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ARTICLES

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POLISH INTERSTATE RELATIONS WITH UKRAINE, BELARUS AND LITHUANIA AFTER 1990 IN THE CONTEXT OF THE SITUATION OF NATIONAL MINORITIES[1]

Abstract: When we compare the contemporary ethnic structure and national policy of Poland and its eastern neighbours, we can see clear asymmetry in both quantitative and legal-institutional aspects. There is currently a markedly smaller population of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians living in Poland than the Polish population in the territories of our eastern neighbours. At the same time, the national minorities in Poland enjoy wider rights and better conditions to operate than Poles living in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania.

Additional complicating factor in bilateral relations between national minority and the home state is different political status of Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine and different processes of transformation the consequence of which is differentiated state of political relations of Poland with its eastern neighbours. Lithuania, like Poland, is a member of EU, Ukraine, outside the structures of European integration, pursued a variable foreign policy, depending on the ruling options and the economic situation, and Belarus, because of internal policy which is unacceptable in the EU countries, is located on the political periphery of Europe.

Key words: national minorities, interstate relations, political transformation, Poland, Ukraine, Belarus, Lithuania.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the early 1990s, significant changes in the political and geopolitical situation in Central and Eastern Europe occurred: the collapse of communist rule, the unification of Germany, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of

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Czechoslovakia. The creation, over a short time, of a number of independent nation-states in the immediate vicinity of Poland had a vast influence on individual national minorities, especially those living near the borders. There were huge changes to the political and economic relations between democratic Poland and its newly independent neighbours and, to a large extent, between individual nations, now divided by borders. The process of expanding the area of European integration began, which led, after a dozen or so years, to the inclusion of some Central and Eastern European countries in the NATO and EU structures, while leaving some of those countries outside the zone of political, economic and military integration, thus creating new division lines in the new political and legal reality. Not only did it not mean the resolution of earlier problems, but it created new ones. At the same time, new opportunities to solve those problems emerged, and the national minorities were allowed to speak about their aspirations and problems openly.[2]

Throughout the whole existence of the Polish People's Republic and the Soviet Union, the border between the two countries was primarily a barrier tightly separating Poles from the Russians, Lithuanians, Belarusians and Ukrainians living in the Soviet Union, but also effectively dividing the Lithuanian, Belarusian, Ukrainian and, of course, Polish populations living on both sides of the border. According to Eberhardt (1993):

> […] the Polish-Soviet border, established after the Second World War, was for several decades one of the cordons dividing the beats in the huge totalitarian camp, stretching from the Elbe to Kamchatka.

Although the border between Poland and the USSR, which was re-formed at the end of the Second World War, functioned for just forty-seven years (1944–1991), its impact on the area it divided turned out to be very durable. The demarcation of the border had a direct impact on the resettlement of hundreds of thousands of people, led to the almost complete isolation of the two parts of the divided territory and resulted in its significant diversification, both in national-cultural and political-economic terms. The multi-cultural and multi-ethnic character of the borderland that was shaped for hundreds of years, was destroyed. Moreover,

[2] The preparations for this article included interviews with the leaders of the most prominent minority organizations in Poland: Ukrainian (Ukrainian Association in Poland – Związek Ukraińców w Polsce, Ukrainian Association of Podlasie – Związek Ukraińców Podlasia, Ukrainian Society – Towarzystwo Ukraińskie), Belarusian (Belarusian Social and Cultural Society – Białoruskie Towarzystwo Społeczno-Kulturalne, the Programme Board of 'Niwa' weekly – Rada Programowa Tygodnika 'Niwa', the Belarusian Students' Association – Białoruskie Zrzeszenie Studentów) and Lithuanian (Lithuanian Association in Poland – Stowarzyszenie Litwinów w Polsce, the St. Casimir Lithuanian Society – Litewskie Towarzystwo Św. Kazimierza). One of the purposes of these interviews was to learn the opinion of the leaders of national organizations about the changes to the situation of individual minorities following the accession of Poland to the EU, as well as their relations with their kin-states abroad.

the insularity of the border contributed to the peripherization of the borderland, leading to its economic and social backwardness. In the early 1990s, Eberhardt (1993) stated that 'it is the sacred duty of Ukrainians, Poles, Belarusians and Lithuanians to overcome this border by cultivating all traditions that prove their cultural and historical bonds'. This objective has been pursued for more than twenty years at the level of international relations (political, social and economic), administrative cooperation (especially in the Euroregions), as well as interpersonal relations (tourist, business, commercial). Due to political, ethnic and historical circumstances, its course and results are different in each of Poland's eastern neighbours. These relations are shaped by the minorities living in the direct vicinity of the national borders, both the Polish minority living to the east of the border and the Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanian minorities to the west. This is undoubtedly important in the analysis of international relations, but – according to Nijakowski (2000) – calling minorities 'bridges' in interstate relations has become a diplomatic canon and rhetorical figure of political correctness. In political practice, due to historical circumstances and the needs of the current internal politics or current geo-political interests, the role a given minority plays in the bilateral relations between the country of residence for such minority and their kin-state may be different, not always 'bridge-like'.

2. UKRAINE

The Polish-Soviet border was effective in hindering relations between the Poles and the Ukrainians and was destructive to the multicultural character of the borderland. On both sides, both the Polish and the Soviet communist regimes implemented a policy of assimilating minorities. As a result, over thirty years (1959–1989) the number of Polish people in Ukraine has decreased, according to official statistics, from 363.3 thousand, to 219.2 thousand. The number of ethnic Poles in the borderland Lvov region decreased by more than a half, from 59.1 thousand, to 26.9 thousand. As a result of displacement and dispersion of the ethnic Ukrainians in the northern and western parts of the country in 1947, the process of assimilation in Poland proceeded more rapidly, although there are no official statistics for the period.[3] The traces of culture and religion of individual minorities were also being destroyed.

[3] In the second half of the 20th century, no official statistics on ethnicity were held in Poland. According to latest census data there were approx. 30 thousand ethnic Ukrainians living in Poland in 2002 (figure 1), while the number of ethnic Ukrainians and people of Ukrainian descent has currently (in 2011) increased to approx. 49 thousand people. Due to the post-war resettlements, they are highly dispersed, mainly in northern and western Poland. The official data show that the number of ethnic Poles living in Ukraine has decreased over the consecutive twelve years (1989–2001) by over 75 thousand, to 144 thousand.



Fig. 1. The percentage of people declaring Ukrainian ethnicity (by districts) in the 2002 census

Source: own study based on data from the Central Statistical Office

The situation changed after the fall of communism in Poland, the dissolution of the USSR and the emergence of independent Ukraine in December 1991. Poland was the first country in the world to recognize the independence of Ukraine, the very next day after its formal announcement. The former border with the totalitarian Soviet Union became the border between two sovereign states. Crossing it was greatly facilitated. In addition to the existing border crossing in Medyka, which was the only one for decades, new ones, both road and railway ones, were created in Dorohusk, Hrebenne, Hrubieszów, Korczowa, Krościenko, Przemyśl, Werchrata and Zosin. The new political situation gave hope for a revival of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, which remained economically, socially and culturally dead throughout the communist times (Barwiński, 2009).

Since the early 1990s, Polish borderlands started trans-border cooperation within the Euroregions based on the existing European models. There are now two large Euroregions in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland: 'Carpathian' (since 1993, the second one in Poland), and 'Bug River' (since 1995). They include the whole

Polish-Ukrainian borderland. The main objectives of the Euroregions are to initiate and coordinate trans-border economic, scientific, cultural, educational, tourist and environmental cooperation, as well as to promote the region. The unique feature of both Euroregions, as opposed to the Euroregions near the western and southern borders, is the marginal participation by the local government in the creation and operation of the Euroregions, with a dominant role played by central and regional governments (Sobczyński, 2001).

The revival of the borderland can also be seen in the dynamics of cross-border traffic. A growth trend could be seen since mid-1990s, with a small slump in 1998. A dramatic increase in the number of people crossing the border, up to over 19 million people per year, occurred between 2005 and 2007 (figure 1). Six months earlier, in May 2004, another significant change in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland occurred, namely Polish accession to the European Union (EU). One of the consequences was the transformation of the Polish-Ukrainian border into the EU's external border, which came with many limitations, such as increased border control and the introduction of the visa requirement for citizens of countries outside the EU. The rapid increase in cross-border traffic in this period seems surprising, given the new formal requirements associated with crossing the border, mainly relating to the so-called EU visas.[4] It can be argued that it was the Polish accession to the EU that contributed to increasing cross-border traffic. As a member of the EU, Poland has become an attractive country for many foreigners from the east, and the interest in economy, trade and tourism has grown, both in Poland and Ukraine. Comparing the Ukrainian section of the border with other Polish fragments of the EU's external border (with Russia and Belarus), we can clearly see that the growth of cross-border traffic after 2004 only happened on the border with Ukraine, where the traffic became significantly higher than on the other two borders[5] (figure 2).

The situation changed dramatically with Polish accession to the Schengen Agreement in December 2007. The introduction of visa fees for Ukrainian citizens to all Schengen Area countries, including Poland, as well as the bureaucratization of the visa application procedures caused a slump in border traffic. In just two years (2008–2009), the number of people crossing the Polish-Ukrainian border fell from more than 19 million to just 11.7 million, and it still remains far lower than five–seven years ago, despite a growth tendency that could be seen over the last two years (figure 2).

[4] Before Poland joined the EU, Ukrainian citizens also needed to have entry visas to Poland, though they were free, reusable and easy to obtain. After the Polish accession to the EU, the so called EU visas were introduced. They were harder to obtain, yet still free. Only after Poland joined the Schengen Area the visas became paid and the procedure became more bureaucratic and complicated. However, the Poles still do not require a visa to go to Ukraine.

[5] The traffic on the Polish-Belarusian border, both passenger and freight, mostly applies to the citizens of Russia, for whom Belarus is a transit country.



Fig. 2. Passenger border traffic on the Polish section of the external EU border (border with Russia, Belarus and Ukraine) in the years 1995–2011
Note: applies only to land border crossings, does not apply to traffic by air and sea
Source: own study based on www.strazgraniczna.pl

A radical reduction in arrivals of Ukrainian citizens to Poland after 2007 led to the collapse of the borderland trade exchange, which has negative consequences for the inhabitants of the borderland. Since the early 1990s, good relationship between Poland and Ukraine directly translated into economic benefits, extremely important for the region. They resulted, among others, from the mobility and resourcefulness of the people who frequently cross the border in connection with the local trade, smuggling of alcohol and cigarettes, as well as looking for a job, but also for family reasons and tourism. One of the consequences of cross-border exchange were the frequent, sometimes regular contacts between the residents of the borderland with the people on the other side of the border, as well as with their language and culture. This had an impact on the perception of national minorities living in the borderland, both Polish and Ukrainian (Wojakowski, 1999, 2002). Sealing the border in preparation for Polish accession to the EU, as well as the increase in visa requirements in December 2007 have significantly limited these contacts.

Speaking of the Polish-Ukrainian border traffic, one has to remember the great role of Polish tourist trips, especially to western Ukraine, that have been becoming more and more popular over the last couple of years. They are mostly sentimental and historical in their nature and can be compared to German trips to Silesia or Masuria. Their economic significance for the Ukrainians, as well as for Poles in Ukraine, is growing every year. Moreover, they are one of the elements of getting to know each other and improving the Polish-Ukrainian relationships.

Despite the historical aspect of Polish accession to the EU, members of the Polish minority in Ukraine and the Ukrainian minority in Poland asked during the survey conducted in autumn 2007[6] about the positive and negative changes in Polish-Ukrainian relations after Polish accession to the EU mostly responded that they did not see any changes or saw more negative than positive changes. By far the most commonly reported negative change was the introduction of new visa regulations, that made life harder for the residents of the borderland on both sides of the border. Respondents also noticed positive changes in Polish-Ukrainian relations, although it is difficult to treat them as a direct result of EU expansion. Rather, they were the result of media reports that often mentioned Poland's involvement in Ukraine's integration into the EU and NATO, as well as Poland's and Ukraine's shared efforts organizing Euro 2012. Changes most often reported by the respondents were political and came as a result of international agreements and treaties. Such agreements usually do not have any significant influence on the relations between the Poles and the Ukrainians, though their impact on the borderland and its inhabitants (e.g. visa regulations) is considerably larger. The negative effects of Polish accession to the EU were more noticeable because they related to cross-border traffic, with which a large portion of borderland residents has some personal experience. On the other hand, the positive aspects were less noticeable to the respondents, mostly because they did not have any direct impact on them or their everyday lives (Lis, 2008).

However, according to the leaders of Ukrainian organizations in Poland, most of whom have a positive opinion about Polish accession to the EU, its most important outcome for the Ukrainian community are the monitoring of the minorities' situation by European institutions, improved subjectivity of the minorities and the government's greater understanding for the demands of the minorities. Further down the list are the financial benefits, primarily resulting from the opportunity to indirectly obtain EU funding through grants from local governments or financing for renovations of Orthodox and Greek Orthodox temples.

Independent Ukraine is not very supportive for the Ukrainian minority in Poland. According to activists in Ukrainian organizations, this support was non-existent throughout the first dozen years of Ukraine's independence. The coming to power of President Viktor Yushchenko in 2005 marked the beginning of the ongoing cooperation between the Ukrainian government and the Ukrainian minority organizations in Poland. It mostly includes partial funding (mainly by the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine) for major cultural events, festivals, conferences organized by Ukrainian associations, performances of Ukrainian folk groups in Poland, material support for schools teaching Ukrainian language (computers,

[6] The study was carried out in Poland and Ukraine and included a population of 265 residents of the Polish-Ukrainian borderland (126 respondents in Poland and 139 in Ukraine). Respondents from Poland were members of the Ukrainian minority, while the respondents in Ukraine were members of the Polish minority (Lis, 2008).

books, newspapers) and the participation of Ukrainian politicians in various celebrations. In the opinion of all Ukrainian activists, this support is far from sufficient, especially after 2010, and the presidential election lost by Yushchenko. Cooperation was also started with Ukrainian organizations, such as the Ukrainian Educational Society, 'Cholmszczyna' Association, a number of Ukrainian non-governmental organizations, as well as with the Federation of Polish Organizations in Ukraine.[7]

Despite the large Polish community living in Ukraine[8] and a clear (unfavourable for the Poles) asymmetry in the rights of the Polish minority in Ukraine and the Ukrainian minority in Poland, the question of the situation of national minorities is not a key topic in the official international relations between Poland and Ukraine, especially compared to the relations with Belarus or Lithuania. The economic and geopolitical issues are much more important. There are, however, numerous NGOs such as 'Wspólnota Polska' Association and foundations such as Aid to Poles in the East Foundation actively working with dozens of Polish organizations in Ukraine. Assistance is also provided by the Polish local governments and partner cities. On the other hand, state authorities (especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Culture and National Heritage) support Polish schools in Ukraine, libraries, publications and cultural activities of Polish organizations by co-funding scientific conferences, as well as renovations of temples, graveyards and memorials. The scale of the needs is, of course, disproportionate with the support.

Official political relations between Poland and Ukraine since 1991 were appropriate, though not free from mutual prejudices and stereotypes. The turning point came with the so-called 'orange revolution' in Ukraine (21.11.2004 –23.01.2005), during which Poland decidedly and effectively supported Ukrainian democratic parties calling for repeating falsified elections and making Ukraine fully independent from Russia. After President of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko took office (2005–2010), Poland became one of the closest political partners of Ukraine, often serving as its 'advocate' at the EU and NATO. This role often has been hampered and restricted by disputes between fraction of President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Tymoshenko, and especially by the clear closing-up 'orange' authorities of Ukraine with extreme Ukrainian nationalists.[9] Mutual political relations were manifested both in symbolic acts of reconciliation (e.g. cemeteries in Lviv and Volhynia) and in joint actions in the international

[7] Based on interviews with the leaders of the Association of Ukrainians in Poland, the Association of Ukrainians in Podlasie and the Ukrainian Society.

[8] According to the Ukrainian census of 2001, 144 thousand people, but according to various estimates by Polish organizations – from approx. 150 thousand to 900 thousand people.

[9] President Viktor Yushchenko, for the whole term of office, pursued a policy of glorification of UPA and OUN, for example he awarded the title 'Hero of Ukraine' to Stepan Bandera, which was repealed by a court decision in 2011.

arena, economic projects and sports events. Awarding the right to organize the European soccer championship in 2012 to Poland and Ukraine became yet another positive factor in activating Polish-Ukrainian cooperation. The policy of the Polish governments towards Ukraine, although not always consistent, sought to strengthen the democratic mechanisms and to link Ukraine as closely as possible to the structures of Western Europe, which is extremely important from the point of view of Polish geopolitical interests. The current complex internal political situation in Ukraine under President Viktor Yanukovych, as well as the turning of political and economic elites towards Russia makes the cooperation more difficult, and the political relations between the countries may once again be called, at best, appropriate.

Moreover, they are heavily burdened with historical circumstances, that have a special dimension in case of Polish-Ukrainian history. The general area of the Polish-Ukrainian borderlands has seen numerous bloody ethnic conflicts that are still alive in the collective consciousness of both Polish and Ukrainian nation. Historical legacy and national resentments are revealed, among others, in disputes surrounding the organization of various national or cultural events of various minorities on both sides of the border, monuments to honour the soldiers of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) or their victims, the two World Wars graveyards. History, including its contemporary evaluation and interpretation, is still far more divisive than uniting for Poles and Ukrainians in both countries, despite multiple gestures of reconciliation.[10]

3. BELARUS

After the proclamation of independence of the Republic of Belarus in 1991 and the related dissolution of the USSR, the emancipation of the former republics within the Empire, and the ongoing process of democratization in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, there was a common hope for the development of friendly, partner neighbourly relations with all newly-created eastern neighbours of Poland. The Treaties of good neighbourship and friendly cooperation with Belarus and Ukraine were signed as early as 1992, but the consecutive years verified these expectations, especially in the case of Belarus.

In the mid-1990s, Poland attempted to commence trans-border cooperation within the Euroregions, many of which were being created around that time. In 1995, the 'Bug River' Euroregion was created in the Polish-Ukrainian borderland, which was joined in 1998 by the Brest province in Belarus. In 1997, the 'Neman

[10] This is confirmed by the results of various kinds of sociological research, including Babiński (1997) and Lis (2008).

River' Euroregion was created in cooperation with Lithuania and Belarus. However, the Euroregions in the Belarusian region are practically non-existent. This is due to distrust of the Belarusian authorities of Poland and the EU, the lack of active cooperation, legal differences, and the lack of legal and financial personality of the Belarusian local governments.

The coming to power of President Alexander Lukashenka in 1994 began the process of political integration with Russia and the re-sovietization of Belarus, which included the restoration of the flag and the national emblem from the Soviet era and once more equality of rights of Russian and Belarusian language in public life.[11] There has been a gradual reduction of democratic and national freedoms. In a few years, Lukashenka's government turned into an autocratic regime and the political system of Belarus became a dictatorship. The whole political, social and economic life has been under supervision of the state, or the president, who now wields absolute power. The persecution of the small opposition movement have been intensified, which significantly worsened the relations between Belarus and the Western-European countries, including Poland. The EU has repeatedly imposed various sanctions, but they have not brought significant changes in the political situation in Belarus. Brutal persecution of political opponents is still a fact, basic democratic freedoms are not provided, violations of human rights are widespread, and the political cooperation with Poland and other EU countries is not functioning. As a result of Lukashenka's policy, Belarus remains outside the area of European integration and does not function as a state of law.

In 2005, the Belarusian authorities led to the breakup of the unity of the Union of Poles in Belarus, at the time the largest independent social organization in Belarus. Currently, there are two Polish national organizations of the same name, one 'official', recognized by the Belarusian authorities, the other unrecognized, discriminated against, cooperating with the Belarusian opposition and acknowledged by the Polish authorities. The Polish minority in Belarus is divided and used for current political purposes. Part of it supports Lukashenka's dictatorship, expecting all kinds of privileges, some favour the opposition, hoping to improve the situation of Poles after the democratization of Belarus. According to the 2009 Belarusian census, 294.5 thousand people declared Polish nationality. This means a decrease in the number of Poles by over 100 thousand people in just ten years.[12]

The support for Belarusian opposition, non-governmental organizations and Polish minority in Belarus, co-organized and co-financed by the Polish government (mainly the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), is one of the priorities of Polish policy

[11] From 1991 to 1995 the only official language in Belarus was Belarusian. Based on the results of a nationwide referendum in 1995, two official languages were introduced: Russian and Belarusian. According to the 2009 Belarusian national census, only 2.2 million of 9.5 million citizens of Belarus use the Belarusian language in their households.

[12] Numerically speaking, Poles are the second biggest minority in Belarus, after the Russians, mainly living in the north-western region of the country, near the border with Poland and Lithuania.

in terms of international cooperation in favour of democracy and the development of citizen society. It is met with strong criticism and counteractions from the Belarusian government. One of the most spectacular manifestations of Polish authorities' commitment to promoting democracy in Belarus was the launch Radio Racja[13] and TV Belsat[14] in Poland. In September 2011, on the initiative of several non-governmental organizations, the Belarusian House was opened in Warsaw. It is supposed to become a place to unite the Belarusian diaspora, coordinate the activities of the Belarusian emigration democratic organizations and support the repressed activists of the Belarusian opposition, as well as a place for discussions among all the organizations fighting for democratic Belarus. It also serves as a centre to inform the Polish public about the events in Belarus.

Currently, the mutual relations between Poland and Belarus are the worst of all the neighbouring countries.[15] They are further aggravated by the character of the border between the countries. The Polish eastern borderland, especially the Polish-Belarusian and Polish-Ukrainian one, is often referred to as Latin-Byzantine 'frontier of civilization', as the border between the Western and the Eastern civilizations (Bański, 2008; Eberhardt, 2004; Huntington, 1997; Kowalski, 1999; Pawluczuk, 1999). Running roughly along the Polish border with Belarus and Ukraine, the cultural dividing line emerging on the basis of the western Christian tradition and the influence of Orthodox culture, is the most enduring divide of the European continent (Bański, 2008). Since 2004 it has also been 'strengthened' by serving as the external border of the EU, which means that the eastern borderland of Poland, both in cultural and in political sense, can be treated as the frontiers of Western Europe, while the external EU border serves as the main axis dividing Europe.

The contemporary Polish-Belarusian border serves as a barrier between completely different political, economic, legal, social and cultural realities. It clearly divides not only the Polish and Belarusian societies but also Belarusians living on both sides of the border[16] (figure 3). It differentiates them not only in

[13] A non-public radio station broadcasting from Białystok and Biała Podlaska in the Belarusian language (also available online), intended for the Belarusian minority in Poland and the citizens of Belarus, funded by the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, operating in 1999–2002 and again since 2006. The main objective of the station is to provide the Belarusian citizens with the access to independent information about events and the situation in Belarus, Poland and the world.

[14] A satellite TV channel broadcasting since 2007 in Belarusian, financed and legally owned by Polish Television. Many programmes, including news, are also available on the internet. The main objectives of the station are the same as the objectives of Radio Racja. It is the only independent Belarusian-speaking television station available in Belarus, which breaks the monopoly of information of the Belarusian authorities.

[15] Despite the attempts made by Poland to improve it, the course of the last presidential election in Belarus in December 2010, with suspicions of fraud and violently suppressed mass demonstrations of opposition in Minsk, dispelled hopes of improving Polish-Belarusian and EU-Belarusian relations.

[16] The Podlasie region, situated in the Polish-Belarusian borderland, is a region with the most concentrated Belarusian minority. It is inhabited by approx. 45 thousand Belarusians (figure 3).

formal, but also in cultural, mental and economic sense, to a much larger extent than the Ukrainian border. It can surely be described as one of the strongest civilization barriers in modern Europe.



Fig. 3. The percentage of people declaring Belarusian ethnicity and using Belarusian language in the Polish-Belarusian borderland (by commune) in the 2002 census

Source: own study based on data from the Central Statistical Office

Paradoxically, as a consequence of the policy run by Lukashenka for over ten years aimed at denationalizing Belarusians by removing Belarusian national symbols, limiting the use of Belarusian language (especially in schools), the liquidation of independent Belarusian organizations and media, it is currently easier (and safer) to be an ethnic Belarusian in the Republic of Poland than in the Republic of Belarus.

Therefore, the Belarusian state is not as important as a point of reference for the ethnic Belarusians in Poland as their kin-state is for ethnic Lithuanians or Ukrainians. Sociological studies confirm that representatives of the Belarusian minority commonly view Poland, not Belarus, as their kin-state. They feel

a strong emotional, historical and political connection with the Polish state and they assess the Polish society much more positively than the Belarusian people living across the border. Therefore, they commonly assume the role of 'Polish citizens' not 'Belarusian minority' in external contacts (Sadowski, 1995). This has been confirmed by the research done by Bieńkowska-Ptasznik (2007) comparing Lithuanian and Belarusian minorities. She claims that Lithuanians identify their capital city with Vilnius, they feel a connection to the Lithuanian state and are more involved in what happens in Lithuania. On the other hand, the Belarusians identify their capital with Warsaw or Białystok, while their attitude towards the situation in Belarus, especially towards the policy of President Lukashenka, is predominantly critical. The negative assessment of the political situation in Belarus among the Belarusian minority in Poland is also confirmed by the research of Kępka (2009), even though his conclusions only relate to young and better-educated respondents that support the democratic opposition. Among older people, especially the rural population, the positive assessment of the political system in Belarus was dominant. The good and stable economic situation of the people of Belarus was emphasized, and President Lukashenka was seen as a 'good host'. The actions of the Belarusian opposition were criticised by the respondents for aiming to destabilise the political situation and leading to poverty and unemployment.[17] Such assessments stem, among others, from the positive view of the times of the People's Republic of Poland and the negative attitude towards the democratic transformations after 1989 in Poland, commonly held by the Belarusian community.

The diverse attitudes of the Belarusian minority toward Belarus are also apparent in the varied perception of the minority by the leaders of Belarusian organizations. Among the Ukrainian and Lithuanian minority organizations operating in Poland, there is hardly any difference and division concerning their relations with their kin-state, while among the Belarusian organizations, the attitude to the Republic of Belarus, its authorities and political system is one of the most contentious issues and the main (apart from the assessment of communist Poland) division and conflict line. Operating for several dozens of years, the Belarusian Social and Cultural Society (BTSK) is the biggest organization representing the Belarusian minority in Poland. Since its inception in 1956, it has been emphasizing its clearly left-wing character and keeping friendly reactions with the Belarusian authorities. This cooperation can be seen, among others, in the exchange of folk bands (partially financed by the Belarusian side), joint organization of cultural events, scientific conferences and publications. BTSK cooperates with the 'official' Union of Poles in Belarus recognized by the Belarusian authorities, which co-organizes annual scientific conferences and artistic events. BTSK activists go to Belarus, where

[17] The study was conducted in 2009, in the Polish-Belarusian borderland, in the towns of Bielsk Podlaski and Hajnówka and the municipalities of Czyże, Dubicze Cerkiewne, Hajnówka, Orla. It included 200 respondents (Kępka, 2009).

they often publicly declare their support for the policies of President Lukashenka. In return, Poland is visited by Belarusian officials and politicians invited by BTSK.

On the other hand, the activists of Belarusian organizations created in the 1990s, standing in opposition to BTSK and nationalist in character, are decidedly negative in their assessment of the Belarusian government. They often stress, that they do not maintain any contact or cooperation with the 'official Belarus'. On the contrary – one of the Belarusian leaders in Poland, Eugeniusz Wappa, has been banned from coming to Belarus by the authorities in Minsk, while the main Belarusian-speaking periodical ('Niwa' weekly) is officially banned there. This does not mean that these organizations do not maintain any contacts with Belarus. They cooperate with the opposition, some journalists and NGOs. They are also involved in the activities of Radio Racja and Belsat Television. However, the newly formed associations do not have a wide support among the Belarusian community in Poland, and their activity is usually limited to a few intellectual urban communities.

There is a clear correlation between the opinions concerning the situation in Belarus voiced by the leaders of the leftist BTSK and the main base of this organization, i.e. the older generation of rural Orthodox community, and the opinions voiced by the Belarusian nationalist organizations and the young, educated generation supporting these organizations.

Just as the activists of Belarusian organizations differ in their assessment of the political reality in Belarus, they also differ in their assessment of the situation of the Belarusian minority in Poland after the Polish accession in the EU. The president of BTSK believes that Polish EU accession did not change anything in the circumstances of the Belarusian minority, while the activists of organizations standing in opposition to BTSK emphasize the positive role of European legal standards in protecting the rights of minorities and better protection of minorities following the accession.[18]

4. LITHUANIA

Over the past several decades, the Polish-Lithuanian relations went through several very different stages – from overt hostility, through 'socialist friendship', early 1990s mistrust, cooperation and strategic partnership within NATO and the EU at the beginning of the 21st century, to the clear cooling down of mutual relations. How they will look in the future largely depends on the situation of Polish and Lithuanian minorities in both countries.

[18] Based on interviews with BTSK activists, the Programme Board of 'Niwa' weekly and the Belarusian Students' Association.

In the communist period, the issues of the Lithuanians minority were not a part of the relations with the USSR or the authorities of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. This changed in the new geopolitical circumstances. At the turn of the 1980s, the newly independent Lithuania regained widespread sympathies among Poles,[19] so it was expected, that the Polish-Lithuanian relations will become model. Despite this, it was Lithuania whose relations with Poland in the early 1990s were the worst among all neighbours. This exacerbation was influenced by the conduct of the Polish minority in Lithuania,[20] but also by the nationalistic slogans by the 'Sajūdis' party that took power in Lithuania and, to a large extent historically motivated, the dislike and distrust of the Lithuanians towards Poles.

After the conflicts of the early 1990s, the interstate relations between Poland and Lithuania, constantly dominated by the issues of minorities, especially the Polish minority in Lithuania, the relations improved. In April 1994, after months of negotiations, the Treaty on the good neighbourly relations and friendly cooperation was signed. By signing the Treaty, both parties committed to observe all international regulations concerning national minorities, that have been guaranteed, among others, the right to freely use their national language

[19] This applied to Poles living in Poland (including Polish politicians coming from the Solidarity movement), who supported Lithuania's struggle for independence as part of the wave of anti-Soviet sentiments of the early 1990s. On the other hand, the majority of Poles in Lithuania had a negative attitude towards Lithuanian independence, fearing the rise of nationalism among the Lithuanians and the persecution of discrimination of the Polish minority.

[20] During the regaining of Lithuania's independence, the attitude of two Polish members of the High Council of the Lithuanian Socialist Soviet Republic was met with very negative reaction when they abstained from voting during the works on the declaration of independence of the Republic of Lithuania on 11th March 1990. Despite the fact that their votes did not influence the outcome of the vote, their decision took on a symbolic meaning. At the same time some of the Polish minority activists, especially coming from the Communist Party, voted in favour of Lithuania remaining in the USSR. In May 1990, the National Council of the Šalčininkai Region, then dominated by Poles, adopted a resolution claiming allegiance of this region to the USSR. On the other hand, the members of the Union of Poles in Lithuania (ZPL) supported the independence of the Lithuanian Republic, while emphasizing the tough circumstances of the Poles in the Vilnius region and how it was discriminated by the Lithuanian authorities. In September 1990, the Polish deputies in the Local Government Councils of the Vilnius Region, with ZPL's support, created the Polish National-Territorial Region with wide autonomy for the Polish minority within the Republic of Lithuania, while in September 1991, the Polish deputies in Vilnius accepted a draft statute of the Vilnius-Polish National-Territorial Region. Decisions relating to the autonomy made by the representatives of the Polish minority were not recognized by the authorities of Lithuania (the Polish authorities were also opposed to the autonomy), and have been met with unequivocally negative assessment from the Lithuanian society. Eventually, the Lithuanian authorities have suspended the Vilnius and Šalčininkai district councils and introduced appointed administrators, which effectively halted any autonomist aspirations. During the referendum on the independence of Lithuania in February 1991, the turnout in the region Šalčininkai was only 30%, with only 64% of voters in favour of independence (with 84% and 90%, respectively in the whole Lithuania), which clearly showed the very limited support for Lithuanian independence among Polish minority. However, a month later, during the Soviet referendum on the future of the USSR boycotted by the Lithuanians, the Šalčininkai region saw a turnout of 76% (Kurcz, 2005).

in public and private life, use their names and surnames in the original form of the minority, set up institutions, participate in the public life on equal terms with other citizens and to protect their national identity.[21] The scale of the problems has been illustrated by the fact that Lithuania was the last of the new neighbours, with whom the Polish government signed an agreement of this type. A few months later the Lithuanian consulate was opened in Sejny in the Polish-Lithuanian borderland, and the Lithuanian government started financing the construction of the 'Lithuanian House' for the Lithuanian minority in Poland.

In the 1990s the border crossings in Ogrodniki and Budzisko were opened. These were the first Polish-Lithuanian border crossings after the Second World War. After Poland and Lithuania joined the EU in 2004, and both countries joined the Schengen Area in 2007, all limitations to crossing the border were lifted. This is an especially favourable situation for the Lithuanian minority living in the Suwałki region (figure 4), and a change which was hard to imagine not so long ago, given that throughout the period of communism, the government has effectively prevented Lithuanians living in Poland from contacting the Soviet Lithuania, including their families.

The Polish-Lithuanian cooperation which was established at the state government level led to the creation of common institutions, including: the Consultative Committee for the Presidents of Poland and Lithuania, the Assembly of Deputies of the Polish and Lithuanian Seym (1997), the Council for Cooperation Between the Governments of the Republics of Poland and Lithuania (1997), the Polish-Lithuanian International Commission for Cross--Border Cooperation (1996), the Polish-Lithuanian Local Government Forum (1998). In addition, the Polish-Lithuanian cooperation at the regional level has led to the creation of: 'Pogranicze' (Borderland) Foundation in Sejny (1990), Polish-Lithuanian Chamber of Commerce (1993), the Lithuanian--Polish-Russian Committee for Border Regions (1997), the Association of the Local Governments of the Sejny Region, and the Polish-Lithuanian Forum of Non-governmental Organizations. The cross-border cooperation was also developing dynamically and diversely, resulting, among other, in the creation of the 'Neman River' Euroregion in 1997, the cooperation between Polish and Lithuanian borderland municipalities and their twin cities, the cooperation of cultural institutions and schools, joint organization of commercial missions and international fairs (Rykała, 2008). These activities, along with other economic agreements, led at the end of the 20th century to the transformation of the Polish-Lithuanian relations, often called 'the best in history' at the time, into a strategic partnership. Effective cooperation concerning the membership of both countries in the EU and NATO has been started, and the shared aspiration have brought Warsaw and Vilnius closer to each other.

[21] Some of the provisions of the Treaty (such as the spelling of names and surnames, and bilingual names) have still not been implemented by the Lithuanian authorities.

However, in the first decade of the 21st century, after Lithuanian independence 'settled down' and Lithuania joined NATO and the EU, the mutual relations got worse. Lithuania started experiencing the old resentments and fears of the small country faced with a much bigger and populous neighbour, who dominated Lithuania politically for many centuries and now had the largest national minority. In the relations between Poland and Lithuania, the small Lithuanian minority in Poland has become a tool the authorities in Vilnius used in talks with the Polish government. When Polish authorities demanded respect for the rights of Poles in Lithuania, the Lithuanian government did not hesitate to raise the issue of discrimination of Lithuanians in Poland. Following the legal changes introduced in both countries in recent years (which are favourable for the minorities in Poland, while often being unfavourable in Lithuania), especially after adapting the Polish law to the EU regulations and the adoption of the Act on national, ethnic minorities and regional language by the Polish parliament, the situation of the Lithuanian minority in Poland is much better than the situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania.



Fig. 4. The percentage of people declaring Lithuanian ethnicity and the use of the Lithuanian language in the Polish-Lithuanian borderland (by commune), based on the 2002 census

Source: own study based on data from the Central Statistical Office

That is why the most important issue in the relations between the Republic of Poland and the Republic of Lithuania is the treatment of Polish national minority in Lithuania. The Lithuanian authorities have introduced a number of provisions

limiting the rights (especially concerning language and education) of the minorities. The still unresolved issues include Polish spelling of the names in the identification cards and bilingual spelling of street names and places. According to Lithuanian law, only the Lithuanian spelling rules can be used in the Republic of Lithuania and no bilingual place names are allowed, even in areas where Poles (or other minorities) are a vast majority of residents.

In 2011, the Lithuanian authorities have adopted the educational law that, according to the Lithuanian Poles, discriminates Polish schools in Lithuania.[22] Its adoption led to mass demonstrations in Vilnius, and the intervention of the Polish authorities. Protests of Poles did not have any effect, and the new education law became the new honed of Polish-Lithuanian conflict. Another unsolved problem relates to the return of Polish property seized after the Second World War by the Soviet authorities and the current Lithuanian authorities, who are their legal heirs. In addition to problems of social and historical nature, there are also economic issues, exemplified by the refinery in Mažeikiai, the biggest foreign investment of PKN Orlen, which has been causing problems far exceeding the so called 'market mechanisms' since its purchase by the Polish company.

Despite the many sensitive issues in the relations between the Lithuanian state and the Polish minority, Polish organizations and institutions have freedom to operate and a real opportunity to influence the local Polish communities. In the Vilnius and Šalčininkai regions, a large part of the local administration is dominated by the Polish minority, there are representatives of the Electoral Action of Poles in the Lithuanian parliament, Polish schools function (though with numerous problems), also at university level. After Poland and Lithuania joined the EU and the tendency to remove the administrative and economic barriers between the two countries became more prominent, as well as a result of the progressing Lithuanization of Vilnius, even the Lithuanian circles resentful of the Polish minority seem to realise, that it does not pose any threat to the territorial integrity of the Lithuanian state. However, the lack of support for Polish territorial autonomy, the issues of accepting the demands concerning the spelling of Polish names or bilingual signs and the regulations included in the new educational law show, that the Lithuanians are still afraid of Polish separatism and they treat many of the initiatives from the Polish minority as acts against Lithuanian sovereignty (Kowalski, 2008).

[22] The most criticized provisions of the new education law are the standardization, since 2013, of the mandatory maturity exams in Lithuanian language in minority and Lithuanian schools (despite existing differences in their curriculum), increasing the number of Lithuanian language classes, the introduction, since September 2011, of Lithuanian history and geography classes in Lithuanian, as well as the 'basics of patriotism', also in Lithuanian in minority schools (where all subjects used to be taught in minority languages). The law also makes it easier for the local governments to close small, rural non-Lithuanian schools, which will surely decrease the number of Polish schools. For comparison, according to the Polish educational law, all Polish history and geography classes are obligatorily taught in all types of schools, and the compulsory maturity exam in Polish language is also standardized.

The resolution of bilateral problems is surely hindered not only because of the lack of good will, but also because of the disproportionate nationality structure in both countries. Lithuanians in Poland are a marginal nationality, both in numbers and territory. Tight groups of Lithuanians live in the north-eastern end of Poland, along the border with Lithuania (figure 4), but they are a majority only in Puńsk municipality. According to the 2011 census, there is only approx. 8 thousand ethnic Lithuanians and people of Lithuanian origin in Poland. However, Poles in Lithuania are the largest ethnic minority (about 213 thousand of 3.2 million people), significantly shaping the history of Lithuania (both in the old days in and in the 20th century). There also is a large number of ethnic Poles living in Vilnius and they dominate in numbers and in political influence around the Lithuanian capital.[23] Of course, this does not justify the asymmetry in the relationship towards minorities. The Government of the Republic of Lithuania, regardless of the changing political options, consistently fails to comply with all the provisions of the Treaty of 1994 with Poland and discriminates Poles. In view of such national and political relations between friendly, fully democratic states, members of the EU and NATO, the state of relations with Belarus or Ukraine should not come as a surprise.

By limiting the rights of national minorities in their territory, the Lithuanian authorities at the same time give various forms of support, financial, organizational, and political, to ethnic Lithuanians living broad, including those in Poland. This commitment is expressed, among others, in significant expenses on minority operations. The Lithuanian government funded the construction of the 'Lithuanian House' in Sejny (which houses, among other things, the Consulate of the Republic of Lithuania, the boards of Lithuanian associations, bands, choirs, folk groups), as well as the buildings of the School Complex with Lithuanian language of instruction 'Žiburys'. In Puńsk, the Lithuanian government co-financed and enabled the construction of the 'House of Lithuanian Culture'. It also subsidizes schools, the operation of Lithuanian minority organizations and the 'Aušra' publishing house. The president of the Association of Lithuanians in Poland emphasizes the significance of multi-faceted support from the Lithuanian authorities and institutions, such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Education, the Institute of Lithuanian Language and Lithuanian schools. At the same time, Lithuanian activists agree that the Polish-Lithuanian relations have a very negative impact on the situation of the Lithuanian and Polish perceptions, as well as on the reception and opinions of the Lithuanians held by Poles in the Polish-Lithuanian borderland. According to them, the Lithuanian minority is 'a hostage of the foreign policy of Poland and Lithuania', and any deterioration in relations between Warsaw and Vilnius has a bearing on the situation in Puńsk

[23] According to the 2011 census, there are approx. 200 thousand Poles living in Lithuania (a drop of over 30 thousand within ten years), representing 6.6% of the total population, about 88 thousand Poles living in Vilnius constitute 16.5% of the total population, while Poles in the Vilnius region constitute 60% and in the Šalčininkai region – 80%.

and Sejny. The consider this relationship to be very unfavourable, unjust, or even dangerous. They find a direct relationship between the political situation in Lithuania and the painting over of the bilingual town names in Puńsk municipality in August 2011, which was, according to them, inspired from the outside.

They do, however, have a very positive assessment of the consequences of Poland and Lithuania joining the EU for the Lithuanian minority, especially valuing the right to freely cross the border between the countries, which is surely of fundamental importance for the people living for decades in the borderland, in direct vicinity of their kin-state (figure 4). Particularly considering the fact, that this geographic proximity did not mean the freedom of mutual contacts long before the communist era, practically from the beginning of the 1920s. For dozens of years, the Polish-Lithuanian border was a very tight barrier that prevented not only normal cross-border cooperation, but even visiting family member living a few or a dozen kilometres away. That is why the most important aspect of European integration for the Lithuanians living in Poland is, literally and practically, the integration of the Polish-Lithuanian border. It should also be noted that the Lithuanian Association in Poland was the only national organization in the study, whose authorities have admitted to using EU funds in their statutory operations.[24]

5. CONCLUSION

One consequence of the contemporary processes of political, economic and military integration of the European continent is the strengthening of its division into the Western Europe (in its widest meaning) and the Eastern Europe (not included in the integration process). At the Polish border with Belarus and Ukraine, the line of the modern division, strengthened in the literal (technical measures to protect the borders) and legal sense (visa regulations) overlaps with the civilization, cultural and religious division line that has been shaped over the ages. Despite the claims from the government in Warsaw of 'Polish eastern policy', we can see a clear turn towards 'western policy'. In political, military and economic sense, Poland is clearly facing west, which results in turning away from its eastern neighbours, which is particularly disadvantageous for political and geopolitical reasons. Despite spectacular attempts by various governments to revive the cooperation, especially with Ukraine and Lithuania, Poland does not currently have any arguments, especially economic or financial ones, to conduct an effective, pragmatic eastern policy, and not a policy based on historical sentiments.

[24] Based on interviews with activists of the Lithuanian Association in Poland and the St. Casimir Lithuanian Society.

When we compare the contemporary ethnic structure and national policy of Poland and its eastern neighbours, we can see clear asymmetry in both quantitative and legal-institutional aspects. There is currently a markedly smaller population of Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians living in Poland than the Polish population in the territories of our eastern neighbours. At the same time, the national minorities in Poland enjoy wider rights and better conditions to operate than Poles living in Ukraine, Belarus and Lithuania.

The improvement of the legal situation of ethnic minorities in Poland is related, among others, to Poland accession into the EU, which is recognized and appreciated by the leaders of national organizations, who stress that the main consequences of Poland's membership in the EU for the communities they represents are not the potential financial benefits, but an improvement in legal standards concerning the protection of ethnic minorities. This is a universally held opinion, very strongly rooted in the consciousness of the leaders of national organizations, even though it is not exactly applicable to EU legislation. The EU law does not include any regulations concerning the rights of ethnic minorities, even though the EU requires its members to respect the standards of international law concerning minorities. The EU legislation only protects the so called less-used languages, which may mean, in practice, some of the languages used by ethnic minorities, but it does not introduce a common national policy. As a result, each country regulates the legal issues of ethnic minorities on its own. The EU legislation clearly prohibits discrimination due to gender, race, religion, ethnic and social origin and the colour of one's skin, yet no EU documents directly mentions ethnic minorities. There are also no special programmes for financial supports of minorities. Thus, they can only apply for financing for their projects as part of general EU initiatives (structural and cohesion funds). The legislation of the European Council concerning the legal protection of ethnic minorities is much more extensive (Budyta-Budzyńska, 2010).

In discussing the interstate relations concerning national minorities, the 'rule of reciprocity' in bilateral relations is often discussed. This discussion, but also the actions of both sides of it, very often see the struggle between, as Nijakowski (2000) put it, the 'old testament' version, which demands that you give rights to a given minority according to the rule of: we will treat 'your people' as badly (give them as few rights) as 'our people' are treated by you, and the 'new testament' version, which uses the rule of: 'look how good your people have it with us'. One has to hope that the latter version will become more and more prominent. As Nijakowski says when discussing the relations between Poland and the foreign kin-states of 'Polish' minorities, it should be a model, while the first is neither ethically admissible, nor politically beneficial.

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INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF REGIONAL POLICY AND THE REGIONAL INSTITUTION SYSTEM IN SERBIA

Abstract: This study summarizes aspects of Serbian regional policy with special focus on regions and the development of the regional institutions. The study emphasizes the importance of the issue in the Republic of Serbia in 2010, with the ambition to join the European Union. With the enactment of the new Law on Regional Development and the legal framework five NUTS 2 regions were created. The Ministry of Economy and Regional Development is responsible for the institutional coordination of the regional policy. Regional Development Agencies are at the intermediate level of institutional hierarchy. After the regionalization of Serbia, the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina remained a whole and unified NUTS 2 region with complex and developed regional institutions.
Key words: NUTS regions, regional policy of Serbia, institutions of regional policy, Autonomous Province of Vojvodina.

1. INTRODUCTION

Serbia is striving to meet the international expectations of the European Union while regionalizing the country. The establishment of the regions evokes serious arguments among the political elite. The mainly ethnocentric-nationalist oriented Serbian politics argue for the preservation of territorial integrity (as well as their own political power) while attributing a marginal role to regions. The Serbian public – but primarily those people who have experienced the traditions of the regional autonomy and the regional political elite – fight for the expansion of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina's (APV) jurisdiction. The rationally and objectively thinking

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public, the political and academic elite are fully aware of the link between economic development and regional self-organization, the huge regional disparities and the probable and already present consequences of centralization around Belgrade.

In this study we will summarize the legal documents regulating and institutionalizing regional policy published during the period 2007–2011 with the aim of providing a general description of the Serbian regional policy. We will also summarize the main characteristics of regional disparities in Serbia. In the analysis, the APV's regional characteristics, institutional solutions will be emphasized, because in our opinion Vojvodina plays an essential part in the Serbian regional development efforts.

2. NUTS REGIONS IN SERBIA AND THEIR LEVEL OF DEVELOPMENT

Institutionalization of Serbia's regional policy started in 2007. The *Regional Development Strategy of Republic of Serbia 2007–2012* is the first document on regional development, which defines the country's development priorities. The Law on Regional Development (LRD) was responsible for creating the legal framework and policy for regional development in 2009 (modified in 2010), and the regulation on NUTS[1] regions was also implemented in 2009 (modified in 2010).

After long discussions and several modifications, eventually 5 regions (five NUTS 2 and thirty NUTS 3)[2] were established in Serbia in 2010 (figure 1).

According to the law these regions (*region* – NUTS 2) and counties (*oblasti* – NUTS 3) are such functional territorial entities which entail planning and the execution of regional development policy. They are responsible for economic and social development, rural development, balanced development between villages and towns, as well as for the operation of the regional economic system and spatial planning, and the initiation of international and cross-border cooperation. In legal (Serbian) phrasing:

> […] the region and county-area are not administrative territorial entities and they do not have autonomy, they are statistical-functional territorial entities which consist of units of local governments situated in their territory (4th paragraph, LRD, 2009, p. 3).

Creating the regions has led to revealing highly visible regional disparities. These new territorial units have no autonomy in regional management (the new law does not give or imply these powers either), so the regions will not be able to decrease the differences in development on their own, thus will not be able to support the long term economic and social development of the country.

[1] Nomenclature d'unités territoriales statistiques – Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics.

[2] The official NUTS 2 regions in Serbia are the following: Region of Vojvodina, Belgrade Region, Šumadija and West-Serbian Region, South- and East-Serbian Region, Kosovo and Metohija Region. *Uredba o nomenklaturi statističkih teritorijalnih jedinica* (2009, 2010, pp. 9–11).



Fig. 1. NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 regions in Serbia, 2010
Source: *Uredba o nomenklaturi statističkih teritorijalnih jedinica* (2009, 2010, pp. 9–11)

In Serbia the regional disparities are enormous even by European standards (Komšić, 2009, p. 76) which can exacerbate (Lilić, 2009, p. 17), or traditionally remain stable along a North-South axis (Nikolić, 2009, pp. 54–56). Comparing the levels of development of Serbian macroregions it can be stated that all have GDPs below the average EU GDP: Belgrade 50%, Vojvodina 37.1%, while Central-Serbia 21.1% of the EU average (according to 2005 data) (Nikolić, 2009, pp. 54–56). The ratio of regional disparities is 1:7 (districts – *okrug*) and 1:15 (municipalities).

According to the economic and social inequalities within these regions, we would like to present the massively fragmented picture of territorial development in Serbia (based on Winkler and Takács, 2012). The socio-economic situation on the municipality level (LAU-level) has been measured within the newly installed NUTS regions, defining the Index of Socio-Economic Pressure.[3]

[3] Based on 5 indices factors (Index of Population, Economic Index, Index of Work and Infrastructure, Index of Preschool Education and the Index of Medical Care, grouping 25 socio-economic variables, based on secondary statistical dataset; in 161 examined municipalities, without data about Kosovo) was composed a cumulative index to depict regional disparities.

Table 1. Regional development indicators of Serbian NUTS 2 regions, 2007–2009

NUTS 2	Territory (km^2)	Population (000) 2008	Population/km^2	Per 1,000 inhabitants					GDP *per capita* (000 din) (2009)	Net personal income (din) (2009)	Housing (ownership) /1,000 km^2 (2008)	Recently constructed roads (%) (2007)
				employed (2009)	self-employed in own business/ worker (2009)	unemployed (2009)	students in higher education (2009)	with higher education degree (2009)				
Republic of Serbia	88,358	7,350	83.2	257	67	99	32	5.5	385	31,733	215.6	63.8
Vojvodina Region	21,506	1,979	92	252	69	99	28	6.2	366	31,203	186.5	88.7
Belgrade Region	3,227	1,621	502.3	379	87	57	74	11.9	690	39,862	2,355.4	75.6
Šumadija and Western Serbia Region	26,483	2,066	78	213	69	118	15	2.3	275	26,600	175,5	60.5
Southern and Eastern Serbia Region	26,255	1,684	64	200	51	116	17	2.3	243	26,085	138.5	63.6
Kosovo and Metohija Region	10,887	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a

Source: own elaboration based on statistical data of *Opštine u Srbiji* (2008, 2010)



Fig. 2. Index of Socio-Economic Pressure of Serbia, 2009
Source: Winkler and Takács (2012)

According to the indicators of regional development – in regional comparison (table 1 and figure 2) the Belgrade region is the most developed (concentration of industry, number of flats owned, number of highly educated people, number of employed, the average income levels, with enormous demographic pressure), while the other regions decline economically and socially. The Vojvodina region today is a well-developed region within the Republic of Serbia, however, Vojvodina's development is far from being homogeneous, the Novi Sad and its zone attractive are well-developed. Serbia's most underdeveloped NUTS 3 region is the South-(Raška), and East-Serbian regions (Bor, Majdanpek former industrial zones). There are noticeable directions of development: north-south axis, central-peripheral and an overwhelming rural and urban discrepancy, underdeveloped border regions, ex-industry zones. This trend to fragmentation creates a more and more unclear regional disparity image (Winkler and Takács, 2012).

3. WHY DOES SERBIA NEED REGIONALISM?

As a result of the centralized economic system of the Milošević regime the Serbian political elite faces the serious obstacles of social-economic disintegration, which make regional development nearly impossible. Janjić argues that even 'with two decades of state history Serbia is still in its initial phase of constructing the nation-state', the major characteristics of which are ethnocentrism and centralized governmental administration. Indeed the Republic of Serbia is an 'unfinished state', which is not ready for integration either on national or international level (Janjić, 2009, pp. 105–106). This explains how the political elite still does not aim to decentralize its power or take steps toward regionalization; and statistical regions (for planning purposes) were created in Serbia in 2010 only to meet EU expectations. According to Nikolić (2009, p. 48) Serbia has to be regionalized to an extent that it could still have a unitary state system; however, the real challenge of regional development is how unitary states can be decentralized in order to enhance long-term economic development (Horváth, 2009a, p. 18). Serbia still fears regionalization, follows ethnocentric ideologies and continues to hinder decentralization (Komšić, 2009, pp. 98–99). The questions of decentralization and regionalization have not been solved by drafting the new constitution in 2006 (Bozóki, 2007, n.p; Takács, 2008, p. 150). Real regionalization could, however, take place only with amending the constitution. Some representative Serbian political experts consider[4] the amendment of the constitution necessary in order to incorporate decentralization that would enable regional autonomy in finances and lawmaking in the entire country (Lilić, 2009, p. 18; Janjić, 2009, pp. 103, 112–114). Janjić (2009, pp. 103–106, 112–115) also handles the concept of region exclusively as a constitutional category, 'the institution of practicing the right of self-government', emphasizing the role of local governments.

Due to the lack of appropriate amendment to the constitution (and according to the new Law on RD) regional policy in Serbia is enacted through centrally managed reforms. This approach is called top-down or 'modernizational regionalism', which makes administrative reforms happen as initiatives of national political consensus (Pálné Kovács, 2004, p. 952; Vuletić and Vukelić, 2009, pp. 117–118), and 'these regions become the authoritative instrument of the standardizing technical rationalism commanded from the government' (Faragó, 2005, p. 200).

Europe than in the Republic of Serbia (2007),[5] thus, 'the potential to introduce the bottom-up approach to regionalization (considering cultural-historical characteristics, emphasis on local needs) is very poor in Serbia' (Vuletić and

[4] Nikolić suggests that the rights of national minorities be incorporated in the Constitution. However, he argues against Albanian, Bosnian and Hungarian 'ethnic regionalization', which would create regions along national minority boundaries, which he considers unacceptable, rather than on the basis of economic development principles (Nikolić, 2009, p. 47).

[5] Project INTUNE, a survey (2007, 2009) of how the political elite in 18 EU member states and the Republic of Serbia relate to regionalization. In Europe 87.5% of politicians feel they have very strong ties

Vukelić, 2009, pp. 123–133). Furthermore, the approach proves to be problematic in Eastern-Central European administrative issues (Horváth, 2009a, p. 16). Simić (2009, pp. 70–72) argues that the experience of regionalization in developed European countries cannot be implemented in the Balkans for various reasons: transitionary processes, ethnic and territorial debates, disintegration of states, developmental differences (north-south), lack of market homogeneity. North (2002, qtd. in Vuletić and Vukelić, 2009, p. 122) mentions the lack of regional identity (lack of community forming power). Janjić refutes Nikolić in that he finds ethnic initiatives and enforcement of interests important. 'Regionalization may strengthen integrative relationships within the Serbian society', the nationalities (minorities) may feel support and security in that their identity and autonomy will not be hurt (Janjić, 2009, pp. 105–106). National minorities will be able to participate in decision-making (Vuletić and Vukelić, 2009, p. 122). Korhecz (2009, pp. 34–36) points out that in the case of the APV and the indigenous national minorities, autonomy connects national minorities and ethnic communities living in the province, as well as stabilizes the multicultural community and helps political-national integration. Regionalization in the Republic of Serbia can be characterized with two processes:

– strives for European integration 'keep the pace with Europe' (Lilić, 2009, pp. 7); 'a necessary concomitant of Serbia's pro-European orientation' (Komšić, 2009, p. 77); 'a forced formal aspect that has to be fulfilled' (skeptical towards the EU: Nikolić, 2009, p. 54), being able to use EU resources (Alibegović, 2009, p. 23), region is a preliminary condition of the EU integration (Vojković, 2003, qtd. in Vuletić and Vukelić, 2009, p. 123).

– separatism and struggle against territorial integrity (Lilić, 2009, p.7; Vuletić and Vukelić, 2009, p. 122). Furthermore, Nikolić (2009, p. 46) continues to argue against the regionalization of the country and emphasizes the 'underdeveloped nature of legal and political culture', 'the lack of leadership capacity', 'the growth of public costs', and 'the superfluity of intermediate level management, thus the needlessness of regions'.

At this time regions in the Republic of Serbia meet EU requirements (Nikolić, 2009, pp. 46–48), and there is no need for real decentralization, as they get EU support, for the time being through Belgrade (Janjić, 2009, p. 104). 'Statistical regionalization' does not mean political autonomy at the same time (Nikolić, 2009, p. 48). Statistical regions very often do not have direct access to EU funds on their own (Lilić, 2009, pp. 18–19), as they depend on the centralized government and control in this case as well. The Law on Regional Development will not change the government system, as it brings only statistical decentralization (Nikolić, 2009, p. 48).

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to their own regions, while in Serbia only 69.4% claim to have such strong connections. Regarding social issues (unemployment, environmental protections, healthcare etc.), the Serbian political elite would only give limited power to the regions. Regionalization is strongly supported by 10% of the Serbian political elite, while another 10% fully opposes the processes (Vuletić and Vukelić, 2009, pp. 123–133).

Instead of 'mechanical and improvisational copying' of European regionalized states, Nikolić (2009, p. 48) suggests applying the concept of statistical regions, which he finds more acceptable as it does not bring new administrative units or new forms of territorial autonomy. Horváth (2009a, p. 13) claims that regions must not only be handled as EU units, since 'region is an optimal framework' of economic development, postindustrial spatial planning, regional-social level of meeting interests, and the organization-planning-implementation triangle. According to Lilić (2009, p. 17), regionalization should be seen as a government method toward larger regional cohesion, accelerated development and competitiveness. It could also be perceived as a 'flexible alternative of power', a way to improved life quality, and responsible international policy-making (Janjić, 2009, pp. 112–114). Regionalization can also be seen as a tool to improve the quality of public services, stop the accumulation of political power, and increase the responsibility of local power and politics horizontally and vertically (Vuletić and Vukelić, 2009, p. 121).

Development documents, which aim to resolve the doubts about the territorial integrity of the country, unanimously refuse the possibility of setting up economic and administrative (political) regions in the Republic of Serbia; instead they suggest statistical-planning and statistical-development regions. Undoubtedly, the Republic of Serbia needs real regionalization, which, through the regions (and their institutions), would enable:

– complex development of the economy,
– social-ethnic (national) integration,
– international integration,
– territorial cohesion, and
– decreasing/annihilating regional inequalities.

4. THE INSTITUTIONS OF REGIONAL POLICY IN SERBIA

Once regionalization is complete, the national institutions will be organized, which will command its own competency in the planning, execution and monitoring of regional policy.

According to the LRD in Serbia a similar, hierarchical, centrally-governed new institutional infrastructure is attached to the existing regional adaptation of the administrative-territorial lay-out. The main point of the law amendment, accepted in May, 2010 can be summed up in the abolition of the County Associations planned for district-level and in the increase of the Regional Development Agencies' – which are to be set up in the NUTS 2 regions – number (3–4 on occasion).



Fig. 3.The institutions of the regional policy of Serbia, 2010
Source: own construction based on Internet sources and LRD

The institutions provide consultancy, function as executive in the implementation of regional policy on three levels: federal, NUTS 2 and NUTS 3 (figure 3). The main jurisdiction happens at the Ministry of Economy and Regional Development, on federal level. The National Agency for Regional Development is the central organ of Serbian regional policy execution. The Regional Development Agencies stand on the intermediate level of the institutional hierarchy, on the level of regions. Other governmental organs/government authorities can exercise their power (on local, regional and federal levels) during the realization of regional

policy.[6] The consultant organs of regional policy – the National Council for Regional Development and the Regional Development Council(s) – are organized on the level of national economy and on regional level.

The institutional coordination of regional development is complex in Serbia. The division of labour is very diverse, coordination is slow, and inefficient. The complexity of regional developments requires a multisectoral approach. As a result of this the authorities of the central executive power – the organs of the ministry[7] – share the execution of the developmental tasks. Subjects of regional development (LRD, 2009, sections 19–40, 5–7) are:

1. Administrative Authorities.
2. Ministry Authorities.
3. Regional Development Authorities:

a) National Regional Development Council – NRDC (Nacionalni savet za regionalni razvoj) – formed by the government, it has 28 members and a president.[8] The NRDC's responsibilities include status assessment, opinion, coordinating the work of regional councils, formation of working groups etc.;

b) The National Regional Development Agency – NRDA (Nacionalna agencija za regionalni razvoj) – is the state's newest coordinating institute, operative agent of regional policy. It acts in the following legal tasks: controls the preparation of development documents, monitors the realization of regional developments, accredits the regional development agencies, monitors their registry, oversees their work, offers professional support. By teaching the instructors of small and medium-sized enterprises it carries out further tasks, renders appropriate projects to the EU funds and other sources, initiates international and interregional cooperation, forms a unified information system, tends to publishing tasks etc. Its work falls under the ministry's jurisdiction.

c) Regional Development Council – RDC (Regionalni razvojni savet) – the government establishes development councils in every region (5 councils). In each region only one council can be established.[9] Tasks: the council offers an opinion

[6] Remarks: on one example we would like to present the differences in the sphere of action of executive organs, on one hand, and the responsible organs for implementation of regional policy, on the other hand. The Department for Policy of Regional Development and IPA Projects within the Ministry of Economy and Regional Development is an executive organ, which is responsible for the complete IPA-programme (Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance) in Serbia (tenders, organizing, controlling and account). Ministry of Finance is the most important responsible organ for implementation of regional policy – in this special example of IPA-programme, supporting the whole budgeting and founding process.

[7] *Zakon o ministarstvima* (2008, 2011), reorganization in March 2011.

[8] The Minister responsible for regional development acts as the president. The members of the Council are appointed for four years by the government (LRD, 2009, pp. 6).

[9] The RDC has a president and a number of members allotted by the statutes with a five-year mandate. The Council consists of the representatives of local governments, NGOs, representatives from the public sector and deputies (LRD, 2009, p. 6).

on regional development strategy, financing programme, other development documents, forms working groups etc., reports to the government and to the NRDC in an annual report;

d) Regional Development Agencies – RDA (Regionalna razvojna agencija) – their establishment is performed by the government. The RDA is an association (*privredno društvo, udruženje*) responsible for regional development tasks. For ensuring balanced regional development the law prescribes the establishment and accreditation of a limited (minimum) number of agencies in each region: Vojvodina Region – 3 RDA, Belgrade Region – 1 RDA, Region of Šumadija and West-Serbia – 4 RDA, South- and East-Serbian Region – 3 RDA (Kosovo and Metohija Region – 1 RDA).

Tasks:[10] participates in the preparation of development documents, accounts for their realization, executes development projects on regional level, ensures the possible access to EU funds, provides professional training, initiates international and national cooperation, forms a regional information system, carries on publishing tasks etc. The RDA is overseen by the ministry. The RDA writes an annual report on its work for the founders (local governments) and for the NRDA.

There is an ongoing formation of the institutional network. Establishing an efficient institution system that aims to decrease regional development differences is an essential requirement of EU accession (Horváth, 2006, pp. 14–15). Their tasks are: supporting economy, solving regional development problems, building economic and social partnerships, getting regional developments through politically, planning and programming, trainings, operation of information systems, investment policy etc. (Pálné Kovács, 2004, p. 952). In Serbia the institutions established for supporting the sector of SMEs are deemed to be the predecessors of regional development institutions. The agencies for the development of SMEs probably will assume the duties of regional development agencies (regional offices: Subotica, Sombor, Zrenjanin (in the area of APV), Belgrade, Požarevac, Šabac, Kragujevac, Kruševac, Kraljevo, Užice, Novi Pazar, Zaječar, Niš, Leskovac, Vranje). According to the new LRD (modification 2010) the institutes entitled to accreditation are those *Limited Liability Companies* (LLC) and *Associations* (among whose duties regional development and the support of SMEs and entrepreneurship is present) that are over 50% owned by local governments. The accreditation of institutes is carried out by the NRDA. The newly institutionalized organizations are characterized by centrally planned, local economic development managed by deconcentrated authorities, political support, and the founding function of economic subjects etc.

Currently the institutional coordination of regional development is hindered by the following factors:

[10] Financial resources for realization of these tasks include: incomes from regular management, transfers of local governments, financial support and donation of foreign and domestic physical and legal persons, other sources according to the LRD.

– the unified network of regional development agencies is not yet set;

–developments are oriented towards certain sectors, the complex – comprehensive developmental solutions are missing;

– financial allocation between regions at different levels of development is not working;

– financial sources get to the development regions through a complex system of various organizations and funds, thus hindering the efficient coordination and monitoring of regional developments;

– the purpose of APV, doubled duties, and the lack of budget autarchy, indifferent attitude of central authorities, powerlessness of the regional political elite (political dependence).

5. THE ROLE OF THE APV IN IMPLEMENTING THE INSTITUTIONALIZED REGIONAL POLICY OF SERBIA

According to the constitutional law in Serbia there are three levels of administration and territorial administration: *central* (*federal*), *regional* and *local*. The territorial organization of Serbia is governed by the Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (2006),[11] the Law on the Territorial Organization of the Republic of Serbia (2007),[12] the Regulation on Activities of Deconcentrated Organs of Ministries and Other State Authorities (1992),[13] furthermore the Law on State Administration (2005).[14] Consequently there are two autonomous provinces in Serbia: Vojvodina and Kosovo. Nevertheless, territorial administration in Serbia lacks the unified power of the regional level.

With its possibilities for a given constitutional territorial administration Serbia defined Vojvodina's regional jurisdiction in the Law on Determining the Jurisdiction of Vojvodina (2009).[15] The rights and obligations for territorial administration were stated in the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina of 2009.[16] International legal issues have arisen concerning the southern province,[17] thus

[11] *Ustav Republike Srbije* (2006).

[12] *Zakon o teritorijalnoj organizaciji Republike Srbije* (2007).

[13] *Uredba o načinu vršenja poslova ministarstava i posebnih organizacija van njihovog sedišta* (1992).

[14] *Zakon o državnoj upravi* (2005, 2007).

[15] *Zakon o utvrđivanju nadležnosti Autonomne Pokrajine* Vojvodine (2009). The region regained its jurisdictions due to the First Law on Jurisdiction of 2002, within the framework of the current policy. *Zakon o utvrđivanju određenih nadležnosti Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine* (2002).

[16] *Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine* (2010).

[17] Kosovo on the 17th of February, 2008 unilaterally declared its independence; Serbia refuses to acknowledge this referring to its own territorial sovereignty. Kosovo is under UN auspices from June 1999 (Security Council Resolution, 1244).

Serbia faced a completely asymmetrical line-up of territorial administration which favours the northern province, Vojvodina.

Law on Determining the Jurisdiction of Vojvodina (2009) specifies the regional competencies of APV in conformity with the principles of regional organization determined by the Serbian constitution. According to this law, the APV is responsible for regional development through its own institutions and development policies along the following issues: regional and spatial planning, balanced regional development, implementing measures with the help of the government of APV, maintaining a regional development bank, and developing the capacities to apply for EU funds etc.[18.] The *Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina*, 2009 conceived significant regional development possibilities (rights and duties related to regional management).[19] According to the Statute, the APV is responsible for balanced sustainable development and major investments in its territory, furthermore, it must document strategic regional planning and development decisions (in conformity with national development goals), establish organizations responsible for development in the region, organize the collection of statistical data and follow up and evaluate the results of development projects.

The LRD of the Republic of Serbia provides relatively limited opportunities for Vojvodina, as it is embedded in a national (centrally managed) regional development strategy. At some level, the province has the right to form and give an opinion regarding developments in its territory, which is unique compared to other regions. Thus, the law handles the asymmetrical economic-administrative structure with some emphasis, yet rather moderately – within the principles of a unified national regional development plan.

The governor of the APV can delegate regional representatives to the NRDC. Since these organizations are set up by the Serbian government, it is important to clarify their relationship with the local, provincial organizations as well as the regulations to control resources on provincial/national levels. Regional development projects are financed from the budget of the province on the basis of contracts between the Vojvodina Regional Development Agency and the province. Such regulation makes it possible for the APV to take a more significant role in financing, and planning development projects in its own territory. The earlier described legal documents differ essentially in that Law on Regional Development empowers national executive authorities with the implementation of regional development projects, and there was no temporal alignment with the later accepted law on jurisdictions, the Statute of APV. Thus, the implementation of the law will hopefully enable the APV to regulate its own regional development policy in accordance with national development priorities.

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[18] *Zakon o utvrđivanju nadležnosti APV* (2009). The APV regained some competencies with the 2002 First Law on Jurisdiction (a comprehensive law referred to as Omnibus law originally in the Southern Hungarian dialect), which provided some autonomy within the constitutional framework of the Yugoslavian administration of that time. *Zakon o utvrđivanju određenih nadležnosti APV* (2006).

[19] *Statut Autonomne Pokrajine Vojvodine* (2010).

Table 2. Federal and regional institutional parallels in Serbia and the APV

Institutions on federal level	Authority	Institutions on regional – provincial level	Authority
Ministry of Economy and Regional Development	Economy, SMEs, IPA, cooperation	Provincial Secretariat for Economy	Economy, SMEs
		Provincial Secretariat for Interregional Cooperation and Local Self-Government (March 2011)	IPA, cooperation
Ministry of Finance	Fiscal policy, monetary policy	Provincial Secretariat for Finance	Coordination There is not fiscal and monetary autonomy in the APV!
Ministry of Agriculture, Trade, Forestry and Water Management	Rural development	Provincial Secretariat for Agriculture, Water Resource Management and Forestry	Rural development
		Provincial Fund for Agriculture	Rural development, subvention and support
Ministry of Environment, Mining and Spatial Planning	Environment, spatial planning, urbanism and construction	Provincial Secretariat for Urbanism, Construction and Environment (March 2011)	Environment, spatial planning, urbanism and construction
Ministry for National Investment Plan (till March 2011) then become part of Ministry of Economy and Regional Development	Investments in infrastructure and economic development	Fund for Capital Investment of AP Vojvodina	Investments in infrastructure and economic development
Ministry for Human and Minority Rights, Public Administration and Local Self Government (March 2011)	Territorial administration (human rights, minority questions)	Provincial Secretariat for Interregional Cooperation and Local Self-Government (March 2011) Provincial Secretariat for Education, Administration and National Communities (March 2011)	Territorial administration Education, human and minority rights

Institutions on federal level	Authority	Institutions on regional – provincial level	Authority
The EU Integration Office	EU, integration	European Affairs Fund of Vojvodina	EU, integration
Republic Development Bureau (till March 2011) then become part of Ministry of Finance	Strategic economic researches	Centre for Strategic Economic Studies 'Vojvodina-CESS'	Strategic economic researches
Development Fund of Republic of Serbia	Economic development priorities, incentives, credits, guarantees	Fund for Development of AP Vojvodina	Economic development priorities, incentives
		Guarantee Fund for AP Vojvodina	Guarantees
		Development Bank of AP Vojvodina	Credits
National Agency for Regional Development	Regional development	Regional Development Agency	Regional development

Source: own construction based on Internet sources.

Regarding the development and experiences of the recently institutionalized Serbian regional policy the role of the APV has to be emphasized. This has become an exemplary system that functions as a model for the entire Serbian regionalism. The comparison of the national and regional institutions shows how Vojvodina has a unique institutional network responsible for the implementation of regional development. Widening the scope of competencies of the APV and the practice of the law since 2002 made it possible to establish such institutions of economic development which lack parallel on a national level. One example is the Development Bank of Vojvodina that controls the Guarantee Fund for Autonomous Province of Vojvodina and the other is the Fund for Development of Autonomous Province of Vojvodina enhancing economic development. Another regional institution, the Provincial Fund for Agriculture, enables the development of agriculture, one of the most important branches of Vojvodina's economy. Examples of policies and activities of regional development can be detected in many spheres of social and economic life of the province. One of the most important regional institutions is the Fund for Development of Autonomous Province of Vojvodina, which according to its annual programme initiated and supported development programmes in value of 30 million euros in year 2010, cooperating with the Development Bank of Vojvodina. The programme is

contiguously elaborating and supports development programmes of agriculture, SME-sector, investment and export promotion, employment, innovation, quality systems, environment and energy efficiency etc.[20] Programmes for social cohesion were also successfully implemented in the Province of APV.[21]

The fact that the province has no monetary and fiscal autonomy is another crucial difference between the regional and national levels of administration. Transfers from the national budget allow less responsibility and development for the province. Low budget and the powerlessness of the regional political elite are major drawbacks of implementing regional development projects.

The network of national institutions of regional development (NUTS 2) will not be able to unambiguously integrate regional and economic development tasks as exemplified in Vojvodina. The primary role of institutions, as decentralized organs of the NRDA, has been to coordinate the pre-accession funds and the system of tenders.

6. PROSPECTS OF AN ACTUAL REGIONALIZATION OF SERBIA

The case of the APV exemplifies how decentralization and regionalization debates are specific to Eastern-Central Europe (Horváth, 2009a, p. 17). Such disagreements are often based on the counter-interests of national governments and often the ethnocentric administration. Vojvodina's 'asymmetrical, atypical and controversial legal position', as well as its political-territorial autonomy (Korhecz, 2009, pp. 14–17) prompted the political antipathy of the representatives of Serbian political elite that supports ethnocentric, unitary state administration (Nikolić, 2009, pp. 46–48; Simić, 2009, pp. 70–72). Komšić (2009, p. 79) rightfully asks 'how in Serbia, citizens' rights to provincial autonomy and local government is declared inconsistent with creating regions (for the entire territory of Serbia)?'.

The APV exists and functions only 'in the state of legal infancy, under Belgrade's guardianship (lawmaking, constitutional guarantees)' (Korhecz, 2009, p. 22). Korhecz argues that the doubled tasks (province-central government) create budget and efficiency constraints. 'The central government has no duties regarding autonomous provinces as most tasks are carried out by the provincial authorities' (Korhecz, 2009, p. 24). The same is true concerning deconcentrated state organs functioning in the territory of the province that fulfill some tasks (employment, chambers of commerce, revenues and taxes, healthcare etc.) together with the central government. According to Korhecz (2009, p. 27), 'site-

[20] Fond za razvoj AP Vojvodine (2012).

[21] Programmes organized and implemented by Office for Gender Equality (programmes in last period: research on women and men in APV, women in villages in APV etc.), Fund for Supporting Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons in Autonomous Province of Vojvodina (e.g. long-term credits for buying real estates, job mediation etc.). Fond za pružanje pomoći izbeglim, prognanim i raseljenim licima (2012).

off' – deconcentrated organs are superfluous however, national government authorities, via deconcentration, openly 'aim to get into deeper spheres of intermediate spaces' within the given segments of the controlled area (Faragó, 2005, p. 204). Horváth (2009a, pp. 17) argues that decontrated organs 'fulfill tasks alien to the agency itself', the lack of coordination, information and reconciliation of interests characterizes the branch-specific, highly divided structure. 'Decisions made at the regional level cannot be replaced with decisions made at other levels' (Faragó, 2005, p. 207); furthermore, 'asymmetrical legal regulation is an indicator of regional specificities', exemplified by Vojvodina (Korhecz, 2009, p. 27). The new *Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina* provides autonomy in more than twenty broad areas (spatial planning, regional development, agriculture, healthcare, education, culture etc.), while emphasizing 'minority rights' based on the multiculturalism of the region, however, without fiscal self-government. Komšić (2007, pp. 65–96) argues that the APV has only 'showcase autonomy', with continuous dependence on and control of the central government, where further addition of constitutional competencies would be necessary.

According to Horváth (2009b, pp. 21–23), the provincial constitutional autonomy in Serbia resembles the first attempts of decentralization in Eastern-Central European countries with a development track along unambiguous rules, own and divided incomes, and planning licenses. Nevertheless, Central Serbia is left without constitutional legitimacy and special status administrative regions, regional institutions (Faragó, 2005, p. 210). The influence of the central government and political elite still prevails through deconcentrated state organs, often hidden into regional development projects, which Horváth (2009b, pp. 21–23) defines as characteristics of the second decentralization model. Thus, regions become the 'passive mediums', while regional institutions fulfil the role of the 'home worker' (Faragó, 2005, p. 210). If local-regional communities get decision-making and fiscal competencies, they will not be the 'passive observers of central-national action' (Lilić, 2009, p. 19).

In Serbia, however, there is no unified wish to redefine the role of the state. The real regionalization of the country (and further constitutional amendments) could provide the basis to clarify scopes of authority. The 'central government does not give up its competencies voluntarily, as decentralization would narrow its scope of activity' (Faragó, 2005, p. 204), yet Horváth (2009a, p. 20) argues that transferring some of the competencies of the central government to the regions would eliminate the outdated unitary form of the Serbian government.

Marking out the regions would make it possible to create autonomous territorial units in Serbia, similar to the APV. Nevertheless, the regions, except for the APV, do not represent homogeneous spatial entities with real internal connections. Nemes Nagy (2000 qtd. in Szabó, 2005, pp. 31–32) characterizes the processes forming the region with the system of *borders*, *cohesion*, *identity and management*. While the APV is a real region according to all region-forming criteria listed by

Nemes Nagy, the other three regions in Serbia are only set administratively and their boundaries marked, yet they do not have a regional institution system, sense of regional identity or strong social and economic factors of administrative-spatial organization. These are artificially created regions, which did not even have marked borders according to the macroregional development concept of Serbia (Spatial Plan of Republic of Serbia, 1996), only the macroregional centres having been identified (Nagy *et al.*, 2009, pp. 173–184). Kosovo can be characterized as more of an independent state (UN Security Council Resolution, 1244), which had an autonomous status, similar to the APV, since 1974 till the war in the 1990s. Rák (2002, n.p.) argues that APV meets all the 'criteria necessary to officially become a region' (geographical, political, economic and historical). We think economic criteria should be emphasized, as in the case of the APV concrete national and foreign political elements have to be considered as well.

Regionalization and marking the regional borders *per se* prompts the continuous development of regionalizing elements such as identity, economic and social cohesion. The APV can become an example for Western Serbia and Šumadija as well as the Southern and Eastern Serbia regions. Though these regions do not yet have a system of regional institutions only deconcentrated organs of the central government fulfil administrative functions. However, if these institutions become separated from the national government they can become independent regional administrative units. Most importantly each region has to be able to identify its human and material conditions which would help create their independence.

7. CONCLUSIONS

Regions in Serbia have been created to boost development without real regionalization. Thus, they are so-called regional political target-regions. The main function of regions should not be statistical-planning, as Serbia has very unevenly spread geographically defined economic inequalities. In order to balance the negative impacts of globalization and the neoliberal economic policy and because of the ongoing EU integration, the competitiveness of local economies should be strengthened. Therefore, it is important to legitimize such regional (autonomous) competencies that enable regions to attract investments, develop their industrial potential, produce for export, and provide satisfying living standards for the population. Thus, the regions will be able to counterbalance and tackle the central, highly polarized, and concentrated economic development and change their peripheral role and exposed status as well as their economic and political dependence in a hierarchical system. Regional space has to be redefined from this perspective. Serbia can be truly regionalized and developed step by step if the Serbian political elite recognizes and admits such forces.

The following steps are necessary to transform the existing deconcentrated institution system into a regional institution system:

– rethinking of the new regional boundaries (new regions created from several former administrative districts), some tasks would be transferred to regional centres;

– gradual termination of authority-based developmental mechanisms initiated by the central administration;

– issuing autonomous development initiatives, regional demands (regional development plans, development funds);

– participation of the local-regional political elite in national decision-making, according to the territorial units of the region;

– social division of labour, regional functions;

– social consensus, subjective perception of region as a factor in regionalization, value system, gradual construction of regional identity.

In Serbia, ethnocentric-nationalism, the lack of rational thinking in economic decision-making, constitutional insufficiencies (the lack of political consensus) in regional development, the atypical, asymmetrical position of the APV and the lack of real regional self-organization are the heaviest drawbacks of regionalism. The foundations of real regionalization are present in the existing functional regional system of Vojvodina, which could be a valuable experience for the Serbian political elite. The Serbian political elite, however, tries to access EU funds for regional development, and thus, the existence of regions is a necessary tool. According to such screenplay, controlling the sources, would, remain in the hands of the central administration. This is how the regional institutional system is set up under centralized political initiative. The statistical-planning role of territorial units would be largely modified if region becomes a functional category and connects to regional economic development. From this perspective, the creation of regions is further justified by medium range regional development programmes, which would enable districts and settlements of a given region to define their development priorities regardless of their economic heterogeneity and complexity, while unifying their financial resources. Regionalization could enhance the improvement of political attitudes, social sensitivity and trust. This is an opportunity for Serbia to take a path of effective economic development.

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ETHNO-RELIGIOUS HERITAGE OF FORMER EASTERN TERRITORIES OF THE POLISH-LITHUANIAN COMMONWEALTH IN CONTEMPORARY POLAND[1]

Abstract: The main objective of this paper is to present the national and religious heritage of the Eastern Borderlands in contemporary Poland. The paper deals with the genesis and selected aspects of the spatial development of the ethnic and religious minorities (mainly Tartars-Muslims, Karaites and Armenians) that date back to the eastern areas of the former Republic (including the territories of Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine) but, due to the post-war border changes and migrations, formed clusters in contemporary Poland and organized various forms of group life.
Key words: ethno-religious heritage, ethnic minorities, religious minorities, Tartars-Muslims, Karaites, Armenians, Eastern Borderlands.

1. GEO-POLITICAL CONDITIONS OF THE ETHNO-CONFESSIONAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN POLAND AFTER THE SECOND WORLD WAR

The Second World War (1939–1945) brought about radical spatial, ethnic and confessional transformations in Poland. They happened mainly because of the extermination of approx. 90% of the Jews living in Poland in the interwar period by the Third Reich. This national (common, both Jewish and Polish) tragedy also led to the destruction of the culture that had been created by them for nearly a thousand years, and had been unique in the history of life in the Diaspora. The Holocaust was also accompanied by migrations, massive both in scale and demographic complexity, caused by the expansive policies of Germany and the

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Soviet Union. According Eberhardt's calculations (2010), these were one of the largest migrations in the history of the world and included approx. 30 million people between 1939 and 1950. The participants of the top-down movements during the final phase of the war with approval from the winning powers, i.e. United States, Great Britain and, after the war, Polish government, included certain ethnic groups, mainly Poles, Jews, Germans and Ukrainians. This selective, ethnically based migration started a process of religious transformation, as ethnicity and denomination often converged.

One factor that intensified these movements, while affecting an ethno-religious change in Poland was the relocation of political borders. The victorious powers, under the provisions of the Yalta (1943) and Potsdam (1945) agreements, drew them in an arbitrary manner, without regard for individual national oecumenes. However, they forced ethnic groups to adjust to these borders, which resulted in the aforementioned migrations.

Due to these shifts, Poland lost the eastern part of it inter-war territory. The loss of the so called Eastern Borderlands was partially made up for by gaining some territories in the west and in the north, that belonged to Germany before that. The so-called Recovered Territories included the Western Lands consisting of the area between the Polish-German border defined after the First World War and the new border running along the Oder and Lusatian Neisse, as well as the Northern Territory encompassing the southern part of the former East Prussia. In addition, the Free City of Danzig was also included in the Polish territory. The post-war, and thus contemporary, Polish territory took the shape referring to the original territory of Poland from the 10–12th century. Thus, Poland returned to the area of Polish oecumene as defined by nature.

The ethnic composition of Poland travelled a course similar to its borders, i.e. from ethnic uniformity, through multi-ethnicity to clear quantitative dominance of one nationality (Rykała, 2009, 2011a). From a geographical point of view, there was a change in demographic trends dating back many centuries: during the past thousand years, the Polish and German populations gradually moved east to finally agree on the ethnic boundary similar to that of the early Middle Ages. As a result of shifting borders, as well as migrations largely stemming from them, almost all Germans were displaced from the territories taken by Poland (some of them evacuated even before the war ended, fearing the incoming front line), replaced mostly by Poles and representatives of other ethnic and religious groups.

2. EASTERN BORDERLANDS – TERRITORIES OF BELARUS, LITHUANIA, UKRAINE, POLAND

The terms 'Belarusian lands', 'Lithuanian lands' and 'Ukrainian lands' that, apart from contemporary Poland, are an essential subject of the study, should be understood as the territories of contemporary Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine.

However, because the discussion is carried out in relation to variable spatial framework, this is not the only geographic criterion corresponding to these terms. These lands have remained for many centuries an integral part of the Polish-Lithuanian state,[2] and when they were excluded from Polish territory after the Second World War many religious minorities chose them as their homeland over the Soviet Union, where their 'little homelands' were now located. Therefore, calling them 'Polish lands', 'Poland', 'Polish state' or 'Polish-Lithuanian state' is also justified. In relation to the eastern areas of the Republic, these terms will be used as synonyms of 'Ukrainian lands', 'Belarusian lands', but also 'Poland' and 'Polish state'. Using the term 'Polish lands' seems appropriate, since the territory that now encompasses three contemporary political entities – Belarus, Poland and Ukraine – was, for many centuries, a uniform political unit administrated by the 1st and 2nd Republic, allowing the clusters of the religions in question to become permanent. Trying to avoid any resentment and the questioning of the existing geo-political reality, the author wishes to emphasize, that any references to the old delimitations in this regard is dictated by the geographical and historical nature of the discussion over the specificity of chosen elements of religious heritage spanning, among others, the territories of contemporary Belarus, Lithuania and Ukraine (the eastern part of the old Republic), and continuing on the territory of today's Poland.

Another term to be used in relation to the area and subject of the study is 'Borderlands'. This concept conveys a very high emotional charge related to the Polish national memory, which certainly does not reflect the feelings behind the Ukrainian and other understandings of this word.[3]

The meaning of these Borderlands in the national consciousness is somehow expressed in Kolbuszowski's words (1995, p. 12), stating that:

> The Borderlands are a one-of-a-kind equivalent of a geographical name, encompassing several regions, several lands, even several ethnic areas, considered nonetheless an area of Polish familiarity. One can say, that the Borderlands are almost a magical word for emotion, nostalgia, historiosophic reflection, thoughts about the peculiarities of the history of our country and our state, as well as our culture [...]. Because these Borderlands are at the same time the most striking reality of Polish history and its myth.

The term '(Eastern) Borderlands' has gained its contemporary meaning relatively recently – at the break of the 19th and 20th centuries. Earlier, as the axiological origins of the term shows, it meant the line laid down by the military watchtowers guarding the territory of the Republic along its south-eastern

[2] Depending on the historical period synonymous with the term 'former Poland' will be the name: 'Polish-Lithuanian state', 'Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth', 'Commonwealth' and 'Republic'.

[3] For Ukrainians, Belarusians and Lithuanians, the term 'Eastern Borderlands', which has a geographic and historical meaning in Polish language and research tradition, has a pejorative character and is an expression of the expansionist and repossessive tendencies.

border. Both the geographic and semantic range of the term changed over time – it expanded west and north to assume a fuller spatial meaning. The modern understanding of the term 'Eastern Borderlands', as shown, among others, by two prominent political geographers Eberhardt (1998) and Koter (1997), refers to the collapse of the Polish state in the 18th century, including the eastern territories of the Republic lost to Russia. This peculiar ethnic, religious and linguistic diversity, as well as its variability in national, religious and linguistic borders gave this area this intangible mythical value, apart from its 'clearest reality' (not only for Polish history) (Rykała, 2009).

3. THE ORIGIN AND SPATIAL DEVELOPMENT OF RELIGIONS OCCURRING IN THE EASTERN BORDERLANDS

One of the religions (denominations) shaping the cultural face of the Eastern Borderlands of the former Republic is Eastern Orthodox Christianity, whose individuality was sanctioned by the so called Eastern Schism (1054), i.e. the ultimate rift between the eastern and western Christianity, preceded by growing dogmatic divergence.

An attempt to define the origin of the Orthodox faith in Poland is not free of controversies. It should be mentioned that this origin, as well as the beginning of Christianization of Polish territories, is equated by some researchers with the contacts between the Slavic population living in the area with the Byzantine culture, which gained a more organized form in the 9th century (before the Great Schism), when Greek apostles Cyril and Methodius started their missionary activities. These activities, carried out in such countries as Moravia, which included parts of today's Poland (Lesser Poland, Silesia), are considered a proof that the territories of contemporary Polish state were thus introduced into the Eastern version of Christian culture.

Given the fact that the territory of Poland forming in the 10th century was included, by way of the christening of its ruler (Mieszko I) in the western cultural circle, defined as the dominance of western Christianity, while the Methodian Christianity was clearly regressing, the largest influence of Byzantine Christianity on Poland came from Christianized Ruthenia which was, over time, partially included in the expanding Polish state.

Important influence on the growth of Orthodox Christianity in the eastern part of Polish territory was exerted by the neighbouring Kiev country or, more generally, Ruthenian lands, i.e. the territory (apart from such lands as Crimea and Bulgarian country) included in the Christianization mission of Cyril and Methodius and constituting its permanent heritage, parts of which were later annexed to Poland as part of the territorial expansion.

Byzantine-Ruthenian Orthodox tradition was present in the Polish state from the beginning of the 11th century (the reign of Boleslaw the Brave), when, as is widely acknowledged, the Methodian faith survived, mostly in the southern part of the country, in a relic form (Mironowicz, 2001, 2003, 2005). The origin of the Orthodox faith in the mentioned tradition in Poland is expressed in two dimensions: family and institutional, which includes, among others, marriages between the representatives of two Christian denominations (i.e. Latin, mostly among the dukes of the Piast dynasty and Orthodox among Ruthenian duchesses), and spatial, including the territories inhabited by the faithful of this tradition, later annexed by Poland as a result of its territorial expansion (Rykała, 2009, 2011a).

Even though they did not result in clear spatial consequences, the marriage ties and family alliances of Polish and Ruthenian courts surely reinforced the position of Orthodox Christianity, making it a significant element of the tradition of the emerging state. The introduction of the Eastern Christian tradition into the sphere of organization of the Polish state, dominated by Latin culture, is primarily the result of its territorial development. The Eastern Rite entered the spatial dimension with the annexation of the Czerwien Towns, as well as the southern part of Podlasie, probably in the 70s of the 10th century, surely after 1018, as the latest archaeological studies show. These lands on the Polish-Ruthenian border were part of that heritage of Eastern Rite, whose formation was heavily influenced by the fact that they remained under the political rule of Ruthenia from the first half of the 10th century till the 14th century (excluding the aforementioned periods of Polish rule). The permanent settlement of the Orthodox Church in the Polish state happened in the 14th century as a result of Poland's acquisition of a substantial part of the westernmost Russian principality, i.e. Galicia-Volhynia Principality, which was one of the districts of the former Kievan Rus. The Orthodox Church owed this position to the organizational structures formed during the almost two centuries of existence of the aforementioned political organizm. By moving the political borders in the 14th century in relation to the borders of Polish national oecumene, whose cohesion formed in early Piast dynasty, the Polish state lost, in addition to its national uniformity (by annexing the territories inhabited mostly by Ruthenians, the ancestors of today's Ukrainians and Belarusians), also its religious uniformity (figure 1).

The situation of the Orthodox Church in Polish territory was also influenced by the personal union of Krewo, concluded in 1385 between Poland and Lithuania – two countries that had expanded the territory of the Orthodox Galicia-Volhynia Rus. It should be noted that Eastern Christianity in the Grand Duchy, introduced through the inclusion of other western Ruthenian principalities, played a significant culture-forming role at the time. In addition to joining both countries under one ruler, the aforementioned United Kingdom of Poland and Lithuania also brought about the Latin Christianization of Lithuania. Catholicism became the favoured religion in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, who was developing quite dynamically

its organizational structure, while the Orthodox religion was merely tolerated. These changes resulted in the decreased progress of the Orthodox Church in demographic, cultural, political and spatial terms.

The Orthodox Church influenced the religiosity and, in some sense, also the morality of other Christian inhabitants of the Republic. This effect was particularly pronounced, as shown, among others, by Różycka-Bryzek (1994), in the development of the monastic movement, the cult of icons, as well as church construction with Byzantine elements, which permeated the Latin Christian traditions of Polish territories.



Fig. 1. The seats of bishoprics of Orthodox and Uniate Churches and the approximate areas of concentration of the followers of major Christian denominations (mid-17th century)

Source: own elaboration

Significantly more negative consequences for the Orthodox Church in the Republic, as compared to the Union of Krewo, were brought about by the church union of 1596 between some Orthodox bishops of the Polish-Lithuanian

Commonwealth and the Catholic Church. As a result of this union, the Uniate Church was formed. The union – which came mostly from the need to counter the influence of the newly created Patriarchate of Moscow on the Orthodox bishops in Poland, as well as to remain independent of Russia, which was trying to conquer the Polish-Lithuanian territory – instituted the primacy of the Pope in cases of church jurisdiction over some Orthodox clergy and believers in the Commonwealth. In addition to the jurisdiction of the Roman Catholic Church, the Uniates also recognized its dogma, while retaining their own liturgy in the Church Slavonic language, the hierarchy, the Julian calendar, marriages and church polity, as well as considerable independence of the administration.

As a result of most superiors and believers of the dioceses within the Crown joining the union, the southern and eastern regions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania remained the largest concentration of Orthodox Christians until the end of the First Republic.

Even though the legal status of the Orthodox believers improved, Catholicism remained the official religion, with dissent (conversion) punishable as a criminal offence, until the end of the First Republic. The state policy towards the Orthodox Church was clearly reflected in demographic and territorial aspects of its operations. The Orthodox Church did not stop being discriminated until the partitions, when the territories of its influence were taken over by the Tsarist Russia. Incorporated into the Russian Orthodox Church, it began to recover, which was expressed primarily in the growth of the number of believers and the territorial 'expansion' of the Orthodox Church in the former Republic. This was, however, happening at the cost of disbanding (by including it in the Orthodox Church) of the Uniate Church, as well as the loss of local traditions and rites. However, the Uniates kept their separate structures – now as the Greek Orthodox Church – under the Austrian rule.

One can say that the origin and territorial development of the Orthodox Church and the Uniate Church in Poland were significantly influenced by the geographical and political conditions, mainly the changes in political rule. The reactivation of the Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church on Polish soil was helped by Poland regaining independence. The territorial extent of the Orthodox and Greek Catholic Churches in the Second Republic roughly reflected the administrative ranges of the partitioners.

Started with the expansion of Casimir the Great to Principality of Galicia-Volhynia and Podolia, the territorial expansion of Poland to the east included, as was already mentioned, a fragment of the neighbouring ethnic oecumene with clearly Orthodox religious nature. But the divergence between the political borders and the boundaries of Polish national oecumene has led to the inclusion of territories not only inhabited by the Orthodox believers, but also by other religious and ethnic groups, in the structures of Polish state. These terrains, apart from native population, included enclaves inhabited by newcomers such as Armenians, Karaites and a relic group of Tartars, faithful to their own religious traditions (not Islam), mostly integrated into the Ruthenian surrounding by converting to Christianity (Orthodox).

More Armenians, Karaites and Tartar settlers professing Islam joined the ethno-religious structure of Poland when the Union of Krewo was concluded.

The first Muslims, coming to Polish lands as early as in the 13th century mainly as merchants, travellers and conquerors fighting in the Mongolian armies, did not form a permanent enclave. The direct origin of the Muslim population in Poland, in its widest meaning of the later Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, comes from Tartars, who came from the Mongolian population assimilated with Turkish Kipchaks. The Tartars arriving in the 14th century in the Grand Duchy of Lithuania were mostly refugees from the Golden Horde and the prisoners captured there. Their arrival marked the beginning of permanent development of Tartar and Muslim colonisation of the Polish-Lithuanian lands, which also included the territory of today's Ukraine.

Fig. 2. Larger Tartar, Karaite and Armenian clusters (14th–18th centuries)
Source: own elaboration

The Tartars were given land from the Lithuanian dukes, along with mandatory military service in separate dynastic-tribal companies. The arrangement of the oldest Tartar settlement indicates that they were initially largely military, strategic

and defensive, in nature. Tartar villages were located mostly near the capitals and around fortified castles, such as Vilnius, Grodno, Trakai, Kaunas and Punie, where they were supposed to perform the function of military watchtowers (Borawski, Dubinski, 1996). In addition to these centres, they were also embedded in border areas to protect them. Grand Duke Witold turned the Tartar settlements into a defensive belt against the Order of the Teutonic Knights and the Livonian Brothers of the Sword. One has to remember, that Tartar emigrants were allowed to also settle down outside of the borderlands, i.e. not only in proper Lithuania, but also, though less frequently, in Polesie, Left-bank Ukraine and Volhynia. In Ukraine, Volhynia and Lesser Poland – in the regions under Polish Crown's rule, many Tartar prisoners were also settled up until the mid-17th century (figure 2).

Since the mid-16th century, when there were approx. 7 thousand Tartars, they were not settling in such large numbers. At the end of the 18th century, there approx. 13 thousand of them (taking into account only the Tartars owning land with families). The decreasing number of emigrants gradually weakened the social and cultural ties of Polish Tartars with their territory of origin, which also had an impact on the disappearance of many elements showing the identity of this group (language, customs) (Rykała, 2005, 2007).

The arrival of the first groups of Tartars, who professed Islam, also marks the beginning of permanent Karaite settlements in the area in question. This coincidence is not accidental, but a consequence of the development, including territorial development, of their religion – Karaism.[4] As a result of the missionary activity of the spiritual leaders, between the 8th and 10th century, Karaism reached the multi-ethnic Khazar Country, which had existed since the 7th century and ultimately fell in the 13th century under the pressure of Genghis Khan's conquest. The followers of Karaism, originating from the Khazar population assimilated with other Turkish-speaking native tribes, started the history of this faith in Polish-Lithuanian territory. Given the fact that the lands included in the Khazar Khaganate were later included in the Mongol-Tatar state, called the Golden Horde (13th to 15th century), which was the birthplace, among others, of Tartars settled in Poland, it must be concluded that the genesis of the Karaite settlement in Polish territory is related to the Tartar Muslim who came to the land (Rykała, 2008a, 2011b).

The first Karaim settlements in Poland formed as a 'splinter' of the 12th-century migration of Central-Asian and Eastern-European peoples to Central Europe (to the Hungarian Lowlands), whose main stream did not cross the contemporary and

[4] Karaite Judaism (Hebrew *qara* – to read, to recite), also called Karaism, is a monotheistic religion that originated in the 8th century in Mesopotamia, then belonging to the Caliphate of Baghdad. It emerged from Judaism as a movement of opposition against the recognition of the Talmud as the true source of faith. The main core was formed by the followers of Mosaism inhabiting this territory since the Babylonian captivity (i.e. since mid-6th century BC). Karaites are, above all, loyal to the authority of the Hebrew Bible, combined with the principle of individualistic interpretation independent of any authority, the assumption of the canonic exclusivity of the Torah and the recognition of the Decalogue as a foundation of the religious doctrine and the basic moral code.

modern borders of Poland. This relatively small group of Karaites settled in the lands of the then Galicia-Volhynia Principality (including Halych, Lviv, Lutsk).

Apart from the territory of the Ruthenian oecumene (today a part of Ukraine), the Karaims also came to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania at the end of the 14th century. They (several hundreds of families) were brought from Crimea by the then ruler, Duke Witold, during his war expedition against the Golden horde. These families were settled in Trakai – a town then serving as the capital of the Duchy and, some time later, in neighbouring settlements. The decision to choose these sites (as well as the decision to bring Karaites in) was not accidental, but resulted from a political tactic aimed at defending the territory of the Lithuanian state, especially its borderland. Grand Duke Witold turned the Karaite settlements into a belt to defend against the Livonian Brothers of the Sword. They were also located near capital cities and around fortified castles, such as the aforementioned Trakai, as well as Vilnius and others, where they served as military watchtowers (Rykała, 2008a, 2011b).

After the collapse of the Polish state, the social situation of the Karaites, as well as the territorial parameters of the partitioners towards this religious group changed. As a result of the partitions, Tsarist Russia included the Karaites from the former Polish-Lithuanian state, as well as from the former Crimean Khanate, which was annexed by Russia in 1783. Inhabiting the same country helped Karaites coming from different clusters keep in contact. On the one hand, it postponed the process of assimilation with the culturally foreign surrounding, yet on the other, it was disadvantageous to the Karaite clusters in the Polish-Lithuanian territory, whose size was decreasing due to Karaites emigrating to the central and southern (Crimea) parts of the Empire, that offered better conditions for their economic development.

During the partitions, a small group of Karaites also came to Warsaw from Crimea, mainly for commercial purposes (including tobacco trade).

Karaites in the Polish-Lithuanian lands were initially a small religious and ethnic group, one of the smallest ones, even though more than 30, maybe even 50 Karaite communities are thought to have existed in the 17th century. At the end of the 17th century, some 4 to 7 thousand Karaites lived in Poland, the number did not exceed 2 thousand in early 19th century, only to drop to approx. 1 thousand in the inter-war period (1931) (Rykała, 2008a, 2011b).

A similar model of some convergence between religion and nationality was presented by the Armenians, members of the Armenian Church.[5] Armenian colonization in the area, with its different phases and directions, was caused by

[5] Opting for Monophysitism (the existence of one divine-human nature in Jesus Christ) contrary to the decisions of the Council of Chalcedon (451), Armenian Church became a national Church fully independent of the Universal Church (breaking the dependence on Constantinople). The differences in interpretation of the formula of the Trinity were not the only, or even the most important, axis of division leading to the formation of the Armenian Church. The forming of different theological reflection and separate structures of the Church was influenced by the geographical aspect of this development, involving diverse historical, cultural and social determinants.

two basic needs – economic and political. The two remained in close relationship with the geopolitical situation of the Armenian state. Its independence fostered emigration of Armenian merchants and craftsmen, while periods of political subordination intensified a wave of war (political) refugees.

In the 13th, and certainly in the 14th century, the lands within the Ruthenian oecumene (Principality of Galicia-Volhynia), but beyond the limits of Poland, included Armenian communities in such places as Kamianets-Podilskyi, Lviv, Lutsk, Volodymyr-Volynskyi. Serving a role of important commercial centres between the East and the West, these towns became the initial seats of major Armenian clusters. The biggest of them were Kamianets and Lviv that, after the Turks conquered Kaffa (the centre of Armenian settlement in Crimea) in 1475, as well as parts of Asia Minor and the Balkan Peninsula, saw, along with other centres, an influx of larger groups of Armenians from those regions. These clusters were incorporated into the Polish state in the 14th century, when Casimir the Great annexed the Principality of Halych with Lviv.

Between the 15th and 18th century, the Armenian colonization, which was in some part a result of internal migration of settlers within the Republic, included more centres, such as Yazlovets, Bar, Pidhaitsi, Tyśmienica, Zamość, Kuty, Rashkiv, Mohyliv-Podilskyi, as well as Jarosław, Kazimierz on the Vistula River, Lublin, and Warsaw.

Thus, Armenians formed their centres mainly in towns in the south-eastern parts of the former republic, close to its borders. In this case, however, the peripheral location proved to be beneficial for Armenian settlements, as it served as a trade route between Eastern and Western European commercial centres. The thickening of Armenian settlements, especially in Podolia, where most of them were located, was also impacted by the Union of Lublin in 1569. Owing to the Union, Polish magnates gained better conditions for the economic development of their estates, mainly cities, in the Podolia, which was annexed by the Republic (Polish Crown). In order to increase their participation in international trade, the owners attracted Armenians, who specialized in trade and craft, to their centres.

In the second half of the 17th century, approx. 3 thousand Armenians lived in all Armenian communities in Poland (Zakrzewska-Dubasowa, 1981). Armenians, as well as representatives of other religious minorities, were subjected to gradual Polonisation. The ethic specificity of the territories where most of these centres were created also influenced the process of Ruthenisation. These processes inevitably lead to a reduction in the number of people identifying with an ethnically distinct group of Armenians. However, they did not result in a quantitatively significant exodus of believers from their religion, which remained in union with the Roman Catholic Church in Poland since mid-17th century, which allowed many followers of the Armenian Catholic Church to retain their Armenian identity. The vast majority of Armenian clusters mentioned here survived until the demise of the Second Republic (Rykała, 2009).

4. IN CONTEMPORARY POLAND – RELIGIOUS HERITAGE AS A LEGACY OF THE BORDERLAND OF OECUMENES AND *IN CRUDA RADICE* ACTIVITIES

4.1. Immigration, Location, Ownership and Organizational Activities

As a result of territorial changes, the westernmost part of the borderland of Polish and Ruthenian (Belarusian and Ukrainian) oecumenes, along with their Orhodox and Greek Catholic religious legacy, remained within Polish borders.[6] The clear ethnic and religious distinction of the Polish-German border (apart from the strong atheistic indoctrination of the German Democratic Republic government which, over half a century, led to the creation of the most religiously indifferent group of citizens of that country), was not reflected in eastern Poland. However, this central-eastern and south-eastern part of the country, densely populated with Orthodox Christians and Greek Catholics, lost its religious uniqueness over the next few years. This happened as a result of the resettlement of the population living there: externally, to the Soviet Union (1944–1946) and internally, as part of Operation 'Vistula' (1947), to the so called Recovered Territories. The Operation was performed in 1947 using religious criteria (membership in the Greek Catholic or Orthodox Church) and involved the elimination of concentrated settlements of Ruthenians (including Ukrainians, Lemkos, Boykos) in south-eastern Poland, which was aimed at preventing further activity of the underground Ukrainian movement in favour of including these territories in Ukraine (Rykała, 2011a). As a result of internal and external resettlement, the territories in central-eastern and south-eastern Poland densely populated by Orthodox Christians and Greek Catholics lost their religious uniqueness over the next few years. Apart from the loss of belongings and property, the worsening of living conditions and the disintegration of family life of the refugees and the destruction of their cultural heritage, operation 'Vistula' also brought significant transformations in the territorial aspect of the Orthodox Church and, especially, the Greek Catholic Church. Since then, other areas, mostly in the north and west of the country, became important for both Churches, in addition to the eastern and south-eastern Poland (figure 3).

The newly formed Polish included only a few clusters of others, "borderland" ethno-religious minorities: Muslims of Tartar origin (including Bohoniki, Kruszyniany, Białystok, Krynki, Sokółka and Suchowola), Karaites (in such places as Warsaw and Podkowa Leśna) and Armenians (Cracow). The largest of these clusters were outside of Poland. The establishment of the new eastern

[6] As a result of the Second World War and the changes in borders caused by it, the Orthodox Church in Poland lost over 90% of their belongings. In 2002, the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church had 509,700 followers, and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church – about 82 thousand (*Wyznania religijne*, 2003; Rykała, 2009).

border required solving the problem of the citizens of pre-war Republic that found themselves in the area annexed by the Soviet Union. Based on the agreements between the representatives of the Polish Committee of National Liberation (PCNL) and the governments of the Soviet republics of Belarus and Ukraine (9th September 1944), as well as Lithuania (22th September 1944), and the consecutive agreement between the Polish and Soviet governments (6th July 1945), it was established that any persons of Polish and Jewish descent who lived permanently on the land given to the Soviet Union, and had Polish citizenship until 17th September 1939, have the right to choose the nationality and place of residence in one of these two countries.



Fig. 3. Territorial-administrative structure of the Polish Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church in Poland

Source: own elaboration

Any persons of Tartar, Karaite and Armenian descent interested in repatriation found it hard, or even impossible to leave because of the lack of criteria concerning nationality which, unlike citizenship, is the actual, not legal status, and is thus determined by non-ethnic factors. The Soviet authorities were interested in ridding the former borderlands of any people with strong Polish identity, coming from intelligentsia and urban communities. The attitude towards ethnic minorities was different than towards the groups of Poles mentioned above, who were often hostile towards the Soviet system. They were treated as workforce needed by the economy, assuming they would be loyal citizens of their new country (Rykała, 2011a).

Many members of these communities who, to a large extent, assimilated Polish culture, decided to abandon their 'small homelands' and settle in Poland. The decision to leave the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), and the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic (LSSR), where most of these clusters were located, was extremely difficult for several reasons. Firstly, there were cultural and emotional reasons, as leaving for Poland meant, to some extent, abandoning many centuries of heritage, which was so closely related to the so called Borderlands. Secondly, there were political reasons that we have already mentioned since, as Soviet citizens (since 1939), they were not officially included in the repartiation efforts.

In addition, the authorities in each of the three Soviet republics neighbouring with Poland had different reactions to repatriation attempts of the representatives of these minorities. The Ukrainian authorities were more interested in full de-Polonization of the part of the pre-war Republic under their rule (this was largely influenced by the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in Volhynia and the so-called Eastern Galicia, started with the extermination of Polish population by Ukrainian nationalists). They were also waiting for the arrival of Ukrainians resettled from Poland, who needed places to live. Therefore, they did not hinder 'their' Tartars' and Karaites' efforts to move to Poland. On the other hand, the authorities of LSSR, who saw themselves as the successors of the Grand Duke Witold of Lithuania, the initiator of Tartar and Karaite settlement in their area, were strongly opposing the repatriation of their population. As Eberhardt (2010) points out, this approach to leaving was also caused by the Lithuanian fears of depopulation of the eastern and southern parts of the country. In spite of all the dilemmas and difficulties, many Tartar, Karaite and Armenian families managed to escape to Poland.[7] Due to the fact that the young people brought up in the independent state showed the strongest affinity with Polish culture, they dominated the emigrants (especially among the Karaites). Most Tatars and Karaites, especially the elderly, who felt more attached to their native traditions in the place owned by them for generations, not to the nation, chose to stay in the USSR.

[7] Large opportunities for Tartars and Karaites to reach Poland from, among others, Volhynia and Eastern Lesser Poland, were provided by joining the Polish Army. Many of them, as demobilised soldiers, later brought their relatives (including people taken away to Germany for forced labour) as part of a family-joining operation.

The first wave of repatriations in 1946 involved several thousand people from these minorities, including many Armenians and approx. 150 Karaites, while the second wave, which began in 1956 and lasted until the next year, involved a few hundred of them. The people coming to Poland in the second half of the 1950s also included some who used the loosening of the political system brought about by the so called Thaw. This short-lived breath of strictly controlled freedom allowed, among others, an increase in contacts between the citizens of neighbouring countries. The acquaintances and friendships started at that time between the representatives of these minorities from Poland and the USSR sometimes became marriages. Such couples were usually not barred from settling in Poland.

Most immigrants settled in the so-called Recovered Territories. Huge damage to the rest of the country, coupled with the implementation of the settlement and development programme in the newly acquired area have left the immigrant scarce choice of places to live. Due to the higher standard of building, richer infrastructure, potential jobs, as well as preserved religious buildings, these lands were an attractive place to settle. Larger Tartar clusters formed in such places as: Jelenia Góra, Wrocław, Legnica, Oleśnica, Krosno Odrzańskie, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Trzcianka Lubuska, Stargard Szczeciński, Szczecin, Wałcz, Szczecinek, Gdańsk, Olsztyn, Elbląg; Karaite settlements: in Ełk, Gdańsk, Gorzów Wielkopolski, Olsztyn, Opole, Słupsk, Szczecin, Wrocław; Armenian: Wrocław, Gdańsk, Gliwice and Opole. The settlement of immigrants was accompanied by a 'latitudinal' rule – people from the Ukrainian SSR were usually directed to Silesia, while the immigrants from the Lithuanian SSR went to the northern part of the Recovered Territories. Less concentrated and significantly less populous settlements of Tartars, Karaites and Armenians in the Western and Northern Territories than in the Borderlands was one of the reasons for the systematic assimilation of these groups.[8]

The delineation of the new eastern border also caused a radical change in the wealth of these parts of the ethnic minorities that chose to stay in Poland. This situation obviously made it hard to keep the traditions and customs of their own group, as well as to care for its culture, inevitably leading to the loss of religious and ethnic uniqueness. All places of worship and property owned by Karaites and Armenians remained in the USSR. Thus, the religious life in a new place of settlement had to be organized almost from scratch. Due to their insignificant population, as compared to the inter-war period, the community of Polish Karaites did not have opportunities, nor the need to build their characteristic places of worship. After the war, there was only one Kenesa (Karaite temple) operating institutionally, located in Wroclaw. In reality, it was an apartment converted into a Kenesa. Karaites had only one cemetery in Warsaw, founded in 1890, which was

[8] As a result of the immigrants' difficulties in adapting to an ethnically, culturally and religiously foreign surrounding, some Tartar immigrants participated in re-emigration, moving to Podlasie, which had a tradition of settlements of this population.

and still remains far more important than just a burial ground for them.[9] On the other hand, the Armenian liturgies started in Roman Catholic churches: in Cracow – the church of the Divine Mercy, Gliwice – in the church of the Holy Trinity and Gdańsk – the church of St. Peter and Paul, as well as in the Res Sacra Miser chapel at Krakowskie Przedmieście in Warsaw.[10]



Fig. 4. Distribution, institutional operations and cultural heritage of Muslim Tartars, Karaites and Armenians in Poland at the beginning of the 21st century
Source: own elaboration

[9] A Karaite necropolis was also a place of assembly, where the Karaites met not only to perform the rites dictated by their faith and religious tradition (assemblies were mainly held to celebrate Lent and to say prayers for the victims of the plague of 1701), but also to maintain the group bonds of their community.
[10] Armenian-Catholic parishes of Holy Trinity in Gliwice and of St. Peter and Paul in Gdańsk are personal parishes.

Apart from these cities, Armenian masses were also occasionally celebrated in other bigger Armenian settlements (such as Wrocław, Opole, Oława). From among the discussed minorities, by far the best situation was enjoyed by the Muslims of Tartar descent in post-war Poland, who had two temples in Podlasie (in Bohoniki and Kruszyniany) and several operating cemeteries (figure 4).

Going beyond the 'religious sphere', we should mention some effects of their contemporary activity that are also important for maintaining their group's uniqueness. Owing to the efforts of many Karaites, their publishing operations are thriving. Apart from all the periodicals published by this community in post-war Poland, which were a continuation of titles from the inter-war period, one notable periodical being published today is the social, historical and cultural magazine *Awazymyz* (*Our Voice*). Some self-sufficiency in this regard is provided by their own publishing house, 'Bitik', which releases books and brochures concerning Karaite issues. The other two minorities also publish their own social, cultural and scientific magazines: Armenians – *The Bulletin of the Armenian Cultural Association*, Tartars – *The Yearbook of Polish Tatars* (Rykała, 2009).

Maintaining the identity of the group is also promoted by: in the case of Polish Armenians – two Saturday schools for Armenian children (in Warsaw and Cracow), in the case of the Karaites – the Karaite Folk Band 'Dostlar' for children and youth (in Warsaw).

The most widespread forms of maintaining their religious and ethnic identity among the analysed minority groups, also aimed at protecting their cultural heritage, are the organizations and foundations representing them. The Muslim of Tartar descent are associated in the Muslim Religious Union (Muzułmański Związek Religijny, or MZR, headquartered in Białystok with communities in Białystok, Bohoniki, Kruszyniany, Gdańsk, Gorzów, Warsaw, Poznań and Bydgoszcz) and the Association of Polish Tartars (Związek Tatarów Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej) in Bohoniki. In the case of the Armenian minority, such functions are provided by: the Armenian Cultural Association (Ormiańskie Towarzystwo Kulturalne) in Cracow, Armenian Cultural Society, part of the Polish Folk Association (Koło Zainteresowań Kulturą Ormian przy Polskim Towarzystwie Ludoznawczym) in Cracow and Warsaw, the Association of Armenians in Poland (Związek Ormian w Polsce) in Gliwice, the Armenian Foundation of the Armenian Cultural Society (Fundacja Ormiańska Koła Zainteresowań Kulturą Ormian) in Warsaw and the Foundation for Culture and Heritage of Polish Armenians (Fundacja Kultury i Dziedzictwa Ormian Polskich) in Warsaw. The tradition of representing the Karaite community is continued by organizations dating back, just like MZR, to the pre-war period: the Karaite Religious Association (Karaimski Związek Religijny, KZR) with religious communities in Warsaw, Gdańsk and Wrocław, and the Association of Polish Karaites (Związek Karaimów Polskich) in Wrocław.

4.2. Religion and Nationality – the Issues of Population and Identity

The distance between the political borders and the borders of Polish oecumene that has been growing for centuries had led to the situation, where the structures of the Polish state include territories not only inhabited by Ruthenian Orthodox Christians, but also by other ethnic and religious groups. Ukrainian territories under Orthodox influence, but also Lithuanian lands, where religion initially played a significant culture-forming role were included in Tartar, Karaite and Armenian colonization. This was desirable for political, military (Tartars, Karaites) and economic (Armenians) reasons. Polish culture had a huge ideological and material impact on the area of this settlement, which remained uniform politically under the administration of the First and, to a large extent, also the Second Republic. The ties to Polish culture in various dimensions were so strong for many Tartars, Karaites and Armenians that, when they found themselves outside the Polish state after 1945, they migrated back to its territory.

In post-war Poland, the majority of settlements related to migration were created *in cruda radice*, while the communities of the minorities in question became clearly diasporic. The process of loss of some unique features of Tartars, Karaites and Armenians (especially their languages) that started when they lived in the Borderlands, became even deeper in the new conditions. Separated from its traditional cultural background, it inevitably led to a decrease in the number of people identifying themselves with this ethnically unique group and the loss of some elements responsible for their religious activity.

When discussing the population of minority groups in contemporary Poland, one has to refer to the aforementioned issue of their perception, or the perception of at least parts of them, both in ethnic and cultural terms. According to Polish law, the Armenians are recognized as one of the nine national minorities in the country, while the Tartars and Karaites are two of the four ethnic minorities. The model of convergence between faith and nationality in some parts of these communities is a unique situation when compared to other minorities in Poland, with a probable exception of some Jews, whose national identity is marked by their faithfulness to their Judaic tradition. But treating the whole minorities as religious and national groups at the same time is unjustified.

When estimating the size of these minorities, taking into account the ethnic category, one can use the data from the national census statistics from 2002 With all its imperfections, the results obtained in this way showed that at the beginning of the 21st century, there were 495 people declaring Tartar nationality (including 447 with Polish citizenship), 45 Karaites (43) and 1082 Armenians (262) in Poland. It should, however, be noted that, due to their strong bonds with Poland, exemplified in the clearest way by the post-war emigration, the ethnic identity of many representatives of these minorities is expressed by their affiliation with their

Tartar, Karaite or Armenian nationality, as well as the Polish one. Thus for many people of Tartar, Karaite and Armenian descent, religion remains a significant element of identification with the communities discussed here. Therefore, it is their denomination, not their nationality that serves as the basic criterion of group identity. Those defining their sense of individuality in religious terms were mainly associated in organizations focused on maintaining the religious activities of their members: MZR, with 5 thousand members in 2002, and KZR, with 150 members in the same year. The number of people participating in the Armenian rites at that time was estimated at about 8 thousand. We should assume that not all members of these organizations were inclined to define their uniqueness in national terms, which surely influenced the census number of people with fully-formed Tartar, Karaite and Armenian national identity.

In contemporary Poland, the religious minorities in question, especially the Muslim and Armenian ones, are not just simple continuations of the communities dating back to the Borderlands. The role played by the Tartars in the development of clusters of Muslims in Poland should not be underestimated. For centuries, they were the dominating, or even the only, followers of Islam in Poland. But with the advent of colonisation, Poland saw an influx (mostly during the partition of some parts of Poland by the Russian Empire) of Muslims of different ethnic descents, such as Azeris, Bashkirs, Uzbeks, Circassians), though the influx was not as massive and mostly sporadic. The intensification of international relations in the 20th century fostered the inflow of immigrants from other Muslim countries to independent Poland. They were mostly diplomats, students and scientists (since the 1960s and, on a larger scale, since the 1970s) and entrepreneurs (since the beginning of political transformations in the 1990s). The Muslim immigrant community has also seen an inflow of refugees in the recent years. These are people who come to Poland due to a justified fear of persecution in their homeland for religious, ethnic or political reasons. Apart from the groups mentioned above, the Muslim minority also includes Poles who converted to Islam due to some kind of contact (family, cultural, tourist) with the Islamic tradition (both in Poland and abroad), but also due to the need to present certain social stance (the need to challenge the existing social order).[11] Especially in the past twenty years, there has been a noticeable increase in the number of Muslims in Poland. At the beginning of the 1990s there were approx. 5 thousand of them, mostly of Tartar descent. It should therefore be assumed that the dynamically growing number of Muslims in Poland in recent years, its social and ethnic structure and, more generally, its face, is not determined by the Polish Tartars that persist in their faith but, to a large extent, Muslim immigrants and Polish converts.

[11] According to various estimates, there are from 20 to 30 thousand Muslims living in Poland now. Among them, there are 2 to 5 thousand Tartars and people of Tartar descent, approx. 16–20 thousand foreigners (including 7 thousand with permanent stay card) and approx. 2 thousand Polish converts to Islam (Rykała, 2007).

Denomination also remains a significant element of cultural identity for Polish Armenians, even though the union with the Roman Catholic Church has led to gradual assimilation with their Polish surrounding. One can say that people who declared Armenian nationality also largely accept the religious heritage of Polish Armenians. In the absence of accurate data concerning the number of followers of the Armenian Church in Poland, it can be concluded that the vast majority of people identifying themselves as Armenians are members of the Armenian Catholic Church.[12] However, it is possible that some people identifying themselves as Armenians in the census due to their strong historical and cultural, as well as religious (through the doctrinal agreement between the Armenian and Roman Catholic Churches) bond with Poland, are nonetheless members of the Roman Catholic Church. It is also influenced by vast territorial distribution of the representatives of this community, which makes it impossible to practice the Armenian faith where they live.

The Armenian Catholic services are attended by the members of the so-called new immigration, without Polish citizenship and belonging to the Armenian Apostolic Church. The number of such people is estimated at 40–60 thousand. Thus, some sources estimate the number of the followers of this Church at 8 thousand, which seems to be a grossly inflated value and matches the estimated number of Armenians, repeated until recently, and not the real number of followers of the Armenian Church in Poland (Rykała, 2009).

5. CONCLUSIONS

In conclusion, it must be said that the religious heritage of the Eastern Borderlands of the Republic in contemporary Poland, limited in this geographical and historical study to the communities stemming from Orthodox Christianity, as well as the Muslim minority of Tartar descent, Karaites and Armenians, is an unquestionable historical, cultural and, to some extent, political value. It is a testament of the singular multiculturalism of the former state, possible due to its relative tolerance for other nations and denominations, which can serve to reinforce the feeling of patriotism among Poles and other descendants of the former Republic. It is, however, far from the patriotism that is limited to respect and love for the homeland stemming from the social and emotional bond with

[12] This thesis is largely confirmed by the studies on a representative group of people of Armenian descent in Poland performed by Kozłowski (2002), who claims that 52% of people of Armenian descent are members of the Armenian-Catholic Church, while the remaining part identify themselves as Roman Catholics. According to him, respondents of Armenian descent who were members of the Armenian Church identified themselves as Armenians, while the ones belonging to the Roman Catholic Church – as Poles (Rykała, 2006).

the country of one's origin, its culture and tradition. These minorities remain a cultural and historical connection for the countries that ultimately emerged from the old Republic – Poland, Lithuania, Belarus and Ukraine. The specific ethno-religious and linguistic diversity, accompanied by the divergence of national, religious and linguistic borders, have given the Eastern Borderlands their 'clearest reality', as well as an intangible mythical value. The post-war fate of many representatives of the community, expressed mainly in their immigration to Poland and the abandonment of their 'small homelands' show how strong the idealistic and material impact on the Borderlands was exerted by Polish culture, with its immanent Orthodox, Uniate, Muslim-Tartar, Karaite and Armenian heritage. State policy aimed at protecting these minorities, as well as support for them provided by those who are aware of the importance of the unique cultural and historical heritage of the former Republic seem desirable. As the post-war history of these minorities shows, they undergo significant quantitative fluctuations, leading to them gaining the status of the 'smallest minorities' (Karaites), as well as ethnic and cultural fluctuations (Muslims, Armenians), that reduce their 'borderland' character (which is not meant as a negative conclusion) in their heritage.

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THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL TRUST IN COUNTERING FEELINGS OF UNSAFETY IN DISADVANTAGED NEIGHBOURHOODS

Abstract: The segregated nature of urban areas reflects an uneven exposure to risk and unsafety. This article analyzes the relevance of place to people's feelings of unsafety by comparing questionnaire responses from people living in a segregated, disadvantaged neighbourhood to a random sample of people living in the same city. The results suggest that the central factors explaining the individual's feelings of unsafety differ in this particular neighbourhood compared to the broader population. The article shows that place has a moderating effect on feelings of unsafety. Trust in public institutions is argued to be particularly important in segregated, disadvantaged neighbourhoods because of its potential to prevent feelings of unsafety.

Key words: feelings of unsafety, trust, moderation, segregation.

1. INTRODUCTION

Urban space is generally divided into islands of segregated areas where social exclusion, crime and relative poverty are clustered in certain parts of the cities. The inhabitants of those areas are more vulnerable and at a greater risk of exploitation than inhabitants in other neighbourhoods. In other words, these social phenomena are emplaced; they exist in relation to their locality. How can the effects of the emplacement of social risk and vulnerability be understood? Feelings of unsafety, fear of crime and mistrust, experienced by inhabitants of disadvantaged, crime-ridden neighbourhoods, has been explained by the fact that the they face greater risks, and have a greater vulnerability due to lacking socioeconomic strength (Hale,

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1996; Sandstig, 2010). In short, structural explanations at the individual level have been the usual suspects for these feelings. However, does the geographical accumulation of these factors matter for the perception of unsafety?

Some researchers have argued that place has more explanatory power than is accounted for by its structural characteristics. The argument is that place partially shapes our social identities (Castells, 1997; Forrester and Kearns, 2001). We cannot avoid the way we categorize the world (by ethnicity, gender, race or place) or ignore the dominant connotations of those categories when we negotiate our identities (Putnam, 2007). The internal compositions of our neighbourhoods as well as others' perception of our neighbourhoods (i.e., their reputations) are important for our socialization (Forrester and Kearns, 2001; cf. Lilja, 2008, p. 173). Identities and perceptions are, thus, shaped by and embedded in the composition and relative categorization of one's neighbourhood. According to this argument, the neighbourhood as a place, and not just its structural characteristics, should influence the individual's feelings of unsafety.

At the end of the millennium a major advance in research at the neighbourhood level occurred (Sampson *et al*., 2002). This research on neighbourhood effects, among other things, focuses on health-related issues, problem behaviour and fear of crime (Brunton-Smith and Jackson, 2012) and differentiates between structural explanations at the individual level and contextual variables (that are also defining variables in urban areas). However, this research has been criticized. First, it is charged that many quantitative neighbourhood studies use neighbourhood boundaries that have been defined by administrative agencies. Therefore, these boundaries are not necessarily equivalent to social community boundaries (Sampson *et al*., 2002; Brunton-Smith and Jackson, 2012). Second, this research generally takes an aggregate-level approach in which the respondents describe the neighbourhood variables. It is questionable whether such an approach accounts for causalities, as they tend to claim. This research has argued that place has no direct effect on people's feelings of unsafety; instead, other geographically-clustered factors explain these feelings. However, few studies have investigated the alternative effects of place.

This study is based on case study data from an urban neighbourhood (Vivalla in Örebro City, Sweden), using a random sample of the other neighbourhoods in the same city as a control group. The neighbourhood of this study, Vivalla, has the typical characteristics of a segregated and disadvantaged neighbourhood. Because of physical planning, it is separated from surrounding neighbourhoods (see figure 3). This research design, in which the neighbourhood boundaries and its characteristics are well-defined, is appropriate because it permits a more nuanced analysis and avoids the trap in which the respondents embody all variables.[1] The aim of the study is to explore the effect of place on the neighbourhood inhabitants'

[1] This is not to say that the inhabitants' understanding and experience are secondary (cf. Lilja, 2008). However, when studying mechanisms quantitatively, there can be methodological difficulties.

general feelings of unsafety, while controlling for the structural characteristics of place. Hence, place is measured as a physical area with certain characteristics: The effect of place is examined as the residual explanation when other structural factors are accounted for. The study examines two issues: first, the perception of place on feelings of unsafety as an addition to the structural explanations; and second, the importance of place on feelings of unsafety in relationship to other variables (e.g., gender, age, interpersonal trust, trust in the police etc.). In summary, does place have a unique and direct effect on feelings of safety, or does it have a moderating effect? If the latter is true, how could we describe and understand that effect?

The next section, which discusses theoretical considerations in understanding and measuring feelings of unsafety, argues for the use of the symbolic paradigm. The following section presents the theoretical models that are tested in the study. A contextual description of the neighbourhood of the study is presented next. Thereafter, we turn to methodological considerations and the questionnaire construction, followed by the empirical analysis. The article ends with a discussion and conclusions.

2. A DEVELOPED CONCEPTUALIZATION OF FEELINGS OF UNSAFETY

In recent decades, government policies and scholarly research have increasingly focused on the community. Well functioning communities are seen as the best response or solution to negative societal trends (assumed or real) such as violent criminality, feelings of unsafety, loss of social control (due to urbanization and individualization) and diminished trust (both interpersonal and institutional) (Bauman, 2001; Gilling, 2001; Crawford, 2009; Lidskog and Persson, 2012). These societal trends are not as obvious in Sweden as in other countries (e.g., the US or the UK). Still, numerous public surveys have measured feelings of unsafety as fear of specific crimes or fear of being out late at night (Björkemarken, 2009), and many local authorities in Sweden have adopted this general measure as a performance indicator. In the policy debate feelings of unsafety are not primarily associated with rising crime rates, but with general anxieties in society, anxieties which are generally argued to be unfounded and fed by the media (Persson, 2012). However, feelings of unsafety, as a political concept, is positioned within the policy field of community safety and local crime prevention. As such, it is closely related to the research on fear of crime (see, e.g., Lee, 2001).

The research on fear of crime is a fast growing research field (Lee, 2001) that is dominated by a rationalist paradigm. Thus, fear of crime has generally been viewed as the rational calculation of the risk of becoming a victim, of the ability to defend oneself, and of the expected gravity of becoming a victim. Hence risk,

helplessness and vulnerability, in addition to the experience of crime, are factors that explain people's fear of crime (Hale, 1996; Elchardus *et al.*, 2008). The paradox of fear of crime, (i.e. that women and the elderly are more fearful than men and young people even though their risk of falling victim is less) is according to the rationalist paradigm, explained by their higher sense of helplessness and vulnerability. The same counts for differences in fear of crime assigned to socioeconomic differences, which is explained by a more vulnerable position where the consequence of loss is greater.

Despite the extensive research on fear of crime, there have been surprisingly few insights in recent decades (cf. Taylor and Hale, 1986; Hale, 1996; Sandstig, 2010). In his review on the fear of crime research, Hale (1996, p. 132) concluded that 'reading the literature on fear of crime produces a sense that the field is trapped within an overly restricted methodological and theoretical framework'. Ditton and Farral (2000), writing four years later, agreed that, despite all the previous research, little could be said conclusively about the fear of crime. There is also a widespread criticism about how fear of crime is theorized and measured (Taylor and Hale, 1986; Hale, 1996; Holloway and Jefferson, 1997; Pain, 2000; Gabriel and Greve, 2003; Vanderveen, 2006). An ongoing conceptual consideration among researchers is whether fear of crime might be better understood as insecurity about certain aspects of modern living, such as the quality of life, urban unease, fear of strangers or perception of disorder (Hale, 1996, p. 84). Hence, in addition to the mainstream paradigm, another paradigm – the symbolic paradigm (Elchardus *et al*., 2008) – has developed and is becoming more influential (see, e.g., Jackson, 2006; Lee and Farral, 2009; Cops, 2010; De Donder *et al*., 2012). In this paradigm, it is argued that fear of crime has a symbolic nature. This argument posits that fear of crime results from people's feelings of unsafety that are connected to macro-sociological developments such as globalization, urbanization, emancipation, migration, secularization, and from attitudes of discomfort, threat and helplessness in the face of the consequences of such developments (Cops, 2010). According to the symbolic paradigm, fear of crime is not a rational calculation but rather a social construction based in perceptions about the social environment. Therefore, the relative controllability of crime by the individual explains the increasingly influential fear of crime discourse that is linked to the risk society (Beck, 1992). Fear of crime, in this interpretation, may be a projection of more indefinable anxieties that derive from uncertainty and multiple life choices (cf. Giddens, 1991; Holloway and Jefferson, 1997).

According to the symbolic paradigm a more accurate way to measure feelings of unsafety is to use a concept that captures the more general concern about unsafety rather than just fear of specific crimes or fear of being out late at night (Elchardus *et al*., 2008). The concept, *general unsafety*, seeks to measure the worry that society is becoming harsher and is losing control over future developments. Feelings of unsafety are more consistent than fear of crime, which is typically linked to specific

situations and therefore may be significant in strength but occur infrequently (Farrall and Gadd, 2004). Because general feelings of unsafety are less specific than fear of crime or feelings of unsafety in certain circumstances, the concept of general unsafety does not have the functional aspect that is inherent with fear of crime (Jackson and Gray, 2010). General feelings of unsafety, which are more deeply rooted and enduring in the individual, tend to be more constant and persistent over time (Hough, 2004).This article follows the symbolic paradigm by which unsafety is measured as general feelings of unsafety and not as the more specific fear of crime.

3. THEORETICAL MODELS AND CONCURRING EXPLANATORY VARIABLES

This article is explorative in two respects. First, in an examination of the influence of place on feelings of safety, previous research (including the fear of crime research) does not proceed to investigate alternative models, such as interaction effects in the form of moderation after the identification of the direct effects. Second, operationalizing the explanatory variable, as feelings of unsafety, consistent with the symbolic paradigm, means that the explanatory model is not established. The number of quantitative studies applying this concept is still limited. Therefore, like other studies that have used this concept (e.g., Elchardus *et al*., 2008; Cops, 2010; De Donder *et al*., 2012), this study builds on the results and established variables of the rationalist paradigm. Feelings of unsafety, defined as fear of crime, are generally explained by individual characteristics such as gender, age and heritage, as well as socioeconomic status, including employment status and education level (Hale, 1996). These structurally-based individual explanations are therefore included in the models, together with exposure to crime, which is another key explanatory variable in the rational paradigm (Elchardus *et al*., 2008).

However, the wider, symbolic definition of feelings of unsafety, as *general unsafety*, requires a broader set of explanations. Feelings of unsafety are related to concerns about the moral and social trajectory of society (including concerns in specific neighbourhoods) and are influenced by political action (Lee, 2001; Jackson, 2006; Cops, 2010). Various forms of trust are said to be variables that may explain feelings of general unsafety (see e.g. Walklate, 1998). According to Goldsmith (2005, p. 444), 'Trust, through its presence or absence, is innately linked to feelings of existential safety'. Both concepts are connected to risk and the way we handle insecurity. The ability to cope with anxiety is, according to Giddens (1991), related to trust developed in childhood; this trust is then continuously shaped through social interaction. According to the literature on institutional trust, the way institutions function in a certain country affects not only the trust in those institutions but also the generalized trust and social capital among its inhabitants

(Stolle, 2007; Rothstein and Stolle, 2008). By its type of welfare state, its degree of general subsidies, the predictability and its level of corruption, a country signals values and interacts with its inhabitants. By these means, a country can enhance trust (Rothstein and Stolle, 2008) and neutralize public insecurity. Institutions may thereby strengthen the individual ability to handle anxiety (Hummelsheim *et al*., 2011, p. 337).

The forms of trust addressed in this study are generalized trust, institutional trust and trust in the police. Our attitudes towards the police are assumed to influence our feelings of unsafety. If affected by or concerned about crime, the police is the institution that we have to turn to and place our confidence and trust in. Previous research has argued that excluded and marginalized groups in general tend to have less trust in institutions (Goldsmith, 2005), and, of these, minority groups in particular tend to have less trust in the police (Tyler, 2005).

Two theoretical models are used in this study for testing the relationships among trust, place and general unsafety. Model 1 tests if place has a unique effect on general unsafety (see figure 1). Hence, model 1 tests whether feelings of unsafety depend on a number of individual explanations, including individual characteristics, the level of social and institutional trust, and the neighbourhood of residence (place).



Fig. 1. Theoretical model 1
Source: own study

Model 2 assumes that the neighbourhood of residence affects feelings of unsafety in a more complex way (see figure 2). In this model, place does not necessarily have a direct effect on general unsafety; rather, place alters factors that are central to safe perceptions of the world. Hence, model 2 tests whether place has a moderating effect on the other explanatory variables of general unsafety.



Fig. 2. Theoretical model 2
Source: own study

4. THE PLACE – A CONTEXTUAL DESCRIPTION OF VIVALLA



Fig. 3. Vivalla's geographical position in Sweden and in Örebro
Note: the map on the right shows the two samples; the map covers Örebro, with Vivalla marked
Source: own study

The two theoretical models were tested on quantitative data collected in Örebro, Sweden. Örebro is a midsize city in the middle of Sweden with approx. 137,000 inhabitants. Like many cities in Sweden of comparable size, ethnic segregation exists. The most segregated areas are the 'white' neighbourhoods that are distanced from the socioeconomically weak and multi-ethnic neighbourhoods (Johansson, 2002, pp. 216–220). The neighbourhood (or place) investigated in this study is Vivalla, the Örebro neighbourhood considered the most problematic (The Örebro Police, 2009). A sample population from the city of Örebro is used as the comparison reference point. The demographic composition of Örebro is comparable to other midsized Swedish cities.

In 2011 (the year following this study), the neighbourhood of Vivalla, had 6,823 inhabitants. During the last decade the neighbourhood has had a steadily increasing population (Örebro Municipality, 2012). The neighbourhood was founded around 1967–1970 in the years when large-scale apartment housing was built in the suburban areas of Sweden, resulting in a homogenous neighbourhood dominated by small rental apartments. Before long, the neighbourhood began to be perceived and described as a 'problem area' and it has since been dominated

by negative connotations such as: criminality, unsafety, social problems, a high density of immigrants, and uniform apartments (The Örebro Police, 2009), of which many are structural challenges that Vivalla faces. However, as Lilja (2008) notes, it is important to remember that the external images of a marginalized place may often be more negative than the image held by its inhabitants who have memories, life experiences and a relationship to the place. See table 1 for a listing of the characteristics of the Vivalla and Örebro inhabitants.

Table 1. Neighbourhood characteristics

Area	% with…	Higher education	Education < 9 years	Open unemployment 18–24 years	Open unemployment 18–64 years	Foreign birth	Foreign background
Vivalla	Women	7.7	25.4	12.8	14.0	52.4	74.8
	Men	9.6	19.6	11.0	16.3	50.3	74.5
	Total	**8.7**	**22.5**	**11.9**	**15.1**	**51.3**	**74.7**
Örebro	Women	30.0	4.6	4.9	3.9	15.1	20.7
	Men	21.1	4.6	6.0	4.4	14.8	20.8
	Total	**25.5**	**4.6**	**5.4**	**4.1**	**15.0**	**20.7**

Note: unemployment (31.10.2011) = according to definition of the Swedish Employment Office.
Source: Örebro Municipality (2012).

Table 1 reveals that Vivalla has a higher unemployment rate than the average in the city of Örebro. Vivalla's inhabitants also have lower levels of education and more foreign backgrounds. In the last decade, the percentage of the inhabitants in Vivalla with foreign backgrounds has steadily risen (an average of 74.7% in 2011 compared to 52.6% in 2003 (Örebro Municipality, 2012). This increase is explained by a high turnover of inhabitants with a relatively large number of 'native Swedes' moving from the neighbourhood at the same time that more people with foreign backgrounds have moved into the neighbourhood.

Because Vivalla is the neighbourhood in Örebro with the most concerns about criminality, the Örebro police department has recently initiated neighbourhood policing (The Örebro Police, 2009). The most alarming crime statistics are the numbers of relational violence against women[2] and muggings. Both crimes are about three to five times higher in Vivalla than in Örebro in general. Other crimes, which are about twice as common in Vivalla as in Örebro, are physical assault

[2] The design of this study does not capture the particularities of this form of crime. This is arguably a limitation of the study because many researchers have shown that the home is the most dangerous victimization location for women.

outside, moped theft and drug offences (The Örebro Police, 2009). According to the police, there is also a serious problem with the recruitment of young men into criminal gangs, as a consequence of the structural disadvantages of the neighbourhood (The Örebro Police, 2009). Considering the conditions in Vivalla; its social composition and structural context, living there is likely to affect the inhabitants' identities as well as influence their feelings of unsafety.

5. METHOD

For this research, a questionnaire was sent to 1,000 potential respondents in the second half of 2010 (Örebro 400; Vivalla 600). The respondents were asked about their feelings of unsafety, trust, their views on the police, together with a number of control variables. The questions were in Swedish, but respondents could reply in English via the Internet. Four reminders were sent. The netto[3] response rate was 43.6% (Örebro 61.8%, Vivalla 30.8%),[4] resulting in a sample of N = 401 (Örebro 235, Vivalla 166). The lower response rate in Vivalla was arguably caused by the rapid turnover in its population as well as by language barriers.

In connection with the fourth and last reminder, we telephoned the potential respondents and encouraged them to answer the questionnaire. However, only about one-third of the potential respondents in Vivalla who had not yet answered had listed phone numbers (in the whole sample of nonrespondents the number was 319 of 599). Of those who answered the phone call (just over half), together with those who returned the questionnaire without answering it, 15 explicitly told they could not answer the questionnaire because of language difficulties. In summary, this tells us that there might be a part of the population that are more mobile and less established, that this sample do not account properly for. It is likely that the inability to answer the questionnaire due to language difficulties is even greater in this group.

To control for bias in the Vivalla sample, due to nonresponses, three variables of individual characteristics (gender, employment, foreign birth), were compared with the municipal dataset. No significant differences were revealed.[5] The number

[3] After subtracting those responses that were sent back blank.

[4] As a consequence of the difficulty in obtaining high response rates (which is typical in contemporary segregated areas), research has been conducted on the statistical effects and limitations that a limited sample implies. These studies show very limited differences due to nonresponses (Langer, 2003). Langer also emphasizes that nonresponses have received disproportionate attention as far as reliability in relation to other methodological questions (such as constructs and choice of statistical method).

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of women and men are similar. The number of respondents born abroad in this data set is 49.1% in Vivalla and 11.1% in Örebro, compared to 50.1% and 14.5%, respectively, in the municipal dataset for 2010. Concerning employment the number of respondents in this sample describing themselves as unemployed are 9.1% in Vivalla and 1.7% in Örebro, compared to 9.3% and 5.3%, respectively, in the municipal dataset from the same year. Note that the Vivalla respondent percentages are closer to those in the municipal dataset than the Örebro respondent percentages as far as unemployment and foreign birth. This difference may partly be explained by the fact that the sample used in this study is from the city of Örebro, whereas the municipal statistics cover a wider area. To conclude, this test shows no considerable bias due to nonresponses.

The statistical method used is regression analysis, where the moderation of place is evaluated by subgroup regression (Hartmann and Moers, 1999). Since the moderator is dichotomous, a subgroup regression approach to testing moderation equals a moderated regression analysis (MRA), which is the most common regression technique for evaluating moderation (Hartmann and Moers, 1999, p. 295). The significance of the differences between the subgroups is calculated using the z-score (Garson, 2011). Missing values on the index/variable level in the regression models are generally few, ranging from 0 to 7.5%. Since listwise deletion is used in the regressions, the listwise number of missing values for some models is about 25%. However, the comparison of listwise means and correlations with estimated means (EM) and correlations reveals no differences.

Questionnaire

General unsafety

The dependent variable was measured using a 6 item index ($\alpha = 0.823$),[6] in which the respondents were asked to respond to the following statements: ‘Compared to fifty years ago, the world has become more unsafe’; ‘Over the last ten years, the streets have become less safe’; ‘At night, you have to be particularly careful when out in the streets’; ‘A burglar alarm is essential nowadays’; ‘It isn’t safe enough to let kids play out in the streets alone’; and ‘The police aren’t able anymore to defend us from criminals’.

The respondents could choose responses coded on a 5-point Likert scale (which was used in the whole questionnaire). The responses ranged from ‘strongly disagree’, ‘disagree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘agree’ to ‘strongly agree’. High responses indicate high levels of general unsafety.

[6] The alfa of the indexes have additionally been calculated in both subgroups (Vivalla and Örebro). No significant differences were found. The indexes have strong reliability in both groups.

Place

Place is measured as the geographical place of residence. Vivalla (coded as 2) is contrasted with Örebro (coded as 1). Hence what is sought to be captured is the particularities of a separated and segregated area, with its particular characteristics, in relation to the general area (i.e., the average of Örebro).

Gender

Men were coded as 1 and women as 2.

Age

The respondents were asked to state their year of birth. Hence, high years indicate younger age.

Heritage

The respondents were asked to select the best response from the following choices: 'You and your parents were born in Sweden'; 'You were born in Sweden, but your parents were born in another country'; 'One of your parents was born in Sweden and the other was born in another country'; 'You were born in another European country'; and 'You were born in a non-European country'. In the regressions, a recoded variable was used: born in Sweden was coded as 0 and born abroad was coded as 1.

Education

The respondents were asked to describe their highest level of education. They were offered the following choices: 'I have no education (0)'; 'Elementary school or equivalent (0)'; 'High school or the equivalent (1)'; and 'University level or the equivalent (2)'.

Employed/unemployed

The respondents were asked to describe their employment status. They were offered the following choices: 'Employed'; 'Pensioner'; 'Student'; 'Unemployed'; 'Job training or course through the Employment Office'; 'Other'. Employed, pensioner and student were coded as 1. Unemployed and job training or course through the Employment Office were coded as 2.

Civic engagement

The respondents were asked how they would describe their civic engagement (for example, in sports, the church, choir, culture or similar)? They responded on

a 5-point Likert scale in which the responses ranged from ‘very large’ to ‘very little’. ‘Very large’ was coded as 5 and ‘very little’ as 1.

Exposure to crime

The respondents were asked if they were victims of any of the following crimes in the last 12 months: vandalism, apartment burglary, robbery, threat, or physical abuse). In the coding, 1 is ‘not exposed’, 2 is ‘exposed to one crime’, and 3 is ‘exposed to two or more crimes’.

Generalized trust

The respondents were asked the standard question for measuring generalized trust (and sometimes social capital): ‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?’ The respondents were offered the following alternatives: ‘People in general can be trusted’; ‘People in general can often be trusted’, ‘neither in general nor often’; ‘People in general can seldom be trusted’; and ‘People in general cannot be trusted’. High numbers indicate high levels of trust.

Institutional trust

A 6-item index was used to measure institutional trust ($\alpha = 0.851$). This measurement combined the respondents’ level of trust in the Swedish Government, the Swedish Parliament, the Courts, the police, the compulsory schools and the social services. The choices ranked from ‘very little trust’ to ‘very much trust’, where high numbers indicate high levels of trust.

Trust in the police institution

A 4-item index was used to measure trust in the police as an institution, using the following statements ($\alpha = 0.836$): ‘I have confidence that the police can do their job well’; ‘I trust the leaders of the police to make decisions that are good for everyone in Örebro’; ‘People’s basic rights are well protected by the police’; ‘The police care about the well-being of all people they deal with’. High numbers indicate high levels of trust.

6. CHARACTERISTICS OF PLACE – VIVALLA COMPARED TO ÖREBRO

Previous research gives us reason to believe that the level of perceived unsafety is higher and trust is lower in segregated, disadvantaged areas because the inhabitants of such areas generally experience greater socioeconomic vulnerability and higher

levels of victimization. They also encounter more visible signs of disorder. These are all factors that are known to produce an increase in feelings of unsafety (measured as fear of crime). In addition, research from the US has shown that ethnic group differences account for the fact that some groups trust the police less than other groups (Tyler, 2005; Stoutland, 2001).

After considering the quality of data,[7] the initial consideration was therefore to learn whether there was a difference in trust and feelings of unsafety between Vivalla and the greater Örebro. Related aspects were also investigated, one being civic engagement, which is often seen as a proxy for social capital and fundamental for general safety (Stolle, 2007). Differences in the level of exposure to crime were also measured, although known from other data that these differences existed, these measures were included to control for the representability of the respondents.

Table 2. Mean levels of central concepts: Vivalla in relation to Örebro

Variables	Vivalla		Örebro		$p < 0.05$	Cohens D
	mean	SD	mean	SD		
General unsafety	2.24	0.85	2.44	0.81	Sig.	0.24
Institutional trust	3.05	0.88	3.17	0.70	n.s.	
Trust in police	3.36	0.93	3.29	0.83	n.s.	
Generalized trust	3.13	1.13	3.70	1.00	Sig.	0.52
Civic engagement	2,66	1.37	2.73	1.28	n.s.	
Exposure to crime	1.47	0.72	1.27	0.54	Sig.	0.32

Source: own study.

Table 2 shows that the inhabitants of Vivalla have higher general feelings of unsafety than the inhabitants of Örebro as a whole. The inhabitants of Vivalla also have lower generalized trust. These two variables show significant mean difference in an ANOVA test ($p = 0.021$, 0.000). The difference in exposure to crime was also tested and, as expected, there is a difference between Vivalla and Örebro. People living in Vivalla are more exposed to crime than people living in Örebro ($p = 0.002$). The strength of the difference can be calculated using Cohen's D (Borg and Westerlund, 2006; Garson, 2011). According to Cohen's categorization of effect strength (Borg and Westerlund, 2006), the difference in general unsafety and exposure to crime is small, whereas the difference in generalized trust is moderate.

[7] The descriptive statistics show that both the skewness and kurtosis statistics are within the limits of assumed normality (see Appendix 2). The standard deviation shows a sufficient variance within the variables. Comparison of the groups (Vivalla and Örebro) shows that the smaller sample in Vivalla has no negative effects on the variance (Appendix 2; table 2).

Considering the socioeconomic disadvantages of the Vivalla inhabitants, including the rapid turnover in its population, these differences were expected. If anything, they would have been expected to be even larger. However, what was less expected is that no significant difference exists between Vivalla and Örebro as for institutional trust, trust in the police and civic engagement. As mentioned, research in a US context shows that minority groups tend to have less trust in the police (Tyler, 2005). A complementary finding is that neighbourhoods with socially disadvantaged and minority groups often provoke socialization processes and experiences that reduce trust in public institutions, including the police (Goldsmith, 2005; Tyler, 2005). It is often claimed that civic engagement has a buffering effect on such lack of trust (Ross and Joon, 2000). However, our study provides no evidence of this could explain the lack of difference, since we found no significant difference in civic engagement by the two groups.

7. THE MODERATING EFFECT OF PLACE ON FEELINGS OF UNSAFETY

Having concluded that there is a difference in general unsafety, however small, we now turn to the central question of this study: Does place have a part in explaining the difference between the two groups regarding feelings of unsafety? Looking at the correlation matrix of the variables (see Appendix 1), we see that place has an individual effect on the dependent variable. Hence, model 1 tests whether that effect remains when the other explanatory variables are controlled for (see table 3).

In order to test model 1, place was included in the same regression with the other independent variables so as to show it has no unique effect on feelings of unsafety. The variables explaining variance in feelings of unsafety are gender, age, and education, plus the three trust variables – generalized trust, trust in institutions, and trust in the police. Women and the elderly feel more unsafe than men and younger people do. The more education an individual has, the more that individual trusts and the less unsafe it feels. This conclusion agrees with other research findings (see, e.g., Hale, 1996; Sandstig, 2010). Employment status, heritage and exposure to crime have no effect on feelings of unsafety. Victimization increases fear of crime, but has less effect when measuring general unsafety (see also Elchardus, 2008, p. 464). In short, we can dismiss model 1: place has no individual and direct effect on feelings of unsafety.

This is where many studies on the effect of place end, however, to investigate the matter further, we now turn to see if place has a moderating effect on feelings of unsafety. Subgroup regressions were made for the inhabitants of both Örebro and Vivalla. As regressions two and three (table 3) show, the explanatory effects of the other independent variables change. They are moderated by the effect of place. Different aspects influence feelings of unsafety depending on whether one lives

in Vivalla or in Örebro. In Örebro, there are still unique effects for the individual explanations: gender, age, and education, plus generalized trust which is the dominant variable, which accounts for 14%[8] of Regression model 3's explanatory power. Institutional trust and trust in police lose significance.

Table 3. Antecedents of general unsafety: the influence of place

Variables	Total		Vivalla		Örebro	
	theoretical model 1		theoretical model 2			
	regression model 1		regression model 2		regression model 3	
	Std. Beta	Sig	Std. Beta	Sig	Std. Beta	Sig
Individual variables						
Gender	0.140	0.006	0.078	0.365	0.174	0.007
Age	–0.139	0.011	–0.035	0.712	–0.172	0.011
Heritage	–0.091	0.115	–0.116	0.217	–0.056	0.382
Education	–0.152	0.006	–0.128	0.147	–0.180	0.009
Employed/unemployed	–0.031	0.571	–0.065	0.468	–0.017	0.791
Exposure to crime	–0.020	0.703	–0.118	0.186	0.023	0.716
Trust variables						
Generalized trust	–0.309	0.000	–0.209	0.025	–0.371	0.000
Institutional trust	–0.180	0.007	–0.323	0.005	–0.080	0.331
Trust in police	–0.117	0 .068	–0.241	0.028	–0.036	0.650
Place	0.035	0.553				
Adjusted R^2	0.241		0.267		0.237	

Note: N total 306, N Örebro 199, N Vivalla 107.

Source: own study.

In Vivalla, on the other hand, we find a new and somewhat reversed pattern. The traditional explanations disappear. Age, gender, education, heritage and employment status show no unique effect on general unsafety. The variables that are significant in the explanation of feelings of unsafety are generalized trust, the level of trust in institutions and institutional trust in the police. Thus, trust is much more central than individual characteristics such as gender, age, employment etc. Moreover, institutional trust and trust in the police are the strongest explanatory variables, accounting for 16% of the variance in regression model 2. To conclude, trust in institutions, and particularly trust in the police, seems to be more important in countering feelings of unsafety in neighbourhoods such as Vivalla than in the average city. It seems to be particularly important (or fruitful) to have a trustworthy

[8] Calculated by taking the squared Std. Beta.

police force and trustworthy institutions in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. Exposure to crime does not have a unique effect on feelings of unsafety in either of our models. Although such exposure may affect fear of crime, it does not seem to affect general feelings of unsafety (cf. Elchardus, 2008, p. 464).

The moderating effect of place causes two different explanatory patterns of unsafety in Vivalla and Örebro. To this point, we have not accounted for the statistical significance of the differences between the subgroups. To account for these differences concerning specific variables, the significance of the difference between the standardized betas of Örebro and Vivalla (table 3 regression model two and three) was calculated.[9] A one-tailed significance test was used to identify significant differences in institutional trust and trust in the police. These are the central aspects moderated by place. The conclusion that place moderates the effect of traditional explanations such as gender, age and socioeconomic status needs to be confirmed by studies with larger respondent samples. The limited sample of this study may lack the power to confirm those relationships. However, the indication that strong identity-forming factors (e.g., gender and age) have no effect on how the inhabitants of Vivalla perceive their environment in terms of general unsafety is an original finding that merits further study.

8. DISCUSSION

A plausible reason for the relative influence of trust in institutions and trust in the police with respect to feelings of unsafety in Vivalla may be the greater presence of and dependence on the police in such neighbourhoods. Trust in the police (as well as in other institutions) may therefore be more essential in such neighbourhoods by having the possibility to prevent feelings of unsafety. It could be explained in terms of vulnerability, however, in a different sense than is portrayed in the literature of fear of crime. The inhabitants are vulnerable because of their relatively greater dependence on public institution. This situation may explain why their level of trust in them relates to their feelings of unsafety.

The crucial role of public institutions to prevent feelings of unsafety is supported by the study of Hummelsheim *et al.* (2011), which shows that a high degree of social expenditure and a higher degree of decommodification of social welfare policy are correlated with lower crime-related insecurity. The authors suggest that these policy measures neutralize public insecurity and social anxiety (Hummelsheim *et al.*, 2011, p. 337). These results explain Sweden's relatively low levels of unsafety as a consequence of the country's social democratic welfare state with its high level of decommodification (Esping-Andersen, 1990). Hence, the differences in trust and

[9] Calculated by converting into z-scores and computing the standard error of difference (Garson, 2011).

feelings of unsafety between disadvantaged, segregated neighbourhoods and the general urban average may be greater in countries with other welfare state models. The somewhat surprising fact that feelings of unsafety were only moderately higher in Vivalla than in Örebro suggests that the public institutions have somewhat neutralized the social insecurity that is the result of structural disadvantages.

A recent empirical study from the same local context pointed to the critical function of the schools in disadvantaged neighbourhoods: schools can be safe havens for children (Svensson *et al*., 2012). Young people in these neighbourhoods, in particular young immigrants, perceive their schools as safe havens where they have an influence that they typically lack in their neighbourhoods. In Svensson *et al.*'s study (2012), as well as in this study, respondents in the disadvantaged neighbourhoods, compared to control groups, did not have higher levels of trust in institutions or greater perceptions of their own influence. However, their trust in institutions and their perceptions of influence have a more critical function as it seems to prevent feelings of unsafety and generate feelings of safety. Hence, to get a full scope of the influence of central factors on feelings of unsafety, one needs to consider moderating effects. In this case we have identified trust as a critical factor for feelings of unsafety in disadvantaged neighbourhoods, whereas other research designs would not have revealed its prominent function in these contexts.

9. CONCLUSIONS

Feelings of unsafety and fear of crime are a political and social concern that is distinguishable from actual crime or risk. Policies on local crime prevention and community safety not only address causes of crime but also address the anxiety and unsafety that surround crime (Gilling, 2001). However, it is difficult to define unsafety as well as deal with it. Unsafety, as a concept, often becomes a measure of how safe one feels from specific crimes and in specific situations. This study takes an alternative approach to feelings of unsafety and follows the symbolic paradigm. Feelings of unsafety is understood and measured as a perception of the societal development and how safe the surrounding society is (see Elchardus *et al*., 2008). The study looks, in particular, at the role place plays in this perception.

Two theoretical models on the role of place on feelings of unsafety were tested. The findings from model 1 show that place has no unique effect on how unsafe one perceives the world. Theoretically, this finding indicates that place can be reduced to its structural variables. However, model 2 shows that place has a moderating effect on feelings of unsafety. Hence, a primary conclusion is that more complex mechanisms than direct effects should be considered when determining the effect of place and when searching for mechanisms behind feelings of unsafety.

Living in Vivalla changes the influence of other factors on feelings of unsafety. In Örebro (and as reported on in previous research) the variables with a unique effect on general unsafety are gender, age and education, together with generalized trust. The fact that women, the elderly, and socioeconomically weaker groups experience greater feelings of unsafety is often ascribed to their greater vulnerability (Hale, 1996), and, for women in particular, it is connected to a socially constructed identity with an inferior power position (e.g., de Beauvoir, 1986; Listerborn, 2001). In Vivalla, these factors with an established relationship to fear of crime do not influence feelings of unsafety. The factors that have a unique effect on feelings of unsafety are institutional trust, trust in the police, and generalized trust.

This is a limited and explorative study and we cannot draw any general conclusions from the presented results. However, the findings challenge established explanations, and further research is needed to determine its scope. The results point in a partly new direction that assigns public institutions a central role in preventing feelings of unsafety in disadvantaged neighbourhoods. This result indicates that it is particularly in such areas that trustworthy institutions have the potential to generate feelings of safety and to neutralize the higher vulnerability and the greater risks these inhabitants face. These results are particularly important in a time when the welfare state is (or is in danger of) being dismantled, when decommodification and redistribution are being reduced, and when nations are considering reduction of social services in deprived areas.

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10. APPENDIX

Appendix 1. Correlation matrix

Variables		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Place	Pearson Corr	1	0.119	0.010	0.070	0.422	–0.251	0.243	–0.258	–0.088	0.039
	Sig (2-tailed)		0.021	0.834	0.161	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.090	0.442
	N	401	376	401	401	399	395	379	397	373	383

2. General unsafety	Pearson Corr	0.119	1	0.099	–0.123	0.025	–0.240	0.058	–0.336	–0.322	–0.196
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.021		0.054	0.017	0.634	0.000	0.276	0.000	0.000	0.000
	N	376	376	376	376	374	371	355	372	353	365
3. Gender	Pearson Corr	0.010	–0.099	1	0.072	0.059	0.018	–0.012	0.003	–0.011	0.029
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.834	.054		0.152	0.244	0.723	0.816	0.953	0.838	0.565
	N	401	376	401	401	399	395	379	397	373	383
4. Age	Pearson |Corr	0.070	–0.123	0.072	1	0.198	0.214	0.082	–0.118	–0.014	–0.090
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.161	0.017	0.152		0.000	0.000	0.112	0.019	0.782	0.077
	N	401	376	401	401	399	395	379	397	373	383
5. Heritage	Pearson Corr	0.422	0.025	0.059	0.198	1	–0.109	0.183	–0.329	0.040	0.032
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.634	0.244	0.000		0.031	0.000	0.000	0.444	0.527
	N	399	374	399	399	399	394	378	397	373	382
6. Education	Pearson Corr	–0.251	–0.240	0.018	0.214	–0.109	1	–0.164	0.178	0.133	–0.121
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.000	0.723	0.000	0.031		0.001	0.000	0.011	0.019
	N	395	371	395	395	394	395	374	392	370	378

7. Employment /unemployment	Pearson Corr	0.243	0.058	–0.012	0.082	0.183	–0.164	1	–0.187	–0.123	0.012
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	0.276	0.816	0.112	0.000	0.001		0.000	0.020	0.813
	N	379	355	379	379	378	374	379	376	356	363
8. Generalized trust	Pearson Corr	–0.258	–0.336	0.003	–0.118	–0.329	0.178	–0.187	1	0.305	0.174
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.000	.000	0.953	0.019	0.000	0.000	0.000		0.000	0.001
	N	397	372	397	397	397	392	376	397	371	380
9. Institutional trust	Pearson Corr	–0.088	–0.322	–0.011	–0.014	0.040	0.133	–0.123	0.305	1	0.565
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.090	.000	0.838	0.782	0.444	0.011	0.020	0.000		0.000
	N	373	353	373	373	373	370	356	371	373	363
10. Inst. trust in police	Pearson Corr	0.039	–0.196	0.029	–0.090	0.032	–0.121	0.012	0.174	0.565	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.442	0.000	0.565	0.077	0.527	0.019	0.813	0.001	0.000	
	N	383	365	383	383	382	378	363	380	363	383
11. Exposure to crime	Pearson Corr	0.157	0.049	–0.063	0.123	0.035	0.026	0.104	–0.158	–0.144	–0.130
	Sig. (2-tailed)	0.002	.359	0.223	0.017	0.505	0.622	0.050	0.002	0.007	0.014
	N	371	349	371	371	369	365	352	367	349	358

Appendix 2. Descriptive statistics

Specification	N statistic	Min. statistic	Max. statistic	Mean statistic	Std. dev. statistic	Skewness		Kurtosis
						statistic	Std error	statistic
General unsafety	376	1.00	5.00	2.36	0.83	0.67	0.13	0.37
Gender	401	1	2	1.49	0.50	0.025	0.12	–2.01
Age	401	1,935	1,994	1,964.2	16.56	0.08	0.12	–1.12
Heritage	399	0.00	1.00	0.27	0.44	1.05	0.12	–0.90
Education	395	0.00	2.00	1.18	0.75	–0.311	0.12	–1.16
Employment	379	1.00	2.00	1.10	0.29	2.77	0.13	5.72
Exposure to crime	371	1.00	3.00	1.35	0.62	1.59	0.13	1.31
Generalized trust	397	1	5	3.47	1.09	–0.68	0.12	–0.33
Institutional trust	373	1.00	5.00	3.19	0.78	–0.37	0.13	0.27
Trust in police	383	1.00	5.00	3.31	0.87	–0.42	0.13	–0.06
Place	401	1	2	1.41	0.49	0.35	0.12	–1.89
Valid N (listwise)	306							

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REVIEW ARTICLES AND REPORTS

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URBAN REGENERATION IN LYON CONNECTIVITY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

1. INTRODUCTION

C'est pas parce que les gens sont pauvres qu'il faut toléré le fait qu'ils vivent dans les clapies. Il n'y a pas de raison pour que tous les ghetto soient à la Duchère et que tous les beaux appart soient au centre de Lyon ou à l' ouest (Télé Lyon Métropole 20.05.2010).

Urban regeneration in France is characterized by extremes. On the one hand, prestigious projects like La Défense in Paris have garnered much attention but on the other hand there are the images of riots in the peripheral post-war social-housing districts (the *grand ensembles* in the *banlieues*) of big cities. In recent years the approach to urban renewal in Lyon has been the leading urban regeneration approach in France. Here an integral approach has been developed that stretches from the centre of the city to the *banlieues*, constituting the Greater Lyon region. Lyon has promoted a prestigious project, the 'Confluence' development, but also has achieved profound transformations in the public transport network and in the re-design of public spaces, such as squares and river borders, with elaboration on different scale levels. The plans to execute renewal of the post-war neighbourhoods in the agglomeration of Greater Lyon have also been quite ambitious. New laws introduced in 2001 and 2003 stimulated renewal of these neighbourhoods which prior to that time were characterized negatively by their isolated location in relation to the city centre and other important facilities. *Rénovation urbaine*, the

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policy motto from the start of the 1950s meant currently the same name referring to new strategies. In this article we discuss the way in which urban regeneration is addressed in two problem neighbourhoods in Lyon; the *Grand Projet de Ville* in La Duchère and in Vaulx-en-Velin (see figure 1). La Duchère, based on a design by Alain Marguerit, is especially exemplary of the current approach. The strategies in both areas are based on solving social exclusion and improving connectivity.



Fig. 1. Greater Lyon and its grand ensembles with the year of the riots
Source: The Lyon Conurbation Master Plan Lyon 2010 by Agence d'Urbanisme de la Communaute Urbaine de Lyon (1991) (the years of the riots added by the authors)

Vaulx-en-Velin is the location where the first riots started in France in 1979. It is also the place where the first 'enterprise zone' (*Zone Franche Urbaine*) was introduced in 1996. In Vaulx-en-Velin (2006) and La Duchère (2010) housing

blocks constructed in the 1960s were blown up in only 6.5 seconds and 6 seconds respectively. This demolition, on the 2nd of April 2006, marks the biggest implosion ever to occur in Europe.

Urban regeneration is driven by a much wider range of urban and regional issues than modernization of housing in deprived areas. Plans for urban regeneration need to respond to new requirements and conditions caused by changes in the social fabric and more endogenous developments e.g. in the employment structure (Stouten, 2010).

The question taken into consideration in this paper is what can be learnt from the approaches in France, especially in Lyon, where topics like social exclusion and connectivity have made an important contribution to solving problems in metropolitan areas. Lyon, located in the Rhône Alps, belongs to the secondary areas of economic activity and distribution of wealth in France, with Paris representing the primary area. After connecting urban regeneration with theories of the 'network city' and social exclusion, we analyze the changing context of urban regeneration in France and the evolution of policies including programmes under the umbrella of *Politique de la Ville*. The past and current policies are discussed before focusing on the two cases in the Lyon region.

2. URBAN REGENERATION; NETWORK CITY AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION

According to Roberts (2004, p. 17) the essential features of urban regeneration are defined as: 'comprehensive and integrated vision and action aimed at the resolution of urban problems and seeking to bring about a lasting improvement in the economic, physical, social and environmental condition of an area that has been subjected to change'. The 'network city' concept is usually absent in the analyzes of urban renewal areas. In the network city concept social and spatial inequalities are part of the discussion of differentiation of residential environments, in the context of the city and region. In this article we understand the notion of network as nodes and connections between nodes, which structure the functional-spatial organization of districts, cities and regions. Dupuy (1991, p. 119), following Fishman, distinguishes three levels of operators who (re)organize space: the first level considers (technical) networks of roads, gas, water, electricity, public transport, telephone etc.; the second level considers (functional) networks of production and consumption; the third level is the actual network or territory used and experienced by urban households. Added to this, connectivity can be an important issue and an important drive in the network city concept. In the New Charter of Athens 2003 (European Council of Town Planners, 2003) 'connections' and 'connectivity' are also seen as vital elements for a sustainable city and for avoiding or preventing exclusion.

To be clear about what is meant by ‘network’ in a specific case, the spatial scale is important: location, city, region, country, EU-region, Europe, world. The question is which parts of the city are included in developing the city and which parts of the city and their population are left aside or even excluded. Policy makers tend to get rid of ‘problem areas’, aiming to ‘normalize’ these areas by stimulating more ‘market-led development’ (meaning resident income upgrading). However, when such an area is seen as part of a regional network instead of a stigmatized problem area, the regional aspects become more important for urban policy makers and more prominent for design tasks to improve the area.

The technical networks (roads, water, power, sanitation etc.), once established, are durable and not easy to change. The functional networks (production and consumption) are rather fixed in terms of location, but remain ‘footloose’ in terms of content, following market forces. The networks of households and other users (including their mental maps) are responsive to (daily) constraints and possibilities. In general, the technical networks in France are considered to be of good or at least reasonable quality in urbanized districts. (figure 2) The functional networks are a different story. In degrading areas and villages functions often disappear and shops closedown. Functions/services also disappear because they lack sufficient clients from outside the area. A neighbourhood needs not only networks within the area, but also needs well provided connections with the other parts of the region. A district and area need to be an integrated and important part of the region, and not a pawn (in achieving municipal ambitions) or solely a ‘backyard.’ And in the case that the urban function of a district is being an ‘urban hotspot ’, then this function must be fulfilled in a way that is not neglecting the needs of residents and users.

Fig. 2. Node in the public transport network
Source: Paul Stouten

Social exclusion and deprivation (spatial-functional shortages) are crucial concepts in the study of urban problems, towards gaining insight into the social costs of spatial urban interventions (Hulsbergen 2005, 2007). Most urban problems are related to social inequalities which as such are reflected in the spatial urban configuration. The social significance of space can be made visible when residents themselves – taking the heterogeneity of residents into account – indicate spatial and functional problems and shortcomings related to their interests and concerns as users. The social significance of space forms one of the key issues in urban regeneration strategies.

3. FRENCH CONTEXT

3.1. Urbanization

Urbanization in France, as in the Netherlands, occurred later than in the UK and Germany with significant migration from the countryside towards the cities in the decades following the Second World War. According to Couch *et al*. (2011), the context for urban regeneration in the different national settings is changing constantly. For comparative research the usefulness of the concept of 'path dependence' is explored by Booth (2011) as a way of understanding the temporal dimension in comparison. This concept emphasises the importance of situating comparisons of current contexts within analyzes of the historical development of particular areas, problems and policy responses (Couch *et al.*, 2011).

French urbanization created a pressing need to develop large housing estates in the outskirts to accommodate new urban populations rapidly. These estates were particularly intended to accommodate middle class nuclear families. In France, there has been strong state intervention regarding housing provision since the Second World War. From 1948 to 1984, there were 3,300,000 dwellings built in the social sector. This amount represents one third of the total housing production during the same period of time (Fernandez-Maldonado *et al.*, 2000). Inspired by the ideas of the CIAM, large housing estates with social housing were constructed in a period of economic growth (*Trentes Glorieuses*). The relationship between high rise and social housing is much stronger in the French situation, mostly in suburban municipalities, than in most other Western European countries. During the 1990s the construction of new social housing units increased in contrast with other Western European countries e.g. the UK and the Netherlands that chose privatization by stimulation of the owner-occupied sector.

Most of the French social housing, 89%, is owned by HLM organizations (Habitations à Loyer Modéré). Since 1977, new social rented housing has been financed by loans with a reduced interest rate to these HLM organizations. The

Caisse des Depot et Consignations distributes these loans. This bank of the state is used for financing local governments and other public bodies that collected funds from the state saving banks. An additional source is the so-called '1%', a tax paid by all employers of a company with over at least 10 employees, that makes up 1% of their costs on salary (Kleinman, 1996).

The division of tenures shows, compared to the Netherlands, a different picture. Though the share of the owner-occupied sector is (in 2006) nearly at the same level, the share of the social rented sector in France, with 17%, is the same share compared to England but nearly half of the share of the Dutch housing stock.

3.2. Social Exclusion

According to the European Commission (Eurostat, 2011) housing deprivation is one of the most extreme examples of poverty and social exclusion in current society. People at risk of poverty are more likely to suffer from a lack of living space. In 2009, 17.8% of the EU population lived in overcrowded dwellings, the Netherlands being one of the countries with the lowest instances (3.7%), much lower than France (7.5%). Housing quality is also judged according to the availability of certain basic sanitary facilities (e.g. bath or shower, indoor flushing toilet). When we compare these basic facilities in France with the UK and the Netherlands, only 'darkness' (the respondents who considered their dwelling too dark) shows a worse condition compared to the Netherlands but better than the UK (10.6%). The quality of the wider residential area, such as noise, pollution and crime, shows some interesting differences. All these indicators (Eurostat, 2011) were perceived as a problem in France by less respondents compared to the UK, the Netherlands and Europe. Moreover in France (3.4%) less people had trouble with the cost of housing, which is much lower than in the UK (16.3%), the Netherlands (13.2%) and Europe (12.2%) (that means where the total cost of housing exceeds 40% of their equivalent disposable income). According to Eurostat (2011) housing costs include mortgage or housing loan interest payments for owners and rent payments for tenants, utilities (e.g. water, electricity) and any costs related to regular maintenance and structural insurance are likewise included. Next to deprivation and to poverty, unemployment is also an important indicator of exclusion. The unemployment rate, in 2010, in France was 9.4% (% over labour force) that is much higher than in the Netherlands (4.5%) and the UK (7.8%). That means that the population at risk-of-poverty or social exclusion in 2009 in France was 18.4%, higher than in the Netherlands but lower than in the UK (21.9%). Below we will show the impact of this in developing policies on urban regeneration.

The political organization of the government and the relationship between the state, departments, regions and communities is very distinctive in France. For decades France has had a system of 'top-down' adversarial governance that

is characterized by small communities of state and economic elites overseeing different policy sectors (Nicholls, 2006). In France there are still more than 36,500 (2008) municipalities. That means that the average French municipality has only 1,720 inhabitants. Large metropolitan regions such as Paris and Lyon include a lot of smaller communities. Also the *grands ensembles* are built in these small communities, representing a dominant share of the housing stock in the regional communities. These relatively small communities lack sufficient capacity to develop decisive urban regeneration policies (Wassenberg *et al.*, 2006). The large governmental dispersion of municipalities reinforces problems of 'NIMBYism' (not in my backyard) from the local authorities who do not want any more people in their area. Municipalities are required to give planning permission and in most cases guarantee loans.

3.3. Riots

Since the mid-1970s there has been a shift from *rénovation urbaine* characterized by more physical strategies mostly near the city centres towards social economic and physical approaches in deprived urban areas. The economic crisis at the end of the 1970s impacted the situation in the *grands ensembles* profoundly and was followed by periods of social unrest e.g. in the Lyon region with riots in e.g. in Vaulx-en-Velin in 1981 followed by new riots in 1983. For the first time in history the neighbourhoods of the *banlieue* and the living conditions of their residents were the headlines in newspapers and on television. That meant a big contrast with the 'ideal home' images of middle class people that were intended to be the residents of these *grands ensembles* in the 1960s. Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, a series of initiatives and strategies were launched with the aim to improve housing conditions of the *grands ensembles*: *Habitat et vie sociale* in 1977, followed by development *Sociale des quartier* in 1982. At the beginning of the 1990s new laws were signed by the French parliament that proclaimed the right of all citizens solving the urban question in fighting segregation and to encourage social cohesion. At the same time a new series of riots followed in the *banlieues*, e.g. Vaulx-en-Velin, in 1990, was again in the picture. Diversity and social mixing became the new aims in politics along with decreasing social exclusion, in 1993, when plans were meant to connect locally-based interventions with a wider social and urban strategy.

3.4. ZUS

Under the wings of *Politique de la Ville*, urban regeneration received two new stimuli in the mid-1990s. To encourage cooperation between the state, local governments and other partners like housing associations the town contract was

established in which goals and commitments were laid down and the particular goals with respect to urban restructuring in the coming years were determined The second stimulus was the selection of the problem neighbourhoods. At the base of the *Pacte de reliance pour la ville* the state designated certain neighbourhoods, with the aid of 'objective' criteria such as share of unemployment, school drop-outs and average income, as problem neighbourhoods.

These ZUS (*Zone Urbaine Sensibles*) neighbourhoods often coincided with the town contract areas. The ZUS classification is regulated at the central level and hardly changes over time, while the town contract areas vary a lot more. To respond to the objection of possible fragmentation, in 1999 another fifty *Grand Projets de Ville* (GPV) were assigned, all of which are related to ZUS. According to Wassenberg *et al*. (2006) GPV's offer the possibility to tune physical, social and economic measures. Thus a complex mix of policy initiatives and problem neighbourhoods originated. For instance the introduction of ZUS was accompanied by the establishment of urban revitalization zones (*Zones de Revitalisation Urbaine*, ZRU) and economic opportunity zones (*Zones Franches Urbaines*, ZFU). The ZFU were intended to stimulate the economic development of poor neighbourhoods and give tax exemptions of five years to small businesses. In 1996 there were ZFU created in 44 of the most disadvantaged ZUS (Couch *et al*., 2011).

4. RETHINKING *RÉNOVATION URBAINE* FROM 2002

Since the 1950s there have been strong interventions supported by the French state in urban areas. Sizeable urban renewal operations date as far back as the 1950s marked by the introduction of the *rénovation urbaine* strategy. With this procedure the state created opportunities for expropriation, demolition and replacement of buildings in bad condition in and around historical centres that were considered for urban renewal according to the *rénovation urbaine* strategy. This strategy had a lot of similarities with the slum clearance and reconstruction policies in the Netherlands in the 1960s (Stouten, 2010).

Politique de la Ville has been central in French urban regeneration policies since the 1970s. Though the national level programme has resulted in a mature set of institutions, instruments and practices, the contents changed in the following periods as indicated by Couch *et al.* (2011): from the mid-1970, in the mid-1990s and since 2002. According to Nicholls (2006) this programme shows an evolution from largely experimental to highly institutionalized in the 1990s. Concerning the situation at the beginning of the 21st century the debate persists regarding urban regeneration, how to balance between physical and/or social approaches. At

the end of the 1990s the emphasis was on physical interventions by stimulating demolition. But after the riots in 2005 and 2007, once again policies had to recognize that social issues cannot be ignored.

In 2000 a new law was introduced to achieve a more even distribution of social housing across urban areas and municipalities within a conurbation: Law on urban solidarity and renewal (*Loi relative à la solidarité et au rénouvellement urbains*; *loi SRU*). The 'solidarity' within conurbations and between urban regions required each municipality to have at least 20% social rental housing. It was also intended to counterbalance uneven geographical distribution within France itself due to high shares of social rented housing in formerly industrialized areas, such as North-east of Paris and the Lyon conurbation. It meant a change in the responsibility of the state, fundamentally reorganizing the local power but showing also a strong resistance of local governments to receive poor people from the neighbouring municipalities (Oblet, 2007). It remains questionable how a mix with more middle class inhabitants will contribute to more cohesion and integration with low income households (Oblet, 2007). On the other hand these changes present opportunities for improvement of connectivity with the city and region through an improved public transport network that decreases car traffic and the demolishment of large shopping centres (in the *banlieues*).

According to Oblet (2007) the position of the middle class is at the centre of the debate about segregation. They are often seen as the main actors of gentrification in old popular areas and/or centres where immigrants are living near the *banlieues*. But despite the concerns about the mix of income groups most important is the quality of the human environment and housing conditions, the distance to shops and amenities and access to transport networks. As we will discuss later these are important starting points in the approach in Lyon.

Next to the SRU law a second law for the City and urban renovation (*Loi sur la renovation urbaine*) provides new content to *Politique de la Ville*. This second law, sometimes called *Loi Borloo* (the name of the minister of Urban Affairs who launched this law), emphasises rebuilding after demolition. Both laws are aiming for integration of selected areas with the whole city and conurbation while emphasizing physical interventions. Governments expect that private investors will participate at a later stage in the renewal process and market mechanisms will take over the regeneration; e.g. in Vaulx-en-Velin. At the same time, according to these policies, social approaches should continue on a lower effort. The most important change based on this *Loi Borloo* was the creation of the National Urban Renewal Agency (Agence Nationale pour la Rénovation Urbaine, ANRU) with the responsibility to invest and coordinate urban renewal projects in the most vulnerable neighbourhoods overseeing the National Urban Renewal Programme. The ANRU gets 50% of their money by the '1%' arrangement and the other 50% from the state. The aim of the programme is regeneration of 530 neighbourhoods with almost 4 million inhabitants by 2013 through an investment of 40 billion euros. Concerning

the division of tenure, the final situation, after urban regeneration, is quite different compared to the Netherlands. In France, every demolished social rented dwelling will be replaced by a new dwelling in the same tenure whereas in the Netherlands the replacement related to tenure is 70% owner-occupied and 30% social rented. In France, the replacement can be on the same location but it is preferred to construct (part of) the replacement in another municipality where the share of social rented housing in the housing stock is below 20% (Wassenberg and Verhage 2006). The 'Marshall plan' of Borloo aimed to invest 30 billion euros of which 6 billion will be paid by the state aiming to invest more money in the *banlieue* particularly the ZUS areas instead of investment in city centres as has been done before.

The riots of 2005 in the conurbation of Paris, Lyon and many other towns revealed that serious problems concerning socio-economic aspects were still unsolved. Since 1975, more then thirty years ago, unemployment has been increasing especially in the *grands ensembles*. In 2005 the unemployment rate for people aged 19 to 29 with French-born parents was 20%, for the same age group with parents born outside France it was 30% and the rate for the same age group with Moroccan or Algerian parents was 40% (Graff, 2005). The riots highlighted the living conditions of nearly 5 million inhabitants (representing about 8% of the French population) of 752 ZUS areas in 490 French towns. Next to unemployment rates of 21% in 2004 (two times more than the national average in metropolitan France as a whole), numbers of drop-outs and crime in these areas are between two to four times higher than the national average. About 25% of the residents in these areas are foreign or French by naturalization (more than 2.5 times the national average). In 2001 the average household income was 19,000 euros in ZUS against an average of 29,500 euros in metropolitan France as a whole.

There is a growing division between the generation that entered the labour market in the period of economic growth and the generations after that, for instance those born during the growth period. The socio-economic deprivation in the *banlieue* or more precisely the *grands ensembles* (which are after all a part of the *banlieue*) constitute a breeding ground in which long-term, recurring outbursts are made possible. In addition the issue extends beyond addressing the poor human environment of living between high-rise concrete blocks that often are poorly connected with city centres, there have also been proposals by the government to create more flexible labour conditions by enlargement of the probationary period to two years.

The riots of 2007 initiated a debate that focused on the same issues that characterized the end of the previous debate in 2005. Moreover the financial crisis in 2008 prompted the central government to invest 1,4 billion extra in housing and 100,000 extra new housing units were planned most of them in the subsidised housing sectors. In the past, the housing production in the social rental sector has varied in a counter-cyclical way. In other words when private construction shows decline, housing associations are supposed to increase their construction efforts to keep the overall number of housing production at an acceptable level

that is brought into action only very occasionally (Pollard, 2010). The measures taken by the French state have been a response to the property crisis in which the social-housing crisis was treated as secondary. That meant support for market-led housing provision with subsidisation of private landlords by tax reduction on income, rather than investment in the social rented sector. This scheme appears to be effective in stimulating the number of completed housing in the private rented sector but the rent levels will not meet the demand for affordable housing (Pollard, 2010). Another element of the current recovery plan is the decision to double the amount of the interest-free loan for first-time home buyers to purchase new-build houses.

In 2008, a new strategy called *Espoirs Banlieue* was initiated. The topics of this new strategy are:

- partnership, governance and solidarity with the poorest communities;
- dis-enclaving, to address connectivity and accessibility of poor communities;
- housing and physical quality of neighbourhoods;
- security and crime;
- employment and education;

This approach claims to link poor people to a network in a broad sense and reveals similarities with the network city concept.

5. MODERNIZATION OF POST-WAR HOUSING ESTATES IN THE LYON REGION

Lyon is a city located in the east of France, where the rivers Rhône and Saône flow together, and is the administrative centre of the region Rhône-Alpes and of the department Rhône. Greater Lyon has 1.3 million inhabitants while the Lyon Metropolis has 2.9 million inhabitants (Agence d'Urbanisme pour le Développement de l'Agglomeration Lyonaisse, September 2010).

The population of Lyon has grown in the period 1990–2007 by a rate of almost 14%, whereas in the previous period starting in 1975 there was a decline of 9%. About 95% of the population has been housed in apartments. The growth of the population has been accompanied by growth of the active workforce (population of 15–64 years) between 1999 and 2007 from 68.2 % to 71% while unemployment declined from 12.6% to 10.9% (Insee, 2010).

The economy in Lyon is dominated by trade, transport and services (in total 56% of the active workforce) with an important bank sector as well as chemical, pharmaceutical and biotech industries. In the Lyon region there are 1.2 million jobs (Agence d'Urbanisme pour le Développement de l'Agglomeration Lyonaisse, March 2010). To stimulate economic development, in the last twenty years there have been large investments in public transport. Lyon is the second railway node

in France and was already linked in 1981 by the TGV with Paris. At both the regional and urban scale there are also train, tram and metro systems. Lyon has two TGV-stations in the city and one near the international airport. This airport is linked to the city of Lyon with the fast tram connection Rhône-express.

5.1. Urban Problems

Lyon is characterized by significant physical, social and economic problems. The approach to these problems in Lyon is driven by the idea that an area, even a district in the suburbs, is an indispensable part of the whole region. Comparable with inequalities between areas in the regional network, there are inequalities between households which hinder progress. In Lyon a number of areas belong to the national restructuring policies. There are 24 neighbourhoods belonging to the scheme of the ZUS neighbourhoods that are located in the east side of the city (see figure 1).

Lyon has four projects that belong to the category *Grands Projets de Villes* (GPV) and has, in addition, four ZFU areas. On the first of January 2009 these four ZFU areas included 3,310 companies, that means 60% more than in 2000. The sectors of construction, business services, finance and real estate represent 58% of this growth. In 2007 33% of these new companies located in the ZFU areas of the four ZFU municipalities (Agence d'Urbanisme pour le Développement de l'Agglomeration Lyonaisse, September 2009).

The approach to the deprived areas is focused on introducing new dynamics in the neighbourhoods and on making these areas less spatially isolated, through demolition and new development. This new dynamic is being facilitated by the development of new programmes besides the housing programme. These plans provide for shopping streets, parks, sport facilities, education facilities and other facilities.

These problem neighbourhoods are often located in municipalities far away from the city centre. Much attention is being given to the accessibility by public transport. Another important aim is to involve private investors in the development.

The focus in Lyon is on the restructuring of two problem neighbourhoods: Vaulx-en-Velin, which belongs to the first generation ZFU areas (from 1996), and La Duchère that has been part of this programme since 2006. Vaulx-en-Velin belongs to all three regimes that are related to problem neighbourhoods. This means that this neighbourhood belongs to the most problematic neighbourhoods in the region if not all of France. La Duchère, which belongs to two of the three regimes, holds a place on the same list. The emphasis in both neighbourhoods is on the integral approach which addresses both physical interventions such as demolition and new construction, as well as social and economic problems. It is mainly the government that takes care of the financial means for restructuring. To attract more private investment, investors receive certain benefits that make it more attractive to invest in these types of neighbourhoods.

5.2. Vaulx-en-Velin

Vaulx-en-Velin was originally its own small municipality, located in the north-east part of the agglomeration. In the 1960s, the municipality commissioned the construction of a *grand ensembles* (figure 3).

Fig. 3. New development of center Vaulx-en-Velin
Source: Paul Stouten

Vaulx-en-Velin has around 42,000 inhabitants, the density is 2,000 inhabitants per km^2 (Lyon: 8,680 inhabitants/km^2). The number of companies is 1,600 with 16,000 employees. Between 1999 and 2006 the unemployment rate was reduced from 23.3% to 20.6%, but is 9% higher than in Lyon. Between 2008 and 2009 the unemployment rate rose by 16% in the ZFU area and that is 4% lower than in the four ZFU areas in Lyon in total. The share of unemployed young people (under age 26) is 22%. The ZFU was especially responsible for the number of business sectors, that rose between 2000 and 2006 by 22% to 1,440 (with 6,000 jobs), one third of the total of the municipality. The building sector followed by the financial sector delivered the biggest contribution to this growth (Agence d'Urbanisme pour le Développement de l'Agglomeration Lyonaisse, September 2009).

The population is relatively young, with 33% of the population younger than 20 and 11% older than 65. The number of houses is 15,153, of which 68% is in the social rental sector. 40% of the population above fifteen years old has no diploma (Greater Lyon: 19%) (ANRU, ASCÉ 2010).

The municipality of Vaulx-en-Velin consists of a number of neighbourhoods and houses two important national schools (including École Nationale d'Architecture

and École Nationale des Travaux Public de l'État). About 80% of the municipality belongs to the *Grand Projet de Ville*, that means 30,000 of the total 40.000 inhabitants. The shopping centre, built in the 1970s, was looted and set on fire in 1998.

Besides the street market every Thursday, the Sunday morning Supermarché aux Puces attracts visitors from within and outside the region and makes an important contribution to social cohesion.

In the past decades, important interventions have taken place in Centre Ville, the neighbourhoods Ecoin-sous-la-Combe and Pré de L'Herpe. In Centre Ville the commercial centre from the 1970s and a number of large scale housing complexes were demolished (*Grand Projet de Ville*, March 2010). The aim was to develop a new centre, intended to be the heart of the area. High rise housing estates in the green environment will be replaced by ordinary streets and squares. These new developments will be made up of apartments of maximum 5 to 6 floors in both private and social rental housing. Besides houses there will be space for enterprises, services, trade and public space including a number of parks, and a street market (figure 4).

Fig. 4. New development of allotments in Vaulx-en-Velin
Source: Paul Stouten

The new programme for the neighbourhood includes (*Grand Projet de Ville*, March 2010):

- a health centre;
- a centre for astronomy and science culture;
- an aqua centre;
- a community centre.

In the neighbourhood Ecoin-sous-la-Combe profound changes have taken place. In the original urban fabric of the neighbourhood there was a sharp division between the different functions like green spaces, parking, living and play grounds and poorly structured public space.

Through demolishing strategic parts of the existing high rise building (about 144 houses were demolished) and the construction of a new street pattern a more recognisable spatial-functional structure has emerged (*Grand Projet de Ville*, September 2010).

This means that the internal connections in the neighbourhood are better organized. The approach in the neighbourhood Pré de L'Herpe started with urban renewal near the city centre through demolition. After demolishing the social rental housing, 370 dwellings were rebuilt, of which 30% is social rental housing. Around 58% of the 490 households moved to another house in the neighbourhood. For 59% of the households the housing expenditures remained the same or decreased. For most of the other households there has been a small increase that remains below 30% of the household income. For 9% of the households the housing expenditures, after moving houses, are more than 30% of the income.

Multiple actors have been involved in the development of Vaulx-en-Velin. Among the main actors are the municipality, the inhabitants, the owners, the investors, Greater Lyon, and the *Grand Projet de Ville* with a project office in the new centre.

The whole process is divided into a number of phases. A number of parties will contribute to the costs with the largest contribution delivered by ANRU and Greater Lyon.

5.3. La Duchère

La Duchère was built according to the model of the 'Cité Radieuse'. In the 1960s 5,000 dwellings were built of which 80% were social rental housing (HLM). In 1968 the population had already grown to 20,000. Between 1999 and 2006 in the ZFU area the population was reduced by 18% to 10,214. Since the 1980s and 1990s the neighbourhood has been confronted with a lot of problems, not unlike the other *grands ensembles* (*Mission Lyon La Duchère*, May 2007).

Between 1999 and 2006 the unemployment rate in the ZUS area decreased from 21.5% to 13.6% and is 2.2% higher than for Lyon as a whole but 6% lower than in Vaulx-en-Velin. Between 2008 and 2009 the number of jobseekers increased by 7% but that is still 13% lower than in in all ZFU areas taken together.

The share of young people (under 26), 21%, is more or less the same as in Vaulx-en-Velin and as in the total of the 4 ZFU areas. If we compare the growth in ZFU Vaulx-en-Velin with the growth in ZFU La Duchère then we can see that the growth in ZFU Vaulx-en-Velin both in the period 2000–2004 and in the period 2004–2006 exceeded the ZFU La Duchère. However in the period 2006–2009

the growth in La Duchère was higher. La Duchère is a third generation ZFU area, designated in 2006. In the period 2000–2006 the growth in the number of enterprises was about 20%. Between 2006–2009, after being selected as a ZFU area, there was growth of about 50% (figures 5, 6, 7 and 8).



Fig. 5. The original urban fabric of La Duchère
Source: *Mission Lyon La Ducherre* (2007)

Fig. 6. Image of the original buildings of La Duchère
Source: Paul Stouten



Fig. 7. The new developed urban fabric of La Duchère
Source: *Mission Lyon La Ducherre* (2007)

Fig. 8. Image of the new developed buildings of La Duchère
Source: Paul Stouten

In the four municipalities which belonged to the ZFU scheme in 2007 almost 2000 enterprises were established. Of those almost 600 were created in the ZFU areas. In the ZFU La Duchère in 2007, 63 new enterprises were established of which almost 50% were in the category of financial services and real estate (Agence d'Urbanisme pour le Développement de l'Agglomeration Lyonaisse September 2009).

In total 16 institutions, including ANRU, CDC and a number of housing associations, have participated in this project (*Mission Lyon La Duchère*, May 2007). In 2001 representatives of the National government, the region, the Communauté Urbaine and the city of Lyon signed the contract for the *Grand Projet de Ville* of La Duchère. For the period 2003–2012 in total 500 million euros were reserved, half coming from private institutions.

Related to connectivity and avoiding social exclusion there are the following urban regeneration issues:

– differentiation of housing types and living environment. Demolition and new construction of 1,600 dwellings on a higher level to reduce the share of the social housing from 80% to 60%;

– the construction of a real neighbourhood centre, including a school;

– improvement of the living environment of the inhabitants. Refurbishment of the buildings and the public space, creation of neighbourhood facilities. Improvement of the accessibility of the neighbourhood and the connections with surrounding neighbourhoods in the region and the city including access to a new designed landscape in the adjacent valley;

– stimulating a successful dynamic in La Duchère by improving the quality of the education system and the re-integration system;

– developing new building blocks: building strips have been replaced by (half) closed building blocks; sometimes with parts of the high rise buildings; new street profiles with more attention to pedestrians and cyclists.

Fig. 9. New developed playgrounds and park in La Duchère
Source: Paul Stouten

6. CONCLUSION

An important drive of the French approach is the attention to exclusion and improving connectivity between neighbourhoods and the rest of the agglomeration. The French approach of urban-region regeneration fits within the theoretical concept of the network city, in which an urban area is considered according to three different networks: a technical network, a functional network and a network of households. Exclusion of households can be reduced when the connections with technical and functional networks are improved. This is an indication of the interaction between the concerned area and the rest of the agglomeration.

In France as in other Western European countries, urban regeneration strategies show that initiatives must go beyond physical approaches. Despite long time launching of *Politique de la Ville* and, more recently, *rénovation urbaine* within changing policies through the years, it is still questionable whether policies against social exclusion produce a significant improvement in the concerned areas. The path dependency in France is dominated by addressing the complex question of social exclusion e.g. in the peripheral social housing estates.

The *grands ensembles* have been the seeding beds for riots for decades. According to Paugam (2007) in France, as in other countries, new urban questions are arising about unemployment, unstable employment and intensification of work that have put issues of social equality on the agenda again. Social protection has become very unequally divided over income groups and the less qualified for the work force are less protected today.

During the last decade there has been a constitutional shift away from a centralized unitary state including much power in the field of urban policy, towards more decentralized authority transferred to the regions and cities. But the state still plays a big role in implementation through state supported institutions and state-owned companies (see also Couch *et al*., 2010). General developments of the economy have a profound impact on the urban regeneration strategies. The persistent problems of unemployment and social exclusion that have particularly affected residents of the *grands ensembles* in the last thirty years and the various policies to solve them are a clear example of this. Important lessons from the Lyon case are referring to the balance between neighbourhood- and area-based initiatives and strategies aiming to secure the renaissance of a wider city-region perspective with the ambition to re-connect excluded areas and households. In Lyon, connectivity, e.g. for sustainable renewal, is defined by being part of the networks and having the ability to link up to the modernized public transport and infrastructure as well as a vast programme of modernization of the urban fabric of post-war areas. But policy and institutional innovation still hinder bottom up planning including participation of local people.

The second feature of the Lyon approach is the ability to link up socio-economic networks that have been supported by the ZUS and ZFU programmes. Although the unemployment rate has been reduced, the overall share of unemployed inhabitants remains high in relation to the city. This situation hits young people especially hard. The development of an area-based economy is an important condition for realizing vital and lively neighbourhoods. Strengthening existing educational institutions and introducing new ones including high schools and universities) can help contribute to solving social and economic problems in the youth community. But investments will be necessary. Certainly, as the market parties step aside the counter-cyclical French policy will be an important condition.

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LARGE HOUSING ESTATES IN POST-SOCIALIST POLAND AS A HOUSING POLICY CHALLENGE

1. INTRODUCTION

Large block housing estates, built after the Second World War, are present in the urban landscapes of many countries all over the world and in nearly all European countries. Their origins are connected with the development of modernism and go back to the 1920s, when the first workers' housing estates were erected in Germany, designed in a spirit of functionalism, existential minimum and maximum healthiness (Rembarz, 2010). The main assumptions of this urban form were formulated in the Athens Charter – a document published in 1943, as the result of fourth CIAM (International Congress of Modern Architecture) in 1933. It stressed the necessity to improve the catastrophic living conditions in cities at that time, which were the legacy of the rapid industrialization and high population concentration in the 19th century. The most important points of this document can be summarized in the following words: the sun, greenery and open space. The design and construction model suggested in the Charter, combined with the idea to provide all the inhabitants with decent living conditions, regardless of their financial status, became the ideological foundation of multi-family housing estates.

Although the ideas of the Athens Charter were noble, they were also completely unrealistic. Not only did their realization fail to bring the expected effects, but by distorting the original concept they also led to building huge, dehumanized housing mono-structures, spatially separated from the historical urban tissue. Today, they are commonly recognized as problem areas in many cities.

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The aim of this article is to take part in the discussion about the future of large housing estates in Poland, and about the chances for their modernization and humanization, i.e. the transformation processes, which aim at providing the inhabitants with housing conditions fully satisfying their needs.[1] These processes are necessary to prevent the negative phenomena leading to the social and physical degradation of these areas, referred to as the 'large housing estate syndrome'.[2]

2. THE EUROPEAN CONTEXT OF LARGE HOUSING ESTATES IN POST-SOCIALIST CITIES

According to the definition formulated for the purposes of the RESTATE[3] project, large housing estates are spatially isolated groups of buildings, comprising over 2,000 flats, built in the second half of the 20th century, planned and fully or partly financed by the state (Musterd and van Kempen, 2005). In other definitions,[4] an additional criterion is the fact that they are buildings constructed using pre-fabricated technology, and that the minimum number of flats in an estate is 2,500 (Knorr-Siedow, 1996).

Despite a similar physiognomy, the large housing estates built in the post-socialist countries are different from those found in Western Europe (cf. Coudroy de Lille, 2000; Musterd and van Kempen, 2005; Dekker *et al.*, 2007). They differ as regards the time when they were built, the urban planning scale and the function they perform in the housing resources of the cities, the state of repair, the form of ownership, the socio-demographic structure of the inhabitants, as well as their prestige and the way they are perceived, which establishes their status in the socio-spatial structure of the city.

[1] The terms used in Polish literature with reference to the transformations in large housing estates, include: modernization, humanization, revitalization, rehabilitation and renovation. Each of them accentuates a different aspect of the same problem (Chmielewski and Mirecka, 2001). The definition of humanization is quoted after Borowik (2003).

[2] The large housing estate syndrome is a phenomenon recognized in Western Europe in the 1980s and defined as a complex of spatial-social conditions, producing a negative image of an estate and accelerating the downward spiral and the replacement of the culturally stronger inhabitants by weaker ones. It leads to an increase in the number of vacant flats and structural social problems, intensifying the spatial degradation and devastation. This in turn causes the economic potential of the estate (such as the purchasing power or the market value of the housing resources) to disappear (Rembarz, 2010).

[3] RESTATE – the acronym of the international research project Restructuring Large-scale Housing Estates in European Cities, 2005.

[4] In several European countries, the definition of a large housing estate is a separate legal category, introduced in order to facilitate the realization of special spatial policy, oriented towards transforming these areas and preventing the large housing estate syndrome. In Germany, the legal category of *Großsiedlung* comprises estates with at least 2.5 thousand flats, while in France the *Grand Ensamble* status is given to the housing areas with over 2,000 flats within the premises of Greater Paris and over 1,000 flats on the outskirts of the city (Rembarz, 2010).

The peak of the development of this particular urban form in the socialist countries was recorded in the 1970s and lasted until the early 1990s, i.e. until the fall of communism. In the West European countries, for a change, the idea of building large estates was abandoned in the 1970s,[5] after they had been recognized as problem areas.

After the Second World War, large housing estates were being built all over Europe, but in the socialist countries they became the predominant type of housing and they appeared on a much larger scale than in the West European countries. According to the data obtained by the IRS (Institute for Regional Development and Structural Planning), in the 1990s, the estates with over 2,500 flats, built in the countries between the Elbe River and Vladivostok, constituted 29% of all the housing resources (53 million flats). The estates were inhabited by about 170 million people and contained nearly half of the households. Considering the post-socialist block, except for the countries of the former USSR, large estates were inhabited by about 34 million people living in 11 million flats (Knorr-Siedow, 1996), while the total number for the rest of the European countries (except the former USSR) was 41 million (Węcławowicz, 2007).

The number of flats in large housing estates compared to the number of all flats built in 1960–1990, as well as to their overall number in Central and Eastern Europe was significant, reaching the highest values in former Czechoslovakia and Poland (table 1). In the West European countries, the percentage of these estates in the overall number of the housing resources is estimated at about 3–7% (Kovacs, 1999). For comparison, in the mid-1990s, the large housing estates in eastern German lands were inhabited by every fourth citizen, while in the western lands – by every sixtieth (Rembarz, 2010).

Table 1. The percentages of flats in large housing estates in the socialist countries

Country	% of the number of flats built between 1960–1990	% of the overall number of flats in 1990
Bulgaria	55	27
CSFR	66	36
GDR	48	18
Poland	61	35
Romania	49	26
Hungary	52	29

Source: Knorr-Siedow (1996).

[5] The symbolic date of the fall of the modernist philosophy behind the idea of block estates is 1972, when the Pruitt-Igoe estate in the USA, consisting of a complex of 14-storey buildings was demolished after it had turned into a crime nest due to the lack of people willing to settle there (cf. Jencks, 1987).

In the East European countries, the flats in large housing estates were meant for an anonymous group of people, representing medium-level needs (mainly families with children), but they were never the social housing type, addressed for the groups with lower income like in most countries in Western Europe.

Despite the numerous drawbacks of these estates, i.e. the monotonous architecture and low aesthetic quality, poor quality of construction and relatively small flats, as well as the insufficient social infrastructure and the shortage of basic services, moving to such an estate in a socialist country (during the socialist period) was usually the only chance to improve one's living conditions. In particular, this concerned the migration of population from rural areas and the population from pre-war sub-standard buildings. In Poland, the strong structural deficit on the housing market (resulting from the dynamic urbanization), the progressing degradation of the pre-war housing resources, limitations put on private construction, as well as the low incomes (and relatively modest residential aspirations), created a reality in which the dwelling in a block of flats was a dream for the majority of the city inhabitants, regardless of their social status (cf. Lewicka, 2004). The relative attractiveness of this form of building, as well as the housing policy implemented by the socialist authorities, subordinated to the idea of egalitarianism,[6] were the reasons why the inhabitants of the blocks of flats were (and still are, though at present to a smaller extent) a mixed community as regards their social status.

Nowadays the large housing estates in many West European countries (e.g. France, the Netherlands or Sweden) are generally badly reputed areas, inhabited by large groups of ethnic minorities, with high unemployment, deprived population and a high criminality rate. The estates in Central and Eastern Europe have a more diversified social structure and as a popular form of housing are not stigmatized, still enjoying a relatively good reputation (Musterd and van Kempen, 2005; Kovacs *et al.*, 2008; Borowik, 2003; Szafrańska, 2009).

Due to these differences, the possibility of using the same terms in order to describe large housing estates everywhere in Europe is limited, and looking for simple analogies within this type of housing in all European countries leads to overgeneralizations (e.g. referring to all large housing estates in Europe as slums). Detailed studies show that the estates differ not only between countries, but also between cities (cf. Kovacs *at al*., 2008), and even within one city (Temelová *et al*., 2010; Szafrańska, 2011).

3. LARGE HOUSING ESTATES IN POLAND – THE DIAGNOSIS OF SITUATION

In contemporary Poland, large housing estates are inhabited by over 8 million people (Węcławowicz, 2007). According to Rębowska (1999), they are inhabited by over 50% of the urban population and contain about 56% of households

[6] In socialist countries, the policy of allocating flats was based on purposeful mixing of the inhabitants, so that they formed a socially varied group of people, which was supposed to guarantee solidarity of the new community (cf. Czepczyński, 1999).

(Rembarz, 2010). Similarly to other countries in Central and Eastern Europe, after the fall of the communist system, the flats in large housing estates represented a significant percentage of the overall number of dwellings in Poland (35%); this figure for dwellings built between 1960 and 1990 was 61% (Knorr-Siedow, 1996). At present, the number of flats in large housing estates in Poland is estimated at about 3.5 million (Rębowska, 1999).

Despite the considerable percentage of large housing estates in the housing resources of Polish cities, they have not turned into problem areas. Contemporary studies show that twenty years after the transformation, the housing estates are frequently inhabited by people with higher level education, as well as people who are professionally and socially active (Szafrańska, 2008). The relatively high social status of the inhabitants is not decreasing, despite the outflow of the more well-off residents, who have higher aspirations as regards the housing conditions (Szafrańska, 2011). Living in large housing estates is quite common and is not seen as socially degrading (Borowik, 2003; Szafrańska, 2009). Similar conclusions can be drawn from the study of the preferred places of residence, which puts block estates quite high in the hierarchy of residential areas in the city (Groeger, 2004). They have not undergone the physical degradation anticipated at the initial stage of the socio-economic transformation (cf. Szeleny, 1996).

The majority of flats in the large housing estates in Poland have been bought from the housing cooperatives.[7] The flats are owned by the inhabitants, for whom they are often the most valuable possession. A small part of these resources has not been sold out and is still the cooperatives' property. Such an ownership structure has its positive sides, because it prevents devastation and stops the outflow of residents. The flats are a real estate market commodity, and are subject to inheritance. In the early 21th century, this results in the exchange of the generations of inhabitants (the generation of the first owners is replaced by the generation of their grandchildren).

The study of the changes in the socio-demographic, spatial and functional structure of large housing estates in Łódź, the third largest city in Poland (750,000 inhabitants),[8] showed the following phenomena:[9]

– the ageing of the population, the growing number of one-person households, the falling percentage of working people and the increasing level of education, which are all socio-demographic processes taking place in other large cities in Poland as well, the only difference being the time when a given estate was built, which affects the rate of changes;

[7] These flats are a particular, imperfect type of ownership with a limited right on property. It is enacted on the grounds of an agreement between the cooperative in the building which is its property or joint property and the member of the cooperative. The actual owner of the building is still the cooperative, which has a right to the land on which the building stands, in the form of ownership or perpetual usufruct. This type of right on property is transferable, hereditary, liable to execution and may be mortgaged.

[8] In Łódź as in other Polish cities more than half of the population (over 300,000 inhabitants) live in large housing estates.

[9] Author's study (Szafrańska, 2011).

– intensification of housing development, which takes the form of individual multi-family buildings or their complexes, characterized by a higher standard and distinctive physiognomy (architectural details, street furniture, the colour and shape of the buildings). The process results in an inflow of new residents and the formation of enclaves of a higher socio-economic status within the estate space (sometimes in the form of gated communities);

– the growing percentage of areas with commercial functions (especially trade and services), sometimes at the expense of other, non-commercial functions (e.g. culture, education). In literature, the process is referred to as commercialization (Sykora, 2000), in examined estates triggered primarily by supplementing the old buildings with new ones, which perform the service and trading functions, as well as by changing the functions in the already built-up areas. As a result, the social sphere of the housing estates is changing, with new jobs, new places and new forms of spending leisure time appearing there. The daily routine of the inhabitants changes as well, because satisfying the majority of needs (not only the basic ones) may take place within the estate space and does not require travelling to the city centre;

– the appearance of new sacral buildings, the construction of which was restricted in the socialist period; in literature the process is referred to as space sacralization (Matlovic, 2000);

– improvement of the standard of the public and semi-public spaces among the blocks of flats as the unoccupied free spaces are turned into green areas, used for recreation and sport. There appear new parks, ball games pitches (mainly near schools), playgrounds and greens. The lighting of these areas improves, benches are installed, resting sites are organized, walking paths and pavements are repaired, and the buildings are marked to be easier to find;

– improvement in the physiognomy of the built-up areas, mainly due to some investments in thermo-modernization,[10] which alters the appearance of the elevations of the buildings (introducing colour and architectural detail, departing from the grayness of a concrete desert). These changes, on the one hand, if planned and coordinated, improve the appearance of housing buildings and entire estates, but on the other hand, if chaotic and uncoordinated, not only do not help to beautify the space, but rather bring about architectural and spatial disorder.

The processes listed above occur in the majority of the large housing estates in Poland, but their rate and scale in individual cities differ.

On the basis of the study conducted in different Polish cities (cf. Borowik, 2003; Węcławowicz *et al.*, 2005; Kozłowski 2005; Gorczyca, 2009; Szafrańska, 2011), we can say that both, the changes so far and the future of the estates in Poland are determined by a number of mutually dependent factors, both endogenous,

[10] The Thermo-modernization Act of 1998 allows subsidizing the refurbishment of buildings from the state budget, in order to reduce the use of heat energy.

depending on the particular character of individual estates and their communities (on the micro-scale), and exogenous, external to these estates (macro-scale factors).

The endogenous determinants include the following:

– urban planning factors, i.e. the location within the urban space and the accessibility by transport, the homogeneity and extensiveness of the estate, compared to the whole city, the state of repair (the size, height, concentration and quality of the buildings), the maintenance of the buildings, the standard and size of the flats (depends mainly on the construction period), the availability of the shopping, service and social infrastructure (corresponding to the socio-demographic structure), the size and condition of the green areas (sport and recreation), as well as the range of modernization for the purpose of the physical renewal of the estates;

– social factors, such as the inhabitants' socio-demographic structure, the reputation of the estate (compared to other housing areas in the city), the level of inhabitants' identification with the place of residence, which determines possible migration preferences and encourages the inhabitants to participate in the modernization and humanization of the estates.

The exogenous determinants include:

– socio-demographic factors, i.e. the changes in the number and demographic structure of the urban population, which are directly related to the deficit on the real estate market;

– socio-cultural factors, i.e. preferences regarding the system of values and patterns, as well as the lifestyle, aspirations as to the standard of living, the residential mobility, and the social perception of this particular form of housing development (its prestige or stigmatization);

– economic factors, considered from the demand perspective (the level of affluence, purchasing power and creditworthiness of households – the main actors on the urban housing market), as well as from the supply perspective (the offer on the real estate market and the availability of mortgage credits); the relation between the price and the quality of the flats in this residential environment;

– organizational and legal factors, such as obtaining funds for the modernization of the buildings, sorting out the ownership issues (currently still undergoing transformation), creating a realistic possibility for the inhabitants to participate in the processes of modernization and humanization.

The determinants listed above may both stimulate positive changes in the large housing estates and hamper them. Permanent monitoring of their influence on the changes in large housing estates is a serious research challenge, which should be conducted with the use of different methods and on different spatial scales (countries, cities, or even individual estates).

4. POSSIBILITIES OF TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE LARGE HOUSING ESTATES IN POLAND

Despite the fact that over twenty years have passed since the fall of the socialist system, the large housing estates in Poland are not problem areas and are not treated as such by the inhabitants, the city authorities or the central authorities. Due to the good social structure of the inhabitants, the relatively high standard of the housing resources and the unchangingly good reputation of these estates (compared to other residential areas in cities), no potential threats are seen which these areas might generate in the future. The relatively small range of studies assessing the condition of the large housing estates in individual cities and monitoring the changes hinders the preparation of comprehensive repair programmes, which might prevent potential problems. Only in some cities the potential threats are taken into consideration and large estates are included in the local planning documents as areas which need repair (Gorczyca, 2009).

Ever since the political and economic transformation started, the changes in the large housing estates have been resulting from natural demographic processes (the ageing of the inhabitants) and migrations (the inflow of a younger population, better educated and more affluent, who buy flats on the primary and secondary real estate market), as well as market processes (commercialization of space and supplementing the existing development with new residential buildings) and political changes (space sacralization). The changes also result from purposeful, though still uncoordinated and fragmentary, actions taken by housing cooperatives and the city authorities in order to improve the standard of living in large housing estates (modernization of buildings and improving the quality of public spaces).

The factors which limit the possibility of planning and taking actions in the large housing estates in Polish cities is a disorder of ownership issues and lack of real host of these areas (the city, housing cooperatives, inhabitants). The flat owners are economically weak (sometimes they form homeowner associations, which comprise individual buildings or small groups of buildings) and the cooperatives administering the housing resources are often unprepared either to plan or to introduce necessary changes. The housing cooperatives often run a rather free spatial policy, restrained only by very general planning documents. Their actions, even if taken in good faith, are often merely temporary, incidental solutions (Rembarz, 1010). For example, selling plots of land to investors, who do not necessarily take into consideration the character of the surroundings and do not care much for the adequate aesthetic quality and architecture, often leads to spatial chaos and space fragmentation, and in consequence lowers the already poor aesthetic quality of these estates.

However, many actions taken in the estates by the cooperatives or the city authorities improve the standard of living there (e.g. creating new or improving

the existing public spaces, green areas, sport and recreation spaces, increasing the number of parking places, the availability of shops and services, etc.). If well-coordinated and not incidental, these processes lead to improvement of the quality of anonymous and monotonous concrete block estates. They are not sufficiently advanced yet, but as the studies show (e.g. Szafrańska, 2009), they are appreciated by the inhabitants, they strengthen their residents' identification and satisfaction with the estate, as well as increase the residential attractiveness of these areas.

5. CONCLUSIONS

The twenty years of the socio-economic transformation in Poland show that so far no comprehensive strategies of transforming large-scale housing estates have been devised yet, and solving this problem has been postponed until an indefinite future. The rich experience of the Western countries, e.g. France, Germany, the Netherlands or Sweden, cannot be used in Poland, because of the different political, social and economic conditions in which these estates were built and functioned. Despite similar political conditions, the solutions used in the post-socialist cities of the former German Democratic Republic cannot be applied in Poland because of the different path of the socio-economic transformation in East Germany and its rapid depopulation. The programme of demolition in large estates realized in Germany is unacceptable in Poland due to the permanent deficit of flats (currently due to economic reasons) and the existence of large built-up areas of much lower standard than the block estates. The experience of other post-socialist countries as regards the policy preventing the degradation of large estates in the future is too modest (or non-existent at all), which means that in Poland it should be gained locally. The need to work out such policy in this country arises from a number of factors. The first thing is the scale of the housing resources and the present situation on the real estate market, where the number of available flats is insufficient to satisfy the demand (about 1.5 million flats) (cf. Gorczyca, 2009). The second thing is the continuous decline of the quality of the old housing resources and the necessity to demolish about 0.8 million old flats (Węcławowicz, 2004). Finally, there is the economic aspect – the cost of modernizing the existing estates is estimated at 25–60% of the cost of erecting new houses (cf. Gorczyca, 2009).

The processes of renewal and modernization (humanization) of large housing estates require the involvement of many actors, of which central and local authorities should play a major role. The involvement of local communities (inhabitants) and NGOs is also of great importance. The correlated and integrated actions of these actors should take into consideration the needs of residents as well as social and economic conditions of the surrounding community.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Doris WASTL-WALTER (ed.), *Ashgate Research Companion to Border Studies*, Ashgate, Surrey 2011, 728 pp.

The *Research Companion to Border Studies*, released by Ashgate in 2011, is presented as the first comprehensive volume on border studies, covering traditional aspects of the field as well as contemporary developments. The editor of this significant collection, Doris Wastl-Walter (University of Bern, Switzerland) notes in her introductory remarks to the volume that borders are 'complex spatial and social phenomena which are not static or invariable but which must be understood as highly dynamic; this is similar to the field of border studies itself' (p. 1), and that hence such an undertaking should reflect this level of dynamism and multi-disciplinarity. With 32 separate contributions from both established and newer scholars, divided between eight thematic sections, and spanning the globe in its scope, the *Research Companion* certainly sets out to reflect the dynamic and expansive nature of the field of border studies. While there are 40 individual authors involved in this volume, writing broadly in relation to borders and border studies, it is notable that the majority of these are specifically based in the discipline of Geography. This, however, is perhaps telling of the ongoing engagement with critical border studies within Geography (see for example the 2011 special on 'Borders, Borderlands and Theory' in *Geopolitics*; Kolossov's 2010 article *Border Studies: Changing Perspectives and Theoretical Approaches*, also in *Geopolitics*; or Newman and Paasi's review on border studies in political geography from 1998 in *Progress in Human Geography*).

The eight thematic sections of the volume do however attempt to 'reflect the current main strands of the field' (p. 3). These individual sections cover theoretical and conceptual themes of border studies, geopolitics, trade, labour and cross-border cooperation, identity, transgression, nature and the environment, and issues of inclusion and exclusion, moving between the scale of the bodily to the transnational. The volume also takes on the 'recently emerging topics' of the role of borders in a borderless world, the creation of 'neighbourhoods', and enforcement and militarization in the post-9/11 period, though it is likely that many would contest the assertion that these are recently emerging areas of study.

Wastl-Walter is clear from the outset that the intention of the volume is to act as a 'textbook for students and scholars in related disciplines, for example political geography, international relations, political science, environmental studies, conflict studies, and history across the world' (p. 1). While it could be perceived that this voluminous collection could act as a supplement for those freshly dipping into the rapidly developing and diverse field of border studies – namely undergraduate social science students – it is perhaps less likely that

scholars already working in the field would find this collection a necessary addition to their library, particularly given the familiar nature of pieces contributed by established border studies scholars (see in particular contributions by Anssi Paasi, David Newman, James Wesley Scott *et al*.). Wastl-Walter notes that regional planners and experts working around issues of cross-border cooperation 'should also be able to benefit from the concepts and case studies' (p. 1) discussed in the volume. Unfortunately no further information is given as to how this specific audience might engage with the pieces contained within; more could be done here to demonstrate the value of this rich collection to non-academic audiences.

The numerous and diverse contributions to this book, both theoretical and empirical/ethnographic, represent the depth and quality of research to be found in the field of contemporary border studies, however these are let down by the notably brief introductory chapter. Following a two-page discussion of the rationale of the volume, the remaining five pages mostly restate the table of contents, section-by-section. The outcome is a rather thin introduction that gives little guidance to the reader, and does even less to support the claim that it is 'an authoritative, state-of-the-art review' (p. 1). The reader is left asking what the wider goals or outcomes of the collection are, or why indeed such a significant undertaking is necessary at this particular point in time. Given that there are no further interventions by the editor between the eight sections, and that there is no concluding summary or discussion, there is little then to support the contributions other than their general thematic grouping. The opening contributions by Paasi, Newman and van Houtum in Part I, and Scott in Part II, do however stand-in here to 'provide an overview of the conceptual aspects of the multidisciplinary field of border studies' (p. 3) for the uninitiated border scholar. Furthermore, the index to the *Companion* is limited to place and person names, making finding specific concepts a difficult task.

It should be noted that at the time of writing this review, a similar contribution to the field of border studies is awaiting release under the Wiley-Blackwell 'Companions to Anthropology' series, titled *A Companion to Border Studies* (edited by Thomas M. Wilson and Hastings Donnan). This identically-named volume of similar length contains the exact same number of contributions, arranged into five rather than eight (albeit similar) thematic sections. This version also features several contributors found within the Ashgate *Research Companion* (Newman, Scott, van Houtum), and political geographers maintain a notable presence here also, though overall its contributors represent a stronger bent towards the discipline of anthropology.

Given this almost simultaneous release, it is worth asking why two such substantial volumes on the field of border studies have appeared at this time. Further, Oxford is soon to release a *Borders* contribution to its *A Very Short Introduction* series in 2012 (authored by Diener and Hagan). Wastl-Walter asserts that 'a new multidisciplinary generation of border scholars [has] emerged' (p. 2) out of the past fifteen years following the end of the Cold War and the subsequent proliferation of state boundaries seen thereafter, along with the development of border studies research centres, particularly in North America and the EU. This could also be coupled with the existence of dedicated research bodies such as the Association of Borderlands Studies and its related journal publication, as well as established global conferences including the *Border Regions in Transition* gathering, amongst many others. Certainly the field of contemporary border studies appears prominent enough to justify such attention.

It would be hard to dispute Wastl-Walter's assertion that this volume covers much of the wide-ranging field of border studies (though perhaps not 'all aspects of borders and border research' as the publisher asserts in its introduction to the volume), and she is correct in her argument that border scholars conceptualize borders as more than physically locatable phenomena, considering also the 'social, political or economic expressions' (p. 2) of borders and bordering (see for example the contribution from Bäschlin and Sidati on nomadic understandings of territory and boundaries in Western Sahara). Efforts are also made to consider the more technical aspects of border making and maintenance, often passed-over or little understood in contemporary border studies, as seen in contributions by Ackleson on border management, Heininen and Zebich-Knos on polar territorial sovereignty/conflicts, and Schofield regarding maritime boundary delimitation. While the editor mentions a specific effort to 'achieve a gender-balanced selection of contributors' (p. 1), there is however a notable gap regarding the growing and essential focus of gender within border studies, the notable exception here being Kron's use and exploration of 'border feminism' as methodological tool, and Raghuram and Piper's contribution, 'Women and Migration in Asia'. Recent collections such as *Gendering Border Studies* (Aaron *et al*., 2010) suggest there is a substantial contribution to the field being made here, and this could perhaps have received a more thorough engagement in this volume.

Others delving into this volume may note similar gaps in other fields of inquiry within contemporary border studies, however the goal of total coverage is certainly an unrealistic and unnecessary one. Similarly, as both Paasi and Newman note in their opening contributions regarding the possibility of developing an overarching 'border theory', '[this] would seem in many ways unattainable, and perhaps even undesirable' (Paasi, p. 27). There is great value to be found in this book through the individual contributions, particularly those that take an empirical and ethnographic approach, demonstrating the multiplicity of methods within contemporary border studies (see for example Dean on the Thai-, Sino-, and Indo-Myanmar boundaries; Choi on North Korean border-crossers; and Peristianis and Mavris on the 'green line' of Cyprus). However, given the nature of such large collections, and the impossibility of encompassing such a vital and diverse field of study in one volume, the *Companion's* primary function will remain as an introductory source rather than a vital reference point for border studies scholars.

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Michael MURRAY, *Participatory Rural Planning. Exploring Evidence from Ireland*, Ashgate, Aldershot 2010, 164 pp.

Recent decades have witnessed an apparent turn towards more participatory approaches in the arena of rural development. There has been a recognizable shift from the imposition of top-down development strategies towards the promotion and encouragement of local and community involvement. Consequently, ideas of partnership, participation and empowerment abound within the rural development discourse. The importance of participation is frequently

stressed and this is underpinned by an espousal of community involvement, empowerment and local capacity-building. Within Europe this has been evident both at EU level and through policy formulation and implementation by national governments. This seemingly more people-centred approach has been the subject of much academic scrutiny and evaluation. Michael Murray's book explores various dimensions of this trend using case study material from Ireland. The book does not advance a single overarching thesis but rather endeavours to present insights drawn over a number of years from the author's engaged activity, fieldwork and critical reflection. The examples used relate to government planning policy for rural areas in its more 'macro' forms, specific strategies with respect to rural housing and village plans, and a more detailed account of the operation of a citizens' planning group. In this way, very different (though connected) elements are brought together. This breadth is furthered through the use of material derived from two political jurisdictions: Northern Ireland (part of the United Kingdom) and the Irish Republic.

The book is organized in six chapters. The first provides a useful theoretical overview of shifts from a more top-down approach to rural planning and development to a more bottom-up one. It outlines an analytical framework for examining participatory approaches. Murray's objectives are to explore the benefits of collective capital (linked to ownership, identity and trust), the promotion of meaningful dialogue (as distinct from adversarial posturing), the potential to bridge relationships rather than simply co-opting or incorporating local views, and the value of recognizing and developing new knowledges within these expanded spaces of governance. The second chapter presents a review of the relevant spatial planning policy context on both sides of the Irish border, with particular reference to the extent and means of citizen engagement in processes of policy formulation. These chapters raise important questions about the disjuncture between the desires of local residents and the needs of statutory organizations and point to tensions between genuine dialogue and tokenism and the distinction between consultation and participation.

Chapters 3, 4 and 5 are designed to investigate participatory planning in action through an exploration of housing policy in Northern Ireland, village planning on both sides of the border and, finally, a focus on European citizens' panels. Chapter 3 reviews the nature of official policy consultation in Northern Ireland in relation to rural housing and goes on to examine a specific 'unofficial' pilot project. Chapter 4 highlights the difficulties and time needed for facilitating meaningful participation focussing on the formulation of village plans and an examination of specific village planning projects. Chapter 5 discusses the EU active citizenship agenda with emphasis on regional citizens' panels. The chapter explores the issues in more detail through a focus a panel straddling the Irish border region. The final chapter presents an appraisal of the limits and potential of more participatory approaches.

Although this is a relatively small volume that ranges over rather disparate examples, it manages to weave a narrative that draws together issues of governance, spatial planning, rural development and community involvement. In some ways Murray's book works better as an overview of trajectories in rural development rather than an in-depth assessment of participatory methods. While there is clearly a case to be made for more genuinely participatory approaches, Murray acknowledges the numerous difficulties associated with it and, importantly, the resistances to it exhibited by statutory agencies. He points to some of the merits and potential of widespread participation but also reminds us of the problems of operationalizing this, the difficulties of fostering genuine engagement and the political

context which might be seen to be rhetorically supportive but structurally resistant. As Murray himself states early on in this book the problem remains of 'the extent to which participatory arenas of engagement can champion negotiating practices that move citizens closer and into the loci of power, or merely place them on the fringes of polite advocacy' (p. 14). Murray argues that government at a variety of spatial scales may promote participation but primarily for functional means. Additionally, in so far as some useful progress is made in relation to bridge building and so on, this may suffer from the time-limited dimensions of funding conditions and related constraints. While Murray concludes that there is an enthusiasm for these approaches, his work paradoxically demonstrates that there remain problems with getting people more actively and meaningfully involved.

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Barbara E. HENDRICKS, *Designing for Play*, Ashgate, Farnham 2011, 260 pp.

Public playgrounds have been part of western cities for a little over a hundred years. Barbara E. Hendricks asks in her book *Designing for Play* why this aspect of public provision has changed so little over the century and how public playgrounds can be made better for children. The book aims 'at bringing the issue of designing for play up to professional level – a subject for designers about design' (p. 2). It means that Hendricks writes about the topic with passion and professional perspective, presenting several examples of outdoor children' playgrounds in western world. The book is well structured into fourteen chapters addressing different aspects of the topic. The intercultural differences and historical changes find some attention in the chapters as well.

Hendricks writes that the provision of public play facilities was part of the Reform Movement – an attempt to improve the living conditions of workers in the rapidly growing and very polluted industrial cities of the 19th century. The author makes some historical associations between play facilities and gardens and later playgrounds for children. For example, kite flying began as an activity for adults, and Chinese history records the use of kites as far back as the Han Dynasty (206–224 BC). Water gardens were built by the wealthy in the 16th and 17th century – such as the gardens at Versailles in France, where adult playgrounds were built for the wealthy to show to the world their power and wealth. The royal gardens were opened to the public in the 19th century. At this time public parks and gardens were not for pleasure but for promenade ruled by particular fashion codes and habits. Hendricks argues that during the Victorian era, however, few wealthy people were constructing adult playgrounds – the public garden became a place for airing and dressing up in fancy clothes. At about the same time gardening became a popular pleasure in itself for the wealthy who had the land and the staff (p. 19). Playthings adopted from the entertainments of the wealthy were the swing, the seesaw and the wading pool.

The book brings up the problem that nowadays many city children are cut away from the rhythms of the planet and from living experiences. The variety of amusement facilities

has become diverse, but many children have access only to limited activities located in supermarkets. Playing generally enables 'to test actions and emotions that would be too dangerous in real life' (p. 11). The outdoor playgrounds are important to learn about the surroundings and living things. Hendricks writes that current urban planning is trapped by the cave-man heritage. But 'much of human history and culture has been touched by our very human dream and longing for Paradise, and Paradise is always a garden, never a building' (p. 222). This argument nicely articulates the problem that often convivial dynamics and public space between the buildings gets little attention in the spatial planning. I would argue that public playgrounds may also indicate particular layers of landscape that become visible only after accidents. For example, Soviet-time playground installations are still present in several day-care centres and house yards. Some of these metal ladders may cause injuries for children and thus require revision and new design solutions.

The author writes about the nature playground approach, which is based in the environmental movement, the green cities organisations and in a pedagogical concept that nature is best for children. Hendricks writes that 'nature is eternal politician – she is anything and everything the person wants her to be. Therefore nature has many different disguises but we must accept the fact that nature is a cultural invention and that our culture forms our attitudes toward nature' (p. 188). It means that there exist multiple connotations for such distinctions like town and country, or culture and nature in different countries. Thus it is that the nature playground movement will find much foothold in western Canada in the form that it is practised in Denmark for example. There exist also differences in how children and adults perceive surrounding nature. I would argue that social dimensions of nature could be theoretically more elaborated in the book by focusing on fewer contextualised case studies.

The author writes that life and movement are interchangeable for children. Many photographed examples in the book present children within their activities on the outdoor playgrounds. Usually the concrete site of the photography is not mentioned and has to be guessed by the reader. The book gives several practical tips for designing particular sites, e.g. school yards or pre-school institutions. This book can be recommended mainly to landscape architects, town planners and designers to contribute to better worlds.

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Steven MILES, *Spaces for Consumption*, Sage, London 2010, 209 pp.

This book examines the ideological nature of consumption in urban spaces and the ways in which society relates to and consumes the surrounding urban landscape. It also addresses the impact of consumption upon the city and how the public realm is transformed as a result. The book is divided in nine parts and covers a range of topics based on consumption, such as the importance and the role of the shopping mall to the consumption at mega-events. Through such examples Miles shows that the city as a space of consumption and the expectations and presumptions that consumers take with them creates a less authentic experience of urban life.

Chapter two, *The Individualised City?*, presents the theory necessary to understand the relationships between individuals and the public and their relationship with the urban environment. Here Miles argues that the world has become a privatised sphere. Therefore one city becomes a blueprint for another, resulting in a disconnection between people as a society, a disconnection with the city and a rise in dominance of the consumer society. This leads to the design of cities being designed for such a purpose of high consumption with the building of shopping malls, thereby intensifying the superficial sense of social interaction. Using the example of the airport Miles illustrates the airport is no longer merely a space where travellers pass through, but a space in which people spend time in consuming objects and to an extent culture. Airports incorporate spaces of eating and retail, which perhaps started as small diners and small duty free shops, however overtime these spaces have grown, with luxury brand retailers renting space, thus serving the dual purpose of being an airport, its primary purpose; and a shopping mall, its secondary purpose.

Having provided the foundation for the third chapter, *Creating Cities*, where Miles considers the role of creative cities, in particular entrepreneurial cities and the impacts of their conception has on as a space for consumption. He argues the change in urban governance has led to, as he quotes Hall (1997, p. 65 cited by Miles, 2010, p. 35): 'places are now commodities to be produced and consumed'. This means that cities market themselves as being 'world class cities' in order to attract tourists. Cities are spaces of performance and symbolic consumption, and are therefore spectacles and culture is needed for post industrial cities to survive. This chapter shows the importance for cities to brand themselves in globally competing market, with campaigns such as Glasgow's Miles Better initiative. However, it is not possible to create an authentic creative city, as the image of the city becomes manipulated and crafted around social and economic standings, thus splitting the social fabric of the city. For example, social groups such as the homeless do not fit with the image of 'world class', and are therefore 'actively excluded from the spaces of consumption that a place marketing model of the city implies' (p. 49). City branding normally relies upon its unique cultural entities placing a high emphasis on the visual aspects of the area. For instance during the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympic and Paralympics Games, Olympic organizers, the City of Vancouver, and the province of British Columbia appropriated the elements of Aboriginal culture and the magnificent natural beauty of the landscape to promote Vancouver, British Columbia, and the Games as being unique.

For the post-industrial city cultural consumption generates large revenue for the city's economy, and therefore many cities such as Boston are dependent on cultural tourism. Miles argues that tour operator provide tourists with environments and experiences that they seek out, questioning the authenticity of the urban experience. In relation to this are the architectures of the city, as they are beacons of symbolic power of consumption. For instance Paris has the Eifel Tower, while Dubai is home to the Burj Al Arab hotel. Miles acknowledges Dubai for being a mega-architectural city, reflective of its consumer driven society. What is termed as 'the Bilbao effect' has resulted in the movement of having monumental architecture, with each city aspiring to have its own Gehry like creation.

Shopping is a word most associated with the term consumption. Shopping is a physical act of consumption where money is exchanged for commodities. In the case of the shopping centre, for some cities the shopping mall is like its Guggenheim, with the architecture being grand, such as Galleries Lafayette in Paris, and West Edmonton Mall,

Edmonton, Alberta, Canada, thus becoming a space for 'a memorable experience that incorporates a sense of place' (p. 100). For example, the West Edmonton Mall has spaces which have theme areas, like Europa Boulevard themed after European cities where luxury brand stores such as Versace are located. However not all shopping activities take place in the mall, in many European cities such as London and Paris many of the well-known centres for retail are on the street, such as Bond Street and Avenue des Champs Élysées respectively, therefore the experiences consumption differ. Integral to the theme of shopping for dreams (chapter 6) is the work of Walter Benjamin and the arcades of Paris where people could look in through the glass, simultaneously offering protection from the elements. Shopping malls are controlled spaces where poverty and other social disparities are erased, creating an urban fantasy.

It is widely acknowledged that hosting a mega-event, such as the Olympic Games is not only considered an honour, but also a chance for marketing. The Olympic Games are an international modern spectacle hinging on, and being indicative of, issues such as political power. Miles argues that 'urban spectacles cannot be analyzed in isolation. They are, by their very nature, complex, multi-faceted entities that above all else demonstrate their inherent complexity and apparent contradictions of life in the contemporary city' (p. 122).

In this section of the book, Miles successfully demonstrates the importance of hosting mega-events to the city in terms of fiscal gain, relying largely on symbolism and cultural capital, to obfuscate the social and political conflicts occurring between various groups. Miles concludes that for the individual the experience of the spectacular is good enough, and the realities of everyday do not matter at this moment in time.

Covering a range of themes, Miles illustrates that consumption is driven by desire and expectations of utopia. For Miles, as consumption is an individual experience he argues that there is a disconnection between people, thus individualism is being encouraged. Spaces for consumption no longer serve a single purpose; they are multifaceted where all activities take place. He believes that privatised spheres such as malls and museums make people weary of the street. Miles does not merely demonstrate how we consume the city and its commodities, but we also aid in defining cultures and are complicit in them. He concludes that cities are theatres where the performances emotions, dreams and tragedy occur. Cities are spaces where the ideological dominance of consumption takes place, and that the ways in which individuals act should not be misjudged.

On the whole, this is a well written and accessible book that would appeal to both faculty and students alike. This book provides the basis of discussions that are important in debates in the disciplines of geography and urban studies for example. Miles provides the reader with engaging arguments which probe further question, by drawing upon the work on renowned scholars in specific fields of consumption. The examples Miles chooses to validate his argument are also analyzed in great detail, and are varied, making for an interesting read. This book makes a valuable contribution to the scholarship on consumption by highlighting the dependency of culture in a post-industrial world, and the changing relationships between people, and people and the urban environment.

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Giovanna SONDA, Claudio COLETTA, Francesco GABBI (eds.), *Urban Plots, Organizing Cities,* Ashgate, Farnham 2012, 178 pp.

At the crossroads between organization and urban studies, the research project at the origins of the volume *Urban Plots, Organizing Cities* – edited by Giovanni Sonda, Claudio Coletta and Francesco Gabbi and published by Ashgate – aimed at showing 'the potential of addressing urban complexity by considering the action net embracing artifacts, practices and narratives'. The 'urban plots' arising from this triangulation are here proposed as privileged entry points for the analysis and representation of what really cities are: states of permanent reorganization. Reorganization is seen here as both an outcome of organizing processes and a fundamental quality of those 'action nets' that are taken as basic social objects in urban life. This theoretical approach allows the editors to travel through the contemporary urban experience through the construction of different 'urban plots', ranging from reformulations in the field of public policy discourse to stories of contentious representations of public housing projects, from analysis of governmental strategies in public transport systems to the shaping of a cultural turn in urban policy. Jerome Denis and David Pontille analyze change and evolution in the Parisian subway signage system, considering it an effective example of how cities are made of semiotic landscapes in which are deeply embedded patterns of expected behaviours and frameworks of action. Recent changes in the RATP signage policy reveal the rise of the habit of the 'informed citizen', a monadic and self-reliant individual who is capable of controlling his displacement in the urban environment. Following the spread of GPS – global positioning systems – these changes set 'the basis for public spaces where the dwelling together counts less than successfully navigating side by side'. Examining the case of contested representation and policy interventions in a public housing estate in Athens, Stavros Stavrides discusses the Lefevrian concept of the right to the city proposing a change of emphasis from a quantitative approach – essentially, 'political action conceived as demands for a redistribution of urban goods and services' – to a qualitative one. Urban forms, in which are embedded 'emancipative' urban practices, must be taken in account while analyzing urban struggles. In the case examined, it is 'urban porosity' to be the quality giving strength to a different discourse about the city able to embody a sort of qualitative and discoursive turn in the research line of the 'right to the city'. In the contribution of Massimo Bricocoli and Lavinia Bifulco, the crisis of public housing in Italian cities emerges as an opportunity for reshaping highly routinely public policy. Examining the case of the programme *Contratti di Quartiere* in Milan and of an innovative public health policy in Trieste, the authors analyze significant evolutions in the treatment of local problems thank to a more transparent scrutiny that allowed participants to open 'the black box of housing management', connecting problems that had been treated individually. The aim of this kind of policy innovation can be conceived as the reorganization of the urban space through the production of social organization: an ambitious goal that is achievable only if institutional rules and self-regulating social forms are optimally combined through public action. In the case of the city of Medellin, Beatriz Acevedo and Ana Maria Carreira, underline as the interplay between modernizing plans and policies implemented by city government and the residents' vernacular culture and social practices created the setting for the raise of a new hybrid urban culture. Building on

the inheritance of South-American patterns of cultural hybridization developing through the colonial and post-colonial era, the authors analyse cases in which 'urban projects are transformed aesthetically, functionally and symbolically through the narratives of local communities, linked to religion and baroque imagery'. In the context of shifting urban culture policies and governance, Claudia Meschiari and Vando Borghi examine the case of a culture-driven urban renewal programme implemented in a former industrial site in the city of Modena, Italy. Through a participative process, the city was able to turn what might have risked to be a routinely and highly private management of a land-use change into a more vibrant occasion of local sense-making at the crossroads between local collective memory and hidden development potentials. Memory is a matter of concern also for Barbara Gruning's contribution focusing on the politics of urban memory in post-reunification German cities. Defining the reality and potential of a narrative space, the author underlines how a counter-hegemonic exploration of urban memories need to rely on traces framing an incomplete, doubtful and a teleological understanding of history. Theoretical assumptions formulated by the editors suggest how the analytical triangulation between artifacts, practices and narratives they propose can be useful in understanding significant episodes and processes of urban change occurring in cities across the globe today. Even more important, effective urban policies need to take in account the strategic role played by 'urban plots' in promoting change. A the same time, the lesson contained in the book can be fully productive only if deeply connected with serious analysis of structural processes affecting urban societies in this time of change and crisis.

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Margaret GRIECO, John URRY (eds.), *Mobilities: New Perspectives on Transport and Society*, Ashgate, Surrey 2011, 163 pp.

The volume *Mobilities: New Perspectives on Transport and Society* is another demonstration of the mobilities paradigm consolidation in social sciences. By gathering a total of 17 contributions, mostly from UK academics, this book edited by Margaret Grieco and John Urry represents a great guide for those that would like to study mobilities challenges in depth. Given the amount of chapters and topic overlapping of some of them, this review will not be chapter by chapter, but it will rather comment on some of the most noteworthy elements that are present across the book.

The volume shows a clear agenda for the mobilities turn around the concepts of social and environmental transport justice, information technologies and behavioural change. The latter idea, although not being specifically quoted in all chapters, is present throughout the book and could be considered the most significant governance challenge for the coming decades. Changing the behaviour of people is a difficult mission, as it requires cultural and conceptual changes that need time and generations in order to be effective. It is about intervention to resolve some social dilemmas (chapter 8 by G. Lyons) when all

lose out through selfish behaviour. Also, since people act at the local level, but demands are coming from regional, national and supranational levels, and the consequences of the climate change are at the global level, this kind of governance requires a multi-scalar or multi-level perspective. While reading this book one feels the urgency of the behavioural change debate, given that the increasing mobility of those in the global north and in the global south offsets the technological efficiency improvements (chapter 15 by C. Divall) and the rising threat from climate change and the unstable market dynamics in relation to fuel scarcity (chapter 1 by J. Urry; chapter 2 by J. Hine). In this regard, chapter 5 by K. Götz and T. Ohnmacht makes a proposal for the definition of lifestyle profiles for developing target group specific motivational factors for behavioural change. In a more descriptive fashion, chapter 9 by P. Jones *et al.* looks into the socio-demographic profiles of commuters in Paris and London.

Social exclusion, lack of access and how this can impact on personal life dimensions are the central topics of a substantial amount of the chapters. Authors agree that measures to tackle transport disadvantage should go beyond transport itself and integrate land-use policies (chapter 2 by J. Hine), public facilities planning (Epilogue by M. Grieco), personal domains (chapter 4 by G. Porter *et al.*), cultural landscapes (chapter 14 by M. Sheller) and, overall, a multi-dimensional and contextualized understanding of the underlying factors which cause transport-related exclusion (chapter 10 by K. Lucas).

In this line, some chapters deal with path-making and path-shaping, and the encounters in the context of waking. Chapter 3 by F. Hodgson deals with the case of Leeds, chapter 4 by G. Porter *et al.* is centred on young people's mobility in Ghana, Malawi and South Africa and the impact of security and violence issues on walking routes, which show important gender differences. Taking a historical approach, chapter 13 by C.G. Pooley also analyses the everyday mobility of children from Manchester and Lancaster, and suggests that there is important path dependency in their mobility as much has remained the same. Although it is not dealing with daily path-making, chapter 16 by F. Rajé critically analyzes aviation links between and mobility patterns of migrants originally from the Caribbean region, finding that traditional sun-sea-sand tourism is not the main explanation of some airline routes configured in the Caribean. On a different matter, chapter 12 by C. Licoppe and C. Levallois-Barth analyzes the process of configuring an interactive advertising system in the Paris underground and discusses the tensions associated with this intrusive advertising method in the path of underground users.

In this regard, the smart and technological debate is also present in the volume. Chapter 7 by M. Büsher discusses how human sense-making could be integrated with smart transport and shows concerns about the democratic values of some smart technologies. In relation to this, chapter 8 by G. Lyons argues that there is too much attention on the technology fix and the priority of accommodating demand, when there are important opportunities for behavioural change. Yet, chapter 17 by J. D. Nelson and P. T. Aditjandra presents a survey that shows that some European stakeholders see Intelligent Transport Systems (ITS) as key for efficient and clean road transport. From another perspective, chapter 11 by E. Laurier and T. Dant debates on some of the benefits that the driverless car could bring.

Something worth highlighting from this volume is the methodological diversity of the chapters, which can certainly be very useful for young researchers and for those that are in the stage of designing a new research project in this field. Some chapters focus on different

qualitative methodologies (e.g., non-structured interviews, surveys etc.) and others apply unorthodox methods, such as video recording of drivers (chapter 11 by E. Laurier and T. Dant on the driverless car) or product experimentation (chapter 12 by C. Licoppe and C. Levallois-Barth on Bluetooth interactive advertising). Also, the volume has chapters with a strong methodological emphasis, such as chapter 6 by E. Horizons and B. Them on snowball sampling.

Having a consolidated body of literature and a considerable number of scholars, probably, one of the coming challenges is achieving that policy makers translate all the accumulated knowledge into real policies addressing social exclusion, achieving behavioural change at a considerable scale, and safeguard democratic and privacy rights in relation to the implementation of smart technologies. Hence, this book is not only worthy of scholarly reflection, but could also be useful to transport and urban policy-makers.

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Daniel A. BELL and Avner DE-SHALIT, *The Spirit of Cities*, Princeton University Press, Princeton–Oxford 2011, 347 pp.

This interesting and stimulating book presents a new approach to the study of cities in which the focus is placed on a city's ethos, defined as a set of values and outlooks that are generally acknowledged by people living in the city. Bell and de-Shalit revive the classical idea that the city expresses its own distinctive ethos, and explore how this classical idea can be applied to modern cities. Moreover, the authors explain why philosophy and the social sciences need to rediscover the spirit of cities.

The book is focused on cities that authors could write about from personal experience, but the choice of cities was also determined by more objective concerns – the authors chose cities that relate to key themes in contemporary political thinking. They begin with the cities that have done most to shape their identities (Jerusalem and Montreal) and then move on to the cities that have played important subsequent roles in shaping their identities (Singapore, Hong Kong, Beijing, Oxford and Berlin). The last part of the book discusses cities that did not contribute so significantly to their personal identities (Paris and New York).

Following an introduction, which briefly outlines the structure and contents, the book is divided into nine chapters, each devoted to a particular city. Chapter 1 is focused on Jerusalem and discusses religious conviction. The second chapter, devoted to Montreal, considers the value of language in economic and psychological sense. Chapter 3 deals with Singapore, which, being the only large city that is a separate state, had to engage in nation building since it was expelled from the Malayan federation in 1965. The fourth chapter discusses the special administrative region of Hong Kong, which is due to its free-market ideology. Chapter 5 is focused on Beijing, which has long prided itself on being a political city. The sixth chapter deals with Oxford and its one of the oldest universities in the world in terms of the ethos of learning. Chapter 7 discusses the case of Berlin and

ideas of tolerance and intolerance. In the eighth chapter the authors consider the idea of Paris as a romantic city (which is actually rejected by Parisians) and conclude with some reflections on the tension between the pursuit of romance and the pursuit of morality. The last part of the book turns to the 'capital of the world' – New York – which became so important in the field of finance or culture mainly due to the ambitions of immigrants. The cities under consideration are presented with an innovative and engaging mix of history, personal anecdote and also the theoretical reflection.

Bell and de-Shalit draw upon the richly varied histories of each city, as well as novels, poems, biographies, tourist guides and architectural landmarks. The authors rely in this book mostly on qualitative methods of research – they visited particular cities of interest and conducted interviews with their inhabitants (e.g. a college president in Oxford, a writer in Paris or a young political activist in Berlin). They also employ strolling as a method of research drawing on the experience of Walter Benjamin (1898–1940), who was walking through the streets of nineteenth-century Paris and contemplating the rise of capitalism and consumerism in this city (it is also worth mentioning that the idea for this book came to the authors when they were walking the streets of San Francisco). The application of the methods mentioned above stems from the authors' conviction that much can be learned about cities and their values through strolling and spontaneous interviewing.

The authors of *The Spirit of Cities* are aware that cities sometimes have more than one defining ethos, and that ethoses vary substantially by social class, location or by religion within a particular city – for this reason they focused on ethoses shared by ethnic groups, social classes and genders by interviewing members of different groups as well as referring to literature.

The book is extremely interesting and entertaining for lovers of cities all over the world, and perhaps even for those who are not, because *The Spirit of Cities* is quite insightful and takes the reader on a thought-provoking personal journey. Moreover, the style of the book is attractively conversational (even autobiographical) and far from social science positivism. It is also worth mentioning that *The Spirit of Cities*, combining strolling and storytelling with cutting-edge theory, encourages debate on new ways of inquiry in the social sciences.

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