Abstract. In the article, the authors summarised the concept of state border security. They have suggested a wider interpretation of the border security model. They discussed modern models of border security in a theoretical context. They presented progressive models of security and functioning of Ukraine’s borders and described their features. They emphasised that the modern Ukrainian-Polish boundary represents a partially liberal model of security and functioning and it can be characterised by the operational security model. Different models of the functioning of the Ukrainian-Polish boundary (asymmetrical, selectively simplified, and symmetrical) were identified and connected with the transformational processes of the Ukrainian-Polish relations.
Key words: state border, Ukraine, Poland, EU, Russia, Belarus, Moldova, border protection, border functioning, model.
In today’s world, much attention is paid to security issues, in particular the security of state borders. The migration crisis on the Belarusian-Polish border in 2021, the accumulation of troops on the Belarusian-Ukrainian border, and the Russian-Ukrainian war since 2014 with its large-scale aggression since 24 February 2022 are examples of threats to EU security and to its borders. The protection of state borders, and the introduction of new models and methods of its functioning are currently at the main focus of states’ leaderships, international organisations, and state institutions for border protection. Researchers are also investigating these issues intensively.
In general, a “model” is a physical, symbolic, or imaginary system. It imitates, reproduces, and reflects certain principles of the internal organisation and functioning, some qualities, certain features, and/or characteristics of an object that is studied (original). A classic model is defined as a “phenomenon, object, paradigm, or hypothetical image.” We consider that, in the current case, the model of state border security should be studied as a system that displays the processes of state border protection. Nowadays, the model of state border security is a common notion that is widely used in official documents, scholarly papers, journalistic works, and the mass media. One of the most common definitions of the notion of a border security model is an alternative to the concept of a “system of state border security”, which implies regularities in the supposed actions of regular, additional, interacting forces and means in contrast to the probable actions of violators of the legislation on a state’s border. There are several models of state border protection in the world today, which we shall discuss in this article. However, the changing geopolitical situation, the emergence of new challenges and threats, such as war with the large-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine, the emergence of refugees from Ukraine in Poland and other EU countries, and the global migration crisis are forcing all states, including the EU, to search for new effective models of border protection and security mechanisms. Much attention is paid to these security issues both in literature and in practice, i.e., in border management. However, theoretical and applied aspects of the concept of border security and functioning models in general, and in particular of neighbouring states, should be studied more deeply, especially for the development of integrated models. Complex models of the functioning and protection of Ukraine’s borders at its various border areas (including with the EU), as well as models of border protection with their predominant measures and models of functioning, are studied in this article. The article also proposes a new “crisis” model of protection and functioning of Ukraine’s border with EU Member States, in particular with Poland, which has arisen in response to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine. Therefore, the investigation proposed in the article makes a significant contribution to the study of security issues of state border protection, and it becomes important for the practice of their protection and functioning, especially in the changing geopolitical situation in Europe.
In the modern world, much attention is paid to the study of borders, in particular the security of state borders. Nowadays, research and scientific investigation also greatly contribute to a better understanding of this issue. However, scholars tend to investigate the borders of their own countries from their country’s side. In assessing the experience of protection and functioning of Ukrainian state borders, in the article was important to use mainly works of Ukrainian specialists, as well as Polish scientists and practitioners who have had significant experience in border protection. This choice of literature was also influenced by the fact that Poland is Ukraine’s closest neighbour and has become a powerful defender of Ukrainian state’s independence during the Russian-Ukrainian war.
At various points in time, Ukrainian and Polish academics were interested in the security of the Ukrainian-Polish border. It is clearly visible in numerous publications, including works by such Polish researchers as L. Bednarek (1998), P. Cichoracki (2012), H. Dominiczak (1992; 1997), P. Eberhardt (1994), W. Śleszyński (2007), and others. In their work, the scholars explained the formation of borders, examined the security of the Ukrainian-Polish border within different time frames and under different political regimes, and analysed the activities of the border security state institutions and examined their effectiveness. The origins of border formations in Poland related to border protection were studied in the works of L. Bednarek (1998). His works have also revealed factors that have led to the establishment of such border institutions. W. Śleszyński (2007), a Polish researcher, examined the activities of border formations in the context of the functioning of the Polish security apparatus during the interwar period (1921–1939). H. Dominiczak (1992, 1997) and P. Cichoracki (2012) conducted research on the causes and factors influencing the formation of state institutions for border protection. Moreover, the formation and change of the most effective border protection structure, i.e., the Border Guard Corps, are among the important topics that have been often studied by modern Polish researchers, such as L. Bednarek (1998), H. Dominiczak (1992, 1997), and M. Cieplewicz (1995). M. Cieplewicz could be called the historian of the Polish Army. In his works, M. Cieplewicz examined the origins, organisation, and the tasks of the Border Guard Corps as a military structure. The specifics of foreign policy of Poland and its security were studied in the work of A. Bieńczyk-Missala (2016). It was necessary to study this work to understand the way Polish borders function in order to fulfil this task. The current changing role of borders especially in Central and Eastern Europe was studied in works of such authors as V. Kolosov, M. Więckowski, (2018) and J. Zupančič, J. A. Wendt, A. Ilieş (2018).
Modern Ukrainian scholars like L. V Bortnyk. (2015) and O. V. Razyhraiev (2012) studied the creation and functioning of such Polish border protection institutions as the State Police and the Border Guard Corps. O. V. Altunin (2005), N. Antoniuk and N. Papish (2019), M. Barthel (2021), L. Bortnyk (2015), Z. Buchko (2020), O. Holdun (2009), R. Kotsan (2012; 2019), N. Krasnikova, H. Filatov and D. Krasnikov (2016), and K. Wolczuk (2008) are among other modern researchers who have devoted their works to the formation of the Ukrainian border in general, and in particular the Ukrainian-Polish border at different historical times, the study of the political peculiarities of its formation, and the legal and institutional aspects of protection and functioning. These authors analysed the formation of Ukraine’s borders in the past, they have drawn attention to the security of the modern border, revealed the border problems between Ukraine and Poland, and emphasised the need to reform the state border protection system in Ukraine.
Nowadays, the issue of protecting the various sections of Ukraine’s state borders is acute. The introduction of a new model of state border protection is currently being actively studied by O. V. Altunin (2005), R. I. Kotsan (2012, 2021), M. M. Lytvyn (2010, 2012), and V. O. Nazarenko and A. V. Vikhtiuk (2011). Their works are devoted to the study of the Border Troops of Ukraine, the modelling of the processes of state border protection, the introduction of integrated border management, and improving the level of national security in Ukraine.
Legal aspects of Ukraine’s state border functioning were analysed in the works of K. Wolczuk (2008). The questions about the formation of Ukraine’s border in general, and its Ukrainian-Polish part in particular, in different time periods, the political peculiarities of its formation, and the legal and institutional aspects of protection and functioning were studied in works by such scholars as N. I. Papish (2013), O. V. Razyhraiev (2012), etc.
Yet further research is needed on the synthesis of security and functioning of state borders (particularly its Ukrainian-Polish component), as well as the distinction of security and functioning models of borders between neighbouring states. These issues are especially important and relevant at the present stage because there are no studies on this topic available in free access for foreign scientists and researchers, a fact that had led us to choose the research topic proposed in the article.
While studying the formation of state borders and the features of their functioning, it is important to use knowledge from the field of limology, which analyses theoretical approaches to the study of borders. V. A. Kolosov (2003, 2008) has identified several theoretical approaches and divided them into traditional and modern. In the modern methodology, a relatively new approach to the study of the processes of formation and development of various structures is a synergetic approach. The scope of its study includes nonlinear effects of the evolution of systems of any type, which involve multiple scenarios of further development. In explaining political processes domestic and foreign scholars actively use a synergetic approach because it reveals a probable vision of the world, as well as possible scenarios for the development of systems under the influence of various factors and their combinations (Maksymova, 2009).
In the case of the study of the development and transformation of state borders, the synergetic approach enables one to see the instability or imbalance of the system (i.e., the state border), which can occur in some spatio-temporal characteristics under the influence of foreign and domestic policy changes. While conducting state border investigations, applying a synergetic approach makes it possible to understand the orientation of the study object and to achieve a political, economic and social balance between the components that characterise the state border as a holistic system. Synergetics holds the key to understanding the little-known causes of addiction. It reveals the mechanisms of instability, as well as the stability of systems, including those at the state border.
Synergetics is somewhat similar to dialectics, but there is a fundamental methodological difference between these paradigms. Synergetics explores the dynamics and the movement of the process, and dialectics is a political phenomenon in the unity and struggle of opposites, in constant renewal and development. The aim of the dialectic approach was to identify the content of the functional component of the border, and the contradictions of domestic and foreign policy development of two states.
The systems approach is the logical tool, covering all the above approaches. It allows us to consider the state border as a holistic, dynamic system. It also makes it possible to reveal the “mechanisms” that ensure this integrity (purpose, “input”, elements, functions, connections, and “output”) (Bebyk, 2000; Shlyakhtun, 2005). The systems approach is important in dialectical cognition (Punchenko, 2014). It helped to gain a deeper understanding of the essence of the state border, to fully reveal its problematic issues, and to understand the range of its activities. The characterization of the state border as a system, which means a set of elements, rather than their simple sum is of great methodological importance. Awareness of the relationships in the systems and the interdependence of the elements helped to understand the trends of the political process, and the formation and functioning of borders, its dynamism, development and transformation.
The use of specific research methods, as well as the use of various details and their analysis is required for a successful study of state borders, the political interaction of interstate actors, the development of border protection models, and their operation. In this study, the methods of structural and functional analysis were used, which helped to understand historical, political, economic, cultural, and other phenomena in terms of the dynamics, changes, and functions of state borders (Shabliy, 2015). The comparative method was also used in this research. It was based on the principles of the similarity and difference between comparative objects. The use of a comparative method in the study of different models of state border protection and functioning helped to compare security measures and features of functioning in view of current challenges of domestic and international nature.
The modelling method was also used while conducting the research. The article considers the model of state border protection as a system that reproduces the processes of state border protection. The method is used to build models of state border protection in modern Ukraine. It is based on the principles of border policy and aimed at maintaining the appropriate level of border security, it is provided by integrated border management, and implemented through the functions of the border institution (Altunin, 2005). The modelling method enabled us to offer various perspective models of protection and the functioning of modern Ukraine’s border.
The combination of these principles and research methods helped to avoid subjective assessments, enabled us to approach the scientific validity of the research results, and presented the material in a consistent and logically complete form, more thoroughly reflecting the essence of Ukraine’s border models of protection and functioning, especially on its Ukrainian-Polish part.
Modern research suggests three common models of state border security. Those are: (1) enclosing (border walls), (2) a joint system of state border security, and (3) a model of a mutual cross-border space. These models were proposed by P. P. Lysak (2014) and V. S. Nikiforenko (2015) in their research papers about foreign experiences in implementing security policies and protecting state borders.
The enclosing model (a border wall) is a unilateral strengthening of the border through the construction of border walls or other barriers. Experts call this model “the Great Wall of China.” Its goal is to protect itself from hostile threats or to isolate itself from a weak neighbouring country. This model has some drawbacks, among them significant expenses associated with the construction and maintenance of border infrastructure, a deterioration of relationships with a neighbouring state, or the severance of relations. An advantage of a unilateral strengthening of the border is defence against military threats, invasion, terrorism, and the penetration by illegal immigrants. The last example is the reason why Donald Trump, US president at the time, tried to build a border wall and defend Mexico (IPress.Ua, 2017). The purpose of the wall was “to become a barrier to illegal immigration from Mexico, as well as an obstacle to drug trafficking” (Sjogodni.Svit, 2018). Annually, around 350,000 illegal immigrants arrive in the U.S. A vast majority of them are Mexicans. The border between the United States and Mexico is 3200 km long and there are already barriers at almost 1100 km of it. Another example of the most guarded border in the world can be found on a 248-kilometer line between North and South Koreas. There are approximately 2 million military personnel there. The border between these countries still remains a permanent obstacle to the uncontrolled interaction of neighbouring states (TSN.Svit, 2018).
The joint system security model was formed in 1990–2000. Its specific feature is the attempt of both sides to prevent the invasion of terrorists or lone militants through legal or illegal channels. This model has been implemented at the borders of Israel, Egypt, and the Palestinian National Authority, as well as between India and Pakistan. Externally, the border system appears peculiar and resembles a structure that consists of several rows of high metal barriers. They are equipped with obstacles, sensors, surveillance cameras, etc. It should be noted that Indian and Israeli barrier systems are intended to kill violators rather than detain them. Thus, there are not only surveillance systems or sensors, but also electrified and mined systems. At night, border guards have the right to shoot potential trespassers on sight. Barrier transparency is considered a drawback of this model as it helps violators and terrorists using it for their advantage, when they pass through border easily.
The aim of the mutual cross-border space model is to counteract mass uncontrolled migration. In modern times, this model is used by the U.S. and Mexico, India, Bangladesh, and Myanmar, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Yemen, Botswana, and Zimbabwe. There are obstructions only at the most problematic sections of a border. “Humane” border hurdles are aimed at stopping violators, not killing them. Since neighbouring states have quite active cross-border connections, lots of migrants can enter an appealing neighbouring country legally. As practice shows, this model presupposes most citizens are law-abiding people, which is the reason why the effectiveness of the barriers against illegal immigrants is quite low. When undocumented immigrants cross the border, they damage it by making tunnels while trying to traverse the barrier. There are corrupt practices among border guards. Surveillance cameras, infrared and seismic detectors, and other devices do not produce the expected results.
We should mention that a similar model has existed on the border between Ukraine and Russia for 23 years, since Ukraine gained its independence. In September 2014, the former prime minister of Ukraine Arsen Yatseniuk announced his intention to build a wall at the border with Russia. He called this project a “European rampart”. He was actively involved in the construction of the wall on the border between Ukraine and the Russian Federation, but after his resignation, the completion of the construction ceased to be mentioned (POLITEKA, 2018). The State Border Guard Service (SBGS) of Ukraine claims that less than a third of the wall at the border with Russia has been completed. Initially, it was planned that fortifications worth more than UAH 8 billion would be built at the border. Later, the project budget was reduced significantly, to UAH 4 billion. The SBGS has already spent approximately UAH 800,000. According to law enforcement officers, a part of the funds was spent for other purposes, while some of the funds were stolen. The National Anti-Corruption Bureau of Ukraine and the Prosecutor General’s Office of Ukraine conducted two separate investigations into the construction. They have estimated total losses at more than UAH 100 million. While such significant funds were spent on “the project” from the state budget, it is successfully used by many Ukrainian politicians only for PR purposes (Eksklyuzyv “Hordona”, 2018).
Nonetheless, in the modern context, the border security model has gained new advantages and requires a broader interpretation, which should be based on systematic and synergistic approaches to the concept of state borders. In contemporary works, the term “state border security model” is used together with another term, i.e., “integrated system of state border security.” In order to create a modern integrated system of state border security for Ukraine and independent rights in its exclusive (maritime) economic zone, the following actions are considered:
Moreover, authorities will pay more attention to measures that will develop operational and search activities, reform the Sea Guard, and advance communication systems (Verkhovna Rada Ukrayiny, 2006). Thus, a model of state border security becomes an integrated system designed to implement cross-border policy objectives and ensure a high level of border security. This model should be based on the principles of the border policy of Ukraine. Moreover, it should be aimed at ensuring a sufficient level of border security (Lytvyn, 2010). This model is executed through the functions of the border institution, as well as guaranteed by the integrated border enforcement (Kontseptsiia, 2015). These approaches to understanding the model of state border security, as well as the extrapolation of the positive features and practices in security and functioning of the Ukrainian-Polish border on the modern Ukrainian border within different time frames, helped to design proposals for different ways of its protecting and functioning. Based on R. Kotsan’s (2012, 2021) research, the following progressive models of border security and operation can be proposed (see the table below).
| Name of model | Model of border security | Predominant measures of border security | Model of border operations | Border regions of Ukraine |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Strict | Military | military regime counterintelligence operational-search |
strict political strict economic |
Ukrainian-Russian andUkrainian-Belarusian since February 24, 2022 |
| Military/technical | military regime counterintelligence operational-technical |
strict political strict economic |
Ukrainian-Russian maritime boundary | |
| Partially strict | Operational | regime counterintelligence operational-search operational-service |
symmetrical asymmetrical |
Ukraine-Belarus until 24 February 2022 |
| Crisis | Operational | regime counterintelligence operational and investigative operational and service |
symmetrical asymmetric simplified |
Ukrainian-Polish, border with EU countries |
| Partially liberal (partially mild) | Operational-technical | operational technical regime |
symmetrical asymmetrical |
Ukrainian-Romanian maritime boundary |
| Operational | operational-service operational-search regime |
symmetrical, asymmetrical, selectively simplified | Ukrainian-Moldavan border with EU countries | |
| Liberal (mild) | Monitoring | analytical informational operational-search operational-service |
open | border with EU countries (in prospect) |
The presented description of the models of border security and operation, as well as their characteristics indicates that, for instance, a partially liberal model can include the operational model of border security (in the Ukrainian-Moldovan section and the border with EU countries) and the operational-technical security model (at the sea border between Ukraine and Romania), as well as such models of operation as symmetric, asymmetric, selectively simplified. All points above concern the Ukrainian-Polish border. With Ukraine’s accession to the EU, a liberal model will become possible at this border section in which a monitoring model of border security and an open model of operation fit well. In this case, border transformations are feasible, while its operation will occur on the new qualitative basis.
The operational model of state border security will involve a system of the following measures: operational/service, operational/search, and established procedures. Border security institutions and their subordinate departments will implement them. This model can be applied at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border, as well as in border areas with EU countries. The operational-technical model of the state border will be characterised by a system of operational, technical, and established measures that will be applied in order to ascertain the surface situation and timely detect any violations regarding navigation, stay, and entry (exit) of non-military and military vessels into internal waters, the territorial sea, and exclusive (marine) economic zones. It is expedient to introduce the operational-technical model of state border security at the maritime border with Romania.
The monitoring model of state border security will apply operational/service, operational/search, informational, and analytical measures. Border security institutions and their subdivisions will implement them. This model is feasible under the condition of Ukraine’s accession to the EU and it will be obtained for the area of Ukraine’s border with EU countries. In this case, the status of the border, cross-border regime, and border area rules will change, as well as the adjacent border areas will reach the stage of full integration. Different models of border functioning will correspond to the models of state border security considered above. Thus, symmetrical, asymmetrical, and selectively simplified models of functioning will correspond to the operational and operational-technical models of border security. At the same time, the monitoring model of state border security will be characterised by an open model of functioning. Below, we will describe each model of state border functioning in detail.
The asymmetrical model has its peculiarities and is presented in states, one of which has introduced visas in order to cross borders, while another country has not. The elements of this model have actually existed between Ukraine and Poland for more than a decade. At the request of the EU, Poland introduced visas for Ukraine in 2003, which took place in accordance with the Agreement on the Conditions of Travel of Citizens (Stokłosa, 2012). Ukraine applied the asymmetrical principle. Ukraine did not introduce visas for citizens of Poland and anticipated that the Polish government would take similar actions. Since then, the issue of visa waivers for Ukrainian citizens has been raised repeatedly. The Polish government took some measures towards that, in particular, the Agreement on rules on local border traffic, the exclusion of payment for the Poland National Visa, the Polish Card (“Karta Polaka”), etc. However, only the requirements for processing and issuing visas were altered. These actions diluted the classic asymmetrical model (Papish, 2013). The asymmetrical visa regime had remained decisive in Ukrainian-Polish border relations until Ukraine obtained a visa-free regime with the EU. The asymmetrical model can be present from the perspective of economic protection of the state border. A country can unilaterally protect the national market from unwanted products or from their excessive amounts by imposing custom tariffs or non-tariff regulations, such as quotas, licences, etc.
The symmetrical model of border operation implies that neighbouring states introduce a bilateral visa regime (customs and non-tariff regime for the regulation of foreign economic activity). This model can be found between states that do not see their prospects in one integration group or have different geopolitical and economic interests.
The selectively simplified model of border operation is based on a differentiated approach to border crossing. In this case, a simplified border crossing procedure is introduced for individuals against the background of the general visa regime for the vast majority of the population. This model is implemented on a national and territorial basis provided that there are family, historical, or cultural relations between the citizens of neighbouring states. It emerges in the context of the asymmetrical model when one state cannot cancel the visa regime, while for another state it is not beneficial to introduce it. Thus, countries seek a compromise in order to simplify border crossing terms. This model existed at the Ukrainian-Polish border by 2017 (Poljsha v Ukraini, 2021). A 30 km wide border zone was created on the territory of Ukraine, in which the visa regime was practically abolished. In order to cross the border, citizens who live within this area were required to only present a passport and a document that specifies a place of residence within the border. For the residents of the 30 km border area, a 7-day shopping visa was introduced (Babij, 2018). Its presence simplified and expedited the procedure for obtaining multiple Schengen visas in the future. Not only the areal principle of border crossing was used, but so was a national one. Citizens of Ukraine who proved their Polish origins or family relations were issued a “Polish Card” to cross the border visa-free (Jurydyzna dopomoga inozemzjam v Poljshi, 2018). The EU’s introduction of the visa-free regime for Ukraine in 2017 was a significant decision (Ievropejska Pravda, 2017). After it was implemented, the citizens of Ukraine have become able to travel to Poland and other Schengen countries (except for the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland) without the need to obtain an entry visa for the destination country. This model was the first step on the way to the implementation of an open model of state border operation (Kotsan, 2012).
The open model of border operation has some peculiarities and involves a free flow of goods, people, finances, and services across the border. It is feasible under the condition of Ukraine’s accession to the EU. In this case, the status of the border will change significantly. According to the new status, the mode of operation of the border will also be altered. The explained open model can be applied gradually to Ukraine. At the first stage, the economic element of the border is transformed. Border and customs controls are cancelled. Visas are abolished. Goods, funds, services, and individuals transit freely. The next stage is accession to the Schengen zone, which results in the cancellation of passport control. The analysed open model of border functioning can be applied to the border with EU countries and to the Ukrainian-Polish border in particular. Many scholars and specialists believe that the legal framework for the development of relations within the Eastern Partnership is an important step towards open and transparent borders within Europe. The European Community interprets the Eastern Partnership as part of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Thus, this example becomes the EU’s framework policy towards neighbouring countries (Ministerstvo zakordonnykh sprav Ukrainy, 2021).
In May 2008, Poland, in cooperation with Sweden, presented “the Eastern Partnership” joint initiative at the European Council. The Eastern Partnership project was launched at a special summit in Prague on 7 May 2009. This project is a specific Eastern dimension of the European Neighbourhood Policy. It is based on the desire to foster various forms of regional and subregional cooperation. Primarily, it is a result of the EU’s aspiration to create a zone of stability as new borders (Holdun, 2009). Participants in the project include EU Member States, as well as Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus (its participation depends on the development of relationships with the EU) and the countries of Transcaucasia (Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia).
The main objectives of the project concerning Ukraine are:
The complicated and dynamic security environment of Ukraine demands alterations in border management approaches. In recent years, Ukraine has taken a number of actions to introduce a modern, consistent, and coordinated border management system, i.e., the integrated border management (IBM). Currently, the main issues on the way to introduce IBM are:
“The Concept of Integrated Border Management” has already been developed and approved by the Cabinet of Ministers of Ukraine (27 October 2010 No. 83; 28 October 2015 No. 1149). The implementation of the Concept will provide an opportunity to “introduce European standards of integrated border management, enhance international, cross-border, and interagency cooperation, coordinate the efforts of authorised state bodies to comprehensively and flexibly respond to current threats to state border security and ensure its openness” (Kontseptsiia, 2015). The EUBAM mission assists Ukraine in making progress in integrated border management.
The integrated border management as well as the policy of EU neighboring states to Ukraine helped to respond quickly to the situation with migrants, which appeared on the EU borders since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war on February 24, 2022. According to the UN, as of early March over 1.7 million civilians have left Ukraine due to the Russian invasion. The EU expects an influx of 4 million refugees. They cross Ukraine’s western borders with such neighbouring countries as Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Hungary, and Moldova. Poland has already received 1,027,603 refugees, Hungary – 180,163, Moldova – 82,762, Slovakia – 128,169, and Romania – 78,977. Since 24 February 2022 the mentioned states have significantly simplified border crossing procedures for Ukrainian citizens fleeing the war. In particular, they have allowed crossing the border with a domestic or foreign passport, birth certificate of children and medical documentation. In Poland and other countries bordering Ukraine, people can stay in refugee centres and receive medical care and food. The EU is preparing to give Ukrainians fleeing the war the full right to stay and work in 27 countries for up to three years. Also, on 4 March 2022, the EU intensified temporary protection for Ukrainian citizens fleeing the Russian war. The EU Council took this decision at a meeting in Brussels. It should be noted that in 2001 the special EU Directive about temporary protection has been adopted, but since then has been never activated. The Directive was applied to all EU countries except Denmark. Since 4 March 2022 it began to be applied for Ukrainians.
It can be stated that in the conditions of Russian aggression and the beginning of a large-scale invasion of Russian troops into the territory of Ukraine, a new “Crisis model of the functioning the Ukrainian border with the EU, including Poland” is being formed. The model consists in coordinating the efforts of various agencies (both Ukrainian and EU), improving international and cross-border cooperation, coordinating the work of government agencies to respond quickly and flexibly to the migratory, peak-free situation that is unfolding today. The introduction of the “Strategic Compass” fits the “Crisis” functioning model of the Ukrainian border at the section with the EU. Security and defence documents define an action plan to ensure the EU’s internal security. The compass covers all aspects of security and defence policy and is structured around four pillars: to act, to invest, to cooperate, and to secure.
In contemporary Ukraine, there is a steady trend towards a differentiated approach to building state border security in different regions of the country, while considering the level of their security, economic and social development, the degree of threats in the border area, as well as the transition to integrated border management and the implementation of various border security models at their frontiers.
We have discussed new models of security and functions of Ukraine’s border, particularly strict, partially strict, partially liberal (partially mild), and liberal (mild). We have emphasised that a partially liberal model should be used for the Ukrainian-Polish and Ukrainian-Moldovan borders and all borders with EU countries, including the maritime border with Romania. Under the condition of Ukraine’s accession to the EU, a liberal model should be applied to this border section. In this case, the border would transform and function on a new qualitative basis. We have emphasised that as the result of the Russian aggression against Ukraine the “crisis” model of protection and operation of the Ukrainian-Polish border and the border of Ukraine with the EU has emerged. This model is provided for a rapid response to the growing number of refugees from Ukraine, assistance to them, and regulation of their housing, employment, access to health care, etc. The existence of a crisis model has prompted the EU to pursue a policy of insecurity, including the adoption of the Strategic Compass. The implementation of the new models of Ukrainian border security and operation should occur along with the following processes: transition to integrated border management; improving the legal framework of the state; enhancing the operation of border security institutions; establishing a multi-level cooperation, from cooperation with border residents to inter-agency and international cooperation on the control and transit of persons, goods and vehicles across state borders. We have also concluded regarding other security and functioning models that: a strict model should be applied to the Ukrainian-Russian border (at both its land and maritime sections) while a partially strict one should be conducted at the Ukrainian-Belarusian border.
In further research, we would consider tracking the implementation of the proposed models of security and operation of Ukraine’s state borders.
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Received: 10.02.2022. Revised: 27.04.2022. Accepted: 4.05.2022.