicine. They commonly lacked food, workwear, shoes, and hygiene products. They lived in primitive barracks, in ruined farm buildings, in pit-houses, or rented mediocre accommodations from the locals. The constant struggle for survival taught them cunning, theft, and accelerated their acquisition of various professional qualifications. They had to adjust to life in extreme poverty, knowing that they could not break down or give in to doubt. The living conditions encouraged the development of various diseases and resulted in accelerated mortality. The exiles rarely decided to marry or expand their families, which increased demographic losses. The most common and lasting effects of the stay in exile concern the mental and physical condition of the victims of deportation. Their psyches were dominated by anxiety, fear, inferiority complex, and hostility. They feared war, hunger, inhumane living conditions, terror, and violence. Frequently, only religion gave them

some consolation and helped them survive. Yet, the dramatic fate of living in exile cemented family ties, and mothers became the main characters. The children grew up prematurely and hardened themselves,mastering the rigid rules of life early. Since they did not have the opportunity to learn at school, their academic development was limited, if any, and they did not pursue its amendment even when they returned to their homeland. After the war, not all exiles returned to Poland – many lie in nameless graves in Siberia and Central Asia. Some Polish citizens (Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Lithuanians) were denied the right to repatriation in 1945. In many cases, those who left the USSR in 1942 with General W. Anders's Polish Army chose life in the free world of the West. From the depths of the USSR, people returned physically and mentally exhausted, sometimes as invalids. In the material sense, they had nothing, as their pre-war property was lost to the Soviets. In exile, they strengthened their love for their homeland and appreciated its existence. At the same time, they learned the realities of the socialist system, which they not only hated but also strongly rejected.

Wars have always been associated with the movement of not only troops but also the displacement of civilians. Some people ran away from the aggressor, others were driven out of their homes. It was no different in the case of World War II. In this paper, I will focus on the fate of those people who, after 17 September 1939, found themselves – mostly against their will – under the rule of the Bolsheviks in the eastern territories of the Second Polish Republic annexed by the Kremlin, and then were forcibly deported from there to the depths of the Soviet territory.

The history of those who managed to survive in the USSR until the moment of their repatriation in 1946 can be divided into three main stages:

- the first stage (the most difficult), which lasted from the deportation in February 1940 until the formal release from exile as a result of the 'amnesty' after the signing of the Sikorski-Mayski agreement in 1941;
- the second stage, which ended with the interruption of Polish-Soviet relations in the spring of 1943; and
- the third stage, which lasted from the establishment of the Union of Polish Patriots (Polish: *Związek Patriotów Polskich*) until the moment of returning to Poland in 1946.

Although in each of these successive stages the situation of the overall group of deportees discussed in this paper improved somewhat, given their previous experiences, the exceptionally difficult provisioning situation in the USSR, the realities of wartime, and the fact that they were forced to stay abroad, the social effects of deportation were not overcome. This leads us to the formulation of certain statements and assessments that refer to the entire period of exile in the USSR.

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The occupation authorities' desire to unify and Sovietise the captured eastern part of the Republic of Poland as quickly as possible resulted in the decision to effectively neutralise those groups of Polish citizens whom they considered the most dangerous in terms of introducing the new order. Thus, the officers of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the USSR pre-emptively began individual arrests of people they classified in the capacious category of 'counter-revolutionary element', in which they included, among others, important personalities of the Polish state, local government, and economic administration, leaders of political, social and cultural life, and judicial, police, gendarmerie, intelligence, and military personnel. After the formal annexation procedure of the occupied lands was completed and temporary authorities were installed, the Soviets' repressions against their actual and potential opponents intensified. This was evidenced in December 1939 by secret decisions of the party-administrative authorities of the USSR to forcibly deport families of military settlers and foresters from the western regions of the Ukrainian and Belarusian SSR[1] since, according to the Soviet authorities, they supposedly constituted a potential basis for the resistance movement and sabotage-espionage activities against the occupation regime. The deportees were to be transported to isolated special settlements under the supervision of the NKVD, located in the northern regions of the European part of Russia, in the Urals, Siberia, and Kazakhstan. They were to be sent to perform hard physical work in logging forests, in mines, and in construction. The deportees' property was confiscated and seized by the state.

The resettlement operation implementing the above-mentioned orders began at dawn on 10 February 1940, on a very cold night. Operational groups rushed to the houses and flats of the completely surprised people, announced the decision to expel the families, ordered them to pack their belongings quickly, and transported them under convoy to the nearest railway station, where deportation transports escorted by NKVD troops were already waiting. Bunk beds made of boards, an iron stove, and a container for fuel were installed in every cattle railway car; a hole would be cut in the middle of the floor to serve as a toilet. Thirty or more people were placed in each car. Their journey to their destinations in exile took place in dramatically difficult conditions. The enormously cramped conditions meant that for long hours people had to lie in an uncomfortable position on bunks or sit on luggage and bundles. As there was no water, it was impossible to wash or clean clothes, so the air was suffocating. There was a penetrating cold. It was almost impossible to prepare a hot meal.

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1 The deportations of Polish citizens are extensively discussed nowadays in the very rich memoir literature, source publications, and historical studies. Among the latter, the following publications should be mentioned: Boćkowski D. 1999; Ciesielski S. 1996; Ciesielski S. et al. 2004; Głowacki A. 2022; Guryanov A.E. 1997.

Some people got sick and even died. Although there were medical and nursing personnel on board the transport, in practical terms medical care was nonexistent. It was hard to sleep at night. The children cried while their elders prayed and argued. No one knew where the train was going. People were depressed. At designated stations, the individuals on duty from each railway car, equipped with buckets, received their allocated food supply (soup, porridge) at the railway buffets and brought a ration of black bread and boiling water. Such stops were also used to relieve oneself near the train cars. All this was done under the guard of the NKVD convoy.

Depending on the location of the terminal station, the journey to exile took between 2 and 4 weeks. After reaching the destination, local NKVD officers took charge of the deportees sent them to remote special settlements (спецпоселок) supervised by the NKVD commandants using transport provided by the deportees' future employers. There, after hygienic and sanitary treatment, the deportees were housed in wooden barracks and other accommodations, where they were to live in very primitive and cramped conditions under the supervision of the NKVD services.

As a welcome, the deportees were then told by the overseers that Poland no longer existed and would never exist, and that they would remain in the settlement forever. The regulations of the special settlement provided for, among others, control of the presence of the settlers, and forbade them to freely leave the place of exile and establish contacts with the local population.

In total, as part of the first deportation, more than 140,000 Polish citizens were sent to exile, according to the NKVD data. In the NKVD documentation, this category of deportees was referred to as 'special re-settlers – settlers'.

After verifying their suitability for work, individuals were sent to various jobs for which they were paid. However, since the pay was conditional on the usually unachievable, inflated performance standards being met, it was usually very low. Children and invalids remained dependent on their families.

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Another group of exiles was designated by the central Soviet authorities on 2 March 1940. At that time, the Ministry of Internal Affairs was ordered, among others, to deport to Kazakhstan for 10 years 22–25 thousand families of repressed persons and of persons held in prisoner-of-war camps. The operation was to cover all families of officers of the Polish Army, the state police, the gendarmerie, the prison guard, intelligence agents, industrialists, landowners, and high-ranking government officials. Their real estate was confiscated, while other property could be cashed or taken with them (up to 100 kg per person). The deportation action began on the morning of 13 April 1940. In total, more than 61,000 people were deported. In the NKVD's nomenclature, they were called 'exiled in administrative mode'. The cohort of deportees was dominated by the Poles

(about 80%). These were mainly women, children, and the elderly (residents of cities); men accounted for only 20% of the adults. This category of deportees was not subject to employment obligations. However, due to economic conditions, they usually decided to take up work. Thus, ultimately 60.5% of the exiles went to the collective farms (*kolkhoz*), over 26.3% to the state-owned farms (*sovkhoz*), and the rest to the industrial workers' settlements. Here, they themselves had to ensure that they found some accommodation, i.e., a room with Kazakh families or in the ruined farm buildings of the sovkhoz (bathhouse, shed, barn, calf shed, etc.). Sometimes they camped in the forest, by the road, where they 'built' primitive barracks or pit-houses. They undertook all sorts of jobs that they had never done before.

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Meanwhile, on 29 June 1940, another group of Polish citizens was transported to special settlements in the northern regions of the European part of the USSR and to Siberia. Indefinitely deported there were those war refugees who refused to accept USSR citizenship and volunteered to return to German occupation, but who were not accepted by the Germans. According to the NKVD archives, a total of 80,653 people were deported at that time. This group of repressed individuals, referred to as 'special re-settlers – refugees', was distinguished by the fact that the vast majority were Jews (over 84% of the total); Poles accounted for slightly over 11%. They were forced to work in logging forests, in metal ore mines and coal mines, and in construction.

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The last wave of deportations of Polish citizens before the German invasion of the Soviet Union was organised in three stages. Its aim was to finally purge the 'socially alien element' from both the areas from which the 'undesirable element' had already been deported in 1940, as well as the area of the Vilnius region, which the Soviets had incorporated into the USSR after the annexation of the Baltic states in the summer of 1940. The order was to arrest and deport to a 20-year exile the family members of participants in 'counter-revolutionary Ukrainian and Polish nationalist organisations' and the family members of persons (from these underground organisations) who had been sentenced to death. The property of all displaced persons was confiscated by the state.

This action was first started on the night of 21/22 May 1941 in the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR. At that time, according to NKVD sources, 12,371 people were deported to settle in the regions of Arkhangelsk, Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Krasnoyarsk (RSFSR), as well as to the southern Kazakhstan region (these were not prisoners but people forced to settle in the above-mentioned areas). Formally, they were not subject

to NKVD surveillance, but restrictions were imposed on their movement and they had to periodically confirm their stay at the militia station. These deportees took up work in order to provide for themselves.

On 14 June 1941, the deportation was carried out in the Lithuanian SSR, including the Vilnius region, from which 3,924 Poles were deported. The majority of the fathers of the targeted families were isolated immediately at railway stations or detained at work. They were mainly sent to the Altai country, where they started working in forests, in the construction industry, and in tailors' workshops.

On the night of 19/20 June 1941, the deportation operation took place in the western regions of the Belarusian SSR. According to the NKVD files available, 2,059 people were arrested and 22,353 people were displaced for deportation to the interior of the USSR. Due to the outbreak of the German-Soviet war and the bombing and shelling of railway transports, it is likely that fewer people were deported, around 21,000. They were settled in the Altai, Krasnoyarsk, Komi ASRR, and in the regions of Arkhangelsk, Omsk, Novosibirsk, and Aktiubinsk.

In total, in May-June 1941, about 40,000 Polish citizens were arrested and deported from the eastern territories of the Republic of Poland annexed by the Soviets. This means that – according to NKVD sources – in total, in the years 1940–1941, more than 320,000 people were deported deep into the USSR in four large displacement waves. These actions were carried out according to the instructions, schemes, and methods tested during the deportation of settlers and foresters. With this form of repression, the occupier struck at 'bourgeois Poland', at the people who were pillars of the society – the patriotic element: the families of the military, policemen, state and local government officials, political leaders, landowners and factory owners, and entrepreneurs in various branches of the economy. All forcibly deported individuals experienced a harsh life, or rather a hard struggle to survive the next day.

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The social consequences of these deportations can be determined both on the basis of archival materials and, in particular, on the basis of the analysis of memoirs, diaries, accounts, and letters of the deportees themselves. These effects can be discussed on different levels. Some consequences were intended by the organisers and perpetrators, others were not; some concerned areas of displacement, and others areas of deportation; some affected primarily adults, others children. Here, we will briefly address the most important of these consequences.

Although the legal situation of the exiles had already changed in the summer of 1941, most had to wait until 1946 for their return to Poland. In that period, the key to their existence and survival was work. Due to the ongoing war and martial law, the deportees were essentially forced to take up employment on a compulsory

basis. To achieve the prescribed norm, they toiled from morning until dusk. Usually, they were not asked about their education or profession, but were simply assigned such tasks as were currently available. They performed very hard physical work in a harsh climate, without suitable training, without knowledge of the local language, without the right tools, without holidays, and without proper medical care and medicine. They lacked workwear and shoes and did not have any spare clothing. Fear for their children and family and even their own lives necessitated the constant acquisition of new behaviours and skills: it taught the deportees cunning, slyness, and thievery, and forced the hurried acquisition of new professional qualifications – be it in logging and timber floating, animal husbandry, farming, haying, mining, brick making, or construction.

The dramatic situation and living conditions – of which the widespread scarcity or even lack of food was a glaring manifestation in particular – meant that hunger was never satisfied. Wanda Andryka-Marchewka, sent away to the forests in the Altai country, recalled:

> We had nothing to eat in the taiga. They gave 500 g of bread [per day – A.G.] for each labourer and for non-labourer 200 g. [...] For all these years we have seen neither sugar nor meat, nor milk, nor butter. [...] We mostly ate nettles, various leaves, grasses, flowers [...] and in the summer there were berries, edible mushrooms.[2]

This created a sense of humiliation, causing desperate people to even feed on animal carcasses that they secretly dug from the ground and the meat of dogs and wolves captured by the settlers. The deficit of practically every daily necessity – a result of the war waged by the Soviets with the Third Reich – meant that people had to get used to it, learn to live in extreme poverty, and share with those even poorer than themselves. They acquired a new instinct of self-preservation: one could not break down and give in to adversity or doubt. In such situations, theft became commonplace, despite supervision, constant checks, and severe punishments. The moral aspect of such behaviour was disregarded as the instinct of life prompted people to use every means to get food. In the case of children, neither prohibitions nor corporal punishment could discourage them from stealing, because it allowed them (and others) to survive until the next day.[3]

For Polish citizens, the complete lack of cleaning products was shocking. Neglect of personal hygiene, malnutrition, exhausting physical work, and the harsh climate facilitated the spread of various diseases. Access to doctors and medicine was illusory, and epidemics of typhoid, malaria, scurvy, whooping cough, dysentery, avitaminosis,

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2 Andryka-Marchewka W. 1991, 115.

3 For more information see: Głowacki A. 2008, 34–35.

anaemia, so-called 'night blindness', and other diseases took a deadly toll. Due to exhaustion and malnutrition, girls matured much later and few babies were born. Dramatically difficult living conditions and change of climate resulted in the disappearance of menstruation in all women and girls.[4] The deportees rarely decided to get married or to enlarge their families. Children who were born soon after their mothers arrived in exile usually died quickly.[5] For the deported communities, and in a broader perspective for Poland, this meant severe, irreversible demographic losses.

The most common effects of staying in exile concern the mental sphere and physical condition of the victims of deportation, leaving them with lasting negative effects.

The humiliating living conditions and extreme poverty, persistent uncertainty about what the next day would bring, and the prolonged autumn and winter made people depressed. Jerzy Koziński recalled the effects of the exile:

> The six-year stay in extreme conditions has had a negative impact on our health and psyche, which has had and continues to have an impact on our lives. To this day, every winter fills me with dread. The psychiatric examinations have confirmed the existence of the 'camp syndrome', which is manifested by a reluctance to be in a crowd, distrust of any authority figures, suspicion of other people and, the most troublesome of all, the stockpiling of worn-out belongings, as 'anything can come in handy', and hoarding of food supplies. People affected by this syndrome are not understood by those who do not know about their experiences and look with pity on the 'irrational' behaviour of former 'tourists' from inhumane land. And the most shocking thing of all: the fear of the future, the fear of the return of bad times – which does not leave even in the current period of good prosperity.[6]

This observation is confirmed by the words of Irena Dolińska-Głowacka, who recalled the following situation:

> My colleague […], when it was said in 1981 that Soviet troops could enter Poland, and pacify and transport people to Siberia, told me that she had prepared two bottles of kerosene, one of which she would pour on those who would come for her, and the other on herself and that she would set everyone on fire. She could not imagine that she would have to survive exile a second time.[7]

Similar problems were experienced by Mirosława Chomów:

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4 Dolińska-Głowacka I. 1997, 288.

5 Fudała T. 2000, 86–87.

6 Koziński J. 1999, 55.

7 Dolińska-Głowacka I. 1997, 295–296.

I got depressed and scared. I was afraid to stay home alone. I was treated for a long time [...] After retirement, these symptoms reappeared [...], I was afraid to be alone at night. Unfortunately, those nightmares are coming back. In a dream, I relive the horror of the deportation and see myself being transported by a huge river and I see familiar landscapes. I wake up wet and sweaty with fear.[8]

The exiles knew injustice, violence, barbarism, and brutality in every aspect of life. It is therefore understandable that anxiety, fear, complexes, and hostility took hold in the psyche of these wronged people. They feared war, hunger, inhumane living conditions, terror, and violence. Is it at all possible for time to heal these wounds, for them not to harbour hatred, and transform their suffering into humility?

An interesting example in this case was given by I. Dolińska-Głowacka:

My mother, no matter how long she lived in Russia, would never have learned Russian. I think it was because of her hatred of everything Soviet. This trauma arose in 1920, when, as a thirteen-year-old girl, she watched the advance of the wild, ragged Red Army toward Warsaw, and then their chaotic escape. My mother was irritated even by the similarity of the Russian language to Polish. [...] She couldn't look at the Red Army soldiers in their torn uniforms with red stars, stinking with tar and cheap perfume. In their behaviour, and even in their laughter, she saw only rudeness and vulgarity. It was only after we were taken to Siberia that she changed her mind a little, when she met simple, old people who from the old days preserved dignity, honesty, and manners.[9]

In this case, which aspects of mutual contacts of the deportees with the local population are worth noting? Well, even before the transports with the deportees arrived at places of their forced stay in the depths of the USSR, the local political and administrative authorities carried out, on the orders of their superiors from Moscow, an information and propaganda campaign among the residents of the planned settlement concerning the prospective newcomers 'from the western regions'. The authorities told the local inhabitants that soon 'enemies of the Soviet rule', 'bourgeoisie' (*буржуй*), 'Polish lords', 'criminals', and 'exploiters and oppressors' would arrive, which was supposed to form negative opinions on the new settlers and cause their isolation. This, of course, affected the process of their adaptation. However, over time, the shared misery of the war and the war times made the so-called 'ordinary people' see the deportees from Poland as normal people, wronged by Stalin's regime. They appreciated their personal culture, skills and professional qualifications, natural honesty,

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8 Chomów M. 2003, 98.
9 Dolińska-Głowacka I. 1997, 288–289.

openness, and kindness. The events on the German-Soviet front brought the victims of the system closer – the locals understood the pain and despair of the Polish exiles. They also recognised that the deportees had been brought to exile from a different world to Stalin's USSR – a richer and happier one, where there was no widespread denunciation, terror or lies, where not everyone was afraid of everyone. Helena Prugar-Scheuring admitted: 'I have also met many good Russians, [...] admiring their cordiality and courage, how did they manage to preserve these treasures of humanity in this cursed regime?'[10]

On the other hand, the exiles forced to travel through huge, completely unknown areas of Stalin's empire carefully observed and assessed everything that surrounded them at that time. They admired the beauty of nature and became familiar with the low standard of living, diverse cultures, customs and languages of the peoples with whom they lived and worked. They were astounded by the commonplace mediocrity, poor organisation, low productivity, and poor work discipline. Despite the war period, they could not understand the causes of the exasperating shortage of food supplies – the lack of even the most necessary goods for everyday use. Even the implementation of bread rationing turned out to be a huge problem.

It is therefore worth quoting here the very apt words of the teacher Janina Grochocka, who was sent to the Pavlodar region (Kazakh SSR). In 1943, she testified in Tehran that:

> [...] even tiny children came to the [Soviet – A.G.] Union with a sense of deep pity for the state that had done them terrible harm. After a short period of observation, older children and young people developed a contempt for the overrated economic and cultural achievements that Polish children had heard about in Poland. Even the little-educated rural youth in Poland were widely aware of: 1) the misery in the Soviet Union, 2) the falsity of slogans about social justice, and 3) about its cultural superiority. These conclusions were based not only on the observations of the parents but on their own insight and analysis.[11]

This bore a very poor testimony to a system which, according to Stalinist propaganda, was supposedly the best in the world.

Only the strongest individuals survived the exile – those who turned out to be the most hardened by work, with a strong psyche and determination to stay alive. Survivors stress that their hope for a better tomorrow was based on deep faith. Wanda Arasimowicz stated explicitly: The hope that one day we would return to our homeland was based on our faith. Faith has kept many people alive [...] We needed God so much.

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10 Scheuring W., Prugar-Scheuring H. 2021, 385.

11 AOK, 1034.

How much easier it was to remain in exile with God in heart, in such a terrible, alien, remote, deprived of human rights, ravaged, and spiritually barren area.[12]

This is confirmed by those who managed to leave the USSR already in 1942 with the army of General Władysław Anders. Wiesława Saternus (Derfel) recalled:

> The Lord God allowed us to survive disease, hunger, squalor, humiliation, slave labour, living in poverty and filth, and an excruciating lack of religious service. [...] For every experience in exile, captivity, and wandering – thank God! It was hard, very hard, painful and bad. But these experiences enriched me, taught me, and gave proof of the existence of God and of God's mercy. With a greater and better understanding of life, I am on pilgrimage now and [...] I thank the Heavenly Father [...] for bringing our whole family of seven out of the 'house of slavery'.[13]

The dramatic fate of living in exile strengthened family ties. Families had to constantly mobilise together to, for example, get some food, and at least partially satisfy hunger. With great determination and superhuman effort, supporting and complementing each other, adults and children alike searched the forests for edible plants, fished and hunted fowl, stole and begged, and queued to buy their ration of bread, which was the staple food for all the families in exile. Zofia Siuzdak rightly noted that: almost all Polish children, without exception, became prematurely mature, hardened and responsible despite their young age.[14] But the daily struggle for the family's survival rested primarily on the shoulders of mothers (in many cases single parents), who were irreplaceable in this very difficult role.[15] This is aptly expressed in the words of Wiesława Saternus (Derfel):

> I will not forget the heroism, sacrifice, and immense kindness of my mother. [...] I owe her the sanity of my soul and body – everything! I see her superhuman efforts and dedication to us children, to our family, and to our neighbours. I see her sharing with people a spoon of green nettle gruel, a piece of bread, a potato, clothes or even a rag, because she had nothing else. [...] I can see her smelling the head of salted fish that I found in the rubbish bin. She had to sniff, carefully check that we would not poison ourselves before she split that fish head between us – the children. At evening prayer, she reminded us not to forget to thank the Lord God for 'today's fish'.[16]

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12 Arasimowicz W. 2005, 21.
13 Łapo H. (ed.), 1996, 118–119.
14 Siuzdak Z. 2003, 193.
15 This topic is discussed, among others, in: Bazuń D., Kaźmierczak-Kałużna I., Pokrzyńska M. 2012.
16 Łapo H. (ed.), 1996, 118–119.

It is significant that after such hardships and experiences, people became more capable of making sacrifices and helping out – and not only within the family. Helena Prugar-Scheuring wrote: 'I remember most cordially those who, themselves mistreated by cruel fate, were able to find a spark of kindness and warmth in order to replace my lost family in this poverty and loneliness'.[17]

The government's enforcement of the schooling obligation meant that school-age children had to attend educational institutions under the Soviet system. However, this was only true in places where there were some school structures at all, because in remote settlements there were big problems with organising education. However, between 1940 and 1941 students did not study in their native language, but in Russian, and according to Soviet programs and textbooks. For the exiles, that system meant forced Russification and Sovietisation, that is, nationalisation and education in the spirit of Bolshevik ideology. Their children, who had been formed in the spirit of Polish patriotism and in a Christian culture, were subject to the intrusive propaganda of godlessness, dialectical materialism, celebrations of holidays and anniversaries from the Bolshevik calendar, and mockery of 'bourgeois Poland'. Only after the establishment of the Union of Polish Patriots in the USSR in mid-1943, did this situation significantly change.[18]

Where there were no schooling opportunities at all, children and young people lost several years and when they returned to Poland, being already adults, they did not always choose to catch up with their education. Barbara Powroźnik, née Bilewicz, admitted that in 1946, already in Poland,

> learning at [...] school gave us, the Sybiraks, great joy. There was eagerness, there was enthusiasm. We thought we could make up for 6 years of disrupted education in a few months. Unfortunately – it took too long, it took years before we caught up with our peers. Many children have never reached that level. The beginning was very difficult. We could not correctly formulate or write down a single sentence. Every second word was spoken or written in Russian. Our notebooks were red with spelling and grammatical errors. It was the biggest tragedy.[19]

Many people have come to terms with the fact that due to their stay in exile, they lost their race against time. Although there were exceptions, relatively few people in the group of deportees later became doctors, engineers, economists, or lawyers. But this was also due to the political repression of the Polish communist authorities against those who openly revealed that they had spent the war period in forced exile in remote regions of the eastern neighbour.

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17 Scheuring W., Prugar-Scheuring H. 2021, 385.

18 Extensively on this topic, among others: Głowacki A. 2019; Trela E. 1983.

19 Powroźnik z Bilewiczów B. 1996, 93.

Unfortunately, after the end of the war, not all the deportees returned to Poland. Some of them have remained forever in nameless graves in the vast territories of Siberia and Central Asia.[20] Their families felt extremely humiliated, unable to provide their deceased relatives with a dignified burial (lack of coffin, clothing) and religious service.[21]

Some pre-war Polish citizens (Ukrainians, Belarusians, Russians, Lithuanians) were denied the option and right of repatriation in 1945. Those who left the Soviet Union in 1942 with Władysław Anders's Polish Army in many cases chose to live in the free world of the West. It should also be mentioned that not all the exiled Jews returned to post-war Poland – information about pogroms in some Polish towns prompted some of them (though not many) to stay in the Soviet Union. In turn, another group of them returned to their homeland but treated it only as the first stage of their journey before leaving for Palestine, where the State of Israel was established.

From the depths of the USSR, people affected by the stigma of fear and servitude, degraded, physically and mentally exhausted, and sometimes even disabled, returned to their homeland. The forced labour, resulting first from their status as exiles, and later from the rigours of martial law and the need to secure legal sources of income, resulted in the fact that in 1946 people returned to their homeland also with new professional qualifications, since over a period of six years, they had to change their place of residence and type of work many times, which meant they had to retrain frequently. The activists of the Union of Polish Patriots also encouraged them to acquire or improve their professional skills, indicating, for example, the future demand for professionals in the process of the post-war reconstruction of the country.[22]

In exile, the harsh employment policy and the simultaneous lack of appropriate technical conditions (equipment, tools, tractive power), protective clothing and footwear, non-compliance with health and safety requirements, and the severe climate resulted in the deterioration of workers' health. Janusz and Henryk Czaiński mentioned: 'Siberia has greatly mutilated our family. Mother became completely paralysed, and the older son [...] returned to Poland as a cripple, barely able to move his legs, as a result of numerous frostbites, and then became severely disabled – a wheelchair user'.[23] Edward Wróbel described his family in the following words: 'They returned sick, poor, lost, without means of living and broken, not knowing where to start. The entire property remained in the Borderlands'.[24]

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20 Drawing up a balance sheet of personal losses as a result of deportation is still not possible. See: Ciesielski S., Materski W., Paczkowski A. 2002, 19–21.

21 Mikulski T. 1995, 33.

22 Głowacki A. 1994, 30–31, 136–162.

23 Broda J. (ed.), 2004, 270.

24 Łapo H. (ed.), 1996, 474; Borderland – eastern part of the Second Polish Republic annexed into the USSR – editor's note.

The repatriates were ashamed of their appearance and their sanitary condition. In the material sense, they were left with nothing. Those who returned from the depths of the Soviet Union did not usually settle on their family land, as their pre-war property – the result of many years of toil by their families in the eastern lands of the Second Republic – was seized by the Soviets. Nevertheless, they were happy because the exile phase of their lives had finally come to an end, as the dreamed, longed-for return had become a reality. Abroad, they strengthened their love for and appreciation of their homeland, although the first post-war years (and longer) proved very difficult for them. In the new Polish reality created by the communist authorities, the repatriates did not feel like fully-fledged citizens. For almost half a century, they could not officially speak about their fate as exiles, about the realities of life in the 'proletarian paradise'; they could not demand an apology or compensation for wrongdoings. In the 1940s and 1950s, they had difficulty obtaining pensions due to their inability to document their length of service or the circumstances of their termination of employment during the chaos of war in 1939.[25] But the fear and terror that had accompanied them under the Bolsheviks' rule in the USSR resulted, among other things, in the fact that they did not openly fight the communist authorities in Poland. They wanted to enjoy their family life and look forward to a peaceful old age.

Wieńczyława Bystrzycka-Kozera later admitted:

> The cruelty of that time did not take away my faith in the meaning and value of life, in the good, in a man who, in the most inhumane situations, was not entirely evil, and even knew how to resist evil. I am convinced, however, that those who did not survive deportation and did not live in Siberia will never be able to comprehend the pain, suffering, the agony of hunger, which was our daily bread there. But those who lived there and survived this time know the whole painful truth.[26]

It should also be noted that avoiding deportation and remaining in place did not necessarily mean a better fate. After all, the occupation of the eastern borderlands of the Second Polish Republic by the Germans in mid-1941 meant annihilation for the local Jewish population, and the uprising of Ukrainian nationalists resulted in mass murders of the Polish population in Volhynia and Eastern Lesser Poland. Thus, paradoxically, the deportations into the depths of the USSR unexpectedly created a chance of survival and salvation.

Mass deportation was one of the basic instruments of the Kremlin's occupation policy. It meant a deliberate breakdown of social and economic structures and local communities. Deportation was supposed to weaken the patriotic element and hinder attempts to organise underground movements. It dispersed and weakened the Polish

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25 Broda J. (ed.), 2004, 384.
26 Bystrzycka-Kozera W. 2001, 18.

and Jewish element and served to relocate and isolate in remote regions of the USSR the 'element' that the Soviets considered to be insecure and dangerous while providing cheap labour. At the same time, the consequence of the deportations was to intimidate those who were left behind. Although they were 'spared', they lived in an atmosphere of constant uncertainty about their own futures.

Deportations affected to varying degrees basically all social and professional groups, not only in towns but also in the countryside, children, young people, adults and the elderly, women and men, the poor and the rich, the politically committed and the indifferent, the educated and the illiterate. They resulted in the complete reconstruction of the social structure of the inhabitants of the annexed lands. Poles, who accounted for almost 60% of all deportees, were hit the hardest.[27]

The years in exile took a toll on the physical and mental health of the displaced persons and destroyed or hampered their opportunities to obtain a good education, a rewarding profession/job, personal affairs and family life.

For everyone, the stay in exile in a country whose party-state authorities declared the construction of a supposedly attractive system of social justice turned out to be a first-hand experience of the Communists' real intentions. The exiles got to know the realities of this process from the inside out and radically rejected such a path. This is reflected in the words of Wanda Nowakowska:

> I don't regret at all that six good young years were taken away from me. I saw the Soviet reality, which I was very curious about, I saw what an ideology, to which my attitude had been decidedly positive six years ago, looked like in contact with real life, and I saw the results of the collective economy. I have brought from my exile not a small achievement: the deepest peace, which is the sum of certain experiences, and the strengthening of faith in humanity. I want to bow here to the beautiful humanity of all those friends of mine who have nourished me during these bitter years with the most precious sweetness, the sweetness of the human heart.[28]

And finally, the thoughts of Maria Jadwiga Łęczycka, a teacher who, returning from exile in 1946, shared this reflection:

> If there are to be no more wronged people and wrongdoers in my homeland, there must also be a little bit of my work in it. [...] If I hadn't lived through those six years in Kazakhstan, I might never have had that little bit. [...] These were cruel years, but not wasted years.[29]

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27 Hryciuk G. 2020, 173.

28 Nowakowska W. (Drozdowa W.) 1997, 114.

29 Łęczycka M.J. 1989, 302.

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Reconstruction of Kharkiv in 1943–1945

Summary: The events of the Second World War brought immense suffering and devastation to countries around the world, and the USSR, including Ukraine, was no exception. Almost 80 years ago, the liberation of Ukrainian territories from German invaders began, including the liberation of Kharkiv on August 23, 1943. From that day on, a complex and necessary process of rebuilding the city commenced, not only by its residents but also with the support of other republics of the USSR. Today, in the face of Russian aggression in Ukraine, Kharkiv once again finds itself under the threat of destruction. This paper examines similar events that occurred in the 20th century and the study of how the city was rebuilt during the war, with the aim of not only quickly restoring industries and institutions but also providing proper living conditions for its residents.

This article aims to identify the priority areas for the reconstruction of Kharkiv during the war years (August 1943–May 1945). It can be argued that two primary objectives existed: rebuilding industry and addressing social issues. Providing housing, adequate nutrition, and medical care were crucial not only for improving people's daily lives but also for increasing labour productivity. The local leadership utilised the joy of liberation and the belief in victory over Nazism to mobilise the city's residents for unpaid work during their free time, compelling them to address most of their household needs independently. However, those involved in the reconstruction of Kharkiv did not bear grudges against the city authorities for these measures; they understood the necessity of quickly restoring normal life and considered the inconveniences to be temporary.

The article emphasises the importance of defining priorities for reconstruction of the economy and improving the living conditions of the population. To achieve these goals, organised leadership, community participation, and individual citizen participation were necessary.

Keywords: Kharkiv, World War II, reconstruction, re-evacuation, de-occupation, destruction, housing stock, faith in victory

Introduction

The events of the Second World War brought immense suffering and devastation to numerous countries worldwide. The Soviet Union, which included Ukraine at the time, was not spared from these hardships. Almost 80 years ago, the liberation of its lands from the Nazi invaders began. Kharkiv, in particular, was liberated on August 23, 1943. From that day the people of Kharkiv began the challenging and necessary phase of reconstruction, undertaken with the assistance of people from other republics of the USSR.

Since February 24, 2022, Kharkiv has once again been subjected to shelling as a result of Russian aggression in Ukraine. This ongoing conflict has led to the destruction of critical infrastructure and residential areas in the city. The historical investigations covered in this paper can shed light on how the city has previously been rebuilt amidst conflict, aiming to restore the functioning of enterprises swiftly and provide a decent quality of life for its residents.

The purpose of this article is to determine the first and most important steps in the reconstruction of Kharkiv between liberation and the end of the war; therefore, the study's chronological framework spans from August 23, 1943, to May 9, 1945.

The topic of reconstruction during the specified period has received relatively limited attention in historiography. However, an article within the collective scientific work *History of the City of Kharkiv in the 20th Century* holds significant relevance. S. Ivanov addresses certain aspects of housing construction during the period, specifically focusing on the emigration of rural populations to Kharkiv. Ivanov's abstract also sheds light on the subject matter related to the reconstruction efforts in the city.

The testimonies of witnesses who experienced the events hold immense significance for the research. Among them, the most extensive memoirs are those of Volodymyr Rybalov, titled *Notes of the Head of the Military Department of the City Executive Party Committee*. In his memoirs, Rybalov provides a party worker's perspective on the reconstruction of Kharkiv. From 1943 to 1945, he held various positions, including secretary of the food industry, head of the military department in the city, and regional committees of the CP(b)U (Communist Party (Bolsheviks)

of Ukraine). Rybalov actively participated in leading the city's reconstruction efforts. Another equally valuable source is the collection of published documents and materials, namely *City and War: Kharkiv during the Great Patriotic War* and *Kharkiv Region during the Great Patriotic War*. These publications contain fragments of documents and memoirs from individuals who survived the war and provided descriptions of the city's state after its liberation from the occupiers. They offer insights into the activities and experiences of those who were involved in the reconstruction process at that time.

Data Analysis and Results

On August 23, 1943, Kharkiv was liberated from Nazi invaders. However, it is important to note that despite the liberation, fighting continued in the region, though the city's reconstruction efforts had already commenced. The initial two years of the German-Soviet war (1941–1943) had inflicted substantial losses upon Kharkiv.

In the initial days of the war against the Nazis, the Soviet government made a crucial decision to evacuate not only the population but also various industrial, food, and other enterprises from the regions that were under threat of occupation. This measure aimed to minimise available resources for the invading forces. The evacuation efforts involved 320 specialised trains for carrying equipment sent to the rear, along with 225 echelons dedicated to transporting people, and an additional 56 echelons specifically designated for hospitals.[1]

Despite the evacuation efforts, however, numerous items and resources were left behind in the city and were subsequently utilised by the occupying Nazi forces for their purposes. As the Nazis retreated in 1943, they managed to take with them nearly 350 wagons filled with equipment from factories and educational and research institutions, as well as valuable items from museums, libraries, and cultural centres.[2] This loss of resources and cultural heritage further added to the challenges faced during the reconstruction period.

But the most significant damage to Kharkiv was inflicted by the hostilities during the war. Russian writer Aleksey Tolstoy vividly described the devastation, stating:

> I saw Kharkiv. This is probably what Rome was like when hordes of Germanic barbarians swept through it in the 5th century – a huge cemetery. On the site of the city, on the site of all giant factories without exception – ruins and burnings.[3]

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1 Diakova O. 2013, 7.

2 Diakova O. 2011, 280–281.

3 Diakova O. 2011, 281.

The destructive impact of the war extended to architectural monuments, leading to their burning, destruction, or mutilation. Prominent landmarks such as the railway station, post office, the Stary Pasazh mall, and the House of the Nobles Assembly (which housed the Palaces of Young Pioneers and Schoolchildren in Soviet times before the war) were among those affected. Additionally, the premises of major enterprises, theatres, educational institutions, and research facilities suffered damage. The scale of destruction was immense, with over 1 million square meters out of the total 2.8 million m² of residential buildings being destroyed.[4]

At the time of liberation, Kharkiv was inhabited by approximately 190,000 people,[5] primarily consisting of women, children, and the elderly. These vulnerable populations had endured the hardships of hunger, fear of reprisals, and humiliations inflicted by the occupiers and collaborators. However, they were the ones who had to initiate a new chapter in the city's history – the era of intensive reconstruction. Although it may have seemed that the task would require decades to accomplish, the city remarkably began to revive itself right before the eyes of its inhabitants.

From the very first day of liberation, the local residents of Kharkiv actively participated in the reconstruction efforts. They offered their assistance to sappers in defusing explosives, aided in setting up crossings, and played a vital role in clearing road debris, etc.

During that time, the responsibility for the reconstruction of the city rested with the local party and Soviet authorities. The regional and city committees of the CP(b) U were led by Viktor Churaev, while the executive committee of the Kharkiv City Council of Workers' Deputies was headed by Oleksandr Selivanov. Major General Mykola Trufanov held the position of military commandant.

On August 24, the City Executive Committee was established, comprising 12 departments that focused on various social issues related to the reconstruction efforts. These departments were responsible for tasks such as coordinating reconstruction work, ensuring food supply, resuming education, healthcare services, and more. Additionally, nine district committees of the party, district Komsomol (Communist Youth League), and district councils of workers' deputies were formed.[6] The following day, to restore normalcy in the city as swiftly as possible, the city council passed a resolution according to which all managers and workers of state and cooperative institutions were required to conduct inventories of their respective enterprises or institutions and commence work starting from August 27.[7]

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4 Yarmysh O. (ed.), 2004, 360.

5 Diakova O. 2013, 32.

6 Yarmysh O. (ed.), 2004, 359.

7 KIM.R. part 2, 279–280.

Immediately after the liberation, a wide range of businesses reopened in Kharkiv, including hairdressers, grocery stores, cafeterias, canteens, household goods stores, and food stores, commonly referred to as stalls or kiosks. It is worth noting that many of these establishments were privately owned. Markets where you could buy any product (even if they were very expensive) were traditionally popular.

In order to regulate the distribution of goods, the city administration implemented a system of food and industrial cards. The population was classified into four categories: workers, employees, dependents, and children under 12 years old.[8] Among them, the best-fed groups included workers, employees of the party, Komsomol (All-Union Leninist Young Communist League), Soviet bodies, law enforcement personnel, scientists, artists, and nursing mothers.

Secretary of the Food Industry, V. Rybalov, expressed significant concerns regarding the functioning of bakeries, as bread was considered a vital food source. An assessment of the enterprises was conducted as early as August 24, revealing that all seven bakeries had been destroyed and required substantial repairs.[9] Initially, the military provided bread, which was transported from other regions. However, in September, the production of bread resumed with the establishment of new bread factories in the city.

Polyclinics, hospitals, and medical facilities were promptly operational following the liberation of the city. Additionally, baths, pharmacies, and sanitary hygiene shops were opened to cater to the needs of the population. Medical professionals provided care not only to the wounded but also to local residents who required assistance. Precautionary measures were implemented to prevent outbreaks of infectious diseases, underscoring the importance of public health in the post-liberation period.

On August 28 the first train arrived in Kharkiv from Moscow, carrying individuals eager to assist in the city's reconstruction efforts. This marked the beginning of a consistent flow of trains transporting vital supplies such as food, construction materials, factory equipment, and other necessary items. Daily arrivals of these trains played a crucial role in providing the resources needed for the reconstruction of Kharkiv.

The party and Soviet bodies had a primary focus on the reconstruction of power plants, as well as other crucial industrial and transportation infrastructure. This emphasis was driven by the need to facilitate the production and repair of military equipment. Power plants played a vital role in ensuring a stable supply of electricity, which was essential for supporting industrial operations and meeting the demands of wartime production.

On August 26, 1943, a government delegation led by the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine, Nikita Khrushchev, and the Chairman

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8 Yarmysh O. (ed.), 2004, 359.

9 KIM.R. part 2, 279–280.

of the Presidium of the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR, Mykhailo Hrechukha, arrived in Kharkiv. The purpose of their visit was to address administrative matters and assess the extent of the damage suffered by the city.[10] On August 30, a city-wide rally celebrating the liberation of Kharkiv from the Nazis took place in the T.H. Shevchenko Garden. At the rally, N. Khrushchev emphasised:

> Your task, friends, is to roll up your sleeves and, with a Bolshevik soul, undertake the restoration of the destroyed city, and the sooner you achieve this, the better it will be for you and the socialist society as a whole.[11]

The state of the city became a matter of special concern and deliberation during a meeting of the Soviet People's Committee of the USSR. On September 7, 1943, the Council of People's Commissars of the USSR (CPC) adopted a resolution titled 'On emergency aid to the city of Kharkiv'. Support and aid quickly began to arrive from the eastern regions of the country, which had not suffered the same level of devastation caused by the war.[12]

Despite the ongoing shelling and bombing of the city that took place until the end of August, the confidence in the victory over Nazism was so strong, that not only evacuated specialists needed for the restoration were called upon to return, but those serving at the front as soldiers were demobilised as well. These specialists primarily included architects, teachers, engineering, and technical personnel. It is worth noting that the architects were among the first to return to the devastated city. Notably, the first to be demobilised were A. Kasyanov, who assumed the position of chief architect of the city, and V. Orekhov, who was appointed head of the regional department for construction and architecture. Other architects, such as Professor O. Molokin, O. Leibfreid, E. Lymar, M. Lutskyi, M. Movshovich, N. Pidgorny, I. Pushkaryov, I. Khazanovskyi, H. Yanovitskyi, and many others, also returned from evacuation shortly after.[13] Their primary task was to expedite the restoration of residential, industrial, and public buildings, enabling industrial and communal enterprises to resume operations as soon as possible.[14] To facilitate coordination among the specialists involved, the organisation Mis'kproekt was established in September 1943 under the guidance of the chief architect of the city (this organisation exists to this day, now known as the limited liability company Kharkivproekt Institute).[15] The city planners developed

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10   KIM.R. part 2, 283.

11   KIM.R. part 2, 286.

12   Posohov S. 2012, 16.

13   Posohov S. 2012, 390, 414–415.

14   Posohov S. 2012, 414–415.

15   Yarmysh O. (ed.), 2004, 366.

projects for the reconstruction of the street and road network, marking the beginning of a transformation in the city's appearance.

Clearing the debris and restoring buildings became a top priority in the reconstruction process. The focus was on restoring the housing stock, particularly those close to industrial complexes, to ensure convenient access for workers. In order to expedite the resettlement of the population, individuals were allocated land plots for the construction of their own houses.[16]

During that time, a significant portion of the building materials needed for reconstruction was obtained by dismantling heavily damaged and unsalvageable buildings. Initially, this process was somewhat disorganised and spontaneous. Priority was given to restoring administrative offices, medical facilities, and industrial enterprises.[17] A large number of individuals, including volunteers and forcibly mobilised workers (including German prisoners of war), actively participated in various restoration tasks. They were involved in activities such as repairing railway tracks and clearing rubble at key industrial sites, including the Kharkiv Tractor Plant (KhTZ), Train-Building Plant, the 'Serp i Molot' factory, the 1st State Flour Mill Plant, and the 'Krasnyi Khimik' factory, etc.[18]

The reconstruction of factories for the production of military equipment was also important. Shortly after the liberation, specialists started returning to Kharkiv from their places of evacuation, beginning with the heads of enterprises. On August 28, representatives of the factory named after Comintern (now known as the Malyshev Factory or KhPZ) arrived, led by director M. Sobol' and chief engineer K. Trusov.[19] The process of registering employees from various enterprises began as well. As early as August 23, 1943, 50 workers had returned to the Kharkiv Electromechanical Plant, and by the end of the month 2000 Comintern members and 150 employees of the bicycle factory had returned as well.

The workshops of the aviation, train-building, and motor-building plants, as well as the mechanical workshop of the tractor plant and the newly established cable plant, were among the first to resume operations.[20] Their products were needed by the front, which caused their rapid entry into the system.

In addition to heavy industry, the light and food industry enterprises in Kharkiv also played a crucial role in the city's reconstruction. These industries were responsible for producing essential goods and products needed for daily life. The reopening of the soap factory, the M. Shchors Woodworking Plant, and the Zhovten Confectionery

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16 Ivanov S. 2011, 14.

17 KIM.R. part 2, 297.

18 KIM.R. part 3, 24, 28.

19 Yarmysh O. (ed.), 2004, 360.

20 Yarmysh O. (ed.), 2004, 361.

Factory (now known respectively as the private industrial and trading firm YUSI, the Kharkivderev open joint stock company, and the Kharkivyanka confectionery factory) in September 1943 marked a significant step in resuming the production of goods that were in high demand by the population.[21]

Scientists and specialists from various enterprises were actively involved in the restoration of electricity. The initial supply of electrical current for radio and telegraph needs was obtained from the restored engine of the Institute for Mechanical Machine Engineering, which later became in 1949 part of the Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute. Some residents of the city began receiving electricity at the beginning of September through a train with installed power-generator that arrived from Moscow. On September 5, the first electric generator was put into operation, producing a current of 5000 kW. Simultaneously, efforts were made to repair other critical infrastructure – the water main, sewage system, tram tracks, and trolleybus carriages were undergoing repairs to ensure the smooth functioning of transportation and utilities.[22]

In parallel with the restoration of enterprises, the reopening of schools was a significant step towards normalising daily life in Kharkiv. On September 5, 1943, classes resumed in schools across the city. It is worth noting that at that time, 55 schools were teaching in Ukrainian and only 22 in Russian.[23] Given the circumstances and the need to provide skilled labour for the factories, many teenagers, particularly those who had experienced the occupation, were directed to attend trade schools at various industrial plants. This measure aimed to equip them with practical skills and contribute to the workforce needs of the factories.[24]

In October, higher education institutions in Kharkiv, including the university, polytechnic, pedagogical, agricultural, and other institutes, resumed their classes. All applicants who had completed their full secondary education were admitted to the first year of their respective programs without the need for entrance exams. This was done to expedite the educational process and provide an opportunity for individuals to continue their studies without undue delay.

As the approaching frosts, which were already being felt in October, became more severe, the issue of heating industrial and residential premises was brought to the attention of local authorities. To address this problem, the management of the enterprises sent out special teams to cut down trees in nearby forests or acquire coal from the Donbas region. While the management of enterprises and institutions provided coal to their employees, the supply was insufficient. As a result, people resorted to burning books, furniture, and anything else that could produce heat. However,

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21 Yarmysh O. (ed.), 2004, 361.

22 Yarmysh O. (ed.), 2004, 360.

23 Yarmysh O. (ed.), 2004, 362.

24 Posohov S. 2012, 486.

as time went on, boiler rooms for heating were gradually established, and by the end of the war, the problem of heating apartments was resolved, and the need for such extreme measures disappeared.

In October 1943, several cultural institutions in Kharkiv were restarted or opened despite the challenging circumstances. Among them were eight cinemas, the Theatre of Musical Comedy, the Music and Drama Theatre T.H. Shevchenko, the Conservatory (now known as the Kharkiv National Kotlyarevsky University of Arts), the Historical Museum, and 21 libraries, including the esteemed Korolenko State Scientific Libraryo.[25]

1944 brought forth new challenges. Those who had been evacuated in 1941 began to return home in large numbers. The rapid growth of the city's population further complicated the already tense situation regarding food, housing, and other domestic matters. As a result of wave of returning evacuees in early 1945, the population swelled to 460,000 people (nearly 2.5 times the figure in August 1943),[26] and there was still a lack of habitable premises. There were instances where apartment owners returned home after the occupation only to find that someone else had been living in their apartments. This naturally led to conflicts, and many of these cases ended up in court proceedings. In the memoirs of engineer I. Shamrai, an incident of this nature is recounted:

> As we walked up the stairs, we encountered Kateryna Ivanovna Sighidina coming from our apartment. It turns out she lives in our apartment with her son, and she has returned and let us into the living kitchen. [...] On the ground floor [where she used to live], she was constantly bothered, so she moved to our apartment.[27]

It is important to note that the quality of housing during that time remained low, and not everyone was fortunate enough to move into or return to habitable homes. Many people received dilapidated apartments and had to undertake repairs at their own expense. The majority of the population lived in small apartments, where they slept tightly packed like herrings in a can. Even if some apartments had relatively more space in terms of area, living conditions were still cramped due to issues such as missing glass in windows or parts of the ceiling, etc.[28] The dwellings lacked basic amenities such as water, toilets, heating, and electricity. Apartments that were unsuitable for habitation became dumping grounds for garbage. Furthermore, some rubble and basements served as makeshift toilets, while corpses lay beneath the debris,

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25 Yarmysh O. (ed.), 2004, 363.

26 Posohov S. 2012, 16–17.

27 Posohov S. 2012, 442.

28 Posohov S. 2012, 442.

emitting a lingering odour until mid-September 1943. The houses were infested with parasites, including bedbugs, cockroaches, mice, and rats, which were extremely challenging to eradicate.[29]

According to the recollections of the family of biologists and professors of Gorky State University (now known as V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University) Yurii Prokudin and Oleksandra Matvienko, they were assigned a new apartment when they were called to the city to work in an educational institution. They described the apartment in the following manner:

> Only one smaller room was deemed suitable for habitation – it was somewhat isolated from the outside world, with two doors and a window frame made entirely of glass. But a part of the ceiling in it had collapsed onto the ceiling joists, the walls had cracks, and a portion of the parquet flooring was torn off.[30]

The issue of food shortages remained a pressing concern. To address this, a resolution was passed to allocate plots of land for vegetable gardens to those who were willing. Departments of labor supplies were established in major enterprises to improve the nutrition of workers. Many factories, plants, institutions, organisations, and educational institutions in the suburban areas established subsidiary farms where they cultivated grains and vegetables and raised livestock. The resulting products were then supplied to canteens and distributed among the workers.

During the difficult times of hunger in Kharkiv, the people found a traditional way to alleviate their hunger by consuming sunflower seeds. V. Rybalov recounted: 'During the two-year famine under the German occupation, the population became so accustomed to shelling seeds that they did it at home, on the streets, and even in theatres'.[31] In the morning janitors cleaned the streets, and a significant portion of the garbage collected consisted of seed husks.[32]

Other republics of the Soviet Union played a crucial role in assisting Kharkiv Oblast in its efforts to rebuild the economy. Support came in the form of agricultural equipment and over 30,000 head of livestock from Russia and Kazakhstan. On September 18, 1943, a shipment of 959 tons of flour arrived from Saratov (Saratov Region, Russia). The Republic of Georgia contributed medicines, equipment, and medical personnel to work in hospitals.[33] Food, construction materials, machinery, and other essential supplies were sent to the city from various regions across the country.

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29 Posohov S. 2012, 442; KIM.R. part 2, 298; KIM.R. part 3, 83.

30 Posohov S. 2012, 439.

31 KIM.R. part 3, 96.

32 KIM.R. part 3, 96.

33 KIM.R. part 3, 30; Diakova O. 2013, 32; *Pisliavoienne vidnovlennia*.

In the spring of 1944, the city committee of the party issued a resolution stating that each worker should contribute 100 hours of work throughout the year towards the restoration efforts.[34] In other words, every resident was expected to work additional hours without pay to contribute to the reconstruction of the city.[35] Despite the voluntary nature of this duty, it was not seen as a burden because it was undertaken for the revival of their own city. Such work was performed, as a rule, on Sundays. In 1943 alone, young people dedicated 30,000 hours of their time on such voluntary Sundays (in Ukrainian *nedíl'nyky*).[36]

Despite ongoing hostilities in the Western regions, Kharkiv enterprises began transitioning towards the production of goods essential for civilian life in 1944. In August, KhTZ resumed production of tractors. The Hammer and Sickle plant began manufacturing threshers, while the surveying tools plant started producing tools for mines in the Donbas and Kryvbas regions (Kryvorizkyi Iron Ore Basin).

However, the pace of reconstruction in Kharkiv slowed down during this year, primarily due to the demands of the ongoing war and the necessity to rebuild other regions that had been liberated from Nazi occupation. As a result of the government allocating 283.6 million karbovanets for industrial construction, 615 enterprises were put into operation by the end of World War II.[37] But it is important to note that not all of these 625 establishments were large-scale enterprises.

Conclusion

In conclusion, it can be argued that the primary objectives between liberation of the city and the end of the war were the reconstruction of the economy and the resolution of social issues. Securing housing, improving nutrition, and providing medical assistance were crucial in enhancing labor productivity. The local leadership capitalised on the people's sense of liberation and the belief in victory over Nazism, mobilising citizens to engage in unpaid work outside of regular working hours and take independent responsibility for household matters such as apartment repairs and pest control. Despite the additional burdens placed on the residents, they did not resent the city authorities for these measures. They were motivated by the desire to establish a normal life as quickly as possible and viewed the inconveniences as temporary setbacks.

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34 KIM.R. part 3, 170.

35 Posohov S. 2012, 447.

36 Yarmysh O. (ed.), 2004, 366.

37 Yarmysh O. (ed.) 2004, 367.

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Population Losses in the Wola Area During the Warsaw Uprising 1944
A Review of Research and an Attempt at Balance

Summary: This article reviews the research of Stanisław Płoski and Ewa Śliwińska, Adam Borkiewicz, Hanns von Krannhals, Maria Turlejska, Antoni Przygoński, Joanna Hanson, Maja Motyl and Stanisław Rutkowski, Piotr Gursztyn, Norbert Bączyk and Grzegorz Jasiński and Hubert Kuberski, which indicates that there were between 10,000 and 57,600 victims of the Wola massacre. A comparative analysis of mass executions in Rumbula near Riga, Babyn Yar near Kyiv, and executions carried out as part of the 'Ertnefest' operation has shown that the German forces in Wola were sufficient to exterminate even up to approximately 60,000 people. It was also demonstrated that the Wola district covered the area west of Towarowa and Okopowa streets, composed of 14 statistical districts belonging to 7 police districts. The estimated population of Wola in the summer of 1944 was approximately 100,000 people – potential victims of mass executions. The above findings indicate the need to develop a new methodological proposal and conduct further research on the number of population losses in Wola in 1944.

**Keywords**: Warsaw Uprising of 1944, massacre of Wola, mass executions, population

I consider absurd the claim of the Polish side that on 5 August 1944, in the Wola district alone, 38,000 Poles were killed. I doubt whether Poles were able to provide the correct data on the losses in Warsaw at all. As far as I am aware, most of such data is based on estimates resulting from the comparison of the population numbers at the beginning and end of the uprising. (...) In fact, I would point out that under

the existing conditions, killing 38,000 people in one day seems to me even technically impossible. Besides, such an event could not be hidden from other services and would have been reflected in the sources I have analysed. Finally, according to my knowledge of conditions in Warsaw, it seems very doubtful whether there were 38,000 people living in Wola district at that time.

Hanns von Krannhals, 23 September 1958.[1]

1 – 6000, August 5; 2 – 4500 , August 5–8; 3 – 4000, August 5–8; 4 – 2500, August 5–7; 5 – 2000, August 6; 6 – 2000, August 5; 7 – 1500, August 5; 8 – 1200, August 5; 9 – 1000, August 5; 10 – 1000, August 5; 11 – 700, August 5; 12 – 600, August 1–10; 13 – 500, August 5–8; 14 – 500, August 5; 15 – 500, August 5; 16 – 500, August 5–7; 17 – 500, August 5; 18 – 500, August 5; 19 – 500, August 5; 20 – 400, August 5–6; 21 – 400, August 5–17; 22 – 300, August 5; 23 – 100, August 5; 24 – 100, August 5; 25 – 100, August 1–10; 26 – 100, August 9–11; 27 – 100, August 5; 28 – 100, August 5; 29 – 100, August 5; 30 – 100, August 5; 31 – 100, August 3; 32 – 100, August 5; 33 – 100, August; 34 – 100, August; 35 – 65, August 5; 36 – 50, August 5; 37 – 50, August 5; 38 – 50, August; 39 – 50, August 4; 40 – 45, August 5; 41 – 40, August-September; 42 – 36, August 3; 43 – 30, August 5; 44 – 30, August; 45 – 23, August 5; 46 – 20, August 3–8; 47 – 20, August 2–9; 48 – 15, August 6; 49 – 15, August 5–7; 50 – 15, August 5; 51 – 11, August 5–6; 52 – 7, August 2; 53 – 6, August 1; 54 – 6, August 1; 55 – 5, August 3; 56 – 4, August 5–6; 57 – 2, August 6; 58 – 2, August 5; 59 – 1, August 5; 60 – unknown, August 1; 61 – unknow, August 6

Fig. 1. Executions of civilians in Wola during Warsaw Uprising in 1944 with estimated number of victims in each place of execution (source: Author's own work, based on: Motyl M., Rutkowski S. 1994)

1 LASH, quote from: Marti P. 2016, 165.

In many respects, the author of this article does not share the position of the German historian Hanns Krannhals presented in the introduction to this paper and formulated 65 years ago, and is aware of the possible ethical objection to placing the aforementioned figure in the role of a kind of arbiter in matters of the mass murders committed against the Polish population by the German pacification forces during the 1944 Warsaw Uprising. Despite the above-mentioned reservations, in the author's opinion, the quoted excerpt very aptly captures the issue of the state of research on the number of victims of the 1944 Wola Massacre, both in relation to research conducted several decades ago and to that undertaken today. Krannhals points to three key issues regarding the study on the number of victims: first, the methodology of calculation, second, the technical feasibility of the execution of the assumed number of individuals, and third, the reference of the estimated number of victims to the number of inhabitants of Wola in that period. All of these issues, although at varying degrees for different periods, are reflected in the academic discussion that has been going on for almost eight decades.

In the first part of the paper, the author will carry out a review of research on the number of victims of the Wola massacre in 1944, taking into consideration the methodology adopted by individual researchers from the 1950s until the publications from the third decade of the 21st century. The second part of the paper will be dedicated to a comparative analysis of the ratio of the perpetrators' forces to the number of victims of the most numerous mass executions from World War II. The third part will present the current state of research on the area of Wola district in the pre-war period and the population of this area. The paper will conclude with a summary of findings in the above areas of research and a presentation of the most important conclusions and research proposals. The spatial distribution of the analysed events is illustrated in the attached map (see: Fig. 1).

Review of research

At the beginning of this section, the author of this paper hastens to explain that he is aware of the vastness of source resource material and the abundance of literature on the 1944 Warsaw Uprising,[2] including the events in Wola[3]. Therefore, the comments presented here should be read with the proviso that they concern only selected publications in this area of study. The criterion for their selection was the matter of presenting calculations made by their authors or – in the opinion of the author of this paper – their important contribution to the discussion regarding the number of victims of the 1944 Wola Massacre.

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2 Utracka K. 2018, 33–67.
3 Utracka K. 2020, 95–104; Jerzak M. 2017, 89–106.

The first publication presenting data on the number of victims of mass executions of residents of Wola is a list of places and numbers of victims of individual mass executions in Warsaw in the years 1939–1944 published and edited by Stanisław Płoski and Ewa Śliwińska on the basis of records containing witness accounts collected by the Main Commission for the Investigation of German Crimes in Poland (Polish: *Główna Komisja Badania Zbrodni Hitlerowskich w Polsce*).[4] Although this publication does not provide the total number of victims for Wola from the period of the Warsaw Uprising, it contains data for 43 locations of mass executions from August and September 1944 in the Wola area.[5] In the case of 6 items on the list, the number of victims was determined to be unknown, and in 7 cases – probably according to witnesses – was described using unspecified numerals 'several thousand', 'several hundred', and 'several dozen'. Based on dictionary definitions contemporary to the discussed events[6] as well as contemporary linguistic analyses,[7] we may legitimately assign specific ranges of numerical values to the above-mentioned expressions, i.e., 'several thousand' = 2–10 thousand, 'several hundred' = 200–900, and 'several dozen' = 20–99. Given the average values of the indicated numerical ranges, i.e., respectively 2,000–10,000 = mean value of 6,000, 200–900 = mean value of 550, 20–99 = mean value of 60, it will be correct to use the average values adopted by Maja Motyl and Stanisław Rutkowski, i.e., respectively: several thousand = 5,000, several hundred = 500, and several dozen = 50.[8] After recalculating the number of victims according to the assumptions presented above, we obtain a figure of around 24,450 victims from 36 execution sites and an unknown number of victims from 6 execution sites.

In 1957, in the wave of the 1956 political thaw, the first monograph on the Warsaw Uprising, written by Adam Borkiewicz,[9] was published. It estimated the number of victims of the Wola Massacre as 'over 38,000'.[10] Adam Borkiewicz was the first author to name a certain number of victims of the events that took place in Wola in August 1944 but unfortunately, he did not provide any specific sources or methodology used by him to calculate the number of the assumed victims. We can only assume that the basis for his assessment could have been the archival resources of the former Home Army Headquarters, to which Borkiewicz had access during the period of work at the Institute of National Remembrance between 1946 and 1949, before they were confiscated by the organs of the communist terror apparatus.[11]

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4 Płoski S., Śliwińska E. 1951, 81–97.

5 For the determination of the Wola area, see part 3.

6 Szober S. 1948, 131, 312.

7 Duszkin M. 2010, 13, 18, 41 *et seq.*

8 Motyl M., Rutkowski S. 1994, 11.

9 Borkiewicz A. 2018.

10 Borkiewicz A. 2018, 287.

11 *Adam Józef Borkiewicz…*

In 1960, the third volume of Władysław Pobóg-Malinowski's *Najnowsza historia polityczna Polski 1864–1945* was published in London, which described the events in Wola in 1944 as a 'monstrous slaughter of the population'. Pobóg-Malinowski, writing in exile, did not provide his own estimate of the number of victims in Wola in 1944, but referred to the number of 38,000 victims provided by Adam Borkiewicz, noting that these calculations may have been 'slightly overestimated'.[12]

Two years later, the first monograph of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising in German was published by Hanns von Krannhals in western Germany.[13] The author, who was involved in the post-war trials of Nazi dignitaries and who was aware of the state of research at the time, argued on various issues with the findings of Polish researchers, including the figure of 38,000 victims of the Wola Massacre indicated by Adam Borkiewicz.[14] Krannhals refers to Pobóg-Malinowski's scepticism with regard to the number of 38,000 Polish victims in Wola and, as an objection, named the failure to indicate sources constituting the basis for calculating this number. The German historian reduces the number of victims of the Wola Massacre to 'over 15,000' but also does not indicate any specific sources on which he based his estimates.[15] The only element of the revealed methodology of Krannhals' estimation is the reference of the number of victims of the Wola Massacre compared to the total number of victims of the Warsaw Uprising. The German author assumes that war crimes committed by the pacification forces of the Third Reich in Wola accounted for 10% of the total number of civilians murdered in August and September 1944, accepted to be 150,000 based on the data given by Polish researchers.[16] However, Hans von Krannhals does not give justification for the reason why the figure of 15,000 he adopted in his work and the percentage of 10% of the total number of victims in Warsaw is more appropriate than the figure of 38,000 estimated by Borkiewicz, giving a percentage of 25% of the total number of victims.

On the 30th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, the magazine "Polityka" published an article by Maria Turlejska presenting excerpts from 2 reports from August 1944 prepared by Hauptsturmführer Adolf Feucht, the first commander of Einsatzkommando in Wola.[17] In this article, Turlejska analyses a fragment of the report from 11 August 1944, which says that 450 executions were carried out (German: *Erschiessungen*) in the period from 6 to 10 August 1944. She points out that the figure refers to

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12 Pobóg-Malinowski W. 1960, 679.

13 Krannhals von H. 1962.

14 It should be noted that Krannhals' polemic with the position of Polish researchers regarding the number of victims of the Wola Massacre in 1944, presented in his book from 1962, has been significantly mitigated against the criticism presented in the testimony given before the prosecutor's office in Flensburg in 1958, a fragment of which was presented at the beginning of this paper.

15 Krannhals von H. 1962, 307–308.

16 Krannhals von H. 1962, 214.

17 Turlejska M. 1974, 27. See: Dunin-Wąsowicz K. 1988, 35.

'450 executions'[18] and not to '450 executed'.[19] The author's interpretation is supported by the fact that the term is applied in this sense today to the events in question.[20] On the basis of the number of 450 executions, Turlejska estimates the number of victims of the Wola Massacre in 1944 as 'around 20,000 people'. She based the above estimate on the product of the number of 450 shootings and the number of victims of individual shootings ranging from 20 to over 500 people. However, she does not indicate the average number of victims of individual executions she adopts for her calculations or where she draws information in this respect.

Six years later, Antoni Przygoński published a new monograph on the Warsaw Uprising of 1944,[21] in which he described the number of victims of the Wola Massacre as 59,400 people murdered in mass executions, for a total of more than 65,000 people when counted together with other victims.[22] This estimate of the amount of population losses was calculated on the basis of separate estimates of the number of victims of individual mass executions on 5–7 August 1944, amounting, according to Przygoński, respectively, to 45,500 people, 10,100 people, and 3,800 people per day. It should be noted that according to the data provided by Antoni Przygoński, in the case of 1,800 people, mass executions took place in places located to the east of Towarowa Street – and thus in the area of the Northern Śródmieście. This way, the number of victims of the Wola Massacre should be reduced to 57,600. Przygoński drew the above-mentioned number of victims for the period of 5–7 August 1944 from three sources: the already mentioned article by Płoski and Śliwińska from 1951,[23] the publication of the Civic Committee for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites in the city of Warsaw (Polish: Obywatelski Komitet Ochrony Pomników Walki i Męczeństwa w M. St. Warszawie) from 1966,[24] and the publication of the Council for the Protection of Struggle and Martyrdom Sites (Polish: Rada Ochrony Pamięci Walk i Męczeństwa) of the same year.[25] These publications are not only completely devoid of references to specific sources but also for some locations give only approximate data while in other cases they give different, divergent figures. Unfortunately, Antoni Przygoński did not address the issue of the

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18 This term was interpreted in the same manner by a team of translators and editors of the source edition published under the supervision of Emilia Borecka. See: Borecka E. et al. (eds) 1994, 42–42. In this sense, they are also quoted by Piotr Gursztyn. See: Gursztyn P. 2015, 223.

19 Norbert Bączyk and Grzegorz Jasiński present this position stating that 450 people were shot. However, the authors do not refer to the views of Maria Turlejska, Emilia Borecka, and Piotr Gursztyn on this issue. See: Bączyk N., Jasiński G. 2020, 52, footnote 37.

20 The announcement of the German administration in Lublin of 21 April 1944 uses the following phrase: 'despite public warnings and threats to shoot people (German: Erschiessung von Personen)'. See: USHMM.

21 Przygoński A. 1988.

22 Przygoński A. 1988, 320. In footnote 146 on page 320, the author refers to key publications for the state of research on the number of victims of the 1944 Wola Massacre.

23 Płoski S., Śliwińska E. 1951.

24 Kur T. (ed.) 1966.

25 *Przewodnik* 1966.

reliability of the data sources he used in his work, nor did he indicate the methodology he applied when converting them into specific numbers mentioned in his book. Furthermore, to the aforementioned numbers of victims of 5–7 August 1944, he adds over 5,000 more victims of individual executions, bombings, fires, etc. between 4 and 15 August 1944, but without indicating the basis or method of making such estimates.[26]

In 1989, a book by the British historian Joanna K.M. Hanson on the fate of civilians in the Warsaw Uprising was published in Poland[27] which described the number of victims of the Wola Massacre as 'between 30 and 40 thousand'.[28] In her book, the author draws attention to the low probability of finding sources containing reliable information giving directly the total amount of population losses in Wola in 1944, as well as the expected incompleteness of the preserved accounts and testimonies of witnesses in relation to all events that took place at that time, as a result of the fact that in the case of some of the executions there were no surviving witnesses. Despite these reservations, the author presents her own calculations based on figures from witnesses' testimonies. Hanson estimates that the total number of victims of mass executions to be 'as high as 30,000', which, together with several thousand victims of other shootings and fires, in her opinion adds up to a figure 'ranging from 30 to 40 thousand'. However, the author does not indicate the specific collections of accounts on which she bases her calculations, nor the basis for estimating the number of victims as several thousand apart from mass executions.[29]

On the 50th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, the work of Maja Motyl and Stanisław Rutkowski was published in which the authors presented, in alphabetical order, a list of addresses, places of mass and individual executions of civilians during the Warsaw Uprising of 1944. Although the authors did not summarise the number of victims in the Wola area, after extracting data for 176 locations located in Wola and calculating the approximate data,[30] we reach the number of approximately 40,000 victims and 9 other locations for which the analysed sources did not provide even an approximate number of victims. Among the literature published to date, Motyl and Rutkowski's publication stands out due to the extensive archival search in the resources kept by the contemporary Institute of National Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish Nation (Polish: Instytut Pamięci Narodowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi Polskiemu) and numerous

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26 Przygoński A. 1988, 290–320.

27 Hanson J.K.M. 2004. Originally published in English in 1982, see: Hanson J.K.M. 1982.

28 Hanson J.K.M. 2004, 48.

29 Hanson J.K.M. 2004, 47–48. The author quotes numerical findings from selected publications on the state of research at the time on the number of victims of the 1944 Wola Massacre.

30 Motyl M., Rutkowski S. 1994, 13. According to the methodology proposed by the authors, the following method was used to convert unspecified numbers into numerical values: 'several' = 5, 'dozen' = 15, 'tens' = 50, 'hundreds' = 500, 'several thousand' = 5,000. See: the remarks in the third paragraph of part 1 of this paper.

court archives. In terms of the list of locations where events took place, this is in fact the first publication of a strictly scientific nature, indicating the source basis for each of the presented locations. Although Maja Motyl and Stanisław Rutkowski did not carry out a detailed analysis of the collected source information, they provided subsequent researchers with valuable material for further studies.[31]

On the 70th anniversary of the Warsaw Uprising, the first synthesis of the history of the 1944 Wola Massacre was published by Piotr Gursztyn. Based on a wide range of researched materials and written in an accessible manner, it has significantly contributed to the popularisation of the history of these tragic events among a wide audience, competently presenting a broad spectrum of research issues.[32] Piotr Gursztyn refers to the existing differences between researchers' positions on the number of victims of the 1944 Wola Massacre. Gursztyn rejects the figure of 15,000, arguing that its author Hanns von Krannhals is not very reliable, and at the same time points to the work of Antoni Przygoński as the most plausible calculation, despite the fact that it is partly based on the accounts of people who were not direct witnesses to the events. In Piotr Gursztyn's opinion, the number of 59 thousand victims given by Przygoński 'should be slightly reduced', but he expresses doubts about the possibility of finding a more precise method of calculation.[33]

In 2020, a book by Norbert Bączyk and Grzegorz Jasiński dedicated to German special weapons used to suppress the Warsaw Uprising was published. Its authors consider the previous estimates of the number of victims of the Wola Massacre to be 'significantly overestimated' and, based on Reinefarth's testimony, are inclined to accept a figure of 'over 10,000 people', supporting the proposed estimates with the fact that 'Wola during the war was inhabited by 30 thousand people'. However, they do not provide the source on which they base this claim, nor do they specify the area of which administrative units they consider to belong to the Wola district during this period. In addition, the authors – taking the calculations given by Bączyk and Jasiński literally – state that a significant part (20,000 people) of the inhabitants of the area in question 'hearing about the murders fled to Śródmieście' or 'to the countryside'. In this respect, the authors also failed to indicate the source basis or methodology they adopted in their calculations.[34]

In 2021, Hubert Kuberski published an article presenting the participation of Dirlewanger's unit in the mass executions of Wola's population in August 1944, in which the number of victims of the Wola Massacre was estimated to be about

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31 The data from the study of Maja Motyl and Stanisław Rutkowski served for the author of this to visualise the spatial distribution of the analysed events. See: Fig. 1.

32 Gursztyn P. 2015.

33 Gursztyn P. 2015, 305–306.

34 Bączyk N., Jasiński G. 2020, 52, including footnote 37.

15 thousand people. Kuberski relied on calculations compiled by Marek Strok based on an extensive source search, but did not explain the methodology adopted by the author he quoted.[35]

a – Płoski S., Śliwińska E. 1951; b – Borkiewicz A. 1957; c – Krannhals von H. 1962;
d – Turlejska M. 1974; e – Przygoński A. 1988; f – Hanson J.K.M. 1989; g – Motyl M., Rutkowski S. 1994;
h – Bączyk N., Jasiński G. 2020; i – Kuberski H. 2022

Chart 1. The estimated number of population losses in the Wola district during the Warsaw Uprising in 1944 (source: Author's own work)

In view of the presented discrepancies (see: Chart 1), in the opinion of the author of this paper, it seems reasonable to analyse the question of the 'technical feasibility' in terms of the postulated numerical estimates and to clarify the understanding of the territorial extent of Wola, as well as to estimate the population of the area in the period before the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising. These issues are presented in the next part of this paper.

'Technical feasibility' of the execution of the assumed number of victims and the number of German forces

It is not determined in numbers. To this day, it is not known exactly which troops carried out the shootings. I don't believe in 35,000, because it was even technically impossible, there weren't enough people on our side, and after all, they were fighting there and these people were not waiting, they would have had to be captured.

<div align="right">Heinz Reinefarth, Sylt Island, winter 1973.[36]</div>

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35 Kuberski H. 2021, 173–174.

36 Kąkolewski K. 1975, 98–99.

The above-quoted declaration by the commander of the group of German pacification forces responsible for the war crimes committed against the inhabitants of Wola in August 1944 details the issue of the 'technical feasibility' of the extermination of the postulated number of victims raised by Hanns von Krannhals in the statement cited at the beginning of this paper. Leaving aside the analysis of SS-Gruppenführer Reinefarth's attempts to relativise the scale of the perpetrated crime and thus reduce his personal responsibility in this regard, it is worth focusing on the issue raised here concerning the purported inadequacy of the German forces to carry out the execution of 35,000 victims in 2 days.[37] When considering this issue, it is worth conducting a comparative analysis of other mass executions of civilians carried out by the German occupation forces in Central and Eastern Europe during World War II.

On 29–30 September 1941, in Babyn Yar near Kyiv, German forces carried out mass executions of the Jewish population deported from Kyiv. The direct executors were members of a group of about 50 men from Sonderkommando 4a together with part of the Einsatzgruppe C staff. About 1,500 policemen and SS men from the Police Regiment South consisting of Police Battalions 45,303, and probably 314 were responsible for ensuring the security of the execution site and the deportation route.[38] According to the official report on the activities of Einsatzkommando in the USSR, which Reinhard Heydrich handed over to Joachim Ribbentrop on 25 November 1941, the number of victims was 33,771 individuals.[39]

On 30 November and 8 December 1941, German forces exterminated Jews from the ghetto in Riga, deporting and murdering about 25,000 people in the nearby village of Rumbula. The German forces involved in this action consisted of about 70 members of the Sonderkommando and Einsatzkommando 2, from among whom a squad of a dozen or so men were selected to carry out the executions directly. There were also about 1,700 German and Latvian policemen securing the execution area and the deportation route and separating the remaining 4,500 Jews into the ghetto.[40]

In turn, as part of the operation 'Ertnefest', on 3–4 November 1943 the German occupation forces exterminated Jewish prisoners from the main camp in Majdanek and its sub-camps in Lublin, Poniatowa, and Trawniki. In this case, the number of victims is estimated at about 42 thousand people.[41] The German forces participating in the mass executions included about 100 SS men and policemen directly carrying out the shootings and 500 members of the 101st Reserve Police Battalion securing the camp

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37 Reinefarth's statement quoted in this paper was made in response to Krzysztof Kąkolewski's question about 35 thousand victims executed on 5–6 August 1944. See: Kąkolewski K. 1975, 98.

38 Berkhoff K. et al. (eds) 2018, 63; *The Order Police…*; *Mass shootings…*

39 DHM, 18.

40 Gładysiak Ł. 2012, 131–138.

41 *Operation 'Harvest Festival'…*

grounds and deportation routes. The total number of SS and police forces in Lublin and the surrounding area at that time amounted to about 2 thousand people.[42]

Chart 2. Comparison of selected mass executions in Central and Eastern Europe during World War II (source: Author's own work)

The examples cited above (see: Chart 2) prove that, with the involvement of groups of direct executors of 50 to 100 people and the support of a security force of 1,500 to 2,000 people, it was technically feasible to exterminate between 25,000 and 42,000 people in 2 days.

It should be noted that the number of German pacification forces operating in Wola in the first days of August in 1944 was respectively 1,000 people on 4 August and 2,297 people on 5 August, on 6 August these forces were further strengthened by additional several hundred people, and on 8 August they numbered 2,640 people.[43] Hubert Kuberski believes that the forces directly involved in the mass executions on 5 August numbered 497 people.[44] Although in order to finally determine this question a detailed research of the extremely extensive archival resources will have to be carried out, there are some premises indicating that other German units were also involved in the war crimes in Wola.[45] In summary, it should be stated that between 2,297 and 2,640 German

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42 Browning C.R. 2001, 142; Chmielewski J.

43 Kuberski H. 2021, 144. On 6 August 1944, German troops were joined by the second battalion of the Dirlewanger Brigade and the 6 companies of field gendarmerie and battalion from 608th security regiment kept in reserve. See: Krannhals von H. 1962, document no. 24.

44 Kuberski H. 2021, 144, footnote 15.

45 The Peterburs battalion of 497 people and Col. Schmidt's battalion of the 608th security regiment with up to 618 people (as of 20 August, See: Krannhals von H. 1962, document no. 40). See: Gursztyn P. 2015, 354–355; Mierecki P., Christoforow W. (eds) 2007, 685. Hubert Kuberski presented

forces were operating in the Wola area on 5–8 August 1944, of whom at least 500 were directly involved in the extermination of the civilian population.

Being aware of the differences in the conditions in which mass executions were carried out in specific places,[46] it can be stated that in comparison with the German forces from Kyiv, Riga, and Lublin numbering 1,500–2,000 people who executed 25,000–42,000 civilians in 2 days, the German pacification forces in Wola in the period 5–8 August 1944 numbering 2,297–2,640 people were more than 25% more numerous and had at least twice as much time at their disposal, and thus the thesis that it was not 'technically feasible' to execute 35,000 or even 65,000 individuals should be considered unjustified. An important element of the analysis of the possible amount of population losses in Wola district in Warsaw is the question of the number of inhabitants of this district on the eve of the discussed tragic events. Thus, the next part of this paper is dedicated to this issue.

The area of Wola district and its population at the beginning of August 1944

In the past, until 1945, Wola, in accordance with the administrative organisation of previous years, was defined as the area between Towarowa and Okopowa streets from the east and Budziszyńska and Bodzanta streets, the western border of the Wolski Cemetery, Olbrachta and Księcia Janusza streets from the west, stretching from the cross-city railway line in the south to the Tatarska and Powązkowska Streets in the north.

Karol Mórawski, 1994[47]

This fragment of the study by Karol Mórawski, a Varsavianist and long-time director of the Wola Museum, does not claim to exhaust all complex issues related to the history of the village of Wielka Wola and the later Warsaw district of Wola, but only serves to answer the question of its area in the period preceding the outbreak of

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a hypothesis that 2.5 of the Schutzpolizei companies in the number of 341 people and 1 Gendarmerie company in the number of 155 people may be the same as the 497 people of the Peterburs battalion, but apart from the convergence of numbers, Kuberski does not provide any additional arguments in support of this thesis. See: Kuberski H. 2021, 144, footnote 15.

46 The question of determining the impact of individual elements on the possible number of victims of mass executions requires a separate study, but it should be noted that some of the conditions prevailing in Wola in the first days of August 1944 certainly favoured an increase in the number of victims. These were, among others, the greater number of hours of daylight, making it more difficult for the victims to hide, the lack of necessity to separate the victims from the rest of the population, the lack of necessity to transport the victims to the place of execution due to the fact that executions were carried out in the victims' place of residence or in the immediate vicinity, the dispersed nature of the buildings, especially in the western part of this district, making it easier to surround the houses and making it more difficult for people to hide and escape, etc.

47 Mórawski K. 1994, 9–10.

Fig. 2. The boundaries of Wola district projected on the plan of the Capital City of Warsaw from 1919 showing the division into State Police commissariats (source: BN 1919)

the Warsaw Uprising in 1944. The indicated course of the eastern boundary of the area of Wola, along Towarowa and Okopowa streets, corresponds to the location of Lubomirski's trenches that marked in the 18th and 19th centuries the boundary between Warsaw and its western suburbs,[48] constituting in the pre-war period the demarcation of Wola, located to the west, and Śródmieście Północne (northern city centre district), located to the east of this line.[49] A visible indicator of this division were the former Rogatki Wolskie (Wola Tollhouses), located at the intersection of Towarowa and Chłodna streets, historically associated with the Śródmieście district[50] and Wolska Street (belonging to Wola). The territorial scope of the Wola district outlined above

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48 Tyszkiewicz J. 2000, 8.

49 Mórawski K. 1994, 10.

50 Gursztyn P. 2015, 305.

Fig. 3.
The boundaries of Wola district projected on the plan of the Capital City of Warsaw from 1938 showing the division into statistical districts (source: *Rocznik* 1938, 125, *Podział Warszawy*)

was also reflected in the area of four pre-war Roman Catholic parishes, i.e., St Stanislaus (św. Stanisława), St Adalbert (św. Wojciecha), St Lawrence (św. Wawrzyńca), and St Joseph (św. Józefa).[51] Before the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising in 1944, the territory of the Warsaw Wola district included the area of 7 State Police stations: III Leszno (in part), V Powązki (in part), VI Towarowy (in part), VII Mirowski (in part), XIX Koło, XXII Wola, and XXVI Marymont (in part). The boundaries of the pre-war Wola district are illustrated by the plan of pre-war Warsaw, with the marked location of individual police districts – police stations (see: Fig. 2).[52]

This area corresponded to 14 statistical districts: 24 'Przyokopowa', 24a 'Przyokopowa' (name the same as the previous district), 27 'Rogatki Wolskie', 30 'Opole', 31 'Powązkowski' (in part), 64 'Gazownia Warszawska', 65 'Gniewkowska St.', 66 'Wola Sowińskiego', 67 'Moczydło', 68 'Gazownia', 69 'Opawska St.', 69a unnamed, 70 'Koło', and 71 unnamed. The designation of the Wola area on the grid of statistical districts is illustrated by the fragment of the city plan (see: Fig. 3).[53]

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51 Koprowska M. 2022, map: *Parafie warszawskie w 1944 roku*.

52 BN 1919.

53 *Rocznik* 1938, 125, *Podział Warszawy*.

Table 1. The population of Wola area by statistical districts as of January 1, 1938

Lp.	District No.	District name	Circuit No.	Circuit name	Residential population	including the number of Jews	including the number of Poles	Comments
1.	III	Leszno	30	Opole	11,444	927	10,517	
2.	V	Powązki	31	Powązkowski	6,738	1,375	5,363	northern part of the circuit 31 outside Wola
3.	VI	Towarowy	24	Przyokopowa Street	5,524	133	5,391	
4.	VI	Towarowy	24a	Przyokopowa Street	3,660	205	3,455	
5.	VII	Mirowski	27	Rogatki Wolskie	26,657	4,265	22,392	
6.	XIX	Koło	69+69a	Opawska Stret, no name	5,118	154	4,964	
7.	XIX	Koło	70	Koło	7,741	248	7,493	
8.	XXVI	Marymont	71+72	no name, Skalszczyzna	6,654	586	6,068	district 72 outside Wola
9.	XXII	Wola	65	Gniewkowska Street	3,757	41	3,716	
10.	XXII	Wola	66	Wola – Sowiński Street	11,149	970	10,179	
11.	XXII	Wola	67	Moczydło	6,567	493	6,074	
12.	XXII	Wola	68+64	St. Stanisław, Gazownia Wolska	9,071	717	8,354	
					104,080	**10,111**	**93,969**	

Source: *Rocznik* 1938, 125–131

Detailed information on the population of the Wola area as outlined above is provided by *Rocznik Statystyczny Warszawy* from 1938 (see: Table 1).[54]

Given that part of the 31 Powązki district and the 72 Skalszczyzna district were outside the Wola area, some of the population included in items 2 and 8 were not residents of Wola. By subtracting an estimated 50% of the value of these items, i.e. 6,700 of the resident population, including around 1,000 Jews and around 5,700 Poles, we obtain a figure of around 97,380 of the permanent population of Wola, including around 9,000 Jews and around 88,500 Poles.

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54 *Rocznik* 1938, 125–131.

Chart 3. Population of Wola for the police districts XIX Koło and XXII Wola – statistical districts 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 69a, 70

Source: Kula W. 1984, 216–217; *Rocznik* 1938, 125–131

Chart 4. Population of Wola for parts of the police districts III Leszno, V Powązki, VI Towarowy, VII Mirowski, XXVI Marymont – districts 24, 24a, 27, 30, 31, 71

Source: Kula W. 1984, 216–217; *Rocznik* 1938, 125–131

Due to the limited volume of the article, it is not possible to present all the components of the population change at the end of 1939 and the beginning of 1940, which include the fatalities of the bombing of the city in September 1939 and the internal and external migration of the city's residents. The state of affairs after these changes was documented in a census conducted by the Municipal Board in May 1940. Due to the inclusion of data on the level of police districts, a detailed numerical comparison is possible with respect to the police stations XIX Koło and XXII Wola, covering 8 out of 14 statistical districts of Wola, corresponding to approximately 44.57% of the population of the entire Wola district (see: Chart 3).[55]

The data visualised above show that for the area of police stations XIX Koło and XXII Wola from January 1938 to May 1940, the total population increased by 2,345 people, the Jewish population decreased by 305 people, and the Polish population increased by 2,650 people.

The remaining part of Wola was part of the police districts III Leszno, V Powązki, VI Towarowy, VII Mirowski, and XXVI Marymont, for which between January 1938 and May 1940 the total population increased on average by 5.02%, the percentage of the Jewish population increased by 13.02%, and the percentage of the Polish population decreased by 1.32%. The calculation of the estimated population of this part of Wola based on the average for the entire area (see: Chart 4).[56]

Thus, the population of the entire area of Wola in May 1940 can be estimated at approximately 102,000 permanent residents, including about 10,000 Jews and about 92,000 Poles.

A detailed numerical balance of the displacement of the Jewish population to the ghetto and the displacement of the Polish population from the ghetto area in the second half of 1940, broken down into individual districts, is not known. However, if one were to assume that for Wola the ratio of Polish to Jewish population did not deviate from the average for the whole of Warsaw of 0.8/1,[57] the number of about 10,000 Jews displaced from this district to the ghetto corresponded to about 8,000 Poles displaced from the ghetto to Wola. Thus, at the beginning of 1941, the estimated population of Wola was about 100,000 people.

For the years 1941–1944, we do not have data on changes in the population at the level of individual statistical districts or police districts, but if we were to assume that they did not deviate from the average for the whole of Warsaw[58] – showing a sustained similar number of Polish population – it can be estimated that the number of people living in Wola before the outbreak of the Warsaw Uprising was around 100,000 individuals.

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55 Kula W. 1984, 216–217; *Rocznik* 1938, 125–131.

56 Kula W. 1984, 216–217; *Rocznik* 1938, 125–131.

57 138,000 Jews displaced to the ghetto and 113,000 Poles displaced from the ghetto. See: Szarota T. 2010, 238.

58 About 955,000 Poles in March 1941, about 950,000 in September 1943, for 1944, there are no detailed figures. See: Szarota T. 2010, 61–64.

Based on the calculation presented above, the allegations of a lack of sufficient population in Wola in view of the number of 38,000 or more victims postulated in the literature must be considered unjustified.

Summary

On the basis of the reviewed research results, it must be concluded that, despite the passage of almost 80 years, not only is there no consensus on the number of population losses in Wola during the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, but the existing discrepancies in this regard are even greater, currently ranging from 10,000 to 57,600 victims.

The comparative analysis with other mass executions has shown that the theses put forward by Krannhals and Reinefarth about the lack of 'technical feasibility' of executing 35,000 or 38,000 people due to the inadequacy of the German forces should be regarded to be unfounded, and considering only the question of 'technical feasibility', the number of victims of the Wola Massacre could have been even higher.

As a result of the analysis of the area and population of the Wola district, it was demonstrated that in the pre-war period, Wola covered an area of 14 statistical districts comprising 7 police districts (including 2 in whole and 5 in part). In the period preceding the outbreak of the 1944 Warsaw Uprising, the population of this area can be estimated at about 100,000 people, which allows us to consider as unfounded the allegations that it was impossible to carry out mass executions of 38,000 or more victims.

In the light of the findings presented above, it must be concluded that, despite the passage of almost 80 years since the tragic events discussed in this paper, the question of the amount of population losses in Warsaw's Wola district remains unresolved and it is necessary to develop a new methodological proposal and conduct further research that would allow reaching a reliable estimate in this regard.

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A Symbolic Message About the War in the Photos of Red Army Photo Correspondent Emmanuil Evzerikhin from 1945

Summary: War photography is rarely treated by researchers of the past as a separate historical source. It rarely becomes a subject of in-depth research or separate academic studies. Even if its documentary value is noted, it is considered in the convention of image carriers rather than separate material for analysis. Meanwhile, the source knowledge about the war contained in the photographs allows military historians specialising in decoding it to use it broadly for cognitive purposes. In this paper, the author presents and discusses the symbolic narrative elements contained in the photographs taken in the final stages of World War II by Red Army photo correspondent, Captain Emmanuil Noevich Evzerikhin (*Эммануил Ноевич Евзерихин*). At the same time, the paper shows that the photographer's individual work was harnessed to execute tasks of the military propaganda services.

Keywords: photos, narratives, photo correspondent, Emmanuil Noevich Evzerikhin, Red Army, 1945

There is a Chinese saying that one picture means more than a thousand words. This proverb can still be considered appropriate, if only in explaining the message contained in the examples of Soviet war photography from World War II which is the subject of analysis in this paper. Historically speaking, the dissemination of information about war has for centuries been the domain of specialised services, which are usually an integral part of military or civilian structures that control access to soldiers and the battlefield. Starting with chroniclers and battle painters for hire, who would depict victories in literature and works of art celebrating the rulers while smoothing

over or even omitting news of the defeats they had suffered. Nowadays, however, the activities of military information structures combine the tasks of disseminating the specific message of the armed forces with counter-intelligence activities, actively cooperating with – often independent of the army – mass media, but still regulating access to and generating universal knowledge about war within the limits of the security of the army and the state.

In the years 1941–1945, the military information activities of the Red Army were directed both internally and externally – mainly to the inhabitants of the Soviet Union. It was based on the authoritarian theory of the functioning of media systems commonly used at that time by totalitarian states. The most widespread media providing public information at the time – i.e., newspapers and radio – were subordinated to the Communist Party controlling the Soviet state. The Party allowed only for the publication of its point of view and importunately persuaded soldiers and civilians to its own rationale.[1]

Photography as a way of recording images was invented in the early 19th century, after which, along with the development of printing techniques and widespread education, it found its way into the mass media, also in terms of the journalistic approach. It allowed the press to present social events from all over the world, including the wars fought at that time. The first armed conflict reported in newspapers with the use of photography was the Crimean War of the mid-19th century. Burdened at its beginnings with the problems caused by the need to transport a large box camera and the long exposure time of the metal or glass plates on which the selected image was reproduced, during World War II, reportage photography was already undergoing another stage of its rapid development. It was characterised by the miniaturisation of equipment, small-format cameras and celluloid film rolls coated with light-sensitive silver salts. The technological progress at the time also significantly changed the technology of chemical processing with negatives and making prints on light-sensitive paper, allowing mobile photographic laboratories to be installed, for example, in adapted trucks or railway cars.[2]

In terms of composition and content, the photographs presented war only in its small sections embraced by a two-dimensional, flattened image. The frame, that is, a chosen from reality or posed element of space, captured by the author of the photographs in a single image, contained various elements resulting from the specific circumstances associated with the creation and the intention to present this specific piece. The photographer usually had a personal influence on the selection of the location, the presentation of human figures, and the richness and aesthetics of the elements of

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1 Goban-Klas T. 2002, 167–169.

2 In Poland, the history of military and war photography, partly also Soviet photography from the World War II period, was studied by Henryk Latoś. His most important publications include Latoś H. 1982.

Fig. 1. An example of a victorious weapon being better than the weapon owned by the enemy. The photo shows the Soviet Heavy Howitzer B-4 placed in a combat position. In the archive description, it was incorrectly stated that it was a tank (Photo: E. Evzerikhin, Museum of the Second World War, Gdańsk)

Fig. 2. According to the archival description, the picture shows German prisoners of war. In fact, the men walking under the convoy were civilians deported from Prussia to forced labour in the reconstruction of the Soviet Union. After the war, deportations were a taboo subject for a long time (Photo: E. Evzerikhin, Museum of the Second World War, Gdańsk)

the specifically captured scenery and background. The author could also modify light and shadow, imitate the impression of movement and dynamics of events, and suggest sounds, even smells and flavours accompanying the space captured in the image. Ultimately, a reportage photograph generally included a representation of what was currently visible in the camera lens and was captured by sufficiently long exposure to the photosensitive material. The sequence of several or more photographs could be arranged in a photo reportage, which was readily used in newspapers as a deliberate, carefully selected narrative picture story.[3]

With the further improvement of printing and the evolution of the press able to reproduce a single image in millions of identical copies and therefore reaching many recipients at once with potentially the same symbolic charge and emotions, it was not complicated or difficult for the audiences to understand and adopt the attitudes or behaviours propagated by the printed images. The narrative elements of photography, intentionally quite easily coded and decoded in the symbolic layer, seemed to convince the viewer of the apparent authenticity of events and did not require specific behaviours, but instead encouraged support, participation, or imitation. The recipient of a press photograph usually believed that what was presented in it was an accurate reflection of reality. The ability to persuade the viewers increased with the use of simple symbols, thought stereotypes that cause quick connotations, or references to the viewer's personal experiences.[4]

The archival material described in this paper was used in such abundance for the first time in Poland. A few years ago, the collection of the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk managed to purchase several hundred photographs taken by two Soviet war photo correspondents, Arkadij Szajchet and Emmanuil Evzerikhin, who were both active in the final stage of the conflict with Germany on the Baltic flank of the Red Army's offensive, including in today's northern Poland. The work of the former is already more widely known thanks to the album *Krzywy obraz wojny* from 2019, in which, together with Dimitr Panto, we showed examples of falsifying the image narrative and propaganda features of photographs taken to satisfy the needs of the army.[5] Now, however, focusing on Evzerikhin's works, I have decided to take a closer look at the symbolism of the imagery contained in the war photographs, allowing the viewers of the time to read the information and indoctrination codes that prompted them to uncritically accept news about the war and to react to it as suggested by the dispatchers of information. The photographs presented in print are

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3 Wolny-Zmorzyński K. 2007.

4 At that time, these phenomena were used only instrumentally, today they are more widely studied. Marianna Michałowska writes about the narrative of contemporary documentary photography, using the phrase 'photo-texts'. Michałowska M. 2012.

5 Gliniecki T., Panto D. 2019.

Fig. 3. This time, the caption for the photo corresponded with the actual situation captured by the frame. A column of German military vehicles, including the assault gun inspected by Soviet soldiers, was supposed to testify to the effectiveness of the Red Army's offensive (Photo: E. Evzerikhin, Museum of the Second World War, Gdańsk)

Fig. 4. Industrial technology was captured from the Germans as a symbol of reparations to the Soviet Union. The photo shows a hammer-shaped crane called the 'Grandfather' from the shipyard in Gdańsk. Soon after, it was disassembled by the Red Army's dismantling units and sent by ship to the east, after which it disappeared without a trace (Photo: E. Evzerikhin, Museum of the Second World War, Gdańsk)

a selection of about one hundred frames taken by Evzerikhin in 1945 used for analysis in this paper. They are also only a part of a wider set of photographs taken by Evzerikhin at that time. However, it can be assumed that they represent a collection representative of the whole of his work from that period. In a condensed form, they present the phenomenon of the symbolism of the image as an element directly determining the purpose of the taking of war photography and its usefulness in presenting war events to the society involved in the conflict.[6]

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6 Author would like to thank the Museum of the Second World War in Gdańsk for making the photographs available for research and for agreeing to their publication in this volume.

Emmanuil Noevich Evzerikhin was born in Russia in 1911, still under the rule of the Tsars. He was of Jewish descent and partially assimilated with the multinational Russian society and later Soviet society. He has been dealing with photography since the 1920s, although his talent flourished in 1937 when his original works were noticed at a great state photography exhibition organised on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the October Revolution, which brought the Communists to power. Over time, he gained the trust of his superiors on behalf of the state agency 'Soyuzfoto', and Evzerikhin documented political life in the Kremlin. At that time, he was a candidate for a member of the Bolshevik Communist Party (Communist Party of the Soviet Union – CPSU), trying to win a political mandate and support for himself. After the outbreak of the war with Germany in mid-1941, he was drafted into the Red Army by order of the Supreme Commissariat of Defence, like hundreds of other representatives of Soviet culture, art, and media, who were put in uniforms and assigned to perform specialised tasks at the front.[7]

Evzerikhin has since participated in the war conflict, serving in the ranks of the army as a war correspondent and a documentary photographer recording images for the needs of the Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union (TASS). He took pictures for the state information headquarters, staying on 'several fronts', as Soviet regional combat groups were called at that time. Fortunately, he did not suffer any wounds or serious injuries during the war. During the fighting for East Prussia and Gdańsk in West Prussia (which at that time were parts of German territory), from January to April 1945, he was a photo correspondent for TASS at the 2nd Belorussian Front commanded by Marshal Konstantin Rokossovsky, and then on the neighbouring 3rd Belorussian Front, then under the command of Marshal Aleksandr Vasilevsky. He worked with a camera hung around his neck in the Baltic Sea coastal strip, photographing the captured areas from Danzig (Gdańsk), through Elbing (Elbląg), to Königsberg (Kaliningrad) in today's Russian exclave. Evzerikhin served in the army in the rank of captain-engineer. During the fighting, he fulfilled the orders given to him in the place of taking photographs. On the battlefield, he was directly subordinate to the commanders of the military political structures of a given front and, in general, to the leadership of the state news agency from Moscow.[8]

During the war, the photojournalist received several military decorations, which were awarded to him for his merits in recording appropriate images needed by his superiors. First, he was awarded a medal, 'For the Defence of Stalingrad', because he took some of his best reportage photos in the ruins of this city, symbolically depicting the war. A year later, Evzerikhin was awarded the 'Order of the Red Star' for photographs taken for TASS.[9] That same year he was awarded the 'Order of the Patriotic War'

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7 *Klassik.*

8 *Klassik*.

9 Award letter of Emmanuel Evzerikhin, CAMD, fund 33, inventory 686044, storage unit 4456.

of the 2ⁿᵈ class. With the latter, the application for the award was filed by Colonel David Weisband[10] of the 2ⁿᵈ Belorussian Front artillery command, who pointed out the very different requirements of the work of military photographers from the 'ordinary' media photography, namely the possibility of using such photos to identify locations where enemy guns were positioned. At the end of the war, Evzerikhin was again awarded the Order of the Red Star. At that time, Chief Kuzovkin of TASS sent telegraphic correspondence to Panteleimon Gornilo of the Political Board of the 3ʳᵈ Belorussian Front as a response and support for the said award. Two such telegrams have been preserved in Evzerikhin personal files. They say that the captain went with the camera through the entire combat route in Prussia, from forcing the former Polish-German border to fighting for the capital of the region. One of these telegrams was almost literally quoted in the justification for the decoration of the photo correspondent. The award application was signed on May 21, 1945 by Lieutenant Colonel Kuznetsov, head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department of the Political Board of the 3ʳᵈ Belorussian Front. The granting of the award was confirmed after a few days.[11]

Fig. 5. In Königsberg, then the capital of East Prussia, captured in April 1945, Evzerihin photographed the destroyed castle square with monuments to Chancellor Bismarck and Emperor Wilhelm I, until recently glorifying Prussian and German militarism
(Photo: E. Evzerikhin, Museum of the Second World War, Gdańsk)

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10 Weisband David Semyonovich, born 1906, Colonel, Chief of Staff of Artillery Command of the 2ⁿᵈ Belorussian Front. A Jew, a member of the Bolshevik Party since 1929. In the Red Army since the late 1920s. He fought during the Winter War in Finland from 1939 to 1940, and later, from the beginning, in the Patriotic War. Awarded with orders of the Red Banner, Suvorov of the 2ⁿᵈ class, Kutuzov of the 1ˢᵗ class, the Order of the Red Star (three times), and the Medal For the Defence of Stalingrad. At the end of the war, he received the Order of Bohdan Khmelnitsky 2ⁿᵈ class. CAMD, fund 33, inventory 686046, storage unit 202, 275–176.

11 Award letter of Emmanuel Evzerikhin (2), CAMD, fund 33, inventory 686196, storage unit 3218.

After the victorious end of the war, Evzerikhin continued his work as a photojournalist in the state news agency and taught the basics of photography in university art classes for many years. He died in 1984 and was buried in Moscow.[12]

We have already noticed that the Red Army front photo correspondents served in the structures of the military political division. On the 2nd Belorussian Front discussed in this paper, the group of people sending information from the area of combat to the Soviet news agencies and the central mass media numbered several dozen individuals in total. They operated under the efficient management of the dean of the correspondent corps, an officer experienced in complex contacts between the battlefield and the Moscow press, Lieutenant Colonel Pavel Milovanov.[13] In addition, there was a special team of film camera operators and their assistants, called the front 'cinematic group' (*киногруппа*) recording short scenes in the sites of combat and making paradocumentaries. Its members performed their tasks in pairs, under the leadership of Captain Mark Troyanovsky.[14] The direct supervision over the broadly understood information sphere, thus also the intelligence security and preventive censorship in all units within the structures of the front units, was exercised by Colonel Ivan Diachenko.[15] Media correspondents were treated in the military service like other political officers and were therefore subject to the orders of the commander of the Political Board of the front, Lieutenant-General Andrei Okorokov.[16]

The basic task of war photo correspondents, i.e. specific soldiers 'armed' with cameras and a monthly supply of films to fill with images of war commissioned by the authorities, was to take photographs of strong symbolic meaning, conveying extreme emotions to the audience. The photographs sent by them from the battlefield and published in the mass media, as well as other elements of the message about the war, were supposed to justify – in a very suggestive and rather uncomplicated way – the need for

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12 *Emmanuil Evzerikhin* 2007.

13 Milovanov Pavel Konstantinovich, born 1913, lieutenant colonel, senior correspondent of the newspaper "Krasnaya Zvezda" dean of the correspondent corps at the 2nd Belorussian Front. Russian. Member of the Bolshevik Party. In the army since 1939, mobilised for the Patriotic War by the central committee of the party in June 1941. CAMD, fund 33, inventory 686196, storage unit 2907, 20–21.

14 Troyanovsky Mark Antonovich, born 1907, captain, commander of the 2nd Belorussian Front cinematic group. Russian. Non-partisan. He fought in the war since 1941. He received several awards, including three orders of Lenin and the Red Star, medals 'For Military Merit' and 'For the Defence of the Caucasus' as well as the Order of Honour. For the work of the cinema group during the offensive in 1945, from the Narew River to the central regions of East Prussia, he was nominated to the Order of the Patriotic War 1st class. CAMD, fund 33, inventory 686196, storage unit 2907, 20–21.

15 Diachenko Ivan Tarasovich, born 1901, colonel, Deputy Head of the Political Board of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Ukrainian. In the Bolshevik party since November 1920. Staff officer in the Red Army, in which he served from 1922. Decorated on several occasions. CAMD. fund 33 inventory 686196 storage unit 113, 19–20.

16 Okorokov Andrei Dmitrievich, born 1905, lieutenant-general, head of the Political Board of the 2nd Belorussian Front. Russian. A party member since 1927, he has also served in the Red Army since then. Staff officer. In the Patriotic War from the beginning, he was wounded once. For fighting in Prussia he was awarded the Order of Lenin. CAMD, fund 33, inventory 686046, storage unit 40, 123–124.

the Soviet society to make significant sacrifices in the name of victory over the enemy, both on the part of the soldier and the entire civilian population of the country. They were meant to boost morale and call on people to make sacrifices – first to defend themselves and then to go on the offensive ending in victory and the defeat of their enemies.[17]

News broadcasts were expected to focus mass-media audiences around the propagated ideas of fighting the enemy. They also promoted important figures, from heroic privates covering the barrels of German machine guns with their breasts to major party leaders and military commanders, which over time developed into a personalised cult of the Soviet leader Joseph Stalin, with whose name on their lips they went into battle and often died with – for it was difficult to deny that Soviet wartime propaganda was extremely effective and gained the trust of its audience, although there was also no shortage of sceptics about its actions among its recipients. Not everyone wanted to die in glory, and surviving the war in its last stage required a much greater effort from the soldiers than a reckless but heroic death rewarded with shining orders.[18]

Therefore, among the important tasks of the photo correspondents was to popularise selected Red Army figures – personally designated combat heroes – through photographs – and to exhort the masses to emulate their combat exploits. Admittedly, those heroes who fought to a glorious death in battle were praised the most. However, usually, the dead could not be photographed and shown to the public so as not to frighten

Fig. 6. An image of the Soviet victory over the enemy showing the space of the then Frederick Wilhelm Square in Elbing. Among the ruined buildings, including the town hall, there was a German cannon, no longer manned, testifying to the strength of the attack and ineffective defence against it (Photo: E. Evzerikhin, Museum of the Second World War, Gdańsk)

17 Sokolov B. 2017.

18 An example of an honourable death in battle was covering up a firing hole with one's own body, as Private Alexander Matrosov did in 1943. The followers of his feat were called 'matrosovists' and there were several hundred of them. Shkadarevich I. 1973.

the combatants and their families. Although in this case, too, there were deliberate exceptions, and unconditional mention must be made of the shocking, posed photograph of the dead partisan 'Tanya' or Zoya Kosmodemyanskaya, hanged by the Germans and described by Pyotr Lidov in the newspaper "Pravda" as a heroine.[19] The photo taken by photographer Sergei Strunnikov of the girl's naked body was published in the Soviet daily press as a cruel warning to the combatants, to whom the enemy did not give pardon, and a call for merciless revenge on the bestiality of the Germans.[20]

Most often, the photo with the Red Army soldiers as the main subject of the frame presented one or several soldiers and occasionally a larger unit. For all the official glorification of the ideal of universality by communism and the promotion of the soldier masses as collectives, only a few heroes were singled out for public remembrance. Their names were given, and their faces were shown, but the viewers were not overloaded with too many of them, so the selected few could be recognised and remembered better. Instead, they had such common biographies and their successes in combat were so easy to emulate, that practically any Soviet soldier could become a potential hero and serve the collective that awaited his sacrifice.[21]

However, many more subjects of war photographs were postulated by the authorities and designated for public dissemination. For example, symbolic photographs were supposed to show the fragility of enemy forces and the collapse of their morale, enemy soldiers already dead or wounded, or at least giving up in captivity. The enemy's destroyed or abandoned combat equipment, fortifications breached by the Red Army and abandoned by the enemy troops in their territory were also keenly depicted. The effects of the destructive occupation of Soviet lands, emotional reasons for personal revenge, and examples of justified revenge on the enemy were also worth showing. These latter tasks were also shown at the end of the war through the images of destroyed German cities, broken monuments and cultural objects, seized equipment and captured infrastructure, as well as images reflecting the emotions of losing Germans, including civilians, with whom the war caught up with all its ruthlessness and evil. In addition to this, there were mentally opposite images, i.e., examples of own reliable and deadly weapons – Soviet tanks, aircraft, or guns. At the same time, there was a reluctance to show those items of equipment that came from the abundant material aid provided by the Western Allies to the Soviets, granted to them under a programme called *lend-lease*. Red Army soldiers were rarely photographed as personified victims of fighting the enemy, i.e., the wounded staying in field hospitals or the bodies of the fallen before being buried in cemeteries.[22]

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19 Lidov P. 1941.

20 The photograph is captioned: The corpse of the Komsomol member and partisan Tatiana, brutally tortured and hanged by Nazi bandits in the village of Petrishchevo, Vereya district, Moscow region.

21 Oleynikov V., Kozyirev S. 2015, 18–22.

22 Vartanov A. 2014.

Fig. 7. A detachment of Red Army soldiers photographed during the march to battle, as evidenced by bayonets placed on the barrels of their rifles. The viewer's attention may also be captured by the soldier with a harmonium in his hands, emphasising the emotional fierceness evident on the faces of the infantrymen (Photo: E. Evzerikhin, Museum of the Second World War, Gdańsk)

In these few most important groups of subjects to be photographed, the command set frontline photojournalists the task of symbolically, even journalistically illustrating the current war narrative and thus fulfilling the information and propaganda requirements ordered by the political authorities – sometimes clearly expecting and sometimes forbidding taking photos in certain circumstances. In wartime reality, however, these were not suggestions addressed to the artists as a request but indisputable military orders that had to be scrupulously fulfilled. Individual ideas and art tendencies, as well as the previous avant-garde experiences of the photographers, had to be immediately rejected or ruthlessly adjusted into the prevailing propaganda schemes defined by the guidelines of their superiors. Also, the literal documentary nature of the taken and published photographs was less important –to achieve the indoctrination goal, the photographers could introduce any symbolic elements into the presented image, even by deliberately abandoning the truth of war. Therefore, photographic fakery was often used in the form of staging battles after they had already taken place, building frames outside the battlefield and using people, equipment, explosives, and smoke and fire effects to increase the appeal and drama of the shots. Other ways of interfering with the photograph included narrowing the frame to omit less important elements, blurring or completely replacing the background, retouching details, and finally cutting out or pasting individual people or equipment in order to radically change the content of the original shot through photomontage, often directly to emphasise its symbolic dimension and increase the scale of the emotions accompanying the viewer.[23]

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23   Vartanov A. 2014.

Fig. 8. Despite the hints from the archival description, it is not a butcher's shop in Augustów but in Thorn (Toruń), at 67 Chełmińska Road. During the Second Polish Republic, it belonged to Fritz Kluge. Showing the Germans' wealth was supposed to justify revenge and individual plunder by the Red Army against the defeated (Photo: E. Evzerikhin, Museum of the Second World War, Gdańsk)

In many cases, the work of the Soviet war photojournalist consisted of presenting specific events, i.e., transmitting image information expanded with additional data. The photograph was often combined with a short description explaining the place and the most important circumstances of its creation, sometimes enriched with the names of the individuals depicted in the shot. This caption under the photo was one of the basic elements of focusing the recipient's attention on the appropriate reading of the pictorial message, decoding the information contained in the photo. However, this caption, too, has often been deformed, sometimes emphasising the symbolism required by the narrative, although in many cases simply due to inaccuracies or mistakes made by the authors when naming photographed places, equipment, or people. At other times, however, captions were deliberately, manipulatively altered by censors, editors of the press or other handlers of photographs intended for public presentation or official reports.[24]

To conclude the above discussion, the social reception of the narrative content contained in symbolic photography, also in the case of Emmanuil Evzerikhin's wartime photographs taken in the first months of 1945, was based on the extraordinary simplicity of the message. In order to convince Soviet soldiers and civilians of the attitudes and behaviour expected by the authorities, as a rule, the congruence of the details of photographs qualified for the presentation with the truth and realities of the combat was not the main concern. Instead, the emphasis was placed on the suggestiveness of the narrative qualities and symbolic elements of the image contained in the proposed frames, creating the desired story of just participation in the war and the victorious struggle against the enemy. These photographs showed and testified to the defeat of the enemy's forces and the success of their own troops, their efficiency in battle and the rapid conquest of foreign lands, the multitude and wealth of the resulting spoils of war, as well as the severe revenge and punishment of the enemies for the crimes committed in the previously occupied Soviet territories.[25]

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24 Gliniecki T. 2016, 19–43.

25 Igrayev B. 2016, 130–136.

Fig. 9. 'Liberators' in Brodnica (Strasburg an der Drewenz), which was then a stopover area for the frontline command and staff. Soviet soldiers in the market square, visible in the background is the Chełmno tower. A similar old city gate is located in Elbląg, hence probably another mistake in the archival description. On the left-hand side of the photograph, a proposal to crop the image has been unceremoniously scratched out (Photo: E. Evzerikhin, Museum of the Second World War, Gdańsk)

Fig. 10. The photo shows a ruined street in one of the recently captured Prussian cities, probably Elbing (Elbląg) or Neidenburg (Nidzica). At the same time, it is a classic example of photomontage, because the self-propelled gun was cut out from another photo and glued to the background, suggesting the creation of this destruction during combat (Photo: E. Evzerikhin, Museum of the Second World War, Gdańsk)

Convincing the public of the veracity of the informational and emotional messages contained in the photographs sent by photo correspondents from the battlefields in Germany brought strong public confidence to the Red Army, strengthened the army's belief in its own capabilities, and implanted an image of a universal patriotic war in the minds of the soldiers, ending in the victory of the internationalist idea and the spread of communism beyond the borders of the state. At the same time, it was an image devoid of any mistakes and weaknesses on the part of the leaders, with Stalin as a personified icon of success. This state of affairs propagandistically shaped the image of the war conflict coming to an end. It was maintained in the Soviet Union for decades to come, thus influencing historical perceptions of the struggle against Germany and public memory of the war, as evidenced, among other things, by albums with photographs and film stills, which were published in large editions, generally for successive milestone anniversaries of the victory.[26] In the Russian Federation today, the Great Patriotic War has the nature of a social experience exclusively heroic and unquestionably victorious, and archival images are one of the elements of strengthening this war myth.[27]

Finally, it must be acknowledged that the wartime treasure trove of Emmanuil Evzerikhin's photographic activity was not more widely known to the public for years after the war and actually lay this time in the archives, and it is only in the last decade that it has been increasingly and more boldly exhibited, especially often in Russia itself. Many years after the war, but also long after his death, their author became one of the war photo correspondents who regained their names and faces and whose works serve as material for the preparation of original exhibitions and album publications. In the part of Evzerikhin's collection dedicated to the battles for Prussia in 1945, one can find photographs that have not been previously widely known but which are worthy of contemporary decoding and showing the conformity of the captured images, sometimes partially arranged, with the Soviet informational and indoctrination canon imposed from above. The way in which Evzerikhin works fit into the overall propaganda narrative shows not only his deliberate selection of symbolic scenes and details captured in the frames but usually also conveys the mood of the moment and suggests the anticipated emotions of the viewers of the photographs at the time, which had faded irretrievably with the victory in the war, giving them a historical dimension.

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26 The flagship example of such an anniversary publication is the five-volume album about war photography and filmography *Velikaya Otechestvennaya voyna 1941–1945 godov v fotografiyah i kinokadrah*. Kurochkin P. (ed.) 1975–1980.

27 The current historiographical interpretation is another multi-volume and richly illustrated publication prepared for the state authorities and editorially supervised by the Minister of Defence of the Russian Federation, Sergei Shoygu. One of its parts is devoted to Soviet propaganda activities, called there 'mobilisation of society to wage war'. *Mobilizatsiya*. 2015.

Summary

Evzerikhin's photographs from 1945 are examples of meticulous justification selected by the author with images of indoctrination theses proclaimed by the Soviet state, party and military authorities at the time. Despite the suggestions directed at the audience, there are no photos taken exactly during the clashes, but they are only taken in the captured places, sometimes shortly after the end of the fighting. It is no coincidence that the author of numerous contemporary albums with photographs taken during World War II, Ian Baxter, noted that they were usually not taken directly during fights:

> Such photographs were taken extremely rarely, and photographers were reluctant to risk their lives, armed only with a camera. Most of the photographs available today from the battlefield were commissioned by press agencies, many of them staged for propaganda, photographic souvenirs.[28]

The symbolic elements contained in the photographs clearly refer to the final period of the war, characterised by the battles fought on German soil at that time, treated as an area requiring first ruthless conquest and later partial takeover by the winners. The justification of the related needs for the military and, more broadly, Soviet society was contained in two different narratives propagated by the military political services of the Red Army – in both informational and emotional contexts. At the time of extinction, due to the exaggeration of revenge on the enemy and its manifestations far beyond the anticipated scale of atrocities, there was a story of the necessity of severely paying Germany for the war wrongs done to the nations they conquered in the East. The official dissemination included, however, a narrative glorifying the role of the Red Army as the 'liberators' of much of Europe from the yoke of German National Socialism. Soviet front photo correspondents eagerly fulfilled the role of knowledge and emotion transmitters indicated to them by their superiors; hence, the effects of their work – also in the case of Evzerikhin – document not so much the course of fighting as the implementation of planned military propaganda activities during the conflict.

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The Beginnings of the Organisation of Polish Historical Science in Great Britain after World War II

Summary: After the defeat of September 1939, a large number of Polish historians found themselves, together with the army, scattered abroad. They lost their previous academic research base, aids and equipment, book collections, notes, etc. As early as the autumn of 1939, the first attempts to organise representatives of this group were made in allied France. The fall of France and the necessity to evacuate to Great Britain meant that a new stage of wartime activity began here for the Polish civilian and military leadership, the organisation of the army and the organisation of the community of Polish historians. The first institutions were established soon after arrival in the United Kingdom. After the end of the war, a number of Polish historians decided to remain abroad and the process of establishing academic institutions began, giving rise to Polish historical science in the UK. The General Sikorski Historical Institute was the first institution to be established, and other institutions soon followed, including the Piłsudski Institute in London, the Polish Underground Movement Study Trust, the Polish Historical Society in Great Britain, the Polish University Abroad, and the Polish Library.

Keywords: refugee, London, Institute of History, General Sikorski Historical Institute, Piłsudski Institute in London, Polish Underground Movement Study Trust, Polish Historical Society in Great Britain, Polish University Abroad, Polish Library

As a result of the German and Soviet aggression against Poland in September 1939, many Polish historians found themselves outside Poland. Some of them were mobilised, and did their military service and shared the wartime fate of their units, while

others consciously made the decision to leave the country and left by different routes and in different directions. Thus, the community of military historians was dispersed, deprived of its previous academic research base, aids and equipment, book collections, notes, etc.

As early as the autumn of 1939, the first attempts to organise representatives of Polish historical science were made in allied France. Within the ranks of the army flowing into France, there was a high proportion of representatives of the intelligentsia, including a significant number of historians, writers, and military publicists. Historical and military writing began to revive slowly. Newspapers and magazines, mainly military ones, started publishing articles about war issues, in particular about matters related to the course of the September Campaign. The soldiers of the September Campaign shared their memories, analyses, experiences, accounts, and descriptions of war episodes with the readers.

However, another disaster came before people managed to recover from the catastrophe of the September Campaign – the defeat and the capitulation of France and the need to evacuate to the United Kingdom. It was here that a new stage of wartime activity of the supreme civil and military authorities of the Republic of Poland, the organisation of the armed forces, but also the creation of an organisational framework for the activities of the community of Polish historians began. Many well-known and respected military historians and writers arrived in the UK, mainly in London. Among them were Henryk Bagiński, Stanisław Biegański, Władysław Dziewanowski, Marian Kukiel, Otto Laskowski, Edmund Oppman, Stefan Pomarański, and Michał Sokolnicki.

As early as December 1940, the Supreme Commander's staff resumed publication of the military academic journal "Bellona". Soon more publications appeared, including "Polska Walcząca", "Dziennik Żołnierza", and various camp and unit newspapers, which readily accepted texts submitted by historians and military writers. During World War II, "Bellona" published many valuable articles and studies, both historical and those devoted to typically military issues. In 1940, the first books were published. During the war years, historical, archival, and museum services also operated in the organisational structure of the army. These services underwent several organisational changes, but still maintained the continuity of work in collecting and securing archival materials and museum exhibits.

After the end of the war, many historians and military writers decided to stay abroad until Poland regained its independence. Far from their homeland, they were deprived of their research base and cut off from national archive resources and libraries. However, despite these obstacles, overcoming numerous difficulties and problems of everyday life, at the expense of their own time and often even their health, they began to organise the first academic institutions, archives, museums, and libraries. This activity was aimed at creating, as far as possible, normal conditions for scientific work and organising Polish academic, cultural, and educational life. The beginning was

very difficult: everything but an unlimited desire to work was lacking – there was no material basis, premises, books, or funds. In such difficult conditions, the beginning of Polish historical science was born – the beginning of Polish military historiography in Great Britain.

The first institutional framework, such as libraries or the Polish Research Centre (Polish: Polski Ośrodek Naukowy), was organised during the war, but broader actions were taken only after the war ended. Already in 1945, the General Sikorski Historical Institute (Polish: Instytut Historyczny im. Gen. Sikorskiego) was established in London. In the initial stage of its operation, the main task of this institution was to collect documents and memorabilia of the tragically deceased prime minister and the commander-in-chief, and to conduct and support historical research related to the life and activities of General Wladyslaw Sikorski. Soon more institutions of Polish academic life began to be organised: the Piłsudski Institute in London (Polish: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego w Londynie), the Polish Underground Movement Study Trust (Polish: Studium Polski Podziemnej), the Polish Historical Society in Great Britain (Polish: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne w Wielkiej Brytanii), the Polish Society of Arts and Sciences Abroad (Polish: Polskie Towarzystwo Naukowe), the Polish University Abroad (Polish: Polski Uniwersytet na Obczyźnie), and the Polish Library (Polish: Biblioteka Polska).

With their development, new academic journals began to appear. The Historical Institute began publishing *Bellona*, and its museum section undertook to continue the pre-war publication "Broń i Barwa". The Piłsudski Institute in London resumed the publication of the "Niepodległość" journal, while the Cavalry Regimental Association (Polish: Zrzeszenie Kół Pułkowych Kawalerii) published "Przegląd Kawalerii i Broni Pancernej". The airmen had their own periodical called "Skrzydła", and in 1945 the Navy Association (Polish: Stowarzyszenie Marynarki Wojennej) began publishing the "Nasze Sygnały" journal. The Polish Historical Society in Great Britain published an excellent scientific journal, "Teki Historyczne", and the Polish Society of Arts and Sciences Abroad published the journal "Rocznik", in which reports on the activities of individual academic institutions associated with the Polish Society of Arts and Sciences were published, in addition to the most interesting papers from meetings and other academic projects, including numerous events organised by the above-mentioned scientific institutions.

The General Sikorski Historical Institute

The origins of the General Sikorski Historical Institute in London go back to the final stage of World War II, when to most Poles in exile it became clear that recognition of the Polish government in exile was coming to an end and the new political situation made it impossible for them to return to Poland. In this situation, one of the

most important issues was the preservation of state and military archives. It became necessary to create an institution capable of taking over and securing the collections of state archives and the Archive and Museum Service of the Polish Armed Forces (Polish: Służba Archiwalno-Muzealna Polskich Sił Zbrojnych). Therefore, the war had not yet subsided for good when the Polish authorities in London undertook work to rescue and preserve archival and museum collections bearing witness to the Polish contribution to the war and the role the Poles played in it.[1] Of course, special care was given to the files of the President of the Republic of Poland, the government and civilian offices and the Polish Armed Forces, from the Cabinet of the Commander-in-Chief, through the Supreme Commander's Staff and the other chief military authorities, to the branches and smallest military units.

The initiator of the establishment of the institution responsible for the gathering of the above-mentioned collections of documents was the then head of the Archive and Museum Service of the Polish Armed Forces, former head of the Supreme Commander's Staff, Lieutenant Colonel Zygmunt Borkowski, who wrote in his memoirs: 'I wanted to create a centre that would not only give evidence of the activities of General Sikorski but could continue to serve the Polish cause'.[2] From the beginning, the Institute was not intended to be a state institution. Andrzej Suchcitz, a long-time employee of this institution, emphasises that the fact of its independence from the emigration state authorities was supposed to protect it in the future from possible pressure from the British authorities and the scheming of the authorities in Warsaw.[3]

President Władysław Raczkiewicz, Prime Minister Tomasz Arciszewski, and acting Commander-in-Chief General Władysław Anders were informed about the plan to establish the Institute. The General Sikorski Historical Institute was finally founded on 3 May 1945.[4] The Council of Ministers of the Republic of Poland, with the consent of President W. Raczkiewicz, ordered individual ministers to hand over their files and archives to the newly-established institution. On 13 July, Lieutenant Colonel Z. Borkowski, on behalf of Helena Sikorska, formally took over General W. Sikorski's possessions and documents. The letter from the widow to her husband's friend and closest associate, General Marian Kukiel, dated 22 July 1945 reads: 'Dear General, The legacy of my husband, General Władysław Sikorski, in the form of memorabilia and documents related to his political and military activities, cannot be wasted. Therefore, I decided to entrust them to the Władysław Sikorski Institute based in London'.[5]

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1 Suchcitz A. 1999, 183.

2 Borkowski Z. 1975, 146.

3 Suchcitz A. 1999, 184.

4 Bokszczanin B. 1991, 2.

5 AIPMS. List.

The basic statutory tasks of the Historical Institute were:

– Securing collections of General Sikorski's memorabilia and documents;
– Collecting and securing books, documents, publications, and other materials concerning the life and activities of General Sikorski;
– Conducting and supporting historical research on the period of General Sikorski's life and activity;
– Establishing and managing scholarships and grants for those involved in research on this period;
– Commemorating the contribution of Poland and the Poles to the victory in World War II.[6]

Helena Sikorska invited 12 people – close friends and associates of General Sikorski – to the first Council of the Institute. These were: Anthony Drexel Biddle (former US Ambassador to Warsaw and then to the Polish Government in London), Stafford Cripps (*inter alia* Minister in Winston Churchill's government), Lord Elgin (President of the Polish-Scottish Society), James Irvine (Principal and Vice-Chancellor of the University of St Andrews), Col. Harold Mitchell (Vice-Chairman of the Conservative Party in 1942–1945, former liaison officer at the Polish I Corps), Archibald Sinclair (Minister of Aviation of the British Government), Stanisław Leśniowski (General Sikorski's son-in-law), Professor Stanisław Stroński, Colonel Dr. Stanisław Szurlej, Vice-Admiral Jerzy Świrski, Dr. Józef Retinger, and General Marian Kukiel.[7]

From the Institute's earliest days, efforts were made to develop academic research and publishing work. An important step in this area was the establishment of the Scientific Commission in September 1945 with prominent historians Marian Kukiel, Stanisław Biegański, and Władysław Dziewanowski.

The intense search and efforts led by Z. Borkowski in July 1946 resulted in the purchase of a house in central London at Prince's Gate, near Hyde Park and the Victoria and Albert Museum. The purchase of this house was made possible by the kindness shown to Poland and the Poles by its owner, the former mayor of Ipswich, member of the House of Commons, and wealthy businessman, Arthur Charles Churchman, who sold the beautiful property for £13,000, i.e., half its then value.[8] Having its own premises allowed the start of proper statutory activities, the import of archive and museum collections, and the organisation of a library.

One of the most important goals of the Institute was to reach out with its projects to the Polish community in Great Britain. The Institute organised various scientific gatherings, lectures, talks, etc. The first lecture, on October 3, 1946, was given by Ambassador Tadeusz Romer, on the topic of his impressions of his travels in Europe.

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6 *Instytut Historyczny* 1945.

7 Suchcitz A. 1999, 184–185.

8 Zuziak J. 2002, 61.

A month later, Marian Kukiel gave a lecture titled 'History at the Service of the Present', thus inaugurating a long series of lectures organised by the Polish Historical Society in Great Britain, which since the beginning of its operations has been based in the building of the Historical Institute. M. Kukiel was the President of the Board of the Institute and at the same time the President of the Polish Historical Society in Great Britain. The two institutions worked closely together. The Institute also cooperated with the Military-Historical Research Section (Polish: Sekcja Badań Wojskowo-Historycznych) established on December 10, 1946, which later became the Historical Commission of the former General Staff. In the spring of 1948, the Research Section became part of the Institute, and its main task was to develop a multi-volume work titled *Polskie Siły Zbrojne w drugiej wojnie światowej.*

The first period of operation of this distinguished Polish scientific institution was not easy, particularly as it struggled financially. In 1949, because of these problems, it was even considered that the Institute's operations would have to be suspended. Fortunately, such a decision was not taken, and thanks to the great commitment and enormous involvement of people devoted to the Polish cause who were dedicated to the idea of independence, this refuge of Polishness in exile, a mainstay of unfettered Polish historical science, has survived the most difficult years, through the following decades, until today, carrying out academic activities and supporting multitudes of researchers from Poland and abroad.

The Piłsudski Institute in London

Among the many thousands of emigrants and war refugees who remained in the United Kingdom after the end of World War II, there was also a large group of former associates and supporters of Marshal Józef Piłsudski. Among them were also former employees of the Józef Piłsudski Institute for Research in Modern History (Polish: Instytut Józefa Piłsudskiego Poświęcony Badaniu Najnowszej Historii Polski) founded in 1923. The largest group of representatives of this community after the war were located in London, which was therefore the most convenient place to create an organisational framework for their activity. One of the main initiators of the establishment of the institution continuing the tradition of the Józef Piłsudski Institute in Warsaw was undoubtedly General Władysław Bortnowski. On March 15, 1947 he organised a meeting of Józef Piłsudski's former associates, in which participated, among others, Tytus Filipowicz, Janusz Głuchowski, Michał Grażyński, Bronisław Hełczyński, Bogusław Miedziński, Juliusz Lukasiewicz, and Tadeusz Piskor.[9] General Bortnowski then presented a draft resolution establishing the Józef Piłsudski Institute in London

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9 Zuziak J. 2001a, 6.

as a branch of the Piłsudski Institute established in 1943 in New York.[10] In fact, however, there has never been a formal organisational relationship with the New York Institute, only a gesture of courtesy, recognising its seniority.

At this meeting, the Institute's Council and the Executive Committee were appointed, i.e., the later Management Board. Tadeusz Piskor became the Chairman of the Council, and Kazimierz Schally and Juliusz Lukasiewicz were elected vice-chairmen. The composition of the first Management Board was as follows: Władysław Bortnowski – chairman, Janusz Głuchowski – vice-chairman, Tadeusz Münnich – secretary, Antoni Jakubski – treasurer, and Kazimierz Iranek-Osmecki, Konrad Libicki, Aleksander Hauke-Nowak, and Jan Starzewski as the remaining members of the board.[11] March 19, 1947, i.e., the name day of Marshal Józef Piłsudski, was adopted as the formal date of the establishment of the Institute.

The aim of the Institute was 'to establish and preserve the historical truth of the last epochs of our history, to examine first of all the life and deeds of Józef Piłsudski, his background, guidelines and teachings he left behind'.[12] In the aforementioned letter of the Management Board informing about the establishment of the Institute, we also read that the aim of the management should be:

> bringing together all those who want to build the ideological foundations of the present moment and the struggle of tomorrow on historical science. We want it to house book collections, archives, document collections, workshops for scientific and publishing work, to become a place for research, lectures, and discussions.[13]

In accordance with the first clause of the Statute, 'the Institute is called the 'Józef Piłsudski Institute for Research in Modern History, London Branch' and fulfils, until Poland regains its independence, the tasks of the Institute of the same name in Warsaw, from which it originated'.[14] This document clearly emphasises the temporary nature of the Institute. Its founders had no doubts that after Poland regained its independence, Warsaw should be its seat.

Despite the difficulties in reaching the Pilsudski community in Great Britain, as early as August 1947 the Institute had 125 members.[15] This number grew relatively quickly, although the fact of the establishment of the Institute had not yet been publicly announced in any media. In this situation, a significant increase in interest was expected after the publication of the information in the Polish press. The hope of

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10 AIJPL. Protokół, 1.

11 Zuziak J. 2001a, 6.

12 AIJPL. Pismo.

13 AIJPL. Pismo.

14 Statute. 1947, 1.

15 Communiqué of the Piłsudski Institute in London, No. 2 of 5 August 1947.

increasing interest in the Institute's activities was also connected with the arrival of soldiers of the Polish 1st Armoured Division and the 1st Independent Parachute Brigade to the UK at that time, after completing their occupation service in Germany.

In the first period of its activity, the Institute had very modest funds. Although contributions – despite the limited financial means of the émigrés – came in fairly regularly, the Institute's financial state severely limited its possibilities for action. In the first quarter of 1947, 'Dom Własny' ('Own House') shares were issued, which raised £114. However, this did little to cover day-to-day operations, particularly publishing. It was estimated that around £600 could be raised by the end of 1947, of which £100 was intended to be used to publish the first issue of the academic journal "Niepodległość".[16]

The beginning of the systematic work was hindered above all by the lack of its own premises. It was with this in mind that the campaign to sell the aforementioned 'Dom Własny' shares was organised. The lack of premises made it impossible to carry out the basic tasks and statutory goals, and most importantly did not allow for the organisation of periodic information and discussion meetings with papers, historical talks and readings, and there were no appropriate conditions for starting the collection of historical materials, book publications, memoirs, accounts, etc. This type of activity unfortunately had to be postponed until premises were acquired.

The editorial plan of "Niepodległość" anticipated the publication of its first issue in 1948 and it was actually implemented, albeit not without struggle. Although it was assumed that the first issue would be published in March, due to financial problems and difficulties with finding a suitable place for printing, it was not released until the end of 1948. This was undoubtedly the first important achievement of the Institute.

The editorial board and many other members of the Institute put a lot of effort into organisational and preparatory work. On August 6, 1947, a special letter was sent to potential collaborators of "Niepodległość" presenting the journal's goals and programme. It was to be a yearbook devoted to 'Poland's recent history, with a special focus on the ideology and activities of the independence movements'.[17] The intention was to publish, first and foremost, works devoted to Polish history in the period 1794–1914, the activity of Józef Piłsudski during the period of the independence struggle, his underground activity and service in the Legions, and his activity in the interwar period, but also historical works in which authors tackled the subject of World War II, especially the Polish war effort. Significant importance was paid to historical accounts, diaries and memoirs, in which the protagonists and direct witnesses of important historical events would present little known or hitherto unknown facts. Such historical material was particularly requested from Józef Piłsudski's direct associates and people from his closest circle.

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16 AIJPL. Wyjątki.
17 AIJPL. List.

Despite the lack of its own premises and modest funds, research and publishing work intensified over time. Research activities were concentrated within the Studies Department and the Historical Section, whose work in the first years was heavily influenced by Józef Moszczeński, played the key role. The most important task of this unit was to create a book collection, conduct research work and support scientific research, and collect accounts and source materials, as well as undertake academic cooperation with institutions of a similar nature and goals. The Historical Section, among other things, organised monthly open discussion meetings. The first such event took place on July 20, 1948 at the headquarters of the Polish Hearth Club (Polish: Ognisko Polskie) at Exhibition Road. The discussion focused on the issues presented in the paper given by the head of the Section, Józef Moszczeński, on the methodological experiences of the pre-war Military Historical Bureau and the Józef Piłsudski Institute in Warsaw.[18]

The Institute's research and publishing focused primarily on Polish independence thought, the restoration of Poland, the Polish-Russian war, and the Polish effort in both world wars. A very important role in the Institute's activities was played by the Women's Independence Work Section, headed by Aleksandra Piłsudska. Her first important achievement was a survey on the activity and independence struggle of Polish women.[19]

As it had not been possible to raise sufficient funds to purchase their own premises by the spring of 1948, discussions were held with several related organisations about a possible joint purchase or lease of a building. Interest was expressed at the time by the communities associated with the 1st Legions Infantry Division, the 7th Uhlan Regiment, and the Independence League (Polish: Liga Niepodległości). The idea came to fruition and on March 10, 1949 a lease was signed for a single-storey building on Upper Richmond Road, in the Putney area of south-west London.

The first two years of the Piłsudski Institute in London's operation were marked by intensive organisational work aimed at laying the material foundations for normal functioning. Above all, efforts were made to obtain its own premises, which were necessary to house the collection of archives, books, memorabilia, and museum exhibits, as well as for scientific and research activities. In the following years, it was already possible to intensify this area of activity, which was the responsibility of the Studies Department, whose work changed radically with the acquisition of its own premises. The conditions were created for building a workshop basis, collecting archival materials and books, as well as organising and cataloguing them. Having its own premises allowed the Institute to implement one of the most important forms of activity, i.e. the organisation of academic meetings, discussions, and lectures. The intensification of

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18 Zuziak J. 2001b, 126.

19 Communiqué of the Piłsudski Institute in London No. 7 of 10 November 1948, AIJPL. Komunikat IJPL nr 7 z 10 listopada 1948 roku.

scholarly work was also reflected in the growing interest of the Polish community in London and beyond in the Institute's activities, which in turn meant that the ranks of its members were constantly growing.

The Polish Underground Movement Study Trust

The genesis of the Polish Underground Movement Study Trust dates back to January 1945, when, barely three months after the end of the Warsaw Uprising, the first efforts were made to set up a special unit to collect and secure archival material and study the history of the Home Army. General Stanisław Kopański, the Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff at the time, ordered Lieutenant Colonel Z. Borkowski, then Head of the Archive and Museum Service of the Polish Armed Forces, to start talks with General Stanisław Tatar, Deputy Chief of the Supreme Commander's Staff for domestic affairs, on the organisation of the Home Army's historical and archive unit. After numerous discussions and consultations on this matter, among others, with the General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski who had arrived in London, General Kopański issued an order in the second half of 1945 establishing the Historical Commission of the September Campaign and the Polish Armed Forces in the West (Polish: Komisja Historyczna Kampanii Wrześniowej i Polskich Sił Zbrojnych na Zachodzie), whose chairman became General Tadeusz Kutrzeba and deputy chairman General Marian Kukiel. At the same time, the Home Army Historical Subcommission was established, whose work was to be directed by General Tadeusz Pełczyński.

In parallel with the initial work of the Home Army Historical Subcommission, the idea of setting up a separate archival and research unit to deal with a comprehensive study of the history of the resistance movement in Poland and the history of the Polish Underground State was considered. On October 22, 1946, General T. Bór-Komorowski sent a letter to the political leaders of the independence underground and to former officers of the Home Army inviting them to participate in a meeting establishing the Polish Underground Movement Study Trust. The meeting took place on October 29, at the headquarters of the Polish Hearth Club. Among the participants were Captain Ryszard Białous, Colonel Kazimierz Iranek-Osmecki, Colonel Stanisław Juszczakiewicz, Major Janina Karasiówna, General Tadeusz Bór-Komorowski, Major Bohdan Kwiatkowski, General Antoni Chruściel, and General Tadeusz Pełczyński. The latter acquainted the audience with the initial assumptions and the most important tasks of the newly-established Trust, which were collecting archival documents and historical publications devoted to the history of the Polish Underground State, and organising an appropriate archive and book collection. The participants of the founding meeting believed that in addition to the history of the military activities of the Polish underground, the Trust should also research the social, economic, and cultural activities of the Polish Underground State. Moreover, attention was also drawn to

the need to make efforts to acquire as many documents as possible on military and civilian conspiracies from Poland.

The participants of the meeting became at the same time the founding members of the Polish Underground Movement Study Trust and members of its Council, headed by General T. Bór-Komorowski. His deputy became General Antoni Chruściel and the secretary Major Bohdan Kwiatkowski. The Trust's Management Board was composed of General T. Pełczyński, Captain Andrzej Pomian, Captain Tadeusz Zawadzki, Konrad Sieniewicz, Colonel K. Iranek-Osmecki, and Jerzy Matłachowski. Officially, the Polish Underground Movement (1939–1945) Study Trust was established on February 19, 1947.

In order to be able to start statutory activities, it was necessary to acquire suitable premises for storing archival documents and a book collection, hosting meetings, and carrying out scientific research. Having its own premises was also necessary for the official registration of the Trust. Initially, its headquarters was located, at least formally, in Barons Court, in a house occupied by two Council members. However, this place did not provide suitable conditions for work. For this reason, in March 1947, a search for new premises began, as a result of which a four-room apartment was rented in Notting Hill Gate. Unfortunately, these premises also did not meet the needs of the Trust and efforts were made to buy a house. This was achieved in the first half of 1948, when a building at 11 Leopold Road in West London was purchased.

Thus, between 1947 and 1948, the organisational structure and foundations for the future activities of the Trust were laid. Thanks to this archival and scientific institution and the extraordinary commitment of a great number of its members, historians, Home Army soldiers, activists and volunteers, it was possible to create one of the most extensive archives in source documents concerning the activities of the Polish Underground State. As a result, many interesting and valuable books and scientific articles were published over the next few decades, since numerous researchers gained the opportunity to carry out source surveys and searches. There is no doubt that the Polish Underground Movement Study Trust has fulfilled its statutory tasks well, joining the ranks of the institutions most distinguished for the Polish historical sciences.

Polish Historical Society in Great Britain

The idea of establishing the Polish Historical Society in Great Britain appeared almost simultaneously with the creation of the General Sikorski Historical Institute. It was born in the community of members of the pre-war Association of Friends of the Army Museum in Warsaw (Polish: Stowarzyszenie Przyjaciół Muzeum Wojska w Warszawie). The organising committee was formed for this purpose, which prepared

a draft statute; on November 29, 1946 a General Assembly was convened, at which the Polish Historical Society was formally established. The first Management Board was composed of Marian Kukiel as chairman, Tadeusz Sulimirski as vice-chairman, Władysław Dziewanowski as secretary, and Otton Laskowski as editor-in-chief of the "Teki Historyczne" journal (which automatically became the organ of Polish Historical Society in the United Kingdom), as well as Józef Jasnowski, Henryk Piątkowski, and Wiktor Weintraub.

During the founding meeting the following main tasks of the Society were formulated: to enable Polish historians residing in the UK to publish scientific works; to inform members of the Polish Historical Society and other individuals interested in historical research about its development, both in Poland and abroad; and to register Polish academic achievements in the field of history and the works of foreign historians who take up issues of Polish history in their research and publications.[20]

In addition to "Teki Historyczne", the Society also intended to publish larger scientific dissertations in a series entitled *Biblioteka Historyczna*, which was to be published in English and primarily present works in the field of Polish-British relations and Polish historiography. The intention of the initiators of such a series was to inform and make British historians aware of issues relating to Polish-British political, cultural, and economic relations.

The most important tasks of the Polish Historical Society were also collecting all types of source materials on the history of Poland, including those kept in British archives, with a view to their later usefulness and use in the prepared academic publications. The work of the Polish Historical Society was conducted in a number of sections, among which the first to be established were the sociology, humanities, and museum and historical sections. The museum section, established in 1948, started publishing its own periodical "Broń i Barwa", which published works in the field of hoplology and studies on military uniforms. It was a continuation of a periodical of the same title published in Poland in the years 1934–1939, edited by Władysław Dziewanowski.[21] Since the beginning of their activity, members of the museum section have closely cooperated with the General Sikorski Historical Institute.

Since the beginning of the Polish Historical Society's operation in Great Britain, one of the most active sections was the historical and military section headed by Stanisław Biegański. Its activeness was associated with the fact that after the end of World War II, many prominent Polish military historians and senior commanders settled in the UK and undertook work on the events and experiences of war. One of the most important tasks of the members of this section was to establish relations and develop cooperation within the International Commission of Military

20 *Kronika* 1947, 79.
21 Miśkiewicz B. 1996, 321.

History and to enable Polish historians to publish in its journal "Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire". In 1950, the International Congress of Historical Sciences was re-convened in Paris after a gap of several years. The organisers invited representatives of national historians to participate as the official Polish delegation; émigré historians were also allowed to attend, but only on the basis of individual applications. While the authorities in Warsaw prohibited historians from Poland from taking part in the Congress in Paris, several Polish historians in exile took part, including Marian Kukiel, Witold Kula, Henryk Paszkiewicz, Leon Koczy, Otton Laskowski, Czesław Chowaniec, Oskar Halecki, Władysław Folkierski, and Zygmunt Zaleski.[22] A great achievement was the preparation of a special volume of "Teki Historyczne" for the Paris Congress, in which eight of the twelve Polish papers presented at the Congress were published. Two years later, the military history section of the Polish Historical Society in Great Britain prepared a Polish issue (12/1952) of the "Revue Internationale d'Histoire Militaire". It is important to emphasise Marian Kukiel's great personal contribution to its publication.

The most important forms of work since the beginning of the Polish Historical Society in Great Britain's activity certainly included a series of lectures, which were very popular both among the members of the Society and the wider Polish community in the UK. In these lectures a special place was given to topics related to Polish and universal military history, including presentations on topics concerning tactics and strategy, the history of types of troops, armaments, and the course of the most important battles and wars over the centuries. Among the first speakers were Marian Kukiel, Henryk Paszkiewicz, and Edmund Oppman.

The Polish Historical Society members closely followed everything related to Polish historiography and kept up to date with studies published in Poland, many of which were thoroughly reviewed in "Teki Historyczne". The Polish Historical Society in Great Britain maintained close cooperation with several other Polish historical and scientific institutions, including the Polish Historical Institute in Rome (Polish: Polski Instytut Historyczny w Rzymie), the Polish Institute of Arts and Sciences of America (Polish: Polski Instytut Naukowy w Ameryce), and the Polish Historical and Literary Society in Paris (Polish: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczno-Literackie w Paryżu).

For Polish historians who found themselves in the UK after 1945, the Polish Historical Society was the institution in which their scientific activities were concentrated. Deprived of their pre-war research base and opportunities for scientific and research work, they laid the foundations of this activity anew, in difficult conditions in exile. For this community, the Polish Historical Society was the centre of their research work, creativity, scientific activity, and intellectual life.

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22 RPTNO. 1950/1951. 22.

The Polish Library in London

The history of the Polish Library in London dates back to the war period, specifically 1942, and is linked to the activities of several Polish government institutions in exile. In 1942, the library of the Office of Education and School Affairs (Polish: Urząd Oświaty i Spraw Szkolnych) was established, headed by Maria Danilewicz. Ministries of Information and Documentation, Congress Works and Internal Affairs also had their own book collections. Likewise, there was a separate library of the Polish Research Centre, which took over the book collection of the Polish Embassy in London. A year later, the Office of Education and School Affairs was merged with the National Culture Fund (Polish: Fundusz Kultury Narodowej) to create the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment (Polish: Ministerstwo Wyznań Religijnych i Oświecenia Publicznego), which at the same time took over the libraries of the combined institutions. In the face of the threat of German bombings, the Ministry's library was moved to Scotland, where it was hosted by the University of St Andrews and where it survived until the end of the war. After the war, as a result of the withdrawal of recognition of the Polish government by the British authorities, many Polish institutions were liquidated and their book collections were mostly taken over by the library of the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment. Consequently, in 1945, it held around 11,000 books.[23] Following the liquidation of the Ministry of Religious Denominations and Public Enlightenment, the book collection was handed over to the care of the British Interim Treasury Committee for Polish Questions, and on 1 April 1947 to the Committee for the Education of Poles in Great Britain (Polish: Komitet dla Spraw Oświaty Polaków w Wielkiej Brytanii) and renamed the Polish University College Library and transferred to the custody of the British authorities.[24] The library became an important centre of Polish intellectual life, organising numerous talks, academic discussions, lectures, etc. It hosted lectures by, among others, Marian Kukiel, Stanisław Stroński, Władysław Folkierski, and Tymon Terlecki.

In October 1953, the Polish University College ceased its activity and the Library was taken over by the Library Committee established by the Polish Research Centre in consultation with the Committee for the Education of Poles in Great Britain. At that time, the name of the library was changed to the Polish Library and the already-mentioned Maria Danilewicz was appointed as its director. The legal owner of the Polish Library was the British authorities. In the following years, the Library underwent some struggles, including the intention to close it when subsidies were withheld and the demand for the return of part of the book collection purchased with British funds. After numerous protests by the Polish community in Britain, supported by various

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23 Wasiak R. 1988, 66.
24 Wasiak R. 1988, 67; Kądziela P. 1994, 154.

British institutions (including professors at Oxford University), a satisfactory solution was reached whereby the Polish Library was taken over in the summer of 1967 by the Polish Social and Cultural Association in London. Finally finding its own premises helped to stabilise the work of this important institution, which has greatly contributed to the development of Polish science and culture. Since the beginning of its activity, the Polish Library has been – and continues to be – an excellent workshop for representatives of the Polish scientific community. In addition to collecting and registering publications, it is active in publishing and hosts within its walls numerous interesting academic events. In addition to the above-mentioned Maria Danilewicz, the Polish Library in London also has another long-standing director, Zdzisław Jagodziński. Undoubtedly, the Polish Library, as one of the oldest and most dynamically operating Polish academic centres abroad, is one of the most distinguished institutions for Polish science and culture.

Polish University Abroad (PUNO)

The end of the war and the inevitable liquidation of Polish higher education organised on British soil during World War II prompted the Polish academic teachers and scientists determined to remain in exile to think about the creation of a new university abroad. The first initiatives and attempts to do so began in 1949. Among the originators and initiators were several eminent professors and military officers, including General Tadeusz Kasprzycki, Professor Tadeusz Brzeski (former Chancellor of the University of Warsaw), General Professor Marian Kukiel, Professor Tadeusz Sulimirski, and Professor Tadeusz Grodyński.[25] Thanks to the involvement of representatives of several already functioning institutions and academic centres, including the Polish Scientific Society (Polish: Polskie Towarzystwo Naukowe), the Polish Historical Society (Polish: Polskie Towarzystwo Historyczne), and the Association of Professors and Associate Professors of Polish Higher Education Institutions (Polish: Zrzeszenie Profesorów i Docentów Polskich Szkół Akademickich), a Provisional Council of the Polish University Abroad was formed to prepare its draft statute. The university classes began in autumn 1950, although the statute itself was approved by the Minister for Polish Affairs in Exile of the Government of the Republic of Poland in exile on September 1, 1952. The Polish University Abroad was granted full university rights, based on the Act of March 15, 1933, by the decree of the President of the Republic of Poland on December 15, 1952. The academic staff consisted mainly of Polish professors who remained in the UK, but also included visiting Polish professors from the US. A large portion of the teaching staff constituted eminent pre-war historians, including Oskar Halecki, Stanisław Kościałkowski, Marian Kukiel, Tadeusz Sulimirski,

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25 Gawenda J. 1985, 18.

and Władysław Wielhorski.[26] The first Rector of the Polish University Abroad was Professor Tadeusz Brzeski.

The most important statutory task of the Polish University Abroad was to conduct teaching at the academic level with particular emphasis on Polish and historical studies, to prepare new teaching and academic staff, and to propagate knowledge. In the initial period of its activity, it was possible to establish only the Faculty of Humanities, with studies in Polish and history. Furthermore, Faculty Commissions were established: law and political science, economics, and natural sciences and mathematics commissions. In the following years, the university created new faculties, including, in 1962, the Faculty of Technical Sciences.

From the first years of its operations, the Polish University Abroad was one of the most important Polish centres of scientific life. In addition to offering academic studies in various fields, the University organised many other forms of education, including, for example, the Universal University Lectures (Polish: Powszechne Wykłady Uniwersyteckie) popularising Polish history and culture in the community of British academic youth, which later served as the basis for the creation of the two-year-long Course in the History of Polish Culture.

The most important field of research was historical studies, which involved a large group of Polish historians already mentioned in this paper, including General Professor Marian Kukiel, one of the most distinguished scholars in this field. For many years, he taught at the Polish University Abroad giving fantastic lectures, classes, and seminars. He was a supervisor and promoter of numerous master's and doctoral theses. Among his doctoral students were the later director of the Polish Library Zdzisław Jagodziński (mentioned above), Roman Buczek, and Adam Sawczyński. In 1970, M. Kukiel received the title of *doctor honoris causa* for his outstanding contribution to the Polish University Abroad.[27]

In 1952, 39 people studied full-time at the Faculty of Humanities, while another 105 individuals participated in correspondence courses. There were further 23 students in the Faculty Committees, for a total number of 167 students.[28]

The Polish University Abroad also published academic textbooks required for the teaching process, as well as other works, including typical academic monographs. Among the first such publications were Tadeusz Brzeski's *Teoria rozwoju gospodarczego Polski*[29] and Władysław Konopczyński's *Dzieje Polski nowożytnej.*[30] In the mid-1960s, the University began publishing 'Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziału Humanistycznego', in which the best doctoral and master's theses were printed.

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26 Radzik T. 1991, 61.

27 Hełczyński B. 1978–1980, 33.

28 Radzik T. 1991, 61.

29 Brzeski T. 1955.

30 Konopczyński W. 1959.

The Polish University Abroad was an academic centre that gave both historians and representatives of other academic disciplines the opportunity to carry out their research, pursue their own individual academic interests, their own development paths, and improve their qualifications.

Conclusions

In this paper, the author presented only a few – in his opinion, the most important – institutions and centres within which Polish historical science was organised in Great Britain in the first years after the end of the war. They were places where Polish scientific and cultural life after 1945 was born in difficult financial, organisational, and staffing conditions. There were no archives or libraries necessary for the work of historians, no pre-war private research bases and collections for scientific work. All of this was created with enormous effort and unprecedented grassroots commitment. It is worth quoting here a passage from the work of Paweł Kądziela:

> Since they planned to tie their fate to the strange, in many ways […], rainy and cool city on the Thames, for the sake of mental hygiene, the infrastructure of Polish cultural institutions had to be created at all costs.[31]

Although this idea refers to representatives of the cultural milieu, representatives of almost all disciplines, in particular the humanities, found themselves in the same situation.

All the institutions discussed above and the representatives of the Polish academic world involved in their establishment and operations contributed to the development of Polish science, in particular Polish military historiography.

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31 Kądziela P. 1994, 141.

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Social Political Differentiation of Electoral Moods of the Population of the Ukrainian SSR after World War II

Summary: In this paper, the main manifestations of the electoral moods of the population of the Ukrainian SSR during the elections to the Supreme Soviets of the USSR, the Ukrainian SSR and local authorities in 1946–1947 are considered. The generally low level of interest of the population in political actions, such as election campaigns, is emphasised due to the difficult social political and economic situation in the state. The factors that determine the electoral behaviour of voters and the causes of social deviations are analysed. The paper presents the stratification of citizens' electoral moods according to socio-political indicators and in the regional dimension, describing in detail the attitude to the elections of such social groups as workers, peasants, petty bourgeois, intelligentsia, women, etc. It is noted that the geography of critical statements proves the similarity of the electoral moods of the population in different regions of the Republic. However, the motivation for the protests and their public manifestation by the residents of 'Great Ukraine' (i.e., eastern and central Ukraine, which was under the rule of the Russian Empire and the USSR) and the western region are radically different. If, in most of the territory of the Ukrainian SSR, citizens accepted the demands of the authorities and were included in the electoral process, Western Ukrainians massively boycotted them. The boycott of the elections by the Western Ukrainian population was caused by a protest against the repeated forced Sovietisation of the region, the predatory economic policy of the authorities, as well as repressions against participants in the national liberation movement. Equally, Western Ukrainians protested primarily for ideological reasons, not accepting the values of the Soviet power and considering it an occupational force, while for the inhabitants of Great Ukraine, the everyday, material aspect turned out to be the most critical issue.
Keywords: Ukrainian SSR, post-war period, population's electoral moods

The efforts of modern researchers resulted in the shuttering of the Soviet mythology of the 'political monolithic nature of the Soviet society'. The said myth was based on the results of elections to the representative branch of power in which Soviet citizens repetitively provided almost 100% support for government initiatives. In fact, the political moods of the Soviet people were very diverse – from active approval of the regime to its complete rejection. However, none of the researchers dares to single out the percentage of the authorities' supporters and opponents, which is understandable, because the results of the elections never reflected the actual public political moods of citizens. In the Soviet Union, with its powerful punitive repressive system, not everyone dared to express their thoughts. Equally, the Soviet party's reporting records stored in the Central Archive of the Supreme Authorities and Administration of Ukraine (TsDAVO of Ukraine), the Central State Archive of Public Organisations of Ukraine (TsDAGO of Ukraine), and regional archives are not objective due to the ideological and stereotyped process of preparing documentation in the USSR.

The first post-war election campaigns for the Supreme Soviets of the USSR and the Union republics of 1946–1947, of course, occupied a special place in the system of the 'model' Soviet democracy.[1] The population's unanimous support for the Communist bloc and non-party candidates was supposed to be proof of the pre-war strength of the Communist regime and an act of its unconditional legitimation. However, holding elections turned out to be a difficult task for the Stalinist leadership due to the significant likelihood of their failure due to difficult socio-political and economic circumstances and the problematic high crime rate in the country at that time, which caused absenteeism.

As a result, the mechanism for conducting elections throughout the entire territory of the USSR, which was not very constitutional in nature, was even more at odds with the letter of the law because the political goals of the Soviet leadership could not be achieved within the framework of the existing constitutional order.

A particularly difficult situation with elections developed in the Western Ukrainian regions, the population of which – having experienced severe repressions in 1939–1941[2] – actively opposed the attempts of Sovietisation, including those involving the use of armed forces. Despite a powerful propaganda campaign, administrative pressure and repressive actions, in the first post-war elections, the authorities failed to make Western Ukrainians active participants in this process.

People refused to participate in pre-election events, relying on the support of the Ukrainian anti-Communist rebels. On election day, they did not appear *en masse* at polling stations, jeopardising the voting. In particular, during the elections to the Supreme

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1 More about elections and electoral law: Hazard J.N. 1949, 9–11; Palazyan A.S. 2012; Zvyagols-kiy A.Yu., Turitsyin I.V., Uporov I.V., Epifantsev A.A. 2016; Stasiuk O. 2018.

2 Tesliuk R. 2023, 41–42.

Soviet of the USSR in February 1946, no more than 10% of the population of the Western Ukrainian regions voted voluntarily, 30% voted under duress, and 60% did not vote at all. However, due to the fact that the Communists controlled the bureaucratic apparatus, the election results were grossly rigged.

This was the result of unlawful actions of public authorities and individual officials, who, in fact, created a certain sphere of 'limited legality' in the country, in which the regulatory legal acts in force at that time were inactive, or their provisions were deliberately not applied. Despite the fact that the inhabitants of 'Great Ukraine' showed more loyalty to the existing regime, their attitude towards the elections was far from unambiguous. A deeper study of the electoral moods of Soviet citizens makes it possible to single out 4 groups of voters depending on their attitude towards the electoral process:

1. 'activists' – who fully supported the government and were actively involved in the campaign;
2. 'calculating', or 'activists with a personal interest' – who participated in the campaign, hoping to settle their daily problems in this way;
3. 'evaders' – some of them tried to avoid participating in the elections using all means, and some openly or indirectly expressed their negative attitude, without opposing the system as a whole; and
4. 'conformists' – who came to the polling stations and voted 'properly' without showing any other political activity.[3]

It should be noted that the first group – the 'activists' – was not the largest one in Soviet society. It included government officials, party activists, Komsomol members, and trade unionists, namely, people who enjoyed certain privileges and benefits under the existing regime.

The 'calculating' and the 'evaders' were equally few in number, because not many individuals wanted to resist the regime even within the framework provided by the constitution. The largest group were the 'conformists', who voted hard in exchange for the regime's loyalty to them. The strategy of social mimicry, assumed by the majority of Soviet citizens as an adaptive form of cohabitation with the authorities, is explained by the consequences of the mass terror that, for many years, had broken the backbone of any form of public resistance.

However, when we consider the situation in the Western Ukrainian regions, the above scale of gradation of the electoral sentiments of Soviet citizens seems to be incomplete. In this case, we should add the following to the above-mentioned groups of voters – which, of course, also existed in Western Ukrainian society, although in different proportions:

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3 Kimerling A. 2016, 109.

5. 'protesting element' – voters who were under the influence of the OUN (Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists) and UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army) and refused to vote for ideological reasons, despite terror and coercion by the authorities;

6. 'rioters' – the largest group who not only refused to vote but also encouraged others to do so, detonating a chain reaction of protests. They resorted to the use of force in response to state terror. For instance, they beat up representatives of the authorities, committed actions compromising the authorities;

7. 'victims' – who voted under the terror of the authorities or refused to vote for fear of being destroyed by the anti-Communist rebels; and

8. 'members of the nationalist underground' – who carried out numerous anti-electoral actions and also tried to actively interfere with the elections, wielding weapons in their hands.

The first above-mentioned four groups of voters in Western Ukrainian regions had their own characteristics. In particular, the 'activists', i.e., the voters who consciously and willingly voted in the elections in Western Ukrainian society, were represented primarily by members of the administration and representatives of law enforcement agencies, chairmen of collective farms, Red Army soldiers, and Komsomol activists. Considering that there are few locals among these categories of the population due to the specific personnel policy pursued by the Soviet authorities in Western Ukrainian regions, it becomes clear that this group of voters in no way reflected the attitude of the 'native' Western Ukrainians towards Soviet democracy. Likewise, there were only a few 'calculating' and 'conformist' voters among Western Ukrainians because, given the activities of the OUN underground at that time, collaboration with the new government was simply life-threatening.

Ukrainians' objections to participating in the elections or their protest against them were motivated by political, economic, social, as well as moral and psychological aspects, which varied across the regions of the Republic. While Western Ukrainians protested primarily for ideological reasons, not accepting the values of the Soviet power, considering it an occupation, for the inhabitants of Great Ukraine, the material and everyday aspects of economic and political realities turned out to be the most critical. Interruptions in the supply of bread, lack of food, and other essentials caused people to have a negative attitude towards the government and its leaders. In particular, the administrator of the theatre in the city of Proskurov (now Khmelnytskyi) turned off the radio that was broadcasting a program about the elections and said irritably: '[I'm] tired, a whole month before the elections, and they are barking. The Communists have gripped us with their fist, there is nowhere to get a piece of bread, and everyone is talking about a good life, chicken's laugh'.[4] A violent emotional reaction among people was also caused by the authorities' indifference to solving

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4 CSAPAU. file 1. op.70. case 1048, 279.

their daily problems: 'Why don't you ask us if we have anything to eat, but only tell us who we should vote for? Who are we going to vote for? Is it the one who took our bread?'[5] – the peasants of the Khodaki village of the Ternopil region asked the representatives of the authorities.

The protests also had a clear social distinctiveness. While the peasants mainly noted the predatory economic policy of the Soviet government and demanded an end to illegal repressions, the intellectuals pointed to the shortcomings of the Soviet electoral system, its inconsistency with constitutional norms, and violation of the electoral legislation by the organisers of the electoral process.

In particular, the accountant of the Lviv State University, S. M. Ukrainskyi, expressed his dissatisfaction with the Soviet electoral law, which, in his opinion, did not provide freedom of choice: 'Our election campaign turns into a real comedy, nowhere, except for the USSR, do the authorities interfere in the conduct of elections. In other countries, each party nominates its own candidate, criticises others, but try to criticise in our country. This is not a democracy'.[6]

Equally, criticism of the Soviet electoral system was voiced in the statements of N. Kimanov, engineer of the Yenakyivsky metallurgical plant, according to whom it had nothing to do with democracy: 'Apparently, we will not wait until the time when truly democratic elections will be held in the Soviet Union. There is nothing democratic about these elections. You have to vote for someone who is already on the list'.[7]

Having experienced participation in the parliamentary structures of Western European states, Western Ukrainians compared the Soviet electoral system with European electoral practices, which allowed them to clearly see the shortcomings of the Soviet electoral reality.

In particular, one of the 5th-year students of the Lviv Polytechnic Institute compared the Soviet elections with the elections to the Polish Sejm and spoke in favour of the latter: 'Elections to the USSR Armed Forces are held in such a way that a predetermined candidate is chosen. Moreover, only this one candidate is placed on the ballot. Here, during the elections to the Polish Sejm, there were many more candidates than needed to be chosen. Therefore, it was possible to strike out an undesirable candidate. Under the Polish government, only those who wanted to vote voted, and those who didn't want to vote didn't even go to the polls'.[8]

Women were especially active during the protests, which was explained not only because the post-war society was largely feminised but also because of the special role of women seen as mothers and wives, programmed to be the keepers of the hearth.

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5 SSA SSU. file 13. case 376, 39, 131.

6 SSA SSU. file 16. op. 1. case 560, 10–11.

7 CSAPAU. file 1. op. 23. case 1424, 5.

8 SSA SSU. file 16. op. 1. case 560, 10–11.

Women could not forgive the authorities' representatives for the predatory policy of grain deliveries, which doomed their families to starvation. They were the first to speak at rallies, raising anti-government riots, beating government officials, and destroying ballots. Western Ukrainian women were especially aggressive and continued to protest even in the face of the threat of arrests or deportations: 'Don't scare me with Siberia, it won't be worse for me there, but I won't go to vote. Get out of the house'.[9]

Red Army soldiers and disabled veterans of the Great Patriotic War, who were left by the authorities to their fate after the war, as well as clergy, actively joined the protests, explaining their position with religious beliefs or public sentiments. The latter were also fully aware of the anti-democratic nature of the Stalinist elections. In particular, one of the priests said: 'Elections – this is only blackmail that the Soviet government uses in relation to its population, since in reality only the party votes and the rights of the population are ignored'.[10]

Massive resistance to the Soviet election campaigns was shown mainly by people in rural areas. In cities, the protests were less intense due to the presence of numerous military garrisons, a large number of employees dependent on the party administration, weaker cohesion of the urban community, insufficient influence of the OUN, etc. Most often, the townspeople agreed to participate in the 'electoral comedy' because they feared losing their jobs and had no other way to provide for their families except for a salary. Others did not want to leave their favourite profession, which for them was the sense of life. In particular, speaking at the pre-election meeting of the staff of the Ivan Franko University in Lviv concerning nominating candidates for deputies of workers in the USSR Armed Forces on 3 January 1946, Miron Zarytskyi, a professor of mathematics, said: 'In today's solemn wave, when our university staff stands as the first in our constituency exercising its honourable right to nominate candidates for deputies to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, allow me to express the ardent desire not only of our team but of the entire population of the Lviv region, for our father, Comrade Stalin, to become our deputy. The human language is weak in order to fully express in words the gigantic greatness of our brilliant leader's life and work and our love for him'.[11]

It is clear that the text of the speech was written for the Professor in the regional committee. He was forced to read it by the authorities because it is hard to believe that the father of the OUN activist Kateryna Zarytska (who was already convicted by that time) could voluntarily deliver such panegyrics to Stalin. To emphasise the forced nature of such speeches, we should note that most of the speakers who belonged to the former nationally oriented milieus read the texts from a sheet of paper.

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9 SSA SSU. file 13. case 376. 39, 131.

10 SSA SSU. file 16. op. 1. case 560, 36.

11 SSA SSU. file 16. op. 1. case 560, 36.

However, there were also those who, having understood the rules of the game, curried favour with the authorities in exchange for advancing their career or material benefits.

Therefore, taking into account the 'ritual' relations established in the Ukrainian SSR between the government and the population, which over time became an integral part of the political culture of the Soviet people, it is impossible to clearly identify the political mood of society. However, recent studies by Ukrainian and foreign scientists point to the existence of broad opposition and anti-Communist sentiments not only in the Soviet society liberalised after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party, but also still under Stalinism. Despite the terror and repressions, people found a way to overcome the suffocating atmosphere of ideological uniformity and political unanimity imposed by force by the regime by expressing their true attitude towards the Soviet reality in a narrow circle of like-minded people or using covert forms of protest. They emphatically reject the image of the Ukrainian SSR as an unshakable ideological monolith, especially given the events that were taking place in the Western Ukrainian region, whose inhabitants in the post-war period not only did not hide their negative attitude towards the Soviet regime, but also actively opposed it. Furthermore, their forced integration into the Soviet political system resulted in the emergence of various forms of 'dual consciousness', which allowed Western Ukrainians to maintain their national and regional identity for a long time.

However, the long integration of Ukrainian territories within the boundaries of a foreign socio-cultural and civilisational sphere [of the USSR] led to a distortion of the basic values of the Ukrainian mentality, provoked a deep social existential crisis, and Ukrainians' problem with self-identification.

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