Using Acemoglu and Robinson’s Concept to Assess Leviathans in CEECs in the Long Term

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Abstract

The main objective of the paper is to use the following terms of Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson – Despotic, Real, Paper, Shackled Leviathans – to check and evaluate the state of democracy, governance and social power in Central and Eastern European Countries (CECCs). Six states were included in the study: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia (before 1993 Czechoslovakia), Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria. Based on a historical analysis, Leviathan types were identified in the interwar period, communism, and the transition time. In the most recent period (the twenty-first century), eight democracy and freedom indices were presented, which take into account the quality of governance, the state of institutions and the potential of social capital in the six CEECs. The usefulness of these indices for assessing whether (and when) a country managed to shackle Leviathan were checked.

Keywords: CEECs, Acemoglu & Robinson Concepts, Types of Leviathan, Shackled Leviathan

JEL: D7, H1, K4, N4, O5, P2, P5

Fingers are crossed
Just in case
Walking the dead
Where are we now?
Where are we now?

David Bowie ‘Where Are We Now?’ (2013)
Introduction

I use the concepts and terms of Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson (A&R) to check and evaluate the state of democracy, freedom, governance and social power in six Central Eastern European Countries (6CEECs), in a long period of time. Using A&R’s terminology of different kinds of Leviathans and on the basis of historical sources and a variety of indices, I classify, categorise and match 6CEECs accordingly. This analysis includes more than a century of time (since 1918).

In the assessment I use historical description, pointing to decisive facts and legislation acts influencing the quality of the state (Leviathan). In the most recent period (twenty-first century) I use the democracy and freedom indices, which take into account the quality of governance, the state of institutions and the potential of social capital. I check the usefulness of these indices to assess whether a country managed to shackle Leviathan.

In the study I take into account six countries: Poland, Czechia, Slovakia (before 1993 Czechoslovakia), Hungary, Romania, Bulgaria. These are all former members of the Warsaw Pact and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON, CMEA), also the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) and finally current EU countries. Four of them became EU members in 2004 and two of them in 2007. I do not take into account other EU countries from the former USSR (Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) and Yugoslavia (Slovenia and Croatia). The six countries studied are the largest in terms of population from the EU’s Eastern bloc. Furthermore, Slovakia, the smallest of the countries studied, is larger in population than EU’s members of the former USSR or Yugoslavia.

I use the following methods in completing the article: critical exegesis of theorists’ texts; critical historical and institutional analysis and comparative statics analysis.

Acemoglu and Robinson’s concept of Leviathan in brief

A&R like to popularize their scientific ideas. They managed to publish two brilliant best-sellers. After Why Nations Fail (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012) they released an equally comprehensive and similarly capacious Narrow Corridor (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019). The first mentioned book explained the institutional hypothesis in a crossing world scale. The authors minimized the importance of environmental, cultural, or perceptual impediments to economic development, increasing and underlining the role of institutions (Dziencek-Kozłowska and Matera 2015; 2020; 2021). A&R claim the institutional order ‘must feature secure private property, an unbiased system of law, and a provision of public services that provides a level playing field in which people can exchange and contract; it also must permit the entry of the new businesses and al-
low people to choose their careers’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, pp. 74–75). Such an approach was more developed in their latest book Narrow Corridor.

There is also one strong thing in common between both A&R’s books. The authors attach great importance to small, seemingly insignificant differences that appear at critical junctures in history, which is in fact the essence of the concept of path dependence (David 1985; Puffert 2002). In Narrow Corridor they go a step further, as they try to be more specific in explaining the factors that have a significant impact on the chosen paths of development. They do this in different historical periods, giving examples and detailed description from the Middle Ages (the Black Death), through to the beginning of modernity (discovering America) or contemporary history (the collapse of the Eastern Bloc), using the example of Poland, Russia and Tajikistan (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019, pp. 281–291).

The main research question of A&R’s book is why and how societies have achieved or failed to achieve liberty (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019, p. xi; McElroy 2021). How have some societies managed to reach a situation in which, on the one hand, we have a centralized power protecting against ‘the war of all against all’, and on the other, this power is kept in check (shackled) by ordinary people? And finally: ‘how those shackles emerge, and why only some societies have managed to develop them’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019, p. 27).

The starting point of A&R’s narration is Thomas Hobbes’ concept of a state of anarchy (called Warre) and the opportunities to prevent it (Hobbes 2020). The solution would be the creation of a state with a monopoly on the use of violence (called Leviathan). The simplest definition of the Leviathan is a group of political elites (rulers, politicians) and sometimes economic elites (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019, p. 72). How do we bring this about and stop the ‘bellum omnium contra omnes’? It can be done by force, or by a kind of social contract under which everyone submits. According to A&R, Hobbes did not care which path was chosen, as long as the Leviathan was established, because only then would the violence be stopped. A&R criticize Hobbes’ position on this aspect (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019, pp. 11–12) by pointing out two issues:

1) that the control of violence is sometimes possible even in stateless societies (with an Absent Leviathan – which is a bit misleading at first sight, because realistically with an Absent Leviathan there is no state. And this was, for example, the situation in Nigerian Lagos at the dawn of the twenty-first century) or in the societies with so-called ‘cage of norms’ (also best observed long-term in India, where society collectively imposes a caste system);

2) the establishment of a centralized authority does not always lead to a state better than a state of ‘the war of all against all’, because the state has a monopoly on violence, but this does not automatically mean that the life of ‘ordinary people’ will be bet-
ter – the key is the respect of civil liberties. When these are not respected, we have a Despotic Leviathan. This was precisely the situation in USSR, PRC or North Korea. There are naturally intermediate options too. To the mentioned set of Leviathans should be added Paper Leviathan (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019, pp. 367–368) – a term introduced for the first time by A&R in 2016. This is the case in which the state has people staffed in all positions in government but offers no services to its citizens. It is the situation in which ‘[…] while society cannot really control or stop a process of state formation, as in the above post-colonial societies, they may be able to withdraw from it and deny it legitimacy’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2016, p. 21). Colombia (described in Paths) or Argentina (described in Narrow Corridor) are good (rather bad) examples of such a Leviathan.

There is also a Real Leviathan in A&R’s earlier publication (Acemoglu and Robinson 2016, p. 29), of which Rwanda during the ethnic drama in 1990s would be the best (rather the worst) example. ‘It was precisely a highly top-down, authoritarian, and non-democratic set of institutional structures and exercise of power that was of crucial importance in the administration of the genocide. Such forces are still present and potentially destructive’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2016, p. 33). Since A&R do not use the term ‘Real Leviathan’ in their Narrow Corridor and instead operate with the term ‘Despotic Leviathan’, we can consider that these are the same forms of the most enslaved state.

After this enumeration of types of Leviathans (Absent, Despotic, Paper, Real) and filled with plenty of examples, A&R conclude that the power of the state and the power of society must be in balance, and once in balance the state can offer its citizens more and more, as long as society also grows in power, in order to be able to contain the growing power of the state.

So in order not to fall into the trap of Warre or into the ‘cage of norms’ or into the yoke/claws of a Despotic Leviathan ‘[…] We need a state that has the capacity to enforce laws, control violence, resolve conflict, and provide public services but is still tamed and controlled by assertive, well-organized society’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019, p. 24). The authors call this ‘nirvana’ ‘Shackled Leviathan’, and the space between a government guaranteeing security and the social force controlling too much power of the government is named the Narrow Corridor.

In the next sections I will try to shackle A&R’s theory of Leviathans. It is really difficult to question the historical content of a fascinating book. Instead, it is worth subjecting the theory to empirical verification, looking at the past and present situation in the 6CEECs through the prism of this concept. Thus, I will first define the types of Leviathan for the studied countries (the next part of the paper) since 1918. Then I will try to answer whether and possibly which countries managed to shackle Leviathan.
Concise historical review and types of Leviathans in CEECs

Before WWII

Based on the broad descriptions of A&R in Narrow Corridor and their other works, we know what characteristics each Leviathan has. Although the differences between them are often blurred (especially between Despotic/Real and Paper Leviathans).

In principle, we have initial doubts about the classification of CEECs before 1918. To begin with, we must remember that not all of them were independent. Poland was under partition for 123 years. It was part of more or less despotic regimes. After 1795, the former Polish territory and its inhabitants were part of Czarist Russia, the Kingdom of Prussia (since 1871 the German Empire) and the Austrian Empire (since 1867 the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy) with a small dose of relative autonomy (Koryś 2018). Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary were within the borders of the Austrian Empire, although the latter had been in the role of a co-hosting absolute monarchy since 1867 (Judson 2016). Romania formally declared independence in 1877 (confirmed by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878), becoming independent from the Ottoman Empire, although there was already an autonomous principality from Austria and Turkey. Finally, the Bulgarian state was created as a result of a dramatic uprising, following the Treaty of San Stefano (1878), but was largely dependent on the Ottomans. Bulgaria became an independent tsarism only in 1908.

All the partitioning countries were despot. They were absolutist, ruled by tsars, emperors, kings, sultans. They were ruthlessly Despotic Leviathans. Although one can theorize whether they did not have the features of a Paper Leviathan. Could it have been better? Let us focus on the definition of A&R: ‘To the extent that it has any powers, it is despotic, repressive, and arbitrary. It is fundamentally unchecked by society, which it continually tries to keep weak, disorganized, and discombobulated. It provides its citizens little protection from Warre, and doesn’t try to free them from the cage of norms. This is all because Paper Leviathan doesn’t care about the welfare of its citizens and certainly not about their liberty’ (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019, p. 368).

However, there are some doubts as to the determination of ‘little protection from Warre’. The biggest problem is with the word ‘little’. The question is: what groups and how many people were affected by this protection? Were the close people of the tsar or sultan protected under this system, or slightly larger groups of elites in Germany or Austria? This was probably not enough as a characteristic feature of a Paper Leviathan. Even independent Romania and Bulgaria did not have the features of a state where an informed society had formed. Before 1918, the inhabitants of CEECs were located within different borders, exposed to conflicts, uprisings and wars (the Balkan Wars). All CEECs were
more or less subordinated from partitioning powers or neighbouring empires, and societies were enslaved and/or completely fractured.

What changes occurred in CEECs’ political systems as a result of the end of WWI, the declaration of independence by some of these countries and the provisions of the Treaty of Versailles? The interwar period was too short for the CEECs to shackle Leviathan. The first step, rather, was to stop the time of Warre, to stop internal struggles, to stop illegal takeovers of power, and finally to form the Leviathan. In the case of Czechoslovakia this was a more successful process, in the case of Poland and Romania partly successful (only for a shorter period). In the case of Hungary and Bulgaria one can speak of failed attempts. Even when it was possible to escape from Warre, the newly created states fell into the clutches of the Paper Leviathan or even the Despotic Leviathan.

Only Czechoslovakia functioned in the whole interwar period as a democratic state. It had some of the characteristics of a Shackled Leviathan, although even this country had too short a time for inclusive political and economic institutions to function effectively. However, there are also critical assessments of the Czechoslovak democracy sometimes called the Masaryk’s republic, pointing out its limitations and failures (Kopeček 2019). Moreover, the development of democracy was mainly halted by the external political situation and the bad examples set by neighbours.

The National Assembly unanimously adopted the Constitution in February 1920. It remained unchanged until the collapse of the state in 1939. In its very first article the document set out the principle of national sovereignty. It recognized the close unity of the Czech and Slovak nations. The country was to be a democratic republic, guaranteeing respect for fundamental civil liberties, including those of national minorities. The final failure of the democratic experiment in 1938 was not the result of the weakness of the state, but rather due to the policy of Nazi Germany and the European powers, which were unable to oppose it.

Poland also made an attempt to shackle the Leviathan, although it failed quite quickly. After the surrender of power by Chief Józef Piłsudski, Poland operated on the basis of the so-called Provisional Constitution (Kaczmarczyk-Kłak 2018), and additionally struggling for more than two years with uprisings and war with Bolshevik Russia. A strongly democratic constitution was promulgated in March 1921, but the political system was still very unstable. During the first seven years of the Republic there were as many as 14 governments, and in 1922 the president was even assassinated. Despite this, the limping democracy bravely resisted authoritarian solutions. In May 1926, however, there was a coup d’état for which Piłsudski was responsible, and although the Constitution was not formally amended until 1935, 13 years before the outbreak of war there had been a monopoly of party (strictly linked with Piłsudski) power, and the rights of minorities and large sections of society had not been
respected. Poland was thus a typical Paper Leviathan (especially revealing during the Great Depression) with the features of Despotic (Real) Leviathan.

In the remaining CEECs, there were also times when Warre dominated state stabilization. Once Warre had been stopped, however, the Real Leviathan was revealed, in which a governing administration, centred around authoritarian rulers, would destroy the opposition (the mechanism was similar to the Polish one). In the case of Hungary, the communists came to power less than six months after the republic had been proclaimed, creating the Hungarian Soviet Republic. After over 100 days of their rule, the power was taken over by the nationalists, starting the authoritarian rule of Miklos Horthy, who became regent after the 1920 elections. He remained in this position until 1945. The constitutional foundations were still modified, and their essence was the assumption that the royal power was to be exercised by the aforementioned regent (called kormanyzo). Hungary, instead of a republic, therefore remained a monarchy, although without a king (Molnar 2001). Nationalist, and in the 1930s showing increased interest in fascism, Hungary was thus a classic Real Leviathan.

In Romania, after a period of chaos (revolutionary movements and general strikes), in 1923 the constitution of 1866 was replaced with a new liberal regulation, although it retained the monarchical form of the state, but also introduced certain limitations to the so far role of the king. He retained the right of legislative initiative and the right of sanctions against laws passed by parliament, but lost any significant influence on the functioning of the national representation. ‘It was, basically, a fluid mixture of authoritarianism and democracy’ (Boia 2001, p. 104). Such a system did not significantly improve the low levels of education and the public’s awareness of their rights. Therefore, there was little resistance to the constitutional changes of 1938, which led to a significant limitation of the powers of the parliament (in connection with the dissolution of political parties) and to the concentration of state power in the hands of the monarch as well as the government subordinated to him. In practice, the king relied on the military who constituted the main basis of his power, and this very model persisted during the war (though the royal dictatorship itself did not last long) (Hitchins 2014).

Among the CEECs, Bulgaria was the most unstable. The proportions between Warre and Leviathan were to the disadvantage of the latter. The periods of political instability were much longer than the brief periods of shackling Leviathan. In the interwar period, drastic fights for power took place (such as coups, attempts to assassinate the tsar and murders of politicians). In the atmosphere of revolutionary unrest, strikes were nevertheless managed by a people’s government in 1919 with prime minister Alexander Stambolijski. The tsar was losing real power, which was a positive tendency, but there was no stability at the level of the government and parliament. In 1923, a fascist coup d’état took place while the former prime minister was murdered. The regime of right-wing movements persisted until WWII. Elements of parliamentary democra-
cy were briefly noticeable in the early 1930s, but already in 1934 another coup d'état was made by the military from the fascist organization. There was another restriction of civil liberties. The short-term Paper Leviathan was then replaced by the Real Leviathan. Only such a country could join the Axis Bloc (Crampton 2005) in 1941. Thus, in the Real Leviathans of Bulgaria and Hungary, Nazi ideology and practice found their way more easily.

Table 1. The Main features of the political system in 6 CEECs in interwar period

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Official and real political systems</th>
<th>No. of elections (in brackets mostly free, rather fair, non‑boycotted elections)</th>
<th>Range of voter turnout. Min–max</th>
<th>No. of parties (in brackets groups of civil representatives) in parliament. Min–max</th>
<th>Repression of the opposition and civic society</th>
<th>Suffrage of women, Year of granting voting rights (fully)</th>
<th>Total no. of governments since 1918</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>Parliamentary republic. Authoritarianism since 1926</td>
<td>6 (2)</td>
<td>47–78</td>
<td>1 (2 including nonpartisans members)–12</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1918</td>
<td>30 till 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECHOSLOVAKIA</td>
<td>Parliamentary republic. Democracy with some defects</td>
<td>4 (4)</td>
<td>90–92</td>
<td>14–16</td>
<td>No</td>
<td>1920</td>
<td>10 till 1938 12 till 1939</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>Partly liberal constitutional monarchy in 1920s. Authoritarianism in 1930s</td>
<td>12 (6)</td>
<td>66–77</td>
<td>1–15</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1929 (fully 1946)</td>
<td>37 till 1940</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* The closing dates of the governments’ activities for each country vary due to the fact that they lost their partial or full independence (sovereignty) at different times. Some CEECs were occupied by Nazi Germany, others were allied with Axis powers or neutral at various times during WWII.

The more important conclusions from Table 1 include the following: more democratic systems existed only in Poland (briefly) and Czechoslovakia (longer). If there were no
authoritarian powers, the parliamentary majorities became unstable. Therefore, frequent elections were organized (mainly Romania and Bulgaria). The most active governments were in Romania and Poland, while the most stable in terms of the organization of elections and governments was in Czechoslovakia. All countries experienced the multiparty system, but in the case of Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and de facto Hungary (Janos 1982, p. 213), there was a party monopoly or groups supporting the regent, tsar, king, marshal (former chief). One could observe a very high turnout in all countries, but in Poland, Hungary and Bulgaria during the periods of the state crisis it dropped to around 50%. There were persecutions of the opposition, coups d’état, general strikes and prisons for political opponents in five of the six countries. Full voting rights for women only existed in Poland and Czechoslovakia. So only the latter country managed to shackle Leviathan, but even this did not prevent it from its dramatic end.

**After WWII**

In the interwar period, there were many common features between the Leviathans from the CEECs, but also some variations were observed. After WWII, the characteristics of the political systems in CEECs were much more similar. This was due to the imposition of ready-made solutions by the USSR and the relatively coherent actions of the communist parties. At the beginning, radical system reforms were favoured by the expectations of a large group of society: peasants counting on free land and workers who were guaranteed full employment.

Beyond any doubt, the communist systems in the CEECs had all the characteristics of a Despotic (Real) Leviathan. One can only differentiate the scale of the persecution of society by Leviathan in individual countries.

Among political extractive institutions we may distinguish: the primacy of a new ideology aimed at the abolition of private property; lack of free elections (the first elections after WWII were held under great pressure from the authorities, their results were falsified, and the next elections were a farce, with society forced to vote for certain party representatives); monopoly of communistic parties; special privileges for the authorities; society was enslaved, and in extreme cases there was also democide (Rummel 1994).  

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1 Rummels’ calculations in *Death of government* indicated 110 mln dead as a result of communist democide from 1900 to 1987. In contrast, Benjamin Valentino (2004) stressed that most communist regimes did not commit mass crimes. From the CEECs he noted 50,000 killed during the worst period in Bulgaria and Romania. The number of victims of democide in these countries can therefore vary greatly: from tens to hundreds of thousands. In the case of Hungary, there were between a thousand and tens of thousands of victims. In the case of Poland and Czechoslovakia between a hundred and a thousand victims of uprisings, strikes and the hardest period of the Stalinist regime. More information on the difficulty of identifying the number of victims of communism can be found in *The black book of Communism* (Courtois et al. 1999).
As part of the most destructive economic extractive institutions, we can indicate: specific legal acts – nationalization of the industry (until 1948 this was carried out in all five CEECs, of which in Hungary it was already over 80% in the hands of the state, and even 97% in Bulgaria (Skodlarski 2012, p. 337)); collectivization of agriculture (the new authorities liquidated landowners’ ownership, allocating land to smallholders and landless peasants and creating state and cooperative farms); exchange of money without market laws. State ownership of factors of production (capital, labour, land); central management and planning; bureaucracy, controlled system; administrative price formation; no competition between economic agents; no commercial institutions; isolationism in innovation and autarkic international trade (at the end of the 1940s, already 40% of CSSR and 80% of Bulgaria’s foreign trade was linked with the USSR); full employment (and compulsory work); permanent shortages on the market. Studies of János Kornai (1992), Oskar Lange (1962) and Michał Kalecki (1993) will be useful here, theoretically, to understand the mechanisms of the system, with Ivan Berend (1996) showing the operation of the system in excellent examples from CEECs.

The hardest power of Despotic Leviathan was visible at the end of the 1940s and in the 1950s, although we may observe the politics of power and harassment of society as a result of mass protests in each country in the following decades as well: during the 1968 Czechoslovak Revolution, in Poland in 1968, 1970, 1976 or 1981 (introduction of the Martial Law), to a lesser extent during the regime of János Kadar in Hungary; to a greater extent during the regime of Todor Zhivkov (Bulgaria), and especially Nicolae Caușescu (Romania).

A&R write quite extensively about the harbingers and causes of the collapse of the communist system in CEE at the very end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s. They show the mechanisms that made Poland shackle Leviathan, while Russia and Tajikistan did not succeed it (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019, p. 290, Figure 3).

The democratization of the political system (the organization of free elections at various levels, the appointment of new governments) slightly preceded or occurred in parallel. The economic situation of the postcommunist countries was thus differentiated, almost half a century after the war and after half a century of despotism. There was a lack of institutions necessary in a market economy, that is, institutions protecting private property and the rights of society and individual individuals. There was also no economic information circulation system. No rules for the operation of institutions such as stock exchanges applied. The conditions of competition were not defined and there were no anti-monopoly offices. The price system had been distorted by universal subsidies and direct regulation; the currency was inconvertible. The industry was overdeveloped at the expense of the service sector. These countries inherited from the collectivist system a deep market imbalance, rising inflation, deformed economic and social structures, decapitalized productive assets, low economic efficiency, disturbed ecological balance and a larg-
ly Sovietized society. The technological and infrastructural gap in relation to industrialized countries clearly increased together with the increase in the external debt. Under these difficult conditions, the painful process of systemic stabilization and transformation began (Brada 1993; Sachs 1993; Blanchard, Froot, and Sachs 1994; Schweickert et al. 2013; Henry 2014). The result of this process was the establishment (restoration) of democracy and the introduction of capitalism.

Complementing figure released by A&R (Acemoglu and Robinson 2019, p. 290), Shackled Leviathan, next to Poland, can be boldly included in this group, including Hungary, Czechoslovakia (since 1993 the Czech Republic and Slovakia), but also Bulgaria and Romania with some delays. The CEECs escaped from the Despotic Leviathan (they did not stay with Russia, Belarus or most Asian satraps) or did not enter the Absent Leviathan’s path like Tajikistan (or in shorter periods, like Ukraine or Moldova).

Table 2. The proposal of international institutional guarantees for shackled Leviathan in 6CEECs

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<thead>
<tr>
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<th>Council of Europe membership</th>
<th>NATO membership</th>
<th>Europe agreement’s signature</th>
<th>Acceptance of the EU accession candidacy</th>
<th>Beginning of negotiations on EU accession</th>
<th>EU accession</th>
</tr>
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</table>

Leaders are bolded.
Sources: own table’s concept based on: Council of Europe (n.d.); NATO (2022); EUR-Lex (2007).

However, international institutional protection (Table 2) decided about the quick shackling of Leviathan and entering the Narrow Corridor. Initially, the leader of CEECs was Poland, in which the empowerment effect (A&R’s term from Acemoglu and Robinson 2012, pp. 455–462) was active as a result of Solidarity’s activity in the 1980s. It was certainly a kick-start to the fastest changes since the very beginning of 1989. Hungary, inspired by the Polish model of round-table talks, and Czechoslovakia, after the Velvet Revolution, also started to join European structures. Romania and Bulgaria followed these leaders a little later. A measure of being in Shackled Leviathan could be the membership of CEECs both in the Council of Europe, in NATO (responsible for regional and global security), and in the EU. Membership in the Council of Europe on its own does not seem to be sufficient, especially in the light of Russia’s membership (Pacześniak 2014). The institutional confirmation of Shackled Leviathan could also be the stages of negotiations
with NATO and the EU in the second half of the 1990s. Poland, Czechia and Hungary were slightly ahead in this respect. The accession to the EU itself was a kind of institutional guarantee for the countries in the Narrow Corridor.

In reaching Shackled Leviathan and staying in the Narrow Corridor, the regional Red Queen effect can be interpreted in an interesting way. The CEECs did not run equally for democracy. Political changes began faster, but more evolutionarily than revolutionarily in Poland, then in Hungary and Czechoslovakia. The latter, however, due to the internal process of disintegration, was not included in the *Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Reconstruction of the Economy* (PHARE) programme for the two change leaders. In Romania and Bulgaria, however, the changes were more revolutionary. The coup took place in the streets (Romania) or inside the communist party (Bulgaria). The transformation was therefore more than two years behind the leaders. At the end of the 1990s, the trio of Poland, Czechia and Hungary were leaders at joining NATO and during the accession negotiations. But then these countries slowed down, were quickly caught up by Slovakia, which, after the era of Vladimir Mečiar, managed to enter the EU at the same time as the mentioned three. Thus, Bulgaria and Romania lagged only two and a half years in relation to the top four. As of 1 January, 6CEECs had already entered the EU together. But was it a smooth run? The next section discusses this issue.

**CEECs in indices of democracy, rule of law and freedom**

I assume all the 6CEECs managed to Shackle Leviathans and have been in the Narrow Corridor since the 1990s, receiving EU guarantees. Is EU membership a permanent and full guarantee of maintaining this state of affairs? Can there be shifts within the Narrow Corridor due to too much government power or too weak social control of the government’s activities? How can this state be verified? This can be done by indicating the trends in changes in the measurements (if any) of both these measures. I assess the measurement of these trends based on eight independent indices of eight different institutions. They regularly monitor the state management process and the state of democracy in most countries of the world, including all the countries described, in the long-term (since 1970s), in the medium-term (from the moment of their accession to the EU or shortly after: 2006–2010, and in the short-term (since 2015).

It does not stop at an in-depth evaluation of the methodology of all these rankings. Generally, however, it can be stated that the assessment of governance is difficult to question methodologically. On the other hand, it is more difficult to assess social power, because it is largely based on surveys while not on real action. For example, there is no detailed record of social protests against the authorities. This is already work for another study.
Tendencies after EU accession

I begin by comparing the 6CEECs with the Democracy Index first published by The Economist in 2006. This is based on 60 indicators in five different categories that indicate measures of pluralism, civil freedom and political culture.


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<td></td>
<td>SCORE</td>
<td>PLACE</td>
<td>SCORE</td>
<td>PLACE</td>
<td>SCORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>7.3</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>7.09</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>6.85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECHIA</td>
<td>8.17</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>7.94</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>7.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOVAKIA</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7.29</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>6.97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>7.53</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>6.84</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>6.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>7.06</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>6.68</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>6.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>7.10</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6.71</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Democracy Index classifies countries into four groups: full democracies; flawed democracies; hybrid regimes; and authoritarian regimes. Of the 6CEECs, only the Czech Republic between 2006 and 2013 was included in the group of states with full democracy. Indeed, this country ranks highest in all editions of the CEECs and there is a clear gap between this country and the rest of the group. Compared to 2006 and 2020 all 6CEECs not only fell in the ranking, but their level of democracy was rated lower. They were considered flawed democracies, relatively safe and distant from hybrid regimes.

Looking at the interstate Red Queen effect, CEECs ran slower than other countries in the last 15 years. Or else the rest of the index countries ran faster. More surprising are the dips in the score, not the places. And so Poland ran with a noticeable change of place. It was the highest in 2014, in 40th place with a level of 7.47, and the lowest in 2019 (57th position and a level of 6.62). In the case of Poland, political culture and the functioning of the government were assessed the worst. Civil liberties and the election process were rated the best. In 2020, with CEECs in the governance efficiency subranking, Czechia was the highest, then Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania and finally Hungary.

The Legatum Prosperity Index (LPI) created and published annually since 2007 by the Legatum Institute evaluates countries on the promotion of their residents flour-
ishing, reflecting both economic and social well-being. The methodology and pillars of the index changed over time. The latest indices take into account nearly 300 different indicators from over 80 different source databases. The index focuses on good governance (legal predictability) and the strength of society. When assessing Leviathan, categories such as safety, personal freedom, governance and social capital should be taken into account in particular.

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>36 (69.14)</td>
<td>+9</td>
<td>−7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECHIA</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>29 (73.12)</td>
<td>−2</td>
<td>−3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOVAKIA</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>35 (69.63)</td>
<td>−2</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>46 (66.13)</td>
<td>−10</td>
<td>−1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>47 (64.92)</td>
<td>−9</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>48 (64.40)</td>
<td>−14</td>
<td>+3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In the LPI, full scores are only available for the year 2020, therefore it is worth to focus on the promotion measures (helpful in the assessment of the Red Queen effect). Czechia is also leading in this index with the CEECs, although in 2015 the difference
between it and Poland was very small. The latter country also achieved the greatest advance between 2007 and 2015. In the same period, Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania recorded the greatest declines. In the 2015–2020 period, three CEECs fell in the ranking, two moved up, and Slovakia retained its place. Poland recorded the greatest decline. In terms of governance, Czechia was the best in 2015–2020, followed by Slovakia and Poland. In turn, according to the social capital assessment, as many as four CEECs in 2020 were in the second hundred countries of the world (Bulgaria out of 112, Poland out of 115, Czechia out of 127, and Romania out of 124, with the biggest decrease being the share of Poland and Czechia). According to the LPI, in the period 2007–2020 only Czechia and Slovakia were moving at a relatively equal pace. Hungary lost the most. Poland moved quickly through 2015 to lose almost all of its promotion in the next five years. Finally, Bulgaria and Romania lost their positions until 2015, only to recover slightly since 2016.

Next, the Fragile State Index (FSI) published by The Fund for Peace since 2006, assesses external and internal political risks and potential conflicts for policymakers and the general public. The foundation collects thousands of reports and information from around the world, detailing existing social, economic and political pressure.

The results of CEECs in the FSI are presented in Table 5 (the lower the position, the greater the stability). In the years 2006–2015, all countries from the region recorded significant progress in political stability and resistance to conflicts (of which Poland made the greatest). In 2015–2020, however, the CEECs did not go evenly: the largest decline was recorded in Poland and Hungary, and the remaining countries slightly advanced. In the latest report from 2021, Slovakia (which jumped over its Western neighbour) and Czechia were considered very stable (higher up were sustainable and very sustainable countries). Poland and lower rated Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria were marked as more stable economies. Thus, they were far from the next, lower-rated groups of countries in terms of warnings and alerts.

The next two indices focus on assessing the freedom of states. The Human Freedom Index (HFI) measures broadly defined freedom, and the Index of Economic Freedom (IEF) focuses on the economic aspects. Only two CEECs (Romania and Bulgaria) slightly improved the score of freedom between 2008 and 2018. Czechia, Slovakia, and especially Poland and Hungary, lowered significantly their score (Table 6). The one and only promotions within ten years in HFI were achieved by Bulgaria and Romania. Czechia down 4 places, Poland – 10, Slovakia – 14, and Hungary 17.
Table 5. Indicators and places of 6CEECs in Fragile State Index by the Fund for Peace: 2006, 2015–2020. Indicators: 120 (the worst) to 0 (the best) rating scale. Places (in brackets): the lower the better

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</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>47.9  (115)</td>
<td>39.8  (153)</td>
<td>40.7  (152)</td>
<td>40.8  (151)</td>
<td>41.5  (148)</td>
<td>42.8  (144)</td>
<td>41  (145)</td>
<td>+8.1 (+38)</td>
<td>-1.2 (–8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECHIA</td>
<td>41.8  (119)</td>
<td>37.4  (154)</td>
<td>40.8  (151)</td>
<td>40.1  (152)</td>
<td>39.0  (153)</td>
<td>37.6  (154)</td>
<td>35.7  (155)</td>
<td>+4.4 (+35)</td>
<td>+1.7 (+1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOVAKIA</td>
<td>49.9  (112)</td>
<td>42.6  (149)</td>
<td>44.9  (144)</td>
<td>44.3  (144)</td>
<td>42.5  (147)</td>
<td>40.5  (148)</td>
<td>38.2  (151)</td>
<td>+7.3 (+37)</td>
<td>+4.4 (+2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>46.7  (116)</td>
<td>49.1  (139)</td>
<td>52.7  (135)</td>
<td>52.0  (135)</td>
<td>50.2  (134)</td>
<td>49.6  (134)</td>
<td>47.6  (135)</td>
<td>-2.4 (+23)</td>
<td>+1.5 (–4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>62.6  (102)</td>
<td>54.2  (132)</td>
<td>52.9  (134)</td>
<td>50.9  (136)</td>
<td>49.4  (137)</td>
<td>47.8  (137)</td>
<td>46.7  (136)</td>
<td>+8.2 (+30)</td>
<td>+7.5 (+4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>62.1  (103)</td>
<td>55.4  (130)</td>
<td>53.7  (132)</td>
<td>53.7  (132)</td>
<td>51.7  (133)</td>
<td>50.6  (132)</td>
<td>49.2  (133)</td>
<td>6.7 (+27)</td>
<td>+6.2 (+3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Fragile States Index (2020).
Using Acemoglu and Robinson’s Concept to Assess Leviathans in CEECs in the Long Term

Table 6. Scores and places of 6CEECs in Human Freedom Index by the Fraser Institute and the Cato Institute: 2008, 2015, 2018. Results: 0-to–10 rating scale

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>HFI 2008</th>
<th>HFI 2015</th>
<th>HFI 2018</th>
<th>CHANGE (+/−)</th>
<th>CHANGE (+/−)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCORE</td>
<td>PLACE</td>
<td>SCORE</td>
<td>PLACE</td>
<td>HFI 2008–2015</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>8,10</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>8,12</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>+0,02 (+1)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECHIA</td>
<td>8,37</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>8,42</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>+0,05 (0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOVAKIA</td>
<td>8,29</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>8,05</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>−0,24 (−14)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>8,14</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>7,86</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>−0,28 (−11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>8,06</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>8,22</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>+0,16 (+8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>7,89</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>7,85</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>−0,04 (−3)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Vásquez and McMahon (2020).

In the IEF, Poland (+37) and Romania (+37) achieved the highest advancement in positions between 2008 and 2020. In turn, the largest decrease was recorded by Slovakia (−25). Slovakia and Hungary results in 2020 were lower than in 2008. Thus, the CEECs did not run evenly. In the case of Poland, the upward trend was from 2009 to 2016. Then, until 2018, a slight decrease was noticeable. In Czechia, the decline occurred only in 2011–2012, then there was an increase. Slovakia was in a very high position after joining the EU, and began to be touched by declines from 2013. Hungary and Romania faced y / y fluctuations, and only Bulgaria saw a strong trend from 2010. In the 2020 index only Czechia and Bulgaria were qualified for the ‘mostly free’ group of countries. The rest of the 6CEECs were considered ‘moderately free’.

Table 7. Scores and places of 6CEECs in Index of Economic Freedom by the Heritage Foundation: 2008, 2015, 2020. Score: 0-to–100 rating scale

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SCORE</td>
<td>PLACE</td>
<td>SCORE</td>
<td>PLACE</td>
<td>SCORE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>POLAND</td>
<td>59.5</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>69.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CZECHIA</td>
<td>68.5</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>72.5</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>74.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLOVAKIA</td>
<td>68.7</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>66.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUNGARY</td>
<td>67.2</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>66.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROMANIA</td>
<td>61.5</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>66.6</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>69.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BULGARIA</td>
<td>62.9</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>66.8</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>70.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In addition to the mainstream indices measuring government performance, there is also short-term (middle-short term), and less cross-sectional studies and reports. The V-Dem Institute – a project affiliated with the University of Gothenburg, publishes a ranking of the top autocratizing states (not the worst autocracies, but those sliding fastest into autocracy). In the first two places of this infamous ranking from the period 2010–2020 there were two CEECs: Poland and Hungary. Poland’s Liberal Democracy Index (LDI) fell from 0.83 to 0.49 (–0.34), which was a drop from Liberal Democracy to Electoral Democracy. Hungary, which was second, fell at the same time by 0.31 (from 0.68 to 0.37), which meant a decrease for this country from Electoral Democracy to Electoral Autocracy (V-Dem Institute 2021). The process of autocratization of Poland and Hungary was also highlighted in other research (Szczepański and Kalina 2019; Ilonszki and Dudzińska 2021; Petrova and Pospieszna 2021).

A detailed analysis of LDI ranking in 2019 was carried out by Maerz et al. (2020). In the case of Hungary, four categories were downgraded: CSO repression; bias media; freedom of academic and cultural expression; and government media censorship efforts had been visible since 2009, in Poland since 2015. In the case of the key categories: free and fair elections, the collapse has been visible in Hungary since 2013, in Poland since 2018 (Maerz et al. 2020). Poland and Hungary have thus suffered a kind of collapse after constant assaults on the judiciary and restrictions on the media and civil society. Based solely on the LDI, there would not be much argument to keep Hungary in the Narrow Corridor. Poland was on its thin border. Both countries had a gigantic problem in shackling Leviathan in the last 5 (Poland) to 10 (Hungary) years.

Of the other indices there is also the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (consisting of 8 factors and 44 subfactors), but it does not include Slovakia, so I will not deal with comparative detailed data. In the first ranking in 2015, Czechia was the 6CEECS’ leader (20th place); just behind it, Poland (21st). Romania was 32nd, Hungary 37th and Bulgaria 45th. In 2020, Czechia moved up to the 18th position, Poland fell to 28th (the score fell from 0.71 to 0.66). The worst category was the constraints of government powers, where Poland fell from the 18th place (score 0.77) to 51st (0.58). The results in the Open Government category were also worse (dropping from the 20th to 37th position). In the overall index, Romania maintained its position between 2015 and 2020, Hungary fell to 60th place, and Bulgaria to 63rd (World Justice Project 2015; 2020).

**Tendencies in the longer-term**

The eighth index referred to shows changes over a longer period. This is why it will be discussed at the end, to make it easier to see the Red Queen effect. Founded in 1941 Freedom House is the longest running non-profit NGO assessing global political sys-
tems and values. Based in Washington D.C., since the 1970s the organization has been monitoring in annual reports the state and changes in democracy, political freedom and human rights in over 200 countries and territories around the world. The Global Freedom report group them into: ‘free’, ‘partly free’ and ‘not free’. Of the 6CEECs, 5 were classified as free in 2021, only Hungary was in ‘partly free’ group. Also current democracy reports indicate the specific outcome of democracy, with detailed percentage level, scores and terminology. In 2021 among 6CEECs the Czech Republic had highest percentage of democracy (76) classified with Slovakia (72%) as ‘consolidated democracy’. Poland (60%), Bulgaria (58%) and Romania (57%) were classified as ‘semi-consolidated democracies’ and Hungary (45%) was in the lower group of transitional or hybrid regime (Freedom House n.d., Countries…).

Freedom House also specialises in Freedom of the Press and Freedom of the Internet reports. However, particularly useful for observing changes in CEECs is the Nations in Transit report which deals with governance in the nations of the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe (29 countries and territories in total). All of them whose combined average ratings for personal rights and civil liberties fell between 1.0 and 2.5 (or 3 since 2003 reports) were designated ‘free’; between 3.0 (3.5 since 2003) and 5.5 (5 since 2003) ‘partly free’, and between 5.5 (5 since 2003) and 7.0 ‘not free’ (Freedom House 2021). Graph 2 shows average score of both political rights and civil liberties taking into account the socialist, transition and contemporary periods of 6CEECs (results for the Czech Republic and Slovakia were standardised during the existence of Czechoslovakia until 1993).

**Graph 2.** Scores in Freedom House Index. Score: 1-to–7 rating scale. The lower score, the higher democracy and freedom

Source: Freedom House (n.d.).
As far back as in the 1970s 5CEECs had centrally planned economies with minimum existence of private property. Therefore, it is not surprising that Freedom House generally rated them as ‘not free’ although there were brief exceptions in the history of Poland or Hungary where both were classified as ‘partly free’ (due to greater civil liberties). In the late 1980s and early 1990s, all 5CEECs (since 1993 6CEECs) entered the path from the real socialism to democracy and market economy by introducing and implementing similar institutional reforms. In spite of these similarities, their level of success in democratisation and economic reform was different, but not significantly different, compared to the former USSR countries of Moldova, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine (Dzionek-Kozłowska and Matera 2021, p. 667). In 2020, after three decades of transition, Czechia and Slovakia were assessed best (with 1.0 score both in political rights and civil liberties), Poland, Bulgaria and Romania were still ‘free’ but with lower score 2.0. Hungary with 3.0 score was on the border between groups of ‘free’ and ‘partly free’ countries which meant in practice being also on the edge of the Narrow Corridor.

CEECs were together in the socialist bloc, but differed in the degree of freedom and democratisation, and so these differences (albeit in a different configuration of countries) can be seen in the third decade of twenty-first century. The smallest differences were in the period 2005–2015, where the spread was less than one point in the Freedom House assessment. When following the transformation period, Bulgaria and Romania were the fastest to shorten the distance to the top. The situation was most stable in Czechia and Slovakia. In turn, the biggest slump occurred in Hungary (since 2010 which is in line with Janos Kornai’s and many other researchers’ opinions: Bretter, 2016, pp. 39–40), and to a lesser extent in Poland (since 2015).

Discussion and conclusion

In the concept of A&R, governance matters and so too do social capital matters. Published independent indices by various institutions from various countries indicate the threats and progress of individual countries. These indices are not perfect, and their methodology differs. But their results are not fundamentally different from the 6CEECs’ assessment. There are much smaller differences in the assessment of the quality of governance.

Much greater differences in the 6CEECs occur in the assessment of social capital, the controlling role of society over government activities. The low position in some rankings (especially Legatum) is puzzling. In the assessment of social activities supervising the government, the published indices can be supplemented by, for example, the number of nongovernmental organizations (both local and international). One can also point to long-term stimuli for changes and greater social awareness, such as the impact of education (using the traditional HDI). In the case of media activities, their limitation by the authorities, the ability to control the authorities, detailed measurements are presented
Using Acemoglu and Robinson’s Concept to Assess Leviathans in CEECs in the Long Term

in the World Press Freedom Index. Eventually, direct social control of government actions can take place through social protests (not the same as registered strikes). Next to elections, this is the most direct pressure on the government. A protest does not necessarily pose a threat to a nascent democracy. Instead, it can, in certain situations, facilitate democratic consolidation. This happens when protest is used as a means to articulate demands for reform of the system, and not as a method of questioning the legitimacy of the regime. In a democracy, protest is accepted as a legitimate method of expressing public discontent or public dialogue with the authorities, especially when coordinated by legitimate organizations and expressed through widely accepted strategies (Eckstein and Gurr 1975, p. 452). From a historical perspective, this was also proved by North, Wallis, and Weingast (2009), stressing that politics has an impact on the quality of life, and some societies managed, as a result of protesting, opposition and even revolution, to adjust the direction of the policy of governments or new governments to expectations, or at least some part of expectations. On the other hand, North Wallis, and Weingast (2009) show that some societies have not succeeded in meeting any of these expectations.

The number of protests, their intensity, massiveness and even length is poorly measurable, few institutions register them, and even if they do, they do so part-time (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace n.d.). In the last five years, the number of protesters in the largest protests in Poland has exceeded 100,000 (in October 2016 Black Protest; July 2017 defence of the judiciary; November 2020 Women’s Strike; October 2021 EU Membership support); in Czechia this figure is even around 200,000 (November 2019); Slovakia 65,000 (February–March 2018); in Hungary 100,000 (April 2018); in Romania as much as 600,000 (2017–2019), and in Bulgaria 400,000 (2020). I assume that these mass protests still help maintain all 6CEECs in the Narrow Corridor. In the case of CEECs, protests are a strong argument in favour of government control, but the evaluation of these protests and their consequences requires further detailed measurements, especially the impact on changing governments’ decisions, for example, withdrawing from the law, calling new elections, etc.

The trend of 6CEECs ratings in several key categories – political stability, government effectiveness and especially the rule of law from the mid-1990s to 2008 – was promising for the whole region (Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastrandu 2009, pp. 84–94). On the basis of detailed reports in the long-term, it should be assumed that entering the Narrow Corridor was a process, and accession to the EU was not the moment of joining it, but rather the crowning achievement of that process.

Where are we now? (see motto) Where are the 6CEECs now in the map of democracy? In the case of the 4CEECs (excluding Czechia and Slovakia), the tendency in the assessment of political stability, government effectiveness, and especially the rule of law, is decreasing or, according to other indices, level at most (but not increasing). Government actions led to an increase in civil resistance. This is often the only
way the government can act in a dishonest way. Fortunately, the tripartite division of power is still holding up (although shaking), and it happens that the results of local elections are in opposition to the parliamentary elections. Free or partly free media also exists, although they operate in a much more difficult environment than 10 or 20 years ago. Social mobilization both in the streets and in the media may therefore deter more radical actions by governments. In this context, Czechia and Slovakia may feel comfortable in the Narrow Corridor and run fairly evenly. Czechia, however, and especially Poland, have slowed down the pace, especially when it comes to the quality of governance. Hungary is hanging on to the borders of the Narrow Corridor with only one hand, Poland maybe with two (or one and a half). Romania and Bulgaria are trying to reach a higher level, but they are also running unevenly. It is therefore imperative for the entire group to stabilize the pace of both government action and that of society. Waiting for the next elections in each of the CEECs is a struggle to stay in the Narrow Corridor. After all, history from the interwar period may repeat itself. While in the 1920s, and especially in the 1930s, external factors contributed to the state of autocracy, the current crisis of democracy is mainly caused by internal politics. Back in 2015, it was difficult to predict that Europe’s economic growth champion(s) (Piątkowski 2018) would suffer from democratic deficit.

Only two countries in the CEECs have had episodes of democracy and thus Shackled Leviathan in the interwar period. Poland had it for a very short time, Czechoslovakia for a slightly longer period, but both countries were prevented from entering the Narrow Corridor for a longer time. A renewed opportunity for the entire 6CEECs emerged in the 1990s after the collapse of communism and the centrally planned economy. The countries took advantage of this by following the path of international support through membership of the Council of Europe, NATO and eventually the EU. Unfortunately, in the second decade of the third millennium and especially in the second half of the second decade of the twenty-first century, there were visible difficulties in staying on track within the Narrow Corridor. The problems with the rule of law (Hungary, Poland) and greater political instability (Bulgaria, Romania) meant that for four out of the six CEECs being in the Narrow Corridor became strongly threatened. A&R did not give specific criteria for when a state falls out of this ideal space between the power of government and its control by society, but with the Democracy, Freedom and Rule of Law indices we can observe that in the absence of a trend reversal, the Shackled Leviathan can be replaced at any time by the Paper Leviathan or even by the Despotic Leviathan.
References


Using Acemoglu and Robinson’s Concept to Assess Leviathans in CEECs in the Long Term


Wykorzystanie koncepcji Acemoglu i Robinsona do oceny Lewiatanów w krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej w długim okresie

Celem artykułu było wykorzystanie następujących pojęć z koncepcji Darona Acemoglu i Jamesa Robinsona: despotyczny, realny, papierowy i poskromiony Lewiatan, do oceny stanu demokracji, siły rządów i mobilizacji społecznej w Europie Środkowo-Wschodniej w długim okresie. W badaniu uwzględniono: Polskę, Czechy, Słowację (przed 1993 r. Czechosłowację), Węgry, Rumunię i Bułgarię. Na podstawie analizy historycznej wyodrębniono typy Lewiatanów w okresie międzywojennym, w czasach komunizmu i transformacji. W najnowszym okresie (XXI wiek) wykorzystano do tego osiem indeksów demokracji i wolności, które mierzą i oceniają jakość rządzenia, stan instytucji i potencjał kapitału społecznego w sześciu krajach Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej. Sprawdzono przydatność tych indeksów do oceny, czy i kiedy danemu krajowi udało się poskromić Lewiatana.

Słowa kluczowe: kraje Europy Środkowo-Wschodniej, koncepcje Acemoglu i Robinsona, typy Lewiatanów, Lewiatan poskromiony, wąski korytarz