

A Gain or a Loss? The Consequences of Brexit in the Opinions of Polish Migrants

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Abstract

The aim of the article is to present the opinions of Polish migrants in Britain on the gains or losses that Brexit may bring to the European Union (EU), the United Kingdom (UK), and Poland, as well as the respondents themselves and their families. These opinions were determined based on the analysis of the results of a survey carried out among these migrants and presented against the backdrop of the results of public opinion polls on EU membership, which have been conducted in the British Isles regularly since the 1970s. The article analyses the beliefs held on this issue by economic migrants, who are faced with a choice as Brexit is underway: to remain expatriates or to return to their country of origin. Among the answers to questions about the possible benefits or negative outcomes of Brexit, it was the latter that predominated. In the discussion, the authors seek to ascertain why migrants from Poland fear the negative consequences of Brexit for the UK and for Europe more often than they fear those for Poland or for themselves and their close family members.

Keywords: Brexit, migrants, public opinion, Brexit's gains and losses

JEL: F22, F55, O15, O24, O52, Z19



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Introduction

As Brexit is a process that impacts many domains of everyday life, its outcomes are extremely difficult to predict (Rogaly 2019). Its supporters claimed that the United Kingdom (UK) would be freed from excess legal regulations (Hobolt and Tilley 2021), while those in favour of remaining in the EU wrote scenarios predicting a financial apocalypse (Calliess 2021) or the weakening of Europe as a whole in the global struggle against terrorism (Piatkowska and Stults 2021). The evaluation of the gains and losses associated with Brexit was not made any easier by the dispute between the UK and the EU about the mutual relations after Britain's withdrawal. This was due to the fact that membership in the European Union (EU) means participation not only in a common political project but also in a unified market that ensures the free transfer of capital, goods, and services (Sieroń 2016). Moreover, the Brexit vote deepened existing divisions in British society on key issues such as national identity (Kozak, Fel, and Wódka 2021), globalisation, diversity, and multiculturalism (Ford and Goodwin 2017).

This article is not so much an analysis of British public opinion on Brexit (cf. Curtice 2018; Guber 2021; Hobolt and Tilley 2021) as an attempt to complement this picture by determining how the outcomes of Brexit are perceived by Polish migrants settled in the UK, who constitute an important part of British society (White 2016).

Brexit surveys

In a 2018 sociological survey among Poles in Britain commissioned by the Department of Statistics of the National Bank of Poland (NBP), a clear majority of respondents (59.3%) stated that Britain's withdrawal from the EU would not have much effect on their current situation and would not require any additional actions on their part (Chmielewska, Panuciak, and Strzelecki 2019, p. 44).

What is interesting is the distribution of opinions on the outcomes of Brexit. Six in ten admitted that Brexit would negatively impact the UK, one in two respondents stated that Poland would be negatively affected by the absence of the UK in the EU, and one in five of respondents expected a negative effect of Brexit on the EU. The percentage was similar in the case of answers indicating the expected negative outcome for the respondents themselves (Taylor, Vautrin-Dumaine, and Bull 2019). In December 2021, in the UK, the R&WS Research Team conducted a survey on British people's opinions about Brexit ($N = 1500$). Although the respondents were not directly asked about the consequences of the UK leaving the EU, they were requested to express their views on the UK rejoining the EU. More than half (53.0%) believed that the UK should remain outside the EU, while 47.0% held the opposite view (R&WS-Research 2021).

Analysing the results of polls, Sara Hobolt and James Tilley concluded that British people often interpreted EU membership as beneficial. However, in the polls from 1974, 1977, 1979–1983, 2003, and 2008–2010, there was a higher proportion who believed that EU membership was not beneficial. That said, the results indicated a distinct trend of positively evaluating the UK’s membership in the EU both before and after the referendum (Hobolt and Tilley 2021). However, Hobolt and Tilley’s observations do not correspond with the 2021 poll, which opens a space for discussion on migrants’ attitudes towards Brexit, as migrants account for a considerable proportion of British society.

Methods

Our sample consisted of 620 respondents from London, Oxford, and Swindon associated with Polish migrant organisations operating in Great Britain (members and non-members of Polish migrant institutions). These organisations conduct their activities in Polish and provide various forms of cultural and charity initiatives targeted at the communities of Poles who went there in recent years. The respondents completed paper questionnaires, answering questions about their opinions on Brexit. The respondents selected (purposive sampling) were adults who attended Polish migrant organisations, for example, parents of children attending Polish ethnic schools linked to Polish parishes.

A review of the literature confirms that British public opinion on Brexit is fairly well documented and discussed (Hobolt 2016), but immigrants’ opinion on this issue seems not to have been adequately surveyed. The literature includes reports from sociological studies concerning migrants’ plans during Brexit (Mazzilli and King 2018; Kilkey and Ryan 2021; Markova and King 2021; Jonczyk Sédès, Miedtank, and Oliver 2022), but opinion polls on Brexit are noticeably lacking.

Results

In view of the above, it seemed relevant in autumn 2019 to ask the respondents the following question: “Is the UK’s departure from the EU advantageous or disadvantageous for the EU?”

Two-thirds of respondents expected negative outcomes for the EU, one in seven stated that it would be of little consequence, while two in hundred expected it to have a positive outcome for the EU. One in seven indicated the “hard to say” option, while one in twenty gave no response.

Table 1. Is the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union advantageous or disadvantageous for the European Union?

Response categories	Within a few years		In an indefinite future		Never		Hard to say		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Advantageous	4	2.8	5	2.7	1	1.1	2	1.0	12	1.9
Of little consequence	21	14.6	23	12.4	18	20.7	23	11.3	85	13.7
Disadvantageous	87	60.4	123	66.1	56	64.4	142	70.0	408	65.8
Hard to say	21	14.6	25	13.4	11	12.6	29	14.3	86	13.9
No response	11	7.6	10	5.4	1	1.1	7	3.4	29	4.7
Total	144	100.0	186	100.0	87	100.0	203	100.0	620	100.0

Source: authors' calculations.

The respondents who saw no advantages for the EU were slightly more numerous among those who hesitated about whether to return to Poland or stay in the UK than among those who declared that they would return to Poland in an indefinite future or that they were planning to remain in the UK permanently. According to one in five of those planning to stay in the UK, Brexit would be of little consequence for the EU in the years to come. Brexit was seen as advantageous for Europe by a small percentage of respondents who were planning to return to Poland. In other words, those who remained in the UK expressed the opinion that Brexit would have little consequence for the EU more often than those who were planning to remigrate.

Among the respondents who saw no advantages of Brexit for the EU, there were more white-collar workers than blue-collar workers (71.2% vs 60.4%). In both groups, the survey revealed the same level of belief that Brexit was not significant for the EU (14.2% in both cases).

Next, the respondents were asked if the UK's departure from the EU was advantageous or disadvantageous for Poland. Compared to the previous, analogous question about the effect of Brexit on the EU, the percentage of respondents that indicated a lack of advantages for Poland decreased by 8 percentage points (from 65.8% to 57.7%), and the proportion of those who claimed that Brexit would be of little consequence for Poland increased by approximately 4 percentage points (from 13.7% to 17.4%). There was also a slight increase (from 1.9% to 2.3%) in the proportion of Brexit enthusiasts who believed that the UK's withdrawal would benefit Poland. Higher percentages (compared to the previous question) were also observed in the cafeteria for "hard to say" answers (from 13.9% to 16.1%) and for the "no response" category (6.5%).

Table 2. Is the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union advantageous or disadvantageous for Poland?

Response categories	Within a few years		In an indefinite future		Never		Hard to say		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Advantageous	6	4.2	5	2.7	2	2.3	1	0.5	14	2.3
Of little consequence	29	20.1	34	18.3	16	18.4	29	14.3	108	17.4
Disadvantageous	79	54.9	109	58.6	51	58.6	119	58.6	358	57.7
Hard to say	19	13.2	25	13.4	14	16.1	42	20.7	100	16.1
No response	11	7.6	13	7.0	4	4.6	12	5.9	40	6.5
Total	144	100.0	186	100.0	87	100.0	203	100.0	620	100.0

$\chi^2 = 7.551$, $df = 9$, $p = 0.580$.

Source: authors' calculations.

When estimating post-Brexit outcomes, the respondents expected more benefits for Poland than for the EU. Concern about the negative impact of Brexit on Poland was expressed by three in five respondents who were planning to return to Poland in the indefinite future, the undecided, and those intending to remain in the UK permanently (58.6% in each case) and by slightly fewer respondents who declared that they would return in the near future (54.9%). The survey shows that the lack of Brexit-related benefits for Poland was more often stressed by respondents planning to remain in the UK permanently.

The view that Brexit **would be of little consequence** for Poland was held most often by respondents who were planning to return, similarly often by respondents who planned to permanently remain in the UK or postpone their return to Poland until an indefinite future (18.3%), and the least often by undecided respondents (14.3%).

No benefits for Poland after Brexit was the outcome predicted by respondents who were remaining in the UK or postponing their departure, by nearly two-thirds of white-collar workers (65.3%) and by half of the blue-collar workers (51.0%). Considerably more blue-collar workers than white-collar workers were unable to specify what effect Brexit would have on Poland (19.4% vs 12.0%).

The next stage in the survey was the evaluation of the UK's departure from the EU and its impact on the UK. Three-quarters (73.2%) stated that it would negatively affect the UK, and one in ten (9.5%) expected the UK to benefit from Brexit. Few respondents (3.1%) believed that Brexit would have no impact on Britain, one in ten (10.0%) reported having no clear opinion on the matter, and 4.2% gave no answer.

Table 3. Is the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union advantageous or disadvantageous for the United Kingdom?

Response categories	Within a few years		In an indefinite future		Never		Hard to say		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Advantageous	16	11.1	16	8.6	8	9.2	19	9.4	59	9.5
Of little consequence	7	4.9	2	1.1	3	3.4	7	3.4	19	3.1
Disadvantageous	99	68.8	146	78.5	63	72.4	146	71.9	454	73.2
Hard to say	13	9.0	18	9.7	10	11.5	21	10.3	62	10.0
No response	9	6.3	4	2.2	3	3.4	10	4.9	26	4.2
Total	144	100.0	186	100.0	87	100.0	203	100.0	620	100.0

$\chi^2 = 5.972$, $df = 9$, $p = 0.743$.

Source: authors' calculations.

The group that was most sceptical about the positive outcomes of the Brexit decision for the UK itself was the respondents who had decided to return to Poland in an indefinite future (78.5%), this view being slightly less frequent among individuals who were planning to stay in the UK (72.4%) and among the undecided (71.9%). Scepticism about these outcomes was shared by two-thirds of respondents who declared they intended to return to Poland shortly.

One in nine respondents who planned to return to Poland in the near future expected Brexit to have positive consequences for the UK. This expectation was less often expressed by those who declared an intention to stay in the UK permanently. The number of respondents undecided about the ramifications of Brexit for the UK was the highest among Poles who had decided to stay in the UK (11.5%).

No benefits of Brexit for the UK were more often expected by individuals planning to stay in the UK, particularly by women ($M = 66.1\%$, $W = 77.8\%$), by eight in ten white-collar workers (79.6%), and by seven in ten blue-collar workers (70.1%). The respondents who saw Brexit as an **opportunity** for the UK were those who planned to return to Poland, more frequently men ($M = 14.7\%$, $W = 7.0\%$), one in ten blue-collar workers, and one in eleven white-collar workers.

In the last question, the respondents were asked if the UK's departure from the EU was advantageous or disadvantageous for them and their families. Almost half were concerned that the decision to leave the EU would have negative consequences for them and their family, while 22.6% believed that Brexit was of little consequence. Slightly fewer reported that they had no clear opinion (21.9%), and only five respondents in the sample saw Brexit as advantageous for themselves and their families. No answer was given by 5.5% of respondents.

Table 4. Is the United Kingdom's departure from the European Union advantageous or disadvantageous for you and your family?

Response categories	Within a few years		In an indefinite future		Never		Hard to say		Total	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Advantageous	1	0.7	1	0.5	2	2.3	1	0.5	5	0.8
Of little consequence	34	23.6	36	19.4	22	25.3	48	23.6	140	22.6
Disadvantageous	64	44.4	104	55.9	38	43.7	99	48.8	305	49.2
Hard to say	33	22.9	38	20.4	22	25.3	43	21.2	136	21.9
No response	12	8.3	7	3.8	3	3.4	12	5.9	34	5.5
Total	144	100.0	186	100.0	87	100.0	203	100.0	620	100.0

$\chi^2 = 7.487$, $df = 9$, $p = 0.587$.

Source: authors' calculations.

Most respondents who were indefinitely postponing their return to Poland saw no advantages of Brexit for themselves and their families. The same was true of almost half who were undecided about returning or staying, and slightly fewer who declared that they would return to Poland shortly or who had decided to remain permanently.

A quarter of those who intended to remain in the UK believed that Brexit would be of little consequence for them and their families, while another quarter had no clear opinion. In other words, a comparable proportion of respondents returning to Poland and those planning to stay reported a similar view on the possible consequences of Brexit for themselves and their families. The belief that Brexit would not have positive consequences for the respondents and/or their families and the belief that it would be of little consequence were found in equal proportions among those who intended to remain and those planning to return.

Fears about the **negative consequences** of Brexit for themselves and their families were more frequent among women ($M = 42.7\%$, $W = 53.9\%$) and among people over the age of forty (40–49 years – 55.0%; ≥ 50 years – 54.5%). Similarly, individuals with higher education (master's degree – 56.0%, bachelor's degree – 55.9%) more often had a pessimistic view of their own future and that of their families after Brexit. Considerably more white-collar workers than blue-collar workers expressed concerns about Brexit, expecting that it would have negative consequences (56.6% vs 45.8%).

One in four men and one in five women believed that **Brexit would be of little consequence** for them and for their families; this opinion was also more often reported by the youngest respondents (< 30 years – 38.2%) and those with primary or basic vocational education (29.2%). The opinion that Brexit was of no consequence was held by a fifth of blue-collar workers (20.8%) and by slightly more white-collar workers (23.4%).

Analysis

The analysis of the results concerning the advantages – or lack thereof – of Brexit showed that two-thirds of the respondents believed Brexit to be disadvantageous for the EU. Those who intended to remain in the UK more often believed that Brexit would not have a significant effect on the EU as a whole. Comparing the results of this survey with the results of a survey carried out in 2019 by Kantar Public in several EU countries reveals that Poles living in the UK viewed Brexit more critically (i.e., they more often saw it as having no advantages) than their compatriots in Poland, who – like the French – were fairly optimistic about the outcomes of the UK's departure from the EU.

Answering the question about the consequences of Brexit for Poland, the respondents from Swindon, Oxford, and London less often indicated the possible disadvantages resulting from the split between London and Brussels. Negative outcomes for Poland were much more often expected by respondents planning to stay in Britain, whereas those planning to return more often claimed that Brexit would be of little consequence for Poland.

Regarding the consequences of Brexit for the UK, a clear majority of respondents believed that leaving the EU would have a negative effect, although one in ten asserted that it would bring certain benefits to the UK. This is noteworthy also because in no other question were the possible benefits so strongly stressed and with such a high level of scepticism regarding the British public's decision. In other words, Poles saw the positive consequences of Brexit more often than Brits. In some respect, the attitudes of Poles in the UK to Brexit revealed by our survey correspond both with the Eurobarometer survey and a survey conducted by the R&WS Research Team among British people in December 2021. These results show the perceived consequences of Brexit in all the analysed frames of reference (the EU, the UK, Poland, family) in terms of doubts about, disputability of, and even opposition to the decision made by British society in 2016.

Doubts in British society about whether Brexit was the right decision clearly decrease with age, which may explain the difference in the perception of the European–British reality within British society itself. What argues in favour of this interpretation is the considerably high percentage of those who support rejoining the EU among respondents who did not vote in the 2016 referendum, i.e., those who had no voting rights at that time (as they were underage or did not have British citizenship) or were undecided on the matter.

In the last question, the respondents were asked about the consequences of Brexit for them and their families. Half of the respondents admitted that they feared the negative outcomes. Our survey found the proportion of respondents who claimed that Brexit would not negatively impact them and their families to be two times lower than the proportion of answers to an analogous question in a survey conducted by NBP. Compared

to the 2018 NBP survey, there was an increase in concerns about the negative outcomes of Brexit for migrants and their families, though, at that time, the respondents also indicated that Brexit did not change their plans to stay or return.

The respondents who expected difficulties in the future but had no plans to leave Britain anyway accounted for 17.7% of the sample in 2018. Meanwhile, 13.3% expected difficulties and reported the need to take action, applying for resident status. One in ten believed that their situation in the British job market might become so complicated that they were not planning to remain there after Brexit (Chmielewska, Panuciak, and Strzelecki 2019, p. 44).

As mentioned before, Polish migrants who were planning to remain in the UK were more tolerant of Brexit than those planning to return to Poland. This may have been due to the strong impact of the British media (Wodka et al. 2022), which they evaluated as non-objective (Gaber and Fisher 2022). Nevertheless, concerns about the post-Brexit reality are seen in many socioeconomic domains (e.g., economy and commerce, law, and migration). On the one hand, the future consequences of Brexit sparked a debate outside the EU on the expected benefits of EU membership; on the other hand, they inspired questions about the strengthening of attachment to the country of origin (Stanojević, Vujić, and Vujović 2022).

Discussion

In hindsight, implementing Brexit has not been as straightforward as set out in the Treaty of Lisbon. It is very difficult to offer an accurate diagnosis and even more so to present an objective prognosis regarding the future of the EU or, more broadly, the world after the UK's departure from the EU. The debate on the character and potential scale of the consequences of Brexit continues to have a widely defined scope, comprising institutional (Wilson and Oliver 2019), political (Malet, Walter, and Association 2021), economic (Green, Hellwig, and Fieldhouse 2022), and social dimensions (De Vries 2022; Van der Brug, Gattermann, and De Vreese 2022). In this section, we present the key aspects of the outcomes of Brexit from the perspective of migrants living in Britain during its implementation and identify the causes of migrants' concerns about the current socio-political situation in the UK.

Leaving aside the issue of whether the ongoing Brexit process will lean in the “soft” or “hard” direction, most economists believe that Brexit will be contrary to the economic interest of the UK, contributing to a slowdown of economic growth (Zuba 2017). It is assumed that while the current economic migration, especially from EU member states, has negative social and economic consequences, its long-term effect on the economy and demography of the UK will be positive (McGuinness and Hawkins

2016). Therefore, because Brexit will lead to undesirable negative outcomes regarding the transfer of goods and services, resulting in painful consequences for the life of migrants in the UK, the respondents' fears that Brexit will not be advantageous for the UK seem to be grounded.

In the debate on the consequences of the 2016 referendum, emphasis has been placed mainly on the economic and political outcomes, which may explain the respondents' considerably high level of concern about the negative consequences of Brexit for the EU. Brexit means the loss of the second largest net contributor to the EU budget and the country with the third largest population, which may upset the balance between member states reflected in the current decision-making scheme. On the one hand, the withdrawal of a country with such a large potential means changes in the budget structure; on the other, it means a new distribution of power in decision-making within the EU (Dahl and Skomorokhova 2017, p. 256). Another issue in the debates is Brexit as a precedent that may pave the way for other member states to leave (Fingleton 2020), which may have consequences on the migration policy of many European countries (Simionescu 2021). The UK's withdrawal will strengthen German domination in the Union (Zuba 2017) and lead to the fulfilment of the Differentiated Integration model, referred to as "multi-speed Europe" (Górka and Łuszczuk 2017). That, in turn, may trigger debate about restrictions on further economic migration within the EU (Kelemen 2021). Therefore, the migrants' concerns about the negative outcomes of Brexit for the whole EU seem justified.

Brexit is related to security and defence policy, not only of the UK but also of the EU as a whole. It certainly means the common security and defence policy loses an important actor with considerable military, economic, and political potential. The absence of the British potential may be perceptible in military transport, early warning systems, and access to intelligence data (Usewicz 2017, p. 126). While the greatest powers in the EU set the direction for its foreign and security policy (Hyde-Price 2012), Brexit may be associated in the migrants' minds with a sense of betrayal and a disruption of their life in Britain, including the undermining of their personal involvement in the country where they have settled (Zontini and Genova 2022), interfering with their life plans. Understanding this process is particularly significant in the context of the uncertainty of post-Brexit reality (Guma and Dafydd Jones 2019). What may also cause concerns among Polish migrants is the military tension built up by Russia in Eastern Europe (Tropin 2021). It has resulted in the prospect of these countries ending up between Germany and Russia again, as there is every indication of the leading role of Germany in the EU in relations with Russia after Brexit (Fischer 2018).

Paulina Bobińska performed a different kind of analysis of the consequences of Brexit for Europe. She seeks its consequences for the whole of Europe in at least three dimensions: **political** – weakened cooperation, upset balance in the EU, a "domino effect"

on other countries interested in following in the UK's footsteps, a division in Europe, political tensions; **economic** – deficits in the EU budget, a weakened bargaining position of the EU in the global arena, anxiety in the financial markets, and a decrease in the competitiveness of the EU; and **strategic** – a decrease in the UK's interest in the fate of Eastern Europe, understood as providing military support, and a slowdown of economic growth (Bobińska 2016, p. 23).

There is also a need to restore trust between the citizens and governments of EU member states, as well as between governments within the EU. With the divisions between member states being the strongest in a generation, the greatest hope for deeper integration is a flexible configuration of coalitions formed by various countries to address different problems. “A Europe of concentric circles – with Germany and France in the centre [...] will not restore solidarity, since many divisions are within the eurozone and the Schengen zone rather than between different circles” (Fischer 2018, p. 35). This explains the uncertainty in migrants' attitudes to Brexit and the concerns about its negative outcomes for the EU. Brexit may upset the political balance that was made possible in the EU precisely by the UK.

What emerges from the sociological surveys conducted so far is a post-Brexit forecast regarding migrants' return to the country of origin. For Polish migrants in the UK, there may be different motives behind the possible remigrations. At least one-quarter of Poles can be expected to return to their country, if not this year, then certainly within a few years. From the long-term perspective, it is reasonable to predict that half of Poles living in the UK will return home (Fel, Kozak, and Wódka 2020). Migrants see the Brexit precedent not only in terms of a political and economic pact being broken but also in terms of the privilege of free movement being taken away from them, which threatens the striving for the long-term stability of migrants' residence in the UK in the future (Lulle, Moroşanu, and King 2018). There are also other restrictions, including the potential loss of the right to return to Britain in the case of further migration or remigration, which may complicate intra-European mobility even more (Sredanovic 2020).

Brexit may also have positive outcomes for Poland. Given the country's worsening demographic situation and the shortage of skilled workers, the remigration of workers with experience in the competitive British market may bring added value to Poland's economy. In the long term, Brexit will also discourage potential future emigrants from going to Britain, where they will face complicated entry procedures and where there will be more requirements to obtain a residence permit associated with having one's own capital and a guarantee of employment in the UK (Borońska-Hryniewiecka 2016). This explains why the respondents in our survey, conducted in autumn 2019, who were planning to return to Poland considerably less often expressed concerns about the negative consequences of Brexit for Poland or for themselves and their families.

Conclusions and implications

This article analysed the opinions of Polish migrants in the UK on the extent to which Brexit might bring benefits or losses to the EU, to Poland, to the UK, and to the respondents themselves and their families. Their answers were predominantly about how they would be affected.

Brexit is an unprecedented event that will be an important milestone in the history of the EU and significantly influence its place in the international environment. The EU can be expected to lose part of its economic (the loss of the second largest economy), financial (the loss of the second largest net contributor to the common budget), political (the loss of a country with efficient diplomacy and a permanent member of the UN Security Council), and military potential (the loss of the country with the highest military expenditures in the EU). Brexit will weaken the role of the EU in the transatlantic system and in the structure of the new international order. The countries that will strengthen their position are China and Russia, which will perpetuate the movement of the centre of gravity in the global order towards Asia (Baran 2018). Brexit weakens the EU in terms of image. For the first time in the history of the EU, the integration process has been effectively halted. This may result in a mistrustful attitude of other countries to the process of deepening cooperation and contribute to greater interest in the idea of selective integration (Möller and Oliver 2014).

The UK's departure from the EU will undoubtedly change the situation of the Poles who have chosen a life of migrants in Britain, making it more difficult to migrate there for those who have planned to do so in the near future. It is hard to estimate how exactly the status of Polish immigrants living in the UK will change, but many analysts who have examined this situation claim that, given the obstacles that present and future migrants may encounter, the likelihood of them returning to Poland will increase together with the social unrest caused by the uncertain socioeconomic and political situation between London and Brussels (Nowak and Sus 2019, p. 30; Fel, Kozak, and Wódka 2020; Falkingham et al. 2021; White 2022).

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Korzyść czy strata? Konsekwencje brexitu w opinii polskich migrantów

Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie opinii polskich migrantów w Wielkiej Brytanii na temat korzyści lub strat, jakie brexit może przynieść dla Unii Europejskiej, Zjednoczonego Królestwa, Polski oraz samych respondentów i ich rodzin. Ustalono ją na podstawie analizy wyników sondażu przeprowadzonego wśród nich, a zaprezentowano na tle wyników badań opinii publicznej na temat członkostwa w Unii, które na Wyspach Brytyjskich prowadzone są regularnie od lat siedemdziesiątych ubiegłego wieku. W artykule analizowane są przekonania na ten temat migrantów zarobkowych, którzy w czasie dokonującego się brexitu stoją przed wyborem: pozostać na emigracji czy wracać do kraju pochodzenia. W odpowiedziach na pytania dotyczące ewentualnych korzyści bądź skutków negatywnych brexitu przeważały te drugie. W dyskusji poszukuje się odpowiedzi na pytanie, dlaczego migranci z Polski częściej obawiają się negatywnych konsekwencji brexitu dla Wielkiej Brytanii i Europy, a rządziej dla Polski, dla nich samych i ich najbliższej rodziny.

Słowa kluczowe: Brexit, migranci, opinia publiczna, korzyści i straty brexitu