European Spatial Research and Policy

Volume 26, No. 2
2019

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH and POLICY

David AMBORSKI
Jakub WOSIK — LANGUAGE EDITORS

Justyna WIKTOROWICZ — STATISTICAL EDITOR

Anna WOSIAK — MAPS AND FIGURES

Katarzyna SMYCZEK — INITIATING EDITOR

Elżbieta RZYMKOWSKA — TECHNICAL EDITOR OF ŁÓDŹ UNIVERSITY PRESS

Maciej TORZ — TYPESETTING

Task: Increasing the participation of foreign reviewers in assessing articles approved for publication in the semi-annual journal *European Spatial Research and Policy* financed through contract no. 605/P-DUN/2019 from the funds of the Ministry of Science and Higher Education devoted to the promotion of scholarship

Published by Łódź University Press
Publisher's sheets 16.6; printing sheets 17.25
W.09523.19.0.C
ISSN 1231-1952
e-ISSN 1896-1525

Łódź University Press
90-131 Łódź, Lindleya 8
www.wydawnictwo.uni.lodz.pl
e-mail: ksiegarnia@uni.lodz.pl
tel. +48 42 665 58 63

sciendo

C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

CONTENTS

PART I
MASS IMMIGRATION TO EUROPE – A THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY?
Guest editor: Marek SOBCZYŃSKI

INVITED ARTICLES

PART II

ARTICLES

BOOK REVIEWS

sciendo

COPE
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

PART I

MASS IMMIGRATION TO EUROPE – A THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY?

Guest editor: Marek SOBCZYŃSKI*

FOREWORD

The unexpected massive influx of migrants to Europe in 2015 caused shock in receiving countries. Despite the fact that the scale of migration was not significantly larger than in previous years, the concentration of the inflow of migrants from a few countries, within only a few months, made this phenomenon more vivid. Numerous governments undertook defence actions on a large scale, using administrative, police and then diplomatic measures.

This phenomenon has become an object of interest of politicians, who have built their political capital on the basis of the criticism of Germany's decision to accept refugees, as well as anti-migrants attitudes, but also has become an object of interest of researchers in several science disciplines.

This topic was raised in political and social geography, which was manifested by the organisation of numerous sessions on migration and refugees held at geographical conferences[1] and planned for next year's 34rd IGU Con-

* Marek SOBCZYŃSKI, University of Lodz, Faculty of Geographical Sciences, Department of Political Historical Geography and Regional Studies, ul. Narutowicza 88, 90-139 Łódź; e-mail: marek.sobczynski@geo.uni.lodz.pl

[1] Sessions at EUGEO congresses: *Mobility and migration in Europe* (Budapest, 2015), *Demography, international population mobility and migration* (Brussels, 2017), *Places and spaces of refugee* (Galway, 2019), and the session on *Forced migration* at 33rd IGU Congress (Beijing, 2016).

gress in Istanbul[2] and the annual meeting of the Association of American Geographers[3].

Since the purpose of Editorial Board of the journal "European Spatial Research and Policy" was to edit the special issue devoted to this currently important research problem, I proposed in this context a topic *Mass immigration to Europe – a threat or opportunity?*

For cooperation in this issue I invited geographers, political scientists and spatial planners from mainly European countries, who have experienced the phenomenon of migration in a special ways.

Finally, in a special issue of ESR&P, six articles devoted to mass migrations to Europe were collected.

As an introduction to the discussed topic, I have proposed my article entitled *Causes and main routes of the mass immigration to Europe in 2015*, which presents the background of the discussed migration process, its causes, migration routes, and the scale of this phenomenon.

The following articles by other researchers are devoted to the case studies showing the policies of national governments towards the influx of migrants, describing themselves as refugees. The situation in Germany, the most important among immigration countries, was presented by Markus Eltges and Wendelin Strubelt in the article *Migration – Germany's past and present. Thoughts and figures.* Ryszard Żelichowski in an article entitled *Mass immigrations in the 21st century. Case of Belgium and the Netherlands* presented the policy of two Benelux countries towards the wave of refugees. Two studies were devoted to Italy: Alessandro Vitale in the article *Italy's approach to East-West and South-North migrations: from lack of knowledge to political use of them* indicated the lack of a concept for a refugee policy in the Italian government, while Mariann Dömös and István Tarrósy in the article *Integration of migrants in Italy: local actors and African communities* discussed the process of integrating African immigrants with the local Italian community. Tolga Levent in an article entitled *A new challenge for urban planning in Turkey: socio-spatial impacts of forced migration* discussed the effects of the influx of migrants to Turkey, including those arriving from Syria in recent years, and showed the impact of this migration on the functioning of Turkish cities.

Unfortunately, despite the invitations extended to authors from Hungary and Greece, no studies could be obtained from those crucial countries regarding the phenomenon of the influx of refugees, which would offer a broader view of the problem of mass migration to Europe in the latter half of the second decade of the 21st century.

Despite this absence, one could expect that the presented texts show the diversity of EU policies towards the mass wave of refugees.

---

[2] Sessions: *Migrants and refugees democratic rights in local governance; Human mobility and regional disparities: patterns of migration from a comparative perspective; The role of human mobility dealing with violence and conflicts; Rethinking the migrations – security nexus: actors, practices, knowledges; Refugee reception and the importance of the local.*

[3] Session *Ethnonationalism and exclusion around the World* planned at AAG Annual Meeting in Denver (2020).

sciendo

C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.01

Marek SOBCZYŃSKI*

CAUSES AND MAIN ROUTES OF THE MASS IMMIGRATION TO EUROPE IN 2015

Abstract. The flow of immigrants into Europe is a phenomenon commonly known since the end of the Second World War. To a large extent it was the result of a colonial and then post-colonial relationship between metropolises and their overseas territories. Migration movements in Europe intensified after 1989 along with systemic changes in the eastern part of the continent.

The phenomenon of increased migration to Europe observed since March 2015 combines both processes: economic migration, which undoubtedly dominates in terms of number, and exiles, of a much smaller scale, but given as the cause of migration by almost all migrants. A new phenomenon is the fact that a large part of migrants constitutes uncontrolled migration, which in previous years was marginal. In 2015, asylum applications were submitted in EU countries by as many as 1.25 million people. The influx of refugees to Europe has become not only a demographic phenomenon, but also a political one, evoking strong political emotions. Mass migrations also seem to be an instrument of international policy implementation by key world powers.

The main purpose of the article was to present the background of the mass migration to Europe that took place in 2015. The main reasons for the decision to emigrate by the citizens of origin countries were shown, as well as the routes by which refugees flow into Europe.

Key words: mass migration, Europe, refugees, migrant routes.

1. MIGRATION IN EUROPE – INTRODUCTION

The main purpose of the article was to present the background of the mass migration to Europe that took place in 2015. In particular, to show the political and economic situation in the countries of origin that led to mass escaping, mainly of young men. An important goal was also to present the diversity of migration routes through which refugees reach Europe and to show the threats to them resulting from the different conditions of each route. Efforts were made to prove the

* Marek SOBCZYŃSKI, University of Lodz, Faculty of Geographical Sciences, Department of Political Historical Geography and Regional Studies, ul. Narutowicza 88, 90-139 Łódź; e-mail: marek.sobczynski@geo.uni.lodz.pl

hypothesis that mass migration in the years 2014–2015 was not unique in terms of the scale of the phenomenon, but that only the concentration of the inflow within a few months was distinctive.

The process of migratory influx into Europe has been a well-known phenomenon since the end of the Second World War. It was largely the result of the colonial and then post-colonial relationship between metropolises and their overseas territories. The right to live in a metropolis was granted to meritorious war veterans from the colonies. At the turn of the 1960s, when the decolonisation process began, officials from former colonies came to a metropolis, often with their families, disgraced by cooperation with the colonists. There were also influxes of metropolitan citizens who did not see any future for themselves in the emerging states, even though they had been sometimes born there. In some cases, a metropolis had to urgently evacuate entire social, ethnic or religious groups whose survival in a former colony was threatened by the seizure of power by hostile political forces, an antagonistic ethnic group or members of a different religion. One example was the mass flight of Christian Moluccans to the Netherlands, threatened by the Indonesian administration dominated by Muslims, or the flight of Muslims from India, not only to Pakistan, but also to the United Kingdom. The "Windrush generation", i.e. migrants from the Caribbean Sea basin flowing in the 1950s to metropolises: the UK, the Netherlands and France, belongs to the same category.

In particular, this phenomenon occurred when independence was the result of a victory over a colonial metropolis in a war for independence. Large migrations took place, e.g. from Algeria to France (mainly to Corsica), with as many as three different social groups participating in them, namely French colonists, especially wine growers, Christians, mainly from Kabylie, threatened by the victorious insurgent movement dominated by Muslims, and, to a smaller extent, also Arab representatives of the colonial administration, fearing restrictions for their anti-national activities.

However, that post-war migration movement was not significant and was surpassed by other trends, e.g. Jewish emigration to Palestine, transatlantic migrations, mainly to North America, migrations between the German occupation zones and then (until 1961) between both German states. There were also mass politically forced migrations in Eastern Europe: the displacement of Germans, resettlements of Poles, Hungarians, Macedonians, Tatars, etc.

That post-war migration wave, often politically inspired, led to the recognition of the emergence of the phenomenon of refugees. As early as 1951, the Geneva Convention recognised a refugee as a person who "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country" (Broniewicz, 2008, p. 1). Initially, the Convention was intended

to apply only to European refugees who emigrated from Europe before 1951, but after the events in Hungary in 1956 and the process of decolonising Africa, its application became more universal, as confirmed by the New York Protocol in 1967 (Pluta, 2008, p. 38).

At the end of the 1950s, a new stream of migrants appeared, which was not associated with the phenomenon of refugees, as its origins were the growing disproportions in the pace of economic development. Some rapidly developing Western European countries began to receive cheaper labour from beyond the Pyrenees (Portugal, Spain), Italy (there was also an internal wave of migration from the South to the well-developed North), Yugoslavia, Greece, Turkey, Ireland and Finland. Occasionally, migrants also came from communist countries: Hungary, Czechoslovakia and, starting in the 1970s, mainly from Poland (Rica *et al.*, 2013, pp. 6–7). During the 1970s and 1980s, the Pomaks people were exiled from Bulgaria to Turkey.

Migration flows in Europe increased after 1989 with political changes in the eastern part of the continent (Salt, 2006, p. 21). It was mainly the flow from the former communist states to the developed countries of Western and Northern Europe, amounting to an annual average of about 850,000 people (Salt, Almeida, 2006). There were at least three main waves in 1989: East German refugees through Hungary to the Federal Republic of Germany, people (mainly Hungarians) from Romania to Hungary during the last years/months of the Ceausescu regime, and from Bulgaria to Turkey.

Refugees (mainly from Yugoslavia and Afghanistan) were marginal in this process, with economic migrations accounting for the majority of the total. During that period, the number of asylum applications submitted in the EU Member states reached its peak, at almost 700,000, a situation which remained unique until 2014 (Sasnal, 2015, p. 10).

The currently observed (since March 2015) phenomenon of increased migration to Europe combines both processes: economic migration, which undoubtedly dominates in terms of numbers, and refugees, much smaller in scale, but cited as the cause of migration by almost all migrants (Linka, 2017, p. 5).

A new phenomenon is the fact that a large part of migrants is the so-called irregular migration, which in previous years was a phenomenon that was always present, but marginal in absolute numbers. Irregular migration is an "unauthorised crossing of a state border". It is also referred to in literature as illegal, undocumented or unauthorised migration (Morehouse and Blomfield, 2011, p. 4).

Christal Morehouse and Michael Blomfield identified 9 reasons why migration becomes irregular. Those are: illegal border crossing, entry using false documents, entry using legal documents but providing false information in those documents, overstaying a visa-free travel period or temporary residence permit, loss of status because of failing to renew a permit, failing to meet residence requirements or

breaching conditions of residence, being born into irregularity, absconding during the asylum procedure or failing to leave a host state after a negative decision, a state's failure to enforce a return decision for legal or practical reasons (tolerated stay). The fact that the EU has 27 different immigration systems, which are often incompatible, does not make things any easier, although the EU is working to harmonise them.

Until recently, irregular migration has been a marginal problem for the EU. As recently as in 2008, the number of irregular migrants residing in EU Member States was still below 1% of their populations, and irregulars accounted for 7–12% of all immigrants. The number of reported attempts to illegally cross EU borders has been steadily decreasing, from over 150,000 in 2007 to less than 120,000 in 2010 (Morehouse and Blomfield, 2011, pp. 6–7).

A dramatic change in the number of migrants arriving in the EU occurred in 2014 when more than 600,000 asylum applications were submitted, 55% of which were rejected. The largest uncontrolled inflow occurred in 2015. As many as 1.25 million people applied for asylum at that time. In the following year it was possible to somewhat slow down that phenomenon and subject it to greater control. By September 2016, only 314,000 migrants had arrived, half of the number that had arrived in the first year of the migrant crisis. As many as 34% of migrants were Syrians, 12% came from Iraq and Afghanistan. Over 70% of immigrants were men, 52% of whom were aged 18–34, i.e. young men of working age, suitable for military service (Matuszczyk, 2016, p. 9). It is worth noting that in 2013 more than 1.7 million immigrants came to the EU, but they were only legal immigrants. There is just over 1 immigrant per 1,000 inhabitants of the EU, so it is still a marginal population (Sasnal, 2015, p. 11).

2. REGIONS OF CONDENSATION OF IMMIGRANT MASSES

Immigrants to Europe came from at least several dozen countries of the world. However, significant groups (over 10,000 annually) were arrivals from only a dozen countries, and the largest of them from only a few countries. They were the main cause of the current migrant crisis.

It is therefore worth taking a closer look at the structure of the territorial origin of the immigrants. As mentioned above, three countries were at the forefront of the most numerous migrant groups, with a third of them coming from Syria, followed by Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2015, the three were joined by immigrants from Kosovo and Albania, i.e. European countries. In 2015, the structure of territorial origin of immigrants was already different than in the first year of the migrant crisis (Table 1).

Table 1. Territorial origin of immigrants to the EU in 2015 (over 10,000 asylum seekers)

State	Number of asylum applications
Syria	383,745
Afghanistan	196,200
Iraq	130,320
Kosovo	72,215
Albania	68,740
Pakistan	48,550
Eritrea	47,030
Nigeria	32,255
Serbia	30,330
Iran	28,530
Somalia	22,830
Russia	22,515
Ukraine	22,415
Unidentified	21,010
Bangladesh	19,070
Northern Macedonia	16,120
Gambia	13,435
Sudan	11,810

Source: *Europe's migrant crisis…,* 2016.

3. THE ORIGINS OF THE MOST IMPORTANT ARMED CONFLICTS, GENERATING MASSES OF MIGRANTS TO EUROPE

The reason for the decision to migrate from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq were the open armed conflict in those countries. The primary issue was the personal safety of migrants, although the economic factor resulting from the devastation of a country's economy and the loss of jobs or sources of means for living must also be considered as important reasons for the decision to migrate. Political, religious and cultural persecution is hardly a significant reason, as there is no need to leave a country to avoid it, it would be sufficient to take refuge in areas controlled by political forces and factions with which one sympathises.

3.1. Afghan conflict

The Afghan conflict has the longest history, which has continued in this phase at least since the country overthrew its monarchy in 1973, i.e. 44 years ago. The main political force associated with the monarchy originated from the Pashtuns (Afghans). For centuries, they faced opposition from their neighbours in Afghanistan, namely Tajiks, Uzbeks, Turkmens and Baluchs, as well as the indigenous Hazaras, the ethnic group which lives only in Afghanistan (Jastrzębski, 2003, p. 244). However, the overthrowing of the monarchy did not result in democracy, but only in foreign policy being directed towards an alliance with the Soviet Union and the breaking of traditionally good relations with the United States (Modrzejewska-Leśniewska, 1996, pp. 357–358). In September 1979, there occurred a coup within the ruling party. The winning group sought apparent democratisation, stopped persecuting followers of Islam, and, in terms of foreign policy, distanced itself from the USSR and sought cooperation with the most important neighbours: Pakistan and Iran, as well as with the United States. In response to this change in Afghanistan's foreign policy, the Soviet Union launched an armed invasion of the country on 25 December 1979 and occupied it for a decade. Radical Pushtunian Islamists, as well as nations from the north of the country, i.e. Tajikis and Uzbeks, resisted the occupation forces. Ultimately, the Soviet losses and the great political changes in USSR caused that in February 1989 their troops withdrew from Afghanistan, but that did not end the civil war. After another coup in 1992, religious radicals seized power and proclaimed the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and a new multilateral civil war ensued. In 1994, Pashtun alumni of koranic schools from Pakistan, i.e. the Taliban, armed and trained by the United States and Pakistan, joined the conflict during the war for liberation from under the Soviet occupation (Calvocoressi, 2002, pp. 593–594). Those factions quickly gained an advantage over other sides of the conflict, occupying 96% of the territory of the country. In 1996, they captured Kabul and proclaimed the Emirate of Afghanistan. The war did not stop, however, as the Tajik army of Ahmed Shah Masoud, also a veteran of the struggle against the Soviet occupier, resisted them. At that time, Osama bin Laden, the Yemenite Saudi founder of the al-Qaeda (The Base) organisation, wanted globally for terrorism, also found refuge in Afghanistan (Odziemkowski, 2006, p. 216). The Taliban remained in power for longer on 75% of Afghanistan's territory, with the most extreme form of sharia at that time, striking at the foundations of social life and threatening Afghan civilisation. The rest of the area was managed by the internationally recognised Burhanuddin Rabbani, President of Afghanistan, Tajik by nationality.

That conflict, which had already lasted 23 years, did not, however, trigger significant supra-regional migration. In addition to internally displaced persons, there were a small number of immigrants who stayed on the territory of Pakistan and Iran. The influx of Afghan migrants to Europe, North America and Australia was small at the time.

Migration is inscribed in the social history of Afghanistan. In the 1960s and 70s, poor Afghanistan was a reservoir of labour for Pakistan, Iran and the Arab Gulf states, which were increasing their oil and gas production (Marchand, 2014, p. 29).

The first clear wave of increased emigration followed the Soviet invasion of 1979. By 1990, it had affected as many as 6 million Afghans, but was still directed almost exclusively to Pakistan and Iran. The highest migration rate existed in the years 1980–1985, when it amounted to -56.7 per 1,000 inhabitants. In the period following the end of the Soviet occupation, this trend was completely reversed, the migration rate for the years 1990–1995 was 44.4 per 1,000 inhabitants, i.e. the influx to the country exceeded the outflow (Marchand, 2014, p. 22) (Fig. 1).



Fig. 1. Migration rate in Afghanistan in the years 1950–2035

Source: Marchand, 2014, p. 31.

Emigrants from previous periods returned to Afghanistan in the hope for peace and development of the country. Both immigration countries implemented repatriation programmes, Pakistan in 1990 and Iran in 1992 (Marchand, 2014, p. 31). Within the framework of repatriation to Afghanistan, 1.3 million people from both neighbouring countries were resettled voluntarily in the years 1992–1995.

The second wave of increased emigration from Afghanistan was triggered by the takeover of power by the Taliban. Starting from 1992, mainly inhabitants of large cities and representatives of the well-educated middle class emigrated. They

went to Iran and Pakistan, where, unlike the first wave of migration, they were no longer happily accepted (Jastrzębski, 2003, p. 267). Over 300,000 people fled to Pakistan in the years 1991–2000. This time, UN assistance was no longer sufficient, and refugees settled in large cities instead of camps, seeking sources of income (Marchand, 2014, p. 32). Iran completely closed its border with the Emirate of Afghanistan, preventing a wider wave of emigration. Programmes to support and educate Afghans in camps and to encourage them to leave Iran also come to an end, which affected 190,000 Afghan refugees. In 1995–2000, the migration rate was again negative and amounted to -6.5 per 1,000 inhabitants (Marchand, 2014, p. 22).

Only the last phase of the Afghan conflict triggered an increased wave of migration, including to Europe. It was linked to the widespread resistance of minority nations to the Pushtune Taliban, the rejection of Sharia by some Pashtuns and, internationally, al-Qaeda's attacks on the WTC buildings in New York on 11 September 2001.

In view of the refusal of the Taliban Government to extradite Osama Bin Laden, who was suspected of having inspired the attacks, the United States declared war on Islamic terrorism and organised an international coalition of several dozen states ready to take part in action against Afghanistan. By January 2002, the allied military action led to the almost total displacement of Taliban forces from Afghanistan, and the country was divided by the allied forces into zones managed by the US Army and their allies. The allies also established a new, democratically elected Afghan administration with President Hamid Karzai at the head (Sobczyński, 2012, pp. 229–230).

In 2002–2012, repatriation programmes led to the re-emigration of 5.7 million Afghans, out of whom 4.6 million benefitted from the assistance offered by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

However, that was followed by the largest wave of migration to date, initiated in 2001, when a part of the Pushtun population, supporting the Taliban, fled to Pakistan together with the Taliban.

The international military intervention in Afghanistan formally ended in 2014 with the transfer of control over the country to an allied-trained army and government police, but the war did not stop, as the Taliban regained not only their influence in the society, extending it even beyond the Pushtun ethnos, but also effective control over several provinces. A limited number of the allied forces, mainly from the United States, remained in Afghanistan.

It was that last phase of the conflict that fostered the condensation of migrant masses. Afghans are fleeing; mostly young men, capable of military service in the government army, or threatened with being recruited into Taliban troops. People are trying to escape government-controlled areas fearing the return of Taliban rule, which is highly probable with the indolence of the army infiltrated by Islamists, as well as the threat to their very existence, as the economy of the country is

crumbling despite less intense fightings; unemployment is massive and there are signs of a coming famine. Paradoxically, the phase of extinguishing heavy armed operations is a period of greater external migration than the civil war or both occupations, be it Soviet and allied. Migrants find it difficult to obtain refugee status, as it is easy to identify places where they could safely hide in Afghanistan itself, remaining under the care of international forces stationed there or in neighbouring countries (the country of first asylum), mainly in Pakistan. The vast majority of the so-called refugees from the last wave of 2014–2016 are treated as economic migrants, which usually does not give them a good position in EU Member States.

In 2013, 1.6 million refugees from Afghanistan were registered in Pakistan, and 840,000 in Iran. (Marchand, 2014, p. 34). However, both the social profile and other characteristics of the population were completely different from those who returned to the country. The vast majority of those refugees have been living outside Afghanistan for more than 20 years, and almost half of the registered refugees have been born outside their country of origin. The decision to repatriate is a very difficult one, and requires financial resources not only for travel, but also for adaptation in the country and support from the relatives living there, many of whom refugees had lost. Poorer families can only count on international aid, but it is diminishing every year.

Migration in Afghanistan has a mass character. According to Koser (2014, p. 11), 3 million people returned to the country in 1992–1993, 6 million emigrated in the 1990s, and 5.7 million returned to the country after 2002. However, this trend collapsed, as in 2011–2013 only 95,000 people from Iran and only 26,000 from Pakistan returned. Apparently, many have moved elsewhere – to Europe and Australia. In 2014, 4,243 Afghans were granted asylum in Australia. The increase in Afghan asylum seekers in Turkey is symptomatic, with 1,248 people in 2010, 2,486 in 2011 and as many as 14,125 people in 2013, i.e. in 2010–2011 the number of refugees from Afghanistan in Asia Minor doubled, and after another year, it increased tenfold (Koser, 2014, p. 3). In 2016, almost 13% of Afghan citizens lived in exile (Zirack, 2016, p. 1). In 2015, more than 175,000 Afghans applied for asylum in EU Member States, but Afghanistan is in fourth place after Syria, Eritrea and Iraq in the number of those who obtained the consent *(Migrant crisis,* 2016). Thus, the security situation in Afghanistan is seen by EU asylum officials as better than in Eritrea, a country where there is currently no armed conflict.

3.2. Conflicts in Iraq

Armed conflicts in another country of origin have a slightly shorter history than in Afghanistan. Iraq, a state created by British mandates in Turkish Mesopotamia in 1932, was also the scene of internal unrest resulting from a complex nationality and religious structure of its population (Tripp, 2009, p. 59). Quite

paradoxically, the period of longer political stabilisation coincided with the Second World War, during which Iraq became an area of concentration and regrouping of allied forces. Shortly after the war ended and foreign troops left Iraq, the country joined the Jewish-Arab dispute, participating in the Arab anti-Israeli coalition in the subsequent stages of that armed conflict. Iraq's participation in the Israeli conflict caused the exodus of 130,000 Jews from the country. Iraq was an active participant in all Arab-Israeli wars. The Hashemite monarchy collapsed in Iraq in 1958 and Iraq became a republic (Tripp, 2009, p. 185). The country severed its ties with the West, including military ones (Baghdad Pact), and began to move closer to the Eastern bloc. At that time, elements of Arab nationalism appeared, which caused an armed uprising of Kurds in the north of the country, lasting to this day, with short breaks. The Ba'ath Arab socialist party, which also ruled in Syria, took to power, and Iraq intended to create a pan-Arab socialist federation with Syria and Egypt. In 1970, a series of dictators were replaced by Saddam Hussein, whose rule led to the total collapse of Iraq, its ongoing defragmentation and several major military disasters. Hussein began his rule with a reorientation towards the West and the elimination of the Communist Al-Ansar guerrilla. In 1980–1988, he waged war with Iran, seeking annexation of part of Shiite Khuzestan along the Shatt al-Arab river. None of the parties to this conflict could consider themselves winners. After the end of the war, Hussein suppressed Kurdish insurgents in Operation Al-Anfal, committing genocide against some 200,000 victims.

Saddam Hussein's subsequent military decisions gave rise to the final collapse of Iraq. In 1990, Iraq attacked Kuwait and incorporated it as a province. However, that was met with an armed response from the international coalition of the West and most of the Arab states of the region. The armed intervention of the coalition, led by the United States, resulted in the defeat of Iraqi troops in 1991, restrictions on the international sovereignty of Hussein's government and the imposition of economic sanctions against Iraq, including control of oil trade. However, the West did not prevent the dictator from suppressing the anti-government uprisings of the Shiites in the south of the country and the Kurds in the north. In the latter case, the success of the Iraqi army was not complete, as in 1992 the Kurds created a separate geopolitical unit with a high degree of autonomy, which still exists today (Iraqi Kurdistan). Since 1993, Iraq has had no freedom to control its airspace and American Airforce has often bombed its cities.

The fear for Hussein's ability to use chemical and biological weapons against his opponents (which turned out to be unfounded) was a deciding factor in starting the final overthrowing of the dictator. After a victorious war, a coalition of several dozen Western and Arab states divided Iraq into occupying zones and dismantled its state structures. Iraq was taken over by the US occupying forces, but the state disintegrated into separate units: Shiite in the south, a politically stable Kurdish unit in the north, and a disintegrated Sunni area in the central part of the country.

The international community and the occupation authorities *de facto* accepted only the autonomy of Kurdistan, denying the Shiites' and Sunnis' similar rights (Zdanowski, 2010, pp. 496–497). That triggered internal conflicts with the Shiites, to whom the occupation authorities gradually handed over successive spheres of the country's social and economic life. They were the first to raise a rebellion against the occupants. Orthodox Shiite factions fighting against both Sunnis and allied forces also became radicalised. The first parliamentary elections in 2005 were boycotted by the Sunnis and the power, formally throughout Iraq, was taken over by the Shiite government. However, in practice it was not respected by the Kurds, Sunnis or even some of the Shiites. The 2010 elections also brought victory to the Shiites who continue to rule in Iraq.

In December 2011, the allied forces were largely withdrawn (a larger US contingent remained for training purposes), but the situation in Iraq did not stabilise. Taking advantage of internal fighting between Sunni factions, radical Islamist troops entered the northern part of Iraq from Syria, ravaged by a civil war. After capturing Mosul and getting several dozen kilometres from Baghdad, they proclaimed the so-called Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIS) in the occupied areas of Syria and Iraq. Only the Autonomous Iraqi Kurdistan effectively resisted the Islamist aggression and ultimately contributed to its complete elimination from the Iraqi territory in 2018.

The beginnings of mass migration of Iraqis were related to Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait (Czajkowska and Diawoł-Sitko, 2012, p. 303) in 1990, when over a million refugees left the country (most of them migrated from Iraq). The emigration took place before the war and the allied Operation "Desert Storm". After the suppression of the uprisings in Iraq, the country was left by large groups of Shiites and Kurds, along with 300,000 Palestinians living in Iraq for decades, who fled to Jordan. Approximately 37,000 Arab Shiites emigrated to Saudi Arabia, while some 100,000 Iraqis fled to Jordan and Syria. In 2003, there were as many as 530,000 Shiite refugees from Iraq in Iran. The exodus of Kurds to Turkey and Iran, estimated at 1.85 million people, was even greater. A significant increase in emigration from Iraq followed the US invasion in 2003. However, before Hussein's dictatorship was overthrown, 30,000 refugees returned to Iraq. Another wave of migration was caused by the allied occupation and internal fighting between Sunnis and Shiites and the related terrorist attacks by al-Qaeda from February 2006 on the mosques of both faiths. In 2007, the number of Iraqi emigrants was estimated at 2 million and the number of internally displaced persons was about 1.7 million. With the intensification of the civil war, the number of emigrants increased. An additional group of migrants were the collaborators of the allied occupants, estimated, together with their families, at 100,000 people, who were attacked from several sides of the conflicted social groups. For them, however, the fate was particularly cruel, with only 69 people successfully finding asylum in the United States in 2007.

Emigrants from Iraq at that time were directed almost exclusively to neighbouring countries (about 2 million people), as much as 95% remained in the Middle East, where they were treated as temporary "guests", not refugees. Syria, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon and Iran, as well as the Gulf Monarchies, hosted the largest groups. Only Egypt and Turkey applied the Refugee Convention to Iraqis.

After 2006, Iraqis became the largest asylum-seeking group in the most industrialised countries, but only 17,800 Iraqis settled there by 2008, including 5,000 in the United States and 6,000 in Australia, with very few in Europe. The nationality-based composition of those immigrants was also significant. In Germany, as many as half of Iraqi refugees were Kurds, and in the UK up to 70%.

The latest wave of refugees from Iraq began after 2014, when the fighters of the so-called Islamic State entered Iraq from Syria, heading to the south of the country, where they soon reached the outskirts of Baghdad, having conquered the largest city in the north of the country – Mosul. They were stopped on the border of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Iraqi refugees travel by land via Turkey to the Aegean Sea and to the European part of Turkey, from where they try to cross the Greek-Turkish border by sea or river. The largest groups of Iraqis have so far reached Belgium (40,000 people) and Finland, the Netherlands and Norway (about 10,000 each). Belgium is generally chosen by refugees from the Baghdad area (Arabs), while Switzerland, Finland and Norway are chosen by refugees from Sulaymaniyah and Dahuk (Kurds) (Weiss, 2016, pp. 5–6). The gender structure of Iraqi refugees is also interesting, with 93% of them being men and only 7% women. The average age of a migrant is 29 years, as many as 2/3 of migrants are single and only 18% of them defined themselves as internally displaced persons at the time of the decision to emigrate, and 53% had a job at that time. Over 2/3 of refugees declared that they had an income in excess of $500 a month, 41% had a university degree and a further 46% possessed secondary education. 40% drew information about migration methods from oral transmissions, 23% from the media and 22% from the Internet *(IOM surveys Iraqi...,* 2016).

3.3. Civil war in Syria

The conflicts in Syria, which are causing mass emigration, did not appear just now, but have been going on for several decades. The Syrian state is a colonial creation, carved out by the Anglo-French occupiers from the Ottoman Empire after the First World War in the face of very strong Arab national movements. It was established within its borders with no prior tradition as the mandate territory of the League of Nations, with the authorities artificially created by importing a family of the sharifs of Mecca – the Hashemite from Saudi Arabia (cast on the thrones of Syria, Iraq and Transjordan) (Milczanowski and Sawicka, 2013, p. 78). During the

Second World War Syria, already as a republic, gained sovereignty, which allowed it to become a founding state of the United Nations in 1945 (Hitti, 1951, p. 704). The inherited borders inhabited by a mosaic of nations and several religions did not bode well for the internal cohesion of the new state. The established legal and political system pushed the Arab-Sunnite majority of the population from power and handed it over to religious minority groups (Alawites and Christians), which also satisfied the national minorities of Kurds, Druze and Turkmen.

Despite internal tensions, which sometimes turned into internal conflicts, Syria was not an emigration state at that time, on the contrary, it received immigrants, especially the Arab population fleeing Palestine. For many years after the war, Syria operated in a market economy system. However, after later military upheavals of the 1960s, the Arab Socialist Ba'ath Party came to power, which also ruled Iraq until the removal of Saddam Hussein in 2003 (Zdanowski, 2010, pp. 233–251). Using the economic support of Arab oil countries, as a steadfast enemy of Israel, and with the military and political support of the USSR and the communist bloc, as well as the PRC, Syria maintained a relatively good pace of economic development for several decades.

The civil war in Syria, which broke out in 2011, was a reaction to the decades-long dictatorial rule of Ba'ath party presidents, first Hafez al-Assad, and after his death in 2000, the dictator's son: Bashar al-Assad (the presidential dynasty). The tradition of fighting against the Assad dictatorship in Syria dates back to the 1980s, when Hafez al-Assad seized power in Syria through a coup. His first victims in 1982 were the Muslim Brothers, an extreme Islamist group that made a failed assassination attempt on the President in 1980. Assad viciously suppressed the rebellious city of Hama, killing several thousand inhabitants (Milczanowski and Sawicka, 2013, p. 85). In June 2000, the son of the dictator, Bashar al-Assad, returned from emigration to become president. Being educated in the West, he gave the impression of a democrat, but he turned out to be a tyrant. The key to the social situation in Syria is the fact that the presidential family and almost the entire ruling elite are Alawites, a religious minority (Lundgren-Jörum, 2012). Syria is home to the majority of the world's Alawites (2.5 million), but this is only 14% of the country's population. Sunnis dominate, besides that there are also Druzes (3%), and 5% are Christians (mainly Orthodox). In ethnic terms, Syrian Arabs make up more than 90%, and the more important minorities are Kurds (east of the country), Druzes (south) and Armenians.

Inspired by the "Arab Spring" in January 2011, anti-government protests took place in Syria, which on 15 March 2011 transformed into a Sunni uprising (Czajowska and Diawoł-Sitko, 2012, p. 221). The authorities sent troops led by Alawites against the demonstrators, but the opponents of the regime, mainly Sunnis, started to desert from the Syrian army. The conflict escalated on 25 April 2011 when the army and security forces were used to suppress demonstrators in Daraa and civilians were massacred. The consolidation of opposition forces, owing to

increasingly widespread desertions from the army, took place at the end of July 2011, when the creation of the Free Syrian Army was announced. In response, government forces pacified Hama on 31 July, killing 100 people, and in August they attacked the country's largest port of Latakia and Deir ez-Zor in the east. Fighting also included the border areas with Iraq, inhabited by Kurds, who until then were neutral in the conflict. The international community did not take any action other than diplomatic at that stage of the uprising. For several decades, the Assad regime supported the Soviet Union (later Russia), Iran and Hezbollah from neighbouring Lebanon, and for some time China. Among Syria's neighbours, only Turkey supports the insurgents and it is the gathering spot for political refugees, who established the opposition Syrian National Council in Istanbul on 26 August 2011 to coordinate the fight against the dictatorship (Sobczyński, 2012, p. 239).

The political and military situation in Syria was very dynamic, the forces that triggered the revolution and seemed to be the only alternative at the end of 2011, suffered military defeat against government troops and their allies, and were also internally disintegrated (Czajkowska and Diawoł-Sitko, 2012, pp. 221–226). There was a well-known failed military training of the opponents of the dictatorship by American experts at the cost of 500 million dollars which was eventually finished by only 50 people *(Fiasko...,* 2016). The forces of the democratic opposition were soon dominated by Islamist organisations, including terrorist ones, first by al-Qaeda and its local allies, and then the so-called Islamic State.

Despite mediation by the League of Arab States and the UN, the dictator carried out criminal rocket attacks on civilians and hospitals in Homs and Idlib, which was not condemned by the UN Security Council following a veto by China and Russia (Holliday, 2012).

As the conflict unfolded, other external forces joined it. Apart from Iran, Lebanon's Hezbollah and the Gulf Monarchies present there from the beginning, the United States, France, Russia, Turkey and Iraqi Kurdistan sent their troops to Syria (Milczanowski and Sawicka, 2013, p. 107). There was also a significant decomposition of the internal system, some of the opposition struck an agreement with Russia, Kurds or the dictator, others took the side of radical Islamists. The West basically lost its existing allies in the opposition and the ability to control at least a part of the country's territory.

Ultimately, the West lost any control over the process of resolving the conflict in Syria. In May 2017, Russia, Turkey and Iran announced the creation of the so-called safe zones in Syria, in areas controlled by the former democratic opposition, which were later almost completely eliminated my military forces by the same parties to the agreement and their populations displaced (except in the Idlib area, where fighting is still ongoing). In areas controlled by Syrian Kurds, on the border with Turkey, an autonomous federal unit called Rojava was established, which eventually helped the West defeat the so-called Islamic State in Syria in early 2019 and which conquered its capital Raqqa. However, Rojava is the object

of aggression of Turkish troops. The Alawite regime in Syria remained in power and, with the support of Russian, Iranian and Hezbollah troops, it regained control of most of the country's territory. The Islamists who dominated the anti-regime opposition are now only defending themselves near Idlib, attacked by Russia and Turkey and by the rebuilt Syrian army.

From the 1970s, Lebanon was a traditional emigration country for Syria, with more than 200,000 Syrian immigrants living there, most often undocumented, who emigrated there for economic reasons. In 2011, the number of such workers was estimated at up to 500,000, which was more than 9% of all the persons employed in Lebanon *(MPC-migration profiles: Syria,* 2013, p. 2).

Before the outbreak of the civil war, Syria was not, however, a generator of emigrant masses. On the contrary, it was a shelter for refugees from neighbouring countries. In 2010, there were 1.3 million refugees in Syria, including more than one million from Iraq (6% of the country's population) (Merelli, 2015).

Only after 2011 did a wave of Syrian migrants start moving to Europe by land. Of the 22 million citizens living in Syria, 250,000 are believed to have died as a result of military action, 7.6 million had to leave their homes but remained in Syria, and about 5.6 million people left the country. The vast majority of them, i.e. 4.3 million (76%), remained in neighbouring countries – Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq, while quite a large number fled to Egypt (Bel-Air, 2016, p. 1). The wave of Syrians coming to Europe is therefore only a small part of the total number of refugees from that country. By 2015, approximately 700,000 refugees from Syria arrived in Europe (not only Syrian Arabs, but also Palestinians and representatives of national minorities), i.e. 12% of all Syrian refugees, and only 470,000 people came to the EU (Bel-Air, 2016, p. 3). It is worth noting that before the civil war the main direction of economic emigration of Syrians was Saudi Arabia and the monarchies of the Arab Gulf. After the outbreak of the war, these countries were no longer willing to accept Syrians on a similar scale. Saudi Arabia reduced the number of accepted Syrians from 500,000 in 2011 to 420,000 in 2015. The Emirates also lowered the number of refugees they received, and Kuwait has reduced the number fivefold.

3.4. Other major concentrations of emigrants

The other two leading countries in the list of the largest providers of emigrants to Europe (with the exception of Kosovo and Albania which, as European countries, will not be included in the analysis of the inflow of refugees from outside the continent) are Pakistan and Eritrea. More than 40,000 refugees came from each to Europe. Although these two countries are not considered as territories currently undergoing warfare in a formal sense, armed conflicts exist *de facto* within their territories or they are involved in such a conflict with their neighbours.

Since its inception in 1947, Pakistan has been at war with India over Kashmir, a smaller part of which it controls (the so-called Azad Kashmir). This conflict took the form of an open war three times in 1947–1948, 1965 and 1971. Pakistan also supports armed uprisings in Indian Kashmir, for example in 1988, and in the 21st century it has also sponsored terrorist acts, not only in the disputed region, but throughout India. A serious threat to world peace is the documented fact that both sides of the conflict possess nuclear weapons.

The second conflict, to which Pakistan is not formally a party, is the civil war in Afghanistan, in which the secret services of Pakistan play an ambiguous role. In addition, the conflict involves the Pashtun tribes living in the Pakistani province of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, particularly the tribal territories under federal administration of North and South Waziristan, Orkazai, Dir, Swat and Dera Ismail Khan, which are Afghan-inhabited and provide refuge for the Taliban. The ambivalent attitude of the Pakistani authorities towards the Afghan conflict has already prompted the United States on several occasions to take unilateral military action on the territory, but that did not lead to Pakistan breaking its alliance with the West.

The war in Afghanistan caused a huge wave of refugees to Pakistan, which is estimated at up to 2.5 million people (Kuszewska, 2016). At present, some of those refugees, after sometimes having lived in Pakistan for several years, are trying to enter Europe.

The third conflict in Pakistan is an internal one, the secessionist aspirations of the people of the Baluchistan province, which have recently been significantly silenced. Another reason for emigration is the situation in the Sindh province, including its capital Karachi, where there is frequent fighting between Muslims coming from India (Muhajiro) and the local population (also Muslims), which is formally caused by language issues. Violence between these communities broke out in 1971–1972 and 1995 *(Pakistan: conflict profile,* 2010). The permanent instability of the Pakistani political scene, frequent military upheavals, rigged elections, the impeachment of the most important people in the country and their persecution by political opponents are also conducive to immigration processes.

Despite that, Pakistan is a country with balanced migration in 2013, the number of immigrants slightly exceeded 4 million people, while the number of emigrants from Pakistan amounted to 4.2 million *(Pakistan migration profiles,* 2016, p. 2). The largest groups of refugees in Pakistan in 2013 came from Afghanistan – 2.3 million, India – 1.4 million, and Bangladesh – 186,000 (until 1971 the country was the eastern province of Pakistan) and Myanmar – 94,000 people. The traditional direction of migration for Pakistanis has been the United Kingdom, where they make up more than 5% of the population. Those migrations began before the Second World War and intensified after the division of the British Indies in 1947.

In 2013, however, the most important emigration destination for Pakistanis was Saudi Arabia (1.3 million), India (1.1 million), the United Arab Emirates (954,000), the United Kingdom (476,000) and the United States (339,000). Clear-

ly, it is mainly economic migration to the Persian Gulf, the United Kingdom and America.

In the case of refugees from Pakistan, the largest group consists Afghans, returning to their homeland (16,000 people in 2013), other refugee destinations are Canada (almost 12,000) and Germany (7,000). It is unclear, however, how many of these were Afghan refugees who left Pakistan after many years of staying there, but did not return to their homeland, choosing rich Western countries.

Eritrea is the last of the countries that generates more than 40,000 refugees to Europe. Like Pakistan, Eritrea is currently not at war, but has been until recently with its neighbour Ethiopia, from which it separated in 1993 (Gebru, 2003, pp. 232–241). It also has bad relations with other neighbours, Sudan, where it supported separatist tendencies and Djibouti, where it supported only one ethnos – Afar (also living in Eritrea), against Issas (Somalis). In 2008, there were even border fights between Eritrea and Djibouti.

The reason for the mass fleeing of men from Eritrea, however, is not the lost war with Ethiopia in 1998–2000, but the oppression of the country's government (Prus, 2015). Eritrea's political system, based on the left-wing ideology of a single legal party, is supported by the dictatorial power of the Maoist President Isaias Afawerki, a hero of the war for the country's independence turned tyrant. Eritrea is a classic totalitarian dictatorship, ruled by secret police using torture; 300,000 people imprisoned without trial. Public surveillance is common, and the law does not work. There are remnants of the slave system here, and there are public executions. Mandatory military service for all men lasts 18 months, but it is often illegally extended, even for life. Old people have also been conscripted into the army. Desertion is punishable by a fine of $3,000 (equivalent to six years' average income). The country was turn to ruin by fifty years of Ethiopian occupation, when the province was treated as an internal colony, followed by a liberation war and a war with its neighbour, and is now in a tragic economic situation. Hunger is a common problem. In the ranking of freedom of the press, Eritrea is lower than North Korea (Górzyński, 2015). All that means that young people under the age of 18 are trying to escape to Sudan in order not to be drafted. Over the last decade, 300,000 people, or 5% of its population, left Eritrea.

The main directions of economic migration of Eritreans (in 2013) were the neighbouring countries – Sudan (144,000) and Saudi Arabia (40,000), the United States (36,000), the United Kingdom (20,000) and the UAE (17,000). As far as political refugees from Eritrea are concerned, the largest group went to Sudan (112,000), Ethiopia (64,000) and Israel (37,000, those were Ethiopian Jews, ancient followers of Judaism, evacuated from Ethiopia and Eritrea, without the consent of their governments, by Israeli special forces), Italy (11,000) and Switzerland (10,000) *(Eritrea migration profile*, 2016).

The inflow of refugees from the rest of the world to Europe does not exceed 40,000 people per year. Among those countries there are also several other Eu-

ropean countries (Russia, Ukraine, Serbia, North Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Turkey, Moldova, Montenegro), but this is intra-continental migration, which was not analysed in this study. The list also includes all the countries of the Southern Caucasus. Other emigration countries are Asian and African states, recently troubled by wars, such as Sierra Leone, the Ivory Coast, and those in which wars continue, e.g. Libya, The Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia or Yemen, as well as relatively peaceful ones, such as Iran, Mongolia, Bangladesh, Ghana or Togo. In this group of emigrant concentrations there is also one of the fastest developing countries in the world – China and only one American country – Haiti.

4. REGIONS OF CONCENTRATION OF MIGRANTS AND MIGRANT ROUTES TO EUROPE

I have already identified the main areas of condensation of migrant masses travelling to Europe, so it is necessary to indicate the routes from these places to other concentration points before finally reaching the Old Continent (Konarzewska, 2007, p. 92) (Fig. 2).

Two such concentration areas can be identified: the Middle East (Turkey) and the Mediterranean coast of Africa (mainly its western tip – Morocco and the central part of Libya). In the Middle East, the number of refugees and internally displaced persons is estimated at 14 million (Sasnal, 2015, p. 11). Practically a large part of Turkey is a refugee concentration area, both southeast, a region bordering Syria and Iraq, where large numbers of refugees live in camps, and the country's Aegean coastline, both in Asia and Europe.

In Morocco, the largest areas of concentration of refugees, mainly from West Africa, are the south of the country, including the occupied Western Sahara, from where refugees try to migrate by sea to the Spanish Canary Islands, and northern Morocco, the Tangier area (the route through the Strait of Gibraltar to Spain) and the Spanish exclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, which can be reached by land without the risk of sailing, through high border fences. In Libya, the concentration area are the central and eastern parts of the Gulf of Sirte, outside the control of the government in Tripoli, where power is exercised by local Islamic militias, including those linked to the so-called Islamic State. From the Gulf of Sirte and the Libyan-Egyptian borderland, refugees try to cross the Mediterranean Sea towards Greece. However, from western Libya, which is also beyond government control, it is closer to the Italian island of Lampedusa, but it is also easier to come across patrols from the European Border Guard Agency (Frontex), whose task is not so much to protect this border as to rescue drowning refugees. They are transported to camps in Italy for further migration procedures. Occasionally one

hears of a boat with refugees being turned away, but only when the people are not in danger of drowning. This encourages smugglers to use equipment that is in a very poor condition, which guarantees that refugees will be taken if they have not already drowned.



Fig. 2. Refugee migrations routes to Europe

Source: own work based on https://blogs.esri.com/esri/ esri-insider/2016/12/18/ mapping-migration-trends-to-europe (accessed on: 7.04.2017)

By far the largest group of refugees has been choosing the Eastern Mediterranean route, mainly because of the highest concentration of refugees in Turkey, and also because of the shortest section of the dangerous sea crossing. The Asian continent is sometimes no more than 2 km away from the Greek islands of the Sporades archipelago. In practice, there are longer distances to swim, as in the narrowest places it is not possible to load a boat on the Turkish shore or to unload it on an island, due

to the cliffs on the shore. However, no more than 15–20 km is enough to cover this route. The waters are also relatively poorly controlled by the Greek navy and night rides are very likely to be successful. However, the conditions in the canals between the islands are treacherous, hence tragic sinkings of entire units are frequent. In the first half of 2014, 132,000 refugees reached Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean route. The largest group of 78,000 people were Syrians, 33,000 were Afghans, while less than 7,000 came from Pakistan. In 2015, according to Frontex data (published on 3 July 2017), as many as 885,386 people arrived in Europe via this route, but only 182,534 a year later. That means that between 2015 and 2016, the EU agreement with Turkey reduced the number of migrants from this direction to less than a quarter of the original figure (Kokot, 2017, p. 10).

The Middle Mediterranean route from Libya to Italy or Greece is the longest and most dangerous. That is due both to the distance to be covered, at least 300 km and sometimes more than 400 km, and to the quality of the equipment used by the smugglers, which is much worse than in Turkey, and the scale of the overloading of the vessels. That is also due to the fact that refugees from Turkey can choose to travel by land, so there is competition for maritime carriers, which reduces costs, and they are much richer than African refugees, which makes their transport much more comfortable and safer. The Middle Mediterranean route was used by mid-2014 by 91,000 refugees to Europe, including 24,000 from Eritrea, 11,000 from Nigeria and less than 10,000 from other sub-Saharan African countries. According to Frontex, in 2015 153,946 people came to Europe via this route, and in the following year 181,126 people, an increase by 18% (Kokot, 2017, p. 10).

The third route, i.e. West Mediterranean route, leads from Morocco to the Iberian Peninsula (mainly to Spain) and is not long. The Strait of Gibraltar does not exceed 30 km in width, but it is very busy, so it is difficult to cross it unnoticed or to navigate. There have been cases of this route being crossed for several days, when refugee boats were thrown off by waves far to the east on the Costa del Sol. There is also a popular land route to Spanish towns on the Moroccan coast. In 2015, less than 7,000 refugees reached Europe via the Western Mediterranean Route. It is also dominated by Syrians (under 4,000), who arrive from Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan or Egypt to Morocco safely, probably by plane. In addition, this route is the most convenient for the inhabitants of West Africa – the Guineans (under 700) and the Ivorians (350 people). According to Frontex data, 7,164 persons arrived in Europe in 2015 via the Western Mediterranean route and 10,231 in the following year, i.e. an increase by 42% (Kokot, 2017, p. 10). Fortunately, this route is the least frequented and the large increase in migration from this direction does not mean a dramatic increase in the number of migrants.

The fourth route is the Western Balkan one, connecting the current flow from Turkey and Libya to Greece with the one that leads by land through the European part of Turkey to Greece or Bulgaria and further through Romania and Hungary or former Yugoslavian states to Austria and Italy, and finally to Germany *(Którędy...,*

2015). The Western Balkan Route is the second largest, with almost 102,000 refugees in mid-2014. The group was dominated by Afghans and Syrians (almost 30,000 each) and Kosovars (23,000).

There is also a fourth route, the Eastern European one, from the Black Sea (Moldavian-Romanian border) in the south to the Barents Sea in the north. On this route, the largest groups of non-European refugees get from Ukraine and Belarus to Poland and from Russia to Finland and Norway, but these are trace numbers. It is peculiar that there have been attempts by Middle Eastern immigrants to cross the Finnish-Russian border in Lapland by bicycle. In the case of Poland, refugees from Chechnya, Southern Caucasus and Mongolia dominate in this direction. In mid-2014, there was an influx of only 717 people, dominated by Vietnamese (less than 200), Afghans (175) and Georgians.

The most dangerous for migrants is the land African route leading from condensation countries in sub-Saharan Africa, through the desert to the north, to the Mediterranean coast (Fig. 3). Not only are the natural conditions and the lack of infrastructure a challenge, but also the lack of any state structures and the domination of local fighters and people's militias in rebellious areas in the countries along the migration route – Sudan, Niger, Libya and Mali. It is precisely the political instability that fosters the maintenance of these routes, and the insurgents have made human traffic their source of income. Many refugees are murdered, almost everyone is robbed, and women are raped. The cost of relatively safe transport by organised crime groups is so great that it sometimes involves contributions from the entire village of an emigrant. Not infrequently, they have to pay extra tribute for buying him out of captivity.

The route from South and Central Asia to Europe looks different. Refugees use relatively well-developed transport, i.e. road and rail infrastructure. They sometimes use their own cars (e.g. Syrians), local transport, and the richest of them even travel by plane. It is only the last stage of the journey, through the Aegean Sea or the land "green border", that must be paid for dearly.

The route from Senegal through Mauritania, Western Sahara and Morocco is similarly convenient and relatively safe. It can be travelled by bus and train. In the case of attempts to get from Morocco to Ceuta and Melilla, there are no costs for the final stage. Larger groups of refugees gather at the border and, at the same time, throw themselves at the barbed wire border fences. The Spanish border police is not able to detain everyone in a group of several hundred. Those detained and deported to Morocco try again and again until they succeed. Outside the traditional routes, refugees have recently been trying to mark out new ones, e.g. from Albania via Kosovo to Serbia (Rujevic and Jarecka, 2016).

A new phenomenon is the support given to refugees by NGOs, which send ships on migration routes to save the lives of refugees and transport them, taken from the sea or overloaded boats, to an EU Member State, usually to Italy. Critics argue that this action inspires more refugees to take the risk of migration, hoping

to be saved more securely if smuggling does not go ahead as planned. There were even theories about facilitating the work of smugglers and even about collaborations between the smugglers and NGOs, such as Jugend Rettet. Migrants were transported from Libya by boat directly to the organisation's vessel, Iuventa, not rescued from the sea (Hlebowicz, 2017a, p. 12; Smith, 2017, p. 47). Proactiva Open Arms has also been suspected of such practices (Cusumano and Pattison, 2018, p. 53). It is estimated that as many as 40% of migrants arriving in Italy in 2017 (i.e. about 44,000) were transported here by NGOs.



Fig. 3. African refugee migration route

Source: own work based on http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6228236.stm.

In August 2017 the Italian government agreed with the transitional Libyan authorities and designated 60 units, including 6 ships, to fight against migrants in order to prevent the landing of migrants on Italian territory and send illegal migrants taken from boats back to Libya with a guarantee of their human rights there (Hlebowicz, 2017b, p. 13; *Between...,* 2018, p. 8). In 2019, the new Italian government successfully fought these "legal smugglers", despite the outrage of global public opinion,

preventing them from going ashore for several weeks. Unfortunately, these organisations, which facilitate human trafficking, use blackmail to force other countries (Portugal, France and Spain) to accept refugees caught at sea.

5. POTENTIAL DESTINATIONS FOR MIGRATION

Almost all refugees to Europe have well-defined destinations. Those include only a few of the most developed EU countries, primarily Germany and the United Kingdom, followed by the Netherlands, Sweden and non-EU countries, i.e. Switzerland and Norway. Rich Austria, Spain or Italy are no longer attractive destinations, while Greece, Hungary or Poland are only transit countries which, if it were possible, the refugees would leave within a few hours.

As the EU effectively locked its land borders in 2016, forcing neighbouring countries to stop refugees at their borders, large groups of refugees were stranded in Northern Macedonia, Croatia, Serbia and on Greek and Italian islands. Large transit camps were set up there, where groups of refugees stayed, e.g. Idomeni on the Greek-Macedonian border. Those refugees who managed to get into the EU but were heading for the British islands were detained on the English Channel coast in a nomadic camp near Calais (Januszewska, 2016, p. 75). It was then administratively dissolved and the migrants living there were scattered across various centres throughout France.

Some EU Member States defending themselves against refugees have secured parts of their borders with fences and walls. The Hungarians thus closed their border with Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia and Romania, and Austria fenced its border with Slovenia. The Germans separated themselves from Austria and Greece, and Bulgaria from Turkey. Non-EU North Macedonia has fenced off its border with Greece.

Table 2. Asylum applications submitted in some EU Member States between 2013 and 2016

State	2013	2014	2015	2016	2013–2016
EU	431,090	636,960	1,322,825	1,259,955	3,650,830
Germany	126,705	202,645	476,510	745,155	1,551,015
Sweden	54,270	81,180	162,450	28,790	326,690
Italy	26,620	64,625	83,540	122,960	297,745
France	66,265	64,310	76,165	84,270	291,010
Hungary	18,895	42,775	177,135	29,430	268,235
Austria	17,500	28,035	88,160	42,255	175,950

Table 2. (cont.)

State	2013	2014	2015	2016	2013–2016
UK	30,585	32,785	40,160	38,785	142,315
Belgium	21,030	22,710	44,660	18,280	106,680
the Netherlands	13,060	24,495	44,970	20,945	103,470
Greece	8,225	9,430	13,205	51,110	81,970
Poland	15,240	8,020	12,190	12,305	47,755
Spain	4,485	5,615	14,780	15,755	40,635

Source: Eurostat 2017.

According to data released by the EU's Statistical Office, the first year of the latest wave of migration, i.e. 2013, saw 562,700 migrants coming to the EU. In subsequent years, a significant increase in their number to 1,257,000 in 2016 was recorded, followed by a slight decrease to 1,204,300 in 2016.

The largest number of refugees in the period 2013–2016 chose Germany as their destination, with 1,555,000 people, Sweden 327,000, Italy 298,000, France 291,000, Hungary 268,000, Austria 176,000 and the United Kingdom 142,000 people (Table 2). Groups significant in number also applied for asylum in Belgium (107,000) and the Netherlands (103,000). Only 82,000 people stayed in Greece. Poland accepted almost 48,000 asylum applications (Eurostat, 2017).

The reasons for such a choice of destinations are a result of the level of economic development of those countries, the traditional migration direction functioning for years and the already existing diaspora of a given nation. For example, migrants from Pakistan almost exclusively go to the United Kingdom, refugees from Francophone Africa to France, from Libya to Italy, Kurds to Germany and Switzerland, Kosovars to Switzerland, Sweden and Germany, Moldovans to Romania, and Ukrainians and Belarusians to Poland.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The influx of refugees to Europe has become not only a demographic phenomenon, but also a political one, evoking fervent political debates. The Hungarian government held a referendum on 2 October 2016 on the acceptance of the refugee relocation plan proposed by the EU. In fact, the EU proposed resettlement to Hungary of only 1,294 refugees from Greece and Italy. Prime Minister Viktor Orban called for refugees to be sent back to their first country of asylum, to the north coast of Africa or to an island where the EU will provide them with living

conditions. Also in Poland, the refugee issue has become one of the key matters in several election campaigns and is still the subject of political negotiations and a means of fostering fear in the society. As numerous polls show, Poles are strongly opposed to accepting refugees other than those from Eastern Europe.

As it has been proven earlier, migrations to Europe are not a new phenomenon, rather a permanent one, with the migration wave of 2014–2015 not significantly larger than before, but different from the previous ones in terms of the structure of the countries of origin and the social structures of migrants and some condensation within a few months, while the traditional inflow of migrants was more evenly distributed throughout the year. The number of migrants arriving in Europe is a small proportion of the refugees from emigration countries, the vast majority of whom remain in neighbouring countries, in particular in the Middle East.

The areas of emigrants' condensation were created as a result of long-lasting armed conflicts, including civil wars in the emigration countries, but the directions of this migration very rarely and only to a small extent were towards Western Europe. It was the intervention of the United States in those long-standing conflicts at the beginning of the 21st century and the involvement of US troops, with some participation in a coalition of other democratic countries, that not only led to an intensification of migration processes from conflict areas, but also to a change of direction of those migrations towards Europe, instead of neighbouring countries. In the case of the Syrian conflict the Russian military intervention was decisive. It is significant that the United States and its richest Arab allies have only marginally become the target of this migration. The majority of the migration wave of 2014–2015 had to be received by the richest countries in Europe, but also by some of the poorer countries such as Northern Macedonia, Serbia, Greece and Turkey.

Only two of the few major routes that refugees take to enter Europe are really significant – the Eastern Mediterranean combined with the Western Balkan, and the Central Mediterranean. The largest groups of refugees reached Europe through these routes – approximately 90% in total.

Migrants are generally targeting only two countries: Germany and the United Kingdom, and the declared reasons for migration include war and persecution, although in reality the vast majority of Middle Eastern refugees are economic migrants, whose status in their countries was above average, with little threat to their livelihoods. Their wealth, health and education allowed them to leave their homeland relatively comfortably (by public transport, including planes or their own cars), hoping to find an appropriate job in Europe.

The migration wave of refugees from 2014–2015 was effectively halted in the following year, mainly thanks to the agreement between Germany and Turkey, and the closing of the borders for refugees by Balkan states, but it is still causing strong political reactions, disproportionate to the scale of the phenomenon.

REFERENCES

Between the devil and the deep blue see. Europe fail refugees and migrants in Central Mediterranean (2018), Amnesty International, London.

BRONIEWICZ, B. (2008), *Status uchodźcy w rozumieniu Konwencji Genewskiej w orzecznictwie sądów polskich,* Prawa człowieka w orzecznictwie polskich sądów, http://www.prawaczlowieka.edu.pl/index.php?dok=bbcbb1e844266f4abdfc29b3d8a64628607fa47e-d3 [accessed on: 1.03.2017].

CALVOCORESSI, P. (2002), *Polityka międzynarodowa 1945–2000.* Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza.

CUSUMANO, E. and PATTISON, J. (2018), 'The non-governmental provision on search and rescue in the Mediterranean and the abdication of state responsibility', *Cambridge Review of International Affairs*, 31 (1), pp. 53–75.

CZAJKOWSKA, K. and DIAWOŁ-SITKO, A. (2012), *Systemy polityczne wybranych państw Bliskiego Wschodu.* Warsaw: Dialog.

DE BEL-AIR, F. (2016), *Migration profile: Syria,* Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, European University Institute, Policy Brief, 2, Brussels.

Eritrea migration proflles (2016), UNICEF, https://esa.un.org/miggmgprofiles/indicators/files/Eritrea.pdf [accessed on: 10.05.2017].

Europe's migrant crisis in numbers. An interactive guide to the European refugee crisis (2016), The Economist, 23.03.2016, http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2016/03/daily-chart-20 [accessed on: 2.03.2017].

Fiasko programu szkolenia syryjskich rebeliantów. USA zmarnowały 500 milionów dolarów (2016), Dziennik.pl, http://wiadomosci.dziennik.pl/swiat/artykuly/521839,fiasko-programu-szkolenia-syryjskich-rebeliantow-usa-zmarnowaly-500-milionow-dolarow.html [accessed on: 9.05.2017].

GEBRU, S. (2003), 'Konflikt etiopsko-erytrejski', [in:] MALENDOWSKI, W. (ed.), *Zbrojne konflikty i spory międzynarodowe u progu XXI wieku. Analiza problemów i studia przypadków.* Wrocław: Atla2, pp. 225–241.

GÓRZYŃSKI, O. (2015), *Erytrea, czyli państwo-więzienie. Stamtąd pochodzą uchodźcy, których przyjmie Polska*, Wirtualna Polska, http://wiadomosci.wp.pl/erytrea-czyli-panstwo-wiezienie-stamtad-pochodza-uchodzcy-ktorych-przyjmie-polska-6027734616581249a [accessed on: 10.05.2017].

HITTI, P.K. (1951), *History of Syria including Lebanon and Palestine.* London: Macmillan.

HLEBOWICZ, B. (2017a), 'Ratunek czy przemyt', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 10, 4.08, p. 12.

HLEBOWICZ, B. (2017b), 'Włosi odeślą migrantów do Libii', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 174, 20.07, p. 13.

HOLLIDAY, J. (2012), *Syria's maturing insurgency.* Middle East Security Report 5, June 2012, Institute for the Study of War, Washington.

IOM surveys Iraqi migrants to Europe (2016), International Organization for Migration, https://www.iom.int/news/iom-surveys-iraqi-migrants-europe [accessed on: 9.05.2017].

JANUSZEWSKA, E. (2016), 'Refugees in France. Research statement', [in:] LALEK, D. (ed.), *Migration as a social process. The economic migrants and the refugees,* Papers of Social Pedagogy, 1, pp. 68–81.

JASTRZĘBSKI, P. (2003), 'Wojna w Afganistanie', [in:] MALENDOWSKI, W. (ed.), *Zbrojne konflikty i spory międzynarodowe u progu XXI wieku. Analiza problemów i studia przypadków.* Wrocław: Atla2, pp. 243–282.

KOKOT, M. (2017), 'Przemyt ludzi za 4 mld euro rocznie', *Gazeta Wyborcza*, 160, 12.07, p. 10.

KONARZEWSKA, A. (2007), 'Migracyjne problemy Unii Europejskiej', *Bezpieczeństwo Narodowe*, 3–4, pp. 91–107.

KOSER, K. (2014), *Transition, crisis and mobility in Afghanistan: rhetoric and reality,* International Organization for Migration, Kabul.

KUSZEWSKA, A. (2016), *Quo vadis, Pakistan? Podsumowanie półrocza 2016,* Centrum Studiów Polska–Azja, http://www.polska-azja.pl/a-kuszewska-quo-vadis-pakistan-podsumowanie-polrocza-2016-czesc-2 [accessed on: 10.05.2017].

LINKA, A. (2017), *Zjawisko migracji i uchodźstwa,* Program Fundusz Inicjatyw Obywatelskich, Szczecin.

LUNDGREN-JÖRUM, E. (2012), 'Discourses of a revolution: framing the Syrian uprising', *Ortadoğu Etütleri*, 3 (2), pp. 9–30.

MARCHAND, K., SIEGEL, M., KUSCHMINDER, K., MAJIDI, N., VANORE, M. and BUIL, C. (2014), *Afghanistan migration profile,* International Organization for Migration, Kabul.

MATUSZCZYK, K. (2016), 'Nowe statystyki o kryzysie migracyjnym', *Biuletyn Migracyjny*, 55, p. 9.

MERELLI, A. (2015), *Before the war, Syria housed three times as many refugees as Europe now,* Quartz, https://qz.com/498597/before-the-war-syria-housed-three-times-as-many-refugees-as-europe-now [accessed on: 9.05.2017].

Migrant crisis. Migration to Europe explained in seven charts (2016), BBC News, http://www.bbc.com/ news/world-europe-34131911 [accessed on: 7.04.2017].

MILCZANOWSKI, M. and SAWICKA, Z. (2013), *Dwa odcienie rewolucji arabskiej: Egipt i Syria.* Oświęcim: Wyd. Napoleon V.

MODRZEJEWSKA-LEŚNIEWSKA, J. (1996), 'Interwencja ZSRR w Afganistanie 1979–1989', [in:] BARTNICKI, A. (ed.), *Zarys dziejów Afryki i Azji 1869–1996. Historia konfliktów.* Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza, pp. 354–365.

MOREHOUSE, Ch. and BLOMFIELD, M. (2011), *Irregular migration in Europe,* Transatlantic Council on Migration, Migration Policy Institute, Washington.

MPC – migration profile: Syria (2013), Migration Policy Centre, Brussels.

NIEDZIŃSKI, B. (2015), 'Którędy uchodźcy trafiają do UE? Jest sześć migracyjnych szlaków', *Gazeta Prawna*, 2.09., http://www.gazetaprawna.pl/artykuly/891650,ktoredy-uchodzcy-trafiaja-do-ue-jest-szesc-migracyjnych-szlakow.html [accessed on: 11.05.2017].

ODZIEMKOWSKI, J. (2006), *Międzynarodowe konflikty zbrojne po drugiej wojnie światowej.* Warsaw: Wyd. UKSW.

Pakistan: conflict profile (2010), Insight of Conflict, https://www.insightonconflict.org/conflicts/pakistan/conflict-profile [accessed on: 10.05.2017].

Pakistan migration profliles (2016), UNICEF, https://esa.un.org/miggmgprofiles/indicators/files/Pakistan.pdf [accessed on: 10.05.2017].

PLUTA, D. (2008), 'Zarys zjawiska uchodźstwa. Aktorzy zjawiska a proces kształtowania uchodźcy', [in:] CZERNIEJEWSKA, I. and MAIN, I. (eds.), *Uchodźcy: teoria i praktyka*, pp. 34–49.

PRUS, J. (2015), *Erytrea to jedno z najbardziej restrykcyjnych państw świata,* Polskie Radio, http://www.polskieradio.pl/5/3/Artykul/1462126,Erytrea-to-jedno-z-najbardziej-restrykcyjnych-panstw-swiata-reportaz [accessed on: 10.05.2017].

RICA, S. de la, GLITZ, A. and ORTEGA, F. (2013), *Immigration in Europe: trends, policies and empirical evidence,* Discussion Papers no. 7778, Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit**,** Bonn.

RUJEVIC, N. and JARECKA, A. (2016), *Szlak bałkański i nowe trasy uchodźców do UE,* Deutsche Welle, http://www.dw.com/pl/szlak-ba%C5%82ka%C5%84ski-i-nowe-trasy-uchod%C5%BAc%C3%B3w-do-ue/a-19054894 [accessed on: 11.05.2017].

SALT, J. (2006), *Current trends in international migration in Europe. Consultant's report to the Council of Europe,* Comité Européen Sur Les Migrations, Strasbourg.

SALT, J. and ALMEIDA JOSÉ, C. (2006), 'International migration in Europe. Patterns and trends since mid-1990s', *Revue Européenne des Migrations Internationales*, Université de Poitiers, 22 (2), pp. 155–175.

SASNAL, P. (ed.) (2015), *Niekontrolowane migracje do Unii Europejskiej – implikacje dla Polski,* Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych, Warsaw.

SMITH, A. (2017), 'Uncertain, alert and distress: the precarious position of NGO search and rescue operations in the Central Mediterranean', *Paix et Sécurité Internationales. Revue Maroco-Espagnole de Droit International et Relation Internationales*, 5, pp. 29–70.

SOBCZYŃSKI, M. (2012), 'Pokój i bezpieczeństwo w skali globalnej', [in:] TRZEPACZ, P. (ed.), *Zrównoważony rozwój – wyzwania globalne*. Podręcznik dla uczestników studiów doktoranckich, Instytut Geografii i Gospodarki Przestrzennej Uniwersytetu Jagiellońskiego, Krakow, pp. 213–290.

TRIPP, C. (2009), *Historia Iraku.* Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza.

WEISS, T.L. (2016), *Migration flows from Iraq to Europe: reasons behind migration*, Iraq Mission International Organization for Migration, Displacement Tracking Matrix, Baghdad.

ZDANOWSKI, J. (2010), *Historia Bliskiego Wschodu w XX wieku.* Wrocław: Ossolineum.

ZIRACK, L. (2016), 'The economic toll of Afghanistan's refugee crisis'*, The Diplomat*, 26.08., http://thediplomat.com/2016/08/the-economic-toll-of-afghanistans-refugee-crisis [accessed on: 7.04.2017].

sciendo

C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.02

Markus ELTGES*, Wendelin STRUBELT*

MIGRATION – GERMANY'S PAST AND PRESENT THOUGHTS AND FIGURES[1]

Abstract. In this article, the history of emigration from Germany and the immigration to Germany especially in relation to its changing borders in the 20th century is discussed. After 1945 Germany was confronted with the integration of a million German refugees. Starting in the 1950s, Germany intentionally attracted foreign workers, and integrated them fairly well. The article analyses the current discussions in Germany in relation to the impact of massive immigration of refugees from non-European areas around 2015. It concludes with a position that in the time of globalisation migration needs a society-focussed and political learning process which has not yet ended and will require more learning. But countries with a declining population are well advised to see immigration as an opportunity for future growth and social diversity.

Key words: Germany, migration, emigration, immigration, statistical data, share of foreigners, attitudes toward foreigners, acceptance of migration, political aspects, moral aspects.

1. INTRODUCTION

According to an estimation by the German Federal Statistical Office in 2019 more than 83 million people were living in Germany, a slight increase compared to the previous year. The increases over the last years were mostly supported by migration to Germany as the German birth rate has for a long time exceeded the mortality rate. According to another additional estimation, more than 20% of the total population have a personal migration history or background ("Migrationshinter-

* Markus ELTGES, Wendelin STRUBELT, Federal Office for Building and Regional Planning, Deichmanns Aue 31–37, 53179 Bonn, Germany; e-mails: markus.eltges@bbr.bund.de, strubelt@t-online.de

[1] This article comes from the BBSR, a federal research institute which focuses on the analysis of urban and spatial developments of Germany in almost all sectors. The institute and its institutional forerunners have for a long time been analysing the demographic development of the foreign population in Germany. Cf. BflR (1985), Strubelt/Veith (1997), BBSR (2014).

grund"). They are persons whose parents were born with a different citizenship than German. And even if they had been born in Germany, they would not be automatically entitled to German citizenship because for a long time this was only automatically possible according to the "ius sanguinis" (i.e. for people with some sort of German descent) and not according to the "ius soli" (i.e. for those who were born on German soil). Only since 2000 has it been possible, according to a new law, to opt for German citizenship if somebody was born in Germany with parents not having the German citizenship. But there is no automatic mechanism. In so far, regarding migration, Germany has been quite a peculiar case. Despite the growing numbers of people of "non-German" backgrounds, the Federal Government did not want, due to political reasons, for Germany to become a target country for migration. Non-permanent migration into Germany, i.e. "Zuwanderung" (in-migration), was allowed without the right to be legally accepted in the process to receive German citizenship, i.e. "Einwanderung" (immigration). The English word "immigration" used for these two German terms in countries with English as the official language does not reflect these political and legal differences in German legal terminology.

According to an international analysis done by the Pew Research Centre (Pew-global, 2019), in

2017 ……17% (12.1 million)

of the German population were not born in Germany. Since 1990, the percentage has more than doubled and has continued to grow:

1990 …….8% (5.9 million)
2000 ……11% (8.9 million)
2010 ...….12% (9.8 million)

All these figures indicate that, in the last 25 years, Germany's population was characterised by a considerable degree of migration (immigration) and not only since 2015, when, on account of civil wars and other unfavourable international circumstances, the wave of refugees from Syria and other Asian and African countries came over the Balkan Route or the Mediterranean Sea to Europe and especially to Germany based on a political decision of Chancellor Merkel in 2015. Compared to other OECD member states it can even be said: "Permanent migration flows have sharply risen in Germany and Sweden in recent years (in the last five years. E./St.) giving both countries a place among the top five OECD countries in terms of immigration as a proportion of the population." (OECD, 2019, p. 78). This is all the more evident if one compares it with the average of the OECD or the EU in toto. That means that Italy, Spain, France and the UK have quite a lower percentage, not to mention Hungary, Poland or even the US.

This political decision by Chancellor Angela Merkel was a humanitarian act and it has since raised considerable discussions and reactions in Europe and naturally in Germany as well. The decision to let a very large number of refugees cross German borders was in 2015 even considered to be unlawful. But by now, it has been agreed that the "order" by Chancellor Merkel was not a violation of the existing legal regulations but that it was covered by law through the right to act under pressure (executive privilege) (cf. Detjen and Steinbeis, 2019) as a rather justified political decision. However, on account of the accusation, the decision by Chancellor Merkel was attacked by politicians and political forces on all federal levels and by the public, especially via the social media from the point of view of breaking the existing law to the populist objection of being a "Volksverräterin" (a traitor in relation to the interest of the people – a common and a legal term from the Third Reich!). Eventually, those questions or objections have never been taken to court, but they gave the public or political discussions a more than negative touch, they turned out to be a political confusion purposefully and intensively used by the rising groups of right-wing populists or nationalists. All these discussions proved to be fora for the so-called "silent masses" to have some concrete topics with which they could identify. It is not surprising that the topic of German identity in relation to foreign refugees became the focus of discussion and even action.

All that influenced elections and dominated the public discussions, and eventually created or strengthened political, mainly populist orientations or groups (parties) in Germany and in other European countries. The increases in the share of the number of people with migration background are not a peculiar or even singular German issue. It has been a European "cause célèbre". But compared to other EU Member States, Germany "excels" in that.

This can be easily seen if one compares the German share of people with migration background with the percentages of other countries, especially European states, from 1990 onwards.

Table 1. Share of people (in percent) with migration background

Country	1990	2000	2010	2017
Germany	8	11	12	17
Austria	10	12	15	19
France	10	11	11	12
Great Britain	6	8	12	13
Italy	3	4	4	10
Norway	5	6	11	15
Poland	3	2	2	2
Spain	2	4	13	13

Table 1. (cont.)

Country	1990	2000	2010	2017
Sweden	9	11	14	18
Switzerland	21	22	26	30
USA	8	11	13	14
Canada	16	18	20	22
Japan	1	1	2	2
Russia	8	8	8	8
Australia	23	23	27	29

Source: Pewglobal, 2019.

However, these figures show quite impressively that Germany as a country has for a long time had an immigration history (DHM, 2005) similar to other European countries like France and Great Britain or even similar to the US, but less like Austria and Switzerland. This shows that over time Germany has become an immigration country ("Einwanderungsland"), but that for a long time it had refused to accept that as its political and legal status. It officially denied this designation. Only with the beginning of the 21th century, this has become more or less accepted, politically and legally, but generally restricted by some sorts of acceptance regulations. The right to seek asylum in Germany due to racial or political persecution, however, remains untouched – a lesson learned after 1945 in reaction to the totalitarian Nazi regime. According to the UN migration report from 2017, Germany is now the third most popular country for migration on an international level after the USA and Saudi Arabia (cf. United Nations, 2017, p. 6). However, the share of foreign-born people has been rising in all European countries over the last ten years with the exception of post-socialist countries like Poland or Russia. Considering the development of migration since 2015 with the new "waves" of refugees from Syria and other Asian states over the so-called Balkan Route and from Africa over the Mediterranean Sea, this has been an extraordinary event with a considerable impact on Germany and its people. However, it was just a temporary but an enormous increase in time with regard to the national and social background of these immigrants. In a short period of time it was a sudden moment of confrontation with international, even global movements, which seemed to have happened only far away. It was an overspill of migration movements which did not touch Europe in the same way as Syria's neighbouring countries like Jordan, Lebanon or Turkey. For the first time, Germany was confronted with real refugees due to a military conflict not in its vicinity but from distant regions. They were perceived at least as rather distant although they were located no more than three hours of flight away. Thus, they were more foreign than those foreigners who came as refugees during the war in the context of the disso-

lution of Yugoslavia. It changed, as already mentioned, the political culture insofar as the migration and the accompanying problems became a topos which allowed especially the former silent level of nationalist attitudes to become public, not at least supported by social media. For quite a long time, it was the number one topic of national public discussions, not just regional or local. The reason for that was the problem with securing places/homes for the incoming refugees including the problem of acceptance – refugees were not always welcome, rather detested which was shown in aggressive actions, e.g. by burning down refugee hostels.

However, Germany after 1945 was a country of mass immigration from regions which Germany had lost. That caused millions of Germans to come as refugees to East and West Germany in various continuous waves from there and, after 1989, from regions of the former Soviet bloc; not to speak of the continuous escapes from East Germans to West Germany between 1949 and 1961. Germany in toto and especially West Germany has since 1945 faced an enormous influx of refugees and the connected problems of, e.g. integration. However, they all spoke German and they sought a new home (Heimat). They had been expelled from their former native countries/regions, ("Heimatvertriebene") thinking that they were coming to a familiar German environment, which was altogether not always the case. It required long processes of integration of the newcomers with the local population. In some way it could be said that those refugees came to some sort of a "cold belonging" (Kossert, 2008). However, they, the refugees, changed the German society in East and West Germany quite intensively, e.g. in changing the religious composition, and they helped through their ability and their skills to rebuild Germany after the Second World War in West and East Germany (Schreyer, 1969; Kornrumpf, 1979). One should neither forget the large number of refugees who left the former German Democratic Republic and settled in the Federal Republic of Germany, stabilizing the West, but destabilising the East of Germany. All those movements accompanied and characterised the social and political groups or better structure of Germany after the Second World War (DHM, 2005; Chaliand, 1994) in East and West Germany, but with that mixed population, it also followed a route of modernisation which in this context cannot be discussed in detail.

2. A SHORT OVERVIEW OF MIGRATION FROM AND TO GERMANY IN THE 19TH CENTURY AND IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 20TH CENTURY

Generally one can say that in the 18th century German regions – one can only speak of Germany for the time from 1871, i.e. the foundation of the second German Reich – were more characterised by emigration (Auswanderung) from Germany to the east and the south-east of Europe, less to North and South Americas,

than by immigration to Germany, with the exception of immigration to Prussia. That changed in the 19th century when the United States became the dominant destination for migration from Europe with Germans having the dominant share (Chaliand,1994, especially chapter "La Grande Migration Trans-Océane, p. 69ff.). But in the 19th century, the growth of centres of industrial development and the accompanying urbanisation, e.g. Berlin and the Ruhr area, resulted in quite an intensive migration into Germany, not to forget the effects triggered by the modernisation of the agricultural sector forcing many peasants to leave and seek a better life in cities ("Landflucht") (Oltmer, 2017). At the beginning of the 20th century, the First World War caused migration waves all over the territories of the fighting nations. The loss of territories in Germany after 1918 was followed by minor migration movements. About one million people moved from former German territories to the spatially newly configured Germany (Oltmer, 2017, p. 132) – in some way, the prelude for the migration after the Second World War. However, the new German spatial configuration also resulted in decreasing the number of minorities in Germany.

The period between 1933 and 1945, the time of the so-called Third Reich, the Hitler regime, was a time of emigration of political opponents and of Jews and a time of killing the remaining opponents and Jews. Not to forget the movement of people enforced by military action of the Allies – basically non-voluntary relocations of people. It is estimated that between 1939 and 1943 – the phase of military expansion by the Nazi regime – about 30 million people became refugees, were expelled or deported (Oltmer, 2017, p. 144). The deportation of people to Germany played an enormous part in sustaining the industrial production during the war by involving them as "Zwangsarbeitskräfte" or "Fremdarbeiter" – a working force sentenced to hard labour from inside or outside Germany. Moreover, deportations ended in the systemic killing of more than 5 million people in concentration camps, mostly Jews from all over Europe.

When the Second World War ended, between 10 and 12 million people left the Nazi camps alive (Oltmer, 2017, p. 151). They were the so-called "displaced persons". The Allies took care of them with the aim to return them to their native countries. We mention this without further analytical details in order to stress their fates, which should not be forgotten in relation to the many Germans who had to leave former German territories, because it demonstrates the enormous amount of migration movements caused by the Nazi regime during the Second World War and after 1945. All those migrations were part of the great migrations of the 20th century, in which Europe was the main area, but not the only one (Chaliand,1994; especially "Les Grandes Migrations du XXe Siècle", pp. 108–109). The effects of those migrations were long-lasting for the different regions and nation states all over Europe, not to forget the social impacts and the individual fortunes.

3. THE MIGRATION SITUATION IN GERMANY AFTER 1945

Coming back to the German situation after 1945 the loss of German territories in the East caused millions of German people (approx. 12.5 million) to leave their former territory more or less voluntarily due to approaching fighting or, more often, by force. They escaped or were expelled to Germany, to the four sectors ruled by the Allies, most of them to the three Western sectors, the later Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), as "Heimatvertriebene" (expellees), but a considerable amount, even the largest share in comparison to the population, to the Soviet sector, the later German Democratic Republic (GDR) (Oltmer, p. 155). In the GDR, they were called "Umsiedler" (resettled persons) because their former German "Heimat" (belonging/home) territory was politically not considered or even recognized as a German territory anymore. In the FRG the loss of those former territories was for a long time legally and politically not accepted. Last but not least, the returning soldiers should not be forgotten, if and when they had been released by the Allies – more than one million from the Soviet Union, more than half a million from France, a bit less from Great Britain and only about 30,000 from the US. The last ones ("Die Heimkehr der 10.000" – the return of the ten thousand based on an agreement by Chancellor Adenauer with the leaders of the Soviet Union without any participation of East Germany) were released in 1955/1956 by the Soviet Union and returned to the FRG. It was an important moment, in some way an end of the immediate post-WWII time. But another group should not be forgotten because, immediately after the end of the war, there was a group of people having been evacuated during the war on account of city bombardments, who wanted to go back to their former homes.

All these movements, escapes, returns or migrations naturally affected the moving people and the remaining population differently, because it affected those who lost their former territories or homes considerably more than those who could have stayed in their places and immediately after the war were involuntarily relocated. A group which demanded acceptance and tolerance and the ability for the migrants to tackle completely new circumstances, which was quite appropriately described as a confrontation with a cold homeland ("Kalte Heimat") (Kossert, 2008). Elisabeth Pfeil had analysed the social concept immediately after the war in her almost classical book "Der Flüchtling" (The refugee). She compared the situation of a refugee with a crustacean having lost its shell and having to find or create a new shell (Pfeil, 1949, p. 83) – a concept often reflected in literature, fiction or non-fiction (Dornemann, 2018).

We mentioned these social events or processes after 1945 in order do show that Germany, East and West, were characterised by the presence of refugees in all regions and on all levels – a social experience or memorial background which in some ways favoured the social acceptance of those new refugee waves but also fostered the attitude of not wanting to share the achievements reached.

Still, on account of the growing economy in the FRG, commonly called the "Wirtschaftswunder", the economic living circumstances of all those migrants (refugees) gradually improved, e.g. by public support offered by taxing those people who had not lost their homes by a national regulation (law) called "Lastenausgleich", that means sharing the burden of the effects of the lost war nationwide (Kornrumpf, 1979). Furthermore, they were improved by tax reductions or national subsidies if someone was accepted with his or her former social status as a classified refugee. A problem concept of integration for the refugees (or "Neusiedler" as they were called) the former GDR had to tackle as well and accompanied it for quite a long time not at least with the endeavour to create enough housing while offering social infrastructure and enough jobs in a centrally planned political system. And it was the political system which especially in the beginning suffered much more from reparations demanded by the Soviet Union than in the Western (the French, the British and the American) sectors (Lowe, 2014; Bade und Oltmer in: DHM, 2005, pp. 20–49).

All in all, Germany, i.e. the two Germanies (FRG and GDR), after the Second World War in many respects was a territory on the "move". A country being divided into two quite different parts, which has not to be stressed in this context; a country in reconstruction, politically, socially and economically in two quite differing ways, confronted with migration from outside as well as from inside. "Inside" must be explained, because, on the one hand, it meant separate movements within the FRG or the GDR. On the other hand, it meant larger and quite more relevant movements from the GDR to the FRG in quantitative and qualitative terms, which were not simple movements but rather escapes caused by political and social inconvenience or just individual aspirations for a better life, which, however, were motivated or interpreted politically. A mixture of reasons one could observe among the migrants of today from all over the world. Between 1949 and 1961, when the Berlin Wall was erected and obstructed any further easy escapes via Berlin, more than 3 million people escaped from the GDR to the FRG, but it should not be forgotten that more than half a million moved from the FRG to the GDR (Oltmer, 2017, p. 163). For the FRG with its growing economy, those refugees from the GDR meant a constant stream of aspiring and well-educated people. That was not the slightest reason for the GDR to stop the effect of bleeding of its economy and endangering the stability of its social and political system. But between 1961 and the end of 1988, altogether about 600,000 people were able to move from the GDR to the FRG (cf. Oltmer, 2017, p. 164). However, most of them were retired or not working people and therefore did not have a bleeding effect for the economy of the GDR. They even redirected the social costs of retirement payments from the GDR to the FRG.

With the unification of Germany, this type of migration or escape movements between the FRG and the GDR in the form of movements between two opposite political systems ceased, though in some way not exactly as they rather changed into interstate movements with their own histories and developments which we cannot treat in more detail in the context of this paper.

However, one should not forget those types of migrants who, since the 1950s, have come to the FRG as people with German descent from countries of Eastern Europe – approx. 4.5 million with a peak of about 2.5 million after the breakdown of the former Soviet Union (Worbs *et al.*, 2013).

All those migrants had to be integrated into the German society and economy. And it could be said that those integration processes did not function smoothly nor immediately in all respects; it took time and demanded adjustment processes by both sides between those who came and those already present. Yet considering all circumstances, it can be said that it was a national success story. It demanded a collective effort and in almost all regions of the FRG it formed a new population mixture, a new social system, a new social configuration, in some way, as already mentioned, a process of modernisation. West Germany, the FRG, received a new structure, a new face, and a new appearance. It was not just a modernisation or just a way to westernise and to develop a new identity, it was a development to continue the modernisation process which had already started in the late 19th century and was continued in the Weimar Republic. Even in the short period of the Nazi regime, a modernisation process was aimed at mobilising the German society and its economic structure for preparing the Second World War and it was implemented by robbing the resources of other regions or countries after the military conquest.

4. IMMIGRATION OF A FOREIGN WORKFORCE

However, this new formation of the German society after the Second World War would be incomplete if one failed to consider the movement of people from other, mainly South European countries, who came to work in Germany because the growing economy needed more workforce (BfLR, 1985; Häußermann and Oswald, 1997; DHM, 2005).

They came from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Yugoslavia and, especially, from Turkey. They were officially hired through intergovernmental agreements and they were supposed to stay only some years according to their contracts. They were called "Gastarbeiter" meaning guest worker. This denomination was purposely selected because it should be positively distinguished against the denomination "Fremdarbeiter" (alien worker) which was used during the Nazi regime. Due to this policy, procedures for integration did not exist or were not intentionally established. There were even no programmes for teaching German because people thought that no elaborate level of understanding and speaking German was needed for their level of work (Can, 2018; Abdel-Samad, 2018).

But as Max Frisch, a Swiss author, already noticed in 1965 with regard to the immigration of people from Italy and Spain into Switzerland: "Wir riefen

Arbeitskräfte, und es kamen Menschen." (We were looking for working force and people (human beings) came). The concept of self-induced immigration contrary to the official federal policies. And in the case of Germany that was quite similar, but there it mostly applied to Turkish people. They came as a workforce but gradually, by taking their wives and kids to Germany, became the largest group of foreigners living in Germany – which is in contrast to, e.g. the enactment of 1973 of stopping the recruitment of workers from outside the EU (Strubelt/Veith, 1997; BfLR, 1985; BBSR, 2013 and 2014). It took quite a long time for the German politics and the German society to accept that. And the result was a large group of foreigners living in Germany, not well integrated, but creating a new German society, a new Germany with different and many cultural backgrounds ("Multikulti" – a common term used in Germany) (BfLR, 1985; Kalter, 2008). This development was highly discussed and all over the public and on all political and public levels. Naturally, this was not a concept for creating a soft and adjusted integration process, but over time Germany, that means the FRG, changed its appearance, became a more and more multicultural social setting especially in urban areas, not a real multicultural society (Häußermann and Ostwald, 1997). There was still some hostility towards those foreigners, described as "Überfremdung" (foreign infiltration – the English term is less negative than the German having a real negative undertone), but the acceptance of those non-Germans was growing, also because living together more or less meant living side by side, more or less without close social contacts. But the results of empirical research showed that the more German people came across or had contact with foreigners, the more positively they were oriented toward them (Böltken, 2003; Ripl, 2008). Naturally, that rather applies to West Germany and less to East Germany, where foreign workers from Vietnam, Cuba or some African countries were only in very small numbers present and more or less concentrated in their living circumstances without contact with their German environment. It would be too easy to take this as the only and single reason that East Germany was more opposed to foreign people than West Germany because there is another important factor that should be considered: the fact that, due to the individual effects of unification and globalisation, there is a growing share of German people feeling social insecurity and anxiety about their own future and the future of their children (see German "Angst" (Biess, 2019)), but "Angst" is not restricted to Germany, if we look to, e.g. France and the "gilet jaune" (yellow vest) movement). And when comparing the West to the East, one must realise a comparative advantage of the West in relation to the East in an economic context, collectively and individually. In total, one could see that many people think that their national government should first of all care for their citizens and only secondly, if at all, for foreign immigrants. This opinion has been spurred by a new wave of populism all over Europe, which is reflected by growing anti-immigration policies in almost all European countries, e.g. included in the arguments for the Brexit or expressed in the Nordic countries popular for their

humanitarian approach to accepting refugees, not to mention the hostility toward foreigners, if not even xenophobia in some new EU Member States.

This became evident when, through the international migration caused by war in the Middle East and in Africa, more and more refugees appeared at the frontiers of Europe and were heading towards countries which they assumed to be more friendly towards them or which would give them a chance for future well-being. The fact that that had to do with the special social development of those countries while others were not prepared or structured to accept immigrants should at least be mentioned. This reflects the concept or outcome of the "Ungleichzeitigkeit des Gleichzeitigen" (The non-simultaneity of the simultaneous – a topic developed by the art historian Wilhelm Pinder and taken up by Karl Mannheim for the social analysis of generations) – a common phenomenon observable in different historical developments in societies over time, e.g. the difference between Eastern and Western countries in Europe, which followed or are still following quite different pathways on account of their different historical developments (Koselleck, 2000).

This was especially obvious around 2015 when Chancellor Merkel allowed refugees from countries suffering from civil wars within a humanitarian act to come to Germany and created a new national policy with the words "Wir schaffen das" (We will manage). This was not accepted well by other European countries and also not by the more conservative political forces in Germany. The reasons were that the former feared a new hegemony by Germany (Hofbauer, 2018, p. 146) while the latter feared the negative effects for them and their children (Reckwitz, 2017, p. 405)

5. IMMIGRATION OF REFUGEES IN RECENT PAST

No other migration movement had challenged Germany to such an extent like the immigration streams of war refugees in 2015, especially from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. This becomes evident (Kalter, 2008; BBSR, 2017; Oltmer, 2017) when comparing them to other migration flows caused by

– the recruitment agreement for the so-called "guest workers" (1955 to 1973),
– family reunifications with foreigners already living in Germany (especially between 1973 and 1985, but also today),
– the immigration of resettlers of German descent, especially between 1987 and 1999,
– the immigration of refugees in the late-1980s and the early-1990s because of the war in the Balkans,
– the free movement of EU citizens since 1957 and after the expiration of the transitional arrangements with the countries that joined the EU in 2004 (the Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia) and in 2007 (Romania, Bulgaria).

Table 2. Immigration, emigration, net migration and surplus of the born or deceased with a long-term perspective in Germany 1950 to 2017

Year	Immigration	Emigrations	Net Migration	Surplus of the born or deceased	Year	Immigration	Emigrations	Net Migration	Surplus of the born or deceased
1950	96,140.00	78,148	+17,992	+368,372	1984	410,387.00	604,832.00	-194,445	-105,007
1951	88,349.00	126,071	-37,722	+353,683	1985	480,872.00	425,313.00	+55,559	-115,846
1952	88,089.00	135,796	-47,707	+337,445	1986	567,215.00	407,139.00	+160,076	-77,194
1953	101,599.00	122,264	-20,665	+304,375	1987	591,765.00	398,518.00	+193,247	-33,322
1954	111,490.00	136,212	-24,722	+334,452	1988	860,578.00	419,439.00	+441,139	-7,634
1955	127,921.00	136,977	-9,056	+317,470	1989	1,133,794.00	539,832.00	+593,962	-22,982
1956	159,086.00	168,101	-9,015	+325,058	1990	1,256,250.00	574,378.00	+681,872	-15,770
1957	200,142.00	173,171	+26,971	+325,360	1991	1,198,978.00	596,455.00	+602,523	-81,226
1958	212,520.00	161,865	+50,655	+357,452	1992	1,502,198.00	720,127.00	+782,071	-76,329
1959	227,600.00	178,864	+48,736	+408,520	1993	1,277,408.00	815,312.00	+462,096	-98,823
1960	395,016.00	218,574	+176,442	+384,893	1994	1,082,553.00	767,555.00	+314,998	-115,058
1961	489,423.00	266,536	+222,887	+463,205	1995	1,096,048.00	698,113.00	+397,935	-119,367
1962	566,465.00	326,339	+240,126	+437,720	1996	959,691.00	677,494.00	+282,197	-86,830
1963	576,951.00	426,767	+150,184	+460,525	1997	840,633.00	746,969.00	+93,664	-48,216
1964	698,609.00	457,767	+240,842	+486,985	1998	802,456.00	755,358.00	+47,098	-67,348
1965	791,737.00	489,503	+302,234	+417,504	1999	874,023.00	672,048.00	+201,975	-75,586
1966	702,337.00	608,775	+93,562	+406,319	2000	841,158.00	674,038.00	+167,120	-71,798
1967	398,403.00	604,211	-205,808	+357,859	2001	879,217.00	606,494.00	+272,723	-94,066
1968	657,513.00	404,301	+253,212	+238,447	2002	842,543.00	623,255.00	+219,288	-122,436

Year	Immigration	Emigrations	Net Migration	Surplus of the born or deceased	Year	Immigration	Emigrations	Net Migration	Surplus of the born or deceased
1969	980,731.00	436,685	+544,046	+154,274	2003	768,975.00	626,330.00	+142,645	-147,225
1970	1,042,760.00	495,675	+547,085	+72,073	2004	780,175.00	697,632.00	+82,543	-112,649
1971	936,349.00	554,280	+382,069	+47,773	2005	707,352.00	628,399.00	+78,953	-144,432
1972	852,549.00	568,610	+283,939	-64,032	2006	661,855.00	639,064.00	+22,791	-148,903
1973	932,583.00	580,019	+352,564	-147,019	2007	680,766.00	636,854.00	+43,912	-142,293
1974	601,013.00	635,613	-34,600	-151,073	2008	682,146.00	737,889.00	-55,743	-161,925
1975	429,064.00	652,966	-223,902	-207,339	2009	721,014.00	733,796.00	-12,782	-189,418
1976	476,286.00	569,133	-92,847	-168,539	2010	798,282.00	670,605.00	+127,677	-180,821
1977	522,611.00	505,696	+16,915	-125,659	2011	958,299.00	678,969.00	+279,330	-189,643
1978	559,620.00	458,769	+100,851	-146,931	2012	1,080,936.00	711,991.00	+368,945	-196,038
1979	649,832.00	419,091	+230,741	-127,257	2013	1,226,493.00	797,886.00	+428,607	-211,756
1980	736,362.00	439,571	+296,791	-86,582	2014	1,464,724.00	914,241.00	+550,483	-153,429
1981	605,629.00	470,525	+135,104	-92,336	2015	2,136,954.00	997,552.00	+1,139,402	-187,625
1982	404,019.00	493,495	-89,476	-82,557	2016	1,865,122.00	1,365,178.00	+499,944	-119,000
1983	354,496.00	487,268	-132,772	-113,099	2017	1,550,721.00	1,134,641.00	+416,080	-148,000

Source: own work, Federal Statistical Office.

Table 2 presents the different phases of migration since 1950. In the 68 years considered, there was a positive migration balance in 53 years. Political processes formed Germany to be a country of immigration rather than of emigration. Between 1950 and 2017 around 13.7 million people moved to Germany.

With the beginning of the full freedom of movement for those European Member States which joined the EU in 2004 and 2007, a positive net migration balance began in 2010, reaching a historical peak of a positive migration balance of 1.1 million in 2015, particularly caused by immigrations from countries suffering from civil wars, i.e. Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq. In 2016 alone, 722,370 initial applications were submitted as a result of the refugee immigration in 2015 under the German Asylum Act. Due to political decisions such as the agreement with Turkey or the closure of the so-called "Balkan Route", the inflow of refugees after 2016 fell sharply. While between 2015 and 2016 441,899 initial applications for asylum were filed, the number fell to 198,317 applications in 2017 and 161,931 in 2018. Between 2014 and 2018, about one third of the asylum seekers came from Syria, followed by Afghanistan (11%) and Iraq (10%). In the wake of that sharp decline, the positive migration balance also decreased to 416,000 in 2017. Current estimates of the Federal Statistical Office for 2018 assume a net migration of 386,000 persons.

On the one hand – and this should at least be noticed and appreciated – the immigration wave which started in 2015 triggered solidarity among the German population, yet also great anxiety among some Germans arising from the daily press coverage and the posts in social media about migration issues. Those images gave the impression of a disorderly, even uncontrolled inflow of immigrants to Germany.

People had the impression that the authorities were not capable of handling the immigration which caused sorrows among the population and even fears of foreign infiltration. Furthermore, immigration from Syria, Afghanistan and Iran applied to parts of the world not belonging to the European cultural circle defined as the "christlich-jüdische Abendland" (the Judeo-Christian Occident) which was necessary to be defended.[2] Among all the cultural differences of faith and religion or the people's attitude towards democratic systems, particularly the relationship of men and women was perceived as a problem for a barrier-free communication between refugees and the domestic population. The fact that, at the beginning of the refugee inflow, predominantly young men had arrived without their families additionally increased security concerns. It is worth noting that these concerns

[2] This was the purpose of a movement which arose in Dresden and called itself PEGIDA, the acronym for – "Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes" (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the Occident) founded in an area of Germany where a proportionally small number of foreigners live and where the religious definition of the Occident had little foundation in religious connections or even activities.

were stronger among the part of the German population which relied on social benefits. Those people were afraid of having to share their limited benefits with large numbers of new potential service recipients. Although social benefits were not cut for any of existing recipients, the question arose in the group of German welfare recipients why and how the Federal Government was able to spend vast amounts of money on additional social benefits for the immigrants and why and how the Federal Government at the same time could argue that it was not able to raise these benefits for the native population. Stichweh (2017, p. 66ff) described those conflicting issues in his essay "Fremdenangst und Fremdenfeindlichkeit" (English: "xenophobia")[3] using such terms as "competition of resources" and "collective identities". He wrote: "The entry of foreigners can be understood as a threat to collective identities and life forms linked to them." The "competition of resources" was in the short term repeated by the accusation "There is enough money for others yet not for us." This accusation referred to the experience during the days of the European and international bankruptcy when hundreds of billions of euros were made available in times of financial and economic crisis after 2008 to save the banking system. Due to the bailout and the high earnings of managers, those billions were made available almost overnight, while tough and long political disputes were waged over every increase in social transfers. This perceived unequal treatment led to a sense of powerlessness among many people who rely on social transfers. That generated mistrust in the public.

Table 3. The ten largest application groups by nationalities from 2014 to 2018 (initial applications for asylum)

Country	Total					2014–2018	
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total	In percent
Syria, Arab. Republic	39,332	158,657	266,250	48,974	44,167	557,380	41.6
Afghanistan	9,115	31,382	127,012	16,423	9,942	193,874	14.5
Iraq	5,345	29,784	96,116	21,930	16,333	169,508	12.7
Albania	7,865	53,805	14,853			76,523	5.7
Serbia	17,172	16,700				33,872	2.5
Eritrea	13,198	10,876	18,854	10,226	5,571	58,725	4.4
Iran, Islam. republic			26,426	8,608	10,857	45,891	3.4
Kosovo	6,908	33,427				40,335	3.0

[3] In German, the English term "xenophobia" can be translated as a fear of the foreign and hatred against the foreign. In German: "Das Hinzutreten von Fremden kann als eine Bedrohung kollektiver Identitäten und mit ihnen verknüpfter Lebensformen verstanden werden."

Table 3. (cont.)

Country	Total					2014–2018	
	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total	In percent
Russian Federation			10,985	4,884	3,938	19,807	1.5
Unknown		11,721	14,659	4,067	4,220	34,667	2.6
Pakistan		8,199	14,484			22,683	1.7
Nigeria			12,709	7,811	10,168	30,688	2.3
Macedonia	5,614	9,083				14,697	1.1
Somalia	5,528			6,836	5,073	17,437	1.3
Turkey				8,027	10,160	18,187	1.4
Bosnia and Herzegovina	5,705					5,705	0.4
Vietnam						0	0.0
India						0	0.0
Sum Top 10	115,782	363,634	602,348	137,786	120,429	1,339,979	100.0
Initial applications for asylum in total	173,072	441,899	722,370	198,317	161,931	1,697,589	

Source: Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2018 (The Federal Office in figures 2018, Nuremberg 2019, p. 17).

At the beginning of the strong immigration by civilian war refugees, the focus was placed on safeguarding the existential living conditions of these people, with an emphasis on housing. However, the question of their rapid integration into the German society became gradually the focus of the socio-political discussion. The geographic distribution of such numbers of people occurred after registration in a federal country like Germany in its 16 federal states. After having been registered centrally, the refugees were distributed over the 16 federal states where they were cared for. In the federal states they were distributed more or less evenly throughout cities and municipalities. The distribution was essentially proportional as per populations among the federal states. Within those, the distribution to cities and municipalities was almost equal. Initially, due to strict time constraints, the accommodation in the so-called shared accommodations was dominant. They were mostly gymnasiums of schools. Furthermore, decentralised accommodation in individual apartments were found. In order to create additional space for accommodation, temporary regulations were created in the German Federal Building Code. Since the beginning, the housing, provisioning, education, and integration of refugees has been a joint task of the German federal system including the

national, the federal and the local level. Since 2017 alone, the Federal Government has been contributing around 15 billion euros per annum to refugee-related benefits. The focus of this expenditure has been divided between the fight against the causes of flight in the countries of origin, the admission and registration, as well as the integration of asylum seekers with right of residence (www.bundesfinanzministerium.de, 2019).

After the peaks in 2015 and 2016, one can observe a sharp decline in the number of refugees. Still, for quite a long time, it was the main public concerns and led to fervent discussions and protests, not only verbal but with physical attacks as well.[4] Last but not least, that was the reason for raising and reassessing the immigration policies politically. For example, the coalition agreement between the CDU, the CSU and the SPD (Coalition Agreement between CDU, CSU and SPD 2017, 19th Parliamentary Term, p. 103) stated: "We continue our efforts to avoid a repetition of the situation in 2015: for that reason, efforts for appropriate taxation and restriction of migration, including improvement of development efforts, expansion of humanitarian commitments, extension of peacekeeping commitments, fair trade agreements, increased climate protection and no export of arms to troubled regions. We note that the immigration figures, based on the experiences of the last twenty years and in view of the agreed policies and the directly taxable percentage of immigrations, are not exceeding the rate of between 180,000 and 220,000 annually." Politically this was quite a turn from a policy of welcome to a more restrictive one. But a political compromise was needed to appease the public dissent and to channel the whole process of managing the refugee problem in a proper and accepted form all over Germany and not leaving the part of acceptance and friendship to the engaged persons in the civil society.

At the same time, an agreement was reached through this coalition agreement to solve a deficit in the German immigration legislation. It is true that within the EU the free movement of citizens applies, however, this legislation excludes the cases of immigration from outside the EU. In principle, the legal basis for recognition as a refugee or asylum seeker in Germany is only a temporary right of residence (see BAMF, 2016, p. 17ff). Many of the refugees, some of whom have been able to find their family members in Germany who had fled to Germany as well, have learned

[4] This was especially the case after such incidents like young male immigrants attacking young women in public places or during public events, like the celebration of the 2015 New Year's Eve in Cologne, or like the case of young girls murdered by immigrants in the city of Freiburg or in the small town of Kandel. Those incidents caused outrage in social media and in tabloids. Those were very serious crimes. The German Federal Criminal Police Office will achieve the following results in 2019 for an overall analysis: "The evolution of the past four years (around 1.52 million asylum seekers in total) had an impact on the crime situation in 2018 both in the area of general crime and politically motivated crime. However, the vast majority of asylum seekers who came to Germany does not commit any criminal offenses" (Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office, 2019, p. 59). Violence against refugees should not be ignored.

the German language, their children go to school, they have a job, go through a vocational training or enter higher education (Schmal *et al*., 2016; Meier-Braun, 2013). Therefore, for the first time in Germany the current political coalition has agreed on the establishment/enactment of a skill-based labour immigration law:

„We regulate the immigration of skilled workers: skilled worker immigration act. It regulates the increasing demand for skilled workers through labour migration in a new and transparent way. It provides clear indication of economic requirements as well as a qualification, age, language, proof of an actual job, and safeguarding of subsistence costs." (p. 16) The German economy needs skilled workers now and it will need then in the future due to the demographic change.

As we have showed earlier, Germany has been characterised by a negative natural balance since 1972, i.e. there have been more people dying than being born. Thus, the more or less stable demographic development in Germany was and is only the result of immigration from the outside. The fact that Germany had around 83 million inhabitants in 2018 had not been foreseeable ten years ago. Many population forecasts for Germany saw strongly declining population figures, but above all rapid aging. Against the background of these changing demographic processes, immigration in Germany is being discussed again, whereby the permanent right of residence for qualified skilled workers is now in the focus of the discussion. The concept now is: by accepting immigration not only restricted to asylums seekers, it should be generally possible to accept trained immigrants as such like in other countries, e.g. Canada. The reason is that in the next few years, i.e. soon, the so-called baby boomers (people born between 1958 and 1967) will leave the labour market consequently creating a big gap in the workforce. It is therefore not only necessary to compensate at least partially for this gap, but also to ensure that the social security systems and above all the retirement pension system are financially stable. Already by now, a gradual increase in the retirement age has affected the pensioning system. For people born in 1964 onwards, basically only a pension entry age of 67 will be able to sustain the system. That means it is necessary to discuss the problem of immigration not only as a challenge from the outside but rather from the inside as an opportunity for future development.

Politically, there is currently a struggle over how qualified specialists from recent refugee immigration can be granted a permanent right of residence. After all, 300,000 people in this group are in employment and subject to social security contributions (Federal Employment Agency, 2019, p. 12). This is strongly supported by employers because they are in actual need for trained employees.

Finally, a spatial aspect of refugee migration should not be ignored. Thus, especially in rural areas with greater population losses, immigration has contributed to the fact that institutions of general interest such as kindergartens or schools have again reached their viability and therefore might not be closed. For the quality of life in these areas, this was and is a gain, as longer commutes to the next kindergarten or school can be avoided. Some individual cities such as the city of Altena,

a small town in North Rhine-Westfalia, have even considered the refugee immigration to be a great opportunity for the town and its local community facing a sharp decline of the population. The town offered an excellent example of international solidarity, but that has not been generally the case. This commitment of citizens and the mayor – a member of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU), i.e. the more conservative party – for the benefit of the refugees and the city, among other things, caused the mayor of Altena to be the European finalist of the Nansen Refugee Award of the UNHCR. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) justified this selection as follows: "When many politicians hesitated and the social sentiment worsened, Dr. Hollstein together with the many volunteers from Altena created an exemplary model of integration – for the benefit of the refugees and their city (...) The action of Dr. Hollstein is characterised by solidarity, humanism and decisiveness, but by a commitment to his city as well: The mayor knew that a successful integration is benefitting everyone. He has proved that taking in and promoting young, committed refugees can positively shape the future of cities and communities" (see altena.de, accessed on on 4 May 2019). It should be said, though, that Altena as a positive example does not stand for the local level in Germany in toto. Nonetheless, it has set a strong example and it can be supplemented with a lot more examples in the German society for a positive commitment for refugees, both individually and collectively. Yet there still exists a basis for prejudice and hate towards refugees stemming from with incidences like in Freiburg or Kandel. And in Altena, Mayor Dr. Hollstein was not only a target of crude insults in social media, he was directly attacked with a knife. The problem-solving of the immigration of 2015/2016 has not yet ended, but it changed in topics, character and agenda. The immediate problems of feeding and sheltering the refugees are solved, but now the more intricate problems of integrating refugees exist. It is still not possible to conclude that they are solved. Their resolution will be a continuing and challenging task for all, the society and politics, institutions and people (Treibel, 2015; Meier-Braun, 2013 and 2018; Abdel-Samad, 2018).

The nationwide discussions about immigrants have now, (2019) almost 4 years after the peak in 2015, more or less calmed down. But from time to time, in relation to current events and due to the fact that large parts of the population stay aside or are reluctant to accept the new social structure or are still hostile to any immigration, some people use it to fuel their populistic and nationalistic attitudes or political orientations which had existed before 2015. However, it is now used as a factor of acceleration for their community and political aims (Heitmeyer, 2018, p. 344ff). Now they favour a closure and strict control of the borders like in many other EU Member States. It is still a social and political challenge, a national issue not only in relation to the future of the very political system and the structure of the society, both nationally and in the context of a more and more globalised world, but it touches the moral and ethical basis of our societies. Their future may be more than we are willing to accept or even discuss.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE

External inflow of people has been characteristic for Germany for over seventy years. It was caused by political, economic or humane factors. In times of political uncertainty in the world, the number of those fleeing has reached a considerable volume. According to the UNHCR, by the end of 2017, 68.5 million people worldwide were "on the run". Around 25.4 million of those people were refugees fleeing from armed conflicts, persecution or serious human rights' violations, or just seeking better living conditions, which is quite understandable. However, the last group is quite unfairly disqualified as "Wirtschaftsflüchtlinge" in German. Half of the world's refugees are children under the age of 18. 40.0 million people are internally displaced persons, i.e. people who flee within their country. 3.1 million people out of the 68.5 million are asylum seekers (www.unhcr.org, 2019). The majority of those refugees find shelter and refuge outside Europe. Despite many endeavours to tackle the causes of people fleeing their homes, the economic gap between the wealthy and poor nations will always be an incentive to seek a better life. Modern forms of communication, worldwide networking within seconds, the high proportion of young people and, above all, mobile people will continue to keep immigration on the agenda in the future. In addition to the search for a better life, escaping war and displacement or ethnic conflicts, there is even a greater danger that, in the future, the consequences of climate change will cause migration in the world. Prolonged heat spells, water scarcity and insufficiency of food can significantly increase the pressure on those countries that still have prosperity in climatically balanced conditions. Europe is one of those regions in the world. A European long-term strategy is needed to balance the current extremely diverse positions within the EU and to form a political and community position in relation to growing differences worldwide. Admittedly, that is a major politically challenging task.

No country can exclude itself from these challenges in the long run. Every society has to face the moral and ethical questions when it comes to accepting people who seek protection from war and expulsion.

In the short term and with regard to the forthcoming Brexit, it has to be observed how migration flows will spread across the EU 27 when Great Britain and Northern Ireland drop out as countries of immigration. Above all, citizens from the Eastern European EU Member States have sought a new home in Great Britain. The question will be where in Europe they will live in the near future. The question will now be whether new nations, regions and cities of immigration are sought. In Germany, it can also lead to more immigration due to the persisting prosperity gap to the Eastern European countries, but also due to the great need for skilled workers in the industry or in the service sector.

Thus, the integration of refugees and immigrants into the German society is not only a moral or ethical approach but a political perspective to be followed

for the future of a country that has been on the move for a long time, as we have shown and argued. And all prejudice or fears of some groups of the population, not only of extremists, about the decrease of the Germans by biological descent – almost impossible to define – and a very dangerous taking up or a revival of Nazi practices to define Arians and their fear of a "Bevölkerungsaustausch" (an exchange of Germans or replacement by immigrants) are mostly based on ignorance or fake news or theories of conspiracy. However, such opinions, publicly or silently uttered or expressed in more or less closed social media channels, are present, not only in Germany but all over Europe. They have to be approached and tackled publicly in an open social discourse.

We would like to close our argumentation by citing two thinkers who perfectly argued in this direction. The first one is Sigmund Freud whom Walter Siebel already in 1997 considered in his discussion (Siebel in Häußermann/Ostwald, 1997, p. 41): "Eine Kultur, die eine große Zahl von Menschen ausgrenzt, hat keine Zukunft und verdient auch keine" (A civilization which excludes large numbers of human beings does not have a future and does not deserve one).

The second is Hannah Arendt who in 1943 wrote an article entitled "We refugees" about her personal experience with the situation as a migrant. In the little booklet of the German translation, which appeared in 2016, she was quoted with a remark during a radio discussion from 1963 saying: "Die für den Nationalstaat typische Fremdenfeindlichkeit ist unter heutigen Verkehrs- und Bevölkerungsbedingungen so provinziell, dass eine bewusst national orientierte Kultur sehr schnell auf den Stand der Folklore und der Heimatkunst herabsinken dürfte." (Under today's circumstances of traffic and demographic developments, the hostility to strangers (xenophobia), typical for the nation state, is based on such a provincial attitude that a wilfully nationally oriented culture will descend to a status of folklore and localism) (Arendt, 2016, pp. 55–56).

Both statements speak for themselves but considering the current discussions in EU Member States in relation to the problem of immigration makes one use a common saying: "You cannot eat your cake and have it, too".

We hope to have demonstrated that Germany has long been a nation characterised by all sorts of migration, inwards and outwards, both voluntary and forced. We could observe and demonstrate that the development over time, the social and political developments have not been easy and were not following clear and direct directions, but at least they have indicated a learning process which has not yet ended and will require more learning. But examples like the one from Altena or publications like *Making Heimat. Germany arrival country*, the catalogue for the German exhibition at "La Biennale di Venezia" 2016 (Schmal *et al.*, 2016) or architectural designs for creating homes for refugees (Friedrich *et al.*, 2015) constitute signs of positive developments towards the future. Thus, the notion proposed by a Canadian author Doug Sounders in his book *Arrival City* which he clarified in his subtitle: "How the largest migration in history is reshaping our world" is

to be taken seriously. The German subtitle of his book is more future-oriented: "Über alle Grenzen hinweg ziehen Millionen Menschen von Land in die Städte. Von ihnen hängt unsere Zukunft ab" (Million of human beings are moving from the country into cities. Our future is depending on them) (Saunders, 2011). This is a positive, future-oriented statement but a realistic one as well. The objective of tomorrow is to face it realistically and tackle the consequences within an open society. To counter it with nationalistic or egocentric (= nation) attitudes or orientations is narrow-minded.

To follow this realistic and future-oriented route can be the role of Germany in the EU and in the world. Even if there is a fear of Germany becoming a new hegemon in Europe, especially after the Brexit, there is also a fear that Germany is too reluctant to take on an active role in international politics as well, and especially in the field of migration. Not an easy position for Germany in Europe and in the world – externally and internally, now and in future.

REFERENCES

ABDEL-SAMAD, H. (2018), *Integration. Ein Protokoll des Scheiterns*. München: Droemer.

ARENDT, H. (2016), 'Wir Flüchtlinge. Mit einem Essay von Thomas Meyer. Ditzingen: Reclam', *The Menorah Journal*, 36 (1), 1943, pp. 69–77.

BEIER-DE HAAN, R. (edited for the Deutsche Historische Museum (DHM)) (2005), *Zuwanderungsland Deutschland. Migrationen 1500–2005.* Wolfratshausen und Berlin: Edition Minerva und DHM.

BIESS, F. (2019), *Republik der Angst. Eine andere Geschichte der Bundesrepublik.* Reinbek: Rowohlt.

BÖLTKEN, F. (2003), 'Social Distance and Physical Proximity', [in:] ALBA, R., SCHMIDT, P. and WASMER, M. (eds.), *German or Foreigners? Attitudes Toward Ethnic Minorities in the Post-Reunification Germany.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 95–118.

BAMF (Bundesagentur für Arbeit) (2019), Berichte: Arbeitsmarkt kompakt, April 2019: Fluchtmigration, Nürnberg (Federal Employment Agency: Reports: Labor Market compact, April 2019. Immigration Monitoring, Nuremberg).

BAMF (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) (2016), Ablauf des deutschen Asylverfahrens, Nürnberg, 2016 (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees: Procedure of the German asylum procedure, Nuremberg 2016).

BAMF (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge) (2019), Das Bundesamt in Zahlen 2018. Asyl. April 2019, Nürnberg (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees: The Federal office in figures, 2018, Asylum. April 2019, Nuremberg).

BfLR (Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumordnung) (1985), Ausländer in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland – ein räumliches Problem? Themenheft der Informationen für Raumentwicklung, 6, Bonn.

BKA (Bundeskriminalamt) (2019), Kriminalität im Kontext von Zuwanderung – Bundeslagebild 2018, Wiesbaden 2019 (Germany's Federal Criminal Police Office (2019): Crime in the context of immigration, Report 2018, Wiesbaden).

BBSR (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung) (2013), Migration und Stadt? Themenheft der Informationen für Raumentwicklung, 5, Bonn.

BBSR (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung) (2014), Zuwanderung, Armut, Verantwortung. Themenheft No. 6 der Informationen zur Raumentwicklung. Bonn/Stuttgart: Franz Steiner.

BBSR (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung) (2014), Zuwanderung, Armut, Verantwortung? Themenheft der Informationen für Raumentwicklung, 6, Bonn.

BBSR (Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung) (2017), Flüchtlinge- zwischen Ankommen und Zusammenleben? Themenheft der Informationen für Raumentwicklung, 2, Bonn.

CHALIAND, G., JAN, M. and RAGEAU, J-P. (1994), *Atlas Historique des Migrations.* Paris: Editions du Seuil.

Coalition Agreement between CDU, CSU and SPD 19th Parliamentary Term.

DETJEN, S. and STEINBEIS, M. (2019), *Die Zauberlehrlinge. Der Streit um die Flüchtlingspolitik und der Mythos vom Rechtsbruch.* Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta.

DORNEMANN, A. (ed.) (2018), *Heimwehland. Flucht – Vertreibung – Erinnerung. Ein literarisches Lesebuch.* Hildesheim–Zürich–New York: Georg Olms.

Fremde Heimat. Das Schicksal der Vertriebenen nach 1945 (2011), Das Buch zur Fernsehserie. Berlin: Rowohlt.

FRIEDRICH, J., TAKASAKI, S., HASLINGER, P. and THIEDMANN, O. (2015), *Konzepte für eine menschenwürdige Architektur.* Berlin: Jovis.

HEITMEYER, W. (2018), *Autoritäre Versuchungen. Signaturen der Bedrohung I.* Berlin: Suhrkamp.

HOFBAUER, H. (2018), *Kritik der Migration. Wer profitiert und wer verliert.* Vienna: Promedia.

KALTER, F. (ed.) (2008), *Migration und Integration. Sonderheft 48 der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie.* Köln: VS Verlag.

KORNRUMPF, M. (1979), *In Bayern angekommen. Die Eingliederung der Vertriebenen. Zahlen – Daten – Namen.* Munich and Vienna: Olzog.

KOSELLECK, R. (2000), *Vergangene Zukunft. Zur Semantik geschichtlicher Zeiten.* Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.

KOSSERT, A. (2008), *Kalte Heimat. Die Geschichte der deutschen Vertriebenen nach 1945.* Munich: Siedler Verlag. Paperbackausgabe2009 Munich: Pantheon.

LOWE, K. (2014), *Der wilde Kontinent. Europa in den Jahren der Anarchie 1943–1950.* Stuttgart: Cotta.

MEIER-BRAUN, K.-H. (2018), *Schwarzbuch Migration. Die dunkle Seite unserer Flüchtlingspolitik.* Munich: Beck.

MEIER-BRAUN, K.-H. and WEBER, R. (eds.) (2013), *Deutschland Einwanderungsland, Begriffe – Fakten – Kontroversen.* Stuttgart: Kohlhammer (hier Sonderausgabe für die Zentralen für politische Bildung).

MEREY, C. (2018), *Der ewige Gast. Wie mein türkischer Vater versuchte, Deutscher zu warden.* Munich: Blessing.

OLTMER, J. (2017), *Migration. Geschichte und Zukunft der Gegenwart.* Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft.

PFEIL, E. (1948), *Der Flüchtling. Gestalt einer Zeitenwende.* Hamburg: Hans von Hugo Verlag.

RECKWITZ, A. (2017), *Die Gesellschaft der Singularitäten. Zum Strukturwandel der Moderne.* Berlin: Suhrkamp.

RIPL, S. (2008), 'Zu Gast bei Freunden. Fremdenfeindliche Einstellungen und interethnische Freundschaften im Zeitverlauf', [in:] Kalter Frank, *Migration und Integration. Sonderheft 48 der Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie.* Munich-Vienna: VS Verlag, pp. 488–512.

SAUNDERS, D. (2011), *Arrival City. Über alle Grenzen hinweg ziehen Millionen Menschen vom Land in die Städte. Von ihnen hängt unsere Zukunft ab.* Munich: Karl Blessing Verlag.

SCHMAL, P.C., ELSER, O. and SCHEUERMANN, A. (eds.) (2016), *Making Heimat. German Arrival Country. Catalogue in conjunction published for the German Pavilion at the 15th international Architecture Exhibition 2016 – La Biennale die Venezia.* Ostfildern: Hatje Cantz. Auf Englisch und Deutsch.

SCHREYER, K. (1969), *Bayern – ein Industriestaat, die importierte Industrialisierung; (das wirtschaftliche Wachstum nach 1945 als Ordnungs- und Strukturproblem).* Munich–Vienna.

STICHWEH, R., 'Fremdenangst and Fremdenfeindlichkeit – Historische und sozialstrukturelle Bedingungen', [in:] Bundesinstitut für Bau-, Stadt- und Raumforschung (ed.) (2017), *Flüchtlinge-zwischen Ankommen und Zusammenleben? Themenheft der Informationen für Raumentwicklung*, 2, Bonn, pp. 62–69.

STRUBELT, W. and VEITH, K. (1997), 'Zuwanderung und Integration – Deutschland in den 80er und 90er Jahren', [in:] FRIEDRICHS, J. (ed.), *Die Städte in den 90er Jahren. Demographische, ökonomische und soziale Entwicklungen.* Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, pp. 109–135.

TREIBEL, A. (2015), *Integriert Euch. Plädoyer für ein selbstbewusstes Einwanderungsland.* Frankfurt–New York: Campus.

WORBS, S., BUND, E., KOHLS, M. and VON GOSTOMSKI, C.B. (2013), *(Spät)Aussiedler in Deutschland. Eine Analyse akt.ueller Daten und Forschungsergebnisse.* Nurnberg: Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (BAMF).

WEBSITES

http://www.pewglobal.org/interactives/international-migrants-by-country/, zuletzt aufgerufen [accessed on: 3.02.2019].

https://www.pewglobal.org/interactives/international-migrants-by-country/, retrieved February 2nd and May 11th, 2019.

OECD (2019), *Society at a Glance 2019: OECD Social Indicators.* OECD Publishing, Paris, p. 78. https://doi.org/10.1787/soc_glance-2019-en [accessed on: 29.03.2019].

Stadt Altena: http://www.altena.de/Pressemitteilung.723.0.html?&no_cache=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=1502&cHash=f4ab2d3d615da32e315c5f1f94a8a7d3"& HYPERLINK [accessed on: 4.05.2019].

United Nations (2017): *International Migration Report,* https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/publications/migrationreport/docs/MigrationReport2017.pdf [accessed on: 11.05.2019].

www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Standardartikel/Themen/Schlaglichter/Fluechtlingshilfe/18-10-19-asylbedingte-belastungen.html;jsessionid=75450C741C9269575B2098288BFA3518 [accessed on: 4.05.2019].

www.unhcr.org/dach/de/services/statistiken [accessed on: 4.05.2019].

sciendo

COPE
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.03

Ryszard ŻELICHOWSKI*

MASS IMMIGRATIONS IN THE 21ST CENTURY CASE OF BELGIUM AND THE NETHERLANDS

Abstract. The uncontrolled wave of immigrants to the European Union countries, which reached its peak in 2015, challenged not only the well-established system of asylum policies in the Member States but also revealed the fundamental differences among them concerning the so-called "immigration issue". The article focuses on the mechanisms and institutions which evolved during the different waves of immigrants in Belgium and the Netherlands. It also looks for an answer to the question: is mass immigration to Europe a threat or an opportunity? Depending on one's attitude to the topic, the answer may be positive or negative.

Key words: immigration, refugees, integration, minors, Belgium, the Netherlands.

1. INTRODUCTION

National debates about immigration crisis in 2015 were amplified by the tragedy at border crossings of all EU Members States. They were particularly strong in new Members States, which were surprised by the unexpected change of their roles. For many decades their populations had been diminishing due to large-scale domestic emigration to a richer neighbour. Suddenly, after the fall of communism, the prosperity brought by the single European market and their accession the EU changed the perception of the standards of living among poorer nations. As long as the immigrants from Asia, Arab states and Africa came in small numbers, even East European states seemed to cope with the problem. A crisis came in 2015. Masses of immigrants stormed the borders in the heart of the EU. The attitude of public opinion towards immigrants changed rapidly, even in countries with long histories of multicultural societies. The defensive measures undertaken by the states which had to physically protect their borders spread panic among the rest

* Ryszard ŻELICHOWSKI, Institute of Political Studies of the Polish Academy of Sciences, ul. Polna 18/20, 02-786 Warsaw, Poland; e-mail: rzeli@isppan.waw.pl

of Member States and fuelled extreme right anti-immigrant parties, which were on the verge of electoral win in the Netherlands, France and even Germany. After all, these countries were the final destinations of the mass immigration. Much has been written about the solutions to this problem by EU politicians and EU structures. Although the main goal of immigrants seems to be controlled, there is still a major divide among the EU states about further procedures concerning the relocation of immigrants, even those "processed", with formal grounds for asylum in an EU country.

The famous slogan of chancellor Angela Merkel "Wir schaffen das" (We can do it)[1] focused world public opinion on the German case. The most desired destinations were, however, Member States with long colonial tradition (the United Kingdom and France), and Benelux countries, i.e. the Netherlands and Belgium. It might be worthwhile to learn from their experiences. I will analyse the mechanisms of the successes, or failures, of their policies and institutions which evolved during the different waves of immigrants.

2. THE BELGIAN EXPERIENCE

2.1. Legacy of economic prosperity

Migration to Belgium was triggered by the industrial revolution and the rapid development of its coal industry. In Limburg, the heart of coal mining, the demand for manpower caused an influx of emigrants from Prussia and Silesia which begun already at the end of the 19th century. After the First World War many coal mine workers came also from Poland (Wojciechowski, 2000). After the Second World War, Belgium's economy needed even more hands to work in mining and in the dynamically developing heavy industry. Belgium started recruiting young people from Italy, Spain, Portugal and Yugoslavia. The attitude of the local population towards immigrants in this period was positive. Those "Gastarbeiters" (guest workers) were building Belgium's prosperity. After the withdrawal of the Belgian government from the system of the state-to-state negotiated contracts, they were soon replaced by workers from Turkey and Morocco. A characteristic feature of this emigration was its periodicity resulting from concluded employment con-

[1] "We can do it!" was a statement made by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel at the Federal Press Conference on 31 August 2015 in view of the refugee crisis in Europe from 2015 and the admission of refugees in Germany and since then in the media and in the political debate it has found far-reaching repercussions. It is considered the core slogan or soundbite of the "new welcome culture". She repeated the later often criticised sentence several times, including at the CDU Federal Party Congress on 14 December 2015. There is a webpage dedicated to this famous citation. https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wir_schaffen_das [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

tracts, without the possibility of family reunification. After the collapse of the industrial boom in 1973–1974 due to the first world oil crisis, many heavy industry plants were temporarily shut down and huge groups of immigrants lost their jobs. Belgium and the neighbouring countries have decided to stop issuing visas to prevent unwanted economic immigration. Some of the "guest workers" returned to their respective countries but many remained in Belgium on the ground of the liberalised right to family reunification.

The next wave of immigrants occurred in 1986 and entailed the arrival of mostly refugees from the war zones in Iraq-Iran and Ethiopia-Eritrea, and Eastern Europe. At that time, the Belgian government decided to create collective refugee reception points (Dutch: *collectief opvangplaatsen*, French: *lieux d'accueil collectif*) and to establish the Belgian Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons[2], which was the result of many years of pressure from social welfare institutions and NGOs.[3] The next wave of immigrants occurred after the fall of the Berlin Wall and after the outbreak of the Yugoslav Wars.

On 1 September 1997, the Dublin Convention went into force, signed also by Belgium and the Netherlands. It laid down rules for the examination of an asylum application by EU Member States (eur-lex.europa 1).

From 2000 a new wave of asylum applications came mainly from refugees from Kosovo, Afghanistan, Burundi, Sudan, Angola, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia and the Ivory Coast. They were victims of fratricidal wars, genocide and conflicts caused by economic interests (raw materials, geostrategic interests, etc.)

In 2007, the Act on Emigration was changed and as a result refugees were directed to centres where they must stay for up to four months, that is, until the end of the asylum application procedure. Financial support for asylum seekers covered by social welfare organisations was suspended to remove the "attractiveness" of the previous asylum application procedure for those who made a way of life out of it at the expense of the Belgian government.[4]

Emigrants from Africa choosing Belgium as a place of asylum are basically French-speaking and while living in Brussels, they reinforce the influence of this language in the capital of Flanders (de Vries *et al.*, 1994, pp. 223–226). This multicultural character of the city is a card in political games and is played by French-speaking parties (Witte and Meynen, 2006, p. 181).

Emigration from two Belgian colonies, Congo and Rwanda-Burundi constitutes a separate chapter. At the end of the 1950s, around 100,000 Belgians lived in Congo (Orzechowski, 2011, p. 104). The beginning of migration to Belgium

---

[2] http://www.refworld.org/publisher/CGVSCGRA.html [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[3] http://www.dewereldmorgen.be/blogs/smarels/2011/11/13/het-asielbeleid-viert-25-jaar-opvang-crisis-60-jaar-vluchtelingenconventie [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[4] https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/belgium-country-permanent-immigration/ [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

occurred in the following decades (Vanthemsche, 2006, p. 511). At the beginning those who migrated were students, businessmen and diplomats. Between 1960 and 1980, because of aspirations for independence and internal struggles, the second big wave of emigration from Africa occurred. Initially, they intended to remain in the country temporarily, but after this period many Congolese decided to settle in Belgium. It was Belgium's third wave of emigration („Knack.be", 2016). Congolese, citizens of Rwanda and Burundi in Belgium[5] initially preferred Brussels as their place of stay; currently the number of Congolese people is spreading equally between Flanders and Wallonia, although the most still remain in the capital city.

"Finally, it is important to note that Belgium is a country of two linguistic and political realities. This has become increasingly conflictual over the last decade, partly demonstrated through the continuous rise of the political right in Flanders. This dynamic has been largely absent in Wallonia. Migration policies seem not to have been directly affected by this tension. However, increased politicisation of migration coupled with the inevitable need to consistently reform the migration policy is pushing policymakers to develop more long-term policies for the future," Petrovic summarised migration policy of Belgium (Orzechowski, 2011, p. 104) The decision-making structure in Belgium makes the solving of crises extremely difficult.

The Kingdom of Belgium is a federal state and consists of three regions, three communities and four language regions.[6] Six parliaments were established, six governments with an extensive administrative apparatus combining extreme decentralisation with strong centralisation. The Kingdom of Belgium has a population of 11,322,088. Flanders, with a population of 6,516,011, Wallonia with a population of 3,614,473 and Brussels Capital Region with population of 1,191,604, the German-speaking Community with a population of approx. 77,000. Statistical data may fluctuate, but the basic population proportions do not change. Over two-thirds of the inhabitants of the Kingdom of Belgium are Flemish speakers who speak Dutch.

2.2. Belgian asylum institutions and procedures

In the Kingdom of Belgium, the following three instances are established for the conduct of asylum procedures:

---

[5] http://soc.kuleuven.be/arc/afrikaverteltd/?q=afrikanen-vlaanderen [access: 11.09.2019].

[6] In the process of six state reforms, there were created three autonomous regions of Belgium: Brussels Capital Region (Dutch: *Brussels Hoofdstedelijk Gewest,* French: *La Région de Bruxelles-Capitale*), Flanders (*Vlaams Gewest*), and Wallonia (la Région wallonne), and three communities (based on culture and language): French (*La Communauté française de Belgique,* from 2011 *Fédération Wallonie-Bruxelles*), Flemish (*Vlaamse Gemeenschap*), German-speaking (*Deutschsprachigen Gemeinschaft*), as well as four language regions: the French-speaking region (Walloon language), the Dutch-speaking region (Flemish), the bilingual region of Brussels, and the German-speaking Community.

– Alien's Department of the FPS Foreign Affairs (also the Aliens Office, Immigration Office) (*Dienst Vreemdelingenzaken*, DVZ, *Direction générale Office des étrangers*, DGOE),

– Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (*Commissariaat-generaal voor de Vluchtelingen en de Staatlozen,* CGVS, *Commissariat général aux réfugiés et aux apatrides*, Le CGRA), and

– The Council for Alien Law Litigation (CALL) (*Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen, RvV*, *Conseil du Contentieux des Etrangers,* CCE).

The final instance is the Council of State (*Raad van State,* RvS, *Conseil d'État,* CE).[7] Below, I include short descriptions of their tasks and responsibilities.

*

Alien's Department of the FPS Foreign Affairs (the Aliens Office) (DVZ, OEF) manages the immigration traffic in the territory of the Kingdom of Belgium, grants decisions on the right of entry of foreigners into the state and regulates the matters of residence and settlement.[8] The current emigration procedure came into force on 1 June 2007. On its basis, any foreigner may apply to the DVZ / OEF office in Brussels, at an airport or at a border crossing.[9]

After registration, the applicant can apply directly to Fedasil (Federal Agency for the Reception of Asylum Seekers)[10], for be directed to the place of the asylum seeker's centre, and for material, social and legal assistance and for medical care**.**

Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGVS, Le CGRA)[11] is an independent federal structure which ensures protection for people who have entered the Kingdom of Belgium and are afraid of returning to their country of origin for fear of persecution or other serious consequences (imprisonment, death, etc.) The Commissioner General determines whether an applicant is entitled to be granted a refugee status. If the category does not apply to them, the Commissioner General considers whether the person qualifies for subsidiary protection introduced in 2006. In accordance with Belgian, European and international standards, "CVGS examines each application for international protection individually, objectively and impartially."[12]

Anyone who meets the following criteria can apply for a refugee status: they have well-founded fears of persecution based on race, religion, member-

---

[7] http://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/Beleid/beleidsthemas/naar_een_mondiale_en_solidaire_samenleving/asiel_en_migratie/asiel/ [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[8] https://dofi.ibz.be/sites/dvzoe/index.html [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[9] http://fedasil.be/nl/inhoud/asiel-belgie [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[10] Dutch: *Federaal agentschap voor de opvang van asielzoekers*, French: *L'Agence fédérale pour l'accueil des demandeurs d'asile* (Fedasil).

[11] http://www.refworld.org/publisher/CGVSCGRA.html [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[12] http://www.cgvs.be/nl/over-cgvs [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

ship to a social group, political views or national affiliation; they are located outside the country of origin; they will not receive protection in their country of origin.



Fig. 1. Asylum procedures in Belgium 2018

Source: Country Report: Belgium, 2018, p. 17, modified.

Some asylum seekers qualify for subsidiary protection when they are not refugees, they have serious grounds for fear that after returning to their country of origin they will face severe consequences (including death penalty) or a real risk, and when they do not want or cannot benefit from the protection of the country of origin. The concepts of "serious grounds" and "real risks" are based on the case

law of the European Court of Human Rights based on Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the case law of the Court of Justice of the European Union.[13]

The Council for Alien Law Litigation (RvV, CCE).[14] Anyone applying for asylum, except for EU citizens, has the option to object to a CGVS decision. RvV is a legal structure that can validate or reject a CGVS decision, and RvV may therefore grant the right to international protection or refuse it. In addition, the RvV may annul the decision of the Commissioner General if irregularities exist. Appeals to the RvV must be submitted within 30 days of the delivery of a CGVS decision. The Minister may appeal a decision on the granting of a refugee status or subsidiary protection within the same deadline. RvV decisions can only be waived by the Council of State. The deadline for filing a cassation is 30 days from the delivery of an RvV decision.[15]

2.3. Belgian system in operation

For asylum seekers the Belgian state envisages spending free time in the form of workshops, courses, access to the library, sports, etc. Most centres also have internet cafes which allow them to keep in touch with friends or family in the country. This also applies to education. All minors in Belgium are subject to compulsory education, including children in the centres. Schools are selected in consultation with parents. First, however, children's language skills and level of education are tested. Then lessons are directed to regular classes.

Asylum seekers do not have access to the labour market for the first four months after submitting an asylum application, but they may use various types of courses or trainings (language courses, cooking classes, computer classes or sewing lessons).

Finally, the last element of the refugee program are civic activity projects created to facilitate integration with the inhabitants of a commune and the closest environment.[16] According to statistical data, in 2017 in Belgium there lived representatives of over 180 nations.[17]

---

[13] Vreemdelingenwet, http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0011823/2015-07-20; [accessed on: 11.09.2019]; http://www.cgvs.be/sites/default/files/content/download/files/beoordeling_van_de_asielaanvraag_20150512.pdf [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[14] http://www.rvv-cce.be/nl [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[15] De Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen, http://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/Beleid/beleidsthemas/naar_een_mondiale_en_solidaire_samenleving/asiel_en_migratie/asiel/ [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[16] http://fedasil.be/nl/inhoud/opvang-asielzoekers-0] [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[17] The newcomers balance covers number of entrants in each year minus the number of outsiders in each year, Vreemdelingen, Belgwordingen en Nieuwkomerssaldo per nationaliteit 1999–2017, http://www.npdata.be/BuG/371-Updates/index.html [accessed on: 12.09.2019].

2.4. Resettlement

Resettlement to a third country (*Hervestiging*, *Réinstallation des réfugiés*) is a procedure that allows refugees to be moved from a country where they found refuge to a third country that has agreed to give them permanent residence rights.[18] This is a solution for those who cannot return to their country of origin or cannot count on protection now or in the foreseeable future in the country of first asylum. This procedure is fully complementary to the Belgian asylum procedure.

Since 2009, Belgium has been regularly organising resettlement actions with UNHCR (UN Refugee Agency) and the European Union. The official webpage of Fedasil explains the role of UNHCR, which "identifies the refugees who meet the requirements for resettlement. It then selects refugees for Belgium according to the European priorities. Next, the CGRS (Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons) travels to the first receiving country for selection interviews with the refugees. Refugees are selected according to the criteria specified in the Geneva Convention."[19]

Since 2013 Belgium has operated a structural resettlement program, which means that the country offers each year protection to a number of vulnerable refugees. In 2018 (until 17 April), 360 refugees arrived in Belgium in the frame of the resettlement program: 326 Syrians coming from Lebanon and 34 Congolese coming from Uganda.[20]

2.5. Organisation of returns

The "Returns Directive" (*Terugkeerrichtlijn*, *la Directive Retour*)[21] on common standards and procedures for returning illegally staying third-country nationals which entered into force on 16 December 2008 and amended by 24 December 2010. The new Belgian Law of 19 January 2012 (published on 17 February 2012) replaced the EU Return Directive, modifying the current legal framework on removal and detention, and putting more emphasis on voluntary departure. According to the new Law, "return procedure will in principle provide a period of 30 days (instead of 5 days) for voluntary departure. In some cases, a shorter period may be granted, or, in exceptional cases, this period can be less than 7 days. That is the case if there is, e.g. a risk of absconding if a person concerned did not respect a preventive measure or if there is a risk to public or national security. At a request and when necessary for the preparation of the voluntary departure, the period can

---

[18] https://www.fedasil.be/en/resettlement [accessed on: 12.09.2019].

[19] *Ibid*.

[20] https://www.fedasil.be/en/resettlement [accessed on: 12.09.2019].

[21] http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi/article_body.pl?language=nl&pub_date=2012-02-17&numac=2012000081&caller=summary [accessed on: 12.09.2019].

be extended. Return decisions shall be accompanied by an entry ban of 3 years if no period for voluntary departure has been granted, or if the obligation to return has not been complied with. In cases of fraud, the length of the entry ban can be up to 5 years."[22]

3. THE DUTCH EXPERIENCE

3.1. Colonial legacy

The experience of contemporary residents of the Kingdom of the Netherlands with immigrants overlaps with four centuries of colonial expansion of two organizational structures: the East India Company and the West India Company. The lands in the eastern hemisphere were colonised by the United East India Company established in 1602 (*Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie*, VOC, 1602–1798). It was the world's first stock company, which received a monopoly on trade with Asia from the States General (Parliament) of the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands.

The fate of the West Indian Company (*West-Indische Compagnie*, WIC, 1621–1792) was different. It was created later, and the area of its operation were both Americas and North Africa. After Napoleonic Wars the Versailles Treaty established the United Kingdom of the Netherlands with King Willem I (1815–1840) as a sovereign. Under one sceptre united were the Southern (Belgium) and Northern Netherlands (The Netherlands). After 1830 Belgian Revolution both parts went their own ways. Although the ongoing wars in Europe caused that the former Dutch overseas territories transitioned from hand to hand, the greatest successes and economic power were built by the Netherlands in the Indonesian Archipelagos.

During the First World War the Netherlands was occupied by Nazi Germany and Dutch East Indies by Japan. The remaining overseas territories were occupied by the English and Americans. When the war ended, some territories had other plans. Established in 1945, the Republic of Indonesia refused to return to the former metropolis and declared independence. Indonesia broke the Union, and in 1960 also diplomatic relations with the Kingdom of the Netherlands, nationalising property belonging to the citizens of that country.[23]

A different history with the Netherlands was shared by the autonomous western-most island of the Leeward Antilles (*Benedenwindse Eilanden*) in the Carib-

---

[22] https://emnbelgium.be/news/new-law-transposing-return-directive [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[23] They were restored only in 1968. In 1970, Indonesian President Suharto paid an official visit to the Netherlands, which was reciprocated by Queen Juliana and Prince Bernhard of the Netherlands in a royal visit to Indonesia in 1971.

bean Sea north off the coast of Venezuela: Aruba, Bonaire and Curaçao (ABC), and three smaller east of Puerto Rico (*Lesser Antilles, Bovenwindse Eilanden*): Saba, Sint Eustatius and the southern part of St. Maarten (SSS). The northern part belongs to the French Republic and is called Saint-Martin. In 1949, these islands formed a combined dependent territory of the Netherlands Antilles, and five years later they became part of the Kingdom of the Netherlands. Because of the new bipolar political order after the Second World War, the Netherlands were forced to set up relations with former colonies differently. Already in 1948 talks began with Guyana and Antilles (initially also with Indonesia). They resulted in the so-called Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands (*Statuut voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden*) issued in 1954 (Bormann, 2005). The so-called Kingdom of New Style (*Koninkrijk nieuwe stijl*) set a new era in the history of the Netherlands. The Charter also initially covered New Guinea until it was transferred to Indonesia.

Subsequent changes in the territorial structure of the Kingdom of the Netherlands occurred in 1975 when the Dutch Guyana regained independence and adopted the name of the Republic of Surinam. The next was Aruba, which in 1986 obtained a special status (*Status aparte*), an independent state within the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The Kingdom of the Netherlands consisted of three parts: the Netherlands-metropolis (the European part of the Kingdom), Aruba, and the Netherlands Antilles.

This lasted until 10 October 2010 (NRC Handelsblad, 2009). On that day, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten became independent countries which form the Kingdom of the Netherlands together with the European part. The Bonaire, Saba and Sint Eustatius islands have become "special or overseas municipalities" (*bijzonder gemeenten*), which directly belong to the European Netherlands. At present, the Kingdom of the Netherlands consists of four autonomous countries and three special municipalities. Autonomous countries include: the Netherlands, Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten. The three special municipalities (overseas) of Bonaire, Sint Eustatius and Saba are called the Caribbean Netherlands (Żelichowski, 2015, pp. 251–273).

3.2. Waves of immigrants in historical perspective

The first significant wave of emigrants that influenced the history of the Netherlands came from Spain and Portugal at the end of the 16th century. It was a group of Sephardic Jews who, fleeing the Holy Inquisition, found refuge in the Protestant Republic of the Seven United Provinces.[24]

[24] A group of about 7,000 Jews came to the Netherlands in the 1930s because of the so-called Nuremberg Laws. Pursuant to them from 1935 Jews could be deprived of citizenship of the Reich, legal protection and property. They also could not serve in state offices or in the army.

For the colonies scattered throughout the other hemisphere, the most important events were the subsequent stages of the ban on slave trade and the abolition of slavery (1814–1863) and the transition to contracting policy. In addition to traditional slaves from black Africa, people from China, India, Pakistan and from the Indonesian Archipelagos came to the Dutch colonies. It was then that the overseas territories of the Kingdom of the Netherlands became a mixture of races, which determined their colours and specificity. The streets of the port cities of the Netherlands were populated by merchants and workers from Asia and the Netherlands Antilles (Dutch India at that time).

During the First World War, as mentioned above, the Kingdom of the Netherlands remained neutral. Its closest neighbour, the Kingdom of Belgium, became the field of dramatic struggles of the armies of the states engaged in the war, as well as the training grounds of new weaponry. In the first months of the war, a great wave of refugees from Belgium arrived in the Netherlands, which was estimated at a million people. Although most of them, after the establishing of the front, returned home, over one hundred thousand Belgians remained in the Netherlands until the fighting was suspended.

The Second World War, in which the Netherlands, like its neighbours, fell victim to German aggression, caused huge damage to industrial infrastructure. Post-war reconstruction needed hands to work. The source of the workforce has mainly included displaced persons (DP), who found themselves on the territory of Germany. A large group of them were Polish soldiers of the 1st Armoured Division of General Stanisław Maczek, whose combat trail led through Belgium and the Netherlands. After demobilisation, most of them decided to stay abroad for fear of returning to Poland under Soviet occupation.

In September 1947, the first Polish "DPs" came to the region of mines in Limburg (Żelichowski, 2014, p. 249). Most of them served as sentinels in US refugee camps and, after arriving in the Netherlands, still wore their military uniforms. Because of their colour, the Limburgers gave them the nickname "black invasion".

The conflict with Indonesia resulted in another wave of emigrants to the Netherlands. It is estimated that the so-called Indian Netherlanders (*Indische Nederlanders*) were a group of around 290,000 people.[25] Mainly they were members of the Royal Netherlands East Indies Army (*Koninklijk Nederlandsch-Indisch Leger*, KNIL) and members of their families.

The most difficult problem for the Dutch government was the situation of the population inhabiting the island of Ambon in the Moluccas archipelago (Republic of Indonesia). After Indonesia declared independence, the island declared in 1950 the creation of its own state: the Republic of the Southern Moluccas (Republik Maluku Selatan, RMS). After a bloody intervention, it became part of the Repub-

[25] http://educatie-en-school.infonu.nl/wereldorientatie/38715-migranten-die-naar-nederland-kwamen-na-wo-ii.html [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

lic of Indonesia. In 1951, at the order of the RMS government, about 4,000 KNIL soldiers, mainly of South Moluccan origin, emigrated to the Netherlands with their families (12,500 in total). The soldiers received the status of members of the Dutch Armed Forces.

Another wave of immigrants came to the Netherlands in the 1950s in response to the shortage of labour force during the period of intense economic growth in the Netherlands in relation to the adoption of the Marshall Plan. Numerous immigrants (*guest workers*) from Italy, Spain, Portugal, Turkey, Greece, Morocco, Yugoslavia and Tunisia were employed in the industry and services on official interstate contracts. After the expiration of the contracts, employees in specific industries were obliged to return to the country.[26] Because of the crisis in the late-1960s and the early-1970s, about 60 percent of guest workers from the above-mentioned countries returned to their countries of origin. The change in the Dutch government's policy from the early-1970s, which allowed family reunifications, resulted in the settlement of a large population of Turkish and Moroccan origin in the Netherlands.

3.3. Dutch asylum institutions and procedures

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (*Immigratie Naturalisatiedienst, IND*) defines an asylum seeker as a person who applied for protection for himself and their family by the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in invoking the 1951 UN Convention relating to the Status of Refugees.[27] There are various procedures for persons applying for the right to asylum and for applicants for a residence permit in the Kingdom of the Netherlands.[28]

Every visitor to the Netherlands who intends to apply for asylum or residence in that country should report to the central admission point (*Aanmeldcentrum*) located in Ter Apel in the province of Groningen.[29] Also, at Schiphol airport there is a special notification centre for people who want to apply for asylum after arrival in the Netherlands.

---

[26] http://www.vijfeeuwenmigratie.nl/periode/1945-heden/volledige-tekst [accessed on: 12.09.2019].

[27] https://www.ind.nl/EN/ [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[28] http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/procedures-wetten-beleid/opvang [accessed on: 12.09.2019].

[29] Up to March 2018 it was Veenhuizen which served as an emergency accommodation for asylum seekers since May 2014 and as a reporting location for following family members of refugees since 2016. The last remaining asylum seekers will leave the COA-location of Veenhuizen around March. Veenhuizen will finally close down in May. Following family members of refugees who report at Veenhuizen after 31 January will be transferred to Ter Apel by the COA. https://ind.nl/en/news/Pages/Following-family-members-of-refugees-to-Ter-Apel-as-of-February-2018.aspx [accessed on: 12.09.2019].



Fig. 2. Asylum procedures in the Netherlands 2018
Source: Country Report: Netherlands, 2018, p. 13, modified.

3.4. Permanent (tolerated) and temporary residence permits

The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands provides several other procedures that consider the complex situations of various groups of foreigners in its territory. Those who, despite not being granted asylum and an order to leave the Netherlands, cannot return to their country of origin "by no fault of their own", can be classified as persons with a temporary residence permit (*Tijdelijke vergunning* or *verblijfsvergunning*). This group also includes people who, for medical reasons, would not be able to travel back.

Such status may also be granted to victims and witnesses of human trafficking if they report it to the police. A temporary residence permit is valid during the

investigation and criminal proceedings against the perpetrators of such an offense. After three years, temporary permits may be changed into permanent ones.

If someone does not qualify for asylum or residence permit, the relevant minister or secretary of state may, under exceptional circumstances, grant such a permit based on a written description of the situation. However, there are no defined criteria and the decision depends on a minister and their assessment of the situation. Examples of emergency situations include serious health problems of a family member, honour revenge if parents return to their country of origin separate without minor children or similar situations related to the culture and customs of the emigrant's country of origin.

3.5. Return procedures

Since 1 July 2010 the situation of asylum seekers in the Netherlands has improved. New asylum procedures include the care for an asylum seeker whose application has been rejected. They have four weeks (28 days) during which they can stay in a centre for asylum seekers and appeal against the decision or start preparing to return to their country of origin. A person who decides to leave the Netherlands voluntarily may receive support from government bodies. It can be a financial benefit, but it can also be material support, for example for establishing a company in the country of origin. Assistance for voluntary departure can also be offered by the International Organization for Migration (*Internationale Organisatie voor Migratie*, IOM). Asylum seekers who do not want to leave the Netherlands voluntarily can be expelled under duress by the Royal Military Police and Aliens (Foreigners) Police (*Vreemdelingenpolitie*).[30]

3.6. Dutch system in operation

Anyone who has undergone an asylum procedure in the Netherlands is initially granted a temporary residence permit (*Tijdelijke vergunning*). This rule applies to everyone, although it is not unconditional. In certain situations, such a permit may be cancelled. Most of the refugees who remain in the Netherlands, after undergoing the asylum procedure, are entitled to full asylum after a five year's residence. Such a right can only be withdrawn if an asylum seeker commits a crime. Obtaining full asylum allows one to take up work legally.[31] During the application procedure asylum seekers must stay in a refugee centre. When they receive a residence permit, they are eligible to receive a flat. The government of the Nether-

[30] https://www.politie.nl/themas/vreemdelingenpolitie.html [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[31] http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/procedures-wetten-beleid/asielvergunning [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

lands considers a person with such a document as a priority group, because it is believed that a long stay in a refugee centre is not beneficial to an asylum seeker and hinders the integration process.

The central role in the settling of asylum seekers falls on the municipality (*gemeente*). The Ministry of Internal Affairs determines how many refugees a given municipality must accept. The decisive factor is its population. To avoid long presence in asylum centres, a commune is obliged to offer a refugee a flat within three months. In case of failure to comply with this obligation, Provincial States may impose a penalty on a municipality. The Home Office publishes a report every six month on the progress of the asylum process in every commune.

Because in many municipalities there is a chronic shortage of housing, the government has prepared two programs to solve this burning problem. The first of those is the so-called self-organisation package (*Zelfzorgarrangement*, ZZA) which allows organising temporary places of stay, for example with family or friends. The second one, the so-called communal self-organisation package (*Gemeentelijk zelfzorgarrangement*, G-ZZA), gives municipalities the opportunity to organise temporary accommodation, for example in empty office buildings or holiday homes. Of course, both packages are temporary and serve to ease the pressure on the central reception system of refugees.[32]

The road to asylum seeker's apartment is divided into four stages. In the first one the Central Reception of Applicants for Asylum (*Centraal Orgaan opvang Asielzoekers,* COA) plays the crucial role; it is responsible for admissions to refugee centres. The COA decides which apartments in a municipality can be made available to asylum seekers. Those apartments are placed in the national database. The task of the COA is to select families for whom those apartments are suitable. Since most refugees have fled their countries in a hurry and left all their belongings behind, they must start life from scratch. The legislator ensured loans from a commune for development. However, the loans are not a one-off act of financial aid, but they need to be repaid.

3.7. An invited refugee

The Kingdom of the Netherlands is one of the dozen or so countries that invite refugees to their country. These are people who found their first shelter in neighbouring countries and stay there for a long time in dangerous conditions. When, as a result of staying in camps, refugees suffer from complex illnesses or become disabled, they are eligible to settle in selected countries. This is decided by the United Nations Agency for Refugees, UNHCR, which selects these so-called "in-

[32] http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/hoe-zit-het-nou-feiten-over-vluchtelingen [accessed on: 12.09.2019].

vited refugees" and entrusts the government concerned, in this case the government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, a special group of refugees. They do not have to undergo the asylum procedure or obtain care in an accelerated way. Their integration process (*inburgeringsprocesses*) is ensured by the IND. Most of the refugees included in this category (this is about five hundred people a year) come from Iraq, Myanmar, Bhutan, Eritrea and Congo.[33]

3.8. Family reunification

In principle, this operation is meant to unite families separated during an escape. When a family member receives a residence permit in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, they can bring their family to them. There are strictly defined conditions associated with family reunification. A refugee must submit appropriate applications to the IND, and members of their family must go to the embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands, often in another country. They must present a valid passport and the asylum seeker, or their partner must have a stable minimum income, and the applicant cannot pose a threat to the public order of the host country. Family members will in some cases have to return to their country of origin to wait for the outcome of the application process. Before they can join their family, they must pass a language and integration examination at the embassy of the Kingdom of the Netherlands in their country of origin.

3.9. Integration courses and social studies exams (*inburgering*)

Foreigners who have lived in the Netherlands for a long time and hold a residence permit must speak Dutch and know how the Dutch society works. Hence, they must undergo a compulsory integration course and pass an examination on the knowledge of how the Dutch society works. The compulsory course of integration covers people aged 18–65. This requirement does not apply to persons who only come to the Netherlands to study or temporarily for education. During the integration course, foreigners, including refugees, must demonstrate communication skills and a good understanding of the Dutch language. In addition, they should demonstrate knowledge of the rules (norms and values) applicable to the Dutch society. The course and examination require entail a fee. In this situation, the Netherlands government offers the possibility of obtaining a loan also for this purpose.[34] Borrowers do not, however, must repay this loan if they pass the citizenship exam within a three months' time.

---

[33] In June 2013, Fred Teeven, the Secretary of State, announced the fact of inviting fifty in 2013 and in 2014 two hundred refugees from Syria, http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/procedures-wetten-beleid/opvang [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[34] https://www.inburgeren.nl/inburgeren-betalen.jsp [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

The last and most important stage in emigration life is to apply for naturalisation, that is, to obtain citizenship of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.[35]

3.10. Minors

The biggest concern for Belgium and the Netherlands are minors. Statistically, in refugee centres, persons under 18 constitute about one third of the total number of asylum seekers. Most of them arrive with their parents, so they stay with them in family rooms, where they have more privacy. Minors who find themselves in Belgium without parents or legal guardians are subject to a different procedure than adults applying for asylum. The government organises tailor-made centres. Until the age of 18, a minor cannot be expelled from Belgium. When they reach the age of maturity, they are subject to the rules applicable to adult refugees.[36]

Another category consists families who have not obtained an official residence permit in Belgium but have underage children. According to the Royal Decree of 24 June 2004, minors who live with their parents without legal residence in Belgium and find themselves in such a need may benefit from the care of the centre and material assistance. To protect family, the right to care extends also to parents. Families without the right to legal residence are placed in DVZ or Fedasil homes, where they are prepared to be sent back to their country of origin.

The same applies to a group of children or young people who have found themselves without parents or guardians in the Netherlands and have applied for asylum there. The procedure for granting asylum to minors is the same as that for adults with this difference that if their application is rejected, they may remain in the Netherlands until reaching the age of maturity. The Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands has foreseen special procedures for them.

At the beginning, however, the IND examines whether a minor applicant has the right to apply for asylum. If they do not qualify for it, the IND checks if they can stay alone in the country of origin and if there is adequate care for them. If that is not possible, they receive the so-called regular residence permit, or "permission for an independent minor foreigner."[37] If a minor asylum seeker does not possess documents confirming the date of their birth, they are subjected to an examination determining their age whose costs are covered by the IND. Young asylum seekers receive care from the Nidos Foundation which helps them during the asylum pro-

---

[35] http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/procedures-wetten-beleid/naturalisatie/naturalisatie-vier-stappen [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[36] http://fedasil.be/nl/inhoud/niet-begeleide-minderjarige-vreemdelingen-nbmv-0 [accessed on: 12.09.2019].

[37] Terminological note. Notion an independent minor asylum seeker and an independent minor foreigner are often used interchangeably *alleenstaande minderjarige asielzoeker* (abbrev. „ama") and *alleenstaande minderjarige vreemdeling* („amv").

cedure. The Foundation also supervises the process of their upbringing and care, for example in a foster family. Since education is an essential element of young people's development, they can go to school. For many of them, education means knowledge and gives them a chance to learn a profession which can help them stand on their feet when they return to their country of origin.

4. 2018–2019 IMMIGRATION TRENDS

On 31 December 2018, the main countries of origin of residents included Afghanistan (12.80%), Syria (12.78%), Palestine (11.91%), Guinea (7.11%) and Iraq (6.97%). As of the same date, the population in the reception network was composed of single men (35.73%), single women (6.53%), families (51.90%) and unaccompanied minors (5.85%).[38] At the end of July 2019, the total number of all applications amounted to 15,326 cases.[39]

Theo Francken (N-VA), State Secretary for Asylum and Migration, announced at the end of March 2018 that there were 23,815 reception places in Belgium and that number would drop to 17,361 places by the end of the year. "The asylum influx is stable at a low level, which leaves room for further reduction and cost savings. Next year we will fall back on 16,629 places, the number of before the migration crisis," said Theo Francken in an interview entitled "Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen: « Asylum crisis is not over yet »" (*De Standaard*, 2018). *The Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen* opposes this plan and thinks that Belgium should just look at how it can use these reception places for refugees who do not get here [yet]. "Within Europe, there is still no question of a crisis that has passed (…) If you look at what happens every day at the internal borders of Europe, where people are stuck in degrading circumstances, in countries that fail to meet their obligations, you see that Belgium still has a role to play to help more people," said Charlotte Vandycke, director of Radio 1 (Vandycke, 2018).

In August 2019, the total inflow of asylum seekers (first asylum applications, repeated requests for asylum and family members of asylum status holders) in the Netherlands was 2,637. In comparison, a year earlier (March 2018) it totalled 2,292; the difference can be traced back to a sharp decrease in the number of family members of asylum status holders who came to the Netherlands.[40] The number of applications submitted by unaccompanied minor foreign nationals (AMV) in

[38] https://emnbelgium.be/sites/default/files/publications/Belgium%20-%20Annual%20Report%20on%20Migration%202018.pdf [accessed on: 11.09.2019].
[39] https://www.cgvs.be/sites/default/files/asielstatistieken_2019_juli_nl.pdf [accessed on: 11.09.2019].
[40] https://ind.nl/en/news/Pages/Asylum-Trends-for-July-2019.aspx [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

March showed almost doubled compared to the previous month.[41] In 2017, 14,716 first asylum requests were filed. The proportion of follow-up travellers in amounted to to 47 percent. Syrians and Eritreans constituted the largest groups of asylum seekers, just like the three years before. These groups accounted for 38 and 15 percent of the total. Stateless persons, often Palestinians from Syria, made up 5 percent.

5. CONCLUSION: MASS IMMIGRATION TO EUROPE – A THREAT OR OPPORTUNITY?

Europe is aging. A report on this issue was published by EUROSTAT in 2013. It contained a noteworthy scenario of how to maintain the percentage of working people in Europe by 2060 through migration to compensate for the effects of the aging of the population. The strongest population growth is expected in Luxembourg (+111%) due to the projected very high net migration, Belgium (+38%), Sweden (+36%), Cyprus (30%), and the United Kingdom (+25%).[42] In the longer term, in the period 2020–2060 the Planning Bureau expects an average population growth of 40,000 inhabitants per year. In the period 1991–2014, the Belgian population grew by 50,000 people a year. That means a population of over 13 million people by 2060, a growth of 16 percent compared to 2015. This growth is the strongest in the Brussels-Capital Region, i.e. by 32 percent. In Flanders and Wallonia, the population is improving by 14 and 16 percent respectively.[43]

Frédéric Docquier, a researcher at Economic and Social Research Institute, wrote that immigration, especially the current wave of asylum seekers, does not generate the economic costs feared by the public. Moreover, the migrant crisis could be an opportunity for Belgium if it can economically and socially integrate asylum seekers. "To do so, Belgium must quickly give them the right to work and provide access to professional and language training, and at the same time more effectively inform Belgian citizens of the fiscal benefits as well as the complementary aspects of Belgian and migrant workers. The social stakes of integration are equally important. Discriminatory practices, intolerance and racism force immigrants into ghettos, and to reject the host country's norms and values. Managing

---

[41] February: 80, March: 158, Eritrean nationality provided a substantial share of this increase (February: 40, March: 89). Asylum Trends Monthly Report on Asylum Applications in The Netherlands, March 2018. https://ind.nl/en/Documents/AT_maart_Hoofdrapport.pdf, p. 12 [accessed on: 12.09.2019].

[42] http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2015/pdf/ee3_en.pdf, p. 19, 318, 372.

[43] http://www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/vluchtelingen-goed-voor-helft-van-bevolkingsgroei-in-2016-en-2017/article-normal-678035.html [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

differences will surely help maximise synergies and the benefits of diversity," Docquier concluded.[44]

The aging factor for the Netherlands means that only for the period 2008–2020 a total of 486,000 working migrants must come to ensure the same working population in 2020 as in 2008. With recent migratory flow, the total number of migrants needed until 2020 would then be on a projected total of 608,000 working migrants.[45]

What do the Dutch think about refugees? Rianne Kloosterman in her study "Views on refugees in the Netherland" wrote that the majority of the Dutch population believes that the Netherlands should receive refugees who have fled their countries due to war or persecution. "There are, however, clear differences in how people view the arrival of refugees. Although most people do not think refugees threaten safety and values and norms in the Netherlands, there is also a substantial group that experiences this. The Dutch population is more divided about the contribution of refugees to Dutch culture. The part that feels that refugees in this area provide enrichment is almost as big as the part that does not (…) The attitude towards an asylum seekers' centre in one's neighbourhood also differs: 36 percent would have no objection to this and a comparably-sized group would that dependant on certain things, such as the size of the centre and whether families or young men would mainly live there (…)" (Kloosterman, 2018, p. 13).

Rianne Kloosterman concluded her research with a fundamental question: "does contact with refugees lead to a more tolerant attitude, or the other way around, do people with a more tolerant attitude get in touch more often and do they experience this more positively?" Depending on to which group one belongs, their answer to the question: *is m*ass immigration to Europe a threat or opportunity? will be positive or negative.

REFERENCES

Asylum Information Database (AIDA) is a database managed by the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE). The updated AIDA Country Reports on Belgium and the Netherlands track reforms and developments in the asylum procedure, reception conditions, detention and content of international protection. http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/netherlands/belgium

Country Report: Belgium, 2018, AIDA online, https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/belgium [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[44] https://uclouvain.be/en/sciencetoday/news/crises-des-refugies-et-immigration-quel-cout-pour-la-belgique.htmlv [accessed on: 11.09.2019].

[45] http://www.emigratie-toos.com/belasting/tot-2020-bijna-500000-migranten-erbij-om-vergrijzing-te-compenseren [accessed on: 12.09.2019].

Country Report: Netherlands, 2018, AIDA online, https://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/netherlands [accessed on: 11.09.2019].
DE VRIES, J.W., WILLEMYNS, R. and BURGER, P. (1994), *Verhaal van een Taal. Negen eeuwen Nederlands.* Amsterdam: Prometheus.
DOCQUIER, F., Crises des réfugiés et immigration : quel coût pour la Belgique?, https://uclouvain.be/en/sciencetoday/news/crises-des-refugies-et-immigration-quel-cout-pour-la-belgique.htmlv
FRANCKEN, Th. (2018), Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen., 'Asielcrisis is nog niet voorbij' [Vluchtelingenwerk Vlaanderen: 'Asylum crisis is not over yet'], "De Standaard", 25 March 2018, https://www.standaard.be/cnt/dmf20180325_03427981
KLOOSTERMAN, R. (2018), *Opvattingen over vluchtelingen in Nederland*, Maart 2018, file:///C:/Users/HP/AppData/Local/Temp/meningen-over-vluchtelingen.pdf
Migratie, toen en nu: Is migratie nu van alle tijden?, "Knack.be" 2016, 28 February, http://www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/migratie-toen-en-nu-is-migratie-nu-van-alle-tijden/article-opinion-123592.html
ORZECHOWSKI, M. (2011), *Belgijska melancholia. Belgia dla nieprzekonanych.* Warsaw: Warszawskie Wydawnictwo Literackie MUZA S.A.
VANDYCKE, C. (2018), „Asielcrisis is nog niet voorbij", https://radio1.be/de-migratiecrisis-niet-voorbij
WITTE, E. and MEYNEN, A. (2006), *De geschiedenis van België na 1945.* Antwerp: Standard Uitgeverij.
WOJCIECHOWSKI, F. (2000), *Voor brood en vrijheid*, Historische Reeks Parkstad Limburg, Heerlen.
ŻELICHOWSKI, R. (2014), 'Nowy ład na Antylach Holenderskich', *Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Geographica Socio-Oeconomica*, 17.
ŻELICHOWSKI, R. (2015), *Stosunki polsko-holenderskie w Europie pojałtańskiej*, ISP PN, Warsaw.

ONLINE RESOURCES

De Raad voor Vreemdelingenbetwistingen, http://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/Beleid/beleidsthemas/naar_een_mondiale_en_solidaire_samenleving/asiel_en_migratie/asiel/
http://diplomatie.belgium.be/nl/Beleid/beleidsthemas/naar_een_mondiale_en_solidaire_samenleving/asiel_en_migratie/asiel/
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2015/pdf/ee3_en.pdf
http://educatie-en-school.infonu.nl/wereldorientatie/38715-migranten-die-naar-nederland-kwamen-na-wo-ii.html
http://fedasil.be/nl/inhoud/asiel-belgie
http://fedasil.be/nl/inhoud/niet-begeleide-minderjarige-vreemdelingen-nbmv-0.
http://fedasil.be/nl/inhoud/opvang-asielzoekers-0
http://soc.kuleuven.be/arc/afrikaverteltd/?q=afrikanen-vlaanderen
http://www.cgvs.be/nl
http://www.cgvs.be/sites/default/files/asielstatistieken_2019_juli_nl.pdf
http://www.dewereldmorgen.be/blogs/smarels/2011/11/13/het-asielbeleid-viert-25-jaar-opvang-crisis-60-jaar-vluchtelingenconventie
http://www.ejustice.just.fgov.be/cgi/article_body.pl?language=nl&pub_date=2012-02-17&numac=2012000081&caller=summary
http://www.emigratie-toos.com/belasting/tot-2020-bijna-500000-migranten-erbij-om-vergrijzing--te-compenseren
http://www.knack.be/nieuws/belgie/vluchtelingen-goed-voor-helft-van-bevolkingsgroei-in--2016-en-2017/article-normal-678035.html
http://www.npdata.be/BuG/371-Updates/index.html
http://www.refworld.org/publisher/CGVSCGRA.html

http://www.rvv-cce.be/nl
http://www.vijfeeuwenmigratie.nl/periode/1945-heden/volledige-tekst
http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/hoe-zit-het-nou-feiten-over-vluchtelingen
http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/procedures-wetten-beleid/asielvergunning.
http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/procedures-wetten-beleid/naturalisatie/naturalisatie-vier-stappen
http://www.vluchtelingenwerk.nl/feiten-cijfers/procedures-wetten-beleid/opvang.
https://dofi.ibz.be/sites/dvzoe/index.html
https://emnbelgium.be/news/new-law-transposing-return-directive
https://ind.nl/en/Documents/AT_maart_Hoofdrapport.pdf
https://ind.nl/en/news/Pages/Asylum-Trends-for-July-2019.aspx
https://ind.nl/en/news/Pages/Following-family-members-of-refugees-to-Ter-Apel-as-of-February-2018.aspx
https://www.fedasil.be/en/resettlement
https://www.inburgeren.nl/inburgeren-betalen.jsp
https://www.ind.nl/EN/
https://www.migrationpolicy.org/article/belgium-country-permanent-immigration/
https://www.politie.nl/themas/vreemdelingenpolitie.html
Vreemdelingenwet, http://wetten.overheid.nl/BWBR0011823/2015-07-20; http://www.cgvs.be/sites/default/files/content/download/files/beoordeling_van_de_asielaanvraag_20150512.pdf

sciendo

C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.04

Alessandro VITALE*

ITALY'S APPROACH TO EAST–WEST AND SOUTH–NORTH MIGRATIONS: FROM LACK OF KNOWLEDGE TO POLITICAL USE OF THEM

Abstract. After the end of the bipolar world, the possibility of an East–West mass migration became a new issue that took root in the Italian consciousness in forms masked by the feelings of the threat of an imminent "mass invasion" from Central and Eastern Europe. This new fear stimulated restrictive measures belatedly adopted in Italy and created a *de facto* unjust and imbalanced condition for new migrants from Eastern Europe because the first South–North migrations' wave had already occurred when the regimes of Central and Eastern Europe collapsed.

There are many evident similarities between the beliefs, attitudes and the use of insecurity (not based on data) of the 1990s and the current Italian migration policy. What they have in common is the incorrect perception and the misuse of it by politicians and propagandists. Immigration from Eastern Europe continues to be compared to that from the South of the world and Asia which continues to be interpreted without considering their real natures and the actual trends that characterise them. According to new studies that compared survey results with population data, contemporary Italians overestimate the number of immigrants coming from outside the EU to their country more than any other Europeans. As a result, the misuse or ignorance of the data on migrations is particularly dangerous because the devaluation of them has critical implications for policymaking.

Key words: migrations, Italy's migration policy, borders, propaganda, Eastern Europe.

1. INTRODUCTION

After the break-up of the Soviet Union, the liberation of its satellite belt and the collapse of the Central and Eastern European political regimes, the issue of immigration came into a deadlock. Particularly, the possibility of an East–West mass migration became a new issue that took root in the Italian consciousness in the forms masked by feelings of the threat of an imminent "mass invasion" from Cen-

* Alessandro VITALE, University of Milan, Department of International, Legal, Historical and Political Studies, 20122 Milano, Italy; e-mail: alessandro.vitale@unimi.it

tral and Eastern Europe. Although little debated, due also to the lack of knowledge about Central and Eastern Europe that matured during the stasis of the polarised world, this issue has been overestimated. Having freed themselves from the immense prison camp of Soviet domination later than the emergence of the migratory wave from the South (a phenomenon difficult to solve, due to the impracticability of expulsions or strict boundary controls), the citizens of the former Eastern bloc have been likened in Italy – due to a fear for a mass migratory movement – to those that were a totally different threat to the European demographic balance.

This new fear stimulated restrictive measures belatedly adopted in Italy (the strong restrictions adopted in visas, the requirements that must be met to immigrate to Italy, the long queues and night time waiting outside police headquarters, the equalisation of all types of migrants under the same definitions, without any consideration for the different reasons of emigration, etc.) and created a *de facto* unjust and imbalanced condition for new migrants from Eastern Europe because the first South-North migrations' wave already occurred and at that time immigrants from the southern hemisphere had already enjoyed a total absence of restrictions and controls.[1]

Moreover, the new restrictive measures, produced by policy-makers' fear and sheer ignorance among about Central and Eastern Europe, had struck hard at the weak beginning of mobility that had been advocated for decades in the West before the crisis of the Eastern bloc – at least verbally, of course, with the rhetoric of "open frontiers" in Europe as a goal to achieve, in order to recreate "historical Europe". On the contrary, already at that time a careful analysis indicated that a mass East–West migration inside Europe had run its course when the post-polarised world began and with the end of the Cold War. In fact, the migratory pressure (push factor) in Eastern Europe was due to the climate of discrimination and political persecution perpetrated in the Soviet period and an anti-economic system (that is a system without economic calculation, price system, with misallocation of resources, destruction of capital, high level of corruption and so on).[2]

Nevertheless, the hysteria of a "besieged citadel", a mirror of the relationship between immigration and insecurity (as immigration becomes the symbol of a condition

[1] A de facto discrimination had been developed against the populations of Eastern Europe and their mobility. This came about (although on technical grounds) under the slogan of the principle of equality but in a phase when Eastern European citizens were already in a position of crushing disadvantage with respect to the first extra-European immigrants. The freezing of this situation posed ethical and practical problems of enormous weight as it responded neither to the respecting of human rights nor to the extensive and integral interpretation of the principle of equality, which in practice was violated, nor to the specific needs of exchange and interaction in Europe.

[2] In 1990, before the break-up of the Soviet Union, the myth of invasion prevailed, in the presence of 1,200,000 immigrants from Eastern Europe, more than half of whom from the USSR (Okolsky, 1990). In that year 16% of Soviet inhabitants expressed the desire to emigrate to the West (Chesnais, 1990). A widespread trend analysis of 1990 predicted definitive departures: between 3 and 20 million persons by the end of 1993.

of expropriation) emerged in fact both from the sudden growth of the global immigration phenomenon in the late-1980s and the perception of the irreversible character of the settlement of the immigrants (which has been effectively predominant in the intentions and practice of immigration from the South).[3] A poll held in 1991 illustrated this issue: despite the fact that immigrant residents accounted for less than 1% of the total population of Italy, 78% of Italian respondents felt the number of immigrants was too high while only 43% were aware of the actual size of foreign migration (Mai, 2002).

2. THE EARLY USE OF INSECURITY

Insecurity has reinforced the myth of "invasion". Since immigration from the East took place at that time, opinion leaders and the media easily consolidated the impression in public opinion of an unstoppable phenomenon, also provoking new policy measures (such as those against Albanian immigration in Southern Italy). At the end of the 1990s, images were formed which foresaw a migration potential of millions of people in Eastern Europe and, above all, in the Soviet Union.[4] The cause was the elimination of travel restrictions for Soviet citizens through a new law on passports, but also the elimination of the visa requirement for Poles by the Federal Republic of Germany and other countries of the Schengen Group. Development and welfare in Western Europe were considered enormous pull factors for migration from the East. It seems quite curious and even amusing today to remember the past rhetoric on the "Albanian threat"[5] or about Croatian, Polish, Bosnian or Romanian pressures.

Excluding the Romanian case (even if nowadays this kind of economic immigration is very flexible and mutable), already in the 1990s the temporary character

---

[3] The intention to move permanently, with families and reunifications, was expressed in particular by North Africans. In 1991, there were about 350,000 irregular migrants in Italy. The collapse of the Soviet Union had affected the development of the Schengen Area. (Zincone and Caponio, 2006, pp. 1–20). The myth of "invasion" was fuelled also by the situation in Poland (see Kosic and Triandafyllidou, 2004) and after the landing of 35,000 Albanian asylum seekers in Apulia, in just a few months in 1991.

[4] Estimates of ILO expected 25–30 million newly unemployed in the Soviet Union and the UN High Commissioner for refugees considered a magnitude of 25 million refugees from all over Eastern Europe as possible (Kruse and Schwarz, 1991).

[5] Albanians were particularly vilified as a group, for a long time having occupied the "least desirable" category in the hierarchy of immigrant groups in Italy. The supposed criminality of Albanians offered a justification for Italian fears, prejudice and negative stereotypes. Their first mass landing led to a public debate linking immigration with crime for the first time (Bontempelli, 2009). That poor political debate was completely beside the fact that Albanian immigration to the United States was one of the most dignified and least inclined to public subsidies, which they considered as not worthy of free men.

of that migration was quite clear.[6] However, that conviction gave rise to instances of open cynicism: as it happened regarding the Bosnian refugees in Italy, despite the clear example of the Croatians who returned to their homeland when the Serbian aggression ended. Already at that time (as it happens today) there was the refusal of the obligation to give temporary hospitality to refugees from war-torn countries. At the same time immigration pressure from the South had still been encouraged in many cases by the reuniting of families, some members of which were already present illegally in Italy. The advocates of a priority for the "old" immigration (from the South of the Mediterranean Sea) emphasised, together with those in favour of multiculturalism, the personal relations and the preservation and improvement of the status of immigrants and especially of family reunification.[7]

For Italy, a southern orientation towards immigration had continued before the end of the 1990s, since immigration from the south had begun earlier. Moreover, the legislative and administrative measures restricting immigration later adopted in Italy (including a strong immigration policy, the indiscriminate limitation of granting visas, even if accommodation and work were guaranteed, the confused regulations[8] and their arbitrary application even regarding intellectuals who held official invitations, in a hostile political climate) and the boundaries which remained locked, were not only superfluous with regard to Eastern Europe (as they corresponded to a trend analysis, probably even ignored by political class, dating back to 1990, before the disintegration of the Soviet Union), but also became disruptive in Europe, causing problems, many of which still unsolved.[9]

---

[6] Emigration from Eastern and Balkan Europe for a limited period was well explained by the populations' attachment to their land (e.g. to Orthodox Slavs it is "sacred"), by their tenacious will to recover their own culture, to reconstruct a vital space devastated by decades of anti-ethnic, homogenizing centralist policies, and, in the 1990s, by the enthusiasm of the rebirth of the "small homelands" liberated from the imperial yoke and handed back linguistic and cultural autonomy. The past tendency to stop in countries of emigration after the Second World War was mainly due to economic reasons but has never had a mass character. Actually, already in the 1990s there was a clear trend towards the decrease of the pull factor from Eastern and Balkan Europe. Western Europe was a source of attraction-repulsion, a place where it is hard to adjust to living.

[7] Using simplified immigration procedures for family members, an option to return to the host country, dual citizenship and free movement.

[8] Only in 1990 the Parliament approved the so-called "Martelli Law", which regulated immigration. It redefined refugee status, solidified and specified the procedures for refusal of entry for undocumented migrants and clarified expulsion procedures. For the first time it introduced the programming of migrant flows from abroad (through the introduction of quotas): a measure that only partially would take into account the needs of the Italian labour market. Moreover, this law envisaged amnesty through which self-employed workers could be legalised. But the immigration from the East was only beginning then. (Veugelers, 1994).

[9] All of Europe is still strongly supporting the anti-historical and "unnatural" separation among European cultures of a common matrix which has lasted all too long. The effect has been that of isolating populations finding it impossible to recover their own European or semi-European identity (such as Russia – as demonstrated in the large amount of data collected by the Levada Center – or the exclusion of Western Balkans), which caused a permanent nostalgia for the previous regimes and the rethinking of "intra-continental conflicts" (imperial nationalism, "anti-Westernism" and so on).

Freezing the effects of the polarised world, legislative measures prolonged them. Rather than basing laws on objective and actual demographic trends, on the identification of migratory potentials and of populations most likely to want to leave (taking into consideration the authentic origin of migratory movements),[10] on the supports bases abroad (previous diasporas) on which a new immigration could rely (destinations of the movements), on the historical cycles and destinations, the stereotypical repetition of the invasion myth prevailed. Moreover, for certain Italian areas and regions closure included even absurd aspects: for example, the long exclusion of the Danube area from contacts with the Lombardy-Veneto region, historically with a strong connection. But the Italian political class still has not realised the uselessness of restrictions of the 1990s against the immigration from Eastern Europe and the long-term harm caused by the adopted measures.

3. ITALY'S CURRENT WAR ON MIGRANTS AND POLITICAL USE OF MIGRATIONS

There are many obvious similarities between the convictions, attitudes and the use of insecurity (not based on data) of the 1990s and the current Italian migration policy. What they have in common is the incorrect perception and the misuse of it by politicians and propagandists.

Five million foreign nationals are currently living and legally residing in Italy, which is equivalent to around 8.3% of Italy's population of 60.5 million. The biggest grouping of migrants come from Romania, accounting for just under a quarter of the total figure, or 23%. Another 9% came from Albania but they diminished considerably. 8% are Moroccan, 5.5% are Chinese and 4.5 came from Ukraine, mainly employed in retail, farming or domestic work. According to a migration study conducted by the ISMU Foundation (ISMU 2018), there are some 500,000 people living in Italy illegally, equivalent to 0.9% of the population, among them asylum seekers and those who have overstayed their visas. Figures from the International Organization for Migration show that around 120,000 immigrants arrived in Italy by sea in 2017. A considerable segment of illegal immigration to Italy, particularly from North Africa but also of Sub-Saharan origin, uses routes through Southern Europe in order to reach the northern part of Europe. Following a new

[10] Wars, persecution of minorities and extreme poverty (push factor) impacted Italian immigration heavily throughout the 1980s and after the breakdown of the polarised world. The great streams of immigrants from African countries accounted for 20.3% of total immigration to Italy in 1989, originating from Morocco, Tunisia and Senegal, joining other national groups already in the country, mostly Eritreans, Somalis, Egyptians and the citizens of various South American nations governed by dictatorships at the time.

deal which was signed in summer 2017, the number of migrants reaching Italian shores in the first five months of 2018 amounted to 13,808 – down by 84% in the same period a year prior. The fact that Italy is still the major destination for asylum seekers arriving by boats does not mean that this country is the main target of current migrations.

According to new studies that compared survey results with population data, nowadays Italians overestimate the number of immigrants coming from outside the EU to their country more than any other Europeans. While Italians believe that immigrants make up 25% of Italy's total population, the real figure is under 8%. That makes for a "perception error" of 17.4%. Italians score the highest misperception of immigrant numbers. Arrivals by the sea were in 2018 almost 80% lower than they were in 2017. No other European country showed such a wide gap.[11] This is obviously a fertile soil for political propaganda which prefers to ignore the statistics and survey data and promises to end migrant arrivals, adopting a hard line on immigration which includes the promise to deport hundreds of thousands of people who do not have permission to stay in the country.[12] The same applies to propaganda which accuses immigrants of committing a disproportionate number of crimes.[13] This misperception is unavoidably related to hostility towards immigrants. Experts agree that the current political climate is fuelling intolerance, in a society that is becoming even more polarised over the issues of migration and citizenship, due to the use of fear and the misuse[14] (or voluntary ignorance) of scientific studies on immigration, all in a *vacuum* of knowledge. The main problems

[11] Western Europeans vary in their perceptions of immigration. Among other EU Member States, the closest to Italy were Portugal (14.6%), Spain (14.4%) and the UK (12.8%). At the other end of the scale Croatia (0.1%), Sweden (0.3%), and Denmark (2.2 %) gave the least inflated estimates of immigrant numbers. Only Estonians underestimate the number of immigrants in their country (by 1.1%) (Istituto Cattaneo (2018)). Germans estimated the unemployment rate among immigrants at 40%, while the true figure is less than 8%.

[12] Italy spent hundreds of thousands of euros of EU funds (at least 200,000 euros, 90% of that journey's cost was paid by Brussels) to escort *Aquarius* migrant boat to Spain after refusing it permission to land at Italian ports for a sixth day in a row. More than 600 refugees and migrants (mostly Eritrean) were left stranded at sea in a four-day standoff until Spain agreed to accept the boat at Valencia. They were refused permission to disembark in the Italian port of Catania, Sicily. This propaganda coup must be considered the highest level reached by politicians in the misuse of data, facts and figures about immigration. This case-study not only helped to restore a distorted perception of the facts and made reality of immigration indistinguishable from political propaganda, but it has been responsible of considerable worsening of relations among European countries. The case of sending back to Italy from Germany, as a result of the Dublin agreement, is a possible future in this respect.

[13] This trend began in 1997, when suddenly in August two or three crimes, whose perpetrators were foreigners, were an opportunity for a campaign of alarm and panic. (Dal Lago, 2004, pp. 27–28).

[14] The media's and especially social media's representations of immigration are the primary sources based on which Italians formulate their ideas about immigrants. The role of social media in creating the image of migrations as a broad threat is substantial, especially among young people. The traditional media influence mostly old people.

concerning immigration clearly stem from the political process of polarisation, creating competition between "national" and "non-national", even in the presence of the so-called "new Italians", a generation who have been denied citizenship despite being born in Italy, living all their lives in the country and speaking fluent Italian or even regional dialects. Italy still has some of the most severe requirements in the EU regarding citizenship acquisition.[15] Combined with harsh and draconian immigration laws, Italian citizenship law limits in a very real way the actual integration of immigrants, reinforcing the sentiment of the majority of the population. Citizenship laws provide for ever-greater delays and much more restrictive conditions than in the past, creating in migrants the idea of a hostile and inhospitable country and a sense of extraneousness.[16] But what is even worse, the bureaucracy of permits pushes asylum seekers into the limbo of waiting. So, immigrants permanently sink into the abyss of irregularity if they do not receive the permission. As a result, they become, in all respects, "illegal men", condemned to life on the margins of the civil society. The closure of borders and the denial of rights to migrants, whether they are regular or not, are two sides of the same coin in the mismanagement of migration.

Italians have perceived immigration to represent a significant problem, regardless of actual numbers and percentage of immigrants in relation to Italian-born citizens. In the country, there is a real war being silently waged between Italians and migrants, who – whether legal or illegal – now live and work in Italy. A wave of hatred stirred against Africans, who very often have already been living in the country for some time, underpaid and even often living in conditions of enslavement, especially in the South. Italians are going backwards in community terms, amid an upsurge of nationalism that is growing together with discrimination and the refusal of anything perceived to be an alien body. Popular support for governments who advocate severe approaches to dealing with the immigration problem illustrates how tolerance for immigrants has actually decreased in the wake of harsher laws. Political parties just do not tolerate the phenomenon of migration and exploit it politically. The most widespread slogan among politicians is: "Italy cannot be Europe's refugee camp". The government's project is to expel hundreds of thousands of illegal immigrants. In fact, politicians failed to address the phenomenon of irregular immigration in a structural way, as they were characterised

---

[15] Especially the Law decree no. 92 of 2008 established newer and tighter norms concerning both undocumented migrants and foreign citizens sentenced to more than two years in prison, including EU nationals. The next step in Italian migration policies was the Law no. 94 of 2009, with which the government introduced the "crime of clandestine immigration". Among some of the measures undertaken in the name of "increasing security", illegal immigration was criminalised and was made punishable by detention, deportation and/or fines. Italians themselves can face legal action if they knowingly provide services or house illegal immigrants.

[16] On integration policies in Italy, Caneva (2014); Finotelli (2018); Scipioni (2018); Grzymala-Kazlowska (2018); Caritas Italiana (2019).

by measures aimed mainly at tackling emergency situations. "Zero-landing" policies have been attempted by all Italian governments, using similar strategies and ending in identical failures: an empty discourse on migrations, TV talk shows full of victimisation, and resentment against richer Northern European countries and illegal migration, financing of Libyan mafias to be jailers patrolling inhumane detention camps for sub-Saharan migrants.[17] Although there is a tendency for governments in the EU to adopt a restrictive approach towards immigration and asylum seekers, because large parts of the European voters hold latent anti-immigrant attitudes (Howard, 2010; Alonso and Claro da Fonseca, 2012), some voters are generally more open to receiving larger numbers of refugees than others. In Italy those attitudes have been variable and instable but when there emerged electorally significant right-wing populist parties (Kitschelt, 1997, pp. 4–19), voters began to demand more restrictive policies. But in fact, there is no difference between a centre-left government's approach to migration and that of a right-wing approach. That is because right-wing populists were able to expand their voter bases at the expense of the government and other "moderate" political parties. By mobilising voters with anti-immigrant preferences and blaming the government for its lenient policies towards immigration, they exerted pressure on the government which in response adopted similar positions and implemented policies that aimed to minimise the intake of asylum seekers, in order not to lose voter support (as already described by Massey, 1999, p. 313). Thus, the main trend in Italy, as in several European countries, is to consider a zero-migration option.[18]

Every migration policy ended with an amnesty and normalisation of thousands of immigrants. Indeed, the *fil rouge* that blinds all Italian migration policies is the use of *sanatorie* (amnesties). Various Italian governments normalised the legal status of 1.7 million once irregular immigrants and workers. Moreover, Italy's external policies of the last decade have shown a conspicuous lack of consistency. Paradoxically, "populist" governments are benefiting from the restrictive policies their opponents had implemented. At the same time, it has also happened that the Italian people and governments have indicated in groups and categories of people, gathered on the basis of prejudices and stereotypes, real objectives to be struck, so as to

[17] Any change in the numbers coming from North Africa will largely depend on the stabilisation efforts in Libya and the persistence of the controversial deal between Rome and the authorities and militias there which have slashed arrivals.

[18] Despite the fact that a continuous stream of migrants cannot be a complement (or a substitute) to the decline of births, and its aggregate growth is not an automatic consequence (because it depends on the skills of the migrants and their employability according to the requirements of the labour market), and migrants may even weigh negatively on per capita income, the zero-migration option would be a serious danger for Italy because its population would decline rapidly due to the decline of fertility (the worst in Europe), the extension of the retirement age, the considerable aging of the working population that will depress productivity and the rate of innovation (Skirbekk, 2008). Working-age population will decline more rapidly than the population in general (see Livi Bacci, 2018, pp. 696–697). In Italy, immigrants are a growing proportion in the labour force, particularly in agriculture.

allow the frustrations to find vent by identifying enemies to be persecuted.[19] Various surveys showed an alarming expansion of hate speech in direct parallel to instances of stereotyping and manipulative misrepresentations of foreigners in the media.[20]

Based on the principle of *jus sanguinis*, according to which descent and not place of birth is the relevant factor for political citizenship, all those not of Italian descent are lumped under the term "*extracomunitari*" (extra-EU citizens), which covers not only asylum seekers and first generation guest workers but also their descendants. The logic of "othering" (Van Houtum, 2002; Van Houtum and Pijpers, 2007; Vitale, 2011) and the building of a potential enemy are quite clear and are functional to the reinforcement of internal politics, the consensus[21] and national cohesion among the Italian population. The construction of a threat as "moral panic", the idea of "national insecurity" stirred by "boat people" as a pervasive threat to Italian security have been used by politicians to justify the implementation of a permanent "emergency" measure towards them. In fact, the ever-new adoptions of highly restrictive measures depending on the "urgency" of the situation itself are a clear demonstration of the government's own incapacity to address the issue of migration and to conform to its obligations under the international law of human rights. Obviously, the huge numbers of poor people, suffering and angry Italians because of the recession (as it is well known, anti-migration feelings increase in periods of depression and decrease in periods of expansion) will not improve their own situation by mobilising against migrants. Nonetheless, misperceptions have created a widespread support for policies that stop immigration. It is obvious also that the lack of a truly European approach has impacted the Italian government's failure to address this issue.

4. CONCLUSIONS

In the Italian immigration debate facts no longer seem to matter. Politicians shape public perception on immigration ignoring the facts, trends (for example the migrants' intention to expatriate to the countries of Northern Europe) or bending the numbers to fit their stories. This is quite curious in a time of widespread access to accurate and widely available data. Even if this problem is not unique to Italy, in

---

[19] In 2018, there have been at least 33 violent attacks against immigrants. Journalists have mapped over 30 racist physical assaults: an average of one every two days, beginning from 1 June 2018, the day the new government was sworn in.

[20] See Camera dei Deputati, *The pyramid of hate in Italy*. Final Report (2016). For new data, see also www.euronews.com/2019/06/12/hate-crimes-in-italy-quadrupled-between-2017-and-2018; see also www.lunaria.org/il-razzismo-nel-2018-on-line-il-nostro-nuovo-focus/ and Sanguinetti N., Poletto F., Bosco C., Patti V. and Stranisci M. (2016).

[21] Centre-right coalition government (the second government led by Silvio Berlusconi) had built part of its consensus on anti-immigration rhetoric in 2004.

this country the dominant political discourse has become increasingly detached from reality and much more than in other European countries. Despite the fact that the number of irregular crossings between Germany and Austria has plummeted, it has not stopped the phenomenon from sparking a political crisis in Berlin and Brussels. The Italian political discourse remains dominated by the idea that NGO rescue operations are a significant *pull factor*. Sceptical voices are dismissed as uninformed and the temptation to hide behind figures has became permanent, facilitating the rise of populist rhetoric and leaders who promised to end the migration crisis once and for all without the European Union.

The misuse or ignorance of data on migrations is particularly dangerous because its rejection has critical implications for policymaking and planning. Mistakes can stimulate an "overfinancing" of asylum and migration processes,[22] stimulating even more alarm among people. This is an evident direct reflection of the pressure generated by politicians who only consider closing external borders, despite the fact that a long-term solution requires above all attention to integrating immigrants already living in a country. Political narratives on immigration stimulate loud voices calling for radical solutions to perceived problems, often detached from facts because they are particularly attractive to voters, playing into their fears and presenting the action of someone who takes charge and fixes the current situation. Not surprisingly, the political response is highly polarising. Tapping into fears is easier and politically much more productive than suggesting finding viable and consensual solutions. "Counter-narratives" are important for presenting a sceptical analysis based on facts and real numbers of immigrants. In Italy, the government's decision appears to be a clear signal of the intent of the voters. The appeal of the idea that Italy should close its borders to migrants is very influential and especially the narrative that, having caused many of Italy's socio-economic problems, migration is the most urgent problem which the country faces. Moreover, this kind of policy stimulates contrasts among bordering countries (Italy and France, Italy and Austria or Germany or Malta[23] and so on: initially accusing them of having

[22] In the EU's Multiannual Financial Framework, the European Commission has proposed a nearly tripling of the amount of money devoted to asylum and migration, from 13 billion to 35 billion euros. http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mff/index_en.cfm; https://concordeurope.org/what-we-do/promoting-civil-society-space/eu-budget-mff-2021-2027/ while funds for securing the EU's external borders will nearly quadruple – from 5.6 to 21.3 billion euros; money devoted to integration (which is essential for a long-term policy and management of immigrants) will most likely remain at current levels.

[23] Malta hosts the second-highest number of refugees per capita in the EU – 18.3 per 1,000 inhabitants (after Sweden: 20.3 per 1,000). Austria hosts the third-highest number of refugees per capita in the EU (10.7 per 1,000 inhabitants. Italy actually hosts only 2.4 per 1,000. Although the Dublin III Regulation clearly failed, the refugee quota system represents a case of unsuccessful EU policymaking and the EU has not been able to agree on a fair distribution of immigrants and refugees, Italy's official position in this respect is quite curious. Although Italy is an important first entry point for many asylum seekers, it must be considered a transit country (Costello and Mouzourakis, 2016) and it receives a comparatively small share of asylum application in relation to its national population (Zaun, 2017, p. 221).

motivated asylum seekers to come to Europe through their temporary open borders and at the end of closing their borders to refugees and refusing relocations of migrants) reinforcing the role of national borders (with the suspensions of the Schengen regime and destructively challenging the practice of freedom of movement in Europe without border controls) and having serious implications for Italy's domestic policy and for the relations with neighbouring countries and the broader EU. Slow proceedings of international agreements and the many divisions within the European Union make it difficult to actually enforce the new measures to tackle the problem of immigration. Italy preferred permanent refugee quotas over the current Dublin system, but the government took a less active role in the negotiations compared to Austria, Germany and Sweden. Far from leading substantive reforms, Rome's line on immigration risks deepening the rift in the EU, often siding with EU Member States and non-Member States that, in terms of migration, had often worked against Italian "national interest" (e.g. supporting the legitimacy of strong rebordering of neighbouring countries). Moreover, with a quota system for relocation, declared as unavoidable by Italian governments, the current top recipient countries would no longer have incentives to engage in the protection of EU's external borders, considered by Central and Eastern European countries their key priority (Zaun, 2017, p. 56). What is clear is the permanent dichotomy of Italian migration policies addressing irregular immigration, with internal policies and often opposite external ones, characterised by variability and instability.

The possibility for minorities to enjoy the benefit of integration can collapse very quickly facing a destructive nationalism and a rigid mentality, indifferent to numbers and bare reality. Calm public discourse still offers plenty of room for data and facts. Experts need to use them more incisively, using the media accurately and compassionately. The changes of the last few years on the world scale will have a direct impact on the immigration policy outlook and development but a consequent policy is still far from a coherent solution to new problems and challenges.

REFERENCES

ALONSO, S. and CLARO DA FONSECA, S. (2012), 'Immigration. Left and Right', *Party Politics*, 18 (6), pp. 865–884.

BONTEMPELLI, S. (2009), 'Il governo dell'immigrazione in Italia. Il caso dei «decreti flussi»', [in:] CONSORTI, P. (ed), *Tutela dei diritti dei migrant.* Pisa: Plus.

CAMERA DEI DEPUTATI (2016), *The Pyramid of Hate in Italy. The "Jo Cox Committee on hate, intolerance, xenophobia and racism*. Final Report, Rome. Available on Internet at www.camera.it/application/xmanager/projects/leg17/attachments/uploadfile_commissione_intolleranza/files/000/000/006/INFOGRAFICA_EN.pdf

CANEVA, E. (2014), *The integration of migrants in Italy: an overview of policy instruments and actors,* INTERACT Research Report 2014/05, European University Institute, Robert Schuman Center for Advanced Studies.

CARITAS ITALIANA (CESAREO V.) (eds.) (2019), *The Twenty-third Report on Migrations 2017.* Caritas, Rome.

CHESNAIS, J.C. (1990), *Migration from Eastern to Western Europe. Past (1946–1989) and Future (1990–2000), Migratory Movements from Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,* Council of Europe, Councile of Europe, Strasbourg.

COSTELLO, C. and MOUZOURAKIS, M. (2016), 'The Common European Asylum System: Where Did It All Go Wrong?', [in:] FLETCHER, M., HERLIN-KARNELL, E. and MATERA, C. (eds.), *The European Union in an Area of Freedom, Security and Justice.* Abingdon: Routledge.

DAL LAGO, A. (2004), *Non-persone: l'esclusione dei migranti in una società globale.* Milan: Feltrinelli.

FINOTELLI, C. (2018), 'Integration in times of economic decline. Migrant inclusion in Southern European societies: trends and theoretical implications', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44 (14), pp. 2303–2319.

GRZYMALA-KAZLOWSKA, A. (2017), 'Introduction: rethinking integration. New perspectives on adaptation and settlement in the era of super-diversity', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 44 (2), pp. 179–196.

HOWARD, M.M. (2010), 'The Impact of the Far Right on Citizenship Policy in Europe: Explaining Continuity and Change', *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 36 (5), pp. 737–751.

ISITUTO CATTANEO (2018), *Immigrazione in Italia: tra realtà e percezione*. http://www.cattaneo.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/Analisi-Istituto-Cattaneo-Immigrazione-realt%C3%A0-e-percezione-27-agosto-2018-1.pdf

ISMU (2018), CESAREO, V. (ed.), *The Twenty-third Italian Report on Migrations 2017,* Fondazione ISMU, Milan. Reported also on: www.thelocal.it/20180612/immigration-to-italy-numbers

KITSCHELT, H. (1997), *The Radical Right in Western Europe. A Comparative Analysis*, Ann Arbor, University of Michigan Press, MI.

KOSIC, A. and TRYANDAFYLLIDOU, A. (2004), 'Albanian and Polish Migration to Italy: the Micro-Process of Policy Implementation and Immigrant Survival Strategies', *International Migration Review*, 28 (4), pp. 1413–1446.

KRUSE, K. and SCHWARZ, B. (1991), 'Neue Freiheit, neue Grenzen', *Die Zeit (Dossier),* February, 15.

LIVI BACCI, M. (2018), 'Does Europe need mass immigration?', *Journal of Economic Geography*, 18, pp. 695–703.

MAI, N. (2002), *Myths and Moral panics: Italian Identity and the Media Representation of Albanian Immigration*: Ashgate.

MASSEY, D.S. (1999), 'International Migration at the Dawn of the Twenty-First Century: The Role of the State', *Population and Development Review*, 25 (2), pp. 303–322.

OKOLSKY, M. (1990), *Migratory Movements from Countries of Central and Eastern Europe,* Council of Europe, Strasbourg.

SANGUINETTI, M., POLETTO, F., BOSCO, C., PATTI, V. and STRANISCI, M. (2016), *An Italian Twitter Corpus of Hate Speech against Immigrants,* www.aclweb.org/anthology/L18-1443

SCIPIONI, M. (2018), 'Failing forward in EU migration policy? EU integration after the 2015 asylum and migration crisis', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 25 (9), pp. 1357–1375.

SKIRBEKK, V. (2008), 'Age and Productivity Capacity: Descriptions, causes and policy options', *Ageing Horizons*, 8, pp. 4–12.

VAN HOUTUM, H. (2002), 'Borders of Comfort: Spatial Economic Bordering Processes in the European Union', *Regional and Federal Studies,* XII, 4 (Winter), pp. 37–57.

VAN HOUTUM, H. and PIJPERS, R. (2007), 'The European Union as a Gated Community: The Two-faced Border and Immigration Regime of the EU', *Antipode*, 39 (2), pp. 291–309.

VEUGELERS, J.W.P. (1994), 'Recent Immigration Politics in Italy: a Short Story', *West European Politics,* 17 (2), pp. 33–49.

VITALE, A. (2011), 'The Contemporary EU's Notion of Territoriality and External Borders', *European Spatial Research and Policy*, XVIII (2), pp. 17–27.

ZAUN, N. (2017), *EU Asylum Policies. The Power of Strong Regulating States.* Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.

ZINCONE, G. and CAPONIO, T. (2006), 'Immigrant and Immigration Policy-making: the Case of Italy', *IMISCOE Woking Article, Country Report.* Rotterdam: IMISCOE.

sciendo

C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.05

Mariann DÖMÖS*, István TARRÓSY*

INTEGRATION OF MIGRANTS IN ITALY: LOCAL ACTORS AND AFRICAN COMMUNITIES

Abstract. Italy is undoubtedly one of the key actors in the current international "migration crisis" in the Mediterranean region. The paper aims to provide an overview of both the opportunities and problems for the Italian integration policy as of today. The authors intend to indicate the role of civil organisations in the 'Italian migration issue' and to emphasize the uniqueness of their initiatives. The study will provide an insight into one of the major immigrant communities, the Africans, through the civil organisations which have been working with them. The paper, based especially on empirical field experiences, is the result of a two-and-a-half-year research in Italy with different scholarships, coupled with other field trips in several sub-Saharan African countries.
Key words: migration, integration, Italy, civil organisations, Africans.

1. INTRODUCTION

By 2019, Italy has certainly become one of the key actors in the current international "migration crisis" in the Mediterranean region. Since the early 2000s, immigration in Italy has increased considerably, and immediately revealed some difficulties in handling the complexity of this phenomenon. Italy's policy did not offer any exact answers, and it managed migration in different ways. It favoured to deal with intensifying migration with permissive or tightening laws, but essentially without much success. Integration has not been an integral part of the Italian migration policy, however, when we talk about migration and its management, the issue cannot be disregarded.

In the country, a strong civil society has been in existence and all the above problems have prompted certain organisations to manage the situation along with integration. However, it is important to note that the number of regular immigrants

* Mariann DÖMÖS, István TARRÓSY, University of Pécs, Department of Political Science and International Studies, Hungary; e-mails: domos.mariann@gmail.com, tarrosy.istvan@pte.hu

in Italy has come close to 5 million, representing 8.7% of the total population (of over 60 million people) (ISTAT). The flows of immigrants from West African countries, such as Senegal and Nigeria, and from Asian countries, including China, Bangladesh and Pakistan, have continued to increase. In Italy, due to the period of colonisation, there are historic African communities from Eritrea, Somalia and Ethiopia.[1] In the 1970s other African immigrants, coming mainly from Central Africa and the Gulf of Guinea, arrived in Italy for work, study or religious purposes. African migration in general has proven to be a substantial issue on the Italian migration policy agenda.

2. FOCUS ON THE QUESTION OF INTEGRATION. AN OVERVIEW OF ITALIAN MIGRATION POLICY

2.1. About the need for a policy of integration

Although conflicts, in general, can result from a myriad of reasons, what is common about them is that an immigrant community is different from the host community, and if problems and deficits connected with such differences cannot be solved by integration – for example, there is no integration programme, as there are too many additional costs that the host society is reluctant to take, the spatial and structural separation is permanent, and *segregation* and *ghettos* are established.[2] Obviously, a lot also depends on the adaptation and handling skills of the receiving society, which can have certain tools: state institutions on the central and local levels, and organisations of the non-governmental sector. Due to the specificities of Italian political culture, Italy has a strong civil society actively involved in tackling emerging problems, particularly local issues. The immigration policy is best described by a Janus face, as on one side there are activities to attract/hinder migration flows (active migration policy), while on the other side, we find the integration of migrants who have already arrived in the country.

It is also easy to recognise that a well-functioning *integration policy* is essential to reduce and mitigate conflicts, which "tries to do something with immigrants" reducing perceived or real friction and is an integral part of a complex immigration policy. If all this is lacking or not thoroughly thought over, the aforementioned risks will increase, scapegoat mechanisms come into operation,

[1] Although "as a colonial power sharing the second longest boundary with independent Ethiopia (that is, after Britain), Italy could scarcely afford to ignore Ethiopia," it was never that strong and powerful that it could colonize this African land. The Ethiopians could get rid of Italians after a 5-year period of occupation between 1936–1941. See more: Zewde, 2001, pp. 150–176.

[2] More on the extent of the adaptation of migrants see: Póczik and Dunavölgyi, 2008, pp. 94–102.

the marginalisation of groups of immigrants will be triggered, while the general society will experience gaps which can eventually become uncontrollable. It is rather unfortunate if the integration policy – due to the diversity of the situation – wants to tackle the issue by using 'Endlösung type' solutions. In other words, the development of consensual, integrative solutions, rather than a unilateral categorical policy, is a good practice, which can offer a long-term perspective and favours (at least initially) positive discrimination and equal opportunity stimulation measures. In the development of the integration concept, it is worth thinking about long-term solutions, since the process of integration is long, it occurs at different levels, and it requires adequate programmes.

One of the most fundamental elements of a suitable integration policy is *the language of a locality*. For those who come from foreign countries and intend to stay permanently, it is essential to acquire the local medium of communication.

The availability of basic *human rights*, such as the right for education or work is also vital. In other words, that means assuring the appropriate rights that will provide a basis for integration. In connection with that there comes the issue of *positive discrimination*, which initially facilitates the emergence and rise of disadvantaged groups, including immigrants.

Integration is yet another important cornerstone in confronting and ending *fears*. Empirical research has shown that fear of immigration is not based on economic or rational foundations, but primarily on fears (Brugnoli and Matteini, 2018, pp. 253–254). Fear of the stranger, the unknown, is a human quality, and it also occurs in the context of immigration. Therefore, it is important for any integration policy to include *sensitising programmes* that can successfully bridge cultural differences and eliminate mutual fears.

Integration has *different types and volumes*, depending on the extent of the fulfilment of the process. For a long time, *total assimilation* was the only solution that was thought to be successful. Later, *partial assimilation* and the ideal of a *multicultural society* proved to be the most relevant theory, and they were common in Europe. Nowadays *neo-assimilation* views are widespread (Tarrósy, 2014, pp. 9–25).

2.2. Italian immigration policy: to hinder migration flows

Integration has not been an integral part of the *Italian immigration policy*. The Italian policy had not really dealt with migration management until the 1980s. Some governments approached the matter explicitly "generously" and left it untreated, not fearing its problematic side but rather focusing on its possible advantages. Until the end of the 1990s, it was looser and more permissive, focused only on the existence of residence permits and deportation statements. All of that benefited the country, as other major receiving countries in Western Europe had already advocated the tightening of immigration laws.

If we review the trends in more detail, we can see that until 1986 only proof of identity and residence permits were verified. The first major comprehensive law was constructed in 1986, which intended to settle the legal situation of migrants and to guarantee their labour market equality (Nyusztay, 2011, p. 107). The *Martelli Law* of 1990 was already a comprehensive legal framework which brought several measures in relation to refugees (Colombo and Sciortino, 2004, pp. 56–59). In 1998, the so-called *Turco-Napolitano law* made efforts to settle the already increased number of communities. This law specified the conditions for admission and residence permits, it set quotas, and it imposed stricter deportation standards and norms, in accordance with the Schengen requirements and the Tampere programme.[3]

The next turning point in the history of Italian migration policy was 2002 when the European Union's strictest anti-immigration law was born, the so-called *Bossi-Fini law*. This, amongst other things, tightened the requirements for extending residence permits, and punished illegal immigration. According to experts, this law was controversial because it gave immigrants an opportunity to legitimise their situation but, at the same time, introduced difficulties for extending residence permits for those who arrived in the country legally. The other main criticism of the law was that it treated the phenomenon of immigration in criminal terms. From there onwards, the Italian migration policy has become *closed-up* and *restrictive*. Since 1998 there has been a steadily tightening tendency to halt immigration. Parallel to this, "public opinion toward migrants cooled, resulting in a conflict with migrant communities of people who had worked for many years in Italy and now began to demand an easier path to citizenship" (Carter, 2013, p. 62).

Then, since 2006 the political situation changed once again, as *Romano Prodi*'s two-year left-liberal governance cycle had an impact on Italy's immigration policy.[4] The Prodi administration continued its controversial policy of inclusive-caring politics and forced tightening. That more permissive policy of migration undeniably contributed to an increase in migration in the second half of the 2000s.

Immigration became a topic of everyday politics and it was highlighted in the 2008 election campaign. The winning *Berlusconi government*, with the Northern League, taking advantage of this responsive public mood, tightened immigration laws.[5] The Berlusconi government sought to combat immigration internationally.

---

[3] Obviously, the Italian regulations have to be in line with the legislation of the European Union, however, in this paper we cannot go into such details. See more: Mohay, 2014, pp. 45–64; Colombo and Sciortino, 2004, pp. 62–66.

[4] Prodi became Italian Prime Minister (second time) after he finished his mandate as President of the EU European Commission (1999–2004). He envisioned an EU-compliant migration policy for Italy. For example, he deleted the labour-immigration quotas for newly entering states. However, after 2007, as a result of increasing migration flows and other problems, the country's immigration policy became strict again.

[5] Amongst other things, they introduced a penalty on irregular immigration, and expulsion became a possible action against irregular immigrants.

They signed agreements with Libya and Egypt, as well as with other 28 countries to reduce immigration. In particular, they agreed on joint coastal patrols and the deportation of irregular immigrants. Those received tough criticism and caused tensions within the European Union. Many people did not like it that the issue of immigration was seen only as a matter of public/national security and its social and cultural aspects were completely ignored. The policy on immigration was tightened further by the *Maroni-Tremonti Act* in 2012.[6]

Finally, after the boat accident in Lampedusa in 2013 and under the influence of protests, Italy eased the immigration law in the spring of 2014. The years between 2014 and 2016 were the peak years in relation to immigration (with record data), partly due to the alleviation of Italian immigration policy and partly due to international events. That intensifying migratory pressure then led the incumbent Italian government again to tighten its immigration policy further. During the period the government re-opened negotiations and closer cooperation with Libya (which has ceased to function as an autonomous state in 2011 due to the international intervention against the Gaddafi regime).

In 2017, Italy developed a new *Code of Conduct for NGO's* for civilian lifeboats, which aimed to coordinate the rescue protocol and to provide a controlled framework for it, so that human trafficking in the Mediterranean could be reduced (Codice di Condotta…). The code triggered a major wave of protest from NGOs (NGO's divided by …, 2017).

It can be seen that immigration policy had tightened well before the new coalition government (the League and the 5 Stars Movement) was formed in 2018. The current situation is due not primarily to the then new Minister of the Interior, Matteo Salvini,[7] but also to, Marco Minniti, the former interior minister of the Gentiloni government. He was the person who conducted a series of talks with Libya from 2016 onwards, including the various tribal groups, and who proposed the new code making it difficult to cross the Mediterranean Sea, which is the main migratory route towards Europe. The impact of these acts was visible and in 2017 the number of people arriving in Italy fell by a third compared with 2016, then, in 2018 fell to one-third of the previous year (UNHCR, 2019). However, that was only a treatment of the symptoms. The measures did not have any impact on the root causes, i.e. the push factors of migration: local problems causing people to emigrate were not solved. Overall, these measures and the latest, so-called *Salvini decree*[8] are mainly focused on the interception of migration and on retaining it outside national boundaries.

---

[6] Irregular immigrants had to pay a financial penalty, which meant an administrative/procedural fee of EUR 80–200.

[7] As of early September 2019, Salvini is no longer part of the coalition government.

[8] The Salvini Decree is a migration security bill and was passed by the Italian Parliament on 7 November 2018. See more: http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2018/10/04/18G00140/sg

2.3. Italian integration policy: to integrate those who have already arrived

Mind you that in terms of the migration policy of Italy there has always existed an *integration policy*. The *Italian Constitution* declares it as an inviolable human right (Fundamental Rights in Italy). Generally speaking, the Italian legislation on the issue of legal status of foreigners is aligned with *fundamental rights*. In Article 3 of the Italian Constitution the principle of equality is assured, therefore, for foreigners this right entails not only obligations, but also rights on equal conditions with citizens (Partecipazione e cittadinanza). In these laws Italy provides an essential tool to favour the integration of foreigners. Naturally, the fundamental human rights in the Italian laws are in line with international regulations. The Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (European Convention on Human Rights) (Rome, 1950, Italy ratified 1955, No. 848) is one of the paramount international documents. The international conventions and the Italian Constitution provide many important rights for immigrants, such as the right for life, the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to freedom and personal security, and the right to take legal action to protect one's rights in civil, criminal and administrative matters before an independent judge established by law and within a reasonable time.[9] Expelled foreigner can return to Italy to defend themselves and attend a court trial. Foreigners can also propose an appeal for a labour process aimed at guaranteeing their worker's rights or defending any other rights connected to their rights and their family. Over these strong human rights, from the aspect of integration of migrants, Italy has a well-structured, national *reception system* with different purposes, but the migrants are distributed unevenly in the country.

Overall, there is a continuing debate over the elements of the system. On the one hand, it is a well-developed, articulated system, which is, however, overloaded and thus it functions poorly. On the other hand, some elements of the so-called CIEs/CPRs[10] are subject to constant debate (Mazza, 2013). The most frequently asked questions regarding the organisation are the effectiveness of its operation, the violation of human rights, and the efficiency of deportation in general that is usually criticized by experts. It is not surprising that these dedicated identification and expulsion centres operate with low efficiency. In 2014, the ratio of actual deportations was around 46% (CIE: ancora cronache …, 2014). Moreover, they do not produce a deterrent effect.

---

[9] Then, the protection by the law includes the review of irrevocable sentences of criminal conviction, the presumption of innocence, the right to redress judicial errors. Furthermore, a foreigner who is under arrest and trial has the right to defend themselves, receive the assistance of an interpreter during an interrogation and the written declarations in his own language.

[10] Identification and Expulsion Center (Centro Identificazione ed Espulsione). From 2017, the Marco-Minnitti Act changed their name to CPR, i.e. Permanence Centers for Repatriations (Centro di Permanenza per i Rimpatri).

However, among the centres, there is the Protection System for Asylum Seekers and Refugees (SPRAR), which could be a good example of integration. The programmes run voluntary by municipalities "and develop social inclusion projects strictly based on agreed operational manual issued by the Government that includes activities in education, vocational training, psychological support, legal support, recreation, integration, and include an exit fund" (Brugnoli and Matteini, 2018, p. 266). The problem of the SPRAR is that it serves few people. "Given the fact that financial resources are available, it looks like Italy suffers from the lack of cohesion and solidarity that Italian politicians often associate with other European countries when it comes to continental relocations" (Brugnoli and Matteini, 2018, p. 266). Basically, all the system needs are reforms because the structure is good, but its operation must be renewed and strengthened, to say nothing of the conditions of the centres.

Although integration requires a general national/state framework to be defined, it is also important to develop local programmes, as the more they manage the problems locally the more successful and better solutions can be developed. NGOs, therefore, have a very important role in this because they can develop local action programmes.

3. WHAT LOCAL ACTIONS CAN DO IN MANAGING MIGRANTS: FOCUS ON CIVIL SOCIETY

Apart from the need of a general framework for integration on the national level, it is important to develop local programs, as more successful solutions can be found on the local level, which consider various specific situations and requirements. Non-governmental organisations have a crucial role in local actions. Additionally, these successful local solutions and action plans can be expanded on a bigger scale, they can stimulate local and higher-level politics, their experiences can be incorporated in the integration policy to shape, reform, and expand it with new elements, and they can establish connections between the different actors in politics. The efficiency of local actions is supported by the fact that those who live in the same place have more solidarity towards each other. The role of Italian NGOs in this is undeniable. They attempt to tackle problems on the local level caused by the lack of a national integration concept.

A strong civil society is an integral part of the Italian political culture, whose roots can be traced back to several elements. For example, trade unions, syndicalism and the strengths of revolutionary powers have always been characteristic features of Italians. Familiarism is also an important element: family centrism is manifested not only in traditions, but also in communities, thinking, and actions,

which also gives a strong foundation for civil society. In addition, the presence of localisation – the area, be it a city or a larger municipal unit such as a region – is displayed as an identity-building factor. Active participation in local affairs is also an indispensable basis for the existence of civil organisations. Furthermore, religious and historical traditions must be considered: the existence of altruism related to Catholicism or various movements and organisations derived from historical traditions. There are also historical reasons for the parallel existence of a "weak state" in Italy and a strong civil society (Szabó, 2003, pp. 135–155). "Civil disobedience and revolutionalism that brings public issues out in the streets are values that are shared, at least in principle, not only by conscious opponents, but also by the majority of the society." (Szántó, 2006, pp. 254–270). Although this quotation was originally about France, it is also true for Italy.

The existence of different grass-roots organisations is also significant as they deal with important (public) issues that affect life at the local level. There has been an emergence of civil initiatives which seek to tackle the problems of large-scale immigration. In other words, some NGOs have begun to deal with migration, and they are trying not only to approximate cultures, but also to capture the issue along the deeper layers of integration, and to make incoming people an integral part of the Italian society. A strong NGO layer is developing in the country, and it is willing to act about the issue of migration and indicate the importance of integration at the same time. These are communal spheres that are deeply rooted in the basic minds of the Italian society and the Italian political culture. Such 'social co-operatives' working in smaller districts help present Italian language and culture to the immigrants at the local level, and through various events they also try to draw the dominant society closer to local migrants. With such an attitude, they seek to tackle the shortcomings of the state immigration policy. One of the reasons for their effectiveness is that they realised that the main obstacles to immigration, exclusion and racism are not economic but they are rooted in the cultural gap between the dominant society and migrants, in the distance between the two and in the growing fear resulting from this. Their activities are aimed at reducing the inequalities between immigrants and the dominant society, and not to marginalise or exclude those groups, but to make them useful members of the community instead.

4. AFRICAN COMMUNITIES IN ITALY

Until the early 1970s Southern European states including Italy were viewed as lands of emigration. In the years to follow they started to experience declining outbound and increasing inbound migration flows. In Italy, the number of for-

eigners with residence permits between 1981 and 1991 doubled, from 300,000 to 600,000, and then rose to 1.4 million by 2000 and 4.6 million in 2010. The leading groups of non-EU residents in 2012 were Albanians (483,000) and Moroccans (452,000) (Castels *et al*., 2014, p. 114). Considering numerous factors including geographic proximity, the common historic and cultural pool of the Mediterranean, together with the heritage of the colonial era, as well as present-day political and economic relations, Italy is one of the top European destinations for African immigrants. Travelling to Italy represents one of the main migration routes from Africa. At the same time, Italy is Africa's seventh largest economic partner (Brugnoli and Matteini, 2018, p. 263). In the country, there are numerous African communities and extended diaspora linkages, among which the most considerable is that of the Egyptians. The presence of stable diaspora communities has a substantial influence on any migration decision, i.e. among the pull factors we always find diaspora connections, which may help the integration of incoming immigrants.

In 2016, the third largest flow of immigrants came from Nigeria (15,000) and from Morocco (15,000) and the African immigrants showed the highest increase during that year. The population of Guinean citizens increased by 161%, Ivorians by 73%, Nigerians by 66%, and Ghanaians by 37% (Istat, 2017). Those trends continued in the following year: Nigerians (23,000; +58.4%) and Moroccans (16,000 +7.1%) arrived in the country (Istat, 2017). "Italy is a major country of destination for human trafficking (women and children), and ranks among the top destination countries for sex trafficking in the world." (Adepoju, 2010, p. 238).

If we examine the situation by the distribution of immigrants, we can say that Lazio is the second most populous region in the country. In 2016, there were almost 660,000 inhabitants, i.e. 13.1% of the total foreign residents (51% women, in line with the national average 52.4%). In the region, the population of migrants increased slightly compared to 2015, while the total resident population showed a little decrease (Albani, 2018, p. 14). In the four provinces of Lazio (excluding Rome), the five largest communities were Romanians (41.1% of the total and among those 54.2% were women), followed by the Indians (10.1%, among whom only 27.2% were women), Albanians (7%, among whom 48.5% were women), Moroccans (4.4%, 44.9% women) and Ukrainians (3.8%, 75.7% women). Clearly, in the top 5 nationalities there is just one African group, but in this community the rate of women is high (in line with the national trends, there are just two African communities from Morocco and Egypt). Obviously, the distribution of immigrants is unequal: in the territory of Lazio, Rome it is the most popular destination, with 82.2% of the total migrant population of the region concentrated in the capital, which makes 10.8% of the total migrant population in Italy (Albani, 2018, p. 15). In other words, Rome is the biggest "region" when we look at the density of immigrants and its pace of growth was the most intense in 2016.

5. AN EXAMPLE: SENEGALESE MIGRANTS IN ROME AND SOME SUPPORTIVE CIVIL INITIATIVES

An illustration of the complexity of migration is the example of the Senegalese community, which offers an insight into one of the African communities living in Italy.

According to the data of the Ministry of Interior, in 2016 the Senegalese people were the most common nationality the crossing the Mediterranean Sea. Approximately 180,000 persons landed in the ports of Italy, which means that Senegal is the sixth country in the crossing of Mediterranean Sea to Italy. And over 10,000 persons declared to be Senegalese. Those numbers are partially indicative because we have to consider various ways of entering the country, for example, the phenomenon of overstaying. In Italy they are the twelfth largest community, one of the five most populous groups of African migrants, together with Nigeria from the Sub-Saharan region (Le communità Senegalese in Italia, 2018).

However, immigration has another aspect: those who emigrate often return to their country of origin. This is also true for the Senegalese immigrants, who decide in large numbers to return to their home country. Obviously, there is a dense network of countless reasons behind a return: job loss, bureaucratic difficulties, family reasons and a combination of various reasons. the issue of 'return migration' is not discussed sufficiently, although the numbers show that it is a very real process.

Due to the population of the Senegalese in Italy and its growth, there are obviously several civil organisations that deal specifically with them. According to the statistics of the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies, there are about 87 civil initiatives.[11] With different profiles, some of these organisations engage specifically in the integration of the Senegalese people, while others try to help and resolve their problems and also help them return home; and there are those which are involved in both.[12] The following organisations are just select examples, and the aim of their selection is to illustrate the different types of local initiatives depending on how they can help Senegalese migrants (integration or return).

Progetto Diritti and *Roma-Dakar*[13] work to help migrants return and to introduce legislative instruments that allow the movement of migrants between the country of origin and the receiving country.

In 2017, the Agency for Conscious Migration (Agence pour la migration raisonnée, *MiRa*) was established with one centre in Rome and another in Dakar. This initiative tries to provide information about conscious migration and to make people become sensitive about the issue. They also support Senegalese migrants in their return to their home country. Besides, they provide legal aid with law-

[11] The list does not contain all organisations. http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Areetematiche/PaesiComunitari-e-associazioniMigranti/Pagine/mappatura-associazioni.aspx

[12] Based upon a field interview, which was recorded on 7.06.2018 in Rome.

[13] Their website: https://www.ritornoinsenegal.org

yers in bureaucratic cases, for example, in the case of the renewal of a residence permit, disagreements with administrative institutions or police headquarters or prefectures. MiRa offers economic and financial counselling, e.g. for legal employment or seasonal work. At the same time, the organisation pays particular attention to indicating the investment opportunities to the Senegalese migrants in their country and to encourage the resettlement and starting their own businesses. The Agency also helps in difficult situations, which are transnational cases and need support both in Italy and Senegal (for instance, in cases of childcare affairs or other affairs with international backgrounds) (Progetto Diritti Onlus and Associazione Roma–Dakar, 2018, p. 379). In addition, they carry out mediation activities, i.e. they are also active in a more social domain, when, e.g. they help rent a flat in Rome. Moreover, MiRa organises scientific activities, conferences, and panel discussions where not only scientists but also the general public can meet and learn more about these issues and the problems of Senegalese immigrants.

They believe in a transnational community that includes both the country of origin and the country of destination. They want to build a community where migrant flows contribute to the civil, economic and cultural growth in the country of origin as well as in the receiving country, creating continuous relations between the different contexts. They believe in "grass-roots globalism", i.e. they support grassroots initiatives and the movements of migrants because they believe that problems can be solved more successfully that way. Obviously, the main propose is to draw attention to the existence of "reverse migration" with all its problems and the need for complex plans to resolve them. They deem it significant that the Italian and Senegalese publics be informed about this issue as much as possible, and for that reason they publish articles, interviews, data reports and summaries, communications and answers from experts on topical issues related to the protection of migrants online (Ritorno in Senegal).

6. OTHER CIVIL ORGANISATIONS WORKING WITH AFRICANS[14]

In Italy, there are currently 797 registered civil initiatives that work in the field of integration (List of the registered…) and 1,413 registered civil organisations of the migrants (List of civil organisations…).[15] Among those, many organisations

[14] The selection of these civil organisations is not exhaustive, this is just an illustration to demonstrate their main types. Moreover, in this paper we cannot undertake to present the typology of the organisations based on more criteria. This is an integral part of the ongoing research, and it will be included in a doctoral dissertation.

[15] The list of migrant associations was developed in 2014 by the IDOS Study and Research Centre, as part of the IN.CO.NT.RO initiative, promoted by the Ministry of Labour and Social Policies.

are dedicated to the integration of Africans or work with African communities.[16] Obviously, in this paper we cannot present all of them, but we will try to show from a broader perspective the aims, activities and philosophies of these initiatives, and indicate their diversity.

6.1. La Casa del Sole Onlus

This civil organization hosts six unaccompanied migrant minors from Nigeria and Senegal and a Congolese family.[17] The initiative summarises their success in 3 points: the location of the Onlus in Cori which is a little town in Lazio, the family management of the structure and their project which is based on two fundamental pillars: planning and education. In other words, they think that education, the acquisition of knowledge, the improvement of skills, and the planning for the future are essential in their age if they want to integrate with the Italian society. For example, one of their projects is a movie club where girls can learn to analyse, interpret and express their emotions and thoughts about films. In this way they can compare different cultures and talk about their similarities and differences (Bianchi and Pesce, 2018, p. 65). In another project they teach how these girls can use social media with awareness. They help them answer the questions about what this new form of dependence means and how they can avoid becoming addicted to it and take advantage of it.

The Atelier project was developed to help create opportunities to work with programs that are in line with the interests of young people, with their skills and with local market needs. The purpose of the association is to build a local community for African women and make something creative and active. A place to cherish African traditions and share knowledge and creations, far from the temptations of exoticism and paternalism (Bianchi and Pesce, 2018, p. 66). “Our intention is to change the narrative full of prejudice and mistrust and enable, through artistic experience, to shatter a monocular vision.” (La Casa del Sole Onlus, 2018). The organisation works with other – mainly female and feminist – associations of Cori, as well as “Chi Dice Donna.”[18]

What is probably important to note is that there are other initiatives which for some reason did not appear in the list.

[16] But importante to note: not all of the organisations of the migrants work in the field of migration.

[17] Based on a field interview, which was recorded on 27.04.2017 in Rome.

[18] See more: https://www.latinacorriere.it/2018/03/03/cori-dovremmo-tutti-femministi-lemancipazione-passa-la-cultura/?fbclid=IwAR1Besknjadi_TKS9BvYB54YYrCvgfjyqPyO4aV66LFPsCFX1jb7YCa1ATg

6.2. Schools of Migrants

Schools of Migrants is a website where different school opportunities for immigrants have been collected.[19] The site is connected with associations which offer free Italian language courses for migrants in Lazio. They can find associations where they can learn Italian at different levels. There are other civil organisations that teach Italian culture and basic human rights, introduce the Italian Constitution, and talk about civic values, which constitute the base of social coexistence. Other initiatives apply to cultural mediations. Some associations offer mediators at the meetings with teachers, organise language courses at school for family members, and translate school documents into several languages. They believe that the effective way to involve foreign parents is to build intercultural laboratories in every class.[20] All civil organisations are listed on a website and immigrants can also find the organisation closest to them on an interactive map (Scuole Migranti).

6.3. Africa Mission – Cooperation and Development ONG Onlus

This organisation consists of two independent associations: Africa Mission, and Cooperation and Development.[21] The organisations operate in two countries, Italy and Uganda. In Italy, the main office of Africa Mission is in Piacenza, and there are 5 independent offices in the country, and they cooperate with various groups. Their main activity is to offer awareness-building programmes for children in schools which can stimulate solidarity. They consider that the recognition of Uganda and its problems can lead to a more supportive society.

The other part of the organisation is the Cooperation and Development ONG Onlus, which is the operational tool of the Africa Mission Movement, currently present in Uganda with two permanent offices in Kampala and Moroto. The NGO was founded in 1982 and since 2004 Cooperation and Development has joined the Federation of International Voluntary Service's Christian Organisms (Focsiv). They manage different projects in several areas and emergency interventions also in Uganda. They have projects in the following sectors: drilling and restoration of wells, and the professional training of local persons; healthcare; agricultural and socio-educational issues such as training, recreational activities in the Youth Center in Moroto. They also support local communities in the area through the donations of food and other useful materials.

Clearly, this organisation has a holistic approach towards solidarity: on the one hand, they consider it important to provide help on the local level through various

---

[19] Civil organizations which are involved: http://www.scuolemigranti.org/aderenti/

[20] From the activities see more: http://www.scuolemigranti.org/cosa-fanno/

[21] Based on a field interview, which was recorded on 30.05.2017 in Naples.

projects and, on the other, they wish to reinforce solidarity in Italy through school programmes or fundraising, all the time raising awareness about the problems of Uganda. Their mission is based on the principles of Christian humanism and in full respect of other people's freedom of thought and religion.[22]

6.4. Africa'70 NGO Cooperation and Development Onlus

Africa'70 is a non-governmental organisation in Monza, northern Italy, which has been operating for 40 years. Their aims are to improve the living conditions of the people of the South and to decrease inequalities in the world. Initially, in the 1970s, the organisation provided help for African countries in their processes of decolonisation. Its first projects were located in Burundi and Cape Verde, and in the 1980s various interventions were started in Somalia and Mozambique, which allowed the movement to reorganise and improve itself.

Currently, the organisation has projects in Africa, Central America and the Middle East where it supports local initiatives in the field of urban re-development, environmental protection and planning, and food security. They encourage local civil organisations to get involved in their efforts, and the Onlus has a good relationship with all the public and private, profit and non-profit actors. Africa'70 thinks that building a strong network with these actors is essential.

Additionally, they work and run projects at schools and universities across Italy. Africa'70 considers that it is vital to make the children and the young generation more aware because this project – as well as the international cooperation and projects – can approach cultures, appreciate the cultural diversity, and break down the contradictions. Africa'70 considers that the awareness-building programmes for the young generation are a key issue which – as well as international cooperation and projects – can connect cultures, approximate cultural diversity, and stop conflicts.

---

[22] The principles of the organization:
"Go and be there
Go and meet
Go and listen
Go and share
Go and support
Go and evangelize
Reception in our locations
Listening to the poor
Respect life and the human being
Attention to poverty and its causes
Pragmatism in interventions
Sharing the burden, the effort and the responsibility
Donation of one's time, capacity, resources, the donation of oneself"
https://www.africamission.org/en/about-us/mission.html

6.5. Kel'Lam

The Kel'Lam (meaning 'a beautiful day' in the Basaa, or Mbene, language of Cameroon) Cultural Association is also a non-profit organisation.[23] Its members come from various countries: from the continents of Europe, Africa, Asia and Latin America. The President, Ndjock Ngana, is Cameroonian and has published several books in Italian in the field of intercultural education. He has worked and collaborated in various projects, also in the field of immigration. Since 1999 Kel'Lam has been working in the field of intercultural education and teaching Italian to foreigners. The level of the courses is A2 and in recent years over 500 immigrants have been trained in the courses offered by the association.

7. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS

Migration is not at all a new phenomenon, it is as old as humanity itself, and historically there have been regular periods of mass migration (L. Rédei, 2014, pp. 29–43). However, the increased migration flows of recent years present enormous challenges for the countries concerned. Italy had to face one of the strongest migratory pressures of the past period. Migration was difficult to address by politics and Italy had a rolling migration strategy: it swung from one extreme to the other, from the principle of open gates to having one of Europe's strictest immigration laws but was essentially unsuccessful in trying to settle the issue. All of this has never been part of a well thought-over integration policy planned in the long term. With regard to immigration, an increasing number of problems have occurred, with events that perpetually confront the society with their problematic nature and unmanageability. This has been further deepened by the migration wave rising from 2014. Extreme opinions, xenophobia and exclusion have also grown across the general Italian society, which used to be more inclusive. It is difficult to anticipate to the additional events that this will entail. In any case, it is certainly symptomatic that, from the spring of 2018 until the early autumn of 2019, a member of the country's coalition government was the populist and anti-immigration League (with Matteo Salvini, the leader of the party, the country's Interior Minister,). The immigration policy of Italy as of today is to control illegal migration, to take immigrants out of the country, to close borders, to accelerate procedures, to make deportation more efficient, and to overshadow the issues of integration. However, these steps are likely to be not enough to solve the tensions already present in the society. Meanwhile, social fears continue to grow, giving

[23] Based on a field interview, which was recorded on 19.10.2016 in Rome.

way to more extreme politics, which further boost this cycle. Already in 2016, Italians believed (Ipsos Mori survey, 2016) that 2.9 times more immigrants lived in Italy than there actually were, and they also thought that the population of Muslims was 5 times higher (Brugnoli and Matteini, 2018, p. 254). The uncertainty of migration and the lack of structured national and international debate increase fears, racism and xenophobia while legitimising political extremism.

The role of the civil society in managing migration (better) – even if there are good examples in a well-established but strained state reception system – is essential. NGOs play a significant role in breaking down walls, be it physical or intellectual. And the walls are often there "around each individual migrant, keeping them secluded like in *a Doll's House.* This is particularly true when applied to the new stream of African migration to Europe, flowing mainly through Italy" (Brugnoli and Matteini, 2018, p. 253). These metaphorical walls keep migrants out from competing for jobs and being part of social integration. Brugnoli and Matteini have identified six walls which divide and enclose migrants: paper, fire, air, chalk, gold and glass walls. The names are symbolic, the paper wall means the legal-status division of what it involves, for example, the power of the passport or entry requirements (ease of access, range of rights). The fire wall is the conflicts divide and it means such basic things as peace and stability helping people to stay in their countries or the existence of humanitarian corridors, and the lack of these makes the wall higher and increases migration. Where war and violence escalate, we need to guarantee a safe transit and means for leaving the war-ridden territory.[24] Climate change, pollution, and natural disasters are building the air wall, i.e. the ecological divide and obviously it is one of the main reasons of migration today. If education is not vital in the development plan of a country, then this deficit increases poverty and migration. Economic differences also affect migration even if people do not migrate only from the poorest areas. The relationship between inequality and migration is much stronger and it builds up the gold wall.

Last but not least, there exists the glass wall. From the analytical aspect of our paper maybe this is the most important, the see-through wall which divides migrants from the Western countries. While people watch migrants' struggles on TV and worry about just one thing, everything is fine in their backyards (Brugnoli and Matteini, 2018, p. 264). This also means that in the debate over the migration policy the aspects of the West often are more important. As well as the "right" migration policy is justifiable but only with those who already are in their new home country. The media also play a major role in building this wall, which have recently been spreading more fake news in Italy as well. In general, policy makers need to be cautious of the number of aspects and the tools of possible solutions, i.e. that not only unilateral agreements are needed, but also that international cooperation, complex national migration policies and local actions are required. They need to

[24] For the Italian example, see: Attias and Silvestrini, 2018, pp. 125–129.

find and provide a more comprehensive response based on the very complexity of the problem itself.

The organisations presented in the paper developed from local communities, they are from among the people, bringing the problems closer to them so that they understand them better, thus help people overcome their prejudice and xenophobia, and what is more, they form a collective. By integrating immigrants successfully, they show a good example, and they can pressure the government: treating illegal immigration as a crime does not solve the problem, those who are already in the country should be helped to become useful and valuable members of the society. This can effectively contribute to cracking and then shattering the glass wall. All these are even more important in a time when a Eurocentric perception of an 'African exodus towards Europe' is high on the political agenda and in the social mindset of societies. In addition to all the presented local efforts, to better integrate immigrants (also) in the Italian sphere, more proper communication is required in order to make people realise that Europe is "one of many possible destinations for sub-Saharan Africans instead of *the* destination" (De Clerck, 2015, p. 272). The Italian example has a lot to offer for further research also from this angle.

Acknowledgements. Mariann Dömös' research is supported by the Hungarian *Eötvös* State Fellowship of the Hungarian Ministry of Human Capacities (EMMI). István Tarrósy's research is supported by the Bolyai Research Fellowship of the Hungarian Academy of Science.

REFERENCES

ADEPOJU, A. (2010), *International Migration within, to and from Africa in a Globalised World*. Legon-Accra: Sub-Saharan Publishers.

ALBANI, M. (2018), 'Residenti e soggiornanti stranieri nelle province del Lazio', [in:] DEMAIO, G. (2018) *Osservatorio. Romano sulle migrazioni.* Roma: IDOS Edizioni, pp. 14–21.

ATTIAS, M. and SILVESTRINI, A. (2018), 'L'accoglienza dei profughi dei Corridoi umanitaria nel Lazio', [in:] DEMAIO, G. (2018), *Osservatorio. Romano sulle migrazioni.* Roma: IDOS Edizioni, pp. 125–129.

BALDONI, E., GIOVANETTI, M. and MARCHESINI, N. (2018), 'L'accoglienza nella rete del Sistema di protezione per richiedenti asilo e rifugiati nel Lazio', [in:] DEMAIO, G. (2018), *Osservatorio. Romano sulle migrazioni.* Roma: IDOS Edizioni, pp. 36–43.

BARTOLI, C. (2012), *Razzisti per legge. L'Italia che discrimina*. Roma–Bari: Editori Laterza.

BIANCHI, L. and PESCE, M. (2018), 'Rincollare la tazzina. Le buone pratiche dell'accoglienza e i processi di resilienza delle Msna nigeriana vittime di tratta nel territorio pontino', [in:] DEMAIO, G. (2018), *Osservatorio. Romano sulle migrazioni*. Roma: IDOS Edizioni, pp. 63–68

BIANCHI, L., CATARCI, M., FIORUCCI, M., GROSSI, M. and MAZZUCCO, E. (2018), 'Indagine sulle Scuole di italiano per stranieri promosse dall' associazionismo a Latina e provincial', [in:] DEMAIO, G. (2018), *Osservatorio. Romano sulle migrazioni.* Roma: IDOS Edizioni, pp. 84–90.

BRUGNOLI, A. and MATTEINI, M. (2018), 'Italy as a gateway to Europe for African migration: How to deal with the Doll's House effect?', *Regional Science Policy and Practice*, 10, pp. 253–268.

CALCATERRA, I. and CIPOLLONE, R. (2018), 'La popolazione straniera residente nella Capitale', [in:] DEMAIO, G. (2018), *Osservatorio Romano sulle migrazioni.* Roma: IDOS Edizioni.

CARTER, D. (2013), 'Navigating Diaspora. The Precarious Depths of the Italian Immigration Crisis', [in:] KANE, A. and LEEDY, T.H. (2013), *African Migrations. Patterns and Perspectives*, Indiana University Press, pp. 60–77.

CASTELS, S., De HAAS, H. and MILLER, M.J. (2014), *The Age of Migration. International Population Movements in the Modern World*. Palgrave Macmillan.

CENTRO ASTALLI (2017), *Rapporto annuale*. Roma, Associazione Centro Astalli Jesuit Refugee Service.

CENTRO ASTALLI (2018), *Rapporto annuale*. Roma, Associazione Centro Astalli Jesuit Refugee Service.

COLOMBO, A. and SCIORTINO, G. (2004), *Gli immigrati in Italia*. Bologna: Il Mulino.

CRAMEROTTI, R. (2018), 'La popolazione straniera nella Città Metropolitana di Roma', [in:] DEMAIO, G. (2018), *Osservatorio. Romano sulle migrazioni.* Roma: IDOS Edizioni, pp. 109–115.

DE CLERCK, H.M.-L. (2015), 'Europe is no longer the only 'El Dorado' for sub-Saharan Africans: the case of contemporary Senegalese migration to Turkey', *Migration and Development*, 4 (2), pp. 272–290.

ISTAT (2017), *Iternal mobility and international migration.* https://www.istat.it/en/archivio/224957 [accessed on: 5.04.2019].

ISTAT (2017), Trasferimenti di residenza. https://www.istat.it/it/files//2017/11/EN-trasferimenti-di-residenza.pdf [accessed on: 5.04.2019].

L. RÉDEI, M. (2014), 'A nemzetközi migráció demográfiai és geográfiai aspektusai', [in:] TARRÓSY, I., GLIED, V. and VÖRÖS, Z. (2014), *Migrációs tendenciák napjainkban*. A 21. Század migrációs folyamatainak tanulmányozásához. Pécs: Publikon, pp. 29–43.

MAZZA, C. (2013), *La prigione degli stranieri. I Centri di Identificazione e di Esplusione*. Roma: Edisse.

MOHAY, Á. (2014), 'A nemzetközi migráció jogi aspektusai, különös tekintettel a legális migráció szabályozására az Európai Unióban", [in:] TARRÓSY, I., GLIED, V. and VÖRÖS, Z. (2014), *Migrációs tendenciák napjainkban*. A 21. Század migrációs folyamatainak tanulmányozásához. Pécs: Publikon.

NYUSZTAY, L. (2011), 'Az olaszországi bevándorlás néhány kérdése az új évezredelején', [in:] Nyusztay, L. (2011), *Tanulmányok a nemzetközi migráció köréből.* Budapest: Perfekt, pp. 97–117.

OMIZZOLO, M. and SODANO, P. (2015), *Migranti e territori*. Roma: Edisse.

PÓCZIK, SZ. and DUNAVÖLGYI, SZ. (2008), *Nemzetközi migráció – Nemzetközi kockázatok.* Budapest: HVG-ORAC.

Progetto Diritti Onlus and Associazione Roma-Dakar (2018), 'Andata+Ritorno: precorsi migrtori dall'Italia al Senegal. Per una migrazione consapevole', [in:] DEMAIO, G. (2018), *Osservatorio. Romano sulle migrazioni*, Roma: IDOS Edizioni, pp. 378–381.

STROZZA, S. and De SANTIS, G. (2017), *Rapporto sulla popolazione. Le molte facce della presenza straniera in Italia.* Bologna: Il Mulino.

SZÁNTÓ, D. (2006–2010), 'Squat-világ, squat-kultúra. Etnológiai megfigyelések egy francia kisvárosban', [in:] GERGELY ANDRÁS, A. (2006–2010), *Város a képben. (Városantropológiai vizsgálatok Terézváros példáján*. Budapest, MTA Politikai Tudományok Intézete Etnoregionális és Antropológiai Kutatóközpont, pp. 254–270.

SZABÓ, T. (2003), Olasz nemzeti identitás és politikai kultúra. *Politikatudományi Szemle*, 3, http://epa.oszk.hu/02500/02565/00038/pdf/EPA02565_poltud_szemle_2003_3_135-155.pdf [accessed on: 4.04.2019].

TARRÓSY, I. (2014), 'Elméleti megfontolások a nemzetközi migrációs tendenciák megértéshez', [in:] TARRÓSY, I., GLIED, V. and VÖRÖS, Z. (2014), *Migrációs tendenciák napjainkban*. A 21. Század migrációs folyamatainak tanulmányozásához. Pécs: Publikon, pp. 9–25.

TARRÓSY, I., GLIED, V. and KESERŰ, D. (2012), Új *népvándorlás. Migráció a 21. Században Afrika* és *Európa között*. Pécs: Publikon.

TRIULZI, A. (2013), 'Listening and archiving migrant voices: how it all began', [in:] ENGEL, U. and RAMOS, M.J. (2013), *African Dynamics in a Multipolar World.* Leiden, Boston, pp. 51–66.

ZEWDE, B. (2001), *A History of Modern Ethiopia. 1855–1991*. Oxford: James Currey.

SITES AND ARTICLES OF THE CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS

Africa '70 NGO Cooperation and Development Onlus: http://www.africa70.org [accessed on: 6.04.2019].

Africa Mission – Cooperation and Development ONG Onlus: https://www.africamission.org/en/about-us/mission.html [accessed on: 8.04.2019].

Codice di Condotta per le ONG impegnate nelle operazioni di salvataggio dei migranti in mare: http://www.interno.gov.it/sites/default/files/codice_condotta_ong.pdf [accessed on: 10.04.2019].

Kel'Lam: http://www.scuolemigranti.org/aderenti/kellam/ [accessed on: 10.04.2019].

La Casa del Sole Onlus: https://www.latinacorriere.it/2018/03/03/cori-dovremmo-tutti-femministi-lemancipazione-passa-la-cultura/?fbclid=IwAR1Besknjadi_TKS9BvYB54YYrCvg-fjyqPyO4aV66LFPsCFX1jb7YCa1ATg [accessed on: 15.04.2019].

MiRa: https://www.ritornoinsenegal.org/mira-sportello-la-migrazione-consapevole-2/ [accessed on: 15.04.2019].

Progetto Diritti Onlus: https://www.progettodiritti.it [accessed on: 12.04.2019].

Ritorno in Senegal: http://www.ritornoinsenegal.org [accessed on: 12.04.2019].

Roma–Dakar: https://www.romadakar.org [accessed on: 15.04.2019].

Scuole Migranti: http://www.scuolemigranti.org [accessed on: 15.04.2019].

UNHCR, Operational Portal, Refugee Situation (2019): http://data.unhcr.org/mediterranean/country.php?id=105 [accessed on: 5.04.2019].

OTHER DOCUMENTS AND NEWSPAPER ARTICLES

CIE: ancora cronache e numeri di sofferenza inutile (2014), Vie di Fuga: http://viedifuga.org/cie-cronache-e-numeri-di-un-sistema-sempre-piu-inutile/ [accessed on: 12.04.2019].

European Convention on Human Rights: https://www.echr.coe.int/Documents/Convention_ENG.pdf [accessed on: 5.04.2019].

Fundamental Rights in Italy: http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/en/legal-framework/fundamental-rights/Pages/Italy.aspx [accessed on: 5.04.2019].

Le comunità Senegalese in Italia, Rapporto annuale sulla presenza dei migranti, 2018: http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/Approfondimenti/Documents/RC2018/RC_Senegal%202018_DEF.pdf [accessed on: 12.04.2019].

List of civil organisations of the migrants: http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Areetematiche/PaesiComunitari-e-associazioniMigranti/Pagine/mappatura-associazioni.aspx [accessed on: 12.04.2019].

List of the registered civil organizations that work in the field of integration: http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Registro-Associazioni-Enti/Documents/Elenco%202019%20I%20Sez%20.pdf [accessed on: 2.04.2019].

Migranti l'esperta Onu: "Con il codice condotta per le ONG si rischiano piú morti in mare" (2017), La Stampa: https://www.lastampa.it/2017/08/15/esteri/migranti-lesperta-onu-con-il-codice-di-condotta-per-le-ong-si-rischiano-pi-morti-in-mare-idun96vsT9jlD5aujaowHP/pagina.html [accessed on: 15.04.2019].

NGO's divided by Italy's new rescue code (2017), Euobserver: https://euobserver.com/migration/138656 [accessed on: 15.04.2019].

Partecipazione e cittadinanza: http://www.integrazionemigranti.gov.it/Attualita/Approfondimenti/approfondimento/Pagine/Partecipazione%20e%20Cittadinanza%20home.aspx [accessed on: 12.04.2019].

Salvini Decree, Gazzetta Ufficale della Republica Italiana (2018): http://www.gazzettaufficiale.it/eli/id/2018/10/04/18G00140/sg [accessed on: 12.04.2019].

Tuttitalia.it: https://www.tuttitalia.it/statistiche/cittadini-stranieri-2018 [accessed on: 4.04.2019].

sciendo

C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.06

Tolga LEVENT*

A NEW CHALLENGE FOR URBAN PLANNING IN TURKEY: SOCIO-SPATIAL IMPACTS OF FORCED MIGRATION

Abstract. In recent decades, forced migration has become a globally salient issue for both developed and developing countries. As a developing country, Turkey is a significant destination for forced migration, with more than 3.6 million Syrian immigrants. This study concentrates on the socio-spatial impacts of forced migration in Turkish cities where Syrian immigrants have been concentrated and aims to answer the question: "Does forced migration produce an urban crisis in such cities?" The study leads to a prescription about new qualities of urban planning for coping with the urban crisis through a resilience strategy.
Key words: cities, forced migration, socio-spatial impacts, urban planning, resilience**.**

1. INTRODUCTION

A very simple definition of forced migration is displacement under coercion. Although the boundary between migration and forced migration is not clear, the distinctive aspect of forced migration is the fact that forced migrants do not have the power or the freedom of choice to decide whether or not to leave (Petersen, 1958, p. 261).

History provides a myriad of examples of forced migration. One of the best-known examples was the slave trade from Africa to the Caribbean, North and South America and Europe. Between the first half of the 15th century and the second half of the 19th century, millions of Africans were displaced forcefully (Bertocchi, 2015). In the 20th century, the main causes of forced migration were the First and Second World Wars. They resulted in large-scale displacements of populations, especially in Europe (Gatrell, 2008; Redondo, 2018). However, it has become one of the most significant and globally salient issues of the period after

* Tolga LEVENT, Mersin University, Department of City and Regional Planning, Faculty of Architecture, Çiftlikkoy Yerleskesi, 33343 Mersin, Turkey; e-mail: tolgalevent@mersin.edu.tr

the end of the Cold War, which started with the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Castles, 2003). In today's world, due to various political, economic, social and environmental reasons, more and more people have to experience coerced displacement from their homelands in Africa, in the Middle East, North Africa and in South-East Asia (Kenyon Lisher, 2009; O'Neill and Spybey, 2003).

It could normally be expected that the main destinations for forced migration are developed countries such as the United States of America, Canada, Australia, and certain European countries, such as Germany, the United Kingdom, and France, where the total international migrant stocks are relatively high (Migration Data Portal, 2019). In these countries, the risk to be undertaken by migrants might be limited, which in turn might increase their prospect of better lives. However, the actual circumstances are different. Developing countries have become the main destinations for forced migration in recent years and Turkey is one of them just because of the massive wave of Syrian forced migration in the last eight years,which is an unusual and rapidly evolving phenomenon.

Actually, Turkey is not the only destination for Syrian immigrants. Some Syrians choose to reside in Lebanon (924,161 immigrants), Jordan (657,445 immigrants), Iraq (228,573 immigrants), and Egypt (130,371 immigrants) (Operational Portal, 2019a, 2019b, 2019c, 2019d). This is normal to some extent since there have been significant historical links between Syria and these countries. They use the same Arabic language (with small differences in accent) and similar traditional codes that help Syrians develop social and economic activities relatively easily (Dorai, 2018). Both the level of adaptation of Syrians and the acceptance of Syrians by local communities are considerably high.

The case of Turkey is, however, different. In the first years of migration, Turkey seemed quite attractive for Syrians, not only considering its everyday life but also with its critical location enabling the continuation of the migration movement. Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War in the year 2011, more than 3.6 million Syrians have started living in Turkey (DGMM, 2019a), mostly in cities. Mersin, a city on the southern coast of Turkey, is one of those cities. According to the official records, in October 2019 there were 204,255 Syrians registered in Mersin (DGMM, 2019a). This amount means a significant addition to the urban population of Mersin. However, there are also unregistered Syrians in the city. The local authorities estimate that there were approximately 300,000 Syrian immigrants in Mersin in 2018, a third of the official urban population (Mersin Portal, 2018). Regardless of the exact number, it is obvious that Syrians have been increasingly visible with their traditional clothes and audible with their Arabic language in public spaces. What has been visible is not only their spatial existence in urban public spaces but also their growing problems, mainly produced by the gap between the home and the immigrant culture (İnce Yenilmez, 2017) and these are waiting to be solved.

Central and local authorities use, more or less, different types of management strategies and structural policies to prevent all those economic, social and cultural problems. Different public institutions of central authorities have made several declarations supporting the permanent existence of Syrian immigrants in Turkey. These declarations generally include promotions of Syrians and presentations of their actual problems in their everyday lives. Local authorities, on the other hand, have other ways of approaching the problems of these people. Some of them have been relatively active and used their economic/financial abilities to solve all the everyday problems of Syrians. Others, however, focus only on the urgent problems of immigrants in a passive manner. Whether they are active or passive, almost all local authorities display an attitude towards the problems of immigrants, especially if there are spatial concentrations of Syrians in their administrative territories. What is interesting in the Turkish case is the lack of foresight in planning agencies, both at central and local levels. For eight years, they have been inactive, like rabbits caught in the headlights, although Syrians trigger certain significant changes in specific cities such as concentrating in specific locations, which changes urban social topography: forming new density surfaces and land-use patterns; increasing housing prices indirectly; degrading and deteriorating urban environments indirectly; and creating inadequacies in public services and quality of life problems in their urban territories.

This study starts from the inactivity of planning agencies and aims to describe the actual and potential socio-spatial impacts of Syrian immigrants in Turkish cities where they have been concentrated and to prescribe new qualities of urban planning to handle these impacts. These descriptions and prescriptions are important for Turkey since the existing trends present the fact that forced migration will increase in the near future due to socio-political or climatic reasons and Turkey will be one of the main destinations for future migration waves due to its strategic location.

This study has four parts. After the introduction, a brief historical evaluation of massive migration movements in the Republic of Turkey is presented in the second part, as the previous migration waves are significant to understand not only the scale and significance of Syrian forced migration, but also its socio-spatial impacts on cities.

Two-phase quantitative and qualitative analysis of Syrian immigration in Turkish cities is presented in the third part. The first phase is mainly quantitative, considering the whole of Turkey as a spatial unit for the analysis. By using official records of Syrian immigrants in cities and in temporary protection centres, the patterns of the spatial concentrations of Syrians will be determined. Those concentrations could be used for categorising the cities which is the starting point for analysing the socio-spatial impacts of forced migration since those impacts and their visibilities differ in cities where there are high or low levels of spatial concentrations of Syrians. The second phase will include mainly qualitative descrip-

tions and be concentrated on socio-spatial processes in cities triggered by Syrians, namely locational preferences of Syrians, their impact on residential densities and land-use patterns. Due to the difficulties of gathering data and information about Syrian immigrants in cities, the qualitative descriptions will mainly use observations in the city of Mersin and limited local studies in other similar cities such as Gaziantep, Antakya, Adana, and Kilis. With reference to these descriptions, it might be possible to understand the actual and potential socio-spatial impacts of forced migrants on cities and the urban problems resulting from forced migration. This part will end in an answer to the question: "Do the impacts of Syrians on cities foster an urban crisis in Turkey (at least in certain cities)?"

The fourth part will be the conclusion. It will have two main dimensions: the policy dimension and the planning dimension. In the former, there will be a general discussion on the ways of approaching forced migration by local and central authorities. The emphasis will be on the planning dimension in the end. There will be a definition of the qualities of urban planning in the face of this new urban crisis within the context of uncertainty and unpredictability. The main motive of this part will be resilience planning, a planning approach providing opportunities to overcome urban crises.

2. HISTORICAL EVALUATION OF IMMIGRATION TO TURKEY

It is almost impossible to isolate the urbanisation history of Turkey from migration movements. Most of the studies about urban history and urban development focus, however, on migration from rural areas to urban settlements, accelerated after the Second World War (Özdemir, 2012; Keleş, 2002).

These migration processes could be analysed with reference to two waves within the Republican period. Although they were almost the same according to the origin/destination relations, their reasons and motivations were slightly different. Mechanisation in agriculture after the Marshall Plan was one of the main reasons for the first wave between 1950 and 1970. The rapidly increasing numbers of agricultural tractors and other agricultural vehicles started to change traditional labour-intensive agriculture to capital-intensive methods[1] (Özdemir, 2012). In addition to mechanisation, structural changes in traditional property ownership in agriculture was another reason. Agricultural plots became smaller due to inheritance through generations, which changed the overall organisation of agricultural activities. Moreover, agricultural fertility decreased mainly because of climatic conditions and problems. All these cumulative and intertwined factors reduced

[1] The number of tractors first increased from 1,800 (in 1948) to 44,000 (in 1956). Between 1956 and 1963, their number increased from 44,000 to 100,000 (Özdemir, 2012).

agricultural incomes and influenced the survival strategies of agricultural households negatively. Chronic unemployment and declining conditions in rural areas forced small-scale producers (villagers) to sell their agricultural lands and produced a push effect from rural areas to metropolitan cities in Turkey, especially after the 1950s (İçduygu and Ünalan, 1997; Akşit, 1998; Keleş, 2002) and produced a wave of emigration to European cities, especially in Germany, France, and the Netherlands in the 1960s (İçduygu, 2014).

The second wave of rural migration was between the years 1980 and 1990. This wave was, however, related to the pull effect of cities. The relative advancements in industrial capacities and the more secure condition of cities in western Anatolia compared to eastern and south-eastern Anatolia were the main reasons for it. Due to the developments of communication possibilities, the rural population became more aware of these increasing employment demands in the industry; however, the increases were not at a specific level which might absorb all the rural migrants (Özdemir, 2012).

The theoretical studies are not only related to the reasons for migration but also their outcomes. Since the number of host cities was limited, migration created significant socio-spatial impacts on cities such as İstanbul, Ankara, İzmir, Adana, and Bursa. They did not have the capacity to cope with that amount of people in those days; therefore, there emerged lots of (urban) problems such as squatter areas, economic informality, unemployment, and social and cultural disintegration. Those problems were quite visible since approximately one third of the urban population lived in squats in these cities (Sağlam, 2006), which emerged due to the limitations of formal provision of housing supplies for rural migrants. Although those problems transformed in time, they have mostly remained unsolved in the Turkish urban context. The former squatter areas are now potential sites for brutal urban regeneration projects displacing people from their residential areas; economic informality and unemployment in these areas still pose problems, and there is evidence for social and cultural disintegration due to ethnic and religious enclaves.

Then, regarding immigration, there is a limited number of theoretical studies, although Turkey has been one of the main destinations for immigration waves. These waves have mostly originated from the countries located in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire. The main immigration waves of the Republican period are listed in Table 1 (DGMM, 2019b).

Immigration to Turkey could be analysed in four different periods. The first period was between the years 1923 and 1944. The immigration waves of this period originated mainly from newly established Balkan countries, including Bulgaria, Romania, and Greece, which was a party to the Population Exchange Agreement. Although there were immigrants heading for cities, the main destinations for those waves were rural settlements in the north-western regions of Turkey. In the first years of that period, immigrants had used farmhouses and cottages left by emigrants who evacuated to Greece. In subsequent years, there emerged

Table 1. The chronological list of immigration to Turkey

Period	Source area	Number of immigrants	Major destination of immigrations in Turkey	Other significant aspects
1924 Population Exchange Agreement	Greece	500,000	Mainly rural areas in north-western Turkey	1,000,000 people left Turkey within this period
1924–1950	Yugoslavia and Macedonia	305,158	The cities in western Thrace of Turkey	14,494 immigrant houses were constructed
1925–1989	Bulgaria	Four immigration waves: 1925-1949: 218,998 1949-1951: 156,063 1968-1979: 116,521 1989 : 800,000	Except for the immigrants of the last wave, mostly rural areas	–
1923–1949	Romania	79,287 (19,865 households)	Cities (with their relatives and former immigrants)	–
1979	Iran	1,000,000	Metropolitan cities and the relatively developed cities in eastern and south-eastern Turkey	–
	Afghani-stan	unknown	Metropolitan cities and the relatively developed cities in eastern and south-eastern Turkey	Uzbeks, Uyghur, Kyrgyz, and Kazakhstani people, along with Afghans
1988–1991	Iraq	519,031	Metropolitan cities and the relatively developed cities in eastern and south-eastern Turkey	The Gulf War in 1991 was the main reason for this wave
1992–1998	Bosnia	20,000	unknown	–
1999	Kosovo	17,746	unknown	–
2001	Macedonia	10,500	unknown	–
1945–2019	Syria	3,666,059 (just after the year 2011)	Syrians have generally preferred to reside in cities close to the Syrian border, along with the metropolitan cities of Turkey	The number of Syrian immigrants from former waves is unknown

Source: The data and information in this table were compiled from DGMM (2019c), RASAS (2019), Arı (1995), Geray (1970), and Doğanay (1996).

immigrant houses in rural areas. Directing immigrants to rural areas was a conscious strategy of the early Republican administration, aiming to increase the gross domestic agricultural production and the efficient use of agricultural lands (Arı, 1995). And it was also logical since most of the immigrants had rural origins.

The second period began just after the end of the Second World War and lasted until the end of the 1970s. That period included immigration waves similar to the ones in the first period. Again, the immigration waves originated in the Balkan countries, due to the changes in the local political inclinations. Those waves, however, targeted the urban settlements in north-western regions of Turkey. They either sought quarters with their relatives temporarily or resided in immigrant neighbourhoods in urban fringes. In both cases, the impacts of immigrants on cities were limited or, more accurately, indefinable (Doğanay, 1996).

With the third period between the years 1980 and 2011, there also emerged immigration waves from Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries such as Afghanistan, Iran, and Iraq. The political instabilities and the conditions of international conflicts related to those countries routed millions of people out of their homelands. Turkey became one of the main destinations for those immigrants. Except for metropolitan cities such as Istanbul, İzmir, and Ankara, they preferred to settle in the relatively developed cities of the eastern and south-eastern regions of Turkey such as Van and Gaziantep (Deniz, 2011; Emek İnan, 2016).

All the immigration waves in these three periods were very visible. Immigrants from Balkan countries preferred to settle in north-western regions of Turkey, where they felt psychologically safe and where they found lots of cultural similarities in their daily practices. For the same reasons, immigrants from Central Asia and the Middle East chose to reside in cities in eastern and south-eastern Anatolia. In the first period, rural areas were the destinations of immigration waves. Yet, immigrants had lots of socio-economic problems there. Since the language and the cultural codes of immigrants were slightly different, they were subjected to offensive attitudes by the members of close rural communities. They sometimes had economic problems due to the lack of knowledge about local agricultural production. Even the climatic differences made agricultural work difficult for them. Although the idea of distributing agricultural land to immigrants (either private properties left by emigrants or public lands) seems in principle a just and lawful decision, yet during the implementation, there were lots of problems such as the distribution of insufficient amounts of agricultural land and occupation of such lands by the members of local communities (Geray, 1970; Arı, 1995). Then in cities in the remaining periods, there were relatively fewer such socio-economic problems of immigrants. The main reason was not only the limited number of immigrants in cities but also the presence of relatives and former immigrants in those cities guiding the newcomers. The lack of immigrant houses, as a failure of public administration, ironically created a situation which increased the interaction among those groups. For immigrants, that was the key to experiencing limited problems in cities (İçduygu, Erder, and Gençkaya,

2014; Arı, 1995). Although one could make broad statements about the spatial presence of immigrants in different periods, the socio-spatial impacts of immigrants in cities are invisible since there are no proper records of their interurban and intraurban distributions and studies analysing their socio-spatial impacts on cities are rare.

The fourth and final period was relatively short. It started in the year 2012 with the massive forced migration of Syrians. It was radically different from the previous ones, mainly in terms of the tremendous scale of migration and the visibility of its socio-spatial impacts. The percentages of immigrants in certain cities were close to the ones of rural migrants in the metropolitan cities in the second half of the 20th century; however, the duration of the concentration of immigrants in cities was considerably short. All those elements make the ongoing forced migration worth studying, especially its socio-spatial impacts on cities.

3. QUALITATIVE AND QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF SYRIAN IMMIGRATION

Approximately 90 years later than the first immigration waves, Turkish cities faced another wave of immigration. In 2011, the Civil War in Syria started, as a result of successive Arab Spring Protests in North African and Middle Eastern countries. Due to worsening living conditions, Syrian people thought that neighbouring countries like Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Egypt, and Turkey would be good destinations for immigration. Turkey, however, became the first country for immigration mainly because of its location enabling continued immigration (to the European Union), its legislation and open-door policy (İçduygu, 2015; Koca *et al.*, 2017).

3.1. Spatial distribution of Syrians in Turkish cities

In the last eight years, more than 3,600,000 Syrians entered Turkey (Fig.1). Less than two percent of them (63,204 people, October 2019) have stayed in temporary protection centres. Since initially there was not a national policy for controlling the distribution of Syrian immigrants in Turkey, the rest (3,608,349 people, October 2019) started living freely in cities or moved to other cities they preferred (DGMM, 2019a). This amount of people might be demographically insignificant if they were distributed evenly throughout the Turkish provinces. However, they presented significant spatial concentrations in certain cities (Fig. 2) due to the lack of control mechanisms on their spatial distribution[2] (Table 2).

[2] The first regulation that limited both the right to travel and the right to move into another city for Syrian immigrants was declared on 5 January 2016. Its aim was not to change the existing spatial distribution of Syrians in cities, but to locally fix it in cities in which they lived.



Fig. 1. Total number of registered Syrian immigrants by year

Source: own work based on *Temporary Protection*, [Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management], https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27 (accessed on: 8.10.2019)



Fig. 2. Provincial Distribution of Syrian Immigrants in Turkey (as of 5 September 2019)

Source: own work based on *Provincial Breakdown Syrian Refugees in Turkey - September 2019,* https://data2.unhcr.org/en/documents/download/71505 (accessed on: 8.10.2019).

Table 2. First ten host Turkish provinces for Syrian immigrants (October 2019)

Provinces[3]	Total number of Syrian immigrants*	Number of Syrian immigrants in Temporary Protection Centres**	Percentage of Syrian immigrants in provincial population [%]
İstanbul	549,216	–	3.64
Gaziantep	451,183		22.24
Hatay*	439,869	11,161	27.32
Şanlıurfa	428,299		21.04
Adana*	239,033	19,151	10.77
Mersin	204,255	–	11.26
Bursa	177,087	–	5.91
İzmir	146,891	–	3.40
Kilis*	116,289	8,533	81.58
Konya	109,304	–	4.96

* Cities with Temporary Protection Centres (TPC). Kahramanmaraş and Osmaniye, not included in this table, are the other cities in which there are also Temporary Protection Centres.

Source: The data and information in this table were compiled from DGMM (2019a).

Considering Table 2, it could be easily stated that there are two groups of cities with reference to absolute numbers and percentages of Syrian immigrants. The first group includes İstanbul, Bursa, İzmir, and Konya which are important Turkish metropolitan cities. Immigrants generally have a tendency towards these open cities since they always feature relatively high levels of economic activity, cultural diversity, and fewer problems related to social acceptance (Alterman, 2002). The absolute numbers of Syrian immigrants are high in these cities, but their percentages in the urban population are relatively low (3.40 up to 5.91 percent). This means that Syrians and the problems related to Syrians are almost invisible for most of the local inhabitants in these cities whether they are concentrated in certain neighbourhoods or they are distributed among all neighbourhoods. However, the second group containing such cities as Kilis, Hatay, Şanlıurfa, Gaziantep, Mersin, and Adana are quite interesting. They are close to the Syrian border and have a high number of Syrians, the percentages of whom are close to the ones

[3] In Turkey, the registration of (Syrian) immigrants is the task of provincial administration. Their administrative territory covers the whole province, including both urban and rural areas. However, urban centres of Turkish provinces, or namely cities, provide immigrants with greater opportunities for employment and a better economic life than rural areas, as is stated in the migration literature (Alterman, 2002), which makes them the main destinations for immigration. For this reason, the numbers of immigrants in provinces could be interpreted as those in cities.

represented by squatters in the 1960s and 1970s (between 10.77 and 81.58 percent). Although the ranking of Turkish cities is changing sometimes, there is no evidence for a change of the overall picture of the spatial distribution of Syrian immigrants in time (Fig. 3). What makes the second group of cities more interesting is the time factor. These high percentages appear in very short periods of time compared with the rural migrations of the last century. In that sense, it can be assumed that these immigration processes should have certain socio-spatial impacts and produce urban problems in these cities as rural migration did in İstanbul, Ankara, and İzmir in the past. All these impacts and problems might pose new challenges for Turkish planning practices, especially for those cities where there are high levels of spatial concentrations of Syrian immigrants.



Fig. 3. Spatial distribution of Syrian immigrants in the first ten host Turkish provinces in October 2019

Source: own work based on *Temporary Protection*, [Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management], https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27 (accessed on: 8.10.2019)

3.2. Socio-spatial impacts of Syrian immigrants in Turkish cities and urban problems

In most cases, immigration entails vulnerability. It becomes chronic when immigrants have limited access to essential resources and opportunities due to socio-economic, cultural and political barriers (Lee, Guadango and Murillo, 2017). There are six different barriers within this context:

– **Linguistic barriers**: These barriers produce certain disadvantages to immigrants in terms of accessing the local labour market, health care, education, and even information including disaster preparedness warnings;

– **Legal and administrative barriers:** Laws and regulations might prevent immigrants (or specific groups of immigrants) from having formal access to housing, employment, healthcare, education, and similar services;

– **Reduced access to social networks:** In host settlements, immigrants usually do not have any family and community ties, which makes them more vulnerable;

– **Reduced knowledge of the local environmental and social context:** Immigrants do not have site-specific knowledge, and therefore, their awareness of local resources and opportunities is insufficient. Both facts might produce specific patterns of exclusion;

– **Inadequacy of skills for the urban labour market:** Immigrants might be obviously disadvantageous if the urban labour market demands completely different skills. Such kinds of facts might result in unemployment and deskilling;

– **Lack of representation, and discrimination and xenophobia:** The lack of political representation might result in a lack of recognition within the decision-making process. In such conditions, immigrants might not have many opportunities for fulfilling their needs.

Most of these barriers and inadequacies are also valid for Syrian immigrants, like other immigrants in other countries. However, in the Turkish case, linguistic barriers and inadequacy of skills for the urban labour market are the most important ones, as they are the main sources of problems for fulfilling daily needs (Koca *et al.*, 2017).

Due to the existing conditions and capacities of public services, there have emerged certain problems for Syrian immigrants in terms of accessing public services, especially health and educational services. Linguistic barriers are the main reasons for these access problems. Moreover, cultural differences are not tolerated solely due to the problems of communication. Inadequacies of skills for the urban labour market are other sources of problems. Syrians generally work in simple jobs necessitating physical effort. Men work as construction workers and dishwashers, which are jobs that do not require qualifications; women are generally beggars, and finally children work as informal recycling workers collecting waste in cities in extremely poor conditions (Uluslararası Af Örgütü, 2014). Unemployed low-income members of local communities, however, are convinced that Syrians have taken jobs away from them. According to them, Syrians are the reasons for the decrease in the values of labour markets (Koca *et al.*, 2017).

In those conditions, social tensions and conflicts with local communities have increased considerably. Then the members of local communities consider Syrians as the sources of diseases decreasing public hygiene, as originators of crime, as factors increasing the risk of terrorism and carrying the war effect into Turkey, and as lazy and parasitic people using public (financial) resources without doing

anything. They think that there should be limits to hospitality in terms of this never-ending reception of Syrians, which are the initial motives for discrimination and prejudice (Koca *et al.*, 2017).

All those problems are important in everyday urban life. However, the problems related to Syrian immigrants cannot be reduced solely to these. They have created unexpected and large-scale changes in certain cities in a very short period of time, especially where they are concentrated. There are four intertwined socio-spatial impacts of Syrian immigrants in those cities which pose challenges for urban planning. These socio-spatial impacts are:

- concentration in specific locations within a city,
- increase in residential densities,
- formation of new patterns of land-use,
- production of symbolic boundaries difficult to permeate.

3.2.1. Concentration in specific locations within the city

Syrian immigrants are not distributed evenly throughout urban space. Since they are personally and socially vulnerable, they tend to concentrate in specific locations in order to achieve their self-protection. Their locational preferences are mainly motivated by their levels of financial resources.

Syrian immigrants with an excessive amount of financial resources prefer either to buy or rent houses where high-income members of local communities are concentrated. But since their numbers are very limited, they could not form any urban patterns in cities.

The ones with a moderate amount of financial resources, or middle-income Syrian immigrants, tend to gather in residential areas where there are clusters of social, educational and medical services provided by Syrians, either formally or informally. They want to continue their previous life standards from when they were in Syria by accessing these services. These clusters are like neighbourhood centres, but those services are mostly informal. Yet, the number of middle-income Syrians is limited just as the number of high-income Syrians.

Syrian immigrants with a limited amount of financial resources constitute the largest immigrant group. They prefer residential areas with the lowest rents. These areas mostly contain informal housing. They have pushed the original residents of these areas elsewhere. And since it is easy to reach from these residential areas the workplaces where they can find informal and daily jobs, there appear obvious tendencies for densification in those areas. These spatial preferences are not only observable in Mersin. Similar patterns emerge also in other cities such as Gaziantep (Sönmez, 2014), Kilis (Harunoğulları, 2016), and Antakya (Harunoğulları and Cengiz, 2014).

Additionally, there are many homeless Syrian immigrants without any financial resources. This group is generally excluded from the studies about immigrants

since it is very difficult to collect data about them. In the Mersin case, however, they are distributed among all neighbourhoods of the city trying to live in poor conditions with the support of local communities.

Since these newcomers have created an important demand for housing in those cities, they have increased average housing prices and rents, at least in certain locations. In Kilis, for instance, average monthly housing rents have increased from 200–300 TL to 700–1,000 TL; in İstanbul, from 700–800 TL to 1,400–1,500 TL (Koca *et al.*, 2017; Harunoğulları, 2016). This is not only a problem for residents, but also for urban planners who aim to manage the spatial distribution of urban rents in a just way.

3.2.2. Increase in residential densities

Syrian immigrants have increased residential densities in certain parts of cities. The densification is quite unusual and unexpected since it has come about through the use of single residential units by multiple households. In other words, there are generally more than two households in one residential unit. What is observed in Mersin is also valid for other cities where Syrian immigrants have become concentrated (Harunoğulları and Cengiz, 2014). The actual densities produced by Syrian immigrants, therefore, are more than the ones catered for in urban development plans. Sharing rents is their survival strategy; however, the result of increasing densities is the inadequacy of social and technical services, insufficiency of green areas and playgrounds, and, consequently, the emergence of a "quality of life" problem in those residential areas of immigrant concentration.

Since their living conditions within the public domain are not good, they present a tendency to diffuse around public spaces (parks, beaches, playgrounds, etc.) in different parts of cities. They generally dominate those public spaces with their traditional behaviours. In such a context, it can be stated that the residential areas of Syrian immigrants might be limited in size, but their lifestyle is dispersed all over the cities.

3.2.3. Formation of new patterns of land-use

The changes in residential densities generate new patterns of land-use, mainly in the form of commercial uses. The commercial units in these patterns are informal but they are quite popular among Syrians since they provide products and services demanded by them. Like residential densities, these patterns are not proposed for in urban development plans. In residential areas where Syrian immigrants are concentrated, residential units are transformed to commercial units. It can be easily

said that, in these residential areas, there might emerge new elements of a system of urban centres influencing the urban structure and a system of daily commuting relations in cities.

3.2.4. Production of symbolic boundaries difficult to permeate

In those cities where Syrian immigrants are concentrated there eventually emerge informal neighbourhoods where high levels of ethnical concentrations are observable. The concentrations of Syrian immigrants in those neighbourhoods are pushing (or displacing) existing social groups to other parts of cities. In such conditions, it is not possible to talk about multiculturalism since Syrians have very limited relations with other social groups, but it is possible to observe symbolic boundaries which are difficult to permeate. All these processes determine a kind of a ghettoisation process.

There is evidence of degradation and deterioration in these ethnically closed neighbourhoods. This is actually normal since property owners have no intention of investing in their residential units and immigrants do not have the opportunities to invest in residential areas.

Invasion-succession processes in ecological terms have been observed to occur in a very short period of time in Mersin and in other similar cities. Those processes produce ethnic enclaves within cities, similar to the formation of Little Italy or Chinatown enclaves in American cities (Terzano, 2014). It is difficult to say that these cities are inclusive cities, at least within their formation processes. They are gradually becoming technical patchworks in which there are high levels of socio-spatial segregation. And those patchworks are difficult to manage through formal planning procedures.

The massive wave of Syrian immigration to Turkish cities creates a kind of urban crisis in those cities due to the "situation of high change and low understanding" (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963). According to Bryson (1981), "a crisis occurs when a system is required or expected to handle a situation for which existing resources, procedures, laws, structures, and/or mechanisms, and so forth, are inadequate." This definition can be easily translated to the Turkish urban context under the pressure of the ongoing massive immigration wave.

It is an urban crisis since it displays almost all attributes of a crisis defined by Alterman (2002), namely, a high degree of uncertainty and surprise, a high degree of change and turbulence, high risks and threats, system-wide and complex effects of anticipated impacts, a low degree of knowledge about solutions, a challenge to the symbolic level and to the social consensus, and urgency because of high costs of delay.

Although there are a considerable number of political declarations and a limited number of studies as conducted by Koyuncu (2016) indicated the fact that Syrian immigration produces opportunities, especially in economic terms, the struc-

tural changes mean a kind of acute shock with a possibility of increasing chronic stresses within specific cities in the Turkish case.[4] This is not a fact discussed only in academic circles, but also a reality of regular people in local communities who think that Syrian immigrants have been increasing housing rents, the rate of unemployment, crime, causing public health problems and consequently decreasing the quality of life for them (Koca *et al.*, 2017).

4. CONCLUSION

After defining the socio-spatial impacts of Syrian immigration as an urban crisis, there should be a discussion about the ways to overcome it. There are two main dimensions to it: the policy dimension and the planning dimension.

In the former, there are strategies of central and local authorities towards Syrian immigrants. The main strategy of the ruling party is to offer citizenship to Syrian immigrants without enforcing any social adaptation policies. Without those policies, however, citizenship cannot be the correct way of solving the real everyday life problems of Syrian immigrants, but it burdens them with responsibility. It might become a kind of responsibility transfer from the authorities to immigrants. The strategy of the opposition parties is to send Syrian immigrants back to Syria. This is another kind of responsibility transfer, this time from the Turkish government to the Syrian government. Due to the massive damage and destruction of the urban and rural settlements of Syria, the restoration of acceptable everyday life conditions will take considerable time during which Syrians, again, might not have their humanitarian needs easily satisfied. Then again, most of the local authorities are under pressure from the additional population. Due to financial limitations, they cannot fully take responsibility for Syrian immigrants and concentrate on what they can do in terms of humanitarian assistance, especially in terms of food and shelter. They also try to provide public services for immigrants, such as language courses and urgent health services (Koca *et al.*, 2017). The big picture in the policy dimension is the proof that there is an apparent need for a new policy structure considering all humanitarian needs of Syrians.

The planning dimension, however, is difficult to comprehend. The basic reasons for this difficulty are uncertainty and unpredictability. These are the basic aspects inseparable from the overall process of forced migration. The reasons for

[4] Chronic stresses weaken the fabric of a city on a daily and periodic basis, including through high employment, overtaxed or inefficient public transportation systems, endemic violence, and chronic food and water shortages. Acute shocks are different to chronic stresses. They are sudden, sharp events that threaten a city such as earthquakes, floods, disease outbreaks, terrorist attacks (International Organization for Migration, 2017).

uncertainties are the problems in registration during legal entry, the rate of influx, and also illegal entries and uncontrolled movements within the country. The uncertainties create a context in which predictability is almost impossible.

Urban planning should deal with uncertainty and unpredictability and focus on ways for handling them at the urban scale. Within the urban context, these uncertainties are related to not only immigrant absorption and immigrant intake rates, but also the impacts of accelerated growth on housing availability and prices, social services, education facilities, infrastructure, and the environment. Obviously, approving mass immigration in cities means accelerated urban growth. This decision given by the central government should also consider local impacts, which means controlling the extent, type, and timing of urban growth in relation to the carrying capacities of cities during the growth (Alterman, 2002). It is clear what should be done; however, it is not so easy to achieve these controls within the existing urban planning systems, at least in the Turkish system.

From the very first days of forced migration, the urban planning institution has been inactive with regard to Syrian immigration in certain Turkish cities. Although Syrian populations are apparently high in specific cities and they produce significant socio-spatial impacts and urban problems, there have been no spatial plans or planning decisions which consider Syrian immigrants. Moreover, it seems that most Syrians are not willing to return to their country because they are convinced that the country, they once lived in is not there anymore and Turkey's conditions are relatively better especially for their children. With the possible immigration waves in the future, this fact gives a permanent character to these impacts and urban problems. The planning institution should produce plans for solving housing problems, infrastructure, and service supply problems, considering their short-term and long-term expectations. But it should not be forgotten that the task of proposing planning solutions in a relatively stable system may differ significantly from the task of developing solutions to problems in a major crisis where uncertainty is high, the needs are urgent, the necessary change is a large-scale one, the risks are high, the planned system is in turbulence, and the usual modes of communication and coordination are strained or non-existent (Alterman, 2002).

Under the pressure of mass migration, increasing urban resilience might be the main target of urban planning. "Urban resilience is the capacity of individuals, communities, institutions, businesses, and systems within a city to survive, adapt and grow no matter what kinds of chronic stresses and acute shocks they experience" (International Organization for Migration, 2017, p. 6). It is not a new concept for the Turkish case. For at least two decades, there have been theoretical discussions about urban resilience. However, they have mainly focused on the managerial dimensions of resilience, while the spatial dimensions have been neglected. But in the case of massive migration waves, managerial strategies for resilience might not be sufficient and the answer to the question "How can urban planning create more resilient cities?" has to be investigated honestly (Cruz *et al.*, 2013, p. 55).

The resilience literature is promising as it proposes the attributes of resilience such as diversity, strength, interdependence, collaboration, redundancy, efficiency, connectivity, capital building, robustness, and autonomy (Cruz *et al.*, 2013; Godschalk, 2003; Eraydın and Taşan Kok, 2013, p. 10). Urban planning should evaluate its strategies and decisions with reference to these attributes in search of urban resilience. However, there are two other concepts, i.e. flexibility and adaptability, which could be considered as key attributes while translating resilience into urban space. This translation may include a flexible urban structure enabling polycentric formation, with which the socio-spatial impacts of migrants might be distributed around the urban space. This polycentricity could not be considered as a physical/spatial issue only, but it should be referred to territorial cooperation, urban networking, and territorial cohesion (Cruz *et al*., 2013), which could enrich the survival strategies of migrants. Within these flexible structures, the existence of self-sufficient small urban areas with a predetermined level of empty housing stock might also provide suitable living conditions for migrants. These parts might help not only to absorb a certain number of migrants but also to control urban rents. The number of such spatial suggestions for resilience could be, of course, increased within a contextual framework. But it should not be forgotten, whether they are limited in number or not, that all these suggestions strengthening resilience for better futures should be reflected in urban development plans since these plans are the basic outputs of urban planning.

REFERENCES

AKŞİT, B. (1998), 'İçgöçlerin Nesnel ve Öznel Toplumsal Tarihi Üzerine Gözlemler: Köy Tarafından Bir Bakış', *Türkiye'de İçgöç.* İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları, pp. 22–37.

ALTERMAN, R. (2002), *Planning in the Face of Crisis: Land Use, Housing, and Mass Immigration in Israel*. London: Routledge.

ARI, K. (1995), *Büyük Mübadele: Türkiye'ye Zorunlu Göç 1923–1925.* İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı.

BERTOCCHI, G. (2015), *The Legacies of Slavery in and out of Africa*, Discussion Paper No. 9105. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.

BRAYBROOKE, D. and LINDBLOM, C.E. (1963), *A Strategy of Decision: Policy Evaluation as a Social Process.* New York: Free Press of Glencoe.

BRYSON, J.M. (1981), 'A Perspective on Planning and Crises in the Public Sector', *Strategic Management Journal*, 2 (2), pp. 181–96.

CASTLES, S. (2003), 'Towards a Sociology of Forced Migration and Social Transformation', *Sociology*, 37 (1), pp. 13–34.

CRUZ, S.S., COSTA, J.P.T.A, de SOUSA, S.A., and PINHO, P. (2013), 'Urban Resilience and Spatial Dynamics', *Resilience Thinking in Urban Planning.* Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 53–69.

DENİZ, O. (2011), '1990 Sonrasında Türkiye'ye Yönelen Sığınma Hareketleri ve Etkileri', *TÜCAUM VI. Ulusal Coğrafya Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı.* Ankara: Türkiye Coğrafyası Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi, pp. 93–102.

DGMM (2019a), [Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management], *Temporary Protection*, https://en.goc.gov.tr/temporary-protection27 [accessed on: 8.10.2019].

DGMM (2019b), [Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management], *History of Migration*, http://www.goc.gov.tr/icerik/history-of-migration_915_1026 [accessed on: 31.04.2019].

DGMM (2019c), [Turkish Directorate General of Migration Management], *Kitlesel Akınlar*, https://www.goc.gov.tr/kitlesel-akinlar [accessed on: 19.09.2019].

DOĞANAY, F. (1996), *Türkiye'ye Göçmen Olarak Gelenlerin Yerleşimi*. Ankara: DPT.YBM 1997, http://www.balgoc.org.tr/gocmenyerlesim.html [accessed on: 31.04.2019].

DORAI, K. (2018), 'Conflict and Migration in the Middle East: Syrian Refugees in Jordan and Lebanon', *Critical Perspectives on Migration in the Twenty-First Century.* Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing, pp. 113–126.

EMEK İNAN, C. (2016), 'Türkiye'de Göç Politikaları: İskân Kanunları Üzerinden Bir İnceleme', *Göç Araştırmaları Dergisi*, 2 (3), pp. 10–33.

ERAYDIN, A. and TAŞAN-KOK, T. (2013), 'Introduction: Resilience Thinking in Urban Planning', *Resilience Thinking in Urban Planning.* Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 1–16.

ERDER, S. (2014), 'Türkiye'de Değişen Siyasal Konjonktür, Değişen Göç ve İskan Politikaları',[in] İÇDUYGU, A., ERDER, S. and GENÇKAYA, Ö.F (eds.) *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Göç Politikaları, 1923–2023: Ulus-Devlet Oluşumundan Ulus-Ötesi Dönüşümlere*. MiReKoç Proje Raporları 1/2014 TÜBİTAK, 1001_106K29, pp. 77–136.

GATRELL, P. (2008), 'Refugees and Forced Migrants during the First World War', *Immigrants and Minorities*, 26 (1/2), pp. 82–110.

GERAY, C. (1970), 'Türkiye'de Göçmen Hareketleri ve Göçmenlerin Yerleştirilmesi', *Amme İdaresi Dergisi*, 3 (4), pp. 8–36.

GODSCHALK, D.R. (2003), 'Urban Hazard Mitigation: Creating Resilient Cities', *Natural Hazards Review*, 4 (3), pp. 136–143.

HARUNOĞULLARI, M. (2016), 'Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Kilis Şehrindeki Mekânsal, Kültürel ve Ekonomik Etkileri', *Uluslararası Sosyal Araştırmalar Dergisi*, 9 (45), pp. 373–396.

HARUNOĞULLARI, M. and CENGİZ, D. (2014), 'Suriyeli Göçmenlerin Mekânsal Analizi: Hatay (Antakya) Örneği', *TÜCAUM VII. Ulusal Coğrafya Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitabı.* Ankara: Türkiye Coğrafyası Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi, pp. 309–318.

İÇDUYGU, A. (2014), '1950'lerden 2000'lere Türkiye'den Yurtdışına Yönelen İşgücü Göçü', [in:] İÇDUYGU, A., ERDER, S. and GENÇKAYA, Ö.F (eds.) *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Göç Politikaları, 1923–2023: Ulus-Devlet Oluşumundan Ulus-Ötesi Dönüşümlere.* MiReKoç Proje Raporları 1/2014 TÜBİTAK, 1001_106K29, pp. 173–221.

İÇDUYGU, A. (2015), *Syrian Refugees in Turkey: The Long Road Ahead.* Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute.

İÇDUYGU, A. and ÜNALAN, T. (1998), 'Türkiye'de İç Göç: Sorunsal Alanları ve Araştırma Yöntemleri', *Türkiye'de* İç *Göç.* İstanbul: Türkiye Ekonomik ve Toplumsal Tarih Vakfı Yayınları.

İÇDUYGU, A., ERDER, S., and GENÇKAYA, Ö.F. (2014), 'Giriş', [in:] İÇDUYGU, A., ERDER, S. and GENÇKAYA, Ö.F (eds.) *Türkiye'nin Uluslararası Göç Politikaları, 1923–2023: Ulus-Devlet Oluşumundan Ulus-Ötesi Dönüşümlere*, MiReKoç Proje Raporları 1/2014 TÜBİTAK, 1001_106K29, pp. 13–25.

İNCE YENİLMEZ, M. (2017), 'The Impact of Forced Migration in the Middle East: Syrian and Palestinian Refugees', *Perceptions*, XXII (4), pp. 183–201.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION. (2017), 'Toolbox of Migration – Related Elements for the City Resilience Strategy, Migration Governance Framework', Geneva, http//

www.uclg.org/sites/default/files/consultation_document_migration_governance_framework.pdf [accessed on: 31.04.2019].

KELEŞ, R. (2002), *Kentleşme Politikası.* İstanbul: İmge Kitabevi.

KENYON LISCHER, S. (2007), 'Causes and Consequences of Conflict-Induced Displacement', *Civil Wars*, 9 (2), pp. 142–155.

KOCA A., YIKICI, A., KURTARIR, E., ÇILGIN, K., ÇOLAK, N., and KILINÇ, U. (2017), *Kent Mülteciliği ve Planlama Açısından Yerel Sorumluluklar Değerlendirme Raporu, Suriyeli Yeni Komşularımız: Istanbul Orneği.* İstanbul: TMMOB ŞPO İstanbul Şubesi.

KOYUNCU, A. (2016), 'Nimet mi? Külfet mi? Türkiye'nin Suriyeli Sığınmacıları ve Göç Ekonomisi Üzerine Bir Derkenar', [in:] ESEN, A., DUMAN, M. and ALPER, H. (eds.), *Türkiye'de Geçici Koruma Altındaki Suriyeliler: Tespitler ve Öneriler*, İstanbul: WALD Dünya Yerel Yönetim ve Demokrasi Akademisi Vakfı, pp. 109–133.

LEE, J.J.H., GUADANGO, L., and MURILLO, F. (2017), 'Migrants and Cities: Challenges and Opportunities', [in:] APPAVE, G. and SINHA, N. (eds.) *Migration in the 2030 Agenda.* Geneva: International Organization for Migration, pp. 85–99.

MERSIN PORTAL (2019), *Mersin'deki Suriyeli Sayısını Biliyor musunuz?*, http://www.mersinportal.com/ozel-haber/iste-mersin-deki-suriyeli-sayisi-h41937.html [accessed on: 19.09.2019].

MIGRATION DATA PORTAL (2019), *The Total Number of International Migrants*, https://migrationdataportal.org/?i=stock_abs_&t=2017 [accessed on: 28.02.2019].

O'NEILL, M. and SPYBEY, T. (2003), 'Global Refugees, Exile, Displacement and Belonging', *Sociology*, 37 (1), pp. 7–12.

OPERATIONAL PORTAL (2019), *Syria Regional Refugee Response*, https://data2.unhcr.org/en/situations/syria/location/1 [accessed on: 20.09.2019].

ÖZDEMİR, H. (2012), 'Türkiye'de İç Göçler Üzerine Genel Bir Değerlendirme', *Akademik Bakış Dergisi*, 30, pp. 1–18.

PETERSEN, W. (1958), 'A General Typology of Migration', *American Sociological Review*, 23 (3), pp. 256–266.

RASAS (2019) [Refugees and Asylum Seekers Assistance and Solidarity Association], *The Number of Syrian Immigrants in Turkey (April 2019)*, https://multeciler.org.tr/turkiyedeki-suriyeli-sayisi [accessed on: 31.04.2019].

REDONDO, E. (2018), 'World War II Refugees and the Origin of the International Organization for Migration', *War and Population Displacement: Lessons of History.* Sussex: Sussex Academic Press, pp. 158–175.

SAĞLAM, S., (2006), 'Türkiye'de İç Göç Olgusu ve Kentleşme', *Türkiyat Araştırmaları*, 5, pp. 33–44.

SÖNMEZ, M.E. (2016), 'Suriyeli Sığınmacıların Gaziantep Şehrindeki Mekânsal Dağılışı ve Geleceği', *TÜCAUM 2016 Uluslararası Coğrafya Sempozyumu Bildiriler Kitab.* Ankara: Türkiye Coğrafyası Araştırma ve Uygulama Merkezi, pp. 392–400.

TERZANO, K. (2014), 'Commodification of Transitioning Ethnic Enclaves', *Behavioral Sciences*, 4 (4), pp. 341–351.

ULUSLARARASI AF ÖRGÜTÜ (2014), *Hayatta Kalma Mücadelesi: Türkiye'deki Suriye'den Gelen Mülteciler*, Birleşik Krallık.

sciendo

C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.07

PART II

Krisztina VARRÓ*

TRACING THE (HIDDEN) SPATIALITIES OF DIGITAL AGENDAS: THE CASE OF 'DIGITAL HUNGARY'

Abstract. Policies that aim at bringing about a digital transformation (seek to) create the conditions for particular spatial development trajectories. Yet, the understandings, explicit and implicit, of space advanced by digital agendas have remained rather underexposed to date. This paper addresses this gap by developing a Foucauldian-inspired discourse-analytical framework and applies it to the programme of 'Digital Hungary'. It is argued that policies of digitalisation in Hungary only to a minor extent consider the spatial dimension, and their impact potentially undermines the declared aims of spatial development at different scales.

Key words: digitalisation, spatial development, discourse, discourse analysis, Hungary.

1. INTRODUCTION

In the past decade, the perception that Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) have been increasingly transforming economic activities, and social interactions have put digitalisation centre stage in policymaking (OECD, 2015). The proliferating 'digital agendas' at the supranational and national levels see digitalisation, understood broadly as the transformation of all sectors of the economy, government and society based on the large-scale adoption of existing and emerging digital technologies (Randall *et al*., 2018), as a major catalyst of economic and social growth (CEC, 2010; OECD, 2015). In the European Union (EU), the Digital Agenda for Europe set out to define the role that the use of ICT will have

* Krisztina VARRÓ, Utrecht University, Faculty of Geosciences, Department of Human Geography and Spatial Planning, Princetonlaan 8A, 3584 CB Utrecht, the Netherlands; e-mail: k.varro@uu.nl

in achieving the objectives of the Europe 2020 Strategy (CEC, 2010). By May 2017, twenty Member States had digital strategies or digital agendas in place and four – Austria, Germany, Slovenia and the United Kingdom – began working on such a strategy.

This paper interprets digital agendas as the manifestations of a new development policy discourse that promotes the widespread adoption of digital technologies to address various – social, economic and environmental – policy challenges. By defining what counts as meaningful development objectives, digital agendas create the conditions for a new set of spatial practices that reshape existing socio-spatial orders. For example, by making claims such as 'we can only tackle the challenges presented by new flows of data if we create the full coverage of infrastructural conditions' (Die Bundesregierung, n.d.) or that '[w]ith the development like internet of things, everything will be connected with everything, always and everywhere' (Ministerie van Economische Zaken, 2016, p. 19) digital agendas set, although implicitly, 'the rules of the game' for spatial development. How this happens has remained under-researched, although in the EU context concerns have arisen recently with regard to the 'profound uncertainty as to whether digitalisation will foster further spatial concentration in Europe, or whether it might promote dispersal and poly-centricity, or a mix of both' (ESPON, 2017, p. 5).

This paper agues that in order to address such concerns, the (explicit and implicit) normative understandings of space and spatial development advanced by digital agendas should be more systematically examined. To this end, the paper proposes to rework the Foucauldian-inspired conceptual lens of Richardson and Jensen (2003; see also Jensen and Richardson, 2001, 2004; Richardson, 2006), developed to reveal the (implicit) spatial impacts of EU policies, and demonstrates the insights provided by this framework through a study of the practical and spatial-political workings of the Digital Hungary programme. This programme was launched in 2015 to ensure a more balanced development of the Hungarian ICT sector, and to enable that info-communication tools and services stimulate competitiveness, sustainable economic growth, employment, and equal opportunities in Hungary. The paper argues that the digital agenda in Hungary has reasserted the largely aspatial character of development policies in Hungary and that the possible consequences of its measures are not consistent with the spatial policy objective of creating a more balanced territorial structure as expressed in the National Development and Spatial Development Concept (NDSDC) (Government of Hungary, 2013). Against this background, the paper suggests that more research needs to be undertaken to examine the spatial perspectives implicitly conveyed by digital agendas and how these impact spatial development trajectories at different scales.

2. DISCOURSES OF DIGITALISATION AND THE (RE)PRODUCTION OF SPACES: A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS

In the 1990s, the works of prominent scholars such as Lefebvre (1991), Harvey (1996), and Allen *et al*. (1998), among others, laid down the foundations for an understanding of spaces and places in terms of a dialectical relation between material practices and symbolic meanings. To refer to Allen *et al*. (1998, p. 9), "[s]paces/places are constructed both materially and discursively, and each modality of this construction affects the other". This constructionist perspective has become increasingly applied in research on spatial development and planning. Healey (2004), for example, highlighted how spatial representations in policy documents perform 'institutional work' and contribute to the spatial impact of policies. The present paper draws more specifically on a series of studies revealing the hidden spatial agenda of EU policies (Hajer, 2000; Richardson and Jensen, 2000, 2003; Jensen and Richardson, 2001, 2004; Richardson, 2006). This body of work has offered a useful framework for considering how policies, even those that are not explicitly framed in spatial terms, enable and constrain spatial practices by attributing meanings to spaces. Jensen and Richardson (2004), for example, showed how the trans-European Transport Network (TEN-T) programme[1] has restructured European space through the very delivery of a tangible system of infrastructure, even though it did not refer to the EU's forming spatial visions (notably the European Spatial Development Perspective accepted in 1999). More recently, the continued relevance of constructionist perspectives was insightfully demonstrated by Schulz's (2017) account that highlighted how innovation policy discourses contribute to reproducing patterns of peripheralisation in Estonia as they tend to frame peripheral regions as 'redundant' for building a 'knowledge-based society'.

Drawing on the above, this paper focuses on how policy discourses of digitalisation are implicated (even if implicitly) in creating new understandings of spaces and places and of how these should be developed. To this end, the paper proposes a three-dimensional analytical lens inspired by Richardson and Jensen (2003) and examines *representations of (cyber)space*, *practices of digitalisation* and *the politics of scale*. The first dimension refers to ways in which digital agendas represent (cyber)space linguistically. 'Cyberspace' has been defined by some as "a world of electronic information, data, and connections among these data" (Starrs and Anderson, 1997, p. 148). From the discourse-analytical perspective of this paper, however, 'cyberspace' is first and foremost regarded as a (set of) metaphor(s) (Pile, 1994) that helps in the thinking about complex digital networks similarly to everyday material and social spaces (Graham, 1998). Importantly, the metaphors of cyberspace bring

[1] The TEN-T programme, introduced under the Treaty of Maastricht and further defined by the European Commission in 1996, set the aim to guarantee optimum mobility and coherence between the various modes of transport in the EU.

about a selective 'discursive rewriting' of space (cf. Pickles, discussed by Warf, 2001) by implicitly propagating certain understandings of these networks at the expense of others. Perhaps most notably, cyberspace has been represented as a singular, inherently democratic domain that overcomes distance and to which, in theory, everyone could have access, thus concealing that 'cyberspace' is a social construct implicated in reproducing socio-spatial inequalities on a global scale (Warf, 2001).

Digital agendas are, however, not merely persuasive narratives, but entail the design of new institutions, knowledges, tools of calculation, and infrastructures of socio-spatial intervention. Hence, the second analytical dimension of the *practices of digitalisation* highlights the material dimension of digitalisation and how digitalisation always implies the (re)production of spaces. For example, the launch of the Digital Economy and Society Index by the European Commission in 2014 to monitor the progress of the digital society and economy among member countries, the establishment of a Digital Agenda Steering Committee in Germany (Die Bundesregierung, n.d), or the attempts to rank cities in terms of their 'smartness' (see e.g. Giffinger *et al*., 2007) can all be seen as examples of tools that are deployed at different scales to make digital spaces thinkable and manageable.

Finally, the analytical dimension of *the politics of scale* is meant to acknowledge the power-laden scalar-institutional dimension of the introduction and use of new technologies, as well as of the evolution and implementation of digitalisation agendas. In other words, its aim is to shed light on how power relations shape the practices of digitalisation and the production of (spatial) knowledge in a 'digital world'. Castells' (1996) well-known conceptualisation of the 'spaces of flows' and 'spaces of places' already emphasised that contrary to popular imagination, the internet does not exist separate from, but is very much shaped by the structures of regulation and power (see also Zook, 2003). In other words, we need to attend to the ways in which ICT-technologies 'become enrolled into complex social and spatial power relations and struggles' (Graham, 1998, p. 176).

3. REFRAMING DEVELOPMENT POLICY: TOWARDS 'DIGITAL HUNGARY'

The antecedents of Hungary's current digital agenda can be traced back to attempts in the mid-1990s to devise policies that would help Hungary enter the 'information society' (IS) (Magyar and Karvalics, 2001). Even though the 'information age' was recognised as offering key opportunities regarding modernisation, Euro-Atlantic integration and the establishment of an open society (idem.), up until the turn of the millennium 'IS' remained a poorly institutionalised policy field without an overarching strategic framework (Pintér, 2004). That began to change

in the run-up to the EU accession. Nonetheless, the lack of societal and political consensus, coupled with a lack of policy commitment resulted in IS development being treated as a low-priority vertical sector (Pintér, 2004), and successive strategies published on the matter failed to create a coherent framework of an IS-based modernisation (Czékmann, 2016).

Pressures to fulfil the *acquis* and the prospect of EU funding have had a strong effect on policy compliance in the field of IS (Czékmann, 2016), and the EU's increasing concern with maximising the social and economic potential of ICT (CEC, 2010) have fuelled efforts to devise a comprehensive national policy approach to digitalisation. The *Digital Renewal Action Plan* of the second Orbán government for the 2010–2014 term set out to offer such an integrated framework of ICT-related interventions for all sectors in line with the EU's Digital Agenda and the *New Széchenyi Plan*, the economic development programme of the Hungarian government launched in 2011 (Ministry of National Development, 2010). Subsequently, the *National Information and Communication Strategy 2014–2020* (NICS) (Government of Hungary, 2014), adopted by the government in 2014, declared the aim to implement the 'Digital Hungary' and described the vision and strategic targets and tools concerning the development of Hungarian information society and the ICT market for the EU's 2014-2020 planning period. To that end, digital infrastructure, digital competences, digital economy, and digital government were identified as the four major pillars and e-inclusion, research, development and innovation, and security as the three horizontal factors. The related *Green Paper* contained the actions to be undertaken to fulfil the Strategy's objectives as well as the resources, responsibilities and deadlines assigned to each action (Ministry of National Development, 2014).

From early 2015 on, the third Orbán government put an increasing emphasis on digitalisation as one of key driving forces of competitiveness, growth and welfare. In March 2015, the *Digital Welfare Programme*[2] (DWP) was introduced with the aim of fostering the competitiveness of the Hungarian ICT-sector and to facilitate sustainable economic growth, job creation and social equality. The Programme extended and updated the NICS and defined concrete objectives and actions in the key areas of the strategy; those were published in 2016 in a series of strategic documents including the Digital Child Protection Strategy, the Digital Education Strategy, the Digital Export Development Strategy, the Digital Start-up Strategy and (in 2017) the Digital Commerce Development Strategy. The EU's Digital Progress Report on Hungary published in May 2017 acknowledged the progress made as the result of the above policy efforts and noted improvements especially with regard to the rate of broadband take-up on

[2] In some instances, the Programme is referred to as 'Digital Success Strategy'. The present paper translates the middle term of the original Hungarian title (*jólét*) as welfare. It should be noted that *jólét* also signifies 'well-being' as well all 'prosperity'.

fixed networks and digital skills; at the same time, it found that mobile broadband was not accelerating, digital skills and the online provision of public services were below the EU average, and the business sector was not exploiting the opportunities offered by digital technology as much as in other Member States (CEC, 2017).

In a renewed effort to tackle the challenge of digitalisation, in July 2017 the Orbán government launched, following a process of public consultation, the extension of the DWP, 'The Digital Welfare programme 2.0' (DWP 2.0), which contains concrete measures ensuring that 'every citizen and business in Hungary and the Hungarian national economy become winners of digitalisation' (Government of Hungary, 2017b, p. 3). Furthermore, the DWP 2.0 envisaged, among others, drawing up a development concept for improving digital competences, implementing a Digital Labour Programme, formulating Hungary's Digital Agricultural Policy, Digital Health Industry Development Strategy and Digital Sport Strategy, as well as setting up digital public administration training programmes.

4. EXAMINING DISCOURSES OF DIGITAL HUNGARY AND THEIR PRACTICAL-SPATIAL WORKINGS

This section will examine, through the three-dimensional conceptual lens introduced earlier, the understandings of spatiality that have supported the discourse of 'Digital Hungary' and how these are being enacted in a multi-scalar policy field. Surely, these enactments are only beginning to take shape. Nonetheless, the emerging practices of Hungary's digital agenda allow for a preliminary assessment. To this end, extensive desk research tracing and analysing relevant national policy documents, websites, news reports and speeches was conducted, and eleven in-depth semi-structured interviews with key informants from the national and local levels were held between April 2017 and September 2018. A twelfth respondent provided detailed responses by e-mail; also, several interviewees supplied additional insights during follow-up e-mail communication. In line with the assumption of Foucauldian discourse analysis to regard discourse as encompassing aspects of language (use) *and* practice (Sharp and Richardson, 2001), it constituted an important aspect of analysis of how the discourse of Digital Hungary has manifested itself in ways of *doing*. In concrete terms, this meant tracing the very process of devising policy documents, the events at and the channels through which these documents have been released, as well as identifying the actual policy measures through which policy objectives have been expected to become fulfilled. An iterative approach to data collection and analysis was applied. Documents, interview transcripts and research notes were read several times. During the coding

phase, key themes and implicit understandings and claims related to ICT developments and digitalisation and to the expected and/or desired (cyber)spatial implications of those were defined. Subsequently, the themes and claims identified were compared and, in some cases, merged, leading to the final set of categories on which the reported findings are based.

4.1. Representations of (cyber)space

In the official policy discourse of Digital Hungary, cyberspace is primarily seen as an undifferentiated space with potentials and possibilities for everyone; as the NICS notes, '[t]he «digital ecosystem» has developed also in Hungary, connecting millions of users and tens of millions of devices with higher bandwidth networks and increasingly complex electronic services' (Government of Hungary, 2014, p. 4). While emphasising the aspects of 'interconnectivity', the Strategy also acknowledges the state-territorial fragmentation of cyberspace. As Tamás Deutsch, Prime Minister's Commissioner for the Digital Success Programme at that time, argued in an interview, it did make sense to speak of a 'Hungarian internet' especially regarding content, the provision of infrastructure and regulation, because '[t]here are certain tasks that no one else will do, if we don't'.[3] As Deutsch elsewhere noted:

> Digitalisation is […] a very exciting, complex social process and that occurs in the entire world by producing winners and losers. It is a realistic objective that the Hungarian nation will be a winner (Deutsch, 2017).

This competitive international cyber environment was contrasted, although implicitly, with the Hungarian digital ecosystem that was characterised by cooperation based on mutual trust and which every Hungarian partakes in (Deutsch, 2017).

At the same time, the documents studied acknowledge the inequalities that persist regarding participation and are explicit about the spatial character of those inequalities (Government of Hungary, 2010, p. 14). More specifically, ICT-based sectoral and regional programmes are announced to 'make the benefits of the digital ecosystem clear and accessible even to those who miss out due to any reason' (pp. 67–68). While the proposed spatially selective interventions mostly focus on rural (isolated) regions that are lagging behind in terms of internet use, the Green Paper also mentions subsidies for smart cities that target urban areas and aim at involving 'more people' (Ministry for National Development, 2014, p. 117) into the use of ICT-based public services.

Overall, the way in which the digital divide is spoken of in the NICS suggests a rather simplistic understanding of cyberspace as a singular, ontic entity (a person

[3] See http://bocskor.fidesz-eu.hu/en/public-consultation-on-the-future-of-the-internet-in-hungary/

is either 'inside' or 'outside' of the space created by the internet), and inclusion is assumed to temporally forward people and place on a path of development (see Graham, 2011). The various kinds of barriers to internet use are acknowledged by policy documents, but according to the NICS, those are primarily cognitive, knowledge and motivation barriers and, given the reduction of computer prices and the drastic decline of internet access prices, less and less financially-oriented (Government of Hungary, 2014, p. 39). Leaving aside to what extent the latter is an overstatement, there is insufficient attention paid to how the differences in the ability to access information and communicate online are related to (and constrained by) various other factors, be it social, political, cultural or spatial (cf. Graham, 2011), as well as to how these can be addressed in an integrated way. For example, the Roma, a severely disadvantaged group in Hungary, have often faced discrimination at community access points (see Kiss, 2007). However, the NICS makes only one brief reference to the Roma when it stresses the need to embed e-inclusion efforts into broader social policy programmes (p. 105).

4.2. Practices of digitalisation

Concerning the political rationalities of the discourse of Digital Hungary, competitiveness is a recurring concept in the NICS and other Hungarian policy documents. One of the key rationalities governing Hungary's digital agenda is that of competitiveness at the national, company and individual levels (Government of Hungary, 2016a), which seems in alignment with the EU's policy discourse that regards the development of the Digital Single Market as a key priority for boosting the EU's economy (CEC, 2014, p. 3). The representation of digitalisation as 'one of the most important driving forces of economic competition' (Government of Hungary, 2016c, p. 4) and that of digital transformation as 'inevitable and ever accelerating' (Government of Hungary, 2017b, p. 5) also legitimates the necessity of an overarching governmental programme. Yet, competitiveness is not the sole rationale of digitalisation, as it is stated that

> the Government no longer regards digital developments as a mere area of its development policy: the new approach puts people's welfare in the focus of digital transformation (Government of Hungary, 2016a, p. 6).

No thought is given, however, to the possibly emerging conflicts between competitiveness on the one hand and socio-spatial equity and sustainability objectives on the other. These implicit tensions are mediated (and concealed) by the notion of 'digital welfare' that is presented as the umbrella for the four major pillars of the digital agenda mentioned above (Government of Hungary, 2017b, p. 6).

The simplistic understandings of (cyber)space and the competitiveness-oriented rationality discussed above are variously instituted through the technologies

of government of the Digital Welfare Programme 2.0. that converge on shaping connected and entrepreneurial subjectivities. To ensure that no Hungarian citizen is excluded from participating in the digital world (p. 6) due to a lack of financial means, the government reduced the VAT rate on internet provision from twenty-seven percent to eighteen percent as of the beginning of 2017 and to five percent as of January 2018, the lowest rate at that moment in the EU. In addition to that, the government initiated the creation of a 'digital welfare basic tariff' trademark and major providers now offer non-users a basic broadband package (fixed or mobile) at a ten-to-fifteen percent price discount. Also, the establishment of a network of 1500 'Digital Welfare Programme Points' (DWP Points) was announced. Financed by EU and national funds (eighty-five and fifteen percent respectively), the network's aim is to ensure that Hungary ranks above the EU average in terms of digital literacy and the use of digital tools by 2020 (https://djp.palyazat.kifu.gov.hu/). As such, the DWP Points build on the legacy of existing community internet access points. However, it is unclear whether and how the experiences of operating those access points have been considered.[4] Furthermore, the call for tenders related to the establishment of DWP Points (launched within the Economic Development and Innovation Operational Programme) only slightly considers the spatial dimension: according to the point-system of the call, location in a disadvantaged region and in a settlement with a population of less than 5,000 weigh the same as setting up a DWP Point in a public library. The 'Digitalisation for the active elderly' sub-programme operates with similarly 'aspatial' criteria, stipulating the minimum size of groups in fifteen participants – a possibly unreachable threshold in smaller settlements and lagging regions (*HVG*, 2018).

The previously mentioned sub-strategies of the Digital Welfare Programme,[5] the Digital Education Strategy, the Digital Export Development Strategy, the Digital Start-up Strategy, and the Digital Commerce Development Strategy also underwrite the understanding of an undifferentiated cyberspace to which Hungary and Hungarians need to be better connected if they are to remain, or become, economically competitive. Indeed, the very fact that it is the above areas for which a digital strategy has been elaborated suggests a predominantly economic understanding of the supposed merits of digitalisation. The decisions designating those

[4] In Hungary, telehouses emerged as hybrid (NGO-small business-municipal) organisations (Kovács, 2001) from the mid-1990s, and they were conceived of as multifunctional public spaces offering a variety of technological, organizational and personal services tailored to the needs of local communities (Gáspár, 2016). Later, state-initiated programmes followed, most notably the *eHungary point* programme that aimed at establishing a community access point in every settlement; as a result, by the end of 2005, there were 2,800 eHungary points (Kiss, 2007), mostly operating at municipal premises (e.g. community centres or libraries). However, in the run-up to EU accession, membership conditionality led to an increasing concern with the roll-out of an extensive network of public internet access points, whereby multifunctionality in the above sense became neglected (Gáspár, 2016).

[5] The focus in this paper is on the strategies accepted by the end of March 2017. The Digital Child Protection Strategy is not relevant in this context and is not considered.

fields 'worthy' of a digital strategy have not been transparent. Furthermore, a frequently used technique of representation in these strategies are SWOT analyses and other statistical overviews – also referring to the EU's Digital Agenda Scoreboard – that, under the disguise of neutrality, have helped to discursively construct the problem of Hungary's lagging status in the field of digitalisation. The recurrent evocation of the 'EU average' sits here somewhat uneasily with the remark of the NICS that it is not just 'better positions achieved in international statistics' that count (Government of Hungary, 2014, p. 6).

The above strategies pay also insufficient attention to the ways in which the deployment of ICT and spatially uneven development mutually constitute each other. They tend to propose spatially undifferentiated measures and even if spatial selectivity is present, it is weakly articulated and not fully consistent with spatial policy objectives. The Digital Education Strategy, for example, assumes that the digitalisation of the whole educational system will improve the employability, living standard and social welfare of workers, and will have a positive effect on the entire digital ecosystem (Government of Hungary, 2016a, p. 7). While the document does contain a map of the number of locations with Wi-Fi access in public education institutions (p. 38), and it evokes the principle of equity in its strategic goals, it does not address the question as to how the spatially uneven availability of ICT devices plays a role in maintaining patterns of uneven development more generally, or how uneven development should be addressed. The Digital Export Strategy envisages measures designed to improve the export capacities of SMEs engaged in IT services, the export of governmental digital solutions and the development of the export of digital services through services centres (SSC). As to the last element, the Strategy discusses a way in which the concentration of SSCs in Budapest could be diminished by the attraction of these centres to big regional cities with a university. However, it concludes plainly that 'there is potential for the creation of plenty of SSC jobs' in places where, among others, ICT training is available at university level, where city leaders are highly committed to job-creating investments or where adequate office buildings are or can be made available (Government of Hungary, 2016b, p. 22).

The Digital Start-up Strategy similarly assumes that the digital economy may be an opportunity for growth for the Hungarian national economy and justifies the focus of the national strategy on Budapest by pointing out that

> a substantial start-up ecosystem typically develops in large cities as such metropolises […] where the capital, knowledge and highly skilled young workforce required […] are available in sufficient concentration (Government of Hungary, 2016c, p. 8).

Given the aim of turning Budapest into an important international start-up centre (Government of Hungary, 2017b), the designated location of the Startup Hungary Centre for Methodology and Coordination (which has been established in the meantime), is Budapest. The primary location of the proposed 'special economic

zone', where start-ups[6] specialising in R&D&I are relieved of tax and social security burdens, is also the capital, although it is mentioned that in addition, sub-centres can be set up in the industrial and academic centres.

Finally, the key objective of the Digital Commerce Development Strategy is to strengthen the sector of e-commerce by offering financial, technical and training support to existing online retailers as well as to traditional (offline) retailers to help them to enlarge their market share or to enter the online market and to create an adequate regulatory environment. The only spatial consideration in the document appears in the form of a diagram showing the uneven regional distribution of online shopping (Government of Hungary, 2017a), but the relevance of this is not further elaborated on. The possible negative implications of an increase of online retail for urban spaces, such as the decline of city centres due to the undermined viability of small retailers (see e.g. Madanipour, 2018) are not considered by the Strategy.

4.3. The politics of scale

In EU Member States, the thinking about the information society and the ICT policy field as a domain of intervention more concretely have been strongly shaped – and disciplined – by the EU's policy discourse on ICT (see e.g. Chini, 2008; Goodwin and Spittle, 2002). Central to this discourse has been a primary concern with the single market and the competitiveness of European industry (Goodwin and Spittle, 2002). By extension, the EU's Digital Agenda can be viewed as a multi-scalar discursive regime and governmental technological apparatus that has made the objects, subjects and spaces of digital transformation thinkable and manageable. This is perhaps best illustrated by the Commission's annual Digital Progress Report (EDPR), which monitors progress in digital policies in the Member States.[7]

The programme of Digital Hungary has taken shape as part of this field of government and although Hungary has been a member state for almost fifteen years, the 'export of governmentality' from the EU in the form of normalising, standardising and control mechanisms (Böröcz, 2001) has exerted a stronger influence than in the 'old' Members States, for several reasons. First, as one of the biggest beneficiaries of EU funding,[8] Hungary has had to adhere more to the practices of monitoring and reporting. Also, even though Progress Reports are developed for each Member State, those evaluations, just as the Progress

---

[6] The Strategy notes that the definition of a 'digital start-up' is not unproblematic because while the activities of most start-ups are linked to digitalisation, not all start-ups provide digital services. Hence, the Strategy proposes to omit the 'digital' adjective altogether.

[7] See https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/european-digital-progress-report

[8] See http://ec.europa.eu/budget/mycountry/HU/index_en.cfm#cinfo

Reports that monitored their progress as the progress of candidate countries in implementing the *acquis* (see Kovács and Kabacsnik, 2001), have tended to cast Central European Member States as lagging and reinforce their position as inferior political subjects. At the same time and somewhat paradoxically, with digitalisation becoming the new field in which Hungary's aspirations of developing the most competitive self-sustaining economy in the Central-Eastern European region[9] is being played out, the EU's discursive regime and governmental technologies have been willingly embraced by Hungarian politicians and policymakers. This has been evident in statements such as 'Hungary performs ever better in the digital competition, but there are areas where further improvement is needed', made by Tamás Deutsch.[10]

The enactment of the development policy under the banner of 'Digital Hungary' has been shaped by the centralising tendencies that have prevailed as the combined result of the EU's emphasis on funds' absorption and domestic trends of centralisation (see e.g. Grabbe, 2001; Varró and Faragó, 2016). As it has been pointed out by several studies, some positive examples notwithstanding, participative planning and partnership-based policy coordination at/across different scales in Hungarian development policy has been rather a hollow term than actual practice, which can be explained, amongst others, by the time pressures pertaining to EU funding application and management (Bajmócy *et al*., 2016), a traditionally weak culture of cooperation (Matkó, 2016), as well as the reluctance of the central government to decentralise decision-making (Dąbrowski, 2014; Pálné Kovács, 2019). Arguably, those factors have also prevented the participation of stakeholders in devising the Digital Hungary programme. Although, as alluded to earlier, a national consultation ('InternetKon') was launched on internet-related issues in 2015, the framing of questions, the processing of responses and the formulation of conclusions was concealed from public view, and it remained unclear to what extent the opinion of the majority was considered in the legislation. As such, similarly to consultations conducted about other issues by the Fidesz government, InternetKon has 'serve[d] primarily as devices of political marketing and only secondarily as instruments of participatory democracy' (Komáromi, 2015, p. 62). Furthermore, the interviews indicated that some elements of the Digital Hungary programme[11] have not sufficiently taken into account existing local capacities and knowledge; additionally, stakeholders, those from the local level in particular, also often lack the knowledge, capacity and opportunities to effectively shape the course of digitalisation policies.

---

[9] See http://www.kormany.hu/hu/miniszterelnokseg/europai-unios-fejlesztesekert-felelos-allamtitkar/hirek/az-europai-parlament-elismeri-a-kormany-erofesziteseit

[10] See http://hirek.prim.hu/cikk/2017/10/19/nem_csak_a_nagy_orszagok_lehetnek_sikeresek_a_digitalizacioban

[11] Here, in particular the Digital Welfare Programme Network was mentioned.

5. CONCLUSION

Overall, although the NICS explicitly claimed to align with the objectives of the National Development and Territorial Development Concept, the Strategy – and, by extension, the Digital Hungary programme – is more concerned with preventing a longer-term imbalance of the digital economy (Government of Hungary, 2010, p. 120) than with the actual spatial development implications of digitalisation. This is clear, for example, if one considers the superficial attention paid to the question of Hungary's Budapest-centredness, or the fact that the concerns of the NDSDC with uncoordinated urban expansion and the related loss of functions in city centres (Government of Hungary, 2013, p. 83) seem to have been completely ignored. The discourse of digitalisation appears to be the new terrain in which the EU's competitiveness-oriented development approach, focusing on the efficient use of funding, has productively intersected with the pragmatism and the centralizing tendencies of the Hungarian state, which latter have even intensified in the meantime (cf. Varró and Faragó, 2016). Given the poor inclusion of sub-national stakeholders, community actors and the broader public, the discursive framework of the programme of Digital Hungary has tended to reassert the largely aspatial character of development policies and practices in Hungary.

On a more general level, this paper's aim was to contribute to the knowledge on digitalisation and spatial development concerned with how policies of digitalisation (re)produce patterns of socio-spatial inequality. The paper showed that the discourses of digitalisation and digital transformation should not only be simply examined as a new set of ideas and practices that are 'rolled out' over places, spaces and scales. Instead, one needs to ask how the discourses of digital transformation have also been implicated in the contestation and redefinition of places, and how scalar relations are shaping and are being reshaped in this process. To this end, a Foucauldian-inspired analytical framework was introduced for the analysis of the practical and spatial-political implications of digital agendas. The examination of the symbolic representations of (cyber)space, the practical workings of digital policies, as well as the scalar-institutional power relations shaping the practices of digitalisation, helps to critically evaluate how digitalisation agendas seek to create conditions for new practices and spatialities. In particular, the Foucauldian perspective has been useful in highlighting that knowledge on digitalisation is heavily imbued with power relations and that policies are always political, even if they appear to be simply 'technical' (Sharp and Richardson, 2001). Overall, the main message of this paper is that one needs to recognise the implementation of digital agendas as both the medium and an outcome of ongoing broader struggles about the spaces and scales of development. Related to this, a broader and urgent research task has emerged to systematically examine what kind of hidden normative spatial understandings are being promoted by national digital agendas in the EU and with what effect, and what differential role the EU's Digital Agenda plays in this process. Furthermore,

one needs to examine how the practices of digitalisation and their spatial impact are related to the proclaimed aims of spatial development and governance at different levels. Only thus can we effectively discuss the 'links between digital development and Europe's territorial future' (ESPON, 2017, p. 7).

REFERENCES

ALLEN, J., MASSEY, D. and COCHRANE, A. (1998), *Rethinking the Region*. London: Routledge.

BAJMÓCY, Z., GÉBERT, J., ELEKES, Z. and PÁLI-DOMBI, J. (2016), 'Beszélünk a részvételről… Megyei jogú városok fejlesztési dokumentumainak elemzése az érintettek részvételének aspektusából', *Tér* és *Társadalom*, 30, pp. 45–62.

BÖRÖCZ, J. (2001), 'Introduction: Empire and coloniality in the «Eastern Enlargement» of the European Union', [in:] BÖRÖCZ, J. and KOVÁCS, M. (eds), *Empire's New Clothes: Unveiling EU Enlargement.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, pp. 4–50.

CASTELLS, M. (1996), *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture, vol. 1, The Rise of the Network Society*. Oxford: Blackwell.

CEC (Commission of the European Communities) (2010), *A Digital Agenda for Europe*. https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R(01) [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

CEC (2014), *Digital agenda for Europe: Rebooting Europe's economy*. Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union.

CEC (2017), *Europe's Digital Progress Report (EDPR) 2017 Country Profile Hungary*. file:///C:/Users/vista/Downloads/HungaryEDPRcountryprofile.pdf [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

CHINI, I. (2008), 'ICT policy as a governable domain: The case of Greece and the European Commission', [in:] AVGEROU, C., SMITH, M.L. and BESSELAAR VAN DEN, P. (eds.), *Social Dimensions of Information and Communication Technology Policy, IFIP International Federation for Information Processing*, 282, pp. 45–62.

CZÉKMANN, Z. (2016), Információs társadalom és elektronikus kormányzat Magyarországon (Doctoral dissertation, Miskolc University). http://www.uni-iskolc.hu/~wwwdeak/czekmann_zsolt_ert.pdf [accessed on: 4.06.2019].

DĄBROWSKI, M. (2014), 'Towards place-based regional and local development strategies in Central and Eastern Europe? EU cohesion policy and strategic planning capacity at the sub-national level', *Local Economy*, 29, pp. 378–393.

DEUTSCH, T. (2017), *Keynote at the Infotér Conference on smart cities* [video] http://okosvaros.infoter.eu/?p=home [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

DIE BUNDESREGIERUNG (n.d.) *Grundsätze unserer Digitalpolitik*. https://www.digitale-agenda.de/Webs/DA/DE/Grundsaetze/Grundsaetze_Digitalpolitik/grundsaetze-digitalpolitik_node.html [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

ESPON (2017), (European Observation Network for Territorial Development and Cohesion) *Transforming territorial thinking through digitalisation. Synthesis report*. https://www.espon.eu/sites/default/files/attachments/Synthesis%20report%20Tallinn%202017_1.pdf [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

GÁSPÁR, M. (2016), 'Csipkerózsika, ébredj! – avagy új kihívások előtta közösségi hozzáférés', *Információs Társadalom*, 16, pp. 113–133.

GIFFINGER, R., FERTNER, C., KRAMAR, H., KALASEK, R., PICHLER-MILANOVIĆ, N. and MEIJER, S.E. (2017), *Smart cities ranking of European medium-sized cities*. Vienna: Vienna University of Technology.

GOODWIN, I. and SPITTLE, S. (2002), 'The European Union and the information society: Discourse, power and policy', *New Media and Society*, 4, pp. 225–249.

GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY (2013), *H/13094. számú Országgyűlési Határozati Javaslat a Nemzeti Fejlesztés 2030 – Országos Fejlesztési és Területfejlesztési Koncepcióról* [National Development and Territorial Development Concept]. http://www.terport.hu/webfm_send/4204 [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY (2014), *National Infocommunication Strategy 2014–2020*. http://www.kormany.hu/download/5/ff/70000/NIS_EN_clear.pdf [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY (2016a), *Digital Education Strategy*. http://www.kormany.hu/download/0/4b/21000/The%20Digital%20Education%20Strategy%20of%20Hungary.pdf [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY (2016b), *Digital Export Development Strategy of Hungary*. http://www.kormany.hu/download/1/4b/21000/The%20Digital%20Export%20Development%20Strategy%20of%20Hungary.pdf [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY (2016c), *Digital Startup Strategy of Hungary*. http://www.kormany.hu/download/2/4b/21000/The%20Digital%20Startup%20Strategy%20of%20Hungary.pdf [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY (2017a), *Digital Commerce Development Strategy*. Retrieved from http://www.kormany.hu/download/c/88/f0000/Stratégia.pdf [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

GOVERNMENT OF HUNGARY (2017b), *Digital Welfare Programme 2.0*. http://www.kormany.hu/download/6/6d/21000/DJP20%20Stratégiai%20Tanulmány.pdf [accessed on: 26.06.2018].

GRABBE, H. (2001), 'How does Europeanization affect CEE governance? Conditionality, diffusion and Diversity', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 8, pp. 1013−1031.

GRAHAM, M. (2011), 'Time machines and virtual portals: the spatialities of the digital divide', *Progress in Development Studies*, 11, pp. 211–227.

GRAHAM, S. (1998), 'The end of geography or the explosion of place? Conceptualizing space, place and information technology', *Progress in Human Geography*, no. 22, pp. 165–185.

GRAHAM, S. (2002), 'Bridging urban digital divides? Urban polarisation and information and communications technologies (ICTs)', *Urban Studies*, 39, pp. 33–56.

HAJER, M. (2000), 'Transnational networks as transnational policy discourse; some observations on the politics of spatial development in Europe', [in:] SALET, W. and FALUDI, A. (eds.), *The revival of strategic spatial planning*. Amsterdam: Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences, pp. 135–142.

HARVEY, D. (1996), *Justice, Nature and the Geography of Difference.* Oxford: Blackwell.

HEALEY, P. (2004) 'The Treatment of Space and Place in the New Strategic Spatial Planning in Europe', *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research*, 28, pp. 45–67.

HVG (2018), A hálón kívül. 15 March, pp. 19–20.

JENSEN, O.B. and RICHARDSON, T. (2001), 'Nested visions: New rationalities of space in European spatial planning', *Regional Studies*, 35, pp. 703–717.

JENSEN, O.B. and RICHARDSON, T. (2004), *Making European space: mobility, power and territorial identity*. London: Routledge.

KISS, M. (2007), 'A digitális esélyegyenlőség helyzete Magyarországon', *Információs Társadalom*, 3, pp. 83–101.

KOMÁROMI, L. (2015), 'Participatory democracy: International and European tendencies, constitutional framework in Visegrad countries, Hungarian instruments and experiences', *Iustum Aequum Salutare*, 11, pp. 31–66.

KOVÁCS, G. (2001), 'Telecottages in Hungary', *Journal of Computing and Information Technology*, 2, pp. 153–160.

KOVÁCS, M. and KABACHNIK, P. (2001), 'Shedding light on the quantitative other: The EU's discourse in the Commission Opinions of 1997', [in:] BÖRÖCZ, J. and KOVÁCS, M. (eds), *Empire's New Clothes: Unveiling EU Enlargement.* New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers, pp. 4–50.

LEFEBVRE, H. (1991), *The Production of Space.* Oxford: Blackwell.
MADANIPOUR, A. (2018), 'Temporary use of space: Urban processes between flexibility, opportunity and precarity', *Urban Studies*, 55, pp. 1093–1110.
MAGYAR, B. and KARVALICS, L.Z. (2001), '«Information society» in Eastern Europe? Chances, possibilities, tasks and programs', *East European Quarterly*, 34, pp. 509–522.
MATKÓ, M. (2016), 'Városfejlesztés az Eu-ban az EU2020 célok mentén', *Falu Város Régió*, 2, pp. 16–25.
MINISTERIE VOOR ECONOMISCHE ZAKEN (2016), *Digitale agenda – Vernieuwen, vertrouwen, versnellen*. Den Haag: Ministerie voor Economische Zaken.
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2010), *Digital Renewal Action Plan*. http://www.terport.hu/webfm_send/2709 [accessed on: 26.06.2018].
MINISTRY OF NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT (2014) *Green Paper on the Development of the Infocommunications Sector in 2014–2020*. http://www.kormany.hu/download/9/2c/70000/ZK%20angol_javított_nokorr.pdf [accessed on: 26.06.2018].
OECD (2015), *OECD Digital Economy Outlook 2015*. Paris: OECD Publishing. Retrieved from https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/science-and-technology/oecd-digital-economy-outlook-2015_9789264232440-en#page4 [accessed on: 26.06.2018].
PÁLNÉ KOVÁCS, I. (2019), 'A Magyar önkormányzatok korlátai a helyi gazdaságfejlesztésben', *Tér* és *Társadalom,* 33, pp. 3–19.
PICK, J.B. and SARKAR, A. (2009), *The global digital divides*. Berlin–Heidelberg: Springer-Verlag.
PILE, S. (1994), 'Cybergeography: 50 years of *Environment and Planning A'*, *Environment and Planning A*, 26, pp. 1815–1823.
PINTÉR, R. (2004), *A magyar információs társadalom fejlődése* és *fejlettsége a fejlesztők szempontjából* (Doctoral dissertation, Eötvös Loránd University Budapest), http://mek.oszk.hu/02300/02336/02336.pdf [accessed on: 4.06.2019].
RANDALL, L., BERLINA, A., TERÄS, J. and RINNE, T. (2018), *Digitalisation as a tool for sustainable Nordic regional development: Preliminary literature and policy review*. Discussion paper prepared for Nordic thematic group for innovative and resilient regions. January 2018, Stockholm. http://www.nordregio.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/Digitalisation_Discussion-Paper_Jan-31.pdf [accessed on: 17.01.2019].
RICHARDSON, T. (2006), 'The thin simplification of European space: dangerous calculations?', *Comparative European Politics*, 4, pp. 203–217.
RICHARDSON, T. and JENSEN, O.B. (2000), 'Discourses of mobility and polycentric development: a contested view of European spatial planning', *European Planning Studies,* 8, pp. 503–520.
RICHARDSON, T. and JENSEN, O.B. (2003), 'Linking discourse and space: towards a cultural sociology of space in analysing spatial policy discourses', *Urban Studies,* 40, pp. 7–22.
SCHULZ, S. (2017), 'The discursive construction of innovation policy in peripheralizing Estonia', *European Spatial Research and Policy*, 24, pp. 77–91.
SHARP, E. and RICHARDSON, T. (2001), 'Reflections on Foucauldian discourse analysis in planning and environmental policy research', *Journal of Environmental Policy & Planning*, 3, pp. 193–209.
STARRS, P.F. and ANDERSON, J. (1997), 'The Words of Cyberspace', *Geographical Review*, 87*,* pp. 146–154.
VARRÓ, K. and FARAGÓ, L. (2016), 'The politics of spatial policy and governance in post-1990 Hungary: The interplay between European and national discourses of space', *European Planning Studies*, 24, pp. 39–60.
WARF, B. (2001), 'Segueways into cyberspace: Multiple geographies of the digital divide', *Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design*, 28, pp. 3–19.
ZOOK, M. (2003), 'Underground globalization: mapping the space of flows of the Internet adult Industry', *Environment and Planning A*, 35, pp. 1261–1286.

sciendo

COPE
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.08

Michał KOWALSKI*, Szymon WIŚNIEWSKI*

TRANSPORT ACCESSIBILITY AND MOBILITY: A FORECAST OF CHANGES IN THE FACE OF PLANNED DEVELOPMENT OF THE NETWORK OF EXPRESSWAYS AND MOTORWAYS IN POLAND

Abstract. The article presents a forecast of changes in the level of transport accessibility and mobility in Poland as a result of the anticipated development of the network of expressways and motorways. The progress which has been made in this respect in the last few years in Poland is unquestionable and unrepeatable by any other European country. Will the subsequent investment plans concerning the road network of the highest parameters offer equally impressive results as far as the increase in Poland's territorial cohesion is concerned? The aim of this article is to establish in what way the planned infrastructure investments will affect the changes in transport accessibility and mobility as well as whether they will result in the changes in traffic flows directed to Warsaw and other regional centres. To achieve this, an analysis of the present and target states of the road network in Poland was conducted from the perspective of the changes in accessibility, anticipated traffic flows, and mobility. For this purpose, the authors used the analyses of isochrone and accumulative accessibility in ArcMap environment and the research into traffic flows and their changes in the Visum software. The conducted research showed that the planned transport network might result in induced traffic through an increase in accessibility (the central variant) with the assumption that an increase in mobility would be vented in the real face of the phenomenon of motility. The fact of opening new road sections of expressways will contribute to substantial changes in the directions of traffic flows only to a slight extent, and the only transformations concern regions with already developed fast car transport infrastructures whose functionality is limited due to the lack of cohesion in the subsequent course or lack of a developed network of expressways and motorways.

Key words: accessibility, mobility, road infrastructure, Poland.

* Michał KOWALSKI, Szymon WIŚNIEWSKI, University of Lodz, Faculty of Geographical Sciences, Institute of the Built Environment and Spatial Policy, ul. Kopcińskiego 31, 90-142 Łódź, Poland; e-mails: michal.kowalski@geo.uni.lodz.pl, szymon.wisniewski@geo.uni.lodz.pl

1. INTRODUCTION

A study of accessibility and motility is one of the most frequently accounted factors that enable the assessment of transport investments. It renders it possible to perform an ex-post and ex-ante evaluation of the significance of the implementation of any given investment. For that purpose, it is the most common practice to utilise research into cumulative accessibility (e.g. Komornicki and Śleszyński, 2009; Wiśniewski, 2016), measured by means of the potential method (e.g. Komornicki *et al.*, 2013a) and the mobility method (e.g. Bocarejo and Oviedo, 2012; Vigar, 2013). In the light of the above, it seems imperative to begin with a presentation of what accessibility and mobility truly are.

So far there has not been, and most likely there will never be, a single and universal definition of "transport accessibility" that would be binding for all researchers (Rosik, 2012). As indicated by Gould (1969), accessibility is "one of those common terms that everyone uses until faced with the problem of defining and measuring it." Others stated that accessibility is an "inherent characteristic (or advantage) of a place with respect to overcoming some form of spatially operating source of friction (for example time and/or distance)" (Ingram, 1971). Other researchers have also developed their own definitions, among others: Vickerman (1974), Komornicki and his team (2010), Hansen (1959) and Martellato with his team (1998), Handy and Niemeier (1997) Bruinsma and Rietveld (1998), Black and Conroy (1977), Cauvin (2005), Biosca *et al.* (2013), Kozina (2010), Karou and Hull (2014), Gutierrez *et al.* (2010), Geurs and van Wee (2004), Makkonen *et al.* (2013).

Regardless of the applied definition, the majority of authors indicated the presence of certain constituents, elements or components, which are necessary for the appropriate comprehension of the issue and which constitute integral ingredients of transport accessibility (Dalvi and Martin, 1976). Thus, one can distinguish four basic components of accessibility (Geurs and van Wee, 2004), two of which play a decisive role in this study. Those are the transport component, represented by the road network – the entirety of the principles that condition movement within a network, and the component of land use, which indicates the manner in which a scrutinised land is utilised. The consideration of those two components is one of the most significant assets of transport accessibility since – due to this very feature – it offers feedback between the policies of transportation and spatial management.

The concept of mobility in geographical literature refers to a wide spectrum of phenomena, from the large-scale movement of people, goods, capital, and information to local processes related to everyday mobility and travelling (Hannam *et al.*, 2006). In order to demonstrate the research presented within this article, it is necessary to narrow down the meaning of mobility. All the aforementioned flows ought to be characterised in three basic dimensions: time-related, spatial, and motivation-dependent. While the first two appear to be – due to their rather measurable

nature – quite obvious (objective), the motivation (the destination of the journey understood as: what for?, for what purpose?) represents a more complex issue and is crucial when research questions are posed about the characteristics and relations of travel, since it is virtually impossible to present the phenomenon of mobility and to draw cause and effect conclusions without considering the motivation that lies at the foundation of this mobility. Even if one were able to present all the travel-related phenomena in a specified territory and in a stipulated time, it could lead to blurring of information, which would de facto render it impossible to conduct any sector analyses. Therefore, attempts have been made in source literature to offer generalisations that would enable a more contrasted presentation of mobility-related phenomena.

The application of reductionism within the motivation-related dimension can be found, for instance, in the work by Modenez and Cabré (1998), who coined the terms "usual mobility", "daily mobility", "occasional mobility," and "residential mobility." Then, Kaufmann (2002) organised this approach by referring motivations to the other two remaining characteristics of mobility – time and space. As far as time is concerned, he isolated "short duration" and "long duration" mobility, and divided space into two types of areas: internal to the living area, and near the outside of the living area. In consequence, he presented four major forms of spatial mobility: "daily mobility", which is short-term and limited to the living area, "travel" (short-term movement outside the living area), "residential mobility" (moving home), which belongs to long-term travelling within the living area, and "migration" – i.e. long-term travel outside the living area.

One final remark needs to be made, following the explanation of all the aforementioned terms and concepts. Namely, the said issues related to mobility and accessibility ought not to be equated. Hanson and Giuliano (2004) wrote that accessibility expresses a spatial relation between selected places, while mobility refers to moving within that space. In conclusion, it could be stated, in accordance with Taylor (1999), that mobility is actual moving, and accessibility only describes the potential possibility of such moving. At the same time, however, one should bear in mind that Kaufmann (2002) introduced a peculiar dual voice into the concept of mobility, by stating that, within its framework, there is actual mobility and potential mobility (motility), which ought to be understood as the possibility of any given individual to be mobile (Kaufmann, 2002). This possibility can be satisfied, e.g. by the development of motoring, the expansion of the transport system, and by appropriate planning strategies aimed at decreasing the dispersion of built-up areas (Komornicki, 2011). In this matter, it seems that spatial accessibility is, to a certain extent, a measure of potential mobility. In the presented studies, mobility was demonstrated as motility, i.e. potential mobility.

As mentioned above, the methods of researching accessibility and motility can be applied in the analyses preceding the plans for the expansion of road infrastructure. Nevertheless, one must also bear in mind that apart from such analyses, the process of making a planning decision also involves other elements, such as

social and economic factors (e.g. demand for transport of people and goods), and factors that refer to a wider spectrum of phenomena, i.e. the implementation of goals within the strategy of transport policy, local development, environmental protection (reduction of external environmental effects), as well as, and in numerous countries primarily, implementational feasibility perceived from a technical, technological, and financial point of view (Rosik and Opałka, 2011).

For making ex-ante analyses of transport investments it is fundamental to precede a decision-making process with studies that allow one to simulate the effects of combined investments. This is of crucial importance since, when compared to single case studies, it makes it possible to determine mutual relations between investments, i.e. the influence that the implementation of some investments has on the fulfilment of other (Wolański, 2010).

Therefore, in a situation when there is a limited budget for the implementation of investments, the creation of a mechanism that enables one to select road investments which are the most effective and not necessarily the easiest to implement should lead to the selection of projects which guarantee shortened travel time, the largest number of beneficiaries (both in terms of transportation of people and goods), the improvement of safety, and the possibility for an increase in economic efficiency (Rosik and Opałka, 2011).

The main purpose of this article is to determine how scheduled infrastructural investments may influence the changes in transport accessibility and motility, and whether they will make it possible to notice the changes in the directions of traffic flows into Warsaw and other regional centres. In order to fulfil the purpose, the analysis of the current and planned sizes of the road network in Poland was conducted in respect to the changes in accessibility, predicted traffic flows, and motility.

The work has been divided into three parts, preceded by this foreword and ended with a discussion and conclusions. The first part is a review of source material and the research methods applied in the study. The second contains a short description of the research area. The third was divided into 3 sections, each of which shows the results in three variants: central, interregional, and regional.

2. SOURCE MATERIAL AND RESEARCH METHODS

2.1. Data sources

In the research, the most up-to-date data was used, for instance, from the Database of Topographic Objects – DTO (Baza Danych Obiektów Topograficznych), obtained from the Head Office of Geodesy and Cartography (Główny Urząd Geo-

dezji i Kartografii) in Warsaw, which is the national system of gathering and providing topographic data. Out of the extensive range of the DTO data, information on the course and features (category, class, surface material, number of carriage ways and lanes) of the road infrastructure was derived. Next, some of these features were applied for the purposes of the research on traffic flows in the VISUM software.

The information on mandatory speed limits for individual sections of the road network was derived from the resources of the General Director for National Roads and Motorways – GDNRM (Generalna Dyrekcja Dróg Krajowych i Autostrad), Voivodeship Road Authorities – VRAs (Zarządy Dróg Wojewódzkich) and the databases provided by OpenStreetMap (OSM), which is a social project that allows people to use and edit data on the basis of the Creative Commons license (Haklay, 2010). The algorithm for utilising the data from the aforementioned sources was as follows. Firstly, in accordance with the GDNRM documentation, speed limits were attributed to individual road sections (motorways, expressways, national roads, and some regional roads). Next, the missing sections of the network of regional roads were assigned speed limits concordant with the VRAs' documentation. The remaining sections of the road network (district, local, access roads, and other) were attributed with speed limits, in accordance with the data within the OSM. It must be stated here, however, that the OSM database provides no information on the maximum permitted speed limits for every section of the road network. For those sections for which none of the sources above specified a speed limit, the values applied were those accordant with the Polish Traffic Law Act (1997 Journal of Laws No. 98, Item 602, as amended). It should also be added that while assigning speed limits to individual road sections, the regulation limiting the speed limit within built-up areas was observed.

The information on the scheduled expansion of the transport infrastructure in Poland was derived from the Regulation of the Council of Ministers of 19 May 2016 (Item 784), which changed the regulation on the network of motor and expressways, which is a currently binding normative act stipulating the targeted network of those roads.

As far as the research on motility is concerned, the analysis also encompassed the data on the deployment of all settlement units in Poland with the corresponding numbers of residents (in accordance with the data of the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Administration, the Central Statistical Office, and Town and Community Councils). For each settlement unit, which, according to the data provided by the aforementioned institutions, has at least one resident (73,651 units), a central point was generated and assigned with the number of residents within any given unit. Moreover, data on the deployment and number of economic entities was derived from the resources of the Local Data Bank – LDB (Bank Danych Lokalnych) within the Central Statistical Office. And since the LDB aggregates such data up to the level of a commune (gmina), for each commune in Poland

(with an additional division into rural areas and cities in rural, and urban communes) a central point was generated and assigned with a corresponding number of economic entities. Population as well as the number of business entities were not forecasted. Since it is not possible to determine the moment when road investments will be completed, it is not possible to make a forecast of those variables. All analyses were based on current data.

2.2. Methods dedicated to accessibility research

The measurement of travel time in personal transport is a complex task, since this parameter is determined by a number of factors, such as weather conditions, unexpected road incidents (e.g. collisions), and individual driving styles, and it also varies on a daily, weekly, and annual basis. The research variant of analysing the travel time of personal road transport presented in this article takes into account only one determinant that conditions vehicle speed, i.e. the speed limits imposed by the Traffic Law Act (1997 Journal of Laws No. 98, Item 602, as amended). Thus, the net travel time was stipulated, taking into consideration neither breaks caused by road conditions, nor time taken to rest or refuel. It was assumed that traffic flows at its maximum allowable speed and along the routes that guarantee the shortest possible travel time. Therefore, sections of toll motorways were also considered. While determining accessibility, the shortest route (timewise) was always searched, which did not always coincide with the shortest physical distance.

Transport accessibility can be researched by means of numerous methods. Some authors listed as many as over a dozen of these (Bruinsma and Rietveld, 1998; Spiekermann *et al.,* 2015; Neutens, 2015; van Wee, 2016). The majority of works on the issue, however, are dominated by a certain consensus regarding the most important approaches (Baradaran and Ramjerdi, 2001; Geurs and van Wee, 2004; Geurs and Ritsema van Eck, 2001; Spiekermann and Neubauer, 2002; Salas-Olmedo *et al.,* 2015; Rosik *et al.,* 2015; Żakowska and Puławska, 2015; Ford *et al.,* 2015; Wang *et al.,* 2015; van Wee, 2016; Rode *et al.,* 2017), which include, for instance: infrastructure-based accessibility, distance-based accessibility, cumulative accessibility, potential accessibility, and person-based accessibility (Geurs and van Wee, 2004). Considering the purpose of the study, which is presented in the article, the approaches based on time accessibility are particularly valuable.

In this study, two of these approaches were applied. The analysis based on the measurement of distance was introduced, where "distance" should be understood as a time distance (travel/transport time) between a journey's starting point and its destination or a set of destinations, and as their cumulative accessibility. This method is also known as isochronic accessibility, in which accessibility is measured through estimating a set of destinations available in a specified period of time.

In subject literature, accessibility measured by means of isochrones is sometimes alternatively described as daily accessibility (Śleszyński, 2004, 2007; Śleszyński and Komornicki, 2009). For that reason, in some reviews of methods, accessibility measured by the distance to a set of destinations is placed in the same class as accessibility measured by the means of isochrones. In studies on accessibility, the methods most often find common ground in the form of time accessibility, when time is selected as an element of the function of spatial resistance. The travel time between two points in the Cartesian geographic space is conditioned by a large number of factors that stem from the features of the space itself, the means of transport, and the user of the transport network. It is imperative here to apply numerous simplifications, the most important of which is people's desire to minimise the travel time between the starting point and the destination. It is, after all, one of the most fundamental principles of economic efficiency of social and economic systems. Broadly speaking, the representation of time-related issues on maps dates to the origins of astronomic cartography (Komornicki *et al.,* 2009).

Generally speaking, when accessibility is measured by means of isochrones, the maximum time and cost (budget for the journey) is assumed. Next, the number of destinations available within a specified period of time, or at a specified cost, is calculated (Spiekermann and Neubauer, 2002). Other examples of research on daily accessibility are: Törnquist (1970), Schürmann *et al.* (1997), Spiekermann and Wegener (1996), Vickerman *et al.* (1999), Fransen *et al.* (2015), Widener *et al.* (2015), and Boisjoly and Geneidy (2016).

2.3. Methods dedicated to mobility research

In order to determine potential mobility, methods that enabled an appropriate spatial aggregation of data had to be applied. To determine the number of residents within the specified travel times, it was assumed that all residents dwelled in the central point of any given settlement unit. For this purpose, a central point for each settlement unit was generated and related to the total number of residents of any given unit. Transport analyses based on the central points (representatives of individual communication regions) obviously entail certain problems. That is probably particularly evident in the case of time availability research. This approach does not consider the actual development of the area and the centre of the area understood in terms of function. Nevertheless, they are often used in research (e.g. Rosik and Kowalczyk, 2016) due to the pace of analysis and the ease of interpretation of the results. An alternative to this approach may be the designation of refactory points at the border of a given communication area. This allows one to avoid generalizations regarding the time of travel in a city, which usually suffers from congestion and other factors limiting the freedom of movement of vehicles. Of course, it is debatable how much a city's administrative boundary determines

the occurrence of such problems. In order to illustrate the deployment of economic entities (due to the statistical confidentiality provided by the Central Statistical Office with accuracy to the basic territorial unit – the commune), a centroid was generated for each of the 2,478 communes (with some additional central points for rural and urban areas within urban-rural communes) and information on economic activity in the areas was attributed to each such centroid. In the course of the research procedure, those central points were totalled in individual isochrones. Both in the case of demographic data and the data related to business entities, an assumption was made that their number and deployment will be invariable until the expansion of the road network characterised by the highest parameters reaches the state described in the said regulation.

2.4. Research procedure

The study began with a construction of two sets of network data based on linear layers that presented the distributions of roads in Poland. The first layer showed the current state of affairs, while the second the planned network of roads. During the creation of the sets of network data, the time required to travel through individual sections of the network (calculated earlier on the basis of segment length and the maximum allowable speed within the section – the use of maximum speeds is a simplification that we decided to use to accelerate the study and increase the ease of interpretation of the results) was taken as a default attribute. Next, on the basis of those sets of network data, work in the New Service Area within Network Analyst tool was commenced. In the central variant, Warsaw (its centroid) was nominated the starting point for constructing travel isochrones. The analysis was performed twice – on the current road network and on its planned variant. The New Service Area tool was also applied in the regional perspective, with centroids of voivodeship capitals as points into which isochrones were drawn. Then, within the areas limited by individual isolines of identical travel times for the existing road network and the planned scenario, settlement units and numbers of residents and economic entities were counted so that, in the following step, they could undergo a comparative analysis. For the purpose of interregional analyses, the New OD Cost Matrix tool was utilised, with centroids of voivodeship capitals (18 out of 18) as starting points and destinations. Next, travel times recorded in the existing and planned road networks were compared. By means of various colours of ribands between individual cities, bilateral time differences were presented, and a cake diagram map was used to illustrate the aggregated changes in travel time for the whole collection of the 18 voivodeship centres.

As far as the analyses of traffic flows and their changes accompanying the expansion of the transport network in Poland are concerned, the VISUM software was used (Rosik and Kowalczyk, 2015, Rosik *et al.,* 2016). As in the case of the

research on accessibility, that stage of the analysis also included a simulation of the network load for the central (Warsaw) and regional (voivodeship capitals) variant of the existing and planned infrastructure of the road network in Poland. For the purposes of that analysis, it was assumed that residents of individual settlement units in Poland (transport regions) travel to Warsaw or to voivodeship capitals within the borders of which they live. In order to determine the number of vehicles that will set out on the road, travelling from each of the transport regions, the level of motoring in Poland calculated at the district level was applied (at this level, the Central Statistical Office provides information on the number of vehicles per 1,000 residents). The applied research tool for the analyses of traffic flows also required data on the course of individual segments of the road network (linear layer), their capacities (vehicles per hour), structures (number of carriageways and lanes), lengths, maximum allowable speeds, and the speeds of free-flow traffic. The data on road capacity and the free-flow speed were derived from the literature on road traffic engineering (Brzeziński and Waltz, 1998; Gaca *et al.,* 2008). The two aforementioned variables were assigned to various combinations of structure and class of road network segment. That was how capacity was assigned to each segment of the road network in its existing and planned forms. In macro traffic models, it was assumed that a traffic flow is uniform and can be determined by three variables: intensity, density, and the average speed of traffic. In the case of uniform traffic, those parameters are linked by a relation called the equation of vehicle flow. One of the results of the application of the aforementioned assumption was the creation of the so-called Volume Delay Functions. Those functions take the form of relatively simple equations that enable the evaluation of average speeds on congested sections of roads by means of information on their capacity. In order to estimate the travel time of any given section for individual transport vehicles, the section delay functions are applied, which use such variables as: traffic density, road capacity, and free-flow speed. One of the simplest functions of this type is a function formulated by Overgaard, which is a combination of the functions offered by Soltman and Smock (Birr *et al.,* 2013):

$$\mathrm{T} = T_0 \cdot \alpha^{\left(\frac{N}{C_p}\right)^{\beta}} \tag{1}$$

where:

T – travel time in a segment,
T_0 – travel time in a segment at free-flow speed,
N – traffic density in a segment,
C_p – critical density (maximum capacity),
α, β – model parameters.

$$T = T_0 + \left(1 + \alpha \cdot \left(\frac{N}{C_p} \right)^{\beta} \right) + \gamma \cdot V \tag{2}$$

where:

T – travel time in a segment,
T_0 – travel time in a segment at free-flow speed,
N – traffic density in a segment,
C_p – critical density (maximum capacity),
V – maximum allowable speed in a segment,
α, β, γ – model parameters.

In the VISUM software, this model takes the following form:

$$t_{cur} = t_0 \cdot (1 + a \cdot sat^b) \tag{3}$$

where:

$$sat = \frac{Q}{c \cdot Q_{\max}} \tag{4}$$

Q – traffic density [veh/h]
t_{cur} – travel time in a segment loaded by traffic density Q
t_0 – travel time in a segment at free-flow traffic conditions
Q_{max} – capacity [veh/h]
a, b, c – parameters.

The parameters of the BPR function were taken from the research conducted by Rosik and Kowalczyk (2015, p. 187). From the same study, the space delay function was borrowed, which took the form of an exponential function with the following parameter β = 0.011552, which returns a 50% decrease in attractiveness of the trip destination after an hour, 75% after two hours, and 90% at nearly 3 hours and 20 minutes of driving. The motivations to take a journey, as applied by Rosik and Kowalczyk (2015), include business trips, visits paid to relatives and friends, and tourism. In two cases, the spatial distribution of vehicle traffic density for these reasons clearly corresponds to the distributions practised in this study – business trips correspond to the variant of travelling to Warsaw, and visits paid to friends and family correspond to trips taken to voivodeship capitals. In the case of the former, the applied model is suited at the level $R^2 = 0.41$, and the model assumptions for the latter correspond to the reality at the level $R^2 = 0.64$.

The research procedure presented above returned vehicle traffic density for individual segments of the road network in its existing state and its planned variant. Next, symbolisation was performed, in the form of continuous thematic symbol map, whose thickness corresponded to the vehicle traffic density in individual segments.

3. RESEARCH AREA

Poland's accession to the EU created new opportunities of funding infrastructural investments, including in transport. That led to the Big Push, which contributed to changes in the transport landscape in Poland thanks to the processes of rebuilding and developing the road network on a local, regional, and national scales (cf. Stępniak and Rosik, 2013; Rosik *et al.* 2015; Wiśniewski, 2016). And it was in the east of Poland that those investments had the greatest impact on the increase of potential accessibility (Komornicki *et al.,* 2013). During that time, the foundations of the express and motorway network were laid (Fig. 1). At present, the road system of Poland is based on routes that run latitudinally (motorways A2 and A4), longitudinally (motorway A1 and expressway S3), and across the country (from south-west to north-east, expressway S8). The aforementioned network is complemented by more fragmentary sections of expressways and a relatively dense system of national and regional roads. Some parts of the said roads are also fragments of European routes.

As a result of those transformations, there occurred a sudden improvement in transport accessibility of Polish regions and cities. A particularly important achievement of that time was an increase in transport accessibility related to personal transportation streaming to the capital city of Warsaw (Rosik *et al.*, 2015).



Fig. 1. Polish network of national roads, expressways and motorways in 2017 (left) and its target layout (right)

Source: own work on the basis of the Regulation of the Prime Minister altering the regulation on the network motorways and expressways.

The spatial distribution of accessibility to Warsaw is radial in its nature, which is typical for European capitals located inland. The shape of isochrones,

to a large extent, stems from the radial layout of roads leading to the capital city. The longest radii correspond with the stretch of the S8 expressway and the A2 motorway. Their "jagged" nature stems from the deployment of interchanges and exits within those roads as well as the stretches of roads that join the network of expressways and motorways (Fig. 2). The influence of the fragmentary sections of the S7 and S10 expressways is also noticeable; despite their lack of continuity, they still contribute to the growth of time accessibility. Another factor that influences the accessibility to Warsaw is the more distant A1 motorway, which – through the hub with the A2 motorway near Stryków and the exits that allow travellers to drive down a section and along other national and regional roads – noticeably impacts the range of the two-hour isochrone that reaches Toruń (cf. Stępniak and Rosik, 2013).

The accessibility of regional centres still demonstrates relatively large spatial disproportions (Fig. 5). In the west, the centre and the south of Poland, regional residents are offered conditions enabling fast travel to voivodeship capitals, which stems from the overlapping of two most crucial factors: the layout of the settlement network with, most frequently, a central capital of the voivodeship (which shortens the distance and, indirectly, also the travel time), and a better transport infrastructure when compared to the rest of the country (that enables faster trips to be made by private vehicles). The areas characterised by poorer accessibility to voivodeship centres are those territories that lack fast roads or have very few of them (e.g. city ring roads), and that impedes fast transport to the quickest reachable regional centres and/or puts at an disadvantage those settlements which are located at a significant distance from them (which most commonly is the effect of the spatial layout or hierarchy of the settlement network – in such regions characterised by a less concentric network such as the West Pomeranian Voivodeship).

A new period of the EU budget programming creates a chance for further spatial development of the network, which – to a large extent – will be based on its complementation, and thus, the ensuring of its continuity (Fig. 1). Broadly speaking, the planned system of express and motorways in Poland is expected to directly connect regional centres (cities – voivodeship capitals) with one another (for national connections) and with the European transport network (for trans-European connections). The final scope of the investment and the moment of its completion depends, of course, on many factors. They are both internal and external to the national transport policy. At the stage of implementation of a specific infrastructure investment, there are often problems with underestimating costs or inaccurate inventories at the planning stage. Key infrastructural investments are usually carried out in such long perspectives that it may even bring about changes in labour costs or building materials (we are currently dealing with that in Poland). In addition, there may be new key strategic investments that have an impact on the entire transport system of the country. In Poland, that

is the currently implemented project of the Central Communication Port. Transnational flows of people and loads can also change. Geopolitical changes may make one of the national investment plans more or less justified. Of course, the list of these factors is much more extensive, and one should be aware of them in the ex-post approach.

4. RESULTS

4.1. The central variant

As a result of the implementation of the planned system of expressways and motorways, the range of "fast-travel" isochrones to the capital city will be expanded mainly in the directions which so far have not been reinforced with the construction of expressways and motorways (Kielce, Lublin, Belarus, Kuyavia and Warmia), or whose technical conditions and fragmentariness (Częstochowa) restrict fast travel (Fig. 2).



Fig. 2. Travel times to Warsaw in 2017 (left) and in the case of achieving the target layout of expressways and motorways (right)

Source: own work.

The construction of the planned express and motorways will mostly contribute to the approximation of Warsaw (in terms of travel time) to the regions of Subcarpathia, Lesser Poland, the Suwałki Lake District, and the eastern part of the West Lake District (Fig. 3).



Fig. 3. Changes in travel time to Warsaw resulting from achieving the target layout of expressways and motorways in Poland

Source: own work.

An increase in the accessibility of Warsaw will result in the growth of potential mobility of people living around the capital city. In particular, this will affect residents of those settlements whose current travel times to Warsaw are between 90 and 120 minutes (Table 1). Such an enormous change stems from the fact that road investments will greatly facilitate transport options with some (demographically) important centres – Toruń, Olsztyn and Białystok, and from an increase of the area covered by this isochrone. The planned investments will substantially expand the range of hour-long travel to Warsaw (in spatial, demographic and settling terms). This results mainly from the fact that these have a supralocal nature, and thus, their construction does not always involve an increase in accessibility between closely located centres. From the perspective of individual settlements, the expansion of the network of expressways and motorways may contribute to a decrease in their residents' accessibility to Warsaw, due to a negative "corridor effect", understood as a spatial barrier for perpendicular interactions (Komornicki *et al.*, 2013b). This phenomenon is, however, marginal in nature.

Table 1. Settlement units, the size of the population and business entities within the isochrones of access to Warsaw in 2017 and in the case of accomplishment of the target layout of expressways and motorways in Poland

Current accessibility			
Travel time [min]	**Number of settlement units**	**Population**	**Number of business entities**
30	636	2,552,501	552,973
60	4,026	3,788,804	662,263
90	10,267	7,039,259	963,268
120	18,332	10,814,321	1,302,919
150	27,019	15,530,213	1,822,760
180	35,004	21,922,584	2,493,655
210	42,735	30,543,491	3,426,299
240	47,813	34,852,819	3,850,226
>240	52,704	37,627,090	4,182,815
Target accessibility			
30	642	2,553,728	552,192
60	4,321	3,888,041	668,692
90	11,624	8,053,309	1,007,297
120	20,986	12,429,223	1,451,772
150	31,469	20,012,878	2,240,714
180	39,923	28,177,551	3,159,401
210	45,661	33,461,703	3,680,781
240	49,875	36,090,947	3,955,878
>240	52,704	37,627,090	4,182,815
Change (100% = present road network)			
0–30	100.9	100.0	99.9
30–60	108.5	107.9	106.6
60–90	117.0	128.1	112.5
90–120	116.1	115.9	130.9
120–150	120.7	160.8	151.8
150–180	105.9	127.7	136.9
180–210	74.2	61.3	55.9
210–240	83.0	61.0	64.9
>240	57.8	55.4	68.2

Source: own work.

As can be seen from the research conducted by Rosik *et al.* (2016), Warsaw, fulfilling its social role, becomes a generator of business trips, in the context of the potential that both generates and absorbs traffic. Therefore, one of the effects of the planned expansion of the transport network may be a potential increase in mobility resulting from the rise in accessibility. It is anticipated that it will, to a great extent, contribute to the improvement of the effectiveness of economic relations between the enterprises that operate within the territory marked by the three-hour isochrone, where a noticeable growth in their number will be recorded (by 26.7%).

Further expansion of the network of motorways and expressways in Poland will contribute to changes of traffic-flow vectors towards Warsaw. Spatially, these vectors are modified in two major types of regions, the first being regions with an undeveloped infrastructure of motorways and expressways. Only upon the implementation of the planned layout of roads will they be incorporated into the national network of motorways and expressways. This implementation will enable traffic flows to be channelled through new routes and national and regional roads to be relieved (Subcarpathia, Świętokrzyskie Voivodeship, Central Pomerania, Masuria). The second type are those regions with a well-developed infrastructure of motorways and expressways, where no new investments are planned. In their case, changes in traffic flows stem from expansions to the transport network which are sometimes planned several tens of kilometres away (Opolian Silesia and the complementation of the network with the central section of the A1 motorway).

Quantitative changes within traffic vectors indicate a substantial growth of density on the existing roads that serve vehicle traffic reaching Warsaw from the west (A2) and the south-west (S8). Due to the densification of the transport network, traffic on national and regional roads will be depleted. That will also refer to some motorways and expressways, since alternative and substitutive routes are to be built.

4.2. The interregional variant

The expansion of the transport network, the aim of which is to connect regional centres by means of a network of motorways and expressways, will – to the greatest extent – contribute to the improvement of the connections between regions located at the opposite sides of Poland (Fig. 4). In consequence, the largest beneficiaries of the planned expansion will be the cities located centrifugally (Olsztyn, Białystok, Lublin, Rzeszów, Wrocław, Zielona Góra, and Szczecin). The cities in central Poland will not improve their position, due the fact that their specific locations usually predestine their relatively high accessibility, and whose potential increase is connected with the development of road infrastructure leading to eastern regions.



Fig. 4. Differentiation of bilateral and accumulated mutual time accessibility of regional centres in Poland in 2017 (left) and in the case of accomplishment of the target layout of expressways and motorways in Poland (right)

Source: own work.

4.3. The regional variant

In the intra-regional approach, the complementation of the network of motorways and expressways will contribute to the increase in accessibility of peripheral areas (Fig. 5), whose poor accessibility to-date has so far stemmed mainly from a poorly developed transport infrastructure. Despite the fact that poorly accessible regions, whose regional settlement networks do not take a concentric form, will be provided with the infrastructure of motor and expressways, their potential will still not be developed to a sufficient degree (i.e. below a 60-minute travel time to the nearest regional centre).

The areas which have already been characterised by decent accessibility will not undergo a substantial spatial transformation, with the exception of territories located in the vicinity of voivodeship capitals in eastern Poland, around which, proportionately, the largest number of new road investments has been scheduled. This is particularly visible in the north of Mazovia and in the south of the Warmian-Masurian Voivodeship. In this area, hourly isochrones of travel to the capitals of voivodships (Warsaw, Olsztyn, Białystok and Toruń) will overlap. This relatively arable area until now peripheral will become much more accessible.



Fig. 5. Travel times to regional centres in Poland in 2017 (left) and in the case of accomplishment of the target layout of expressways and motorways in Poland (right)

Source: own work.

The implementation of the stipulations listed in the Polish normative acts, despite the relatively vast spatial scope, will result in a limited increase in the numbers of residents who are within the reach of the one-hour isochrone of travel time to the nearest regional centre, i.e. by as little as 4.7% (Table 2) on a national scale. Such a low growth rate of motility stems chiefly from the nature of the settlement network (spatial growth of accessibility will mainly refer to poorly populated regions). An even lower growth rate (3.5%) is reported in terms of potential mobility resulting from the operations of business entities, which so far have not been located within an hour's travel time to the nearest (timewise) voivodeship capital.

Table 2. Settlement units, population, and business entities within the isochrones of travel to regional centres in 2017 and in the case of accomplishment of the target layout of expressways and motorways in Poland

Current accessibility			
Travel time [min]	**Number of settlement units**	**Population**	**Number of business entities**
30	7,566	15,750,797	2,167,479
45	19,805	23,725,430	2,871,403
60	38,864	32,201,230	3,601,914
>60	52,704	37,627,090	4,182,815

Table 2. (cont.)

Target accessibility			
30	7,898	15,958,024	2,181,097
45	21,347	24,482,588	2,923,316
60	43,531	33,714,111	3,727,025
>60	52,704	37,627,090	4,182,815
Change (100% = present road network)			
0–30	104.4	101.3	100.6
30–45	109.9	106.9	105.4
45–60	116.4	108.9	110.0
>60	66.3	72.1	78.5

Source: own work.

Traffic flows directed at the fastest accessible regional centres will not demonstrate changes and, except for the region of Central Pomerania, they basically refer only to changes resulting from the fact that part of the traffic will move from lower class roads to the newly constructed expressways and motorways, which are frequently designed to run in the vicinity of alternative existing roads that take traffic heading towards a central city from the whole region (Fig. 6).

The most important changes will occur as far as the change in cardinal directions of traffic flows in Central Pomerania is concerned, where – as a consequence of the planned modifications – there will be a change in the fastest accessible voivodeship capital, from Szczecin to Poznań, with its resulting modification of the direction of the main traffic flow, from latitudinal (along the projected S6) to longitudinal (the proposed S11).

5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS

The planned transport network, through increase in accessibility (the central variant), may offer induced mobility (a larger number of trips, including everyday commuting and business trips), provided that the growth of motility will manifest itself in the real-life phenomenon of mobility. This traffic will chiefly be taken by the network of expressways and motorways, which should relieve low-class roads. The opening of new (planned) sections of expressways and motorways will, to a minor extent, contribute to the fundamental changes in the directions of traffic flows, and the only transformations will apply to regions:

– with a developed infrastructure of fast vehicle transport whose functionality is limited due to a lack of cohesion in further stretches,
– without a developed network of expressways and motorways.



Fig. 6. Changes of network traffic flows to the most accessible regional centre in Poland as far as travel time is concerned

Source: own work.

The improvement of the accessibility of Warsaw and the increase in motility may result in numerous benefits for the Warsaw job market (by increasing the availability of labour force) due to the expansion of its spatial reach.

The increase in accessibility and its related mobility may result in the improvement of the conditions of running a business due to the optimisation of the processes related to transporting goods and making business trips.

Regionally, the expansion of the transport infrastructure will only slightly increase the direct (up to 45 minutes) transport accessibility of regional centres. Nevertheless, an increase of the spatial range of accessibility (of the influence radius) has been observed in terms of one-hour travel time to major regional cities. This increase does not entail substantial changes in potential mobility. No changes in the directions and the density of traffic flows towards voivodeship capitals (centres with the largest degrees of employment concentration and public benefit services, and strongest business connections) are anticipated, with the exception of Central Pomerania (an increase in the importance of Poznań at the expense of Szczecin).

As a consequence, the program of expansion of Polish expressways and motorways will be beneficial in the context of short-term spatial behaviours on a central and regional scale, including the transfer of transit traffic from lower category roads (often running through cities without bypasses) to high-speed roads with higher capacities. We expect that this infrastructure will trigger long-term spatial behaviours, including those related to the transformation of landscape management, which can bring social and economic benefits.

This article presented the research into the change of transport accessibility and potential mobility, based on the assumption that the existing land development and functionality remain unchanged. In reality, however, the expansion of transport infrastructure brings economic, social, demographic, and spatial changes, as was shown in studies related to such changes.

When it comes to the economy, these changes entail the economic growth of easily accessible regions, and thus, are related to the concentration of a larger number of business entities around transport corridors, including the development of logistics centres (Wiśniewski, 2015). Therefore, the economic dimension of the expansion of the Polish motorways and expressways ought to be greater than how it might appear based on the presented model-like approach.

At this point it must be mentioned that an increase in the accessibility to transport infrastructure does not lead, in itself, to a increase of territorial cohesion. As demonstrated by Gorzelak (2009), in low-cost countries (which in the EU include Poland) foreign capital places its investments in spots that offer better administrative conditions (i.e. which are better developed, i.e. big cities) and improved transport accessibility despite their relatively higher business costs when compared to peripheral areas. What is more, Rosik (2006) noticed that the development of a transport network in a country characterised by vast infrastructural delays (e.g. Poland) may be effective on a national scale, but it leads to further regional polarisation. Due to economies of scale, the implementation of an infrastructure with higher technical parameters often results in centralisation and poorer competitiveness of businesses from outside the region characterised by the highest level of accessibility (the core), since enterprises in smaller settlement units are incapable of competing with companies based in large centres, which have vaster local mar-

kets and greater access to workforce, services, infrastructure, etc. In a situation when two parts of the same region are integrated by new infrastructure, the core region demonstrates the so-called drainage tendency, i.e. it absorbs the economic potential of the whole region. Thus, from this point of view, the expansion of the network of roads characterised by the highest parameters in different regions of Poland ought to be considered as a positive phenomenon. The conducted research indicated that there will be a growth in the levels of accessibility and mobility, but it will be so spatially "fair" and non-revolutionary in its outcomes that it ought not to cause the drainage of the potential of areas characterised by lower levels of economic development. Instead, it will only fill the existing deficits in accessibility.

It is also quite common that the spatial dimension, followed by demographic and social ones, undergoes transformations that lead to suburbanisation and urban sprawl. Therefore, one ought to assume that the expansion of the range of a city's influence may facilitate these phenomena and, as a result, may also modify potential mobility, i.e. it may increase it.

The development of transport infrastructure (especially with the highest parameters) may have a varied impact on the socio-economic environment. Its impact can also have not only a positive character. As discussed, the drainage of resources from regions towards areas with better living conditions (e.g. higher salaries) will emerge. Such processes may consequently lead to the impoverishment of regions and the formation of internal peripheries. In addition, assuming that supply creates its own demand, the expansion of infrastructure can increase mobility by causing higher ecological loading. The accumulation of traffic on express roads and motorways with increased mobility can lead to lower resilience.

The increase in the potential of mobility may bring benefits for regional cities which can partially compensate the negative external effects of the demographic crisis recorded in Polish cities.

The expansion of the catchment area of regional cities may result in the enhancement of their competitiveness in certain sectors of the job market and high-order specialised services. A growth of the potential number of employees resulting from enhanced accessibility does not always translate into the accompanying development of the job market, since the proximity of the area to workplaces does not necessarily mean that its residents have access to those workplaces, as their qualifications may not correspond to the profiles of vacancies (Cervero *et al.*, 1995).

It is imperative to conduct further research that will take consider the travel model with the stipulated traffic-generating potentials and the distribution of traffic density within the network for individual destinations. As recommended by Rosik and Kowalczyk (2015), the next step ought to be the combination of a gravitational model and the model of potential, which – in the context of the currently implemented infrastructural investments stipulated in the regulation on the network of motorways and expressways – would provide information on the

impacts of the implementations of individual sections of the network upon changes in accessibility and mobility. A valuable extension of such an analytic research would also be the inclusion of vehicle flows in international traffic. The conducted study confirmed the thesis proposed by Rosik *et al.* (2016) that research related to the feedback between accessibility and mobility ought to focus on offering a methodology of a simultaneous analysis of research methods, attributes, constituents, dimensions, and conditions of accessibility in reference to the feedback between mobility and accessibility.

REFERENCES

BARADARAN, S. and RAMJERDI, F. (2001), 'Performance of accessibility measures in Europe', *Journal of transportation and statistics*, 4 (2/3), pp. 31–48.

BIOSCA, O., SPIEKERMANN, K. and STĘPNIAK, M. (2013), 'Transport accessibility at regional scale', *Europa XXI*, 24, pp. 5–17.

BIRR, K., JAMROZ, K. and KUSTRA, W. (2013), 'Analiza czynników wpływających na prędkość pojazdów transportu zbiorowego na przykładzie Gdańska'. *Prace Naukowe Politechniki Warszawskiej – Transport*, 96, pp. 19–29.

BLACK, J. and CONROY, M. (1977), 'Accessibility measures and the social evaluation of urban structure', *Environment and Planning A*, 9 (9), pp. 1013–1031.

BOCAREJO, S.J.P. and OVIEDO, H.D.R. (2012), 'Transport accessibility and social inequities: a tool for identification of mobility needs and evaluation of transport investments', *Journal of Transport Geography*, 24, pp. 142–154.

BOISJOLY, G. and EL-GENEIDY, A. (2016), 'Daily fluctuations in transit and job availability: a comparative assessment of time-sensitive accessibility measures', *Journal of transport geography*, 52, pp. 73–81.

BRUINSMA, F. and RIETVELD, P. (1998), 'The accessibility of European cities: theoretical framework and comparison of approaches', *Environment and Planning A*, 30 (3), pp. 499–521.

BRZEZIŃSKI, A. and WALTZ, A. (1998), *Budowa hierarchicznych modeli ruchu w sieciach drogowych*, Ph.D. thesis, Politechnika Warszawska.

CAUVIN, C. (2005), *A systemic approach to transport accessibility. A methodology developed in Strasbourg: 1982–2002*. Cybergeo: European Journal of Geography.

CERVERO, R., ROOD, T. and APPLEYARD, B. (1995), Job accessibility as a performance indicator: An analysis of trends and their social policy implications in the San Francisco Bay Area. University of California Transportation Center.

DALVI, M.Q. and MARTIN, K.M. (1976), 'The measurement of accessibility: some preliminary results', *Transportation*, 5 (1), pp. 17–42.

FORD, A.C., BARR, S.L., DAWSON, R.J. and JAMES, P. (2015), 'Transport accessibility analysis using GIS: Assessing sustainable transport in London', *ISPRS International Journal of Geo-Information*, 4 (1), pp. 124–149.

FRANSEN, K., NEUTENS, T., De MAEYER, P. and DERUYTER, G. (2015), 'A commuter-based two-step floating catchment area method for measuring spatial accessibility of daycare centers', *Health & place*, 32, pp. 65–73.

GACA, S., SUCHORZEWSKI, W. and TRACZ, M. (2008), *Inżynieria ruchu drogowego. Teoria i praktyka*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Komunikacji i Łączności.

GEURS, K.T. and RITSEMA VAN ECK, J.R. (2001), *Accessibility Measure: Review and Applications*. Bilthoven: RIVM. National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven.

GEURS, K.T. and VAN WEE, B. (2004), 'Accessibility evaluation of land-use and transport strategies: review and research directions', *Journal of Transport geography*, 12 (2), pp. 127–140.

GEURS, K.T., RITSEMA VAN ECK, J.R. (2001), *Accessibility Measures: Review and Applications*. RIVM report 408505 006, National Institute of Public Health and the Environment, Bilthoven.

GĘSIARZ, Z. (1982), *Zarys geografii transportu*. Warsaw: WSiP.

GORZELAK, G. (2009), 'Fakty i mity rozwoju regionalnego', *Studia Regionalne i Lokalne*, 2, pp. 5–27.

GOULD, P.R. (1969), *Spatial Diffusion*. Washington DC: Association of American Geographers.

GUTIÉRREZ, J., CONDEÇO-MELHORADO, A. and MARTÍN, J.C. (2010), 'Using accessibility indicators and GIS to assess spatial spillovers of transport infrastructure investment', *Journal of transport geography*, 18 (1), pp. 141–152.

HAKLAY, M. (2010), 'How good is volunteered geographical information? A comparative study of OpenStreetMap and Ordnance Survey datasets', *Environment and planning B: Planning and design*, 37 (4), pp. 682–703.

HANDY, S.L. and NIEMEIER, D.A. (1997), 'Measuring accessibility: an exploration of issues and alternatives', *Environment and planning A*, 29 (7), pp. 1175–1194.

HANNAM, K., SHELLER, M. and URRY, J. (2006), Editorial: Mobilities, immobilities and moorings. Mobilities, 1(1), Routledge, Milton Park, pp. 1–22.

HANSEN, W.G. (1959), 'How accessibility shapes land use', *Journal of the American Institute of planners*, 25 (2), pp. 73–76.

HANSON, S. and GIULIANO, G. (2004), *The geography of urban transportation*. New York: Guilford Press.

INGRAM, D.R. (1971), 'The concept of accessibility: a search for an operational form', *Regional studies*, 5 (2), pp. 101–107.

KAROU, S. and HULL, A. (2014), 'Accessibility modelling: predicting the impact of planned transport infrastructure on accessibility patterns in Edinburgh, UK', *Journal of Transport Geography*, 35, pp. 1–11.

KAUFMANN, V. (2002), *Re-Thinking mobility*, Aldershot: Ashgate.

KOMORNICKI, T. (2011), *Przemiany mobilności codziennej Polaków na tle rozwoju motoryzacji*. Warsaw: IGiPZ PAN.

KOMORNICKI, T. and ŚLESZYŃSKI, P. (eds.) (2009), *Studia nad lokalizacją regionalnych portów lotniczych na Mazowszu.* Warsaw: IGiPZ PAN.

KOMORNICKI, T., ROSIK, P., STĘPNIAK, M. and POMIANOWSKI, W. (2013a), 'Dostępność transportowa, czyli jak ocenić za pomocą modelu potencjału, które inwestycje są najważniejsze?' *Przegląd Komunikacyjny*, 12, pp. 18–22.

KOMORNICKI, T., ROSIK, P., ŚLESZYŃSKI, P., SOLON, J., WIŚNIEWSKI, R., STĘPNIAK, M., CZAPIEWSKI, K. and GOLISZEK, S. (2013b), *Impact of the construction of motorways and expressways on socio-economic and territorial development of Poland*. Warsaw: Ministry of Regional Development.

KOMORNICKI, T., ŚLESZYNSKI, P., ROSIK, P., POMIANOWSKI, W., STĘPNIAK, M. and SILKA, P. (2009), 'Dostępność przestrzenna jako przesłanka kształtowania polskiej polityki transportowej', *Biuletyn PAN. Komitet Przestrzennego Zagospodarowania Kraju*, 241, pp. 1–163.

KOZINA, J. (2010), 'Transport accessibility to regional centres in Slovenia', *Acta geographica Slovenica*, 50 (2), pp. 231–251.

MAKKONEN, T., SALONEN, M. and KAJANDER, S. (2013), 'Island accessibility challenges: Rural transport in the Finnish archipelago', *European Journal of Transport and Infrastructure Research*, 13 (4), pp. 274–290.

MARTELLATO, D., NIJKAMP, P. and REGGIANI, A. (1998), 'Measurement and measures of network accessibility: economic perspectives', *Transport networks in Europe: Concepts, analysis and policies*, pp. 161–180.

MÓDENES CABRERIZO, J.A. and CABRÉ, A. (1998), *Flujos espaciales e itinerarios biográficos: la movilidad residencial en el* área *de Barcelona*. Barcelona: Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona.

NEUTENS, T. (2015), 'Accessibility, equity and health care: review and research directions for transport geographers', *Journal of Transport Geography*, 43, pp. 14–27.

RODE, P., FLOATER, G., THOMOPOULOS, N., DOCHERTY, J., SCHWINGER, P., MAHENDRA, A. and FANG, W. (2017), *Accessibility in cities: transport and urban form. In Disrupting Mobility*. Springer International Publishing.

ROSIK, P. (2006), 'Efekty redystrybucyjne zmian regionalnej dostępności transportowej', *Studia Regionalne i Lokalne*, 1, pp. 65–82.

ROSIK, P. (2012), *Dostępność lądowa przestrzeni Polski w wymiarze europejskim.* Warsaw: IGiPZ PAN.

ROSIK, P. and KOMORNICKI, T. (2013), *Wpływ budowy autostrad i dróg ekspresowych na rozwój społeczno-gospodarczy i terytorialny Polski*, Ministerstwo Rozwoju Regionalnego, Warsaw.

ROSIK, P. and KOWALCZYK, K. (2015), *Rozwój infrastruktury drogowej i kolejowej a przesunięcie modalne w Polsce w latach 2000 –2010.* Warsaw: IGiPZ PAN.

ROSIK, P. and OPAŁKA, E. (2011), 'Szacowanie efektów projektów drogowych. Przykłady zastosowania modelu ustalania i prognozowania efektów z wykorzystaniem wskaźnika dostępności transportowej', *Ocena wpływu i prognozowanie efektów w badaniach ewaluacyjnych,* 8, pp. 93–117.

ROSIK, P., KOMORNICKI, T. and GOLISZEK, S. (2016), 'Modelowanie dostępności i mobilności w kontekście zróżnicowań regionalnych liczby ludności, PKB i spółek prawa handlowego', *Prace Komisji Geografii Przemysłu Polskiego Towarzystwa Geograficznego*, 30 (4), pp. 21–34.

ROSIK, P., KOMORNICKI, T., STĘPNIAK, M. and POMIANOWSKI, W. (2013), 'Dostępność transportowa, czyli jak ocenić za pomocą modelu potencjału, które inwestycje są najważniejsze?' *Przegląd Komunikacyjny*, 12, pp. 18–22.

ROSIK, P., STĘPNIAK, M. and KOMORNICKI, T. (2015), 'The decade of the big push to roads in Poland: Impact on improvement in accessibility and territorial cohesion from a policy perspective', *Transport policy*, 37, pp. 134–146.

SALAS-OLMEDO, M.H., GARCÍA, P. and GUTIÉRREZ, J. (2015), 'Accessibility and transport infrastructure improvement assessment: The role of borders and multilateral resistance', *Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice*, 82, pp. 110–129.

SCHÜRMANN, C., SPIEKERMANN, K. and WEGENER, M. (1997), 'Accessibility indicators' *Berichte aus dem Institut für Raumplanung*, 39, pp. 1–102.

SPIEKERMANN, K. and NEUBAUER, J. (2002), 'European accessibility and peripherality: Concepts, models and indicators', *Nordregio Working Paper*, p. 9.

SPIEKERMANN, K. and WEGENER, M. (1996), 'Trans-European networks and unequal accessibility in Europe', *European journal of regional development*, 4 (96), pp. 35–42.

SPIEKERMANN, K., WEGENER, M., KVETON, V., MARADA, M., SCHÜRMANN, C., BIOSCA, O., SEGUI, A.U., ANTIKAINEN, H., KOTAVAARA, O., RUSANEN, J., BIELAŃSKA, D., FIORELLO, D., KOMORNICKI, T., ROSIK, P. and STĘPNIAK, M. (2015), *Transport accessibility at regional/local scale and patterns in Europe. TRACC executive summary and final report.* Luxembourg: ESPON.

STEPNIAK, M. and ROSIK, P. (2013), 'Accessibility improvement, territorial cohesion and spillovers: a multidimensional evaluation of two motorway sections in Poland', *Journal of Transport Geography*, 31, pp. 154–163.

ŚLESZYŃSKI, P. (2004), 'Demograficzne i ekonomiczne aspekty lokalizacji planowanego portu lotniczego w okolicach Warszawy', *Przegląd Komunikacyjny*, 43, pp. 13–19.
ŚLESZYŃSKI, P. (2007), 'Możliwości rozwoju regionalnych portów lotniczych w Polsce w świetle uwarunkowań popytowych', *Prace Komisji Geografii Komunikacji PTG*, 13, pp. 153–174.
ŚLESZYŃSKI, P. and KOMORNICKI, T. (2009), 'Wpływ rozwoju sieci drogowej na obszary rynkowe istniejących i planowanych portów lotniczych (2008–2015)', *Drogi: lądowe, powietrzne, wodne*, 9 (17), pp. 90–99.
TAYLOR, Z. (1999), *Przestrzenna dostępność miejsc zatrudnienia, kształcenia i usług a codzienna ruchliwość ludności wiejskie*. Warsaw: IGiPZ PAN.
TÖRNQVIST, G. (1970), 'Contact systems and regional development', *Lund Studies in Geography* B 35.
VAN WEE, B. (2016), 'Accessible accessibility research challenges', *Journal of transport geography*, 51, pp. 9–16.
VICKERMAN, R.W. (1974), 'Accessibility, attraction, and potential: a review of some concepts and their use in determining mobility', *Environment and Planning A*, 6 (6), pp. 675–691.
VICKERMAN, R., SPIEKERMANN, K. and WEGENER, M. (1999), 'Accessibility and economic development in Europe', *Regional studies*, 33 (1), pp. 1–15.
VIGAR, G. (2013), *The politics of mobility: Transport planning, the environment and public policy.* Routledge.
WANG, Y., MONZON, A. and DI CIOMMO, F. (2015), 'Assessing the accessibility impact of transport policy by a land-use and transport interaction model–The case of Madrid', *Computers, Environment and Urban Systems*, 49, pp. 126–135.
WIDENER, M.J., FARBER, S., NEUTENS, T. and HORNER, M. (2015), 'Spatiotemporal accessibility to supermarkets using public transit: an interaction potential approach in Cincinnati, Ohio', *Journal of Transport Geography*, 42, pp. 72–83.
WIŚNIEWSKI, S. (2015), 'Significance of trans-European transport networks for logistics centre localization as exemplified by the Łódź region', *European Spatial Research and Policy*, 22 (1), pp. 23–44.
WIŚNIEWSKI, S. (2016), 'Zmiana dostępności wewnątrzregionalnej województwa łódzkiego wskutek otwarcia wschodniej i zachodniej obwodnicy Łodzi', *Studia Regionalne i Lokalne*, 66, pp. 79–96.
WOLAŃSKI, M. (2010), *Rozwój infrastruktury transportowej w latach 2007–2010 w kontekście dotychczasowej realizacji Strategii Rozwoju Kraju 2007–2015 oraz kluczowych strategii sektorowych*, Ministry of Regional Development.
ŻAKOWSKA, L. and PUŁAWSKA, S. (2015), 'Transport accessibility – concepts and measures', [in:] GACA, S. (ed.). *Recent advances in civil engineering: road and transportation engineering*. Krakow: Politechnika Krakowska, pp. 189–209.

sciendo

C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.09

Elżbieta ANTCZAK*

MUNICIPAL WASTE IN POLAND: ANALYSIS OF THE SPATIAL DIMENSIONS OF DETERMINANTS USING GEOGRAPHICALLY WEIGHTED REGRESSION

Abstract. This article provides a quantification of the territorially varied relation between socio-economic factors and the amount of municipal waste in Polish districts. For this purpose, eight causes were identified: revenue budgets, the number and area of uncontrolled dumping sites, population density, the share of working-age population, average gross monthly wages, registrations for permanent residence, and the number of tourists accommodated. The preliminary data analysis indicated that to understand waste generation in Poland at the local level it is necessary to consider regional specificity and spatial interactions. To increase the explained variability of phenomena, and emphasise local differences in the amount of waste, geographically weighted regression was applied.

Key words: municipal waste, Polish districts, regional heterogeneity and spatial interactions, socio-economic factors, geographically weighted regression.

1. INTRODUCTION

The identification of the key factors affecting the amount of municipal waste[1], waste prevention, and eco-innovation is becoming one of the most significant challenges for contemporary science dedicated to the paradigm of smart, sustainable, inclusive growth, and to the decoupling theory in the context of waste management. The decoupling theory proposes that fewer resources be used and less waste per unit of economic activity be generated, and suggests the possi-

* Elżbieta ANTCZAK, University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, Department of Spatial Econometrics, ul. POW 3/5, 90-255 Łódź, Poland; e-mail: elzbieta.antczak@uni.lodz.pl

[1] Municipal waste includes waste generated by households (excluding end-of-life vehicles and hazardous waste) and waste from other generators that, due to its nature or composition, is similar to household waste (European Commission, 2008).

bility of de-linking economic growth from resource use through resource efficiency; that is, 'doing more with less' (European Commission, 2008; Jaligot and Chenal, 2018; United Nations Environment Programme, 2011). Municipal waste management (MWM)[2] is one of the most urgent environmental issues which Poland faces. According to the 2022 National Waste Management Plan, Poland lacks a waste monitoring system, including a comprehensive waste database, and a sufficient number of installations for the recovery and disposal of waste other than landfills (landfills remain the most common MWM method used in the country) (Council of Ministers, 2016). Moreover, rapid adaptive amendments to EU regulations have resulted in an applicable 'litter law' unaccompanied by a tight, coherent, rational and effective management model in Poland. MWM, including installations for waste collection and treatment, is very fragmented, since the tasks associated with it are the responsibility of local districts and communes (municipalities). This change, introduced in 2013, made municipalities the owners of municipal solid waste generated in their jurisdiction, and held them responsible for waste collection and treatment. Several private companies collect residential and commercial waste, often in parallel within the same commune, and dispose of it at several facilities (Koszewska, 2016; the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, 2015). Waste quantities are defined by weighing delivery vehicles at landfills, and sorting or composting facilities. Such a system generates uncertainty about the accuracy of the waste data collected (as noted by den Boer *et al*., 2010), as well as notable problems with identifying the factors underlying waste generation and the range of their regional impact on waste.

As a result, studies intended to identify the factors determining the amount of municipal waste in Poland have been rather scarce and mainly theoretical. An example of an empirical analysis was Tałałaj's (2011) study, which assessed the influence of selected factors on changes in waste generation across the districts of the Podlaskie Voivodeship. Another study employed a multi-criteria analysis, which could be helpful in planning waste management procedures in European cities or regions with a variety of waste disposal methods (Generowicz *et al*., 2011). Cheba's (2014) study forecast changes in municipal waste generation in Polish cities by considering the impact of various factors. Kukuła (2016) applied a multidimensional comparative analysis to describe the diverse conditions impacting the municipal waste economy in Poland. Klojzy-Karczmarczyk and Makoudi (2017) analysed the waste generation rates in urban and rural areas, estimating the causes of the differences in the municipal waste generation rate between Poland and other European countries.

[2] Municipal waste management involves waste generation, collection, treatment, transport, disposal and trade processes (European Commission, 2008).

However, the majority of the contemporary literature regarding MWM neglects the possible impact of spatial processes (spatial autocorrelation,[3] spatial non-stationarity[4] and spatial heterogeneity[5]) on the quantity and quality of collected waste, see Bach *et al*., (2004), Hockett *et al*. (1995), Hage and Söderholm (2008), Khan *et al.* (2016), Schultz *et al.* (1995), and Sterner and Bartelings (1999). Nevertheless, the influence of particular characteristics may vary according to geographical location at the national, regional or local levels. The analyses dealing with spatial variation in municipal waste data have been rather limited to date, vide Antczak (2014), Hung *et al*. (2007), Ioannou *et al*. (2010), Ismaila *et al*. (2015), Keser *et al.* (2010), Keser (2012), Rybova *et al.* (2018), and Rybova (2019). In general, the results obtained in these studies indicated that the quantity of waste is positively correlated with population projections, population density, national economy entities, the size of a district, urban population, the number of people in working age, tourist numbers, and the number of people working in construction and industry. However, household size, gender ratio, migration, average household size, employment in agriculture, infant mortality rate and the revenue and expenditures of local budgets have not been found to be positively correlated with the quantity of waste; that is, they have a negative, or no, influence on the quantity of municipal waste.

This paper contributes to the existing literature by identifying the regionally divergent relation between selected socio-economic determinants and the amount of municipal waste in Poland. Local-level data for 379 districts from 2008–2016 was used. That analysis was extended further by examining the spatial aspects of the relation. It was found that the amount of municipal waste in Polish districts was spatially dependent (the volume of garbage in one district was correlated with the quantity of waste in another district). That ascertainment indicated that geographical differences could be considered when investigating empirical relations between selected factors and waste generation. In other words, the evidence of the spatial non-stationarity and spatial autocorrelation of waste at the aggregate level warrants the application of a geographically weighted regression (GWR) for

[3] Spatial autocorrelation measures the correlation of a variable with itself through space; that is, it indicates the degree to which a set of spatial features and their associated data values tend to be clustered together (positive spatial autocorrelation) or dispersed (negative spatial autocorrelation) in space (Anselin, 2010).

[4] Spatial non-stationarity is a condition associated with spatial variability in which varying economic conditions, natural resource endowments and other geographical-area measures can lead to a situation in which the relationships between dependent and independent variables are not constant over a space, varying along the spatial context (Brunsdon *et al*., 1996).

[5] The uneven distribution of a trait, event or relationship across a region (Brunsdon *et al*., 1996). Spatial heterogeneity can also be modelled through spatial panel data models (Ertur and Le Gallo, 2008). However, panel data analysis utilising geography focuses primarily on treating geography as an 'agent' for dependence among cross-sectional observations, whereas spatial heterogeneity is very much determined by distance (Fotheringham *et al*., 2002; Lu *et al.*, 2018).

the dataset. GWR can evaluate the spatial processes of waste production, as per to its determinants. This territorial disaggregation shows how the causes of waste generation differ (are not spatially stable) across districts and identifies the determinants of the growth in waste quantity. This approach represents a new way of analysing municipal waste production in Poland; that is, such an analysis has not been performed previously.

2. MUNICIPAL WASTE IN POLAND. PRELIMINARY DATA ANALYSIS

2.1. Regional disparities and spatial heterogeneity in the quantity of waste

Poland is divided into three regional classification levels (NUTS, Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics) and two levels of local administrative units (LAU-1 and LAU-2). As of 1 January 2016, there are six regions (NUTS-1), containing 16 provinces (NUTS-2), also known as voivodeships, and 72 subregions (NUTS-3), containing 379 districts (NUTS-4, LAU-1) and 2478 communes (NUTS-5, LAU-2). The average area of a LAU-1 district is 825 sq. km, which approximates to 0.3% of the total area of Poland. At the district level, residents generated an average of 209 kg of municipal waste per capita in 2008. In 2016, more than half of the districts (53%) were characterised by a municipal waste quantity higher than the country's average of 208 kg per capita (Fig. 1). In the European Union as a whole (EU-28), the amount of municipal waste generated per person amounted to 500 kg on average in the years 2008–2016. With an average of below 310 kg per person, Poland has the lowest amount of municipal waste generated in that time span. However, the quantities of collected waste are actually greater than statistically reported, with the missing tonnage usually being dumped illegally in forests. The main factors behind such behaviour are low ecological awareness and low effectiveness of the waste management system. These hypotheses have been confirmed by studies conducted by the Ministry of the Environment (2017).

In 2016, noticeably more waste was generated by the residents of cities (characterised by a higher development level), and inhabitants of north-western Poland (a wealthier area of Poland, especially attractive to tourists), north-eastern Poland and the Silesian Voivodeship (an area in the south of Poland characterised by high population density and strong urban and industrial centres). In general, changes in the quantity of collected municipal waste showed a downward spatial trend towards the east of Poland and an increasingly notable upward trend in the north-western direction, from 2008 to 2016 (Fig. 1, Table 1).



Fig. 1. Standard deviations in the quantity of municipal waste (kg per capita) in the years 2008 and 2016, $n = 379$

Source: own work based on Statistics Poland data.

Table 1. Correlation between municipal waste and geographical direction (coordinates)

	Coor.	**2008**	**2009**	**2010**	**2011**	**2012**	**2013**	**2014**	**2015**	**2016**
Correlation coefficients: waste amount and geographical coordinates										
NUTS-2	X	-0.73***	-0.81***	-0.77***	-0.82***	-0.83***	-0.81***	-0.77***	-0.78***	-0.77***
	Y	0.42	0.34	0.31	0.37	0.36	0.42	0.43*	0.52**	0.48**
NUTS-3	X	-0.48***	-0.56***	-0.53***	-0.57***	-0.59***	-0.60***	-0.60***	-0.61***	-0.61***
	Y	0.19	0.15	0.12	0.17	0.16	0.22**	0.24**	0.30***	0.29***
NUTS-4	X	-0.36***	-0.40***	-0.39***	-0.40***	-0.43***	-0.49***	-0.49***	-0.51***	-0.49***
	Y	0.09	0.11	0.13*	0.12**	0.11**	0.17***	0.20***	0.24***	0.24***
NUTS-5	X	-0.39***	-0.39***	-0.32***	-0.36***	-0.42***	-0.45***	-0.32***	-0.31**	-0.25**
	Y	0.11	0.19	0.18	0.33**	0.29**	0.23*	0.10	0.25**	0.26**

Source: own work.

From a regional perspective, the level of LAU-1 is characterised by large distortions in the amounts of waste generated per capita and provides the most significant territorial variation in the quantity of waste (Fig. 2).



Fig. 2. Regional heterogeneity in municipal waste at different administrative levels (coefficients of variation)

Source: own work based on Statistics Poland data.

2.2. Spatial interactions in the volume of municipal waste

In the 2008–2016 period, an average of 61% of the collected waste in Poland was disposed of at landfills (compared to 35% in EU-28), with a low level of thermal processing and energy recovery (4.8% in Poland compared to 23.2% in EU-28), or export to places technologically prepared to recycle it (the rate of materially-recycled municipal waste was 12.8% in Poland compared to 25.3% in EU-28). In fact, in 2016, only seven municipal waste-to-energy incineration plants operated in the country, while there were over 450 such facilities in Europe at that time. In 2014, only 300 entities were generally involved in municipal waste management in Poland. Those included associations and companies handling the collection and transport of municipal waste, and networks running or building waste processing facilities that were able to process only 33% of the total collected municipal waste (Kołsut, 2016). In such a situation, the trans-boundary shipment of waste has been, and remains, popular in Poland; that is, its export, import or transit over short or long distances (Cyranka *et al.*, 2016). This movement of waste can result in spatial interactions – the volume of garbage in one unit may be correlated with the waste quantity in another unit. However, the ranges of operation of facilities can exceed commune boundaries, and this fact, coupled with the number of waste treatment installations available (necessary for the collection of accurate waste statistics), gave rise to the need to aggregate the data at a higher level. Hence, the district level was utilised.

To examine the extent of the spatial interactions in the quantity of municipal waste at the LAU-1 level, the global Moran's I statistic[6] was applied (Table 2). To explore the intensity of spatial interactions, several fixed-distance spatial weights matrices (**W**) were used (Table 2). Each **W** was a quantification of the spatial relationships that existed among features in a dataset or was at least a quantification of the way one conceptualised those relationships (Getis and Aldstadt, 2004). Each fixed-distance matrix represented a distance cut-off as a step function, with a value of 1 for neighbours with $d_{ij<\delta}$, and a value of 0 for the rest, where d_{ij} is the distance between observations *i* and *j*, and δ is the bandwidth. In that case, **W** was defined as a row-standardised binary matrix ($n \times n$), with non-zero diagonal elements, in which each element in the -th row was divided by the row's sum. The elements of the row-standardised matrix took values between 0 and 1, and the sum of the row values was always 1.

In all years of the analysed period, and for all distances, the quantity of waste was characterised by positive spatial autocorrelation; in spatial terms, this finding meant the clustering of units with similar amounts of the variable. The significant spatial dependencies increased over time and decreased with distance (Table 2). However, the distance extended to 150 km, which confirmed the findings of Kołsut's study regarding the distances between the bodies involved in processing and collecting waste in Poland (Kolsut, 2016). A remarkable increase in the distances for waste transportation to disposal facilities was also observed (Pasiecznik *et al*., 2017; Zemanek *et al.*, 2011).

Table 2. Spatial autocorrelation of municipal waste measured by Moran's I statistic, using distance **W** matrices for the time span 2008–2016

	Fixed distance (bandwidth) in kilometres					
Ws	30	60	90	120	150	190
2008	0.33***	0.19***	0.12***	0.07**	0.02*	0.01
2009	0.37***	0.23***	0.13***	0.08**	0.02*	0.01
2010	0.37***	0.21***	0.13***	0.08**	0.02*	0.008
2011	0.35***	0.21***	0.14***	0.08***	0.03*	0.02
2012	0.39***	0.26***	0.18***	0.10**	0.04*	0.02
2013	0.46***	0.35***	0.25***	0.18**	0.05*	0.02
2014	0.49***	0.36***	0.26***	0.20***	0.07*	0.006
2015	0.48***	0.33***	0.25***	0.21***	0.11**	0.03*
2016	0.45***	0.30***	0.23***	0.19***	0.10**	0.02*

Note: significance level $\alpha = 0.10^{*}, 0.05^{**}, 0.01^{***}$.
Source: own work.

[6] Moran's I is a commonly used measure for testing the presence of global spatial relationships (Moran, 1950).

2.3. Potential causes of waste generation in Poland

Many variables can be possible determinants of waste generation in Polish districts. Taking into account the availability and comparability of data and those variables defined in literature, this paper suggests the following eight factors: district revenues in Polish zloty per capita (*R*); uncontrolled dumping sites per 100 sq. km (*UDS*); total area of uncontrolled dumping sites per 100 sq. km (*AUDS*); population density (*PD*); share of the population at working age as a percentage of the total population (*PWA*); average gross monthly wages and salaries in PLN (*GW*); registrations for permanent residence per 10,000 people (*PRP*); and tourists accommodated per 1,000 capita (*T*). The data was collected from the Local Data Bank of Statistics Poland. Table 3 displays the summary statistics for these variables.

Table 3. Summary statistics (mean values, 2008–2016) of the potential determinants of waste generation

	PWA	GW	UDS	AUDS	R	RPR	T	PD
Mean	63.6	3,162.8	1.9	213.8	3,294.1	768.6	1,731.2	378.4
Max	71.0	7,170.2	453.4	6,458.0	8,505.6	21,886.0	55,553.0	4,084.1
Min	57.8	1,992.5	0.0	0	2,000.1	63.0	0.0	0.0
Standard deviation	1.6	558.7	13.0	1,847	834.5	1,328.3	4,621.9	674.9
Coefficient of variation in %	2.5	17.7	680.5	864	25.3	172.8	267.0	178.4
Skewness	0.1	1.6	23.9	23	1.7	8.8	5.9	2.4
Range	13.2	5,177.7	453.4	64,580	6,505.5	21,823.0	55,553.0	4,084.1
Kurtosis	3.1	9.0	648	1,287	7.6	113.4	45.1	8.4

Note: $n = 379$, $t = 9$, $N = 3411$.
Source: own work.

Most of the variables had large relative variability. All variable distributions were right-skewed. The values of all the potential determinants were visibly focused around their means, demonstrating leptokurtic distributions. These shortcomings indicated a strong temporal variability in the data, resulting in two research questions: firstly, whether lag times in changes in the variables impact waste quantity; and secondly, whether spatial interactions can account for the differences in municipal waste at the LAU-1 level? Based on ANOVA, a significant correlated lag time between changes in the socio-economic factors impacting waste volume was confirmed, and significant differences in correlation strength

were identified.[7] To capture all temporal influences, the dependent variable used in this study was the per-capita municipal waste generation in 2016. The explanatory variables were population density in 2014, share of the population at working age in 2014, average wages and salaries in 2016, number of uncontrolled dumping sites in 2010 and the area of uncontrolled dumping sites in 2010, district revenues in PLN per capita in 2016, the number of registrations for permanent residence per 10,000 people in 2016, and the number of tourists accommodated per 1000 of the population in 2016.

3. METHODOLOGY

The conventional approach to the empirical analysis of spatial data is to build a global model that assumes homogeneous (stationary) cross-spatial relationships between dependent and independent variables. Doing so means that the same stimulus provokes the same response in all parts of the studied region. The regression equation can be expressed as:

$$y_i = \beta_0 + \sum \beta_k x_{ik} + \varepsilon_i \tag{1}$$

Where y_i is the dependent variable at location i, x_{ik} is the k-th independent variable at location i, β_{i0} is the intercept for location i, β_{ik} is the local regression coefficient for the k-th independent variable at location I and ε_i is the random error at location i.

However, in practice, the relationships between variables might be non-stationary and may vary geographically (Matthews and Yang, 2016). GWR is a non-stationary technique that models spatially varying relationships (over space). Compared to the basic (global) regression (Eq. 1), the coefficients in GWR are functions of spatial location. Thus, the coefficient β_k takes different values for each location. This method generates a separate regression equation for each location. Fotheringham *et al.* (1998, 2002) presented the general form of a basic GWR model as:

$$y_i = \beta_0(u_i, v_i) + \sum \beta_k(u_i, v_i) x_{ik} + \varepsilon_i \tag{2}$$

where (u_i, v_i) are the location coordinates.

The model parameter estimation is achieved by using the weighted least square method and assigning different weights to each unit. The parameter estimation obtained for each location is:

[7] Available via e-mail.

$$\hat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}} = (\mathbf{X}^{\mathrm{T}}\mathbf{W}(u_i, v_i)\mathbf{X})^{-1}\mathbf{X}^{\mathrm{T}}\mathbf{W}(u_i, v_i)\mathbf{Y} \tag{3}$$

where $\hat{\boldsymbol{\gamma}}$ is the vector of elements k, $\mathbf{X}^{\mathrm{T}}\mathbf{W}(u_i,v_i)\mathbf{X}$ is the geographically weighted variance-covariance matrix, $\mathbf{W}(u_i,v_i)$ is the diagonal matrix ($n \times n$) of spatial weights with non-zero diagonal elements, and w_{ij} is the geographical weight, referring to the surroundings of location i defined by coordinates (u_i,v_i). Most commonly, the coordinates (u_i,v_i) indicate location i's geographical centre and the location of each point where an observation was made, so that $\mathbf{W}(u_i,v_i)$ = diag elements $(w_{i1}, w_{i2}, ..., w_{in})$.

Here, the weighting scheme $\mathbf{W}$ is calculated with a kernel function based on the proximities between regression point i and the N data points around it. Several options are possible for the estimation of the bandwidth in GWR models. For this study, used to explore local relations, the fixed Gaussian kernel weighting function was employed because it best fits the model (Charlton and Fotheringham, 2009; Fotheringham *et al*., 2000):

$$w_{i,j} = \exp\left[-\frac{1}{2}\left(\frac{d_{ij}}{b}\right)^2\right] \tag{4}$$

where d_{ij} is the Euclidean distance between locations i and j in geographical space and b is the bandwidth; that is, the radius of the circle containing points which are considered as still having influence on the formation of model parameters. An optimum bandwidth can be found by minimising a model goodness-of-fit diagnostic (Loader, 1999), such as the cross-validation (CV) score (Bowman, 1984; Cleveland, 1979; Fingleton, 1999), which accounts for model prediction accuracy only, or the Akaike information criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1973), which accounts for model parsimony (i.e. a trade-off between prediction accuracy and complexity). Thus, for a GWR model with a bandwidth b, its CV of bandwidth can be found by minimising the following expression (Cleveland, 1979):

$$CV = \sum_{i=1}^{n}\sum_{j=1}^{n}\left[y_i - \hat{y}_{j\neq i}(b)\right]^2 \tag{5}$$

where $\hat{y}_{j\neq i}$ is the theoretical (estimated) value of the observation y_i.

As with any GWR study, it is important to estimate the parameters of the global non-spatial regression (Eq. 1), so that this benchmark model can be compared to its GWR counterpart. However, as there is no single agreed upon functional form in modelling, several statistical tests were conducted, using a pseudo-stepwise procedure, to explore the data with a limited number of ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analyses (Fotheringham *et al*., 2002). To test for multicollin-

earity, the variance inflation factor measure was used (Gollini *et al*., 2015). To test the spatial dependency on the residuals, Moran's I measure and the Lagrange multiplier tests for both dependence error and missing spatially lagged dependent variable were used (Leung *et al*., 2000). To identify the spatial non-stationarity, Koenker's statistic (Koenker's studentised Bruesch-Pagan test) was applied (Andy, 2005).

The dynamic development of GWR has enabled the method to be used in many scientific disciplines, including waste studies (e.g. in Turkey – Keser, 2012; Keser *et al*., 2010; in Nigeria – Ismaila *et al*., 2015; and in the Czech Republic – Rybova, 2019; Rybova *et al*., 2018). Nonetheless, studies using GWR for analysing the impact of socio-economic factors on the collected municipal waste quantity in Poland are still not prevalent.

4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

Having identified eight potential determinants of the waste generation process in Poland over the years 2008–2016, and having conducted stepwise regression to identify the most appropriate tool with which to overcome the problems of spatial non-stationarity[8], I used GWR to determine the model, as follows, via ArcGIS and GWR4:

$$Waste_{2016,i} = \gamma_0(u_i, v_i) + \gamma_1(u_i, v_i)PD_{(2014,\,i)} + \gamma_2(u_i, v_i)PWA_{(2014,\,i)} + \\ + \gamma_3(u_i, v_i)GW_{(2016,\,i)} + \gamma_4(u_i, v_i)R_{(2016,\,i)} + \gamma_5(u_i, v_i)T_{(2016,\,i)} + \varepsilon_i \qquad (6)$$

where (u_i,v_i) denotes the coordinates (longitude, latitude) of a destination location *i,* for $i = 1, 2,\ldots, 379$ districts, $\gamma_k(u_i,v_i)$ are structural parameters of the weighted regression model and ε_i is the random error at location *i*. Here, $Waste_{2016}$ was the municipal waste quantity collected in 2016, PD_{2014} was the population density in 2014, PWA_{2014} was the share of the population at working age in 2014, GW_{2016} where the average wages and salaries in 2016, R_{2016} was district revenue in PLN per capita in 2016, and T_{2016} was the number of tourists accommodated in 2016.

Preliminary (non-spatial) regression results indicated the absence of a statistically significant relationship between the quantity of municipal waste collected in 2016 and the increased number of uncontrolled dumping sites in 2010, their area in 2010, and the number of registrations for permanent residence in 2014. All variables were expressed in natural logarithms. To select the optimum bandwidth in the model (Eq. 6), the minimum CV was employed. The bandwidth value was

[8] The stepwise procedure for this model selection is available via e-mail.

121,580.62, with a minimum CV of 0.02. This statistic exhibits the smallest value deemed to be optimal (Table 4).

The first empirical finding suggested that the share of individuals at working age in the general population was, in terms of its strength rather than regional range, the factor that most considerably affected the quantity of municipal waste collected annually. An increase by 1% in the share of that economic age group in the population generated an average increase in the quantity of waste collected from around 5% to as much as 13% (*ceteris paribus*). Such a situation occurred in the Warmińsko-Mazurskie and Podlaskie Voivodeships (north-eastern Poland), the Silesian and Lesser Poland Voivodeships (southern-central Poland) and the Mazowieckie and Łódzkie Voivodeships (central Poland) (see Fig. 3). The districts located in those regions featured stimulated socio-economic development (especially Mazowieckie) and intense, ongoing urbanisation due to their high potentials and realistic investment attractiveness (Advisory Group TEST Human Resources, 2014). In fact, those regions also have the greatest concentrations of the population's wealth and have the lowest rates of unemployment. Then again, Łódzkie and Podlaskie (including Białystok, the largest city in and the latter, and the capital of the voivodeship) include strong academic and tourist centres. One should bear in mind, however, that the working-age population accounts for about 64% of Poland's population. Nonetheless, given the spatial distribution of the variable's impact, it was statistically significant ($p < 0.01$) in only 34% of the units (see Fig. 3).



Note: significance level $\alpha = 0.05$ (**), $|t\text{-Stat}| \geq 1.648$, and $\alpha = 0.01$ (***), $|t\text{-Stat}| \geq 2.336$; df = 373.

Fig. 3. GWR results for the quantity of waste in 2016 and share of the working-age population in 2014

Source: own work.

Moreover, population density and average gross wages had the greatest spatial range of impact affecting the phenomenon fundamentally. In about 68% of the districts, a statistically significant impact of an increase in population density by 1% resulted in a rise in the amount in municipal waste from 0.11% to 0.24% (*ceteris paribus*), especially in districts located in the Mazowieckie, Świętokrzyskie,

Lesser Poland, Łódzkie and Pomorskie Voivodeships (see Fig. 4). The impact, however, was the strongest in the northern, central and south-eastern parts of the country. In central Poland, where the richest, as well as the largest, towns are located (such as Warsaw, Poznań, Bydgoszcz and Krakow[9]), the highest population density was observed in 2014 – with up to as many as 3,355 residents per sq. km (districts in the Mazowieckie and Lesser Poland Voivodeships). The districts situated in the east of the country have rates of economic development that are greater than in the rest of Poland, mostly due to funding from the European Regional Development Fund between 2007 and 2013 (2.3 billion euros was invested in the Lubelskie, Podkarpackie, Podlaskie and Świętokrzyskie Voivodships) (EC, 2018). I also found that a rise in the population density in 2014 (*ceteris paribus*) in the northern parts of Poland significantly influenced the sharpest increase in the quantity of waste (from about 0.16% to 0.24%). Generally, such an increase could be determined by the location on the Baltic Sea. In the Zachodniopomorskie, Pomorkie and Kujawsko-Pomorskie Voivodeships, the major cities, which are particularly attractive in investment terms (and therefore in people's willingness to settle there), are Szczecin, Kołobrzeg, the Tri-City (i.e. Gdańsk, Gdynia and Sopot), as well as Toruń and Bydgoszcz. Finally, an increase in the population densities of districts located in north-eastern Poland, including the city of Suwałki (which is accessible from Tallinn (Estonia), Riga (Latvia) and Vilnius (Lithuania)), also resulted in an increase in the quantity of waste (*ceteris paribus*).



Note: significance level α = 0.05 (**), |t-Stat| ≥ 1.648 and α = 0.01 (***), |t-Stat| ≥ 2.336; df = 373.

Fig. 4. GWR results for the quantity of waste in 2016 and population density in 2014

Source: own work.

In turn, a 1% increase in salaries in 2016 triggered a statistically significant rise in the amount of waste in 2016 in 58% of the districts, ranging from 0.5%

[9] The area encompassing Krakow is characterised by a high population density caused mainly by a large number of small, family-run farms clustered together (Advisory Group TEST Human Resources, 2014).

to 1.9% (see Fig. 5). A particularly strong relationship ($p < 0.01$) was found in districts located in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, south-eastern Poland (the Lesser Poland, Świętokrzyskie, Podkarpackie and Silesian Voivodeships) and eastern Poland (the Lubelskie and Podlaskie Voivodeships). According to Statistics Poland, the highest growth in gross average monthly wages was observed in some of those voivodeships – Lesser Poland, Świętokrzyskie, Silesian and Podlaskie. Moreover, many foreign companies have their headquarters in the Mazowieckie Voivodeship, resulting in higher incomes for most families; thus, their private consumption usually increased as well, which increased the quantity of waste.



Note: significance level α = 0.05 (**), |t-Stat| ≥ 1.648 and α = 0.01 (***), |t-Stat| ≥ 2.336; df = 373.

Fig. 5. GWR results for waste in 2016 and the average gross monthly wages and salaries

Source: own work.

The smallest impact on the quantity of municipal waste was exerted by district revenues in PLN per capita, which was found in only 4% of the units; that is, Suwałki, and districts in the Greater Poland and Łódzkie voivodeships (see Fig. 6).



Note: significance level α = 0.05 (**), |t-Stat| ≥ 1.648 and α = 0.01 (***), |t-Stat| ≥ 2.336; df = 373.

Fig. 6. GWR results for waste in 2016 and district revenues in 2016

Source: own work.

In those districts, a 1% increase in revenue per capita in 2016 resulted in a slight rise in the quantity of waste of about 0.2% in that year (*ceteris paribus*). For example, Konin (in the Greater Poland Voivodeship) has one of the largest opencast mines in Poland, whereas the city of Łęczyca (in the Łódzkie Voivodeship) was the location of one of the biggest municipal waste dumping sites in the region. For the majority of districts (about 97%), an increase in revenue generated a decline (or absence of change) in the quantity of waste. According to Beigl *et al*. (2004, 2008) and Tałałaj (2011), the trend of a diminishing relationship between economic development and the quantity of waste has been observed in Poland since the beginning of rapid economic growth; that is, since 1990 and the transition period. Such a declining correlation (or even the lack of one) occurs when the well-being of a society is increasing –the higher the level of prosperity, the stronger the decoupling observed.

Finally, districts attractive to tourists, especially regions in northern Poland (such as the Pomorskie, Zachodniopomorskie and, partly, Warmińsko-Mazurskie Voivodeships) and districts located in the east of the country, generated the highest increases in the quantity of waste in the investigated period (see Fig.7).



Note: significance level α = 0.05 (**), |t-Stat| ≥ 1.648 and α = 0.01 (***), |t-Stat| ≥ 2.336; df = 373.

Fig. 7. GWR results for waste in 2016 and tourists accommodated per 1,000 capita in

Source: own work.

A 1% increase in the number of tourists accommodated per 1000 capita in these regions in 2016 resulted in an increase of about 0.11% in the quantity of waste in 2016 (*ceteris paribus*). The greatest asset northern Poland has is its location on the Baltic Sea. The impact, moreover, was the strongest in districts also located in the north-east, in particular the Suwałki and Augustów districts of the Podlaskie Voivodeship. The bays, rivers and lakes found there make excursions to those parts of Poland attractive to many. Then again, a rise in the number of tourists accommodated per 1,000 capita (*ceteris paribus*) signifi-

cantly influenced an increase in the volume of municipal waste in the Łódzkie and Mazowieckie Voivodeships. Central Poland is becoming an increasingly attractive destination not only for leisure, but also for business travel, due to its accommodations, public and regional transport, and international airports. Moreover, the empirical findings suggest that an increase in the number of tourists resulted in a lower increase in the phenomena (of about 0.01% to 0.06%, *ceteris paribus*) in the southern part of the country in districts located in the Lesser Poland Voivodeship, which is a popular destination thanks to its mountainous landscape.

For a robustness check of the results, the OLS model results were compared to those of the GWR model (Table 4).

Table 4. Diagnostic statistics for GWR compared to OLS

Global regression results (OLS)

Residual sum of squares:	8.78	Variable	Estimate	Standard Error	t(Est/SE)	
Number of parameters:	6	***Intercept***	-13.82	1.98	-6.99	
ML based global sigma estimate:	0.15	T_{2016}	0.07	0.01	5.06	
Unbiased global sigma estimate:	0.15	PWA_{2014}	6.72	1.04	6.45	
-2 log-likelihood:	-351.50	GW_{2016}	0.57	0.18	3.20	
Classic AIC:	-337.50	R_{2016}	0.45	0.18	2.53	
AICc:	337.19	PD_{2014}	0.07	0.02	3.22	
BIC/MDL:	-309.94	Diagnostics for spatial dependence of residuals				
CV:	0.02	Test	Value	Prob		
R square:	0.34	Moran's I (residuals)	0.18	0.00***		
Adjusted R square:	0.33					

Geographically varying coefficients (GWR)

Bandwidth size:	121580.62	Summary statistics for varying (Local) coefficients				
Residual sum of squares:	5.24	Variable	Mean	STD	Median	
ML based sigma estimate:	0.12	***Intercept***	-7.42	4.77	-6.10	
Unbiased sigma estimate:	0.13	T_{2016}	0.05	0.02	0.05	
-2 log-likelihood:	-546.85	PWA_{2014}	3.92	2.55	3.34	
Classic AIC:	-428.55	GW_{2016}	0.69	0.38	0.66	
AICc:	-406.23	R_{2016}	-0.05	0.37	-0.02	
BIC/MDL:	-195.64	PD_{2014}	0.12	0.05	0.12	
CV:	0.02					
R square:	0.68					
Adjusted R square:	0.64					
GWR ANOVA		Diagnostics for spatial dependence of residuals: Moran' I: -0.001, Prob.: 0.16;				
Source	SS DF MS F					
Global Residuals	8.78 373.0					
GWR Improvement	3.54 73.57 0.05					
GWR Residuals	5.24 299.43 0.02 2.75					

Source: own work.

As to their merits, using GWR in relationship modelling increased the quality of the assessments considerably over using global OLS regression, and had a lower sum of squares of the residuals; for example, Adj.$R_{sq.GWR}$ = 0.64 *vs.* Adj. $R_{sq.OLS}$ = 0.30, and AICc of GWR = −406.23 *vs.* AICc of OLS = −337.19 (Fig. 7, Table 3). Moreover, the residuals of the GWR model were free of spatial autocorrelation. Furthermore, the GWR model equations were characterised as providing an insufficient fit to the data for only 26% of the districts located in the south-central and south-western parts of the country, whereas the fit was best in north-western and eastern Poland.

5. CONCLUSIONS

In contrast to previous studies, this research represented the first attempt at studying the strength of, and regional variations in, the socio-economic factors impacting the changes in the quantity of municipal waste in Polish districts. The selected variables explained the values of the quantity of municipal waste in 2016 in about 80% of the regions. Those variables were, in order from the most influential to the least, while taking into account the spatial range and strength of the influence: population density; average salaries; share of individuals at working age in the general population; and the number of tourists. A progressive weakening relationship between economic development and the quantity of waste was observed. There is no statistically significant relationship between the quantity of municipal waste collected and the increased number of uncontrolled dumping sites, the area those sites cover or the number of registrations for permanent residence.

Moreover, the results indicated that waste collection might be local (regional, social and urban economic development and waste policy determine the volume of waste streams) and global in nature. Spatial autocorrelation reached more than 150 km, undoubtedly due to the transboundary shipment of waste. This empirical study provides useful data for the relevant decision-makers and local governments in terms of urban planning. Knowledge of the spatial dimension in waste generation may form the basis for preparing reliable expert opinions and prognostic models, and for supporting local government in MWM decision-making processes.

Additionally, the finding of spatial non-stationarity is important for MWM planning. Even though the objectives of MWM policies are created at the national level, many decisions are made at local levels by local representatives who know the particular situations in their region best. The results of the study show that this approach is appropriate, and that there is no simple way of predicting the amount of generated municipal waste based on the experiences of other administrative units.

Finally, GWR proved to be an extremely effective instrument for identifying and modelling spatially-varying relationships between waste and its determinants. Local models were characterised by considerably better fit to empirical data than global ones. Nonetheless, there are still unexplained variations that must be addressed in future studies. Accounting for the determinants of municipal waste by taking into account their structures, as well as examining the directions of waste transport by constructing different (nonlinear or asymmetrical) spatial weights matrices, could enrich the analysis. Another stage in the research will be an attempt to identify more precise economic activity indicators at local levels of aggregation, and also to consider them from a decoupling theory perspective, with the delinking of economic growth from resource use. Further studies should also consider more spatial information, such as housing characteristics, the average income of households, environmental values, the psychological factors that influence the behaviour of the inhabitants, and the location of a municipality regarding metropolises and regional peripheries.

REFERENCES

ADVISORY GROUP TEST HUMAN RESOURCES (2014), *Labour Market and Human Resources in Kraków, Business in Małopolska*. Orange Report, http://businessinmalopolska.pl/public/upload/fck/orange_raport_7.pdf [accessed on: 10.10.2018].

AKAIKE, H. (1973), 'Information theory and the maximum likelihood principle' [in]: PETROV, B.N. and CSAKI, F. (eds.), *Selected Papers of Hirotugu Akaike. Springer Series in Statistics (Perspectives in Statistics).* New York: Springer, pp. 199–213.

ANDY, M. (2005), *The ESRI Guide to GIS Analysis. Volume 2: Spatial Measurements and Statistics* and *Zeroing* In: *Geographic Information Systems at Work in the Community*. Boston: ESRI Press.

ANSELIN, L. (2010), 'Thirty years of spatial econometrics', *Papers in Regional Science*, 89, pp. 3–25.

ANTCZAK, E. (2014), 'Economic Development and Transfrontier Shipments of Waste in Poland – Spatio-Temporal Analysis', *Comparative Economic Research*, 17 (4), pp. 6–21.

BACH, H., MILD, A., NATTER, M. and WEBER, M. (2004), 'Combining socio-demographic and logistic factors to explain the generation and collection of waste paper', *Resources, Conservation and Recycling*, 41 (1), pp. 65–73.

BEIGL, P., LEBERSORGER, S. and SALHOFER, S. (2008), 'Modelling municipal solid waste generation: A review', *Waste Management*, 28 (1), pp. 200–214.

BEIGL, P., SALHAFER, S., WASSERMAN, G., MAĆKÓW, I., SEBASTIAN, M. and SZPADT, R. (2004), 'Forecasting municipal solid waste generation in major European cities', International Congress: Complexity and Integrated Resources Management, Osnabrück, Germany. https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6d33/e9d43a906be1dfe52f97b1fea27375183a78.pdf [accessed on: 10.05.2019].

BOER DEN, E., JĘDRCZAK, A., KOWALSKI, Z., KULCZYCKA, J. and SZPADT, R. (2010), 'A review of municipal solid waste composition and quantities in Poland', *Waste Management*, 30 (3), pp. 369–377.

BOWMAN, A. (1984), 'An Alternative Method of Cross-Validation for the Smoothing of Density Estimate', *Biometrika*, 71, pp. 353–360.

BRUNSDON, C., FOTHERINGHAM, A.S. and CHARLTON, M.E. (1996), 'GWR: A Method for Exploring Spatial Nonstationarity', *Geographical Analysis*, 28 (4), pp. 281–298.

CHARLTON, M. and FOTHERINGHAM, A.S. (2009), *Geographically weighted regression.* Maynooth: National Centre for Geocomputation.

CHEBA, K. (2014), 'Methods of Forecasting Changes of Municipal Waste Production in case of Cities', *Acta Universitatis Lodzensis. Folia Oeconomica*, 3 (302), pp. 223–229.

CLEVELAND, W.S. (1979), 'Robust Locally Weighted Regression and Smoothing Scatterplots', *Journal of American Statistical Association*, 74 (368), pp. 829–836.

COUNCIL OF MINISTRY (2016), *National Waste Management Plan 2022*, Annex to the Resolution No 88 of the Council of Ministers of 1 July 2016 (item 784), Warsaw. https://www.mos.gov.pl/komunikaty/szczegoly/news/krajowy-plan-gospodarki-odpadami-2022/ [accessed on: 12.11.2018].

CYRANKA, M., JURCZYK, M. and PAJĄK, T. (2016), 'Municipal Waste-to-Energy plants in Poland–current projects'. *E3S Web Conf. Volume 10,* 1st International Conference on the Sustainable Energy and Environment Development (SEED 2016).

ERTUR, C. and LE GALLO, J. (2008), 'Regional Growth and Convergence: Heterogenous reaction versus interaction in spatial econometric approaches', *LEO Working Papers/DR LEO 1423*, Orleans Economics Laboratory, Orleans: University of Orleans.

EUROPEAN COMISSION (2008), *Directive 2008/98/EC*. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ / LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2008:312:0003:0030:en:PDF [accessed on: 12.10.2018].

EUROPEAN COMISSION (2018), *Eastern Poland more attractive for inhabitants and investors*. http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/newsroom/news/2018/03/23-03-2018-eastern-poland-more-attractive-for-inhabitants-and-investors [accessed on: 12.10.2018].

FINGLETON, B. (1999), 'Spurious Spatial Regression: Some Monte Carlo Results with a Spatial Unit Root and Spatial Cointegration', *Journal of Regional Science*, 39 (1)*,* pp. 1–19.

FOTHERINGHAM, A.S., BRUNSDON, C. and CHARLTON, M.E. (2000), *Quantitative geography: perspectives on spatial data analysis.* London: Sage.

FOTHERINGHAM, A.S., BRUNSDON, C. and CHARLTON, M.E. (2002), *Geographically Weighted Regression: The Analysis of Spatially Varying Relationships.* Chichester: Wiley.

GENEROWICZ, A., KOWALSKI, Z. and KULCZYCKA, J. (2011), 'Planning of Waste Management Systems in Urban Area Using Multi-criteria Analysis', *Journal of Environment Protection*, 2 (6), pp. 736–743.

GETIS, A. and ALDSTADT, J. (2004), 'Constructing the Spatial Weights Matrix Using a Local Statistic', *Geographical Analysis*, 36 (2), pp. 90–104.

GOLLINI, I., LU, B., CHARLTON, M., BRUNSDON, C. and HARRIS, P. (2015), 'GWR model: An R Package for Exploring Spatial Heterogeneity Using Geographically Weighted Models', *Journal of Statistical Software*, 63 (17), pp. 1–50.

HAGE, O. and SÖDERHOLM, P. (2008), 'An econometric analysis of regional differences in household waste collection: the case of plastic packaging waste in Sweden', *Waste Management*, 28 (10), pp. 1720–1731.

HOCKETT, D., LOBER, D.J. and PILGRIM, K. (1995), 'Determinants of Per Capita Municipal Solid Waste Generation in the Southeastern United States', *Journal of Environment Management*, 45 (3), pp. 205–217.

HUNG, M.L., MA, H.W. and YANG, W.F. (2007), 'A novel sustainable decision making model for municipal solid waste management', *Waste Management*, 27 (2), pp. 209–219.

IOANNOU, T., LASARIDI, K. and KALOGIROU, S. (2010), 'Spatial analysis of the recyclable municipal solid waste collection'. http://gisc.gr/docs/sk_papers/2_5_ Ioannou_Lasaridi_Kalogirou_2010.pdf [accessed on: 5.10.2018].

ISMAILIA, A.B., MUHAMMED, I., BIBI, U.M. and HUSAIN, M.A. (2015), 'Modelling Municipal Solid Waste Generation Using Geographically Weighted Regression: A Case Study of Nigeria', *Journal of Environmental Science*, 4 (8), pp. 98–108.

JALIGOT, R. and CHENAL, J. (2018), 'Decoupling municipal solid waste generation and economic growth in the canton of Vaud, Switzerland, Resources', *Conservation and Recycling*, 130, pp. 260–266.

KESER, S. (2012), 'Investigation of the Spatial Relationship of Municipal Solid Waste Generation in Turkey with Socio-Economic, Demographic and Climatic Factors'. http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.632.5116 &rep=rep1&type=pdf [accessed on: 5.10.2018].

KESER, S., DUZGUN, S. and AKSOY, A. (2010), 'Application of spatial and non-spatial data analysis in determination of the factors that impact municipal solid waste generation rates in Turkey', *Waste Management*, 32, pp. 359–371.

KHAN, D., KUMAR, A. and SAMADDER, S.R. (2016), 'Impact of socioeconomic status on municipal solid waste generation rate', *Waste Management*, 49, pp. 15–25.

KLOJZY-KARCZMARCZYK, B. and MAKOUDI, S. (2017), 'Analysis of municipal waste generation rate in Poland compared to selected European countries'. www.e3s-conferences.org/articles/e3sconf/abs/2017/07/e3sconf_eems2017_02025/e3sconf_eems2017_02025.html [accessed on: 5.10.2018].

KOŁSUT, B. (2016), 'Inter-Municipal Cooperation in Waste Management: The Case of Poland', *Quaestiones Geographicae*, 35 (2), pp. 91–104.

KOSZEWSKA, M. (2016), 'Analysis of the legal framework in the sustainability area across v4 countries', Polish report prepared in the framework of the project *Prospects of the Visegrad cooperation in promoting a sustainable consumption and production model*. http://www.k48.p.lodz.pl/ecomarket/plik---reportlabels-polandgot_(V4EcoMarket--p54).pdf [accessed on: 20.07.2018].

KUKUŁA, K. (2016), 'Municipal Waste Management in Poland in the Light of Multi Dimensional Comparative Analysis', *Acta Scientiarum Polonorum Oeconomia*, 15 (4), pp. 93–103.

LEUNG, Y., MEI, C.L. and ZHANG, W.X. (2000), 'Statistical Tests for Spatial Nonstationarity Based on the Geographically Weighted Regression Model', *Environment and Planning A: Economy and Space*, 32 (1), pp. 9–32.

LOADER, C.R. (1999), 'Bandwidth selection: classical or plug-in?', *The Annals of Statistics*, 27 (2), pp. 415–438.

LU, B., YANG, W., GE, Y. and HARRIS, P. (2018), 'Improvements to the calibration of a geographically weighted regression with parameter-specific distance metrics and bandwidths', *Computers, Environment and Urban Systems*, 71, pp. 41–57.

MATTHEWS, S.A. and YANG, T.C. (2016), 'Mapping the results of local statistics: Using geographically weighted regression', *Demographic Research*, 26, pp. 151–166.

MINISTRY OF THE ENVIRONMENT (2017). https://www.mos.gov.pl/fileadmin/user_upload/mos/Aktualnosci/2017/grudzien_2017/Raport_z_badania_dot._gospodarki_odpadami_2017_r._.pdf [accessed on: 20.10.2018].

MORAN, P.A.P. (1950), 'Notes on Continuous Stochastic Phenomena', *Biometrika*, 37(1), pp. 17–23.

THE ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT (2015), 'Environmental Performance Reviews, Poland Highlights'. https://www.unece.org/env/epr.html [accessed on: 12.10.2015].

PASIECZNIK I., BANASZKIEWICZ, K. and SYSKA, Ł. (2017), 'Local community e-waste awareness and behavior. Polish case study', *Environmental Protection Engineering*, 43 (3), pp. 287–303.

RYBOVA, K. (2019), 'Do Sociodemographic Characteristics in Waste Management Matter? Case Study of Recyclable Generation in the Czech Republic', *Sustainability,* 11 (2030), pp. 1–15.

RYBOVA, K, BURCIN, B. and SLAVIK, J. (2018), 'Spatial and non-spatial analysis of socio-demographic aspects influencing municipal solid waste generation in the Czech Republic', *Detritus*, 1, pp. 3–7.

SCHULTZ, P., OSKAMP, S. and MAINIERI, T. (1995), 'Who recycles and when? A review of personal and situational factors', *Journal of Environmental Psychology*, 5 (2), pp. 105–121.

STERNER, T. and BARTELINGS, H. (1999), 'Household waste management in a Swedish municipality: determinants of waste disposal, recycling and composting', *Environmental and Resource Economics*, 13 (4), pp. 473–491.

TAŁAŁAJ, I.A. (2011), 'The influence of chosen socio-economical factors on change of waste quantity in Podlaskie province', *Inżynieria Ekologiczna*, 25, pp. 146–156.

UNITED NATIONS ENVIRONMENT PROGRAMME (2011), 'Decoupling natural resource use and environmental impacts from economic growth'. http://hdl.handle.net/20.500.11822/9816 [accessed on: 20.07.2018].

ZEMANEK, J, WOŹNIAK, A. and MALINOWSKI, M. (2011), 'The role and place of solid waste transfer station in the waste management system', *Infrastruktura i Ekologia Terenów Wiejskich*, 11, pp. 5–13.

sciendo

COPE
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.10

Aleksandra LASOŃ[*], Andrzej TORÓJ[**]

ANTI-LIBERAL, ANTI-ESTABLISHMENT OR CONSTITUENCY-DRIVEN? SPATIAL ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS OF POLISH PARLIAMENTARY ELECTION RESULTS IN 2015

Abstract. We investigated the spatial variation patterns of voting results in Polish parliamentary election in 2015 across 380 regions. That election was a milestone event in Polish politics that substantially affected Poland's internal and foreign policy directions and promoted two emerging political parties as runners-up against the well-established ones. While socio-economic, cultural and geographical factors such as economic activity, historical legacies (post-Russian East vs post-German West) and economic dichotomies (cities vs the countryside) explain most variations for most parties, they do not appeared to fit as determinants of the new parties' support, especially of right-wing populists. Demographic target groups of individual parties appear to be relatively unresponsive to their pre-election offerings. The spatial specification of econometric models considerably improves their statistical properties. We also examined mixed-W models to account for the unobservable spatial effects stemming from the construction of constituencies. Their distinctive sets of candidates added significantly to the explanation of the spatial variation in voting.
Key words: spatial analysis, election results, Poland, constituencies, mixed-W models.

1. INTRODUCTION

On 25th October 2015 the Polish parliamentary elections were held, resulting in the victory of a right-wing, nationally and socially conservative party Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*, PiS[1], member of the European Parliament's

[*] Aleksandra LASOŃ, University of Amsterdam; e-mail: lason.aleksandraa@gmail.com.
[**] Andrzej TORÓJ, SGH Warsaw School of Economics, Institute of Econometrics, ul. Madalińskiego 6/8, 02-513 Warsaw, Poland; e-mail: andrzej.toroj@sgh.waw.pl;
ORCID http://orcid.org/0000-0003-3623-168X.

[1] Abbreviations: **PiS** – Law and Justice (*Prawo i Sprawiedliwość*), **PO** – Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*), **K15** – *Kukiz'15*, **N** – Modern (*.Nowoczesna*), **PSL** – Polish People's Party (*Polskie*

group *European Conservatives and Reformists*). The liberal Civic Platform (*Platforma Obywatelska*, PO, member of the Christian democratic European People's Party group at the European Parliament) and the agrarian Polish People's Party[2] (*Polskie Stronnictwo Ludowe*, PSL, another EPP member), which had governed since 2007, stepped back to the opposition. At the same time, two brand-new groups entered the parliament, the right-wing populist Kukiz'15 (*K15*, never before in the EP) and the liberal Modern (.*Nowoczesna*, N, formal member of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe).[3] Law and Justice became the first party in Poland since pre-1989 communist era to secure an absolute majority of seats in the Sejm, the lower house of the Parliament, which enabled them to appoint an autonomous government.

The changes on the Polish political scene coincided with the rise of populist, anti-immigration and anti-establishment sentiments and parties in Europe (cf. Algan *et al*., 2017), such as A*lternative für Deutschland* in Germany*, Freiheitliche Partei* Österreichs in Austria*,* Swedish democrats – *Sverigedemokraterna* or Danish People Party – *Dansk Folkeparti.* They also shortly preceded the anti-establishment campaigns in the UK and the US that paved the way towards the vote for Brexit and the victory of Donald Trump, respectively, as well as the historically best results of the French *Front National* in 2017. A question that arises is to what extent the Polish election results from 2015 fit this broad international context, as the voters were able to not only choose between the right-wing opposition (PiS) and the liberal, long-standing incumbent party (PO), but also the well-established parties (PiS, PO) and absolute newcomers (K15, N) that, in the Polish system, are by law financially handicapped on their way to the Parliament through the lack of financing from public sources and hence, to be successful, have to target emerging anti-establishment sentiments very skilfully.

A more specific question that we intend to address in this article is related to the spatial distribution of such sentiments (see, e.g. van Gent *et al*., 2013). We examined at the level of *poviats* (380 units in Poland) to find a relationship between the voting behaviour and a wide range of variables defining the regional socio-economic context, putting the problem into the spatial political economy perspective (cf. Morton, 2017). This approach might be interesting for at least three reasons.

Firstly, to the best of our knowledge, no studies have attempted to discuss the results of Polish elections in 2015 from a multivariate spatial analysis. Żerkowska-

---

Stronnictwo Ludowe), **EU** – European Union, **EP** – European Parliament, **EPP** – European People's Party, **PKW** – National Electoral Commission (*Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza*), **BMA** – Bayesian Model Averaging.

[2] PSL is the only political group represented in the parliament after 2015 election that is not analysed here due to a relatively low support, concentrated in the rural areas.

[3] Tags and descriptions of individual parties based on their individual websites, as well as on http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/poland.html.

Balas, Lyubashenko and Kwiatkowska (2016) analysed how the social statuses of individuals, ideological and cultural issues, as well as economic factors, determine electoral decisions, stating that variables describing citizens' social statuses explain in the most appropriate way the tendency to vote for individual parties. Turska-Kawa (2016) evaluated the system of higher-order values of the 2015 electorates and individuals with different ideological self-identifications. All these micro-studies might be treated as a suggestion to use respective, feasible socio-economic regressors at the local level.

Secondly, regional studies are the key to a correct understanding of the nexus between constituency formation and election outcomes. Conclusions could be relevant for a wide range of countries (though we leave them outside the scope of this paper).

Thirdly, in recent years, there has been an increase in interest in the role of party leaders in elections and the *personalisation* of politics (Barisione (2009), Bittner (2018), Garzia (2011), Garzia (2012), Mughan (2015), Rahat and Sheafer (2007)). Peszyński (2016) examined the leader effect on the 2015 Polish election results of their party or group, refuting the hypothesis that a party leader is a more important determinant of electoral decisions in the case of new, leader-driven parties (N and K15) than in the case of more institutionalised entities (PiS and PO). Corresponding with the current research trend, spatial studies allow to capture the non-observable effect of the local leaders' charisma on the voting result, at least when the election is held in constituencies, and are perhaps the only non-survey (and hence non-declarative) method of looking into this phenomenon.

In our study, we conducted a spatial econometric investigation of the drivers that impacted the following variables: (i) the unprecedented support for PiS, (ii) the support for other parties, (iii) the vote split between right-wing and liberal-wing, as well as old *vs* new parties, and (iv) the voter turnout. **Our research hypotheses included (H1)** the dominant role of socio-economic factors, which can be linked with parties' specific policy promises and target electorate, in determining regional aggregate choices (see Sections 2 and 3 for details), **(H2)** the presence of spatial patterns due to both spillovers of various kinds and the unobservable effects related to the candidates' attractiveness in individual constituencies, and **(H3)** different decision-making mechanisms with respect to the choice between liberal and conservative, and between well-established and new parties.

The data used in the paper, available via Local Data Bank from Statistics Poland, as well as the data from the National Electoral Commission (*Państwowa Komisja Wyborcza*, PKW), included *poviat*-level data (380 units in Poland at the EU's NUTS-4 level). Taking into consideration the fact that the *poviat*-level offers a broader set of determinants than the *gmina*-level data (2479 the EU's NUTS-5 units), NUTS-4 was chosen as representing an optimum balance between spatial

precision (multiple poviats per constituency, in almost all cases) and the availability of potential regressors. After the preliminary extraction of 363 socio-economic variables available from Statistics Poland's Local Databank, due to the constrained number of territorial units and on the literature basis, we chose or constructed 54 that could most likely determine election behaviours.[4] We used the *General-to-Specific* modelling approach, as well as the Bayesian Model Averaging (BMA) technique, as methods for handling model uncertainty. In the final stage, we applied spatial econometric models to consider the presence of additional spatial processes.

The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we reviewed the previous literature related to spatial methods and their use in political science, as well as the existing literature on turnout and political preferences. In Section 3, we presented the process of data selection and the preliminary linear regression. In Section 4, we applied spatial econometric analysis and we discussed the results of this application. Section 5 is the final concluding section.

2. ELECTORAL GEOGRAPHY IN POLAND: BACKGROUND INFORMATION AND LITERATURE REVIEW

In an announcement of 27 October 2015, the National Electoral Commission in Poland stated that PiS received 37.58% of votes, which translated into 235 out of 460 parliamentary seats (see Table 1). PO gained 24.09% votes (138 seats), recording a decrease of 15 percentage points compared to the election results in 2011. PiS and PO have been the leading parties on the Polish political scene since the parliamentary election in 2005.

Looking at the spatial distribution of election results, PiS was more popular among voters in eastern and south-eastern regions, while PO recorded the highest scores in the north-west, the west and the south-west, as well as had a clearly more metropolitan electorate than PiS (see Fig. 1). Relatively high support for N could be seen in cities with *poviat* rights and in the south-western part of the country. The high support for N in south-western Poland coincided with a high support for the Civic Platform in that part of Poland. This may suggest that the electorate of both parties had a similar profile, as well as that N as a newcomer seized some of PO's voters. However, no material spatial patterns emerged in the case of K15.

[4] The variables rejected at this stage comprised mostly highly disaggregated local government expenditure values and detailed, bookkeeping-related breakdowns related to the European Union funds absorption.

Table 1. Poland's parliamentary election in 2015: country and *poviat*-level results [%]

	National result	***Poviat*-level unweighted mean**	***Poviat*-level unweighted standard error**	***Poviat*-level maximum value**	***Poviat*-level minimum value**
PiS	37.58	39.13	10.59	69.87	17.76
K15	8.81	9.13	1.75	22.18	5.02
PO	24.09	22.22	7.96	41.35	5.68
N	7.60	6.01	2.58	16.49	1.31

Source: own work, PKW (National Electoral Commission in Poland).

In recent years, research about the determinants of electoral behaviours, focusing on voter turnout, has expanded rapidly. Around 200 studies on turnout were published only in 2014, which is nearly four times the number of articles published in 2000 (Cancela and Geys, 2016). The meta-analysis of 83 aggregate-level studies (Geys, 2006) and its extension (Cancela and Geys, 2015) indicated that voter turnout studies conducted as multivariate regression analyses included at least one of 14 variables:

– **socio-economic**: population size, population concentration (though weakly correlated with voter turnout), population stability (measured by three factors: population mobility, population growth and the percentage of homeowners in the community), income homogeneity and ethnical homogeneity, proportion of minorities (turnout is lower if the share of a minority in the population is higher), past turnout;

– **political**: closeness of election (Fauvelle-Aymar and François, 2006) – there is a positive relation between the competitiveness of an election and the percentage of voters come to vote, political fragmentation (Dettrey and Schwindt-Bayer, 2009), campaign expenditures (Hogan, 2013; Holbrook and Weinschenk, 2014);

– **institutional**: electoral system (Eggers, 2015; Endersby and Krieckhaus, 2008), compulsory voting (Fowler, 2013), registration requirements (Ansolabehere and Konisky, 2006), and concurrent elections (Nikolenyi, 2010).

While looking for spatial determinants of the voting behaviour, some further country-specific aspects should be borne in mind, both in the long-term perspective and related to the specific electoral circumstances in 2015. From this point on, we limited their presentation to the factors that were potentially relevant in the spatial dimension.

Following the first elections in Poland after the systemic transformation out of communism initiated in 1989, one could observe significant regional differences in both election results and turnout. Polish electoral geography literature indicates two main aspects of spatial differentiation of electoral behaviours. According to

the first one, the main reason for electoral disproportionality are historical and cultural circumstances, while the second one focuses on socio-economic factors (Zarycki, 1997). The first theory emphasizes the relevance of the partitions of Poland (that took place towards the end of the 18th century and resulted in the elimination of Poland's sovereignty for 123 years) and the resulting historically shaped political attitudes. For a long time, the highest turnouts were recorded in the north-western, western and southern regions. This regularity is often explained by long-term parliament traditions that characterize societies living in Prussian and Austrian states, while eastern communities developing within the Russian Empire, due to the authoritarian regime, did not have the appropriate conditions to progress (Kowalski, 2003). Life in a given partition led to the formation of distinct social norms and political views (Krzemiński, 2009). The second concept rejects historical influence, explaining election behaviours predominantly using contemporary socio-economic situations. Our analysis builds predominantly upon the second approach.



Fig. 1. Spatial distribution of dependent variables

Source: own work, National Electoral Commission (pkw.gov.pl).

Additionally, Poland has considerably benefited from the accession to the European Union in 2004 by receiving a substantial inflow of EU funds. In the 2007-2013 financial perspective, Poland has been the largest beneficiary of the EU policy of economic and social cohesion, having the amount of 67.3 billion euros at its disposal, over 19% of funds allocated by the EU for the purposes of this policy (see Ministry of Regional Development, Poland National Strategic Reference Framework 2007–2013). The 'Operational Programme Development of Eastern Poland', focused on, e.g. generating a socio-economic upgrade of five eastern voivodships (lubelskie, podkarpackie, podlaskie, świętokrzyskie and warmińsko-mazurskie),[5] the least-developed regions in the entire EU as of 2004. The considerable investments undertaken, mainly in infrastructure, may have affected the traditional Polish electoral geography of right-wing dominance in the east.

In the years preceding 2015 election, in the majority of Polish cities with populations above 100,000, one could observe a population decline, mainly driven by great number of city dwellers moving to the neighboring small towns and rural areas (Biegańska and Szymańska, 2013), which possibly implied some spatial autoregression pattern driven by an increasing population of commuters.

As for the electoral campaign itself, PiS made a number of attractive promises, most notably (i) reversing the incumbent PO's reform of increasing the retirement age, which had been supposed to stabilise the public finances in the long term (see Jabłonowski, Müller, 2013), and (ii) introducing additional child benefits.[6] Both of those key offerings may have induced a link between the election outcomes and regional demographic conditions.

The parliamentary election in October 2015 was directly preceded by a presidential run-up in May (also won by PiS). The presidential election gave a considerable boost to the political career of Paweł Kukiz, a former rock star, and his newly created group K15 was considered in the media as a potential coalition member in the absence of the parliamentary majority for PiS. Its main aim was to create a new constitution and lead to a deep transformation of the political system in Poland, with emphasis put on single-candidate elections as a means of weakening the political parties.[7] While, formally, K15 was not established as a political party, a large number of candidates were members of smaller right-wing parties, not least extreme right. The micro-level study of Turska-Kawa (2016) showed that the voters of K15 represented the most contrasting system of values against other parties.

---

[5] http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/en/atlas/programmes/2007-2013/poland/operational-programme-development-of-eastern-poland [accessed 30.07.2018]

[6] http://wybierzpis.org.pl/materialy-programowe [accessed 30.07.2018]

[7] http://ruchkukiza.pl/klub-poselski/strategia-zmiany/ [accessed 30.07.2018]

The main purpose of PO's campaign[8], in turn, was to retain voters after the long period of governance since 2007 that covered different phases of the financial and economic crisis, predominantly in the euro zone. The party faced an additional, unexpected threat of voter loss due to the establishment of a new liberal and pro-EU party N. This group largely targeted its programme at young voters with higher education, and entrepreneurs interested in liberal economic policy[9], which once had been identified with PO. N's premise was to simplify the tax system, remove union and pension privileges, as well as to improve the education system to suit the labour market. It also promoted the state's ideological neutrality. The political offering of N appeared to be addressed predominantly to big city residents, and the spatial effects of this targeting strategy may had followed.

According to Wciseł (2016), the issue of the migrant crisis that emerged during the parliamentary campaign suggested that a large part of the electorate wanted to protect Poland against the influx of refugees and promote nationalistic attitudes. In 2015, during the peak of the European refugee crisis, PiS opposed the reception of any immigrants. However, Poland is highly homogeneous in terms of resident nationality, and – on top of that – no material spatial pattern of minority distribution emerges, so it would be unjustified to expect any spatial pattern in the anti-immigrant sentiment. That focus of the campaign, however, might had been the reason for including some symptomatic variables that might had been related to cultural or historical backgrounds of individual regions.

Finally, as our research applied to the subnational level, we omitted institutional and political variables focusing on socio-economics ones. Common institutional determinants applied to all regions: voting is voluntary, previous registration is not required, voters who are away from their place of residence on the day of an election may vote at any polling station. 460 members of the lower house of the Parliament are elected through proportional representation in 41 constituencies. Constituencies consist of groups of *poviats* covering parts of voivodships, or entire, smaller voivodships (NUTS-2 level). It implies that there are spatial clusters of *poviats* with the same sets of candidates. Each constituency has a number of mandates calculated0on the basis of its population (from 7 in a constituency with the lowest number of inhabitants to 20 mandates in the capital city Warsaw). Furthermore, as opposed to federal states or econometric time series setup, political determinants such as political fragmentation and campaign expenditures are not applicable in Poland, either. The political fragmentation is perceived unitarily, as opinion polls are conducted on the na-

[8] http://www.platforma.org/aktualnosc/42974/program [accessed 30.07.2018]
[9] https://nowoczesna.org/program-nowoczesnej-w-pigulce/ [accessed 30.07.2018]

tional level. What is more, campaign expenditures are difficult to regionalise in practice, especially when political campaigns have largely shifted to the Internet in the recent years.

Since political science data is frequently spatial (Darmofal, 2006), spatial statistics and econometrics are relatively widely used in political research worldwide, especially the United States (due to the Electoral College and the "winner-takes-it-all" system), and our analysis was also related to this strand of literature.

Answering to the questions about the extent to which the U.S. is segregated by the political preferences, Cho, Gimpel and Hui (2012) relied on data for migrants across seven states to show that many Republicans and Democrats relocate on the basis of destination characteristics, such as income, racial composition and population density, but they also prefer to relocate into areas populated by copartisans. The research confirmed the previous study of Seabrook (2009) which investigated the patterns of geographical clustering in the U.S. votings for the presidential elections of 2004 and 2008. Seabrook pointed out that the change in the presidential voting appeared to be significantly more spatially dependent than the raw voting itself, suggesting a high degree of geographical clustering. Then again, Chen and Rodden (2013) demonstrated that partisan bias in U.S. legislative elections can emerge from patterns of human geography, where Democrats are inefficiently concentrated in large cities and can expect to win less than 50% of the seats when they win 50% of the votes.

In Europe, the geographical variability of electoral turnout determinants was examined by Mansley and Demsar (2015). The example of the London mayoral election in 2012 showed that electoral behaviours vary over geographical space and that some variables that are considered to influence the turnout in a specific way act non-uniformly across space and sometimes even change the direction to the opposite of the traditionally assumed effect. Regarding France, Saib (2017) tried to identify the share of inequalities in voter turnout that directly results from the specific socio-economic factors of the studied areas, in order to distinguish specific neighbourhood effect.

3. EMPIRICAL STRATEGY

In order to conduct a spatial econometric investigation of the drivers that impacted on the turnout level, the support for particular parties, especially the unprecedented support for PiS, the vote split between right-wing and liberal-wing, as well as old *vs* new parties, we used the data that comes from National Electoral Commission (PKW) and Local Data Bank of Statistics Poland.

Table 2. List of *poviat*-level explanatory variables used in regression analysis

FINANCIAL	DEVELOPMENT
PIT revenues *per capita* – **H1.4** CIT revenues *per capita* – **H1.4** Coal mining tax revenues *per capita* Debt service expenditure per 1k PLN revenue Dynamics of PIT revenues per capita (2015 vs 2007) – **H1.1** Dynamics of CIT revenues per capita (2015 vs 2007) – **H1.1**	EU funds *per capita* – **H1.5** Enterprise investment per 1 inhabitant Enterprise capital per 1 inhabitant Share of investment spending by local government Fixed capital in industry *per capita*
STRUCTURE OF THE ECONOMY	**NATURAL CONDITIONS**
Share of employment in agriculture – **H1.3** Share of employment in construction Share of employment in financial sector – **H1.4** Share of employment in other services – **H1.4**	Density of population Share of urban population City with *poviat* rights (big cities) – **H1.4** Distance to the voivodship capital Spending due to natural disasters
SOCIO-CULTURAL	**SURFACE TREND / HISTORICAL**
Divorce per 1000 inhabitants Marriages per 1000 inhabitants aged 18-49 Crimes *per capita*	Longitude* Latitude* Historical Prussian partition Historical Russian partition
EDUCATION	**DEMOGRAPHICAL STRUCTURE**
High school education (number *per capita*) Students *per capita* Educational subsidy *per capita* Children in kindergartens aged 3-5 *per* inhabitants aged 18-49 – **H1.2** Children in kindergartens aged 3-5 per place – **H1.2**	Share of pre-working age population – **H1.2** Children aged <14 per inhabitants aged 18-49 – **H1.2** Share of post-working population: men – **H1.2** Share of post-working population: women – **H1.2** Share of women Children benefit – **H1.2**
LABOUR MARKET	**DEMOGRAPHY**
Workers per 1000 population – **H1.4** Dynamics of workers per 1000 population (2015 vs 2007) – **H1.1** Monthly average gross salary – **H1.4** Registered unemployment rate Share of unemployed below 24 years old among unemployed Share of long-term unemployed (>1 year) among unemployed Share of unemployed with higher education among unemployed Activity rate – total – **H1.4** Activity rate - women	Live births per 1000 inhabitants – **H1.2** Deaths per 1000 inhabitants Death share – cardiovascular Death share – neoplasms Death share – respiratory Registered arrivals *per capita* Migration balance *per capita*

* The longitude and latitude are representing the centroid of the region as the geometric center of its shape's projection on the plane. The symbols **H1.1**-**H1.5** correspond to specific hypotheses discussed in Sections 2 and 3.

Source: own work, Local Data Bank, National Electoral Commission.

As dependent variables, we chose the results (in %) of particular election committees, i.e. PiS, K15, PO and N, as well as the turnout level. Moreover, 4 aggregate variables were created: (1) the percentage share of votes cast for K15 in the total number of votes for K15 and PiS (to look into the propensity to vote for the newcomer on the right wing), (2) the percentage share of votes cast for N in the total number of votes cast for N and PO (to look into the propensity to select the newcomer in the liberal segment), (3) the percentage share of votes cast both for PiS and K15 (as an aggregate right-wing measure) and (4) the percentage share of votes cast both for N and K15 (as an aggregate measure of propensity to vote for the newcomers).

Focusing on the parties' programmes, the way that they framed the election campaign rhetorically, as well as based on the election behaviour literature discussed in Section 2, we selected 54 out of approximately 360 *poviat*-level variables from the Local Data Bank provided by Statistics Poland that most likely determine the election behaviour (see Table 2).

Trying to explain the voting results and the victory of PiS, we need to take into account its sharp criticism of the incumbent government (formed by PO and PSL since 2007) and a series of attractive (but potentially very costly) election promises. Due to the fact that PiS accused the previous government of anti-development policy and of focusing on driving fast growth exclusively in large cities and their neighbourhoods, we hypothesize (**H1.1**) that the local economic dynamics from 2007 to 2015 (understood as the dynamics of PIT revenues, CIT revenues and workers per 1000 population) may have affected the voting results in such a way that the population of slow-growing *poviats* preferred to cast their votes on PiS, while the fast-growing *poviats* supported the incumbent party. Since the core poviats may have been sharing the profits from the high growth with the nearby peripheries via e.g. wages of commuters, spatial linkages are hypothesised here as well.

The introduction of additional child benefit – the 500+ child support program and reversing the retirement age reform – were two most notable PiS pledges prioritized during the election campaign. Therefore, in our analysis, we put emphasis on demographical variables, i.e. live births, children aged 14 and less per adult population aged 18–49, as well as the share of pre- and post-working population, and expect their connection with with the voting results (**H1.2**). Moreover, the relationship between the demographic structure and the support for the particular parties allows us to examine if the belief that the support for right-wing parties is increasing with age holds in the Polish case.

Taking into consideration variables referring to the structure of the economy, the share of agriculture (understood as percentage of employees in the agricultural sector) is anticipatred to increase the support for PiS and K15 due to their election promise of introducing the law permitting the purchase of land exclusively by Polish farmers (**H1.3**).

On the other hand, variables related to the economic activity, such as the employment per 1000 population and income from CIT or wealth of the inhabitants (approximated by income from PIT) are expected to positively influence the support for liberal parties (PO and N), especially for N which mainly targeted its programme to young voters with higher education and enrepreneurs interested in liberal economic policy (**H1.4**). In addition, due to the fact that the aforementioned parties are characterized by a pro-EU attitude, we are interested if EU fund absorption affects their results (**H1.5**).

Last, but not least, the dataset contains various cultural and historical factors, such as marriages per 1000 inhabitants aged 18–49, divorces per 1000 inhabitants, XIX-th century partitions, which possibly can explain the liberalism-conservativsm trade-off and refer to the theory that emphasizes the relevance of the partitions of Poland and the resulting historically shaped political attitudes.

Fig. 2. Correlations between potential explanatory variables

Source: own work, Local Data Bank – Statistics Poland (stat.gov.pl).

Due to the fact that such a wide dataset is characterised by some collinearity (see Fig. 2), in order to obtain a proper set of variables, we apply two strategies:

1. General-to-specific modelling strategy (Campos, Ericsson, Hendry, 2003) and additionally, we used **Bayesian model averaging** (BMA) to confirm that models included all important variables indicated by BMA (Koop, 2003). The results presented in subsequent parts of the paper refer to specific (reduced) models.[10]

2. Principal component analysis based on the graphical screeplot criterion (see Fig. 4).



Fig. 3. Bayesian model averaging: regressor sets in best models [sign: black +, grey -]
Source: own work.

The application of the **first strategy** began with the linear, non-spatial regression. Based on its results, we constructed an initial set of determinants for the purpose of spatial specifications, for each dependent variable individually, com-

[10] Estimates from full (general) models available on request.

prising of: (i) variables significant in consequent linear regressions (significance level 0.1), (ii) most likely regressors indicated by BMA (see Table 3 and Fig. 3), and (iii) four key variables by expert judgement: the longitude and latitude to control the surface trend, the employment rate per 1,000 population and the dummy for city with *poviat* rights (big cities).

Next, we extended the specification for each dependent variable in the spatial direction. It should be stressed that, in the presence of an omitted spatial data generating process, the non-spatial coefficients tend to be upward biased in the modulus if regressors are spatially autocorrelated themselves. As a result, the explanatory variables may spuriously appear as significant in linear regressions, and hence the initial sets are probably too wide and should be subject to further reduction.

Table 3. Model sizes with highest posterior likelihood under Bayesian model averaging

Dependent variable	Dominant model size	Model sizes with probability > 0.1
PiS	15	13-17
K15	8	7-10
PO	10	12-14
N	9	8-11
K15 vs PiS	8	7-11
N vs PO	5	4-6
PiS+K15	13	12-15
N+K15	9	8-11
Participation	17	15-18

Source: own work.



Fig. 4. Scree plot for principal components of the regressor set

Source: own work.

The second strategy consists of building principal components out of 54 variables under consideration. In line with the picture emerging from the screeplot criterion (see Fig. 4), two components were created (see Fig. 5):

– **Factor 1** (**"activity, employment, cities"**) consisted of variables related to the high labour market activity rate (in general and among women), relatively high employment in the service sector (as compared to the agriculture) and pointed to big cities with *poviat* rights and high population density. It appeared as predominantly related to high economic activity areas. Note the inverse relationship of the factor to high economic activity of the poviats (see the signs of loadings in Fig. 5).

– **Factor 2** (**"young"**) is based upon a set of demographic variables. The higher the component value, the younger the society.



Fig. 5. Loadings and interpretation of principal components [sign: black +, grey -]

Source: own work.

Having established the individual regressor sets for each of the dependent variables in question (both in terms of raw variables and principal components), we estimated the spatial models using the row-standardized $\boldsymbol{W}$ matrix based on geographic proximity (see Section 4). On top of that, we considered mixed-$\boldsymbol{W}$ specifications with an additional row-standardized matrix $\boldsymbol{W}$ indicating the adherence of two *poviats* to the same constituency. The inclusion of the latter matrix in the spatial error part stands for the latent effect of shared candidates within a group of *poviats* (Section 5).



Fig. 6. Values of principal components for individual regions

Source: own work.

4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR SPATIAL SINGLE-SOURCE MODELS

4.1. Testing for spatial effects in linear regressions

The results obtained for Moran's I and Lagrange multiplier tests indicated that the residuals from all linear regression specific models were spatially dependent (see Table 4; see also graphical inspection in Fig. 7). The robust versions of Lagrange multiplier tests indicated that, in 7 out of 9 models (except the one explaining voting participation and the outcome of N), the linear model should be rejected against the alternative of the SLM model, but not SEM. A less obvious picture emerged for principal component models (see Table 5 and Fig. 8) and, in consequence, we inspected both SLM and SEM models, looking for the robustness of the results.

Table 4. Testing of linear non-spatial regression specific (reduced) models

Feature	PiS [% all]	K15 [% all]	PO [% all]	N [% all]	K15 [% K15 + PiS]	N [% N + PO]	PiS + K15 [% 4 parties]	N + K15 [% 4 parties]	Partici-pation [%]
R-squared	0.826	0.374	0.859	0.819	0.653	0.417	0.879	0.611	0.896
Adjusted R-squared	0.813	0.344	0.852	0.810	0.632	0.394	0.873	0.589	0.889
Breusch-Pagan (p-value)	**0.095**	0.999	**0.083**	0.186	0.841	0.258	**0.038**	0.812	**0.023**
Jarque-Bera (p-value)	0.062	**0.000**	**0.003**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	0.573	**0.000**	0.245
Moran's I (p-value)	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
LM: err (p-value)	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
LM: lag (p-value)	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
RLM: err (p-value)	0.424	0.291	0.280	**0.056**	0.123	0.788	0.237	0.737	**0.005**
RLM: lag (p-value)	**0.000**	**0.003**	**0.000**	**0.023**	**0.000**	**0.006**	**0.000**	**0.012**	**0.000**
SARMA (p-value)	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
AIC	2264.23	1363.92	1951.78	1192.25	1935.65	2096.52	2253.62	1766.29	1660.54

Source: own work.

It is noteworthy that some models exhibited exceptionally low R-squared (and adjusted R-squared) values. That was the case when explaining support for the new right-wing K15, and the choice between the liberal newcomer N and the incumbent PO. Those two variables may require additional clarification at the micro level, as the choice appears to be explicable on the individual level, rather than the regional one. One can conclude that the regional cross-section allows one to explain the election results to a decent extent as regards the results of well-established parties and the voting participation. This is, however, no truer for newly emerged parties that declare themselves as anti-establishment (K15) and/or are difficult to distinguish in the ideological or economic dimensions from their direct competitors (N vs PO).

The residuals of the spatial models reported here were not any more spatially autocorrelated (see Tables 6 and 8), and hence no need for considering dual-source models arose (except the additional hypothesis tested in Section 5).



Fig. 7. Residuals from specific (reduced) models – spatial distribution

Source: own work.

Table 5. Testing of linear non-spatial regression models on principal components

Feature	PiS [% all]	K15 [% all]	PO [% all]	N [% all]	K15 [% K15 + PiS]	N [% N + PO]	PiS + K15 [% 4 parties]	N + K15 [% 4 parties]	Partici-pation [%]
R-squared	0.257	0.008	0.406	0.619	0.123	0.072	0.433	0.308	0.397
Adjusted R-squared	0.253	0.003	0.403	0.617	0.119	0.067	0.429	0.305	0.394
Breusch-Pagan (p-value)	**0.002**	0.367	**0.045**	**0.000**	0.599	0.412	**0.030**	0.919	**0.000**
Jarque-Bera (p-value)	0.213	**0.000**	**0.031**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	0.620	**0.000**	0.267
Moran's I (p-value)	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
LM: err (p-value)	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**

Table 5. (cont.)

LM: lag (p-value)	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
RLM: err (p-value)	**0.099**	**0.000**	**0.009**	0.959	0.541	**0.002**	**0.001**	0.995	**0.000**
RLM: lag (p-value)	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	0.519	**0.000**	**0.000**	0.862
SARMA (p-value)	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**	**0.000**
AIC	2766.902	1508.626	2465.000	1441.638	2249.445	2248.768	2808.470	1948.623	2282.693

Source: own work.



Fig. 8. Residuals from models on principal components – spatial distribution

Source: own work.

4.2. What does explain voting results? Single-source spatial models with principal components and reduced sets of variables

Tables 6 and 8 provide information about the spatial models estimated with individual variables and principal components on the right-hand side, respectively:[11]

$$\text{SLM:} \quad y_j = \rho_j W y_j + x_j \beta_j + \varepsilon_j; \tag{1}$$

$$\text{SEM:} \quad y_j = x_j \beta_j + (I - \lambda_j W)^{-1} \varepsilon_j. \tag{2}$$

with $\boldsymbol{y_j}$ – dependent variable in the *j*-th model, $\boldsymbol{x_j}$ – the respective set of regressors in the *j*-th model, $\boldsymbol{\beta_i}$– structural coefficients (reported, along with ρ_i and λ_i, in Tables 6 and 8), $\boldsymbol{W}$ – spatial weight matrix based on shared border criterion. For robustness check, we also consider two additional $\boldsymbol{W}$ matrices: (i) defining neighbours as poviats whose centroids are located no further than 60 km away from each other, (ii) based on inverse distance (in km).

Firstly, the component of **economic activity** (Factor 1) can be interpreted quite intuitively. It positively influenced the turnout level, as well as the support for liberal parties, especially for N. Then again, it contributed to a decrease in support for PiS and K15 (**H1.4** generally confirmed). However, in the case of K15, the spatial model was needed to state this dependency (not confirmed in the linear set-up). Interestingly, the factor representing the economic activity was not related to the traditional east-west division along the former borders of Poland's partitions in the 19th century.

Considering individual variables of the component, one can arrive at the following conclusions:

– The share of agriculture (understood as percentage of employees in the agricultural sector) had a visible, positive impact on the support for PiS, but not K15. The share of agriculture negatively affected the result of PO, but not N (the latter may have competed against the agrarian party PSL, the former coalition member with PO, to a lesser extent). Hence, **H1.3** and **H3** may be viewed as partly confirmed.

– In Poland, the share of people under 24 in the total number of the unemployed in 2015 was 15.1%. The lowest share was recorded for Warsaw (5.3%), whereas the highest for *poviat* proszowicki near Krakow (30%). While, unsurpris-

[11] Alternative estimates, i.a. using SEM / SLM (where not provided here) and SARAR specifications, are available upon request. There is no qualitative difference between SLM and SEM results, regarding the significance of variables, in a vast majority of cases. In case of the model for participation rate, since Lagrange multiplier tests did not favour SLM or SEM models, all 3 estimate sets are shown (OLS, SLM, SEM). However, in the case of SLM, Moran I test continues to show spatial dependencies so SEM appears to be preferable.

ingly, unemployment among young people influenced the support for PiS as the runner-up, it turns out to weaken the support for both newcomers on the political scene, both on aggregate and as compared to their direct competitors (N vs PO, K15 vs PiS – **H3** partly confirmed). Although it may be viewed as a sign of young people rebelling against the authorities, one must admit that this phenomenon is very limited in Poland and the variable might in fact approximate another phenomenon, i.e. the generally passive attitude of young voters towards politics in some regions.

– The wealth of the inhabitants (approximated per PIT tax income) increased mainly the result of N and the turnout level. It did not increase the support for PO, which can be treated as result of weariness among more affluent people with the establishment. It turns out that the variable did not impair PiS.

– Against the expected outcome, the fact that a *poviat* was a city with *poviat* rights (i.e. a big city) did not decrease the share of votes for both right-wing parties, and at the same time weakened the results of PO. It possible that geography patterns are not the same as wealth distribution and, after accounting for wealth explicitly, it appeared that the anti-establishment sentiment wave may had appeared in big, but less wealthy cities. Still, in line with the previous literature, the voting turnout tends to be significantly higher in big cities.

– Contrary to how the whole component of economic activity works, the employment per 1,000 population weakened the turnout level. At the same time, the voter turnout was strengthened by the unemployment among people with higher education. Thus, it suggests a political activation of regions which abounded in economically inactive people and specific groups of the unemployed. The total unemployment indeed diminisheed the turnout, as less educated people, registered as short-term unemployed, often work abroad.

Secondly, looking at the impact of Factor 2, *poviats* with younger **demographic profile** of the residents noted higher voter turnout and support for the liberal party N. Furthermore, the transition from the linear to the spatial model caused that the negative impact on PiS – as well as the positive on PO – ceased to be significant. That suggested that the spatial clustering of Factor 2 (see Fig. 6) approximated the spatial effects arising elsewhere. A closer look at the individual variables building up this factor demonstrated, however, that the impact of demographics was more nuanced.

– Inhabitant registration, which reflects the population inflow to selected *poviats*, had a positive influence on the results of the new parties (part of **H3**).

– In *poviats* with many live births, there was no significant increase in support for PiS; on the contrary, the variable weakened its results. That suggests that election promises regarding the additional child benefit, widely considered as the main driver of their electoral success, could convince the socially oriented electorate, but not necessarily people in the childbearing age. This insight was confirmed by the other variables with similar information content, i.e. children aged 14 and

less per adult population aged 18–49, as well as children benefit amount *per capita*. Note that this aspect of demography remained neutral for the liberal parties. Surprisingly, this leads us to rejection of the hypothesis **H1.2**.

– The share of pre and post-working population had a positive influence on the result of PiS and the turnout level, and a negative one on the new parties. One could conclude that the relationship between age and the support for the winner party was non-linear, and hence the previous belief (see Cornelis *et al*., 2009; Truett, 1993; Wilson, 1973) that the support for right-wing conservative parties increases with age could be negated in the case of Poland's 2015 parliamentary election.

Cultural and historical factors (post-German territories, higher crime and divorce rates as compared to more conservative territories) had some predictive power in terms of the liberalism-conservatism trade-off, but the 19th century partitions or pure surface trend by no means play the dominant role in explaining this dichotomy. Although the decrease in latitude appears to support the right-wing parties, some liberal ones (N) do not necessarily gain when moving to the North. Overall, the new parties do not fit into the old electoral geographical schemes when taking into account the signs and significance of the last 4 variables in Tables 6 and 8.

– Divorces per 1,000 population can be treated as symptomatic for moral liberalism prevailing in some *poviats*. As expected, the variable strengthened the shares of liberal parties, but also for the right-wing newcomer K15 (perhaps as a possible alternative to PiS for voters that were, for some reason, inclined to support the right-wing but were reluctant to adopt an ideologically conservative perspective).

– Conversely, the rate of marriages (computed against the population aged 18–49) increased, on average, the support for PiS and decreased for PO.

It must be emphasised that **EU fund absorption** in a given *poviat* had surprisingly no effect on the election results in any of the analysed dimensions (rejection of **H1.5**). Looking at Fig. 2, this phenomenon cannot be explained by strong collinearity with any other variable. This suggested that the very fact of implementing EU policies was neutral to the local election outcomes, but perhaps the effects of these policies, as measured by other socio-economic variables, were relevant. However, there was some effect of local investment activity (by *gminas* and *poviats*) in the expected dimension, i.e. in favour of the incumbent PO.

Also, surprisingly, the local economic dynamics from 2007 to 2015 did not at all affect the voting results. This variable had never appeared as significant, for any dependent variable. Against our previously stated hypothesis, the population of slow-growing poviats was probably not blaming the incumbent government, nor the fast-growing poviats did prefer the incumbent party. Other factors appeared to have dominated over this dimension (**H1.1** rejected).

The alternative specifications of the $\boldsymbol{W}$ matrix in (1) and (2) leave all the above discussed conclusions unaffected. It must be emphasised that the first alternative version does not remove the spatial autocorrelation from the residuals for some

dependent variables (including PiS, total right-wing score and participation). For the remaining dependent variables, a vast majority of conclusions regarding the significance holds (including all the essential, hypothesised relationships). With the second alternative ***W***, we rejected the null hypothesis in the Moran's test for all the variables (while the coefficients also remain qualitatively unaffected as compared to the base version).[12]

Table 6a. Spatial reduced models for 9 dependent variables (N=380)

Model	PiS		K15		PO	
	OLS	SLM	OLS	SLM	OLS	SLM
ρ		0.514***		0.398***		0.484***
λ						
Constant	64.852**	32.93	53.822***	35.181***	-47.848***	-60.764***
Own income g-p PIT (p.c.)			-0.001**	-0.001***		
Own income g-p CIT (p.c.)						-0.008**
Total capital in industry (p.c.)					-0.026***	-0.013*
Debt service g-p per 1000PLN income			-0.036*			
Capital - enterprise sector (p.c.)	0.031**	0.018*				
Investment by g-p (% total exp.)					0.06**	0.064**
Share emp.: agriculture	13.043***	13.243***			-12.944***	-10.48***
Share emp.: industry incl. construction			2.895***	2.652***		
Share emp.: finance, insurance, real est.						
Share emp.: other services	17.311***	18.312***			7.118*	
Employment per 1000 population						
Monthly avg gross salary	0.002**	0.002***				
Registered unemployment						
Unemployment: % aged <24	23.099**	16.233*	-5.347*	-5.508**		
Unemployment: % duration >1y	0.137***	0.1***				
Unemployment: % higher educated	0.197**	0.226***				
Activity rate (total)			-5.617***	-4.736***		
Activity rate: women	-17.402*					
Children <14 per 1000 popul.18-49	-0.167***	-0.104***			0.092***	
Pre-working (% popul)	7.073***	4.798***	-0.397***	-0.393***	-2.007***	
Post-working men (% popul)						
Post-working women (% popul)	248.25***	158.512***	-64.024***	-49.954***		
Women (per 100 men)	-0.561***	-0.4**			0.235**	0.406***
Children benefit (p.c.)	-2469.137**	-1835.685*	-803.943***	-838.327***		
Live births (per 1000 popul.)	-1.253***	-0.839**	-0.264**			
Deaths (per 1000 popul.)						

[12] Complete results available upon request.

Table 6a. (cont.)

Model	PiS		K15		PO	
	OLS	SLM	OLS	SLM	OLS	SLM
Share deaths: cardiovascular						
Share deaths: neoplasms					0.133*	
Share deaths: respiratory	0.251*	0.207*				
Inhabitant registrations (p.c.)						
Migration balance	-0.001**	-0.001***				
Divorces (per 1000 popul.)	-4.608***	-3.584***			2.826***	2.661***
Marriages (per 1000 popul.18-49)	0.731***	0.571**			-0.515***	-0.365***
Secondary school enrolment (p.c.)	231.469***				-72.22**	
Educational subsidy (p.c.)	-0.009***	-0.007***				
Students (p.c.)	-29.419**	-34.423***				
Children 3-5y in k-gartens (to popul.18-49)						33.817***
Population density						
Urban population share	0.082***	0.065***			-0.042**	
City with poviat rights			0.764**			-1.21**
Distance to voivodship city						
Longitude	0.708***		0.162***	0.117**	-0.563***	-0.213**
Latitude	-1.583***	-1.031***	-0.552***	-0.347***	1.173***	0.721***
Prussian partition	-8.279***	-2.074**	2.035***	1.272***	2.988***	
Russian partition	-3.428***		1.768***	1.321***	-3.017***	-2.264***
Moran's I (p-value)	0	0.32	0	0.454	0	0.096

Source: own work.

Table 6b. Spatial reduced models for 9 dependent variables (N=380)

Model	N			K15vsPiS		NvsPO	
	OLS	SLM	SEM	OLS	SLM	OLS	SLM
ρ		0.362***			0.422***		0.449***
λ			0.543***				
Constant	5.688*	4.838*	14.862***	82.527***	60.689***	43.28***	11.317
Own income g-p PIT (p.c.)	0.004***	0.003***	0.005***	-0.003**	-0.003**	0.004***	0.003***
Own income g-p CIT (p.c.)							
Total capital in industry (p.c.)							
Debt service g-p per 1000PLN income				-0.101**	-0.077**		
Capital - enterprise sector (p.c.)							
Investment by g-p (% total exp.)							
Share emp.: agriculture							
Share emp.: industry incl. construction							

Table 6b. (cont.)

Share emp.: finance, insurance, real est.				-45.531***	-33.011**		
Share emp.: other services						-6.943*	-6.266*
Employment per 1000 population	0.008*	0.008*					
Monthly avg gross salary							
Registered unemployment							
Unemployment: % aged <24	-15.329***	-13.397***	-14.86***	-26.471***	-20.916***	-23.165***	-18.895**
Unemployment: % duration >1y				-0.093***	-0.075***		
Unemployment: % higher educated				-0.135**	-0.134**		
Activity rate (total)	-13.091***	-10.275**	-3.634***				
Activity rate: women							
Children <14 per 1000 popul.18-49				0.063**	0.045*	-0.11***	-0.1***
Pre-working (% popul)				-3.275***	-2.381***	2.215***	1.899***
Post-working men (% popul)						167.346***	123.178**
Post-working women (% popul)	18.859*	15.656**		-129.28***	-96.862***		
Women (per 100 men)							
Children benefit (p.c.)				-3683.72***	-3174.539***		
Live births (per 1000 popul.)	0.173**					0.917***	0.691**
Deaths (per 1000 popul.)	-0.21***	-0.277***	-0.113**	-0.512**	-0.49**		
Share deaths: cardiovascular						-0.098**	
Share deaths: neoplasms						-0.24***	-0.166**
Share deaths: respiratory							
Inhabitant registrations (p.c.)						207.423**	234.966***
Migration balance				0.001***	0.001***		
Divorces (per 1000 popul.)				1.316**	1.198**		
Marriages (per 1000 popul.18-49)							
Secondary school enrolment (p.c.)				-154.433***	-93.855**		
Educational subsidy (p.c.)				0.004**	0.003**		
Students (p.c.)	10.583***	9.728***	8.217***				
Children 3-5y in k-gartens (to popul.18-49)				43.927*	34.987*		
Population density				0.001***	0.001**		
Urban population share							
City with poviat rights							
Distance to voivodship city						-0.015**	
Longitude	-0.27***	-0.167***	-0.37***			-0.287**	-0.203*
Latitude	0.104**	0.1**				-0.367**	
Prussian partition	0.546***			5.404***	2.546***	-3.453***	-2.139***
Russian partition				2.731***	2.006***		
Moran's I (p-value)	0	0.067	0.389	0	0.557	0	0.218

Source: own work.

Table 6c. Spatial reduced models for 9 dependent variables (N=380)

Model	PiS+K15		K15+N		Participation		
	OLS	SLM	OLS	SLM	OLS	SLM	SEM
ρ		0.493***		0.404***		0.283***	
λ							0.515***
Constant	210.561***	124.584***	62.594***	54.71***	0.936	-6.02	8.178
Own income g-p PIT (p.c.)					0.011***	0.007***	0.011***
Own income g-p CIT (p.c.)	0.03***	0.019***					
Total capital in industry (p.c.)							
Debt service g-p per 1000PLN income					-0.055*	-0.049*	
Capital - enterprise sector (p.c.)							
Investment by g-p (% total exp.)					0.049**	0.033*	
Share emp.: agriculture	21.17***	18.378***			-9.683***	-7.906***	-7.147***
Share emp.: industry incl. construction							
Share emp.: finance, insurance, real est.							
Share emp.: other services			-10.107***	-6.626**			
Employment per 1000 population			0.025**	0.02**	-0.187***	-0.183***	-0.175***
Monthly avg gross salary		0.001**			-0.001*		
Registered unemployment					-0.578***	-0.589***	-0.554***
Unemployment: % aged <24			-31.709***	-20.473***			
Unemployment: % duration >1y			-0.064***	-0.047**			
Unemployment: % higher educated			-0.141**	-0.139***	0.27***	0.254***	0.263***
Activity rate (total)			-41.653***	-21.933**	167.453***	166.82***	159.439***
Activity rate: women	-27.906***	-18.355***	18.619**				
Children <14 per 1000 popul.18-49	-0.095***				-0.079***	-0.048***	-0.058***
Pre-working (% popul)	3.164***	1.05***	-1.112***	-0.653***	3.465***	2.449***	2.912***
Post-working men (% popul)			97.433*		124.338***		145.567***
Post-working women (% popul)			-131.696***		171.366***	204.945***	157.347***
Women (per 100 men)	-0.672***	-0.512***	0.245**				
Children benefit (p.c.)					-2087.043***	-2086.594***	-1798.965***
Live births (per 1000 popul.)	-1.34***	-0.772**			0.703***	0.481***	0.567***
Deaths (per 1000 popul.)			-0.372*	-0.69***		-0.426***	-0.356**
Share deaths: cardiovascular							
Share deaths: neoplasms							
Share deaths: respiratory					0.154**	0.105*	0.102*
Inhabitant registrations (p.c.)			165.8***	178.424***			
Migration balance	-0.001**	-0.001***			-0.001***		0***
Divorces (per 1000 popul.)	-4.689***	-4.205***	1.142**	0.94**	-1.35***	-1.379***	-0.916**

Table 6c. (cont.)

Marriages (per 1000 popul.18-49)	0.905***	0.618***					
Secondary school enrolment (p.c.)	196.78***		-90.828**				
Educational subsidy (p.c.)			0.003**		-0.002***	-0.002**	-0.002***
Students (p.c.)			11.833*	11.487*			
Children 3-5y in k-gartens (to popul.18-49)	-62.46***	-47.45***					
Population density							
Urban population share	0.099***	0.07***					
City with poviat rights					1.241**	1.495***	1.111**
Distance to voivodship city					-0.011***		-0.011**
Longitude	1.04***	0.373**					
Latitude	-2.215***	-1.349***	-0.56***	-0.358***	-0.375***	-0.202*	-0.411**
Prussian partition	-5.395***		4.089***	1.878***	-3.331***	-2.06***	-2.481***
Russian partition	3.233***	2.754***	3.576***	2.094***	-2.381***	-1.593***	-1.873***
Moran's I (p-value)	0	0.16	0	0.168	0	0.013	0.653

Source: own work.

Table 7a. Mixed-W reduced models for 9 dependent variables (N=380)

Model	**PiS**		**K15**		**PO**	
	SARAR mixed W	**SEM mixed W**	**SARAR mixed W**	**SEM mixed W**	**SARAR mixed W**	**SEM mixed W**
ρ (base W) / λ (base W)	0.444***	0.537***	0.356***	0.351***	0.409***	0.496***
λ (constituency W)	0.316***	0.17**	0.15	0.112	0.283***	0.196***
Constant	37.895	63.78**	35.283***	48.823***	-59.277***	-60.497***
Own income g-p PIT (p.c.)			-0.001**	-0.001***		
Own income g-p CIT (p.c.)					-0.01***	-0.009***
Total capital in industry (p.c.)						
Debt service g-p per 1000PLN income				-0.033*		
Capital - enterprise sector (p.c.)	0.017*	0.019*				
Investment by g-p (% total exp.)					0.063**	0.066**
Share emp.: agriculture	13.525***	11.999***			-9.25***	-11.873***
Share emp.: industry incl. construction			2.385***	2.711***		
Share emp.: finance, insurance, real est.						
Share emp.: other services	15.506***	13.418**			5.673*	5.626*
Employment per 1000 population						
Monthly avg gross salary	0.002***	0.001**				
Registered unemployment						
Unemployment: % aged <24	21.068**	36.196***	-5.61**	-5.359*		
Unemployment: % duration >1y	0.091**	0.101***				

Table 7a. (cont.)

Model	PiS		K15		PO	
	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W
Unemployment: % higher educated	0.275***	0.34***				
Activity rate (total)			-4.255***	-4.973***		
Activity rate: women						
Children <14 per 1000 popul.18-49	-0.122***	-0.147***			0.036*	0.063***
Pre-working (% popul)	5.285***	6.129***	-0.222*	-0.266*	-0.748**	-1.464***
Post-working men (% popul)						
Post-working women (% popul)	176.677***	190.462***	-44.997***	-48.848***		
Women (per 100 men)	-0.401**	-0.31*			0.341***	0.284***
Children benefit (p.c.)	-1700.177*		-818.148***	-829.437***		
Live births (per 1000 popul.)	-0.789**	-0.939**	-0.201*	-0.206*		
Deaths (per 1000 popul.)						
Share deaths: cardiovascular						
Share deaths: neoplasms						
Share deaths: respiratory	0.207*					
Inhabitant registrations (p.c.)						
Migration balance	-0.001***	-0.001***				
Divorces (per 1000 popul.)	-3.399***	-2.858***			2.633***	2.809***
Marriages (per 1000 popul.18-49)	0.501**	0.637***			-0.4***	-0.427***
Secondary school enrolment (p.c.)						
Educational subsidy (p.c.)	-0.006***	-0.004**				
Students (p.c.)	-36.364***	-37.489***				
Children 3-5y in k-gartens (to popul.18-49)					25.699**	
Population density						
Urban population share	0.072***	0.086***				-0.051***
City with poviat rights				0.542	-1.74***	
Distance to voivodship city						
Longitude		0.973***	0.132**	0.123*	-0.273**	-0.927***
Latitude	-1.177***	-2.13***	-0.392***	-0.557***	0.859***	1.543***
Prussian partition	-2.505***	-3.063**	1.555***	2.006***		
Russian partition			1.472***	1.957***	-2.917***	-3.984***
Moran's I (p-value)	0.435	0.445	0.469	0.349	0.216	0.379

Source: own work.

Table 7b. Mixed-W reduced models for 9 dependent variables (N=380)

Model	N		K15vsPiS		NvsPO	
	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W
ρ (base W) / λ (base W)	0.342***	0.527***	0.347***	0.405***	0.349***	0.378***
λ (constituency W)	0.103	0.031	0.32***	0.235***	0.392***	0.275***
Constant	5.193*	14.832***	51.342***	61.888***	1.007	6.217
Own income g-p PIT (p.c.)	0.003***	0.005***			0.004***	0.005***
Own income g-p CIT (p.c.)						
Total capital in industry (p.c.)						
Debt service g-p per 1000PLN income						
Capital - enterprise sector (p.c.)						
Investment by g-p (% total exp.)						
Share emp.: agriculture						
Share emp.: industry incl. construction						
Share emp.: finance, insurance, real est.			-27.29**	-25.197*		
Share emp.: other services						
Employment per 1000 population	0.008*					
Monthly avg gross salary						
Registered unemployment						
Unemployment: % aged <24	-13.436***	-14.808***	-23.63***	-31.629***	-12.2*	-13.138*
Unemployment: % duration >1y			-0.074***	-0.094***		
Unemployment: % higher educated			-0.159***	-0.203***		
Activity rate (total)	-10.042**	-3.657***				
Activity rate: women						
Children <14 per 1000 popul.18-49					-0.096***	-0.105***
Pre-working (% popul)			-1.319***	-1.43***	2.476***	2.714***
Post-working men (% popul)					149.103**	177.833***
Post-working women (% popul)	14.955*		-96.617***	-98.761***		
Women (per 100 men)						
Children benefit (p.c.)			-2796.665***	-1843.92***		
Live births (per 1000 popul.)						
Deaths (per 1000 popul.)	-0.271***	-0.112**				
Share deaths: cardiovascular						
Share deaths: neoplasms					-0.172**	-0.18**
Share deaths: respiratory						
Inhabitant registrations (p.c.)					222.881***	191.336***
Migration balance						
Divorces (per 1000 popul.)			1.591***	1.517***		
Marriages (per 1000 popul.18-49)						
Secondary school enrolment (p.c.)			-85.69**	-104.616***		

Table 7b. (cont.)

Model	N		K15vsPiS		NvsPO	
	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W
Educational subsidy (p.c.)			0.004**	0.004**		
Students (p.c.)	9.371***	8.228***				
Children 3-5y in k-gartens (to popul.18-49)			32.592*			
Population density						
Urban population share						
City with poviat rights						
Distance to voivodship city					-0.026***	-0.038***
Longitude	-0.176***	-0.37***				
Latitude	0.098*					
Prussian partition			2.979***	4.993***	-1.634***	-2.091***
Russian partition			2.087***	3.718***		
Moran's I (p-value)	0.066	0.365	0.308	0.401	0.097	0.124

Source: own work.

Table 7c. Mixed-W reduced models for 9 dependent variables (N=380)

Model	PiS+K15		K15+N		Participation	
	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W
ρ (base W) / λ_1 (base W)	0.408***	0.483***	0.261***	0.299***	0.214***	0.475***
λ / λ_2 (constituency W)	0.293***	0.198**	0.419***	0.319***	0.238**	0.117
Constant	137.903***	207.016***	59.527***	69.77***	-3.03	7.175
Own income g-p PIT (p.c.)					0.009***	0.01***
Own income g-p CIT (p.c.)	0.018***	0.019***				
Total capital in industry (p.c.)						
Debt service g-p per 1000PLN income					-0.046*	
Capital - enterprise sector (p.c.)						
Investment by g-p (% total exp.)					0.035*	
Share emp.: agriculture	19.95***	22.633***			-8.665***	-7.32***
Share emp.: industry incl. construction						
Share emp.: finance, insurance, real est.						
Share emp.: other services			-6.001**	-5.908**		
Employment per 1000 population			0.018*	0.022*	-0.189***	-0.184***
Monthly avg gross salary	0.001**	0.001*			-0.001*	0*

Table 7c. (cont.)

Registered unemployment					-0.589***	-0.578***
Unemployment: % aged <24			-22.973***	-25.69***		
Unemployment: % duration >1y			-0.041*	-0.048**		
Unemployment: % higher educated			-0.146***	-0.175***	0.267***	0.276***
Activity rate (total)			-19.869*	-24.638**	172.74***	167.321***
Activity rate: women	-17.021***	-18.323***				
Children <14 per 1000 popul.18-49	-0.055**	-0.061**			-0.063***	-0.061***
Pre-working (% popul)	2.234***	2.611***	-0.525***	-0.585***	2.888***	2.956***
Post-working men (% popul)					83.273*	143.738***
Post-working women (% popul)					175.045***	153.038***
Women (per 100 men)	-0.494***	-0.618***				
Children benefit (p.c.)					-1911.602***	-1852.85***
Live births (per 1000 popul.)	-0.777**	-1.001***			0.437**	0.529***
Deaths (per 1000 popul.)			-0.526***	-0.494***	-0.355**	-0.325**
Share deaths: cardiovascular						
Share deaths: neoplasms						
Share deaths: respiratory					0.115**	
Inhabitant registrations (p.c.)			237.375***	268.575***		
Migration balance	-0.001***	-0.001***				
Divorces (per 1000 popul.)	-4.158***	-3.912***	1.079**	0.976**	-1.11***	-0.856**
Marriages (per 1000 popul.18-49)	0.659***	0.741***				
Secondary school enrolment (p.c.)		128.091**				
Educational subsidy (p.c.)					-0.002***	-0.002***
Students (p.c.)			11.698**	13.393**		
Children 3-5y in k-gartens (to popul.18-49)	-41.863**	-36.24*				
Population density						
Urban population share	0.087***	0.103***				
City with poviat rights					1.213**	1.073**
Distance to voivodship city					-0.008*	-0.013**
Longitude	0.463**	1.46***				
Latitude	-1.624***	-2.695***	-0.499***	-0.572**	-0.26*	-0.364*
Prussian partition			2.944***	3.746***	-2.087***	-2.139***
Russian partition	3.999***	5.161***	2.594***	3.141***	-1.475***	-1.643**
Moran's I (p-value)	0.332	0.593	0.207	0.238	0.021	0.62

Source: own work.

Table 8. Principal component models for 9 dependent variables (N=380)

Model	PiS			K15			PO		
	OLS	SLM	SEM	OLS	SLM	SEM	OLS	SLM	SEM
ρ		0.807***			0.613***			0.766***	
λ			0.859***			0.644***			0.872***
Constant	39.13***	7.023***	39.486***	9.132***	3.466***	9.063***	22.219***	5.768***	22.644***
F01: activity, employment, cities	1.245***	0.718***	0.716***	0.013	0.037*	0.038*	-1.128***	-0.723***	-0.743***
F02: young	-0.927***	0.152	0.161	-0.06	0.017	0.095**	1.021***	0.044	0.034
Moran's I (p-value)	0	0.695	0.972	0	0.703	0.787	0	0.223	0.95
Model	**N**			**K15vsPiS**			**NvsPO**		
	OLS	SLM		OLS	SLM		OLS	SLM	SEM
ρ		0.537***			0.74***			0.653***	
λ									0.661***
Constant	6.005***	2.871***		19.69***	5.119***		21.425***	7.328***	20.969***
F01: activity, employment, cities	-0.477***	-0.352***		-0.41***	-0.178***		-0.319***	-0.194***	-0.243***
F02: young	0.331***	0.147***		0.272***	0.052		0.136	0.17**	0.382***
Moran's I (p-value)	0	0.533		0	0.913		0	0.33	0.51
Model	**PiS+K15**			**K15+N**			**Participation**		
	OLS	SLM	SEM	OLS	SLM		OLS	SLM	SEM
ρ		0.764***			0.608***			0.727***	
λ			0.875***						0.804***
Constant	63.029***	14.001***	62.998***	19.823***	7.785***		47.168***	13.324***	47.159***
F01: activity, employment, cities	1.889***	1.196***	1.223***	-0.505***	-0.314***		-0.977***	-0.756***	-0.895***
F02: young	-1.645***	-0.074	-0.09	0.266***	0.117**		0.363***	0.167**	0.518***
Moran's I (p-value)	0	0.195	0.982	0	0.788		0	0	0.994

Source: own work.

Table 9. Mixed-W principal component models for 9 dependent variables (N=380)

Model	PiS		K15		PO	
	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W	SARAR mixed W	SEM mixed W
ρ (base W) / λ_1 (base W)	0.743***	0.683***	0.425***	0.443***	0.706***	0.689***
λ / λ_2 (constituency W)	0.298***	0.205***	0.418***	0.281***	0.296***	0.21***
Constant	9.564***	39.626***	5.201***	9.061***	7.024***	22.181***

Table 9. (cont.)

F01: activity, employment, cities	0.767***	0.722***	0.045**	0.039*	-0.761***	-0.744***
F02: young	0.145	0.2	0.063*	0.108***	0.026	-0.018
Moran's I (p-value)	0.725	0.857	0.325	0.495	0.329	0.764
Model	**N**		**K15vsPiS**		**NvsPO**	
	SARAR mixed W	**SEM mixed W**	**SARAR mixed W**	**SEM mixed W**	**SARAR mixed W**	**SEM mixed W**
ρ (base W) / λ_1 (base W)	0.517***	0.582***	0.628***	0.569***	0.535***	0.541***
λ / λ_2 (constituency W)	0.127	0.161**	0.337***	0.252***	0.354***	0.18**
Constant	2.99***	5.838***	7.321***	19.35***	9.885***	21***
F01: activity, employment, cities	-0.355***	-0.348***	-0.185***	-0.178***	-0.233***	-0.264***
F02: young	0.155***	0.186***	0.107	0.176**	0.313***	0.425***
Moran's I (p-value)	0.653	0.541	0.718	0.728	0.217	0.306
Model	**PiS+K15**		**K15+N**		**Participation**	
	SARAR mixed W	**SEM mixed W**	**SARAR mixed W**	**SEM mixed W**	**SARAR mixed W**	**SEM mixed W**
ρ (base W) / λ_1 (base W)	0.699***	0.696***	0.461***	0.436***	0.509***	0.634***
λ / λ_2 (constituency W)	0.321***	0.206***	0.402***	0.315***	0.616***	0.213***
Constant	18.222***	63.435***	10.708***	19.557***	23.453***	47.075***
F01: activity, employment, cities	1.267***	1.234***	-0.329***	-0.326***	-0.933***	-0.927***
F02: young	-0.074	-0.025	0.214***	0.272***	0.466***	0.535***
Moran's I (p-value)	0.387	0.846	0.623	0.461	0.081	0.923

Source: own work.

5. THE ROLE OF CONSTITUENCY-SPECIFIC LISTS OF CANDIDATES: DUAL-SOURCE SPATIAL MODELS WITH MIXED-W MATRICES

On top of the usual spatial dependencies between *poviats* based on physical proximity, the discontinuity effect emerging from the borders of constituencies can be another aspect of the spatial election process. The presence of electoral districts, and thus the possibility of voting for the same candidates in a cluster of *poviats*, may influence election results.

Using mixed-$\boldsymbol{W}$ models with two spatial weight matrices, we analysed that possibility. One of those matrices ($\boldsymbol{W_1}$) represented the geographic proximity criterion (as in all models considered in Section 4). The other indicated two *poviats* as connected when they both belonged to the same constituency. The quality of candidates may be viewed here as an additional, latent regressor, and hence the latter $\boldsymbol{W}$ matrix

($\boldsymbol{W}_2$) was considered in the spatial error part only. The parameter accompanying this matrix should be estimated as significant if additional unexplained spatial discontinuity around their borders exists (while within-constituency spatial proximity should already be captured by $\boldsymbol{W}_1$). We applied the estimation method to isolated regions as the capital city Warsaw forms a single-*poviat* constituency.

While mixed-$\boldsymbol{W}$ SARAR models should in fact be reported as straightforward extensions of the baseline models for all dependent variables except the turnout, we reported both mixed-$\boldsymbol{W}$ SARAR and mixed-W SEM estimates in all cases for the purpose of robustness check:

$$\text{Mixed-W SARAR:} \quad y_i = \rho W_1 y_i + x_i \beta + (I - \lambda W_2)\, \varepsilon_i; \tag{3}$$

$$\text{Mixed-W SEM:} \quad y_i = x_i \beta + (I - \lambda_1 W_1)(I - \lambda_2 W_2)\, \varepsilon_i. \tag{4}$$

Estimates from mixed-$\boldsymbol{W}$ SARAR and SEM models were presented in Tables 7 and 9. They generally **confirmed our hypothesis H2** about the existence of the unobservable effects related to the candidates' attractiveness in individual constituencies (λ and λ_2 coefficients proved statistically significant in almost all cases, as confirmed by the likelihood ratio tests). The only cases in which they appeared as insignificant were the fractions of votes for the newcomers – K15 and N – as represented by relatively unknown, and hence less charismatic leaders of the lists than in the case of PO and PiS. However, it is noteworthy that even K15 and N exhibited this effect when their results were evaluated in relation to their segment competitors, i.e. PiS and PO respectively.

Both in the models with principal components and reduced models with original variables on the right-hand side of the equation, only minor changes in variable significance arose. If anything, individual explanatory variables tend to lose (rather than gain) statistical significance.

In the analysed cases of mixed-$\boldsymbol{W}$ SARAR models, the sum of ρ and λ is higher than the respective values of ρ considered in Section 4. The explicit inclusion of another source of spatial dependence, i.e. candidates' attractiveness in individual constituencies, improves the goodness of fit – in most cases, the log-likelihood for mixed-$\boldsymbol{W}$ models is higher than for SAR (spatial autoregressive models; see Table 10). K15 (in the run-up against PiS) is the only exception and it may be due to the presence of only one distinctive leader in one district (Paweł Kukiz himself).

This conclusion is robust with respect to the variant of $\boldsymbol{W}_1$ under consideration. In the first alternative version (poviats connected when centroids located up to 60 km from each other), the constituency-related parameter λ in (3) (or is λ_2 in (4)) was significant in all cases (even K15 and N). The same is true for the second alternative version (spatial weight matrix based on inverted distance), although it must be noted that for most of the dependent variables in question, this version of $\boldsymbol{W}_1$ leaves significant spatial autocorrelation in mixed-$\boldsymbol{W}$ model residuals.[13]

[13] Complete results available upon request.

The fact of accounting for constituency-specific lists of candidates as a latent determinant of electoral behaviours can be an important source of reducing spurious significances of other spatially correlated variables. In the political economy literature, this mechanism is technically similar in nature to including vertical interactions (variables describing upper-tier authority expenditures) in models of interaction between lower-tier authority expenditures (cf. Reveli, 2003). As demonstrated by Reveli for English local government expenditures, when vertical fiscal externalities among upper-tier (County) authority and lower-tier (District) authority expenditures were taken into account, the estimated magnitude of fiscal interactions between districts was substantially reduced. Omitting the vertical fiscal interactions can give the false impression of spatial interaction at the horizontal level and, by the same token, the fact of omitting the effect of constituencies can give a false impression of a strong spatial autoregression between individual *poviats* (lower tier than constituencies).

Table 10. Comparison of log-likelihood between SLM and respective mixed-W models

	SLM (reduced)	**SARAR (reduced, mixed-W)**	**SLM (PCA-reduced)**	**SARAR (PCA-reduced, mixed-W)**
PiS [% all]	-1068.5	**-1063.7**	-1157.2	**-1153.9**
K15 [% all]	-652.3	**-650.2**	-699.6	**-691.4**
PO [% all]	-923.8	**-918.3**	-1021.3	**-1018.0**
N [% all]	-592.8	**-592.4**	-641.7	**-640.9**
K15 [% K15 + PiS]	**-921.2**	-924.6	-987.5	**-983.9**
N [% N + PO]	-1013.7	**-1010.4**	-1059.7	**-1053.7**
PiS + K15 [% 4 parties]	-1073.2	**-1067.3**	-1178.9	**-1174.7**
N + K15 [% 4 parties]	-847.2	**-836.3**	-895.3	**-887.1**
Participation [%]	-787.4	**-781.1**	-992.4	**-958.8**

Source: own work.

6. CONCLUSIONS

We conducted a spatial econometric investigation of the 2015 Polish parliamentary election results, examining the determinants of choosing the incumbent (PO) versus the opposition (PiS), right-wing (PiS+K15) versus liberal (PO+N), as well as well established (PO+PiS) versus newly created parties (K15+N). Our analysis was located in the strand of spatial political economy literature and based

on regional data on the *poviat* level (380 units at the NUTS-4 level in the European Union nomenclature). We considered a broad set of socio-economic explanatory variables, selected by the *General-to-specific* principle and additionally supported by Bayesian model averaging, as well as used as input for the construction of 11 principal components.

Our results generally confirmed that traditional factors, such as a region's economic activity, demographic profile and north-west versus southeast orientation, continue to play a dominant role in the distribution of electoral support between the liberal and right-wing groups. However, the full picture appeared more nuanced: big cities tended to give more support towards right-wing parties (after controlling economic activity and demography), and the variables related directly to key promises during the electoral campaign (e.g. targeted at parents of young children and people nearing the retirement age) did not affect the results, at least not from the spatial perspective. At the same time, the spatial patterns in newcomers' results (N and, especially, K15) suggested that the geographical dimension of anti-establishment sentiments in Poland were more difficult to capture.

The data offered strong support for using spatial models, predominantly the spatial autoregression. The robust Lagrange multiplier tests prefer this specification over the spatial error model in most cases, which suggests that the spatial interactions of the dependent variable are a more likely spatial process than the spatial process of error autocorrelation that might have been due to an omission of important explanatory variables. The switch from non-spatial perspective (OLS estimation) to spatial models affected a number of conclusions about individual variable significance. Moran's I tests of the residuals confirmed that single source models (with neighbourhood-based $\boldsymbol{W}$ matrix) were sufficient to remove the spatial autocorrelation from the residuals.

Using mixed-$\boldsymbol{W}$ spatial models with an additional spatial weight matrix representing the adherence to the same constituencies, we also demonstrated that the latent effect of sharing the same candidate list offerede a significant contribution to election results. This conclusion was robust over political parties and model specifications (both SEM, turned into mixed-$\boldsymbol{W}$ SEM, and SAR, turned into mixed-$\boldsymbol{W}$ SARAR).

Future research could confront the 2015 election results with analogous upcoming results in 2019, as long as the system of constituencies persists, the set of parties running up for the victory remains stable and the socio-economic context of the campaign remains unchanged, at least to a decent extent. Another issue worth investigation is the combining of the regional dataset with micro-data (if available) into a spatial multilevel model. The impact of constituencies could be re-tested, backwards or forwards in time, regardless of the abovementioned circumstances, unless single-candidate elections are introduced. It could also be interesting to investigate this effect in an international panel, combining countries with similar, proportional, constituency-based electoral system.

REFERENCES

ALGAN, Y., GURIEV, S., PAPAIOANNOU, E. and PASSARI, E. (2017), 'The European Trust Crisis and the Rise of Populism', *Centre for Economic Policy Research Discussion Papers*, DP12444, November 2017.

ANSOLABEHERE, S. and KONISKY, D.M. (2006), The introduction of voter registration and its effect on turnout, *Political Analysis*, 14, pp. 83–100.

BARISIONE, M. (2009), So, what difference do leaders make? Candidates' images and the 'conditionality' of leader effects on voting, *Journal of Elections, Public Opinion and Parties*, 4, pp. 473–500.

BIEGAŃSKA, J. and SZYMAŃSKA, D. (2013), 'The scale and the dynamics of permanent migration in rural and peri-urban areas in Poland – some problems', [in:] SZYMAŃSKA, D. and CHODKOWSKA-MISZCZUK, J. (eds.), *Bulletin of Geography. Socio-economic Series*, 21, pp. 21–30. Toruń: Nicolaus Copernicus University Press.

BITTNER, A. (2018), Leaders always mattered: The persistence of personality in Canadian elections, *Electoral Studies*, 54, pp. 297–302.

CAMPOS, J., ERICSSON, N.R. and HENDRY D.F. (eds.), (2003), *Readings on General-to-Specific Modeling*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

CANCELA, J. and GEYS, B. (2016), 'Explaining voter turnout: A meta-analysis of national and subnational elections', *European Studies*, 42, pp. 264–275.

CHEN, J. and RODDEN, J. (2013), 'Unintentional Gerrymandering: Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures', *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 8, pp. 239–269.

CHO, W., GIMPEL, J. and HUI, I. (2012), 'Voter Migration and the Geographic Sorting of the American Electorate', *Annals of the Association of American Geographers*, 103.

CORNELIS, I., VAN HIEL, A., ROETS, A. and KOSSOWSKA, M. (2009), 'Age differences in conservatism: Evidence on the mediating effects of personality and cognitive style', *Journal of Personality*, 77, pp. 51–88.

DARMOFAL, D. (2006), 'Spatial Econometrics and Political Science', *Annual Meeting of the Southern Political Science Association,* Atlanta, GA, January, pp. 5–7.

DETTREY, B.J., SCHWINDT-BAYER, L.A. (2009), Voter Turnout in Presidential Democracies, *Comparative Political Studies*, 42 (10), pp. 1317–1338.

EGGERS, A.C. (2015), Proportionality and Turnout: Evidence From French Municipalities, *Comparative Political Studies*, 48 (2), pp. 135–167.

ENDERSBY, J.W., KRIECKHAUS, J.T. (2008). Turnout around the globe: the influence of electoral institutions on national voter participation, 1972–2000, *Electoral Studies*, 27, pp. 601–610.

FAUVELLE-AYMAR, C. and FRANÇOIS, A. (2006), The impact of closeness on turnout: an empirical relation based on a study of a two-round ballot, *Public Choice*, 127, pp. 469–491.

FOWLER, A. (2013), Electoral and policy consequences of voter turnout: evidence from compulsory voting in Australia, *Quarterly Journal of Political Science*, 8, pp. 159–182.

GARZIA, D. (2011), The personalization of politics in Western democracies: Causes and consequences on leader–follower relationships, *The Leadership Quarterly*, 22 (4), pp. 697–709.

GARZIA, D. (2012), Party and Leader Effects in Parliamentary Elections: Towards a Reassessment, *Politics*, 32 (3).

VAN GENT, W.P.C., JANSEN, E.F. and SMITS J.H.F. (2013), 'Right-wing Radical Populism in City and Suburbs: An Electoral Geography of the Partij Voor de Vrijheid in the Netherlands', *Urban Studies*, pp. 1–20, DOI: 10.1177/0042098013505889.

GEYS, B. (2006), 'Explaining voter turnout: A review of aggregate-level research', *Electoral Studies*, 25, pp. 637–663.

HOGAN, R.E. (2013), Campaign spending and voter participation in state legislative elections, *Social Science Quarterly*, 94, pp. 840–864.

HOLBROOK, T.M. and WEINSCHENK, A.C. (2014), Campaigns, Mobilization, and Turnout in Mayoral Elections, *Political Research Quarterly*, 67 (1), pp. 42–55.

JABŁONOWSKI, J. and MÜLLER, C. (2013), '3 sides of 1 coin – Long-term Fiscal Stability, Adequacy and Intergenerational Redistribution of the reformed Old-age Pension System in Poland', *National Bank Of Poland Working Paper*, 145.

KOOP, G. (2003), Bayesian Econometrics, John Wiley & Sons, Chapter 11: *Bayesian Model Averaging*.

KOWALSKI, M., (2003), 'Polaryzacja zachowań wyborczych w Polsce jako rezultat cywilizacyjnego rozdarcia kraju', *Przestrzeń wyborcza Polski*, Polskie Towarzystwo Geograficzne Oddział Akademicki, Warsaw.

KRZEMIŃSKI, P. (2009), 'Zachowania wyborcze w wyborach parlamentarnych i prezydenckich w Polsce w latach 2005–2007 – wzory przestrzennych zróżnicowań', *Przegląd Geograficzny*, 81 (2).

MANSLEY, E. and DEMSAR, U. (2015), 'Space matters: Geographic variability of electoral turnout determinants in the 2012 London mayoral election', *Electoral Studies*, 40, pp. 322–334.

Ministry of Regional Development in Poland, Poland National Strategic Reference Framework 2007–2013, URL https://www.funduszeeuropejskie.2007-2013.gov.pl/WstepDoFunduszyEuropejskich/Documents/NSRO_an_20_07.pdf (accessed on: 31.07.2018).

MORTON, A.D. (2017), 'Spatial Political Economy', *Journal of Australian Political Economy*, 77, pp. 21–38.

MUGHAN, A. (2015), Parties, conditionality and leader effects in parliamentary elections, *Party Politics*, 21 (1), pp. 28–39.

NIKOLENYI, C. (2010), 'Concurrent Elections and Voter Turnout: The Effect of the De-Linking of State Elections on Electoral Participation in India's Parliamentary Polls, 1971–2004', *Political Studies*, 58 (1), pp. 214–233.

PESZYŃSKI, W. (2016), 'Prezydencjalizacja zachowań wyborczych w elekcji parlamentarnej w 2015 roku', *Political Preferences*, 12, pp. 37–54.

RAHAT, G. and SHEAFER, T. (2007), 'The personalization(s) of politics: Israel 1949–2003', *Political Communication*, 24, pp. 65–80.

REVELLI, F. (2003), 'Reaction or interaction? Spatial process identification in multi-tiered government structures', *Journal of Urban Economics*, 53 (1), pp. 29–53.

SAIB, M. (2017), 'Spatial Autocorrelation in Voting Turnout', *Journal of Biometrics & Biostatistics*, 8.

SEABROOK, N. (2009), 'The Obama Effect: Patterns of Geographic Clustering in the 2004 and 2008 Presidential Elections', *The Forum*, 7 (2), Article 6.

TRUETT, K.R. (1993), 'Age differences in conservatism', *Personality and Individual Differences*, 14, pp. 405–411.

TURSKA-KAWA, A. (2016), 'Preferowane wartości podstawowe a zachowania wyborcze w elekcji parlamentarnej 2015 roku', *Political Preferences*, 13, pp. 105–118.

WCISEŁ, W. (2016), 'Migratory crisis in the eyes of the party leaders during the parliamentary campaign in Poland in 2015', *Political Preferences*, 13, pp. 21–34.

WILSON, G.D. (1973), *The psychology of conservatism*, Oxford, England: Academic Press.

ZARYCKI, T. (1997), 'Nowa przestrzeń społeczno-polityczna Polski', *Studia Regionalne i Lokalne*, 23 (56), Warsaw: Europejski Instytut Rozwoju Regionalnego i Lokalnego, UW.

ŻERKOWSKA-BALAS, M., LYUBASHENKO, I. and KWIATKOWSKA, A. (2016), 'Determinanty Preferencji Wyborczych: Polska w latach 1997–2015', *Studia Socjologiczne*, 4 (223), pp. 69–92.

sciendo

C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.11

Agnieszka KWIATEK-SOŁTYS[*], Małgorzata BAJGIER-KOWALSKA[**]

THE ROLE OF CULTURAL HERITAGE SITES IN THE CREATION OF TOURISM POTENTIAL OF SMALL TOWNS IN POLAND

Abstract. Historical sites may be found in nearly all small towns in Poland. Some are listed by UNESCO as World Heritage Sites. The purpose of the paper is to discuss the role of these resources in the broader set of elements shaping the tourism potential of towns, and also to illustrate the regional differences among small towns in Poland in terms of their potential to develop a local or regional tourism sector. The study provides a typology of towns based on local natural and landscape elements, cultural heritage resources as well as hotels and other tourist accommodations. The statistical data discussed in this paper was obtained from the Local Data Bank of Statistics Poland for the period 2012–2014, while historical sites were chosen from the National Heritage Board of Poland. The study covers all small towns in Poland and has shown unequivocally that the presence of a historical site is not necessarily a factor in the overall development of a local tourism sector. The cultural resources appear to be an undervalued asset, which can be used to develop a local tourism sector, especially in towns which are searching for new development paths.
Key words: cultural heritage sites, small towns, tourism potential, site evaluation, Poland

1. INTRODUCTION

Tourism potential is a broad term that covers most factors facilitating tourism across a geographic area. It includes structural elements such as potential tourist sites and related tourist infrastructure that serve as the basis for presenting a city/town or region as attractive to tourists. It also includes functional elements associated with the actions of entities directly and indirectly engaged in the tourism

[*] Agnieszka KWIATEK-SOŁTYS, Pedagogical University of Kracow, Faculty of Geography and Biology, Institute of Geography, Krakow, Poland; e-mail: akwiatek@up.krakow.pl

[**] Małgorzata BAJGIER-KOWALSKA, Andrzej Frycz Modrzewski Krakow University, Faculty of Law, Administration and International Relations, Department of International Tourism and Social Geography, Krakow, Poland; e-mail: malbajkow@interia.pl

sector (Bellinger, 1994; Kaczma *et al*., 2005; Meyer, 2010). In terms of geography, tourism potential can be associated with the attractiveness of the local tourist environment, which includes both culture and nature, enhanced with tourist infrastructure, and easy transportation accessibility (Lijewski *et al*., 2008; Mamun and Mitra, 2012).

Environmental value serves as a key element determining the position of a city/town or a region in the tourism market, and determines the tourist flow (Knudsen *et al*., 1995; Macagno *et al*., 2010). The geographical location determines the availability of both natural and landscape features favouring the development of various forms of tourism and recreation (Collins, 1999; Garrod *et al*., 2006). Apart from relevant natural features found in urban areas, architectural features and the urban fabric constitute the primary components that determine local tourism potential and tourism attractiveness of an area. A number of features are of particular importance including historical sites such as old city districts, valuable religious sites, facilities associated with the so-called high culture, shopping areas, and sports and recreational facilities (Silberberg, 1995; Bajgier-Kowalska and Rettinger, 2014; Faracik *et al*., 2015). The material heritage of cities/towns is the most readily observable element that differentiates their main area of tourism potential in the era of global unification and 'uniform' urban structures (Mika, 2011). Cultural and natural heritage is viewed as a leading determinant of tourist choices of travel destination (Ryan, 2002; Poria *et al*., 2003; Timothy and Boyd, 2006; Loureiro *et al*., 2012).

The tourism attractiveness of small towns may result from their history, former function, ethnic structure, and the associated cultural heritage resources. It is these features that establish the cultural landscape of cities/towns in Poland, in most cases. This is especially true of small towns, where traditional urban formation mechanisms are weak. Many small towns in Poland are now experiencing a period of stagnation associated with poor municipal financial situation and high unemployment, which manifests itself through the neglecting of the cultural landscape and historical sites. Many of those sites are still relatively unknown to tourists (Kwiatek-Sołtys, 2011; Kuśnierz and Kuśnierz-Krupa, 2015).

The role of cultural heritage is often marginalised in the research literature on small towns and their development, especially when their cultural heritage does not yield a direct financial gain (Ashworth, 2003; Hudečková and Ševčíková, 2007; Rudan, 2010). McMorran (2008) noted that heritage is employed as an element that is both profitable and desired by tourists, and not due to the fact that it is a key witness to history and should be maintained for that reason. The role of cultural heritage in local development was also discussed by Murzyn-Kupisz (2012). In addition, the issue of cultural heritage tourism, with the example of small Canadian towns, was examined in the work by Jamieson (1993). The starting point for Jamieson's analysis was the issue of economic crisis and the need to find new development pathways. Jamieson argued that cultural tourism at the local level

may be analysed in terms of heritage, environment, handmade products, local cuisine, language, art, music, technology, religion, education, and dress. However, Jamieson wrote that the analysis of cultural factors is associated with the risk of poor understanding of cultural resources as well as unrealistic expectations.

Matei and Caraba (2010) studied small towns in Romania and noted that the development of the tourism sector is often viewed as the ultimate solution to all problems which towns face. However, many towns do not meet the basic conditions for such growth, including the infrastructure, investors, qualified workers, and a robust service sector. This view was also expressed in the work by Fonseca and Ramos (2012) who studied peripheral areas in Portugal. Steele (2017) wrote that the development of tourism in small towns is currently favoured as never before due to an increasing demand for rural tourism. The demand for locally made products as well as the desire to experience small city life have led to the emergence of many new types of tourism such as slow food, cittaslow, authentic tourism, geotourism, agritourism and heritage tourism (Kwiatek-Sołtys and Mainet, 2015). Steele also noted that many small towns fear becoming 'Aspenized'. To Aspenize is to become – or cause to become – tourist-oriented, especially in such a way as to grow unaffordable or 'unlivable' conditions for workers or native residents.

Many small towns in Poland possess a large number of cultural heritage sites. Thus, the main purpose of the paper is to determine the role of such sites in the set of elements shaping the tourism potential of towns. The starting point for the analysis consisted of historical sites protected by the Polish law. The goal was to show the results of a comprehensive analysis of the tourism potential of all small towns in Poland and to show regional differences. The secondary goal of the analysis was to show the relationship between tourism potential and its actual utilisation, as measured via incoming tourist flow including tourist flow from abroad.

2. STUDY AREA AND METHODS

Small towns defined as towns of fewer than 20,000 inhabitants (Mainet, 2011; Vaishar, 2005; Kwiatek-Sołtys, 2011, 2017) constitute a very diverse set of settlements (Bartosiewicz and Marszał, 2013; Heffner and Halama, 2011). They make about 75% of all urban settlements in Poland and are home to almost 5 million people or 21.6% of the urban population in Poland.

In the era of globalisation, many small towns are searching for new ways to grow both in the social and the economic senses. Many small towns are also experiencing a deep social crisis in terms of population loss as well as a deep economic crisis in terms of the decline of some key urban functions associated with the ser-

vicing of rural areas and the agricultural sector, and an added layer of competition from larger cities. The current situation of small towns may be described as a serious threat to their continuing development (Heffner, 2005). It is precisely those reasons that drive many small towns to seek an economic stimulus in the form of the development of a local or regional tourism sector.

Given the above issues related to the vision for small towns and tourism development, a basic question emerges: Which small towns really possess the potential for the development of tourism, and whether this potential is being used.

The paper introduces and utilizes a new research method. The authors proposed a new method that may be employed to assess the value of selected components of tourism potential in order to use the final outcome in the process of planning tourism development. The comprehensive nature of the work is rooted in a typology of all small towns in Poland. The analysis in this paper may be used as a basis for further research on the relationship between the elements of small-town tourism potential and their applicability in the tourism sector, as well as local and regional government efforts, thus yielding practical applications of the results of this study.

The paper provides a typology of small towns in Poland basing on primary factors affecting the development of the tourism sector. It uses a well-known and relatively frequently used taxonomic method, the so-called natural indicators method by Perkal (1953), which was widely used in later studies, among others Kostrubiec (1965), who transferred it to the field of geographical research. The Perkal method is often used in socio-economic and spatial research (Ilnicki, 2009; Męczyński *et al*., 2010). In the statistical procedure, the form-based index described by Runge (2006) was used:

$$Ws = 1/p \text{ Sum } y_{ij} \quad (1)$$

Ws – synthetic index,
T_{ij} – a standardised size of the *j* characteristic for the *i* object of particular measures,
p – number of features considered,
j – 1,2,3, ..., p.

The comprehensive Index was used to find a group of towns with the highest and lowest potentials for the development of a local or regional tourism sector. This index works in the following manner: the highest value of the index describes a city with the highest potential, while the lowest value describes a city with the lowest potential.

The study covered four main elements important in terms of tourism development: (1) geographical location of each studied town, along with the resulting natural and landscape features, (2) cultural heritage resources, as measured by the number and type of historical sites that are registered with Poland's *National Heritage Institute*, (3) hotels as well as other forms of accommodation, as measured

via the number of year-round occupancy, and (4) occupancy rate for hotels, as measured by the number of hotel stays (all tourists, foreign tourists).

The "valuation method" used in this paper was a modified version of a point method and was employed in the study to determine the rank of small towns located across Poland in terms of their capability to build a tourism sector. Points were assigned per the chosen quality scale to quality features of analysed elements of tourism potential (Warszyńska, 1970). Although this was only an approximated valuation, it did have a specific purpose, in that it enabled a comparison of the tourism resources of the studied group of towns (Warszyńska, 1970; Clay and Daniel, 2000; Dramstad *et al*., 2006; Lijewski *et al*., 2008). Each major stage of the study was discussed in the following section. The proposed research method, if applied to another time period, would make it possible to determine changes in the rank of each small town analysed in this particular study of tourism potential.

The statistical data discussed in this paper was obtained from the Local Database for the period 2012–2014. The Local Database is operated by Statistics Poland. The mean value for each analysed index was calculated for three different years (2012, 2013, 2014) for each studied town in order to eliminate one-year shifts. All 685 small towns in Poland, as defined by the Polish law in 2012, were analysed in the study. The first studied year was 2012 and was selected based on the availability of comparative data for all 685 towns. While the number of small towns increased by five in 2014, the appropriate data for these new small towns were not available for analysis for the period during which they were still classified as rural communities.

3. RESEARCH RESULTS

One of the basic factors affecting the development of the tourism sector in a city/town is its geographical location. It determines the presence of natural and landscape features along with a climate and the health benefits associated with it. All of these features may or may not foster the development of various forms of tourism and recreation. The local nature and landscape serve as the basis for the development of tourism, and remain the primary selection criteria in tourist choices of travel destination (Urry, 2002; Garrod *et al*., 2006; Daugstat, 2008; Holden, 2008; Macagno *et al*., 2010). The relative importance of these features is illustrated by the concentration of tourist infrastructure in areas deemed most attractive from an environmental point of view. The tourist value of a city/town also increases with a close proximity to protected natural areas that help shape the landscape, as well as climate in a geographical area.

The basic criterion used to divide Poland into tourist regions is the landscape region division of Poland. The landscape classification is used in tandem with a tourist flow distribution map and tourism infrastructure map. The most attractive regions in terms of tourist value were identified based on a review of the environmental assessment of Poland from the perspective of what is known as tourist attractiveness (Mileska, 1963; Rogalewski, 1971; Wyrzykowski, 1986; Lijewski *et al*., 2008). Those five regions are: the Baltic Sea coast, the Carpathian Mountains as well as the Sudetes, the Mazury Lake District, and the Pomeranian Lake District.

In this paper, the environmental attractiveness of a town was assessed based on its location in one of the above tourist regions. The largest number of points (4) was assigned to towns located in the most attractive regions on the Baltic coast and in mountain regions, the Carpathians as well as the Sudetes. Towns located in the Mazury and Pomeranian Lake Districts were assigned 3 points, while towns located in upland areas and in the Wielkopolska Lake District (with a small number of lakes) were given 2 points. The smallest number of points (1) was assigned to towns spread across the Middle Polish Lowlands and found in the so-called Piedmont Basins, whose landscape value is limited. Towns officially called "spa towns" were assigned 4 points, while towns found close to national parks received 2 points. Finally, towns located on man-made lakes providing some recreational opportunities were given 1 point each. Theoretically, the highest value a given town could be assigned was 11 points.

The analysis of small towns in Poland with respect to environmental resources (Fig. 1) indicated that towns located in less attractive areas of the country also possess natural healing resources or simply put: spa features. Among others, those include the small towns of Uniejów, Ciechocinek and Busko-Zdrój. Those towns are not located on the Baltic coast, in mountain areas or in lake districts. Small towns located close to national parks such as Zwierzyniec, Kostrzyn nad Odrą, Dąbrowa Białostocka and Tykocin were also highly ranked. In addition, selected towns situated on man-made lakes such as Sulejów and Otmuchów were highly ranked as well.

The major elements that determine the potential and attractiveness of towns to tourists are the architectural value and urban areas, especially complexes of historical buildings (Ryan, 2002; Poria *et al*., 2003; Timothy and Boyd, 2006; Mika, 2011; Loureiro *et al*., 2012; Faracik *et al*., 2015).

Many small towns in Poland possess a wealth of cultural heritage sites including urban areas, church complexes, monastery complexes, Orthodox churches, synagogues, outdoor stations of the cross, cemeteries, castles, palaces, former seats of Polish kings and the nobility, historical gardens, defensive structures and landmarks, as well as non-religious historical sites such as city halls, brownstones, granaries, and technological sites from days long gone. The sites listed above may exist in architectural-urban complexes or may stand on their own. Hence, their

ability to yield tourist flow varies. The most valued of those historical sites are recognized by UNESCO as part of its World Cultural Heritage List or the Nature List. Of the 15 UNESCO World Heritage Sites in Poland, only 2 sites are located in small towns. These two sites are Kalwaria Zebrzydowska, with its large array of artistic, spatial, and compositional merits, and Łęknica featuring Muskauer Park, a park that spans the Polish-German border.



Fig. 1. Attractiveness of the geographical location of small towns in Poland.
Source: own work.

In this study, all small towns in Poland were analysed in terms of the number and type of historical sites officially registered as such with Poland's national heritage organizations (National Inventory…, 2016). Five points were assigned to small towns featuring historical urban complexes, church or monastery complexes, as well as castle or palace complexes that normally attract the largest number of tourists. A maximum of 15 points were assigned per town for architectural

complexes. One additional point was assigned for historical sites within a category of historical sites identified by the National Heritage Institute: religious sites, defensive structures, castles, public use facilities, palaces and manors, farmhouses, business facilities, homes and apartments, industrial facilities, green areas, cemeteries, and more.

The presence of historical sites in each category may produce 12 points for each studied town, which would yield a maximum of 27 points.

The research has shown that 24 small towns in Poland (3.5%) do not possess any historical sites registered in the national historical site registry. Most of these towns are young towns, whose urban statuses had been granted at some point in the 20th century. Many of those towns include mines, industrial facilities, or transportation hubs – mainly railway hubs. The origins of some of those towns reach the Middle Ages, but later history including World War II has not been kind to them. Old urban areas were often destroyed, and historical sites were turned to rubble by war. Some of those 24 towns include new towns emerging as a result of the recent process of suburbanisation occurring across Poland (e.g. Siechnice near Wrocław). The distribution of towns with the largest supply of cultural heritage resources is fairly even across Poland. Yet, the largest number of towns with a wealth of historical sites tends to concentrate in areas most affected by urbanisation. The first city type generated in this study, one where towns accumulated the largest number of points in the process of city evaluation, included 124 small towns, the history of 64% of which date back to the Middle Ages (Fig. 2).

Apart from 79 of the oldest towns, this type also includes a large number of towns that are still relatively young, whose urban history is rooted only in the 20th century, but still possess a number of different types of architecture, including palace and manor complexes, as well as churches and monasteries and spa facilities. Some of these small towns are well-known tourist hubs with a regional reach. This includes the small city of Kalwaria Zebrzydowska, whose Mannerist architecture and landscape, as well as the pilgrimage park were listed as UNESCO World Cultural Heritage sites in 1999.

The number of hotel beds serves as a measure of the tourist capacity of a city/town, as well as an important factor driving the development of the tourism sector. The number of beds may be analysed using three groups: (1) from 20 to 400 beds, (2) from 400 to 2,000 beds, and (3) over 2,000 beds (Wysocka, 1975). The first group covers towns with some historical sites. The second group covers towns characterised by a developed tourism sector, while the third group covers towns with a well-developed tourism sector that serves as a fundamental factor driving social and economic growth (Wysocka, 1975). The statistics of Statistics Poland for the period 2012–2014 were used to analyse the accommodations sector in the studied towns. The study covered year-round accommodations. The mean value for each index used in the study was calculated for three years and towns were classified based on the above hotel bed number categories.



Fig. 2. Ranking of small towns by historical sites.
Source: own work.

the statistical analysis of year-round accommodations at tourist facilities indicated that small towns in Poland differ significantly in this respect. Many small towns have been tourist destinations for a long-time including spa towns such as Krynica-Zdrój, Ustroń, Ciechocinek, Kudowa-Zdrój, and Świeradów-Zdrój. Some small towns are strong tourist destinations due to their strong tourism and recreation offers. This includes Karpacz, Szklarska Poręba, Wisła, Szczyrk, Międzyzdroje, Ustka, and Władysławowo. The number of year-round hotel beds in those towns ranges from more over 2,000 to over 5,000. According to Statistics Poland, there are only 12 small towns in Poland offering over 2,000 year-round hotel beds. A total of 28 towns were identified in the group of developed tourist centres – with from 400 to 2,000 hotel beds. This group includes towns located in the most attractive regions of Poland and towns which part of large

metropolitan areas such as Warsaw, Łódź, and Krakow. Those small towns are located close to major cities but offer cheaper accommodations than their parent urban centres.

A total of 645 towns were found to possess less than 400 year-round hotel beds. Those include 257 small towns with no year-round hotel accommodation. This means that the towns are not developed tourist centres, and business activity associated with tourism does not substantially impact their overall development. Inadequate tourist infrastructure including a small number of hotel beds is a significant problem in many small towns in Poland. This problem is discussed in most documents published on development strategies for towns specifically in the area of tourism. The mean number of year-round hotel beds at tourist facilities calculated for all small towns in Poland is 175.

The next stage of the analysis consisted of the creation of a typology of small towns in Poland using a comprehensive index produced using the method proposed by Perkal (1953). The structuring of the index considers the full tourism potential of the examined small towns. Five groups of small towns were identified for Poland based on a comprehensive assessment of natural conditions, cultural heritage resources, and the number of hotel beds.

Groups I and II (Perkal index value: group I 0.01–0.99, group II 0.99 or more) consist of small towns with a large or very large potential for the growth of a tourism sector. First and foremost, those include spa towns and towns with a specialised and permanent role in the realm of tourism and recreation located along the Baltic coast, in the Carpathians and the Sudetes, and across the Mazury Lake District (Fig. 3).

Those towns are usually associated with successful local economies, where work is easily available compared with neighbouring towns, and the economic structure is also quite different (Kantor-Pietraga *et al*., 2012).

Towns with little or very little potential for the development of the tourism sector (Groups IV and V Perkal index value: group IV -0.53 – (-0.22) and group V -0.93 or less) are located mostly in the central lowland part of Poland where agriculture still remains dominant. At the same time, those areas are still affected by the history of the region or more precisely the so-called partitions of Poland in the late 18th century. Towns with the lowest rank or comprehensive index value are located across the former Russian partition or most areas in eastern Poland.

An important research question is the following: How tourism potential is utilised by towns. The degree to which the tourism sector is developed is often measured based on the number of hotel beds (Sharpley, 2000; Szromek, 2012). This appears to be a gross simplification and may lead to erroneous conclusions in the case of small towns. It is tourist volume and its reach in terms of geography, which is beyond the scope of this paper, that serve as good measures of the rank of a small town in comparison with all towns experiencing the influx of tourists. In this context, the study focused on the number of overnight stays in general, and

with respect to foreign tourists in particular. In addition, the mean length of tourist stays in each city was also measured. The number of stays is an accurate measure of tourist flow and shows real tourist volume per city/town.



Fig. 3. Tourism development potential in small towns in Poland.
Source: own work.

209 towns recorded no tourist stays during the study period, while in 285 towns the number of foreign tourists was found to be zero. This does not mean that no tourists visited those towns. In many cases, tourists arrived on day trips to visit local cultural sites and events. The largest number of overnight stays was recorded for towns with the highest estimated potential in the area of tourism development. Those included towns situated close to major metropolitan areas and other major tourist hubs in Poland that offer cheaper accommodations (Fig. 4). Research on small towns in Poland has shown that there does not exist a relationship between

the presence of historical sites and the number of overnight stays, including foreign tourists. This pattern ought to be relevant to local governments shaping the image of their cities/towns in the sense that more decisive promotion of local cultural heritage is warranted.



Fig. 4. Average number of all overnight tourist stays in small towns in 2012–2014

Source: own work.

The mean length of tourist stays in the examined towns in the three years of the study period was 2.8 days. This value is similar to that obtained for other cities including values for cultural heritage (Borg van der *et al.*, 1996). However, in the context of all small towns in Poland, this value is significantly increased by spa towns, where the mean tourist stay is about 10 days. The highest mean length of stay was recorded for the town of Sulejówek at 21 days, which is likely to be closely tied to its proximity to Warsaw. The town of Sulejówek is

home to a relatively large number of low-cost private accommodations such as "employee hotels" and apartments, as well as regular hotels serving the greater Warsaw area.

4. DISCUSSION

The tourist attractiveness of a small town is determined by a variety of factors that may result from its geographical location, natural environment, local history, former function, as well as cultural heritage resources associated with it. Architectural value as well as local urban spaces are also unique and may enhance the tourist attractiveness of a city/town. Yet, in the modern world, the ability to draw tourists to a city/town results from a larger array of pull factors (Richards and Wilson, 2006; Cellini, 2011; Faracik *et al*., 2015). Currently, many small towns benefit from new tourist attractions created by local entrepreneurs, including all types of entertainment parks, theme parks, spa and wellness facilities, street festivals, music concerts, film festivals, sporting events, fairs, wholesaling centres, and business meetings and conventions. All of the above are also served by supplementary facilities and hotels, as well as restaurants that may sometimes constitute tourist attractions in themselves.

One of the basic problems with the protection of cultural heritage is the fact that not everything that is valuable can be protected (Smith, 1996). The protection of cultural heritage is delegated to local governments, which catalogue existing sites, register new sites, manage protection programs formulated at the national level, and maintain historical sites when needed. The transformation of historical sites into the so-called tourism products may help stimulate the development of tourism in a small town.

Many valuable sites do not receive government funding for maintenance. Certain sites are managed by their private owners, while many are awaiting any type of funding. In a sense, tourists can also decide what is maintained and what is not (Silvestrelli, 2012). The renovation of historical sites is often associated with a change in their original function. Some historical sites are updated to suit tourist tastes, which allows them to function in a new economic reality. This is also related to the growing demand to discover heritage as well as find authenticity in the tourist experience (Taylor, 2001; MacCannell, 2002; Purchla, 2013).

Tourism products associated with cultural heritage play an important role in urban and cultural tourism. However, such products in themselves are not sufficiently attractive to draw tourists – for whom pretty urban landscapes and the aesthetic beauty of historical sites no longer suffice. The limiting of urban tourism to cultural heritage sites is not justified given what is observed contemporarily in

terms of social processes (Richards and Wilson, 2006; Kurek, 2007). It is unclear whether cultural heritage sites can attract tourists (Cellini, 2011). This suggests that what may be needed is an integrated approach to the promotion of cultural sites that are less well-known, as opposed to the concentration of efforts of well-known towns with a strong cultural heritage brand (Cuccia and Rizzo, 2010).

The challenge for small towns that wish to become *cultural tourism destinations* is to find a balance between the identification of unique cultural assets and a refined way of selling them to the general public, as well as a means of linking them with the business strategies of major international tour operators (Russo and Van der Borg, 2002; Rizzo and Throsby, 2006; Peacock and Rizzo, 2008). A city/town is not merely a sum of its historical sites – there are other important sites such as museums, galleries, sporting arenas, shopping centres, entertainment centres, and events associated with the local culture and traditions. These additional attractions may serve as key reasons to visit a city/town.

The combination of urban tradition and contemporary use by constructing new facilities and offering new services alters the identity of a city/town and its image, while at the same time it helps create a climate that attracts tourists. Urban tourism may also be generated through tourism infrastructure oriented towards the key needs and expectations of modern tourists (Law, 2002; Kaczmarek and Kaczmarek, 2009). Yet advanced services and facilities associated with these types of needs and expectations are rarely available in small towns. The concentration of sites related to culture, sports, recreation, entertainment, lodging, and restaurant services suggests that a city is more than a regional city. In the case of small towns, the combination of the sites listed above with accommodations suggests the presence of tourists, as shown in this study. The development of the tourism sector affects the general activity level and attractiveness of towns (Kwiatek-Sołtys *et al*., 2014). It also helps spark outside interest in the local culture and traditional arts and crafts, thus increasing the local sense of the local value and the need to preserve it (Mika, 2007).

Hence, it is necessary to properly utilise the existing resources and transform them into factors stimulating the tourism competitiveness of towns. The success of the effort lies first and foremost in the efficiency of the functioning of the social and economic systems in a city/town, as well as their ability to multiply local resources. The level of competitiveness is also determined by a city's/town's relationship with the surrounding area and a proper selection of development strategies (Wojdacki, 2004; Burnett *et al*., 2007). The level of tourist satisfaction may also be used to indirectly measure the competitiveness of a city/town. Empirical research by Cracolici and Nijkamp (2008) in tourist regions in southern Italy showed that tourist volume is not always correlated with tourist satisfaction. Poor service quality may threaten a city's rank in the tourism sector in the long run. Hence, small towns need to be a key part of the regional policy in cases where they possess the potential to develop a tourism sector and promote local products deemed highly attractive.

5. CONCLUSIONS

Small towns possess multiple resources associated with what is often known as tourism potential. The study has shown that environmental resources are the most valued of resources in the case of small towns. These are due to the geographical location of a city/town in a region rich in natural value and this includes things such spa waters. Tourist infrastructure including hotels and other accommodations are driven by attractive geographical location. Research has shown that many small towns do possess a wealth of cultural heritage resources, which could be used to support the growth of their local tourism sectors. However, other elements such as infrastructure, potential investors, local entrepreneurship, and properly trained workers are often not readily available in small towns. In this study, the given typology of small towns in Poland based on their potential to develop a local tourism sector suggested that cultural heritage sites in themselves are not sufficient drivers of development pathways for tourism in small towns. This fact is further confirmed by the lack of a correlation between the presence of historical sites and the number of tourist overnight stays. Hence, historical sites appear to be an undervalued asset, which may be due to inadequate marketing or poor physical condition due to the lack of site maintenance. Many sites in Poland's national historical site registry require immediate renovation. Only then can they start to attract tourists in larger numbers.

The research indicated that most small towns do not experience a permanent tourist boom simply due to the arrival of 'new' attractions unless there is at least one of three other factors in play: an attractive natural environment, good tourist infrastructure, or key historical sites.

The study has showed that small towns in Poland vary substantially in terms of each aspect of tourism examined herein. The study confirmed that spa towns rank high in the area of tourism potential. The same was confirmed for physically attractive areas such as the seacoast as well as mountain areas and lake districts. The point assignment method used in the study appeared to be a good method for research on the distribution and rank of small towns in the sense of small towns serving the role of tourist hubs.

REFERENCES

ASHWORTH, G.J. (2003), 'Urban tourism: still an imbalance in attention?', [in:] COOPER, C. (ed.), *Classic reviews in tourism.* Clevedon: Channel View, pp. 143–163.

BAJGIER-KOWALSKA, M. and RETTINGER, R. (2014), 'Tourism development in small cities on the example of Pistoia in Tuscany', *Annales Universitatis Paedagogicae Cracoviensis, Studia Geographica*, 5 (155), pp. 77–87.

BARTOSIEWICZ, B. and MARSZAŁ, T. (eds.), (2013), 'Przestrzeń publiczna i sektor usług w małych miastach', *Acta Universitatis Lodziensis. Folia Geographica Socio-Oeconomica*, 15.

BELLINGER, C. (1994), *Touristische Angebotspotentiale einer Stadt. Trends–Forschung–Koncepte im Strategischen Turismusmanagment*, Band 4, Trier.

BORG VAN DER, J., COSTA, P. and GOTTI, G. (1996), 'Tourism in European Heritage cities', *Annals of Tourism Research,* 23 (2), pp. 306–321.

BURNETT, P., CUTLER, H. and THRESHER, R. (2007), 'The Impact of Tourism for a Small City: a CGE Approach', *Tourism and Regional Science JRAP*, 37 (3), pp. 233–242. Available at: http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/132994/2/07-3-6.pdf

CELLINI, R. (2011), 'Is UNESCO recognition effective in fostering tourism? A comment on Yang, Lin and Han', *Tourism Management*, 32 (2), pp. 452–454.

CLAY, G.R. and DANIEL, T.C. (2000), 'Scenic Landscape Assessment: the Effects of Land Management Jurisdiction on Public Perception of Scenic Beauty', *Landscape and Urban Planning*, 49, pp. 1–13.

COLLINS, A. (1999), 'Tourism development and natural capital', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 26, pp. 98–109.

CRACOLICI, M.F. and NIJKAMP, P. (2008), 'The attractiveness and competitiveness of tourist destinations: A study of Southern Italian regions', *Tourism Management,* 30 (3), pp. 336–344.

CUCCIA, T. and RIZZO, I. (2010), 'Tourism seasonality in cultural destinations: Empirical evidence from Sicily', *Tourism Management*, 32, pp. 589–595.

DAUGSTAD, K. (2008), 'Negotiating landscape in rural tourism', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 35, pp. 402–426.

DRAMSTAD, W.E., SUNDLI-TVEIT, M., FJELLSTADT, W.J. and FRY, G.L. (2006), 'Relationships between visual landscape preferences and map-based indicators of landscape structure', *Landscape and Urban Planning,* 78, pp. 456–474.

FARACIK, R., KUREK, W., MIKA, M. and PAWLUSIŃSKI, R. (2015), '„Stare" i „nowe" wartości w turystyce miejskiej. Zarys problematyki', [in:] TRZEPACZ, P., WIECŁAW-MICHNIEWSKA, J., BRZOSKO-SERMAK, A. and KŁOŚ, A. (eds.), *Miasto w badaniach geografów.* Krakow: UJ IGiGP, 1, pp. 121–133.

FONSECA, F.P. and RAMOS, R.A.R. (2012), 'Heritage Tourism in Peripheral Areas: Development Strategies and Constraints', *Tourism Geographies*, 14 (3), pp. 467–493.

GARROD, B., WORNELL, R. and YOUELL, R. (2006), 'Re-conceptualising rural resources as countryside capital: The case of rural tourism', *Journal of Rural Studies*, 22, pp. 117–128.

HEFFNER, K. (2005), 'Małe miasta – problemy badawcze i próby syntetycznych ujęć', [in:] HEFFNER, K. (ed.), *Małe miasta a rozwój lokalny i regionalny*. Katowice: Wydawnictwo Akademii Ekonomicznej*,* pp. 9–11.

HEFFNER, K. and HALAMA, A. (eds.), (2012), 'Ewolucja funkcji małych miast w Polsce', *Studia Ekonomiczne. Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziałowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach,* 92.

HOLDEN, A. (2008), *Environment and Tourism*. New York: Routledge.

HUDEČKOVÁ, H. and ŠEVČÍKOVÁ, A. (2007), 'The renewal of the rural cultural heritage of the Czech Republic with the support of regional policy', *Agricultural Economics – Czech*, 53, pp. 505–512.

ILNICKI, D. (2009), *Przestrzenne zróżnicowanie poziomu rozwoju usług w Polsce. Teoretyczne i praktyczne uwarunkowania badań.* Wrocław: Uniwersytet Wrocławski, Instytut Geografii i Rozwoju Regionalnego.

JAMIESON, W. (1993), 'Planning for small town cultural tourism', [in:] PREMATILLEKE, P.L. (ed.), Cultural Tourism. International Scientific Symposium, 10th ICOMOS General Assembly. Sri Lanka: Sri Lanka National Committee of ICOMOS and the Central Cultural Fund of the Government of Sri Lanka and UNESCO, pp. 90–97.

KACZMAREK, J. and KACZMAREK, S. (2009), 'Turystyka kulturowa – człowiek w miejskiej przestrzeni wymiany', [in:] BUCZKOWSKA, K. and MIKOS VON ROHRSCHEIDT, A. (eds.), *Współczesne formy turystyki kulturowej*. Poznań: Akademia Wychowania Fizycznego im. Eugeniusza Piaseckiego w Poznaniu, 1, pp. 7–35.

KACZMAREK, J., STASIAK, A. and WŁODARCZYK, B. (2005), *Produkt turystyczny*. Warsaw: PWE.

KANTOR-PIETRAGA, I., KRZYSZTOFIK, R. and RUNGE, J. (2012), 'Kontekst geograficzny i funkcjonalny kurczenia się małych miast w Polsce Południowej', [in:] HEFFNER, K. and HALAMA, A. (eds.), Ewolucja funkcji małych miast w Polsce, *Studia Ekonomiczne, Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziałowe Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Katowicach*, 92, pp. 9–24.

KNUDSEN, D.C., METRO-ROLAND, M.M., SOPER, A.K. and GREER, CH.E. (1995), *Lanscape, tourism, and meaning.* Hampshire: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

KOSTRUBIEC, B. (1965), 'Klasyfikacja dynamiczna i wielocechowa województw Polski', [in:] KUKLIŃSKI, A. (ed.), *Z badań nad strukturą przestrzenną Gospodarki Narodowej Polski*, cz. 1. *Biuletyn KPZK PAN*, 35, pp. 28–49.

KUREK, W. (2007), *Turystyka.* Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN.

KUŚNIERZ, K. and KUŚNIERZ-KRUPA, D. (2015), 'Tourist function as an activating factor in small historic towns in the former Krakow region in the second decade of the 21st century – selected problems', *Journal of Heritage Conservation*, 42, pp. 61–70.

KWIATEK-SOŁTYS, A. (2011), 'Small towns in Poland: barriers and factors of growth, The 2nd International Geography Symposium GEOMED 2010', *Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences*, 19, pp. 363–370.

KWIATEK-SOŁTYS, A. (2017), 'Własność gruntów a poziom rozwoju małych miast w Polsce. Ujęcie typologiczno-przestrzenne', *Prace monograficzne*, 813, p. 254. Krakow: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Pedagogicznego.

KWIATEK-SOŁTYS, A. and MAINET, H. (2015), 'Cittaslow, a qualitative approach to small towns' local development', [in:] SOJA, M. and ZBOROWSKI, A. (eds.), *Miasto: w badaniach geografów*. Krakow: Instytut Geografii i Gospodarki Przestrzennej UJ, 2, pp. 123–135.

KWIATEK-SOŁTYS, A., MAINET, H., WIEDERMANN, K. and EDOUARD J.-C. (eds.). (2014), *Small and medium towns'attractiveness at the beginning of the 21st century.* Clermond-Ferrand: Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal, (CERAMAC, 33).

LAW, C. (2002), *Urban Tourism: The Visitor Economy and The Growth of Large Cities.* New York, London: Continuum.

LIJEWSKI, T., MIKUŁOWSKI, B. and WYRZYKOWSKI, J. (2008), *Geografia turystyki Polski,* Warsaw: PWE.

LOUREIRO, M.L., MACAGNO, G., NUNES, P.A. and TOL, R. (2012), 'Assessing the impact of biodiversity on tourism flows: an econometric model for tourism behavior with implications for conservation policy', *Journal of Environmental Economics and Policy*, 1 (2), pp. 174–194.

MACAGNO, G., NUNES, P. and LOUREIRO, M. (2010), The influence of agriculture landscape on tourism flows: An application to Tuscany, Bioecon proceedings. Available at: www.ucl.ac.uk/bioecon/12th_2010/Macagno.pdf

MACCANNELL, D. (2002), *The Tourist: a New Theory of the Leisure Class*, Berkeley. Los Angeles: University of California Press.

MAINET, H. (2011), 'Les petites villes françaises en quête d'identité. Ambiguïté du positionnement ou image tactiquement combinée?' *Mots. Les langages du politique*, 97, pp. 75–89.

MAMUN, A.A. and MITRA, S. (2012), 'A Methodology for Assessing Tourism Potential: Case Study Murshidabad District, West Bengal, India', *International Journal of Scientific and Research Publications,* 2 (9), pp. 1–8.

MATEI, E. and CARABA, C.C. (2010), 'Tourism a panacea for the Romanian small towns development?', *GeoJournal of Tourism and Geosites*, 5, pp. 82–88.

MCMORRAN, C. (2008), 'Understanding the 'Heritage' in Heritage Tourism: Ideological Tool or Economic Tool for a Japanese Hot Springs Resort?', *Tourism Geographies*, 10 (3), pp. 334–354.

MEYER, B. (ed.) (2010), *Potencjał turystyczny: zagadnienia przestrzenne.* Szczecin: Wydawnictwo Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego.

MĘCZYŃSKI, M., KONECKA-SZYDŁOWSKA, B. and GADZIŃSKI, J. (2010), *Poziom rozwoju społeczno-gospodarczego i klasyfikacja małych miast Wielkopolski*. Ekspertyza na zlecenie Urzędu Marszałkowskiego w Poznaniu.

MIKA, M. (2007), 'Przemiany pod wpływem turystyki na obszarach recepcji turystycznej', [in:] KUREK, W. (ed.), *Turystyka*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, pp. 406–482.

MIKA, M. (2011), 'Miasta jako obszary recepcji turystycznej', [in:] M. Mika (ed.), *Kraków jako ośrodek turystyczny*. Krakow: Instytut Geografii i Gospodarki Przestrzennej, Uniwersytet Jagielloński, pp. 15–34.

MILESKA, M. (1963), *Regiony turystyczne Polski: stan obecny i potencjalne warunki rozwoju*. Warsaw: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe.

MURZYN-KUPISZ, M. (2012), *Dziedzictwo kulturowe a rozwój lokalny.* Krakow: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Ekonomicznego w Krakowie.

NATIONAL INVENTORY OF HISTORICAL MONUMENTS (2016). Available at: http://www.nid.pl/pl/Informacje_ogolne/Zabytki_w_Polsce/rejestr-zabytkow/zestawienia-zabytkow-nieruchomych/

PEACOCK, A. and RIZZO, I. (2008), *The heritage game. Economics, policy and practice.* UK: Oxford University Press.

PERKAL, J. (1953), 'O wskaźnikach antropologicznych', *Przegląd Antropologiczny,* 19, pp. 209–219.

PORIA, Y., BUTLER, R.W. and AIREY, D.W. (2003), 'The core of heritage tourism', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 30 (1), pp. 238–254.

PURCHLA, J. (2013), 'Dziedzictwo kulturowe a kapitał społeczny', [in:] ROTTERMUND, A. (ed.), *Dlaczego i jak w nowoczesny sposób chronić dziedzictwo kulturowe?,* pp. 21–30. Available at: http://www.unesco.pl/dlaczegoijak/index-21.html

RICHARDS, G. and WILSON, J. (2006), 'Developing Creativity in Tourist Experiences: A Solution to the Serial Reproduction of Culture', *Tourism Management,* 27 (6), pp. 1209–1223.

RIZZO, I. and THROSBY, D. (2006), 'Cultural heritage: economic analysis and public policy', [in:] GINSBURGH, V., THROSBY, D. (eds.), *Handbook of the economics of the arts and culture*. Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1, pp. 983–1016.

ROGALEWSKI, O. (ed.) (1971), *Plan kierunkowy zagospodarowania turystycznego Polski.* Wrocław: GKKFiT Zakład Zagospodarowania Turystycznego.

RUDAN, E. (2010), 'The development of cultural tourism in small historical towns', *Tourism & Hospitality Management*, 10, pp. 577–586.

RUNGE, J. (2006), *Metody badań w geografii społeczno-ekonomicznej: elementy metodologii, wybrane narzędzie badawcze.* Katowice: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Śląskiego.

RUSSO, A.P. and VAN DER BORG, J. (2002), 'Planning considerations for cultural tourism: a case study of four European cities', *Tourism Management*, 23, pp. 631–637.

RYAN, C. (2002), 'Tourism and cultural proximity: Examples from New Zealand', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 29 (4), pp. 952–971.

SHARPLEY, R. (2000), 'The influence of the accommodation sector on tourism development: lessons from Cyprus', *International Journal of Hospitality Management,* 19 (3), pp. 275–293.

SILBERBERG, T. (1995), 'Cultural tourism and business opportunities for museums and heritage sites', *Tourism Management,* 16 (5), pp. 361–365.

SILVESTRELLI, P. (2012), 'Entrepreneurial innovation for cultural tourism development', *Impresa Progetto Electronic Journal of Management*, 2, pp. 1–18.

SMITH, V.L. (1996), 'Indigenous Tourism – the 4 H's', [in:] BUTLER, R., HINCH, L. (eds.), *Tourism and Indigenous Peoples*. London: International Thomson Business Press, pp. 283–307.

STEELE, J. (2017), *Times have never been better for adding tourism to a small town's economic mix*, Center for Rural Affairs, RuralTourismMarketing.com. Available at: http://www.cfra.org/node/2504

SZROMEK, A.R. (2012), *Wskaźniki funkcji turystycznej. Koncepcja wskaźnika funkcji turystycznej i uzdrowiskowej.* Gliwice: Wydawnictwo Politechniki Śląskiej.

TAYLOR, J.P. (2001), 'Authenticity and Sincerity in tourism', *Annals of Tourism Research*, 28 (1), pp. 7–26.

TIMOTHY, D.J. and BOYD, S.W. (2006), 'Heritage Tourism in the 21st Century: Valued Traditions and new Perspectives', *Journal of Heritage Tourism*, 1, pp. 1–16.

URRY, J. (2002), *The Tourist Gaze.* London: SAGE Publications Inc.

VAISHAR, A. (ed.) (2005), *Geografie malych mest.* Brno: Ustav Geoniky Akademie ved Ceske Republiky.

WARSZYŃSKA, J. (1970), 'Waloryzacja miejscowości z punktu widzenia atrakcyjności turystycznej (Zarys metody)', *Zeszyty Naukowe UJ, Prace Geograficzne*, 27, pp. 103–114.

WOJDACKI, K. (2004), 'Partnerstwo i konkurencja miast w świetle zmian systemów osadniczych krajów Unii Europejskiej', [in:] KARWOWSKI, J. (ed.), *Partnerstwo w regionie*. Szczecin: PTE, pp. 28–39.

WYRZYKOWSKI, J. (1986), *Geograficzne uwarunkowania rozwoju urlopowej turystyki wypoczynkowej w Polsce*. Wrocław: Uniwersytet Wrocławski.

WYSOCKA, M. (1975), 'Funkcje turystyczne gmin w świetle wielkości i rodzaju bazy noclegowej', *Biuletyn Informacyjny Instytutu Turystyki,* 4/5.

sciendo

C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

http://dx.doi.org/10.18778/1231-1952.26.2.12

Marcin FELTYNOWSKI*

THE VILLAGE FUND AS A SUPPORT TOOL IN SPATIAL PLANNING ACTIVITIES: A CASE STUDY OF POLAND

Abstract. With respect to space, local authorities may deploy diverse instruments designed to promote the engagement of local communities in the spatial planning and decision-making process. The Village (Polish: *Sołecki*) Fund, established for rural and urban-rural communes, is one of the ways for achieving this goal. Resources from the Village Fund may be used for, e.g. spatial planning, which is one of a commune's own tasks.

The activities related to the Village Fund have triggered studies focused on the units which run such funds and, on the amounts, earmarked for goals pertaining to spatial planning. On top of that, the spatial distribution of communes delivering such tasks has also been assessed. The analyses covered statistics as well as budget queries in communes which allocated funds for activities connected with spatial planning.

Key words: Village Fund, spatial planning, rural and urban-rural communes, Poland.

1. INTRODUCTION

A characteristic feature of local development is the existence of a specific system, referred to as a local system. Communes foster local development by involving local populations in management processes. A community's awareness of the issues and needs, combined with appropriate organisational structures (local institutions), prove the independence and distinctiveness of the created local systems (Jałowiecki, 1986; Misztal, 1986). This awareness is connected with grass-roots initiatives.

One of the elements of self-governance is the Village Fund, available in Poland since 2009. According to Starosta (1995), local development should be approached as a locally initiated, spontaneous, yet planned set of actions aimed at

* Marcin FELTYNOWSKI, University of Lodz, Faculty of Economics and Sociology, ul. POW 3/5, 90-255 Łódź, Poland; email: marcin.feltynowski@uni.lodz.pl

transforming the economic, social, cultural, and environmental settings of a community. In the case of the discussed instrument, it becomes evident that in communes it should be considered the basis of self-governance, and the creation of local development belongs to residents of a village.

The main objective of the paper is to identify and assess the spatial distribution of communes within whose boundaries there exist villages which finance tasks related to spatial planning. Another objective is to identify the scale and scope of the disbursement of money from the Village Fund for spatial planning, combined with a basic statistical analysis of the phenomenon. In addition, in the theoretical part of the work, I indicate how spatial planning is an important task for communes, and I present the mechanism of how the Village Fund operates.

2. SPATIAL PLANNING AS A COMMUNE'S TASKS

Spatial planning is one of the basic tasks of a commune. Its role is to develop land in individual areas in a planned manner using the tools available to local authorities. Actions undertaken within the remit of a commune's tasks are expected to ensure spatial order in the commune.

In Poland, tools available for spatial planning in communes relate to the study of the conditions and directions of spatial development, which is a mandatory document. Land-use plans, which in principle are optional, are the most powerful tool that influences space organisation in communes. Alternatives to such documents can be sought in planning permits – decisions which specify the conditions for building up and developing an area when a land-use plan is missing (Nowak, 2012; Brzeziński, 2015; Brzeziński, 2016; Feltynowski, 2018a).

Activities linked to spatial planning should be considered from a broad perspective, i.e. from the preparatory actions up to the final product – the documents. From the perspective of the Village Fund, in all cases, they target spatial planning documents drafted upon the initiative of local authorities. Thus, resources from the Village Fund are not spent on planning permits issued at the demand of investors.

By approaching spatial planning as an opportunity to engage the local community in a dialogue about the allocation of resources from the Village Fund, I want to improve the quality of the dialogue and the overall culture of the processes surrounding spatial planning (Kolipiński, 2015; Feltynowski, 2018b). Engaging local communities in such efforts is also aimed at building relations with local authorities while alleviating conflicts that might arise when documents connected to spatial planning are drafted or amended. Such an approach should enhance the involvement of the local community in the drafting of a study and land-use

plans (Chrisidu-Budnik and Korczak, 2018). By allocating Village Fund resources to tasks relating to spatial planning, I may reach out to a local community and inform them about what the local authorities intend to do in the field of spatial planning and how these decisions will be reflected in spatial development. Thus, the execution of tasks connected with spatial planning using resources from the Village Fund, besides the purely economic aspect, helps in accomplishing social objectives involved in the process.

3. THE VILLAGE FUND IN RURAL AND URBAN-RURAL COMMUNES

The Village Fund was established in rural and urban-rural[1] communes as an instrument to help engage local communities in rural areas in decision-making processes. This local development tool was introduced in 2009 by the Village Fund Act, which became effective in April of the same year. The Act was amended with the Village Fund Act of 21 February 2014, which entered into force on 20 March 2014. Both acts were driven by the intention to involve communities in decision-making processes and improve residents' standards of living through investment projects. As a rule, the Village Fund is disbursed for activities within a catalogue of a commune's tasks. A commune's tasks, as enumerated in the Commune Self-government Act, include spatial order, which directly relates to the delivery of tasks in the field of spatial planning. In accordance with the wording of the Spatial Planning and Land Development Act of 2003, spatial order means a harmoniously shaped space that in orderly relationships considers all circumstances and meets functional, social, economic, environmental, cultural, compositional, and aesthetic requirements.



Fig. 1. Village institutional structure

Source: own work based on the *Commune Self-government Act.*

[1] Urban-rural commune is understood as town and rural areas combined into one administrative unit.

Assumptions to the Village Fund Act refer to the delivery of commune tasks in auxiliary units of a commune. A village carries out its activities through the village leader (Polish: *sołtys*) who acts as an executive body for the auxiliary unit of the commune and is assisted by the village council in its advisory capacity. The village meeting is a legislative body composed of all residents of a village (Fig. 1). The Village Fund is separated from the commune's budget by the legislative and overseeing body of a commune and then executed by the executive body of the commune. The size of the fund left at the disposal of a village is calculated pursuant to a unified methodology (1):

$$F = \left(2 + \frac{L_m}{100} K_b \right) \tag{1}$$

where:

F – resources allocated to a village which may not exceed ten times the K_b;

L_m – number of residents in a village as of 30th June of the year preceding the fiscal year;

K_b – base amount expressed as a quotient of the current expenditure of a commune – referred to in regulations on public finance – incurred in the year two years prior to the fiscal year and the number of residents of a commune as of 31st December of two years prior to the fiscal year, specified by Statistics Poland (Polish: *Główny Urząd Statystyczny*).

Pursuant to the provisions of the Village Fund Act, the above-presented solution helps a commune to get some of its costs reimbursed depending on the base amount calculated for a commune in relation to the average base amount for the country. The following three reimbursement thresholds have been defined:

– 40% in communes where the base amount is lower than the national average;

– 30% when the base amount in a commune ranges between 100 and 120% of the national average;

– 20% when the base amount is higher than 120% of the average national base amount.

The Village Fund may be used to support the execution of the Spatial Planning and Land Development Act with regard to the drafting of local development plans, studies of the conditions and directions of spatial development, as well as to cover the costs of input data (BPP Katowice, 1983; Feltynowski, 2018a). Sources used to finance the tasks in the area of spatial planning can be traced in documents connected with drafting and executing a commune budget. Budget classification and its organisation in titles and chapters enable the identification of goals to which resources from the portion of the commune budget earmarked for the Village Fund are allocated.

4. METHODS AND MATERIALS

The materials used in the paper come from the data of Statistics Poland concerning the amounts earmarked and disbursed within the Village Fund. Data from the Statistics Poland Local Data Bank cover the period 2014–2016; data availability is limited due to the scope of data collected in individual years and delays in publishing statistics. Information about the resources from the Village Fund is divided into titles and chapters, which was a crucial element of the statistical data, and it provided the grounds for this research (Fig. 2).

For the description of the directions of budget expenditure, it is necessary to examine Title 710 because it covers different kinds of services and includes Sub-chapter 71004, which addresses land-use plans. In accordance with the the binding resolutions of the Court of the Regional Chamber of Audit (Polish: *Regionalna Izba Obrachunkowa*), this sub-chapter also covers activities undertaken with regard to drafting a study of the conditions and directions of spatial development. For the purpose of this paper, I considered land surveys connected with the merging and splitting of registered plots of land classified in Sub-chapters 71013 and 71014.

The investigated input data included all rural and urban-rural communes in Poland. First, I assessed the use of the Village Fund in communes, and then I focused on the allocation of resources to specific budget classification titles. As a result, I obtained a set of communes which, between 2014 and 2016, subsidised spatial planning tasks from the Village Fund.

Based on the data received from Statistics Poland, I searched the websites of the Public Information Bulletin (Polish: *Biuletyn Informacji Publicznej* – BIP) to learn about the tasks delivered within the framework of the Village Fund and to identify villages which had decided to allocate financial resources to goals connected with spatial planning. Those queries allowed me to classify tasks and put them in order based on available public information. The latter originated from budget resolutions of communes and reports of commune heads on budget execution. An important aspect of the research involved developing criteria for the division of tasks delivered within the framework of the Village Fund. As a result, I obtained 6 groups of tasks relating to drafting a land-use plan (C1), amending or updating a land-use plan (C2), developing or amending the study of the conditions and directions of spatial development (C3), purchasing the input data necessary for spatial planning (C4), carrying out land surveys (C5), and other tasks intended to improve the quality of an area (C6).

The information obtained from the searches provided the basis for the spatial analysis of the engagement of local communities in the spatial planning process at the commune level. To assess the spatial autocorrelation of those results,

I used the Global Moran's statistic. This measure helped me in establishing whether the distribution of these territorial units was random or whether there was any spatial autocorrelation (Dube and Legros, 2014). The measure was calculated using the ArcMap software and was based on the Euclidean distance between objects.



Fig. 2. The procedure adopted in the research on the Village Fund

Source: own work.

5. RESULTS

In accordance with the research procedure, the first stage focused on verifying which rural and urban-rural communes had decided to establish a Village Fund from resources of the commune budget between 2014 and 2016. An analysis of the statistical data led to a conclusion that the establishing of Village Funds in rural and urban-rural communes is a continuous process which attracts an increasingly larger group of recipients.

Table 1. Village Fund in rural and urban-rural communes

Commune type	Number of communes with Village Fund			Percent of communes with Village Fund		
	2014	2015	2016	2014	2015	2016
Rural	753	916	984	48.08	58.61	63.12
Urban-rural	412	449	472	67.76	73.49	76.62
Total	1,165	1,365	1,456	53.59	62.79	66.95

Source: own work based on Local Data Bank.

The use of Village Funds in communes which have auxiliary units such as a village changed the share of rural communes that pursued those activities over the three examined years by over 15 percentage points. In urban-rural communes, the index amounted to 8.84 percentage points. Considering all the units covered by the analysis, I need to highlight that at the end of 2016, the change reached 13.36 percentage points (Table 1).

The first step in the procedure acted as a facilitator for the next stage, which involved identifying communes that had earmarked resources for tasks connected with spatial planning in those communes. In the period covered by the research, only 15 communes had decided to spend resources from the Village Fund on activities that fit within the sub-chapters of budget classification considered in this paper. As with the implementation of the Village Fund, the number of communes allocating resources for their own tasks in spatial planning activities increases every year. The collected analytical data enabled me to conclude that transfers of resources from the Village Fund to tasks relating to spatial planning were experimental occurrences covering, at best, two years of the period included in the study.

In accordance with the Global Moran's used as a measure, I could confirm that the spatial distribution of communes which allocated resources to spatial planning-related tasks was random. Additionally, the distribution was not uniform across voivodeships because, in the Zachodniopomorskie, Lubuskie, Lower Silesia, and Podkarpackie Voivodeships, not a single Village Fund was detected

that spent resources on tasks pertaining to spatial planning. In the Opolskie and Mazowieckie Voivodeships, there were, respectively, two and three communes whose Village Funds included tasks in spatial planning (Fig. 3).

According to our research, activities involving tasks connected with spatial planning were carried out in 24 villages. An examination of their budgets made it possible to match tasks attributed to Village Funds with selected groups of outlays connected with spatial planning. The village which I investigated carried out 27 activities in total that were linked to funding tasks coupled with spatial planning. Based on the classification groups, over ¼ of the tasks concerned drafting new land-use plans. The task was connected with activities involved in updating or amending existing local plans, identified in almost 15% of cases. The situation was similar for tasks connected with drafting or amending the study of conditions as well as land surveys undertaken to put the land in order. In both cases, the identified tasks comprised less than 15% of the analysed set. The purchase of input data necessary to accomplish tasks relating to spatial planning in communes applied to less than 7.5% of the investigated tasks. Other work connected with introducing spatial order in a commune accounted for 22% of cases.



Fig. 3. Communes with Village Fund with spatial planning tasks budgeting in the years 2014–2016

Source: own work based on budget data and spatial data from Head Office of Geodesy and Cartography.

The average outlays on tasks relating to spatial planning in the examined group reached almost PLN 4,689. The projects accomplished in a village ranged from PLN 500 to 16,000. The activities that they carried out consumed slightly more than 35% of the resources at the disposal of the village which decided to spend them on efforts connected with spatial planning (Table 2).

Table 2. Tasks related to spatial planning implemented as part of Village Fund

Task	Value of accomplished projects			Share of Village Funds implementing individual tasks
	Average	MIN	MAX	
C1	6959.29	1300	16,000	55.8
C2	8628.11	5000	11,572.7	55.2
C3	2708.91	910	5108.98	22.2
C4	1740	500	2980	13.2
C5	2952.5	1476	4182	35.2
C6	2873.83	1243	6500	17.1
Total	4688.74	500	16,000	35.3

Source: own work.

The analysis of the financial outlays relating to spatial planning has helped me to highlight projects which demanded large expenditures from the Village Fund. As expected, the biggest average amount allocated to the delivery of tasks was found for expenditure class 2 (C2), i.e. amending or updating land-use plans. The average amount paid out for this purpose amounted to PLN 8,628.11. Big average outlays were also made on drafting new land-use plans (C1), where the average amount reached PLN 6,959.29.

Of the above-mentioned expenditure lines, the smallest sums were paid for acquiring input data for spatial planning (C4). The average amount, in this case, was PLN 1,740. Relatively small sums were allocated to tasks related to the drafting or amending of a study of conditions (C3), PLN 2,708.91 on average. The average outlays on land surveys (C5) and other tasks intended to improve the quality of an area (C6) did not exceed PLN 3,000.

Looking at these results in terms of the share of resources allocated to different objectives and spent on activities relating to spatial planning from the Village Fund, the highest percentage of resources was earmarked for tasks from group C1 (55.8% of all the resources from the Village Fund). A similar share was reported for activities from group C2 (55.2%). On the other extreme, there were tasks connected with the purchase of input data (C4) whose results for financial outlays overlapped – as with groups C1 and C2. When it comes to tasks from group C4,

expenditure from the Village Fund amounted to only 13.2%. Investment projects intended to improve the quality of areas in communes (C6) required 17.1% of the Village Fund. The share of activities from group C3 slightly exceeded 22.2% while land surveys (C5) required about 35% of resources.

6. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION

The results of the research have led to the conclusion that only a few villages in Poland decided to earmark financial resources from the Village Fund for tasks connected with spatial planning. Admittedly, such decisions were marginal compared to other tasks delivered from the resources of the fund in question. Much bigger amounts and more projects were identified for activities such as the modernisation of public premises, improved access to information and better communication between local authorities and residents, higher quality of the technical infrastructure (including roads and lightning), the promotion of a village, providing meeting places and ensuring social integration, organising local cultural and educational events, and increasing the share of green areas in villages (Feltynowski and Rzeńca, 2019).

The actions undertaken in villages did not allow for full financing of the tasks connected with spatial planning. However, one needs to bear in mind that they lay the foundations for financial engineering based on the resources left at the disposal of a village and local communities. This approach may also provide the basis for initiatives paid from off-budget resources (Filipiak and Dylewski, 2015; Kamiński, 2012). This study was also intended to assess the openness of the rural population to the co-financing of projects linked to spatial planning from the Village Fund. In this context, it needs to be stressed that local self-governments whose auxiliary units carry out investment projects financed from the Village Fund are obliged to inform local communities what tasks may be paid from these resources.

The obtained data was not very optimistic, although it needs to be acknowledged that the 24 villages which were identified should be seen as examples of best practices when it comes to the openness of both the local community as well as the local authorities which promote spending from the Village Fund on tasks in the area of spatial planning. Unfortunately, the resources allocated to this goal are very limited, which, in the light of the estimated market price for a local development plan of one hectare in size, means they are not sufficient to pay for any local plan for a big area (Feltynowski, 2018a).

The results of the study also demonstrated that some of the groups distinguished in the research study generated big average amounts, which absorbed

more than half of the Village Fund. Other groups, despite value indicators higher than minimal, did not absorb significant resources from the fund. Nonetheless, regardless of the group of tasks connected to spatial planning, one must point out that only 24 out of more than 40,000 rural administrative units financed these types of tasks. It is hard to find a single voivodeship that uses the Village Fund for spatial planning activities to a significant degree.

The use of Village Fund in rural and urban-rural communes should be seen as a wish to build a civil society in which the residents decide about the allocation of financial resources made available to them by local authorities. It also develops relations between local authorities and the community. We need to bear in mind that these activities should be promoted further, which calls for awareness building among council members in communes as they are responsible for establishing the Village Fund out of a commune's budget.

REFERENCES

Biuro Planowania Przestrzennego Katowice (BPP Katowice) (1983). Materiały wejściowe. Katowice: BPP Katowice.

BRZEZIŃSKI, C. (2015), *Polityka przestrzenna w Polsce. Instytucjonalne uwarunkowania na poziomie lokalnym i jej skutki finansowe.* Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.

BRZEZIŃSKI, C. (2016), 'Threats of sustainable development resulting from legal requirements of spatial planning in Poland', *Economic and Environmental Studies,* 16, 2 (38), pp. 319–330.

CHRISIDU-BUDNIK, A. and KORCZAK, J. (2018), 'The Role of Trust in Spatial Planning Processes: The Case of Poland', [in:] KOŻUCH, B., MAGALA, S. and PALISZKIEWICZ, J. (eds), *Managing Public Trust.* Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 255–272.

Commune Self-government Act of 8 March 1990. J. of L. (1990), 16 (95), as amended.

DUBE, J. and LEGROS, D. (2014), *Spatial Econometrics Using Microdata.* New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

FELTYNOWSKI, M. (2018a), *Planowanie przestrzenne gmin wiejskich. Zastosowanie koncepcji polityki opartej na dowodach.* Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.

FELTYNOWSKI, M. (2018b), 'Level of spatial planning culture of rural gminas in the central region of Poland', *Infrastruktura i Ekologia Terenów Wiejskich*, II (1), pp. 293–304.

FELTYNOWSKI, M. and RZEŃCA, A. (2019), 'Solecki fund as instrument in the hands of rural development policy makers: the case of rural communes of the Lodz Metropolitan Area in Poland', [in:] KRAKOWIAK-BAL, A. and VEVERKOVA, M. (eds.), *Infrastructure and Environment*, Springer, Cham, pp. 263–271.

FILIPIAK, B.Z. and DYLEWSKI, M. (2015), 'Działalność inwestycyjna jednostek samorządu terytorialnego w latach 2008–2013', *Zeszyty Naukowe Uniwersytetu Szczecińskiego,* 854. *Finanse, Rynki Finansowe, Ubezpieczenia,* 73, pp. 867–877.

JAŁOWIECKI, B. (1986), 'Próba oceny badań nad Polską lokalną. Wstępne wyniki badań', *Seria: Polska lokalna i samorząd terytorialny w warunkach reformy i rekonstrukcji gospodarki przestrzennej*, 2, pp. 57–78.

KAMIŃSKI, A. (2012), *Finansowanie dłużne w jednostkach samorządu terytorialnego.* Warsaw: Wolters Kluwer Polska.

KOLIPIŃSKI, B. (2015), 'Przywróćmy wysoką kulturę planowania przestrzennego', [in:] KALINOWSKA, A. (ed.). *Miasto idealne – miasto zrównoważone. Planowanie przestrzenne terenów zurbanizowanych i jego wpływ na ograniczenie skutków zmian klimatu.* Warsaw: Uniwersyteckie Centrum Badań nad Środowiskiem Przyrodniczym i Zrównoważonym Rozwojem, pp. 169–175.

MISZTAL, B. (1986), 'Przemiany restrukturyzacyjne społeczności lokalnych. Wstępne wyniki badań', *Seria: Polska lokalna i samorząd terytorialny w warunkach reformy i rekonstrukcji gospodarki przestrzennej*, 2, pp. 79–92.

NOWAK, M.J. (2012), *Decyzje o warunkach zabudowy i zagospodarowania terenu w gospodarowaniu i zarządzaniu przestrzenią*. Warsaw: CeDeWu.

Spatial Planning and Land Development Act of 27 March 2003. J. of L. (2003), 80 (717) as amended.

STAROSTA, P. (1995), *Poza metropolią. Wiejskie i małomiasteczkowe zbiorowości lokalne a wzory porządku makrospołecznego.* Łódź: Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Łódzkiego.

Village Fund Act of 20 February 2009. J. of L. (2009), 52 (420) as amended.

Village Fund Act of 21 February 2014. J. of L. (2014), 301, as amended.

sciendo

COPE
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

BOOK REVIEWS

Christie JOHNSON COFFIN, Jenny YOUNG, *Making Places for People: 12 Questions Every Designer Should Ask*, Routledge, New York/London 2017, 226 pages

Cities and towns increasingly make use of placemaking to design places where people feel at ease. Just think of neighbourhoods where professionals involve residents to develop 'tiny forests' in order to make public space more attractive and climate-proof. Since its emergence in New York in the 1970s, placemaking has become both a philosophy and a method of developing physical environments in co-operation with its main users. Also, in academic circles placemaking has been receiving more and more attention. Classic books like those by Jane Jacobs, Kevin Lynch, and Jan Gehl are reread, while there is a growing interest in environmental behaviour studies by psychologists, planners, and architects.

A few years ago, the geography department in Nijmegen asked me to teach a course on placemaking. I was immediately excited, since from earlier experiences I knew that most students love the topic, not least because of its practical applicability. But how to make the course also academically sound? While looking for appropriate and recent literature, I encountered the book *Making Places for People: 12 Questions Every Designer Should Ask* by Johnson Coffin and Young, two American professors of architecture. The goal of their concise and well-illustrated book is to provide an overview of environmental design and provoke thinking about the relationship between people and places. The term 'place' can be nearly anything in the built environment: houses, libraries, streets, neighbourhoods, campuses or even whole cities. In dealing with the topic, the authors present twelve 'wicked' questions – questions with no straightforward answers – every designer should ask when developing a place. Each chapter in the book is devoted to one of these questions.

The first four chapters (1–4) deal with some basic features of places. The following questions are addressed: what is the story of a place? whose place is

it? where is it and how big is it? The authors explore those issues by providing theoretical insights, empirical findings and case examples from places across the world, as varied as the Taj Mahal, the housing project Pruitt-Igoe in St. Louis, the Chernobyl-area and the design of Italian public squares. Although the chapters deal with only a selection of the available theories and results, they stimulate readers to think, look for additional material and reflect on places in their own contexts. This is fair enough, because placemaking is highly location specific. Thus, the chapters act as a kind of compass for navigating the vast terrain of placemaking.

Chapters 5 until 9 analyse some of the functions and goals of places: their logic, the community-privacy balance, and usefulness, as well as the ways in which places are able to support health and sustainability. Again, the studies and examples come from all parts of the world, varying from architect Peter Zumthor's thermal baths at Vals (Switzerland) to the Hospital Healing Garden in Shenzhen (China). Among those chapters, I particularly liked chapter 6 on the balance between community and privacy. There, the authors expand on the distinction made by Humphry Osmond, a psychiatrist, between 'sociopetal' and 'sociofugal' places, i.e. places that foster or discourage communities. It is a case in point that the book integrates research from a range of disciplines, even psychiatry.

The last three chapters of the book (10–12) deal with some really trick questions that place designers should ask: who likes a place? is there evidence that it works? and, last but not least: does the place foster social equity? Highlighting the importance of personal, social and cultural contexts, Johnson Coffin and Young demonstrate how challenging it is to make places that every person will like in every circumstance. The authors also show how spotty and imperfect design research evidence often is. For example, the popular study by Roger Ulrich on the value of windows overlooking natural landscapes for hospital patients can be criticised on many grounds. There are a lot of pitfalls for researchers, making 'evidence-based design' a challenging task. Finally, the authors discuss the importance of inclusive design, while also recognising that it is hard to achieve in today's complex society.

Over the last two academic years, I have used the book by Johnson Coffin and Young as one of the basic study materials in my course on placemaking. My experiences with the book are quite positive and my impression is that students do agree with that. Thanks to its crystal-clear structure in twelve intriguing questions, the book offers an excellent base for lecturing. During each lecture, I have dealt with one or two chapters in combination with academic papers related to the topic. For example, chapter 7 on the health effects of places was an excellent starting point for discussing recent findings in the geography of health.

In summary, I highly recommend *Making Places for People*, not only to colleagues who teach in the field of placemaking. The book will be valuable and relevant also to researchers and professionals. For the latter, the twelve questions can

even function as a tool for assessing whether a place they work on meets human needs. From my own course, I know that the function of the book as a 'checklist' works well: my students have produced useful reports when I asked them to analyse real places from a placemaking perspective. Therefore, I hope that Johnson Coffin and Young's book will find its way in the professional community as well, thus contributing to making better places for people.

Gert-Jan HOSPERS
Radboud University & University of Twente (The Netherlands)

sciendo

C O P E
Member since 2018
JM13714

EUROPEAN SPATIAL RESEARCH AND POLICY

Volume 26 2019 Number 2

Ugo BARDI, *The Seneca Effect. Why Growth is Slow but Collapse is Rapid*, Springer 2017, XII, 203 pages

Ugo Bardi's book, as one of the latest reports to the international think-tank Club of Rome, may be of interest to readers from various academic fields and approaches such as development economics, environmental economics, system dynamics, chaos and complexity theory, game theory, etc. The book is part of Springer's Frontiers Collection that discusses challenging and open problems at the forefront of modern science. It fits the well-established literature of system thinking and world modelling. Although the topics discussed in the book are highly scientific, the language is articulated in a non-academic manner in order to be accessible to non-specialist and non-academic audiences as well. From its multi- and interdisciplinary viewpoint, the book discusses the basic feature of collapses. The expression "Seneca Effect" refers to a line written by the ancient Roman philosopher Lucius Annaeus Seneca: "Fortune is of sluggish growth, but ruin is rapid". Indeed, the lifeline of complex systems, either natural or social ones, usually follows a particular and strongly asymmetric bell-shaped curve which grows slowly and declines rapidly.

The Seneca effect. Why growth is slow but collapse is rapid presents a rich collection of historical and contemporary examples for this seemingly simple yet far-reaching issue, and shows how modern system science has rediscovered this phenomenon. It consists of five chapters including an introduction, three chapters of the main body, a short conclusion and an important appendix depicting the system dynamics approach.

Chapter 1, which serves as the *Introduction*, describes the above-mentioned nature of collapses, underlining that "collapse is not a bug, it is a feature". In other words, from a scientific approach, one might learn to live together with collapses happily by accepting them rather than trying to fight them. Here, Bardi emphasized that collapses are ubiquitous, and all have some common characteristics, such as they occur in complex systems or networks that behave in a non-linear way. His inspiring message is that common sense may be enough, and one can cope with collapses, reduce the damage they cause, and even exploit them to their advantage.

Chapter 2 entitled *The Mother of All Collapses: The Fall of Rome* presents the fall of the Roman Empire as the collapse of a complex system. By illustrating a set of different but mutually reinforcing causes and effects, called feedbacks, that led to the relatively fast collapse of the Western Roman Empire in late antiquity, the author drew a parallel between the ancient Roman Empire and globalisation as our current empire.

Chapter 3 goes into detail of the *Collapses of Large and Small* in seven sections by examining various fields where collapses often occur. One part of this chapter deals with complex networks as a way of modelling our natural and social environment. From this point of view, the so-called "Seneca collapses" (very quick decline of complex systems) can be considered as phase transitions, when networks become completely rearranged, which are quite common. The author indicated important points about depletion in the context of natural, renewable and non-renewable resources which can easily be reflected further in social systems. Particularly, in the context of overexploitation of natural resources, the author asked whether the oscillations, disasters and suffering caused by them could be avoided or, at least, reduced in amplitude. The answer, again, lies in understanding how the laws of complex systems affect markets, and the economic and financial environment. Of course, politics and lobbying also play significant roles in the outcome of the process. The last two sections of this chapter lead to modelling issues and world models as first described by Jay Wright Forrester (MIT) and in the well-known "Limits to Growth" literature (cf. Meadows *et al.*, 1972), as well as to the issue of the collapse of the earth's ecosystem as a result of increasing CO_2 concentration.

Chapter 4, *Managing Collapse,* brings forward the question of how to avoid and/or exploit collapse, that is, how to manage and how not to mismanage complex systems. In the first section of this chapter, the question of overexploitation reappears, and several possible solutions are listed and assessed. At this point, resilience is a key term that means much more, or even the opposite, than just resisting a change as it implies adaptability to changing conditions without becoming vulnerable to outside shocks. This chapter also mentions examples for the recovering of collapsed systems which is the other side of resilience. Importantly, financial collapses and their prevention are also discussed. In the second section of Chapter 4, the exploitation of collapses is discussed by differentiating between hostile and creative collapsing, the latter being the case when a system eliminates the old and creates space for the new. It can be a managed collapse of an obsolete structure in order to facilitate a transition that needed to happen anyway. The persistence of obsolete structures can be observed in various social and economic systems, such as bureaucracy or "The Fossil Empire", therefore, many efforts are needed to "pull the levers in the right direction". Indeed, in the time of climate change, more than ever the issue of how to build resilient societies and economies is key. In this context, a noteworthy question (but not mentioned in Bardi's book)

is also how complex systems behave in spatial terms, and what factors determine the different resilience of places.

Chapter 5, serving as the *Conclusion*, repeats that everything continues to change, and that change is unavoidable. Instead of dreading it we might learn how to adapt ourselves to it.

The *Appendix: Mind-Sized World Models* retains the reader-friendly style as it provides some illustrative models to represent how complex systems, such as predator and prey populations, behave in real situations (known today as the "Lotka-Volterra" model). This part of Ugo Bardi's book proposes system dynamics as the best option for simulating complex systems in a low-cost, user-friendly and still effective way equipped with commonly available software tools. Using the system dynamics method, Bardi reproduces the Seneca curve in a relatively simple stock-flow model. In this way, we can better see real-life interactions and hence understand more about our future.

One of the most interesting points of the book is that complex systems never reach a statically stable position. Instead, they oscillate dynamically around the so-called "attractor", which is a couple of values that stabilise a system, without ever reaching it. Furthermore, when complex systems grow, their growth mechanism is non-linear. There are different kinds of non-linear models and some of them, such as the exponential, the logistic or the bell-shaped models, can be described by mathematical functions. However, the most common "Seneca model" cannot be described using an equation as several subsystems are linked to one another after reaching a certain complexity, generating feedback effects. Consequently, when a system starts to fall, the decline is much faster than the growth. Despite the lack of an equation, the above-mentioned curve can be simulated by means of system dynamics à la J.W. Forrester to illustrate the Seneca model.

It would have been good to see some references within the book to another report from the Club of Rome, namely Bernard Lietaer and co-authors' (2012) book titled *Money and Sustainability: The Missing Link*. Unfortunately, there is no reference to this report. However, Lietaer and his colleagues articulated a statement that was very close to Bardi's setting about financial collapses, when they wrote:

> This report proposes that we view the economy as an open system consisting of complex flow networks in which money circulates between and among various economic agents. It has recently become possible to measure with a single metric the sustainability of any complex flow network on the basis of its structural diversity and its interconnectivity. A key finding is that any complex flow system is sustainable if, and only if, it maintains a crucial balance between two equally essential but complementary properties: its efficiency and its resilience. When too much emphasis is put on efficiency at the cost of resilience, diversity is sacrificed. This will automatically result in sudden systemic collapses. (p. 13)

The authors illustrated their statement with a curve which resembled Bardi's curve of the Seneca effect. We would welcome to see the ideas by Lietaer and his

co-authors and by Bardi linked together in literature in the near future. However, all things considered, we found *The Seneca effect. Why growth is slow but collapse is rapid* a really engaging book that is well-illustrated, opens the readers' eyes and sheds new or more light on certain important aspects of the dynamics of humanity's natural, social, and economic environments.

Csaba LAKÓCAI and Zsuzsanna ZSIBÓK
Centre for Economic and Regional Studies (Hungary)

Acknowledgement. This book review has been made within the framework of project no. 120004 with the support provided from the National Research, Development and Innovation Fund of Hungary, financed under the K16 funding scheme.

REFERENCES

LIETAER, B., ARNSPERGER, C., GOERNER, S. and BRUNNHUBER, S. (2012), *Money and Sustainability – The Missing Link. A Report from the Club of Rome – EU Chapter to Finance Watch and the World Business Academy.* Axminster: Triarchy Press Ltd.

MEADOWS, D.H., MEADOWS, D.L., RANDERS, J. and BEHRENS, W.W. III. (1972), *The Limits to Growth: A Report for the Club of Rome's Project on the Predicament of Mankind*, 1st edition. New York: Universe Books.