


Determinants of Foreign Aid: The Case of Poland

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Abstract

This study examines the determinants of Poland's bilateral official developmental assistance (ODA) per capita allocation between 2013 and 2023 across 127 recipient countries. Employing panel data and multiple regression models, the analysis evaluates whether Poland, as a European Union post-accession donor with a post-communist transition background, allocates aid primarily based on recipient need or donor interest. The results indicate that Poland allocates significantly higher per capita aid to Eastern Partnership countries, reflecting strong regional solidarity rooted in historical ties. Within this regional context, aid allocation exhibits a non-linear income pattern, with middle-income recipients receiving the most support. Contrastingly, among non-Eastern Partnership recipients, income plays a minimal to negligible role in Poland's aid allocation decisions. Trade relationships are relevant within the regional context, whereas democracy promotion shows no significant influence on aid allocation. The analysis further reveals that Russia's invasion of Ukraine had a significant impact on Poland's aid allocation to Eastern Partnership countries. Overall, these findings provide partial support for the dual-track hypothesis identified in the literature on emerging Asian donors. The results suggest that Poland's ODA follows a regionally focused strategy that combines geopolitical concerns with transition solidarity, rather than being driven by humanitarian or commercial motives.

Keywords: ODA determinants, Poland, post-accession donor, Eastern Partnership

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Introduction

Poland's transition from aid recipient to aid donor represents a striking transformation in the context of international development cooperation. Following its first parliamentary elections after the Round Table Agreements of April 1989, Poland dismantled the communist order, marking a new caesura in the country's economic and political environment (Sulowski 2014, pp. 23–24; Szewczak 2015, pp. 1–3). As Sulowski (2014) notes, Poland was not a newcomer in the international arena, nor was it starting “from scratch.” Poland received extensive Western assistance between 1990 and 1994 (Kojder 1998, pp. 247–249), which facilitated its accession to the European Union (EU) in 2004 and subsequently to the OECD's Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 2013. This transition was not only institutional but also deeply connected to the country's desire to “reverse the aid chain” and repay obligations accumulated when Poland itself depended on international assistance (Drażkiewicz-Grodzicka 2013, pp. 65–66). Yet, despite this transformation, Poland's aid allocation decisions remain largely absent from aid-allocation literature, which has focused primarily on traditional Western donors and, more recently, on emerging Asian donors.

Poland's identity as an aid donor has been largely shaped by its post-communist trajectory and the development of a foreign policy that actively supports the Eastern European region in general and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries more specifically. The EaP, launched in 2009 as the “eastern dimension” of the EU's European Neighborhood Policy, constitutes a joint framework involving the EU, its member states, and six Eastern European Partner countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine (European Union External Action 2025). Poland's post-1989 foreign policy which Sulowski argues is built on “good neighborhood” relations and a pro-Western alignment places eastern neighborhood stability as a priority, explaining why policymakers draw on Poland's own transition experience to justify highly concentrated official developmental assistance (ODA) support for EaP countries.

Recent geopolitical developments have intensified Poland's regional engagement. Bieńczyk-Missala (2025) demonstrates that the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine led to a substantial increase in Polish humanitarian and development assistance, with Poland becoming a major hub for bilateral and multilateral support to Ukraine. Public and governmental responses framed this support in terms of solidarity and responsibility (Drażkiewicz-Grodzicka 2013, pp. 65–71; Bieńczyk-Missala 2025, pp. 6–7). These developments raise the question of how much of Poland's ODA allocation reflects structural factors such as income and trade, and how much is shaped by geographical proximity, regional identity, and war-driven considerations.

Table 1. Poland's Official Development Assistance by Region and Volume, 2013–2023

Year	Bilateral by Region					Bilateral Total	ODA as % of GNI
	Europe	Africa	America	Asia	Oceania		
2013	36.89	47.66	0.48	35.21	0.02	120.26	0.1
2014	44.26	44.15	0.51	–4.28	0.03	84.67	0.09

Year	Bilateral by Region					Bilateral Total	ODA as % of GNI
	Europe	Africa	America	Asia	Oceania		
2015	58.37	54.95	0.48	-7.94	0.08	105.94	0.1
2016	78.58	106.43	0.41	-0.24	0.03	185.21	0.15
2017	150.66	30.87	0.41	82.98	0.05	264.97	0.13
2018	136.37	44.85	0.61	83.94	0.04	265.81	0.14
2019	167.25	29.24	2.95	36.57	0.04	236.05	0.14
2020	171.55	22.46	2.39	37.54	0.02	233.96	0.14
2021	184.23	31.44	2.49	74.42	0.03	292.61	0.15
2022	469.41	12.52	2.86	39.75	0.04	524.58	0.53
2023	310.38	8.34	1.37	36.75	0.09	356.93	0.34

Note: Bilateral Total represents geographically allocated bilateral ODA only and excludes in-donor costs. Regional bilateral columns are expressed in USD millions at constant 2023 prices; ODA/GNI is expressed in current prices. ODA/GNI figures for 2013–2017 are based on net disbursements methodology; 2018–2023 are based on grant equivalent methodology, following changes in OECD reporting standards. Negative values reflect net loan repayments from recipient countries exceeding new disbursements in the given year.

Source: OECD DAC2A and OECD DAC1 Databases.

As illustrated in Table 1, Poland’s geographically allocated bilateral ODA grew steadily from USD 120.26 million in 2013 to USD 292.61 million in 2021, with the ODA/GNI ratio remaining stable between 0.09% and 0.15%. The year 2022 marked a stark adjustment: bilateral ODA increased to USD 524.58 million, and ODA/GNI surged to 0.53%, before partially normalizing to 0.34% in 2023. Structurally, Polish ODA relies heavily on multilateral channels most notably the European Union although in 2022 and 2023, the bilateral share became dominant (OECD 2025, pp. 1–4). The regional concentration is equally pronounced: Europe consistently receives the largest share of bilateral ODA, while allocations to Africa declined sharply over the period, suggesting a possible crowding-out effect.

This is consistent with Poland’s Multiannual Programme for Development Cooperation, which names the Eastern Partnership as the primary geographical priority, and explicitly links development to foreign policy objectives, including regional stability and institutional development (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland 2021, pp. 9–22). Recent development cooperation plans further emphasize Ukraine’s positioning as the central recipient of Polish aid, particularly in the areas of reconstruction, institutional capacity, and humanitarian support (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland 2025, p. 3). Taken together, these trends indicate that Polish ODA has evolved towards an increasingly concentrated allocation pattern.

Against this background, this study examines the determinants of Poland’s bilateral ODA per capita from 2013 to 2023. The ODA measure covers total bilateral official development assistance, including both development and humanitarian components, without distinguishing between the two. The analysis evaluates whether Poland’s allocation patterns are shaped by recipient-need (RN) considerations, donor-interest (DI) motives, democracy promotion, or regional priorities, and whether the 2022 war in Ukraine altered these allocation patterns. The study tests four hypotheses:

Hypothesis 1: Poland provides higher ODA per capita to EaP countries compared to non-regional recipients, reflecting post-communist solidarity.

This hypothesis is grounded in Poland's historical ties to the region and its commitment to supporting EaP countries. Szent-Iványi (2012) provides evidence that geographic proximity, neighborhood foreign policy orientation, and pre-1989 historical ties as opposed to recipient need are the primary determinants of aid allocation in Central and Eastern European (CEE) donors (Szent-Iványi 2012, pp. 70–81). If confirmed for Poland, the hypothesis suggests that shared cultural bonds and historical solidarity play an important role in determining where Poland directs its aid, consistent with the “gift/reciprocity logic” (Drażkiewicz-Grodzicka 2013, pp. 68–71).

Hypothesis 2: Regarding the dual-track pattern DI for high-income recipients and RN for middle-income recipients Poland exhibits distinct allocation patterns across recipient groups. For EaP recipients, ODA allocation follows an RN pattern (negative income coefficient). For non-regional recipients, ODA follows a DI pattern (positive income coefficient), similar to South Korea.

This hypothesis tests whether Poland maintains different standards for different recipient groups, following humanitarian patterns in its immediate surroundings while pursuing strategic patterns in other regions. Opršal et al. (2020) find a middle-income effect in Polish aid allocation alongside a predominant post-Soviet neighborhood bias, suggesting that income-based allocation patterns operate differently depending on the recipient's regional proximity to Poland. Such findings would support the dual-track hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3: Poland's ODA is positively associated with democratizing regimes (Freedom House scores) as a result of its 1989 history.

Given Poland's history and its stated commitment to sharing transition know-how, it can be expected that Poland will reward countries making progress in democratic governance and civil liberties. Poland's mandate of democracy promotion is codified in official documentation, with both the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Multiannual Programme for Development Cooperation explicitly listing democratization, good governance, and civic society development among core priorities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland 2019, p. 4; 2025, p. 10). Petrova (2014) argues that this orientation is rooted in Poland's own 1989 “negotiated transition,” with Polish aid emphasizing civil society development as a reflection of its domestic democratization model. A positive relationship between democratic improvements and aid allocation would support the notion that Poland's own transition experience shapes its ODA priorities.

Hypothesis 4: The Ukraine war (2022–present) altered Poland's ODA behavior, increasing aid to Ukraine and strengthening regional solidarity.

Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022 marked a turning point for European security. Poland's response was immediate: the Act of 12 March 2022 on Assistance to Citizens of Ukraine set the foundations for a large-scale support framework whose associated expenditures were reported as in-donor refugee costs within Poland's ODA statistics (Republic of Poland 2022). This hypothesis posits that this geopolitical shock shifted Poland's aid toward countries affected by

the conflict, particularly Ukraine, while also strengthening its overall commitment to supporting EaP countries for security reasons.

By analyzing these hypotheses, the study contributes to the limited empirical literature on aid allocation among European donors. It assesses whether Poland aligns more closely with the behavior of traditional DAC donors or with emerging donors whose allocation patterns incorporate geopolitical and regional considerations. While Hypothesis 1 establishes a regional bias towards EaP countries, the study's primary contribution lies in assessing the magnitude and structure of this prioritization whether standard aid allocation variables (income, population, trade, democracy) operate differently within Poland's priority neighborhood than outside it. The study tests whether the dual-track framework is consistent across donor types and applies in a European post-accession context. Beyond hypothesis testing, the study incorporates a structural break analysis of the post-2022 period, providing evidence on how geopolitical shocks modify pre-existing allocation logics, and revisits the conceptual classification of Poland as a donor, as discussed in the literature review.

Literature Review

Research on the determinants of foreign aid allocation has traditionally been organized around two explanatory variables: RN and DI. Alesina and Dollar (2000) demonstrate that aid allocation by traditional donors reflects both humanitarian factors (such as poverty and governance) as well as strong political and strategic considerations. Subsequent work by Berthélemy and Tichit (2004) shows that both RN and DI variables systematically influence aid decisions, though the relative weight varies across donors. They find that the post-Cold War period decreased bias toward former colonies and increased the importance of trade relations, while donor attention to governance quality increased in the 1990s. Importantly, they reveal that aid becomes more “progressive” once large recipients such as China and India are excluded, suggesting that the distribution of aid depends on both recipient income structure and geopolitical relevance. Additionally, research on EU member states' bilateral aid has revealed differences between national interests and EU-level development norms. Hoekman and Shingal (2024) observed that bilateral aid from EU members tends to promote national exports, whereas EU-level aid aligns more closely with development goals. This suggests that even within the EU which emphasizes development policies individual member states advance aid programs that serve their national commercial and strategic interests.

While this literature primarily examines traditional donors, recent research has extended these frameworks to emerging donors, whose motives differ due to their dual identity as former recipients. Kim and Oh's (2012) analysis of South Korea shows that Korean aid demonstrates a “dual-track” structure, with a positive relationship between recipient income and aid for higher-income recipients, while exhibiting a negative relationship for middle-income recipients. This implies that Korea focuses on DI motives for higher-income developing countries but remains more receptive to RN among countries undergoing economic transitions. Similarly, Fuchs and Vadlamannati (2013) find that India's aid allocation is driven primarily by political and commercial motives (including voting affinity at the United Nations and access

to foreign markets). Their results underscore the argument that emerging donors despite claims of South–South solidarity often pursue self-interested objectives comparable to those of DAC donors. Additionally, when analyzing Türkiye’s foreign aid patterns, Kavakli (2018) observes that Türkiye’s aid allocation shifted significantly following its political turnover, with aid increasingly directed toward trade partners and culturally affiliated (Muslim-majority) countries after the rise of the AKP government. Dreher et al. (2018), analyzing China’s official financing to Africa, demonstrate that concessional flows are primarily guided by foreign policy and diplomatic considerations, whereas less concessional flows follow more commercial interests such as investment opportunities.

A comparatively under-analyzed section of the literature concerns the CEE member states of the EU, whose place as former aid recipients turned donors gives them a distinct profile among DAC members. Lightfoot (2010) investigated the “Europeanization” of CEE development assistance following EU accession, finding that international factors were the primary catalysts for institutional transformation a term he refers to as a top-down process where CEE states aligned their legislative frameworks with EU development norms rather than developing aid policies based on domestic demand. This period is described as one of “adaptation and learning,” in which national development architectures were built to satisfy external requirements (Zajackowski and Smolaga 2023), building on earlier analysis by Horký and Lightfoot (2012). Zajackowski and Smolaga (2023), drawing on OECD DAC data for 11 CEE EU members from 2004 to 2021, identify two main determinants of CEE aid behavior: national interests, which shape the direction of bilateral flows, and institutional factors, which drive overall volume. They find that between 65% and 90% of CEE ODA is channeled through multilateral institutions (primarily the EU), meaning that bilateral aid that represents genuine national policy choices remains a relatively small share of total ODA (Zajackowski and Smolaga 2023, p. 106). CEE donors direct their bilateral ODA primarily towards neighboring European recipients, with sub-Saharan Africa receiving comparatively minimal attention – a structural pattern they attribute to the link between “security and stability interests in the CEE region and the provision of aid” (Zajackowski and Smolaga 2023, p. 119).

The quantitative dimension of the aid allocation literature on individual CEE donors remains sparse. Szent-Iványi (2012) applied a regression-based approach, finding that post-communist donors prioritize political and security interests over poverty reduction, with the majority of bilateral aid directed towards the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and neighboring countries. This challenges the predominantly humanitarian framing that CEE policymakers use to legitimize their aid programs. It does, however, align with Zajackowski and Smolaga’s (2023) assessment that the implementation of “transition experience” often functions as a “rhetorical move,” concealing the “pursuit of national interests”. Opršal, Harmáček, and Syrovátka (2016) extend the quantitative analysis to Czechia. They find that historical communist-era ties are the predominant and statistically significant determinant of Czech ODA to Sub-Saharan Africa, while recipient economic level plays a secondary role.

The closest precedent to the present study is Opršal et al. (2020). It is the only quantitative study to comparatively analyze both Poland and Czechia, and it portrays their bilateral aid as a “mélange” of geopolitical and developmental objectives. This reflects the persistent tension between neighborhood-focused foreign policy and DAC development norms that neither country has fully

resolved since EU accession. More recently, in an analysis of aid allocation across the humanitarian-development-peace nexus for 23 DAC donors, Yabe et al. (2024) deliberately exclude Poland from their dataset due to its post-2009 DAC accession a gap that motivates the donor-specific panel analyses carried out in this paper. Collectively, the aforementioned literature suggests that CEE donors operate according to a logic shaped by historical path-dependency, security interests, and geographical ties.

Throughout this study, we intentionally avoid the terms “emerging donor” and “new donor” when referring to Poland. While these terms have been widely used in the literature, their accuracy has declined in recent years. Poland has been an EU member since 2004, an OECD DAC member since 2013, and has maintained an active development cooperation program for over two decades a path that renders “emerging” both inaccurate and misleading. As Drażkiewicz-Grodzicka (2013) observes, the category of “emerging donor” is “more political than analytical,” functioning primarily as a marker of Poland’s attempts to reposition itself within post-Cold War global hierarchies rather than as an accurate description of its donor characteristics. Moreover, as Horký and Lightfoot (2012) note, these terms conflate decidedly distinct donor types: China, India, and South Korea have fundamentally different institutional and geopolitical positions from post-communist EU member states, and grouping them under a single label obscures more than it reveals. We therefore propose the term “post-accession donor” to describe states whose development cooperation systems were institutionalized primarily in response to EU and OECD DAC accession conditions, and whose aid allocation logic reflects the path dependencies, neighborhood orientations, and transitions created as a result of that accession process. This framing more accurately captures the distinctiveness of Poland’s position neither a traditional DAC donor with decades of autonomous aid history, nor a non-DAC Southern donor operating outside Western development norms and provides a more long-lasting anchor for future comparative research on this donor group.

In essence, the literature indicates that DI and RN motives coexist across donor types, but the relative balance varies based on donors’ history, domestic political institutions and experiences, and geopolitical priorities. Traditional donors demonstrate historical colonial patterns, whereas emerging donors exhibit region-specific preferences and sensitivity to political change. The aforementioned findings regarding South Korea, India, Türkiye, and China suggest that emerging donors do not entirely follow humanitarian “South–South cooperation” norms, raising questions about whether European post-accession donors such as Poland follow similar “dual-track” patterns. The existing literature provides a clear foundation but offers minimal empirical analysis of post-communist EU donors, underscoring the need for research on Poland’s ODA allocation patterns.

Data and Methodology

This study utilizes panel data covering 127 recipient countries over the period from 2013 to 2023. This timeframe was chosen to reflect Poland’s increasing engagement in international development cooperation following its accession to the OECD’s DAC in 2013.

The dependent variable, *ODA per capita*, measures Poland's bilateral aid to each recipient. The disbursement data are obtained from the OECD DAC database and measured in US dollars at a constant price with the base year 2023. The ODA variable captures total bilateral official development assistance and does not distinguish between development-oriented and humanitarian assistance. As such, the measure includes all aid, including emergency humanitarian support and crisis-related expenditures. Addressing the potential for the dependent variable to contain many zero values, this study added one to each observation before log-transforming it, which allows us to avoid missing value-related problems. As a limitation, this will create a natural distortion, but its benefit will outweigh the cost given the improved quality of data analyses stemming from reduced missing values.

The analysis incorporates several core independent variables to capture both RN and DI considerations. These include *income*, measured as the recipient's per capita GDP, obtained from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (WDI). Additionally, the variable *income*² is employed to test the non-linear (dual-track) aid pattern utilized by Alesina and Dollar (2000) as well as Berthélemy and Tichit (2004). Furthermore, the recipient's population is included as the variable *pop*, also sourced from WDI. This variable controls for country size effects, as the size of a country may influence aid allocation. Another independent variable included is *trade*, which measures bilateral trade flows between Poland and recipient countries as a proxy for donor economic interests. These data are obtained from the International Monetary Fund. To capture political and humanitarian motivations, the variable *Democracy_Change* in recipient countries is included. This variable specifically represents the year-over-year change in Freedom House's Freedom in the World Score, which assesses political rights and civil liberties on a scale from 0 to 100, with higher scores indicating greater democratic freedom.

The analysis also incorporates two dummy variables to control for specific patterns in Poland's aid allocation. First, *Eastern_Partnership* is included as a dummy variable, coded as 1 for countries that are members of the EaP initiative (Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan) and 0 for non-members. This variable examines whether Poland exhibits a geopolitical bias toward countries with which it shares historical, cultural, or security interests. Second, a *post-2022* dummy variable is included, where 1 represents years ≥ 2022 and 0 represents years before 2022. This variable captures the potential impact of the Ukraine War, which began in 2022, on Poland's aid allocation patterns. Based on the variables outlined above, the following model equation is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \ln(\text{ODA}_{PC})_{it} &= \beta_0 + \beta_1 \ln(\text{Income})_{it-1} + \beta_2 \\ &[\ln(\text{Income})_{it-1}]^2 + \beta_3 \ln(\text{Pop})_{it-1} + \beta_4 \ln(\text{Trade})_{it-1} \\ &+ \beta_5 \text{Democracy_Change}_{it-1} + \beta_6 \text{Eastern_Partnership}_i \\ &+ \beta_7 (\ln(\text{Income})_{it-1} \times \text{Eastern_Partnership}_i) \\ &+ \beta_8 (\ln(\text{Income})_{it-1} \times \text{Democracy_Change}_{it-1}) \\ &+ \beta_9 \text{Post 2022}_t \times \text{Eastern_Partnership}_i \\ &+ \alpha_i + \gamma_t + \varepsilon_{it}. \end{aligned}$$

All variables, except *Democracy_Change* and the dummy variables, are log-transformed to account for skewness in their distribution, thereby reducing the influence of extreme values. Additionally, apart from the dummy variables, all independent variables are lagged by one year. This addresses potential endogeneity concerns and reflects the reality of aid budgeting, as donors typically rely on data from the previous year when making allocation decisions.

The study employs three complementary estimation models. First, a pooled ordinary least squares (OLS) regression model is used to capture the overall cross-country allocation pattern. Second, a fixed effects (FE) model is implemented to control for time-invariant and country-specific factors that may influence aid allocation. Third, a random effects (RE) model is employed for full-sample comparison, assuming uncorrelated country effects. To further test the hypotheses, subsample regressions are conducted. These include an analysis of EaP countries versus non-EaP countries to examine whether Poland applies different allocation criteria, consistent with the dual-track motive. Another subsample regression compares the pre-war (2012–2021) period with the post-war (2022–2023) period to assess whether the Ukraine War changed Poland's aid priorities and allocation patterns. Finally, interaction terms between key variables are included to test for conditional relationships. Accordingly, the interaction between *ln_income* and *Democracy_Change* is examined to evaluate whether Poland's response to democratic improvements differs across income levels. To test whether the income effect differs by region, an interaction model between *ln_income* and *Eastern_Partnership* is estimated.

Empirical Results

Overall Regression Results

Table 2 presents the results from the pooled OLS, FE, and RE models. Several patterns emerge regarding the determinants of Poland's bilateral ODA per capita across specifications.

Beginning with the pooled OLS models, the income variables show a clear non-linear pattern: *ln_income* is positive and significant in the basic model, while its squared term, *ln_income*², is significant with a negative sign. This implies that Poland's ODA allocation increases with a recipient's income but at a decreasing rate. This result is consistent with prior studies that incorporate quadratic income terms to capture diminishing marginal effects (Alesina and Dollar 2000, p. 8; Berthélemy and Tichit 2004, pp. 261–262). However, once the *Eastern_Partnership* dummy is introduced in the augmented OLS model, the income coefficients shrink dramatically and lose statistical significance ($\beta = -0.047$ for *ln_income*; $\beta = 0.001$ for *ln_income*²). This suggests that much of the initial income effect is absorbed by Poland's strong regional targeting.

In contrast to the pooled OLS results, the FE and RE models do not exhibit strong support for income-driven allocation. When utilizing within-country variation over time, the income terms are small and statistically non-significant in the RE specifications and remain non-significant once the *Eastern_Partnership* dummy is included in the FE augmented model. This suggests that changes in recipient income from year to year do not significantly influence Poland's aid decisions. Instead, the relationship with income appears to reflect larger structural differences across countries, which are captured in the pooled OLS model but largely filtered

out in the panel specifications. These results imply that Poland's income-based allocation patterns are primarily cross-sectional and not highly responsive to short-run income changes within countries. This result is consistent with Kim and Oh's (2012) observation that the effects of DI often become clearer in aggregate comparisons than in panel models that emphasize within-country changes.

The population variable, *ln_pop*, consistently exhibits a negative and significant association with ODA per capita. Across pooled OLS, FE, and RE models, larger countries receive less aid per person. For example, the FE specifications show that a 10% increase in population is associated with a reduction in ODA per capita of approximately 3–4%, as indicated by the negative population elasticities (ranging from -0.293 to -0.399). The RE estimates follow these results with smaller magnitudes (-0.043 in the basic and -0.025 in the augmented model), confirming that the population bias is robust across specifications. This result aligns with the general literature on aid allocation, which frequently documents a population bias due to the budgetary implications of assisting large countries.

Trade flows provide evidence of DI motivations in Poland's ODA allocation. In the pooled OLS models, bilateral trade (*ln_trade*) is positive and significant, indicating that Poland allocates more aid to countries with which it has stronger commercial ties. This is consistent with previous findings that commercial connections constitute a key factor in the aid allocation of emerging donors. Dreher, Nunnenkamp, and Thiele (2011) demonstrate that trade ties often influence ODA flows among non-DAC donors. For instance, a 10% increase in trade is associated with roughly a 5% increase in ODA in the β -coefficient specification. However, this relationship weakens in the FE models, where *L.ln_trade* remains positive but remains small and statistically nonsignificant. In the RE specifications, however, *L.ln_trade* is positive and significant in both the basic (0.040, $p < 0.05$) and augmented (0.025, $p < 0.10$) models, suggesting that bilateral trade ties have a within-country effect on aid allocation when unobserved heterogeneity is modeled as random rather than fixed. This suggests that *ln_trade* is more important for explaining which countries Poland supports than for explaining changes in aid allocation within countries over time. This dynamic mirrors the case of South Korea, where *ln_trade* appeared as a strong cross-sectional determinant but demonstrated limited explanatory power within panels (Kim and Oh 2012, pp. 264–265).

Democracy_Change does not emerge as a significant predictor of ODA in any of the baseline models. Whether lagged or not, changes in political rights and civil liberties do not appear to influence Poland's aid allocation. This result contrasts with Poland's history of transitioning from authoritarianism to democracy in 1989 and suggests that democracy promotion is not a systematic determinant of Polish ODA within the baseline framework.

However, the *Eastern_Partnership* dummy displays one of the strongest and most consistent effects across all regressions. In the augmented pooled OLS model, *Eastern_Partnership* = 0.688*** ($p < 0.01$), and in the RE augmented model, it rises to 0.723*** ($p < 0.01$). These coefficients indicate that being an EaP country increases Poland's expected ODA per capita by a substantial margin of approximately 99% ($\exp(0.688) \approx 1.99$) in the OLS and 106% ($\exp(0.723) \approx 2.06$) in the RE model. This result underscores the importance of regional considerations in Poland's foreign aid strategy and emphasizes its historically rooted orientation toward the East. The magnitude

of the *Eastern_Partnership* effect suggests that regional prioritization is one of the most important determinants of Poland's ODA allocation.

Table 2. Regression Results for Poland's ODA Allocation: Pooled OLS, FE, and RE Estimates

Variables	1. Pooled OLS models			2. Fixed effect models		3. Random effect models	
	Basic	β -coefficient	Augmented	Basic	Augmented	Basic	Augmented
<i>ln_income</i>	0.324 (0.204)	1.015** (0.158)	-0.047 (0.165)				
<i>ln_income</i> ²	-0.025* (0.014)	-1.229** (0.010)	0.001 (0.011)				
<i>ln_pop</i>	-0.075** (0.035)	-0.408*** (0.008)	-0.024 (0.023)				
<i>ln_trade</i>	0.072** (0.037)	0.512*** (0.006)	0.025 (0.021)				
<i>Democracy_Change</i>			-0.001 (0.003)				
<i>Eastern_Partnership</i>			0.688*** (0.227)				0.723*** (0.233)
<i>L.ln_income</i>				-1.069 (0.667)	-1.198* (0.713)	-0.149 (0.249)	-0.281 (0.202)
<i>L.ln_income</i> ²				0.080* (0.045)	0.091* (0.049)	0.009 (0.016)	0.017 (0.013)
<i>L.ln_pop</i>				-0.293* (0.152)	-0.399** (0.170)	-0.043* (0.019)	-0.025* (0.015)
<i>L.ln_trade</i>				0.025 (0.017)	0.028 (0.018)	0.040** (0.020)	0.025* (0.014)
<i>L.Democracy_Change</i>					-0.000 (0.002)		0.001 (0.002)
Intercept	-13.763*** (0.907)	-13.763*** (0.633)	-13.201*** (0.612)	-5.621 (3.800)	-3.551 (4.143)	-12.588*** (0.924)	-12.339** (0.728)
Number of observations	946	946	874	879	806	879	806

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White-corrected standard errors were calculated to minimize heteroskedasticity issues. In the fixed effect and random effect analyses, *ln_income*, *ln_pop*, *ln_trade*, *ln_income*², and *Democracy_Change* are lagged by one year to address endogeneity concerns.

Source: oDA data are obtained from the OECD DAC database, income and population data from the World Bank World Development Indicators, bilateral trade data from the IMF, and democracy measures from Freedom House's Freedom in the World dataset.

Overall, the baseline regression results indicate that Poland's ODA allocation is influenced by a combination of DI and regional strategic considerations. Income effects in pooled OLS suggest interest-based behavior, whereas strong *Eastern_Partnership* coefficients reveal a clear neighborhood focus consistent with Poland's foreign policy orientation. The consistently negative population

coefficients reflect standard aid allocation tendencies, and the limited significance of *Democracy_Change* suggests that political reform in recipient countries is not a major factor in Poland's aid decisions. These patterns collectively support findings in the literature on emerging donors, where structural interest and geopolitical priorities often coexist with weaker responsiveness to short-term changes in recipient characteristics.

Eastern Partnership Versus Non-Eastern Partnership Recipients

Table 3 presents separate regressions for EaP and non-EaP recipients and highlights the stark differences in the determinants of Poland's ODA allocation between the two groups. The contrast between the two models reveals Poland's dual allocation logic: a strongly regionally driven pattern for EaP countries and a DI-oriented pattern for non-EaP recipients.

For EaP countries, the income terms indicate a non-linear, inverted-U relationship with ODA. The lagged income coefficient ($L.\ln_income$) is large and positive, while its squared term ($L.\ln_income^2$) is negative and significant. This combination implies that Poland increases support as EaP countries transition from low- to middle-income status but reduces it at higher income levels. The magnitude of these coefficients is substantially larger than in any of the baseline models, indicating that income effects increase within the EaP region. This pattern is consistent with earlier studies demonstrating that donors often target middle-income neighbors for strategic or transition-sharing purposes, as found in South Korea's differentiated aid strategy toward countries at intermediate income levels (Kim and Oh 2012, pp. 265–267). These results suggest that ODA allocation within Poland's priority neighborhood is most responsive at income levels characteristic of transitioning post-Soviet economies.

The population variable in the EaP sample shows a strong negative effect ($L.\ln_pop = -3.603$, $p < 0.05$), indicating that even within Poland's strategic region, larger countries receive less ODA per capita. A 10% increase in population reduces ODA per capita by approximately 36%, reflecting a stronger population bias than in the full-sample FE models. Trade flows ($L.\ln_trade = 0.408$, $p < 0.10$) are also positively and significantly associated with ODA within the EaP group, suggesting that commercial links reinforce Poland's regional motives. This result is consistent with the emerging-donor literature, which suggests that economic and geopolitical motivations overlap rather than operate independently.

Table 3. Eastern Partnership Versus Non-Eastern Partnership Countries

Variables	Eastern Partnership Countries	Non-Eastern Partnership Countries
$L.\ln_income$	18.243*	-0.972
	(7.771)	(0.697)
$L.\ln_income^2$	-1.206*	0.069
	(0.490)	(0.047)
$L.\ln_pop$	-3.603**	-0.758***
	(1.275)	(0.261)

Variables	Eastern Partnership Countries	Non-Eastern Partnership Countries
<i>L.ln_trade</i>	0.408*	0.002
	(0.181)	(0.012)
<i>L.Democracy_Change</i>	0.003	0.001
	(0.015)	(0.001)
Year		
2016	0.053	0.019
	(0.082)	(0.012)
2017	0.211	0.035**
	(0.122)	(0.016)
2018	0.247**	0.058***
	(0.070)	(0.021)
2019	0.313**	0.066***
	(0.095)	(0.022)
2020	0.385*	0.091***
	(0.175)	(0.028)
2021	0.437**	0.110***
	(0.155)	(0.035)
2022	0.860**	0.110***
	(0.274)	(0.034)
2023	0.439**	0.092***
	(0.138)	(0.035)
Intercept	-27.178	2.046
	(35.575)	(6.091)
Number of observations	54	752

*** $p < .01$, ** $p < .05$, * $p < .1$

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White-corrected standard errors were calculated to minimize heteroskedasticity issues. Coefficients represent lagged independent variables (L.) to address potential endogeneity. All continuous variables are in logarithmic form, except Democracy_Change. The Eastern Partnership group includes Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan. As a main caveat, the Eastern Partnership subsample analysis relies on a small number of countries, making the result sensitive to particular countries (e.g. Ukraine after 2022), which could be re-examined in further studies.

Source: oDA data are obtained from the OECD DAC database, income and population data from the World Bank World Development Indicators, bilateral trade data from the IMF, and democracy measures from Freedom House's Freedom in the World dataset.

Examining the non-EaP sample, income behaves very differently. The lagged income coefficient (*L.ln_income*) is small and negative (-0.972), and its squared term (*L.ln_income*²) turns positive (0.069), but neither is statistically significant. This indicates that outside the EaP region, Poland does not allocate ODA systematically according to recipient income. In contrast to the EaP model, where income strongly predicts aid levels, income among non-EaP countries

plays almost no role. This distinction provides empirical support for the dual-track logic: Poland's income-sensitive aid pattern applies primarily within its strategic neighborhood.

Population continues to remain negative and statistically significant among non-EaP recipients ($L.ln_pop = -0.758^*$, $p < 0.01$), though the effect is less steep than for EaP countries. Furthermore, trade flows ($L.ln_trade$) are nonsignificant in the non-EaP sample (0.002, $p > 0.10$), indicating that commercial relationships meaningfully shape Poland's aid only within its prioritized regional area.

The year dummies included in the sample provide additional insight into how aid patterns evolved over time. For EaP countries, the post-2018 period shows a consistent upward trend, with year FE rising from 0.247 in 2018 ($p < 0.05$) to 0.860 in 2022 ($p < 0.05$). This substantial increase captures the rise in Poland's regional engagement following the escalation of tensions in Eastern Europe, culminating in the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Comparable patterns are observed in Türkiye's aid behavior, where geopolitical shocks and regional crises strongly increased aid flows to neighboring countries, as demonstrated by Kavakli (2018). For non-EaP countries, the year effects are positive but considerably smaller, suggesting that while Poland's total ODA rose globally, the increase was disproportionately concentrated in its EaP neighbors.

It is important to note that the aggregate nature of the ODA variable which includes both development and humanitarian assistance affects the interpretation of the post-2022 results. Given that the analysis does not differentiate between the two components, a portion of the substantially larger coefficients for EaP countries may reflect emergency humanitarian assistance directed toward Ukraine following the Russian invasion, rather than a sudden increase in traditional, long-term development aid. Consequently, the post-2022 effects should be interpreted with caution.

There are various signals that a significant portion of the post-2022 increase reflects crisis-driven mobilization rather than a strategic reorientation of aid policy. Poland's ODA/GNI ratio surged from 0.15% in 2021 to 0.53% in 2022, a level the OECD (2023) primarily attributes to in-donor refugee hosting costs and emergency expenditures affiliated with the reception of Ukrainian refugees. Nevertheless, the post-2022 shift is not purely reactive Poland's Multiannual Development Cooperation Programme already designated the Eastern Partnership as the primary geographic priority prior to the invasion of Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland 2021, pp. 9–22). This suggests that the war intensified a pre-existing orientation rather than creating a new one. Nonetheless, given the short post-2022 time window in the dataset, it is not possible to ascertain whether this increase demonstrates a temporary crisis-driven response or a longer-term structural reorientation of Poland's development policy.

Overall, the EaP versus non-EaP regressions reveal different allocation patterns. Within the EaP, Poland's ODA is strongly shaped by a non-linear income relationship that favors middle-income recipients, trade connections, and significant year-on-year increases tied to the Ukraine war. Outside the EaP region, these determinants weaken, leaving the population effect as the only remaining factor. This divergence provides clear evidence for a regionally segmented aid strategy, in which Poland behaves as a strategic, neighborhood-focused donor for its closest partners but adopts a more neutral or diffuse allocation logic for the rest of the world.

Interaction Effects

As shown in Table 4, the interaction models test whether the effect of income on Poland's ODA per capita differs by regional affiliation (EaP) or by democratization. Across specifications, the results confirm that Poland's income–ODA relationship is strongly influenced by regional status rather than by shifts in political liberalization.

In the model examining income interacting with EaP, the main effect of lagged income is negative and statistically non-significant ($L.ln_income = -0.690$, $SE = 0.757$). However, the interaction term $Eastern_Partnership \times L.ln_income$ is positive ($\beta = 0.381$, $SE = 0.583$), suggesting that the marginal effect of income is more favorable for EaP countries. Although the interaction does not reach high significance levels, the direction and magnitude align with the earlier EaP-only regressions, where income had large and significant coefficients. The quadratic interaction term ($L.ln_income \times L.ln_income = 0.046$, $SE = 0.053$) provides additional evidence for a curvature in the income effect among EaP neighbors. Evidently, income plays a qualitatively different role inside Poland's strategic neighborhood than outside.

Population effects remain robust in the interaction models, with coefficients of -1.410^{***} and -1.464^{***} across the two specifications. These values imply that even after accounting for regional interactions, a 10% increase in recipient population reduces ODA per capita by approximately 14–15%, reinforcing the negative effects observed in the EaP and non-EaP regressions. Trade remains small and statistically non-significant ($\beta = 0.004$), consistent with the FE results in the full-sample models, where bilateral trade was not significant. While the RE specifications and the EaP-only sample suggest that trade does have some within-country influence on aid allocation, this effect does not survive once income–region interactions are introduced. Democracy change also shows no significant moderating effect. In the income \times democracy change model, the interaction term $L.ln_income \times L.Democracy_Change$ is almost zero ($\beta = -0.000$, $SE = 0.001$), reinforcing the conclusion that Poland does not reward democratizing countries with additional ODA, even when controlling for income levels.

The year dummies demonstrate a clear upward trajectory across both models. Coefficients rise steadily from 0.025^* in 2016 to 0.219^{***} in 2022, reflecting a continuous increase in Poland's ODA disbursements over time. The substantial rise in 2022 is consistent with Poland's intensified aid engagement following the outbreak of the Ukraine war.

Table 4. Interaction Effects of Income with Eastern Partnership Status and Democracy Change

Variables	Income \times Eastern Partnership	Income \times Democracy Change
$L.ln_income$	-0.690 (0.757)	-0.756 (0.771)
$Eastern_Partnership \times L.ln_income$	0.381 (0.583)	
$L.ln_income^2$	0.046 (0.053)	0.052 (0.053)

Variables	Income × Eastern Partnership	Income × Democracy Change
<i>L.ln_pop</i>	- 1.410***	- 1.464***
	(0.449)	(0.420)
<i>L.ln_trade</i>	0.004	0.004
	(0.014)	(0.014)
<i>L.Democracy_Change</i>	0.000	0.003
	(0.002)	(0.011)
Year		
2016	0.025*	0.025*
	(0.013)	(0.013)
2017	0.062***	0.063***
	(0.023)	(0.022)
2018	0.097***	0.099***
	(0.031)	(0.029)
2019	0.119***	0.122***
	(0.041)	(0.038)
2020	0.153***	0.158***
	(0.049)	(0.045)
2021	0.185***	0.192***
	(0.051)	(0.047)
2022	0.219***	0.226***
	(0.069)	(0.067)
2023	0.193***	0.201***
	(0.071)	(0.065)
<i>L.ln_income x L.Democracy_Change</i>		-0.000
		(0.001)
Intercept	11.846	13.104*
	(7.959)	(7.289)
Number of observations	806	806

*** p < .01, ** p < .05, * p < .1

Note: Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, and * indicate significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. White-corrected standard errors were calculated to minimize heteroskedasticity issues. All continuous variables are expressed in logarithmic form and lagged by one year to mitigate endogeneity concerns. Interaction terms capture how the marginal effect of income varies across (1) Eastern Partnership recipients and (2) changes in political rights and civil liberties. Year fixed effects are included.

Source: oDA data are obtained from the OECD DAC database, income and population data from the World Bank World Development Indicators, bilateral trade data from the IMF, and democracy measures from Freedom House's Freedom in the World dataset.

Marginal Effects of Income

Figure 1 displays the marginal effects of income on predicted ODA per capita, differentiating between EaP and non-EaP countries. The plotted lines reveal that the relationship between income and aid differs not only in magnitude but also in slope across the two groups. For non-EaP countries (green line), the slope is shallow but generally positive, indicating a weak tendency for higher-income recipients to receive slightly more ODA a pattern consistent with DI behavior observed among many non-DAC donors.




Figure 1. Marginal Effects of Income on Poland’s ODA per Capita for EaP & Non-EaP Countries
 Note: The red fitted line represents the marginal effect of income on ln(ODA per capita) for Eastern Partnership countries, while the green fitted line represents the corresponding effect for Non-Eastern Partnership countries. Income is measured as the natural logarithm of GDP per capita, and blue points indicate individual predicted values across all observations.

Source: The figure is based on regression estimates using bilateral ODA data from the OECD DAC database, GDP per capita and population data from the World Bank World Development Indicators, bilateral trade data from the IMF, and democracy indicators from Freedom House’s Freedom in the World dataset.

For EaP countries (red line), the slope is visibly steeper, confirming that income plays a stronger role in shaping Poland’s ODA allocation within its strategic neighborhood. The red line’s upward trajectory at mid-income levels corresponds with the large income coefficients observed in the EaP-only regressions. At lower income levels, the EaP and non-EaP marginal predictions intersect, but beginning around $\ln_income = 7.5-8.0$, the EaP prediction line rises more sharply. This suggests that Poland allocates relatively more aid to middle-income EaP countries those whose development trajectories most closely resemble Poland’s own historical transition experience.

The interaction results and marginal effects graph jointly support the conclusion that Poland’s ODA allocation follows a region-based allocation pattern. Income is more significant for EaP countries

than for other recipients, while *Democracy_Change* has no moderating influence. The visualized marginal effects demonstrate that Poland's aid behavior cannot be understood solely through global determinants: the income–aid relationship is fundamentally different inside Poland's geopolitical neighborhood, with mid-income EaP states receiving the strongest marginal increases.

Conclusion

This study analyzed Poland's bilateral ODA allocation and tested whether Poland, as a post-accession donor with its own experience of receiving aid, exhibits allocation patterns similar to traditional Western donors or emerging Asian donors. In doing so, this study bridges the literature on traditional DAC donors and emerging non-Western donors, specifically examining Poland, a European transition economy that occupies an intermediate position between the two. Using panel data covering 127 recipient countries from 2013 to 2023, this study employed multiple regression techniques, including pooled OLS, FE, and RE models, along with subsample analysis, to test four key hypotheses regarding regional preferences, dual-track allocation patterns, democracy promotion, and the impact of the war in Ukraine.

Our findings provide strong support for regional solidarity, as Poland allocates significantly higher ODA per capita to EaP countries compared to non-regional recipients. This regional bias predates the Ukraine war, reflecting Poland's long-standing historical and cultural ties, as well as strategic engagement with its eastern neighborhood. However, it has become significantly stronger after 2022, suggesting that geopolitical shocks in this case, the Russian invasion of Ukraine can greatly reinforce pre-existing regional allocation priorities.

Additionally, the dual-track pattern is only partially supported. Initially, Poland's aid behavior differed significantly between EaP and non-EaP countries. However, after the war in Ukraine began, Poland shifted its support toward wealthier, more strategically important partners within the EaP. These results indicate a reorientation from a recipient-need (RN) to a donor-interest (DI) allocation of aid, likely driven by security concerns and the imperative to support countries most threatened by the ongoing war.

Furthermore, *Democracy_Change* does not predict ODA allocation in any of the specifications, remaining statistically non-significant across all models. This finding does not imply that Poland is indifferent to sharing transition know-how and supporting democratic reforms. Instead, it suggests that short-term changes in political rights and civil liberties, as captured by Freedom House's Freedom in the World Score, do not influence aid allocation decisions.

Finally, the findings indicate that Poland is shifting toward a more crisis-driven, security-aligned donor profile following Russia's invasion of Ukraine in 2022. As the ODA measure includes both development and humanitarian assistance, part of this shift may reflect short-term crisis response rather than a permanent change in Poland's aid allocation strategy. However, whether this shift reflects a permanent transformation or a temporary response remains an open question.

Beyond hypothesis testing, this study reveals several additional patterns. First, population (*ln_pop*) consistently demonstrates a strong negative relationship with per capita ODA across all

models. This suggests that Poland maintains a systematic preference for supporting smaller countries, in which aid can achieve greater per capita impact. Second, trade flows (*ln_trade*) show a positive association with aid allocation in the pooled OLS and RE models, but weaken in the FE models. This pattern suggests that commercial connections help explain both cross-country differences in aid allocation and aggregate within-country variation, even if year-to-year shifts within individual countries are not strongly trade-driven.

Collectively, the findings in this study align with recent literature on emerging donors. They are consistent with Kim and Oh (2012) and Fuchs and Vadlamannati (2013), who both find that emerging donors often combine need-based allocations with strategic and geopolitical objectives, rather than adhering to purely humanitarian logic. Moreover, Poland's post-2022 shift toward security-driven and regionally concentrated aid aligns closely with Dreher et al.'s (2018) concept of "strategic state financing," in which concessional flows serve regional stability goals in an increasingly deliberate manner over time. Poland's post-war aid also reflects a broader trend within EU member states, where, although the EU collectively promotes development effectiveness, bilateral ODA is frequently employed as a foreign policy instrument, with strategic interests shaping allocation decisions (Hoekman and Shingal 2024, pp. 5–6).

The shift from the RN to the DI approach in aid allocation within the EaP after 2022 raises questions about the sustainability and development impact of Poland's aid. As security concerns increasingly shape allocation decisions, there is a risk that aid may be redirected from promoting poverty reduction and long-term development toward short-term stabilization and political support. This growing tension between security concerns and long-term development objectives illustrates a broader challenge for donors operating in conflict-affected regions.

The post-2022 reorientation toward Ukraine and the broader EaP region also raises questions about implications for other recipients. As shown in Table 1, geographically allocated bilateral ODA to Africa declined from USD 47.66 million in 2013 to USD 8.34 million in 2023, while Poland's four remaining non-EaP priority countries Palestine, Lebanon, Tanzania, and Ethiopia received a combined USD 12.1 million in 2023, compared to USD 249.7 million for Ukraine (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland 2023). This structural imbalance is consistent with broader concerns in the literature that the post-2022 Ukraine response has crowded out allocations to lower-income regions among European donors, raising the question of how sustainable Poland's development commitments are beyond its immediate neighborhood (Kiel Institute for the World Economy 2025).

Polish public opinion has shifted toward more pragmatic and nationalist interpretations of aid, partly due to the high costs of supporting Ukraine and rising domestic skepticism (Jasiecki 2024, pp. 30–33). While not directly tested in this study, this shift in public opinion may reinforce the government's approach of using aid in the national interests rather than humanitarian solidarity, potentially reducing support to non-strategic regions. However, given that this study covers only the period from 2013 to 2023, it has several limitations. Most notably, given the recency of the war in Ukraine, the post-war data are restricted to two years, limiting the ability to distinguish between short-term crisis response and long-term structural change. As additional post-2022 data become available, future research can assess

whether Poland's reorientation persists or gradually normalizes. Furthermore, this study did not consider the influence of domestic political changes on foreign aid allocation, such as shifts in the Polish government. Additional research could incorporate variables that capture government dynamics or differentiate political from geopolitical factors.

Moreover, Poland allocates both bilaterally and through EU frameworks, creating an important distinction between its own national interests and motives that are driven by the EU. Further studies could analyze EU allocation rules, compare national versus EU-driven motives, or separate EU-managed ODA from national bilateral ODA. Future research could also examine whether other CEE DAC members exhibit similar allocation patterns. Comparing Poland to neighbors such as Czechia, Slovakia, and Slovenia would reveal whether Poland's EaP focus represents a national strategy or regional approach among post-communist EU donors.

Ultimately, Poland's ODA behavior reflects neither purely humanitarian nor predominantly commercial motives. Instead, it illustrates how donor identity and allocation strategy are shaped by historical solidarity, geographic proximity, and security context. The Polish case suggests that history as an aid recipient does not ensure need-based aid allocation as a donor.

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Determinanty pomocy zagranicznej: przypadek Polski

W artykule poddano analizie determinanty bilateralnej oficjalnej pomocy rozwojowej (ODA) *per capita*, przyznawanej przez Polskę w latach 2013–2023 na rzecz 127 krajów-beneficjentów. Wykorzystując dane panelowe oraz modele regresji wielokrotnej, zbadano, czy Polska – jako kraj Unii Europejskiej z doświadczeniem transformacji postkomunistycznej, będący po akcesji dawcą pomocy – alokuje pomoc przede wszystkim na podstawie potrzeb beneficjentów czy też interesów dawcy. Wyniki wskazują, że Polska przeznaczona istotnie wyższą pomoc *per capita* dla krajów Partnerstwa Wschodniego, co odzwierciedla silną solidarność regionalną zakorzenioną w więziach historycznych. W ramach tego kontekstu regionalnego alokacja pomocy wykazuje nieliniowy wzorzec dochodowy, przy czym kraje o średnich dochodach otrzymują największe wsparcie. Z kolei wśród krajów nienależących do Partnerstwa Wschodniego poziom dochodu odgrywa minimalną lub wręcz znikomą rolę w decyzjach Polski dotyczących alokacji pomocy. Relacje handlowe mają znaczenie w ujęciu regionalnym, natomiast promowanie demokracji nie wykazuje istotnego wpływu na alokację pomocy. Analiza ujawniła ponadto, że inwazja Rosji na Ukrainę miała istotny wpływ na alokację polskiej pomocy dla krajów Partnerstwa Wschodniego. Ogółem wyniki te częściowo potwierdzają hipotezę podwójnej ścieżki, identyfikowaną w literaturze dotyczącej wschodzących azjatyckich dawców pomocy. Rezultaty sugerują, że polska oficjalna pomoc rozwojowa realizuje strategię skoncentrowaną regionalnie, łączącą uwarunkowania geopolityczne z solidarnością transformacyjną, zamiast być determinowaną względami humanitarnymi lub komercyjnymi.

Słowa kluczowe: determinanty ODA, Polska, poakcesyjny dawca pomocy, Partnerstwo Wschodnie